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Putin’s Second War: The Danger Emerging in Moldova

by: Alexandra Paul

Vladimir Putin’s dream of resuscitating the Soviet Union has sent waves of terror across the world, but none are so acutely aware of its menace as those living in eastern European countries that were once under the hammer and sickle flag. Particularly, countries who share a border with Ukraine, Putin’s first victim in his crusade to restore Russian glory, have wearily taken stock of their own vulnerability to Russian manipulation. Though Poland and Belarus are often mentioned in such conversations, Moldova is emerging as perhaps the likeliest candidate to be the second country invaded under the pretense of liberation. Like Ukraine, there is an unignorable part of the Moldovan population that still feels a kinship with Russia and wants to break away to rejoin a country that will protect their their identities and interests.

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Moldova became part of the USSR in 1940 when Romania was forced to surrender the territory to Moscow because of the wartime Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. During the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova declared itself independent - though not all of its land was necessarily unified behind this decision. Since 1990, a small strip along the Dniester River near Moldova’s border with Ukraine has styled itself as the breakaway state of Transnistria. Unique from the rest of the country, ethnic Russians and Ukrainians make up the majority of Transnistria’s population. A preference to remain with the Soviet Union over reuniting with Romania and a fear of their relegation to a second-class status pushed the idea of independence in the late 1980’s and early ‘90’s, and persists today.

A war broke out between Transnistria and Moldova in 1990 with Russian and Ukrainian volunteers and even a former Soviet field army joining the fight before a ceasefire was declared in July 1992. The agreement was negotiated by the Russian and Moldovan presidents as it became apparent that Moldova had insufficient military resources to gain real control over the region. Today, the faction wanting to rejoin Russia retains the plurality of public opinion, with independence being the second-most popular option. The Moldovan government considers Transnistria to be the “Administrative-Territorial Units of the Left Bank of the Dniester” and in 2022, the Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe recognized the territory as being under a Russian military occupation.

But, why does any of this matter? The answer lies in the lead-up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the continued Russian rhetoric surrounding the status of the Donbas region. Like Transnistria, Donbas has a significant Russian-speaking community and has engaged in armed conflict with its central government to attempt to join the Russian Federation. Both ended in a ceasefire without any concrete resolutions, leaving the areas suspended in “frozen conflicts” – a situation where the lack of a peace treaty or other declarative documents means a war could legally resume at anytime.

A central part of Russia’s justification of its invasion was reigniting this conflict, recognizing the “Donetsk People's Republic” and claiming to protect the territory from the Ukrainian government’s totalitarian and genocidal attempts to force Donbas to remain part of Ukraine. While Moscow’s claimed interest in protecting Donbas’ democratic process is about as legitimate as its claims of having a “denazification” mission in Kyiv, the similarities between Donbas and Transnistria are haunting. Yet, perhaps Transnistria is an even easier target for Putin’s rampage.

Transnistria has already been used by Russia as a base for troops in the Ukrainian conflict, likely because the region houses a Soviet-era ammunition depot. While this alongside Transnistrian rhetoric advocating for a return to Russia is unnerving, even more so Putin’s recent decision to rescind a 2012 declaration that Moscow would attempt to find a solution to resolve the issue of Transnistria’s status while upholding Moldova’s sovereignty. This decision makes Russia’s position clear –it is prepared to do with Transnistria and Moldova what it did with Donbas and Ukraine.

Within the last month, more signs of Russian interference have emerged. Moldovan police claim they arrested seven actors, some of whom are Russian nationals, who were paid to cause mass disruption during an anti-government protest. Less than one week after this incident, several media outlets (including the Dossier Centre for Investigative Journalism, a site funded by an exiled Russian energy executive and political enemy of the Kremlin) published a five-page document outlining a decade-long plan to overhaul Western influence in Moldova. Its objectives included neutralizing Moldovan opposition to a Russian military presence in Transnistria, freezing Moldovan relations with NATO, and bolstering political parties who view Russia favourably.

The Moldovan government, like any other (including the Ukrainian government), is not and cannot be beyond reproach – the cost of living crisis in Moldova is severe and there continue to be many social and political issues that go unaddressed. But, Russia is hardly a more benevolent governor. As tensions rise between the pro-Western and pro-Russian factions, Moldova seems more and more like a powder keg one spark away from exploding into the second front of Russia’s war.

The likelihood of a Russian invasion of Moldova is growing and the question must be asked – have Western countries learned anything about what happened in Ukraine? Will there be some preventative action taken to stop another invasion, or will Moldovans be doomed to the same fate as their neighbours? As a country whose neutrality is constitutionally enshrined but is a well-known NATO collaborator, Moldova stands to become the next target in Putin’s reactionary European power grab, and it is not alone. Georgia and Armenia, countries near Russia in the Caucasus region, are also candidates to be pulled into this neo-Soviet campaign. It is now up to their allies, those whose relationships have endangered them, to stand with them against Russian aggression.

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