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Territorial Rescaling for Polycentric Governance: the Case of Albania's Regions

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Candidate: Dritan Shutina POLIS Supervisor: Prof. Sherif Lushaj DA Supervisor: Prof. Gastone Ave CycleXXX

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International Doctorate in Architecture and Urban Planning (IDAUP) International Consortium Agreement between University of Ferrara Department of Architecture (DA) and Polis University of Tirana (Albania) and with Associate members 2014 (teaching agreement) University of Malta I Faculty for the Built Environment; Slovak University of Technology (STU) I Institute of Management and University of Pees I Pollack Mihaly Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology.

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INTERNATIONAL DOCTORATE IN ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN PLANNING Cycle XXX IDAUP Coordinator Prof. Roberto Di Giulio

Territorial Rescaling for Polycentric Governance: the Case of Albania’s Regions Curriculum Urban Planning / IDAUP 2.4 City governance and appropriate development policies through land management, and economic and financial tools, etc.

(Area 08 – SSD: ICAR 21 Planning)

Candidate Dritan, Shutina

Supervisor POLIS Prof. Sherif Lushaj

(UniFe Matr. N. 123733) (Polis Univ. Reg. N. PL581N010003)

Supervisor DA Prof. Gastone Ave

(Years 2014/2018)

Acknowledgements Having accompanied the decentralization process in Albania in almost all of its steps, I have been always interested on the outcomes of that process. As such, good governance, initially, and later also Regional Development have become core part of my professional career. Yet, my practical applied work required always scientific and academic insight, and to achieve this, I ended up doing also my PhD. Indeed, I have been lucky enough to be involved in different policy discussions, processes and concrete projects which have urged me to get into theoretical discussions, while seeking practical solutions relevant to Albania. I have learned a lot, and I hope my thesis can contribute further to the discussions on how to obtain a balanced territorial development in Albania Spanning over several years, PhD work has been a real journey and I am grateful to many colleagues and friends who have supported me in this endeavour. I am very grateful to my colleagues at Co-PLAN for giving me the motivation to push the regional development agenda in Albania; to POLIS University for the inspirational environment, and Ferrara University for their enormous support throughout the study program. I am also grateful to many colleagues, public officials and international colleagues that I have encountered in different decentralization and regional development projects, from whom I have had a chance to learn and exchange.

I am very appreciative, to POLIS and Ferrara universitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; thesis supervisors Prof.

Sherif Lushaj and Prof. Gastone Ave, who have been very instrumental with their comments and suggestions. Seemingly, I am very thankful to Prof. Kosta Mathey and Dr. Aleksander Karaev who, as external readers, have been extremely helpful with their comments and suggestions for improvements. I am very thankful also to my colleagues Merita Boka and Fiona Imami, who have assisted me while developing and visualising regional datasets. I am particularly thankful to my colleague and friend Prof. Besnik Aliaj for challenging and persuading me professionally to carry out my PhD research.

Finally, deepest appreciation goes to my colleague and my partner in life Rudina Toto who has been both inspirational and instrumental to my work. Without her support in work and family matters this journey would have been difficult. I am thankful, to my mother and sisters that, though from distance, have always found ways to support and motivate me pursuing this work. Last, but most important, I dedicate my work to my two lovely little girls Maja and Lisa, who never complain for my missing hours with them, and always fill me with positive energy.

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Table of Contents Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... 2 Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 7 Abstract ...................................................................................................................... 10 I. Scope and Problem Definition .............................................................................. 13 1.1 [Regional] Development - an evolving conception .................................................... 13 1.1.1 [Regional] Development in Albania....................................................................... 18 1.2 Territory matters in development and governance .................................................. 21 1.2.1 The territorial dimension of EU regional policy .................................................... 26 1.2.2 The need for territorial dimension in [future EU] policies ..................................... 32 1.4 Gaps, objectives for research and methodological approach .................................. 36

II. Deepening the Theoretical Discussion ................................................................ 64 2.1 Theoretical concepts .................................................................................................... 64 2.2 Regions and regionalization as object of territorial rescaling ................................. 66 2.3 Peripheriality as a spatial typology – the Western Balkans..................................... 72 2.2.1 EU classifications of spatial and regional typologies ............................................. 74 2.2.2 ESPON classifications of spatial and regional typologies – peripherality ............. 77 2.4 Polycentric Governance – between institutions and territory ................................. 83 2.4.1 Defining Polycentricity: objectives, measuring and scales .................................... 86 2.4.2 Polycentricity and polycentrism in EU policies ..................................................... 93

III. Empirical Evidence and Analysis ...................................................................... 97 3.1 The model of territorial rescaling and the resulting spatial typologies .................. 97 3.1.1 Territorial rescaling in governance reforms ........................................................... 97 3.1.2 Territorial rescaling in regional development ...................................................... 115 3.2 Territorial polycentricity .......................................................................................... 122 3.3 Territorial/regional disparities and/or competitive advantages ............................ 148 3.4 Polycentric interactions on the territory – polycentric governance ...................... 193 3.5 Discussion ................................................................................................................... 215 3.5.1 Territorial disparities and peripheralisation.......................................................... 215 3.5.2 Polycentrism in Albania ....................................................................................... 225 3.5.3 Regions’ typologies in Albania – an empirical spatial classification ................... 233 3.6 Conclusions on Albania’s ‘Polycentricity Gap’ – the Way Forward .................... 248

