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WHERE DOES NUCLEAR POWER FIT INTO GERMANY’S GREEN FUTURE?

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CONTRIBUTORS

CONTRIBUTORS

By Holly Baker

Following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, Angela Merkel, who (as a physicist herself) had been a firm supporter of nuclear power up until this point, declared Germany’s nuclear phase-out. The plan was simple: immediately shut down the oldest reactors and incrementally remove the remaining nuclear power plants from the supply grid over the course of a decade. By the end of 2022, Germany would no longer have any operational nuclear reactors, eliminating nuclear energy from the country’s internally generated electricity supply. In this way, the German government struck the perfect balance between mitigating the direct risk of a similar nuclear accident occurring on German soil and establishing a realistic time frame to safely replace nuclear energy with more sustainable sources. With 80% of the federal parliament voting in favour of the motion and strong support from the public in the polls, the decision was a flying success for Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Germany was going to lead the way for the rest of the world in eradicating the menacing threat of nuclear catastrophe and the accumulation of toxic nuclear waste.

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So, Germany began the long and complicated journey of implementing this plan in the real world. The pair shared a decade-long flirtation with harmonious cooperation. Initially, everything was going smoothly; nuclear power plants were taken off the grid accordingly and Germany’s dependence on nuclear power fell from 25% of the national power supply in 2011 to 6% in the first quarter of 2022. There had certainly been a few bumps along the way, with questions arising about the capability of renewable energy sources to plug the gap in the energy demand left by the nuclear phase-out. Renewable energy sources like wind and solar power alone do not have the capacity for rapid expansion on the scale that would be needed to compensate for the loss of nuclear power. As in any good relationship, however, compromises were sought in the form of increased reliance on energy supplied by gas and coal. This compromise casts a shadow of doubt on the plausibility of Germany reaching its 2038 coal phase-out target and, by extension, its end goal of carbon neutrality by 2045. The plan and its real-world execution looked like they were going to unite in 2022 and get their happyever-after ending after all.

Then, of course, the real world remembered that life is not a fairy tale. At the end of February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a violent declaration of its apathy towards the country’s sovereignty that shocked the world, even though it had been looming on the horizon for many years. From this crisis sprung forth a multitude of problems for Germany, the most pressing being how best to support Ukrainian refugees arriving at its train stations. It was equally important to ensure that Germany did not inadvertently support this criminal invasion via the continued importation of Russian natural gas.

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In the first half of 2021, 14.4% of Germany’s electricity was generated using natural gas, around 55% of which was supplied to Germany by Russia. In the first half of 2022, these figures fell to 11.7% and 35% respectively.

Despite this decrease, Germany remains heavily dependent on Russian gas. Whilst the country is able to rely on a reserve gas stockpile and gas imported from other countries at a high cost to fall back on, a total ban on imports from Russia would compromise the stability of the national grid. Such a scenario could create new problems for Germany, such as prolonged blackouts due to insufficient supply to meet domestic and commercial energy demands. The consequences of this could not only be financially disastrous, but they would also pose a humanitarian threat if citizens, especially seniors, were unable to heat their homes this winter.

Therefore, on 17th October 2022, the German government announced that the three remaining nuclear reactors may legally stay in operation until 15th April 2023. This compromise represents a brief reprieve for nuclear power, conceded only so that dependence on natural gas can be safely reduced first. However, for the Green Party (die Grünen), this new date stands as a hard deadline that they will not deviate from. Starting from April, not only must the remaining 6% share of nuclear energy be rapidly compensated for, but also a large portion of the 11.7% of energy generated in gas power stations. Whilst the amount of energy produced by renewables will most likely continue to climb steadily, the only energy source with the infrastructure to match the pace of a gas and nuclear phase-out is power generated by burning coal.

Coal brings with it its own considerably hefty barrel of problems. Though the risk of immediate death by nuclear disaster is a much more tangible fear than death by air pollution, the effects of mining and burning coal have been calculated to be a slow killer of a much greater magnitude. Cancer, lung complications and other pollution-related illnesses aside, the continued burning of fossil fuels poses a much more existential threat in the form of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions. Coal produces more emissions than any other energy source, emitting 820 tonnes of CO2 or equivalent for every Gigawatt hour of electricity generated. This is almost twice as much as gas (490 tonnes) and 273 times the emissions from nuclear power (3 tonnes), which were both categorised as environmentally “sustainable” energy sources in a new ruling by the European Union in January 2022. Coal, on the other hand, was not.

T--------he effects of climate change are ------------undeniable and Germany has already experienced the consequences first-hand. In June of 2021, Germany faced recordbreaking flooding as the world saw a sharp and frightening increase in forest fires These extreme events will only continue to take more lives and devastate more communities if we continue to allow fossil fuels to be burnt on the scale they are currently. Whilst in 2011 a nuclear phaseout was an honourable goal with good intentions, Germany must surely now take a moment to stop and reassess its priorities for clean energy Gas, which would have acted as a slightly more sustainable alternative to coal as a replacement energy source, now comes at too high a moral price.

With advancements in research and development within the nuclear field, the likelihood that an accident like Fukushima will happen again is much lower than it was in the past. Scientists have already proposed a multitude of innovative solutions in response to the challenge of securely disposing of nuclear waste so that it does not harm future generations, but this issue remains just that: a problem for future generations Greenhouse gas emissions and climate change are already affecting us today Germany has the time to phase out its remaining three nuclear plants slowly enough so that it does not have to rush towards its goal of April 2023. Now is the time to take decisive action against climate change and stop a needless increase in the burning of fossil fuels to fulfil an outdated dream.

