The Wagner Group: How Information Warfare Sets a Dangerous Precedent

by: Olivia Howells

“All is fair in love and war.”

What was once a lighthearted saying could now become a reality as groups like Wagner lead the world in information warfare. Lately the name “Wagner” has become a gateway to understanding the Russia-Ukraine war. However, what is neglected from media coverage and potentially ideologically disappointing, is the fact that Wagner is neither new, nor is it uniquely Russian.

For those unfamiliar or who have heard it in passing, the Wagner Group is a Russian private military company (PMC). Founded in 2014 by army officer Dmitri Ukin, Wagner has come to the forefront of the news lately because of their presence in Ukraine on the assumed contract of Vladimir Putin. The Wagner Group has been closely associated with Putin’s regime, despite his insistence of no association.

Often compared to mercenaries, private military companies are contracted to fulfill military objectives for profit. Officially, states employ PMCs when the state military may be undertrained in a certain skillset, lacking numbers, or guidance in a certain region. On a less official basis, the nuanced legalities surrounding PMCs give states a unique opportunity to thwart international law and norms, while evading responsibility.

Although it has only started to gain the attention of mainstream media outlets, the Wagner Group reflects a long-standing tradition in Russian defence policy. Alongside many 20th century reports of Russia employing private militias, use of the Wagner Group dates back to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Using the Wagner Group to achieve military objectives in Crimea was valuable because it allowed for Russia to maintain their plausible deniability, which mirrors their strategy today in Ukraine. From there, Putin has employed the Wagner Group in various other regions, namely Syria and Central Africa. It is not uncommon for states to employ PMCs to help secure their geopolitical or strategic interests. Many large powers employ PMCs, namely the US, who used them in the 2003 Iraq War. The controversy here lies in the actions of the Wagner Group. The Wagner Group have been cited in the assassination of high-ranking separatist commanders in post-soviet republics, as well as human rights abuses of Ukrainians. They have been accused of aggravating instability in Central Africa by assisting rebels. They have also perpetuated Islamophobic violence in their presence alongside the Syrian army.

Upon learning that many other powers legally employ PMCs, it is natural to wonder why we should care about Wagner. I surely would not be satisfied with some liberal democratic enshrined answer that essentially proclaims Western moral superiority. The ethical case of PMCs is a story for another time. Rather, I want to highlight that these same large powers who employ PMCs have legalized them. In fact, China, often ideologically linked to Russia in IR, was an original signatory of the Montreux Document which establishes human rights obligations for states regarding PMCs. The Montreux Document seeks to identify “good practices” in the employment of PMCs as a basic regulatory structure. What surprises many, is that Russia themselves have not legalized PMCs. Thus, despite constant collusion and arguable attachment to the Russian government, the Wagner Group is not legal in Russia.

By not legalizing PMCs, Russia has employed a common state tactic to thwart international responsibility. Since they are not legal, there are no regulatory structures and corresponding responsibilities that Russia must develop. Evoking “blissful ignorance,” this legal ambiguity essentially allows Putin, under proxy of the Wagner Group, to do as he pleases regardless of international law. So long as there is no proof of his involvement, he gets off scot-free. It is like giving a kid a gun, and telling him to shoot someone, but evading responsibility because he’s not your kid.

Legal nuance is a large reason that many have pushed to designate PMCs like Wagner as mercenaries. It has actually fostered a large divide, as mercenaries are outlawed in Russia and the word itself carries a different semantic meaning. Some claim that PMCs like Wagner are identical to mercenaries because they kill for profit, while others distinguish between monetary and ideological motivations. I understand the semantic merit of this debate, as “mercenary” sounds a lot worse than “PMC,” however, I think it misses the point. The Wagner Group are not motivated by just money, or Russian faith; they are motivated by both. This is far more daunting, as it renders the Wagner Group as a state army with greater monetary incentive and little international accountability, or otherwise as a real-life game of Call of Duty.

The case of Wagner is important to understand, because they are a prime example information warfare’s success. Modern Russian grand strategy is increasingly reliant on misinformation, which spreads fast in today’s uniquely digital age. Though many of us have not fallen victim to Russian propaganda, the sheer lack of knowledge on the normalization of PMCs like Wagner is evidence this tactic is working. Many of us grew up in this era of mass technological consumption, sifting through hours of content each day as attention spans diminish between generations. It has become common custom to consume our news through a headline, or forget about anissuethatinfuriatedusjustaweekago. The breadth of knowledge out there has condemned us to neglect inquiry and trust what was put in front of us. I see it in myself last year, when I hadn’t yet heard of the Wagner Group or PMCs as I confidently wrote my paper on the Russia-Ukraine war. We are falling victim to our own advancements. This is troublesome as it has enabled Wagner to operate under the radar with little repercussions, with estimated soldiers in the tens of thousands. Unsupervised, they will only get bigger, along with their ability to exert Putin’s will.

This is not meant to be tangential or a guilt trip but is rather a worthy concern as we move forward and hold governments accountable. It scares me that I, along with many, didn’t know that the so-called “good guys” in the West employed PMCs. What scares me even more is how these groups have become normalized within state defence. Key takeaways here are that the Wagner Group continues to grow and the Russian state’s ability to violate international law is becoming more efficient, namely in Ukraine. The other takeaway is that the Wagner Group is one of many. There is no easy solution, however, there has been a promising push for regulatory structures in scholarship. Establishing unique international regulatory structures for PMCs, regardless of their legality, could encourage accountability and transparency. On an individual level, I would encourage a return to inquiry. I urge everyone to read further than the surface, especially as Russia’s war on Ukraine unfolds. The widespread existence of PMCs, especially in Russia, sets a dangerous precedent for the future of warfare. In the absence of accountability, the Russian military has an open door to play dirty, which they seem to need at the moment. It appears that fairness is a double entendre in love and war.