IV. Annexes .............................................................................................................. 267 4.1 Indicators on regions, development, accessibility and disparities ......................... 268

V. References ............................................................................................................ 275 Notes .......................................................................................................................... 291

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Table of Tables Table 1. Critical factors for assessing cases of polycentric governance in Albania .... 59 Table 2. The morphological polycentricity indexes in Albania and Europe – 27 ..... 137 Table 3. Comparison of PUSH population with FUA population ............................. 140 Table 4. Registered unemployed jobseekers at region level (number)...................... 160 Table 5. Employment rate per age and gender (%) ................................................... 161 Table 6. Active enterprises, stock at the end of the year ........................................... 163 Table 7. Active enterprises by qarks per 10,000 inhabitants (number) ..................... 164 Table 8. Active enterprises by regions, stock at the end of the year (number) ......... 165 Table 9. Expenditures in education by qarks (% of total) ......................................... 169 Table 10. Expenditures in education at development regions level (% of total ........ 170 Table 11. Distribution of schools for basic education by qarks (in %) ..................... 171 Table 12. Poverty indicators by qark (in %) .............................................................. 178 Table 13. Number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) per qark ................. 195 Table 14. Summary of polycentric interactions based on the key criteria for polycentric governance .............................................................................................. 259 Table 15: Areas, sub-areas and indicators for analysis ............................................. 268 Table of Figures Figure 1. EU Regional Policy and its Territorial Dimension ...................................... 28 Figure 2. Research framework..................................................................................... 43 Figure 3. Prefectures of 1930 versus qarks in 2018 .................................................... 99 Figure 4. Historical maps: provinces of the antiquity VII-II b.c. (map on the left), and principalities XIV-XV a.c. (map on the right)........................................................... 100 Figure 5. Planning regions as per GNTP (urban system and spatial connections) .... 109 Figure 6. Regions for tourism development as proposed by the Government of Albania in 2013 ......................................................................................................... 110 Figure 7. Regionalization of agricultural production and activities as per Government of Albanian proposal in 2013 .................................................................................... 111 Figure 8. Statistical regions (on the left) and regions that match EU criteria on development (on the right) ........................................................................................ 112 Figure 9. Territorial rescaling models proposed by local actors on the regionalization of Albania .................................................................................................................. 113 Figure 10. Polycentric planning and development regions proposed in Albania 2030 Manifesto ................................................................................................................... 114 Figure 11. Sub-regions in the northern Albania (the case for qark of Shkodër – 2 maps*) ....................................................................................................................... 118 Figure 12. Regional Management Areas (RMAs) in Albania ................................... 121 Figure 13. Map of the functional areas in Albania (FUAs) ....................................... 126 Figure 14. Regression lines for the population of FUAs, with and without Tirana... 128 Figure 15. Regression lines of FUAs GDP for 2016, with and without Tirana ........ 129 Figure 16. National Size Index of Albania versus EU – 27 countries ....................... 130 Figure 17. Thiessen polygons of the 17 FUAs: Service areas of FUAs .................... 131 Figure 18.The Lorenz curve of the FUAs size and Gini coefficient of inequality .... 132 Figure 19. Polycentricity location index.................................................................... 132 Figure 20. Potential accessibility of FUAs (Index) ................................................... 134 Figure 21. Potential accessibility of 17 FUAs ........................................................... 135 Figure 22. Regression line and slope of potential accessibility ................................. 135 Figure 23. The Lorenz curve of potential accessibility and the Gini coefficient ...... 136