In the words of J.E. Folley, a British soldier writing from the Second World War, “I am beginning to develop a hatred of these people – all due to the force of circumstance I suppose.” He later writes: “there’s only one good German, when he’s dead.”

Folley’s self-consciousness as he contemplates that his mounting prejudice against the German people is “due to the force of circumstance” is unique, as it presents a tone of cynicism towards the caricatured portrayals of the German character, culture and language within British media during the early stages of the Second World War. This greatly contrasts the violent edge of his outburst that “there’s only one good German, when he’s dead” within his later letters home, demonstrating the loss of his critical eye towards the portrayal of the German character within British propaganda in the latter half of the war. Moreover, this decisive shift in attitude, which no longer questions the politicised presentation of German culture, reduces the German people to a homogeneous mass. This demonstrates a wider issue within our contemporary culture: the loss of criticality towards the Othering of cultures within the British education system.

Focusing specifically on university education, this article is part of the wider project German at Leeds – Then and Now, which analyses how shifting British-German relations across the 20th century have influenced the pedagogy and dissemination of German language learning within further education in Britain.

By Holly Perril

The foundational research for this project has been undertaken by analysing the crossover between two archival collections within the University of Leeds Archive –firstly, the Department of German Collection, which provides a detailed account of the changing pedagogy, curriculum and attitudes towards German learning at the University of Leeds, and secondly, the Liddle Collection, which concerns major crises of the 20th century such as the First and Second World Wars.

This strategy has facilitated a thorough analysis of how global crises and tense British-German relations across this period have directly influenced the pedagogy of German Studies at the University of Leeds. The profound influence of such conflicts and political disputes provides insight into how biases towards other cultures are engrained within the British education system and how such prejudices are mobilised to perform a political function. In our contemporary historical moment, in which Britain is striving to come to terms with its imperial past, this project has presented a case for the decolonisation of language learning as a central tenet of the pursuit to rid the British curriculum of biases which promote prejudice, discrimination and Othering towards foreign cultures.

o---------------of Leeds have been immensely affected by changing BritishGerman relations throughout the 20th century. However, the university’s reaction to global events has dramatically changed, illustrating a clear shift in strategies for academic institutions dealing with moments of international crisis. Throughout the pre-war period from the 1880s to the 1890s, we begin to see a developing fascination with German culture and literature within Britain, which is heavily influenced by the increasing economic and cultural presence of Germany on the global stage.

However, by the 1890s the tone of this fascination becomes more sinister, infiltrated by anti-German conservative rhetoric within the British Foreign Office. This highlights how the intimidation of Britain in the face of a culturally and economically influential Germany led to the Othering of European cultures within British undergraduate education, in aid of stressing the ‘superior’ status of Britain as an economic and cultural power in the global arena. This xenophobic tone intensified upon entry into the 20th century, evidenced by clear attacks on the German character within British media which later disseminated into popular discourse.

Despite this, it was not until the period directly following the First World War that German Studies at Leeds were dramatically shaken by anti-German prejudice. This is evident in the dramatic shift of assessed content in 1919, as the replacement of German literature with epic Greek narratives was manipulated as a means of reviving the memory of British imperial glory. In this way, the emergence of epic in German Studies allowed a celebration of the supposed ‘heroism’ of Britain without directly fetishising the recent conflict with Germany.

Moreover, this troubled relationship within German Studies became increasingly tense in the years leading up to the Second World War, with attitudes towards the study of German being divided into two camps. Firstly, there was the belief that German – the language of the ‘arch enemy’ – should cease to be taught within Britain as it represented the ‘low ideals’ of a backward society. Secondly, there was the belief that the study of German within Britain was imperative to ensuring that Germany’s economic and political progress could be monitored by an insecure Britain desperate to maintain its precedence on the world stage.

Such a conflict can be seen in the divided approach to German learning within Britain during this time. Whilst German became mandatory as a foreign language for young men at the earliest stages of education, it was banished from female education altogether. This gendered divide is very revealing, demonstrating the need to continue the study of German for political purposes. On the one hand, the need for young men to learn the language stresses the need for those in the most influential positions in business and politics to have a firm understanding of German to maintain economic and cultural superiority. On the other hand, the rejection of German in the education of young women conveys a desperate attempt to downplay the cultural importance of Germany in the British psyche.

This divided approach to German Studies from a broader British perspective can be seen in the University of Leeds German Department throughout the Second World War. The complete removal of Old High German texts reveals a desire to eliminate all connections between the roots of Old English and German language and culture, thus illustrating how shifts in the syllabus at the University of Leeds were made to facilitate the Othering of German language and culture.

-----------his portrays how closely the ------------demonisation of German ----

------------identity, such as Churchill -------------describing the ‘vile’ character of the enemy, impacted the representation of Germany and Germanness within British education, leading to seismic shifts in the curriculum and pedagogy of German Studies at the University of Leeds.

Thus, the results of this study have found that the portrayal of Germany and the German language within British education has been constructed by changing international relations between Britain and Germany across the 20th century to perform a political function. This is most notable during the First and Second World Wars, whereby the pedagogy, curriculum and examination of German Studies at the University of Leeds were transformed to promote anti-German sentiment. The portrayal of the German language and its decreasing popularity amongst students within the UK demonstrates how economic tensions between the two countries have engrained biases within the British education system that we continue to use to inform students of the wider world today.

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