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Figure 24. Polycentrism connectivity index .............................................................. 136 Figure 25. Polycentricity Index – Albania versus Europe ......................................... 138 Figure 26. Comparison of PUSH population with FUA population ......................... 140 Figure 27. Number of persons reachable from FUA centres within 30km of linear distance ...................................................................................................................... 141 Figure 28. Population density .................................................................................... 142 Figure 29. Distribution of hotels (all categories) ....................................................... 143 Figure 30. Number of students attending tertiary education ..................................... 144 Figure 31. Potential Urban Strategic Horizon areas (PUSH, intersection 45 minutes isochrones) ................................................................................................................. 146 Figure 32. Potential Integration Areas (PIA, at municipality 61 level) ..................... 147 Figure 33. Albania GDP year on year growth rates (in %) (GDP at current prices) . 150 Figure 34. GDP by Qark at current prices, in ALL Million (lhs) and GDP annual growth rates in % (rhs) .............................................................................................. 150 Figure 35. Average weight of nominal GDP per qark (% versus total) .................... 151 Figure 36. Contribution of qarks at annual (nominal) GDP growth rate (in percentage points) and GPD annual growth rate (in percentage) ................................................ 151 Figure 37. Contribution of regions in (nominal, total) GDP (in % points) and GDP annual growth rate (in %) .......................................................................................... 153 Figure 38. Nominal GDP per capita (in lekë) ............................................................ 153 Figure 39. Growth rate of nominal GDP per capita (%) ........................................... 154 Figure 40. GDP per capita by qarks, indices (Albania = 100) .................................. 155 Figure 41. Participation of Qarks at Gross Values Added formation, (weights in %) ................................................................................................................................... 156 Figure 42. GVA weight (%) by qark for each economic sector and sectors’ GVA (weight in %) versus total (Albania) in 2015 ............................................................ 156 Figure 43. Participation of Regions at GVA formation, (weights in % vs. total GVA) ................................................................................................................................... 157 Figure 44. Contribution of Regions GVA, (in pp) and GVA annual growth rate (in %) ................................................................................................................................... 158 Figure 45. Registered unemployed jobseekers at qark level (% versus total) ........... 159 Figure 46. Average employment rate (%, average of employment rate for age groups and gender) ................................................................................................................ 161 Figure 47. Qark contribution in overall employment (in %, weight) ........................ 162 Figure 48. Employment per sector and qark (2016) .................................................. 162 Figure 49. Active enterprises by sector and qark in 2016 ......................................... 164 Figure 50. Indexes of stock of active enterprises per 10,000 inhabitants (2016) ...... 165 Figure 51. New enterprises birth rate ........................................................................ 166 Figure 52. New enterprises birth rate per qark and gender based (2016) ................. 167 Figure 53. High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports) ........................... 168 Figure 54. R&D expenditures in selected countries .................................................. 169 Figure 55. Number of teachers per 10,000 inhabitants at qark level (2014) ............. 172 Figure 56. Number of teachers per 10,000 inhabitants at qark level (2015) ............. 172 Figure 57. Number of pupils graduated per 10,000 inhabitants at qark level (2015) 174 Figure 58. Hospital beds per qark (2016, % of total) ................................................ 175 Figure 59. Number of hospital beds in the qark of Tirana (2009-2016) ................... 175 Figure 60. Index of the number of beds for 10,000 inhabitants, at qark level (2016) ................................................................................................................................... 176 Figure 61. Infant mortality (for 1,000 live births) ..................................................... 177 Figure 62. Infant mortality (for 1,000 live births) (regions 2011-2015) ................... 177 Figure 63. Poverty headcount ratio by qark (in %) ................................................... 179 Figure 64. Poverty headcount ratio by region (in %) ................................................ 179

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Figure 65. Poverty gap and poverty severity by development regions (in %) .......... 180 Figure 66. Urban and inert solid waste (total and per capita, 2013-2017) ................ 181 Figure 67. Urban waste per capita in 2013 (ton per inhabitant) by qarks ................. 181 Figure 68. Population trends (annual change of population every 1st of January in %) ................................................................................................................................... 182 Figure 69. Population changes 2016/2001 (as by January 1) by qarks (in %) .......... 183 Figure 70. Index of population density by qarks (2016) ........................................... 184 Figure 71. Index of urban population per qark .......................................................... 185 Figure 72. Age dependency ratio at qark level 2016 (in %)...................................... 186 Figure 73. Travel time (in minutes) of people (from municipalities’ centres) accessing motorways exists ....................................................................................................... 189 Figure 74. Travel time of people (from administrative units) to urban centres by road and public transport ................................................................................................... 190 Figure 75. Cities with at least 10,000 residents within 60 minutes by road .............. 192 Figure 76. Access to higher secondary schools (45 minutes by road and public transport to FUAs’ centres) ....................................................................................... 193 Figure 77. Distribution of urban renewal and landscaping projects per municipality ................................................................................................................................... 199 Figure 78. Distribution of urban renewal funds (from RDF) per municipality ......... 200 Figure 79. RDF in years (000 000 Euro) ................................................................... 201 Figure 80. Villages that are subject to the ‘100+ Villages’ program ........................ 203 Figure 81. Forest land cover in Albania .................................................................... 207 Figure 82. Categories of land cover in Albania ......................................................... 208 Figure 83. The polycentric network of institutional interactions in territory planning in Albania ....................................................................................................................... 215 Figure 84. Regions’ (qark) typologies based on disparities (socio-economic development) ............................................................................................................. 222 Figure 85. Regions’ (qark) typologies based on disparities (territorial and environmental performance)...................................................................................... 223 Figure 86. Territorial typologies based on local governments territorial specificities prior to the administrative and territorial reform ....................................................... 224 Figure 87. Sample of ‘fuzzy strips’ in the Albanian territorial context – Fier Municipality............................................................................................................... 227 Figure 88. Water supply enterprises versus municipal boundaries and river basins boundaries .................................................................................................................. 235 Figure 89. Administrative boundaries in Albania: 373 local government units (prior 2015), 61 municipalities and 12 qarks....................................................................... 236 Figure 90. Planning regions versus development regions ......................................... 241 Figure 91. Comparison between various typologies ................................................. 242

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Abstract Territory, development and governance are at the focus of this study, and there is particularly one level (territorial, governance or development related), which brings all these notions inextricably together in a unique way – the region. This research analyses the region as a dynamic concept, from the lenses of territorial rescaling in Albania.

Albania is characterised by dramatic political and socio-economic shifts, and rapid accumulation of population and economic activities, starting as of 1990. In years, there has been a trend of increasing territorial disparities and emergence of peripheralities, reinforced also by a pattern of noticeably increasing monocentricity in the territorial structure, development and governance modes.

The accounts on territorial rescaling (with geographical, political, ecological, and socio-economic dimensions), and on territorial development and governance have evolved significantly towards developing interdependency connections, especially after 1999, with the adoption of the European Spatial Development Perspective by the European ministers of spatial planning. This evolution is based on the worldwide necessity to tackle disparities and achieve sustainable territorial development, and to pursue efficient and democratic governance mechanisms that achieve the latter. This is no doubt a challenging path, lying mostly on the stakeholders’ ability to deal with territorial fragmentation and interdependencies, and with mismatches between territorial functionalities and formal jurisdictions. In order to produce cohesive growth at both, national and regional levels, stakeholders are bound to [re]construct territorial structures and conduct governance shifts that deal with the above challenges.

This research is looking at understanding the interdependencies between territorial typologies (regions) obtained in the territorial rescaling process, due to continuous governance shifts and the emergence of polycentric governance, as a means for boosting sustainable territorial development and cohesion. The research examines whether polycentric governance models have an effect on or connection to territorial development, and to what extent territorial rescaling and regional typologies define this connection. This examination should lead further to enhanced understanding on the ‘polycentricity gap’ and means to overcome it, which implies the following:

i)

Territorial polycentricity, as an objective for tackling territorial disparities while boosting competitiveness, has limited validity at regional levels, not always supported by empirical evidence. ii) Polycentric governance is claimed as a mode of governance that embodies network interactions and different degrees of decision-making autonomy

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for its stakeholders. Polycentric governance can enhance territorial polycentricity by eliminating inefficiencies, improving the exchange and flow of information and goods, increasing resilience of the institutional and socio-ecological systems, and internalising the effects resulting from the dynamics of territorial rescaling. iii) Knowledge on regional/territorial typologies borne out of, or contributing to territorial rescaling, is needed to understand the modus-operandi of polycentric governance in a specific territorial context. In the case of Albania, a model for unravelling the polycentricity gap is established: i) Analysis of the territorial rescaling processes and related policy developments/results; ii) Analysis of territorial disparities, fragmentation and polycentricity/monocentricity in terms of territorial structure; iii) Linking territorial rescaling and polycentricity to cases of polycentric governance; iv) Concluding on territorial development effects. The analysis of polycentric governance in particular corroborates the validity of each case, based on 6 critical factors: Level of decentralization; Presence of network governance; Existence of at least one subject of common interest for stakeholders in the network; The presence of a common niche of attraction for genuine cooperation between stakeholders; Existence of a space, or a territory, where objectives of the actors are materialised; The presence of a commonly agreed system of rules for interactions and functions. It is assumed in this research that territorial constructs (typologies), resulting from rescaling processes, play a role in defining the subject/s of common interest and the need that brings actors, or centres of decision-making together.

The model of analysis here provided is useful to other contexts and to future research that builds on the assumption that combined territorial polycentricity and polycentric governance will produce cohesive growth on the territory. The research concludes that for the Albaniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s case there is positive correlation between the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s monocentric territorial structure and monocentric development profile. Monocentricity in governance modes is also spatially positively correlated with the findings on the territorial structure and development profiles. There are cases of polycentric governance for a number of sectors/issues, and their policy outcome seem to affect development positively. It is also concluded that territorial rescaling should be a continued and dynamic process, in order to readjust and self-correct inefficiencies borne out the presence of the polycentricity gap. In the case of Albania, the government should undertake cyclical assessments of governance and territorial reforms, improve processes accordingly, and initiate a regionalization reform. Finally, knowledge sharing

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and exchange is identified as key to taking informed decisions and increasing the capacities of informal forums and networks in governing specific territorial tasks, regardless of the scale. Polycentric development requires interdisciplinary inputs from various stakeholders and various knowledge groups, in order to produce integrated and widely accepted territorial development visions.

However, Albania constitutes one case, and other similar cases (on national basis) need to be produced, to prove the validity of the above correlations and conclusions at a wider scale. Furthermore, the research is not dealing with the analysis of factors behind the identified correlations. This is not the object of this research, but it constitutes the next step to a full examination of the polycentricity gap. The latter remains an important objective, because once solved, it allows for polycentric development achieved through productive interactions and successful cooperation at societal level, and through enhanced knowledge of systems, both socio-economic and territorial ones.

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Abstract Territorio, sviluppo e governance sono al centro di questo studio, e vi è in particolare un livello (territoriale, di governance o di sviluppo), che riunisce tutte queste nozioni inestricabilmente insieme in un unico modo - la regione. Questa ricerca analizza la regione come un concetto dinamico, vista da lenti territoriali interscalari tra loro.

L'Albania è caratterizzata da drammatici cambiamenti politici e socio-economici e da un rapido accumulo di popolazione e attività economiche, a partire dal 1990. Negli anni si è registrata una tendenza in aumento delle disparità territoriali e l'emergere delle periferie, rafforzate anche da un modello di notevole aumento del monocentrismo nella struttura territoriale e nelle modalità di sviluppo e di governance.

I resoconti sull'interscalarità territoriale (con dimensioni geografiche, politiche, ecologiche e socioeconomiche), sullo sviluppo e sulla governance del territorio, sono evoluti in modo significativo verso lo sviluppo di connessioni interdipendenti, specialmente dopo il 1999, con l'adozione del documento "European Spatial Development Perspective" da parte degli ministeri europei coinvolti nella pianifiazione territoriale. Questa evoluzione si basa sulla necessità mondiale di affrontare le disparità territoriali e realizzare uno sviluppo territoriale sostenibile in modo di perseguire meccanismi di governance efficienti e democratici. Questo è senza dubbio un percorso impegnativo, che si basa principalmente sulle capacità degli stakeholder di affrontare

la

frammentazione

e

le

interdipendenze

territoriali create

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disallineamento tra funzionalità territoriali e giurisdizioni formali. Al fine di produrre una crescita coesiva a livello nazionale e regionale, le parti interessate sono tenute a [ri] costruire le strutture territoriali e condurre cambiamenti di governance che affrontino le suddette sfide.

Questa ricerca cerca di comprendere le interdipendenze tra le tipologie territoriali (regioni) ottenute da una lettura interscalare territoriale, creata a causa di continui cambiamenti di governance e l'emergere di una governance policentrica - come mezzo per stimolare lo sviluppo territoriale sostenibile e la coesione territoriale.

La ricerca esamina se i modelli di governance policentrici hanno un effetto, o una connessione allo sviluppo territoriale, e in che misura il ridimensionamento territoriale, e le tipologie regionali, definiscono questa connessione. Il resultato dovrebbe portare ad una migliore comprensione del "divario di policentricità" e mezzi per superarlo, il che implica quanto segue:

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i) La policentricità territoriale, come obiettivo per affrontare le disparità territoriali, mentre aumenta la competitività, ha una validità limitata a livello regionale e non sempre supportato da prove empiriche. ii) La governance policentrica è riconosciuta come una modalità di governance che incarna le interazioni di rete e offre diversi gradi di autonomia decisionale per i propri stakeholder. La governance policentrica può migliorare la policentricità territoriale eliminando le inefficienze, migliorando lo scambio e il flusso di informazioni e beni, aumentando la resilienza dei sistemi istituzionali e socio-ecologici e internalizzando gli effetti derivanti dalle dinamiche territoriali interscalari. iii) La conoscenza delle tipologie regionali / territoriali sostenute, o che contribuiscono al ridimensionamento territoriale, è necessaria per comprendere il modus-operandi della governance policentrica in uno specifico contesto territoriale. Nel caso dell'Albania, viene stabilito un modello per svelare il divario di policentricità: i) Analisi dei processi interscalari territoriali e di sviluppi / risultati delle politiche correlate; ii) Analisi delle disparità territoriali, frammentazione e policentricità / monocentrismo in termini di struttura territoriale; iii) Collegare i dimensioni territoriali interscalari con la policentricità descritta da casi di governance policentrica; iv) Concludere sugli effetti di sviluppo territoriale. L'analisi della governance policentrica, in particolare, conferma la validità di ciascun caso, sulla base di 6 fattori critici: livello di decentralizzazione; Presenza di governance in rete; Esistenza di almeno un argomento di interesse comune per le parti interessate nella rete; La presenza di un'attrazione comune per una vera cooperazione tra le parti interessate; Esistenza di uno spazio, o di un territorio, in cui si concretizzano gli obiettivi degli attori; e La presenza di un sistema di regole concordato per interazioni e funzioni.

In questa ricerca si presume che i costrutti territoriali (tipologie), risultanti da processi interscalari sul territorio, svolgano un ruolo cruciale nel definire il soggetto di interesse comune, e la necessità di una decisione aperta tra attori locali e poteri decisionali.

Il modello di analisi fornito è utile per altri contesti e ricerche future che si basano sull'ipotesi che la policentricità territoriale combinata con la governance policentrica producono una crescita coesiva sul territorio. La ricerca conclude che esiste una

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correlazione positiva tra la struttura territoriale monocentrica del paese e il profilo di sviluppo monocentrico. Il monocentrismo nelle modalità di governance è anche correlato spazialmente con i risultati sulla struttura territoriale e sui profili di sviluppo.

Esistono casi di governance policentrica, per un certo numero di settori / problemi, con esito politico che sembrano influenzare positivamente lo sviluppo.

Inoltre, concludento, la lettura interscalare del territorio dovrebbe essere un processo continuo e dinamico, a fine di ristabilire le inefficienze, e i processi di auto-correzione derivanti dalla presenza del divario di policentricità. Nel caso dell'Albania, il governo dovrebbe intraprendere valutazioni cicliche della governance e delle riforme territoriali, migliorare i processi, e di conseguenza, avviare una riforma per la regionalizzazione.

Infine, la condivisione e lo scambio di conoscenze, risorse cognitive, possono identificarsi come la chiave per prendere decisioni colletive, e per l'aumento di queste capacità in reti e forum informali per governare specifici compiti territoriali, indipendentemente dalla scala amministrativa. Lo sviluppo policentrico richiede input interdisciplinari da parte di vari stakeholder e vari gruppi di conoscenza, al fine di produrre visioni di sviluppo territorialmente integrati e ampiamente accettati.

Tuttavia, l'Albania costituisce un caso, e altri casi simili (su base nazionale) devono essere prodotti per dimostrare la validità delle affermazioni e conclusioni sopra riportate su scala più ampia. Inoltre, la ricerca non tratta l'analisi dei fattori alla base delle correlazioni identificate. Questo non è l'oggetto della ricerca, ma costituisce il prossimo passo per una completa lettura del gap di policentricità. Quest'ultimo rimane un obiettivo importante, perché una volta risolto consente allo sviluppo policentrico di raggiungere interazioni produttoti da una cooperazione fatta di successi a livello sociale e attraverso una maggiore conoscenza dei sistemi, sia socioeconomici che territoriali.

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I. Scope and Problem Definition 1.1 [Regional] Development - an evolving conception Territory, development and governance are at the focus of this study and there is particularly one level, be that territorial, governance or development related, which brings all notions inextricably together in a unique way â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the region. Governance modes or shifts for sustainable territorial development, constitute the broad scope of the research. As of the outset questions arise in understanding the larger context in which all three notions (territory, governance and development) are shaped, how their meaning has evolved in time, what approaches are taken in relation to each of them, and what are eventual gaps in the related theories and practices. This first step of acquiring clarity leads then to the identification of the external and internal objectives of the study.

Development is the starting argument for the very direct way in which it affects people and the ease at which people perceive it, compared to the territorial (regional) and governance aspects. There are different ways of understanding development and this is reflected on how the concept has evolved and development is measured in years. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Historically, the level of development of a national, region or locality was measured by using economic indicators, such as economic growth or income per personâ&#x20AC;? (Pike et al., 2017, p.20). In respect to this, Gross National Product1 (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product2 (GDP) have always been the two key indicators to measure and show overall level of development. However, these indicators and others that were added later to demonstrate economic growth in general do not reveal the complete image and substance of development. After all, humans have a myriad of needs that are often conflicting in nature. Humans use natural resources to produce, create economic growth and advance development. But, if for instance, in the process they do not consider that several resources are finite and depletable, then it would very well happen that at some moment in time the final purpose, that of producing for growth, will not be achieved, unless some new considerations are made and measures are taken.

In order to deal with the limitations of understanding, assessing and measuring development simply as economic growth and through solely economic indicators (Cypher & Dietz, 2009) new and different metrics (Pike et al., 2017) are introduced.

The purpose has been to expose other dimensions implicitly or explicitly related to development. Most importantly, after the articulation of the sustainable development

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concept, objective and paradigm (United Nations, 1987) in the report delivered by the Brundtland Commission in 1987, development has ‘officially’ equally embodied three core dimensions, economic, social and environmental, leading to the need for developing new instruments to define and measure it. In this regard, new metrics include the UNDP 3 ’s Human Development Index (HDI) created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country (UNDP, 2018), or other social indicators and indices – demographic statistics on infant mortality, life expectancy or fertility rates; access to a number of services and basic rights, such as water supply, education, or housing, etc.; corruption perception; crime levels; global multidimensional poverty index4 (GMPI); gender development index5 (GDI); gender inequality index6 (GII); etc.

However, besides increasing the scope of the conception, it has become necessary to unravel it space-wise. So, while societies worldwide have made significant progress in improving their socio-economic conditions for people over a century, this positive performance hides great heterogeneity and sharp uneven development among countries and regions, in important aspects of the quality of life (World Bank, 2017); (Hudson, 2015); (Ehrlich et al., 2015). The same World Bank report (2017, p.40) informs that in the last 20 years, more than “1.2 billion people have been lifted out of poverty”, but around 1 billion people, or “14% of the total global population”, are still in the conditions of extreme poverty, and disparities in development performance are increasing, and in many occasions quite striking. Understanding route causes for these development disparities is crucial to policymaking and to instruments for mitigating inequality. The World Bank (2017) report lists a number of challenges for unequal development, such as poor service delivery, violence, corruption, unsustainable management of natural resources, etc. These challenges, together with the above discussion on development metrics, reveal two connotations for development, as defined by Dunford (2010) in (Pike et al., 2017): development of or in an area to make it more useful and more productive of useful things, and human development (of or for the people in the area). This gives development a clear institutional and territorial character, next to its traditional economic growth nature. Furthermore, by focusing on people, as institutions but also as beings, it provides clues for how development has to be measured, therefore increasing its scope in terms of meaning and metrics.

With advancements made in the concept of development, the way of achieving it has also evolved, experiencing [paradigm] shifts strongly related to the purpose and

14

meaning of development. The World Bank (2017) defines governance as an underlying determinant for achieving sustainable development. Governance, itself as a concept receives also various definitions, which range from being a process through which actors (formal and informal) interact, or interdependently coordinate to design and implement policies (World Bank, 2017); (Rametsteiner, 2009), to a manner for exercising power to manage resources (World Bank, 1991), or the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority (OECD, 2007), modes of societal decisionmaking (IOG, 2018), etc. These excerpts of definitions show that governance is very complex and it is difficult to capture in one definition (IOG, 2018), but there are some aspects, namely power, processes and resources, appearing (directly or not) in most of the definitions, and are useful to understanding how governance affects, shapes and steers development. These three aspects exhibit differently at different territorial levels (regions included), which is then further reflected in modes of governance and in the resulting form and level of development, which is context specific (Pike et al., 2010).

In simplistic terms, regional development is development that occurs at the regions’ level. This study will explore in detail the region as a conception, but for now, the region is a territorial scale between local and national, or across national scales. Most of the recent literature, after 2000s, regardless of variations in the definition of regional development, agrees on two aspects of regional development: i) its purpose, which is to address and reduce territorial disparities, while enabling sustainable development and growth; ii) the nature of regional development, encompassing not merely the economic growth dimension, but also social equity and welfare, environmental sustainability, and even cultural diversity concerns (Pike et al., 2017); (OECD, 2014).

As such, issues raised in the broad ‘development’ discussion are equally valid when discussing regional development.

Territorial disparities – geographical and social, have early routes, as of the 19th century, and are a direct effect of shifts in socio-economic regimes (Pollard, 1999), which led national governments toward combining top-down interventions with more regionally oriented ones, with greater focus on areas with highest unemployment (Pike et al., 2017). After the World War II, the unbalanced development was dealt with mainly through top-down state interventions and spatial policies, aiming at redistribution and subsidies to support lagging regions (Toto, 2010/a); (Plane et al., 2007). This was soon to change, after the crisis of the mid 1970s, when the power of the national state as an agent of development and regulation was confronted and taken over by the neo-liberal

15

approach, which promoted “deregulation and liberalization of markets” for higher efficiency (Pike et al., 2017, p.28); (Plane et al., 2007). According to Storper (1997), later on, in the 1990s, the complexity and uncertainty of globalization, and “reflexive forms of capitalism” required a combination of state interventions and market operations, as a way to address regional development (Pike et al., 2017, p.28).

Next to a changing paradigm for regional development as a production of several stakeholders from public and private sectors, the other conceptual shift was that of encompassing social, environmental, political and cultural dimensions next to the economic one. Equally as with the discourse for development, in the case of regional development too, the economic dimension was considered as narrow and insufficient to capture other important dimensions, such as health, quality of life and well-being, climate change effects and resource shortages, particularities of the various geographical settings, etc. (Pike et al., 2010); (Pike et al., 2017). The discussion on broadening the scope of regional development as a conception, and as an objective and the subsequent means to achieve it has emphasised, among others, territory as a critical dimension in regional development.

Territory is inherently part of regional development, but, due also to the latter being conceptualised originally as merely economic growth, the discussion on the territory has slowly gained importance. It has become obvious due to: representing the location of settlements, actors, and resources in relation to one-another; its size and the way size affects

interactions,

development,

efficiency,

and

governance

mechanisms;

infrastructure networks, connectivity, and socio-economic continuities; being the space-reflection of socio-ecological interactions, economic growth, power and authority, and political legitimacy (Pike et al., 2017); (Shutina & Toto, 2017); (Faludi, 2016); (Capello, 2009); (Maier & Trippl, 2009). Development takes place on the territory, and the two are mutually affected.

Power and politics have a crucial role in regional development, by shaping the way it is implemented, and principles and values it follows. This leads to the need of understanding whose interests are pursued, where, when, and how (Pike et al., 2017).

Hence, on one side knowledge about the [role and interests of] institutions (be those public, private, community, or individuals) is essential in understanding how power dynamics flow among actors involved in regional development. On the other side, the territorial dimension of institutions’ locations, roles, and [reasons for] interactions should also be scrutinised, to understand whether a balance of interests exists, and how

16

costs and benefits arising from power dynamics are distributed between regions and localities.

Different actors will push forward their individual agenda, which will most probably give rise to conflicting decisions and events. For instance, economic growth-related groups would face divergence vis-Ă -vis environmental groups, and it is only through appropriate place-based governance models that balance and negotiation between such competing interests could be achieved. The result is different in each and every single case, as the governance arrangement is, due to place-based or place-informed conditionalities (Imami et al., 2018). Furthermore, government institutions as well may pose obstacles in the way regional development is achieved, because of the conflict that exists between sectorial developments and horizontally coordinated territorial development (Toto et al., 2014); (Imami et al., 2018). Hence, power dynamics between the various ministries and bodies responsible on regional development is and will be often present, leading to a need for solutions in favour of sustainable development.

The power dynamics will be dealt with differently in different [territorial] contexts, also due to the decision taken on what type of regional development to pursue. The different types of Regional Development, depending on the mode of governance, might be topdown, bottom-up, or combined with various degrees of governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s intervention (Araral & Hartley, 2013); (Arnouts et al., 2012); (Pike et al., 2017). The mode of governance will depend on the type of government arrangements within a country (the level power distributed to the subnational and local governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s levels and the existence of partnerships) and on the focus of regional development. The more centralised the governance context is, the more regional development is due to resemble traditional subsidising approaches as described in Plane et al. (2007). Decentralised approaches, on the other hand, tend to be led either by subnational, or non-government stakeholders, such as regions and local governments, market and businesses, civic society organisations, etc., as well as in certain cases by donor institutions that try to inject forms of cooperation. As a result of the way in which the approach is conceived and implemented, the focus of regional development may be exogenous (originating from the outside) or endogenous (from within) (Pike et al., 2017).

Usually, every country has a domestic agenda for regional development that is based on how regional disparities are perceived, and on the power dynamics between stakeholders. In some cases, due to this agenda, but also due to the institutional capacities of those who deliver regional development, the balance between domestic

17

and European Union (EU) related regional development proves to be difficult (Imami et al., 2018). This is especially the case for countries that are in a process of accessing EU (ibid). However, it can also be the case for any country, because regional development has territorial effects and it is shaped by the territorial context, therefore giving rise to a crucial policy question – what form of development is best for a country.

Still, European Union member countries, or those that aspire to become EU members, have a system of regional development that is both endogenous and exogenous. The development addresses territorial diversities and it is achieved through a multi-level system of governance and through the delivery of hard (infrastructure) and soft (socioeconomic and capacity support) interventions, and related investments. As Pike et al.

(2017) define, the interactions among stakeholders and among territories can be competitive and/or cooperative and the territorial scale of the intervention varies from small to large, because what matters the most is the territorial scale of the effect, rather than that of direct implementation.

In conclusion, sustainable territorial development at the region’s level is a complex objective, both in terms of meaning and definition, and in terms of policy and practical steps for implementation. Conception-wise, regional/territorial development embodies equally the economic, social, environmental and territorial dimensions. Being so multidimensional it requires governance systems that are flexible enough and multistakeholders and multi-levels, in order to make sure that harmonization among economic sectors (for their outcome on the territory) and coordination among stakeholders (for balancing power dynamics and reducing disparities) is achieved.

Besides emphasizing territory and governance as two inherent ingredients in regional development, the analysis so far reveals also the importance of metrics in development and on the way regional development is/can be measured. Measuring regional development is central to the development process itself, because it feeds the policy discussion on the types of regional development to pursue in a given context, and on the governance mechanisms to implement for achieving the ‘development’ objective on a given territory.

1.1.1 [Regional] Development in Albania During the communist period (1954-1990) Albania was characterized by centralized planning of the economy and resource allocation. With the ambition of having a selfreliant economy, the regime dispersed state-owned enterprises across the country and

18

forced the population, as a workforce, to remain or locate close to them. As such, from the outside, the development seemed to be well distributed across the country. However, most of the urban centres were mono-functional and dominated by a single industry, i.e. mining, textile, agro-processing etc. Similarly, the centralized state put a lot of effort in the agriculture sector, which employed almost “50% of the work force” (INSTAT, 1991, pp.78-79). The land was almost all organised in state-owned farms and cooperatives, and production was centrally planned with imposed targets to be achieved.

Both, the industry and the agriculture sector were not competitive, and with the socioeconomic and political system changing in 1991, these two sectors could not be transformed into competitive enterprises that would sustain employment and economic development. The massive privatization of state-owned enterprises that took place during 1991-1995, as part of the rapid economic transformation program of the new democratic government, did not help in keeping them in production, or quickly transforming into small-medium scale enterprises (Shutina & Toto, 2010); (Shutina, 2015). Also, the land reform in 1991 dismantled state-owned farms and cooperatives and divided the land to farmers (Toto, 2018). However, fragmentation of land and lack of technology and knowhow did not allow for agriculture sector to rebound quickly and sustain employment in this sector. As such, people, massively, either emigrated abroad, or moved in the major urban areas, especially those located along Tirana – Durrës corridor.

The change from a centralized socialist regime to a market parliamentary democracy required transformation of state organization and functions in the territory. In August 1992, for the first time after communist regime, local governments were instituted as politically autonomous. Yet, their administrative and fiscal autonomy was limited. It was only in 2000 that functional decentralization took place, and local governments were given some exclusive and shared functions. Within that local governments were supposed to play a role also on local economic development. However, this role was limited more to preparing strategies and improving the physical infrastructure rather than actively being involved in skills’ development, or SME support (Toto, 2010/b).

The economic development to large extent has been and still remains depended on the central government level. However, actors involved in local development are diversified and different mechanisms for identifying and setting priorities have been explored and employed in various forms. In addition, the decentralization reform of the year 2000 introduced ‘qark’ as the second level of local government. Though stipulated

19

as a level of local government in the constitution, qark was intended as a ‘cooperation and coordination’ body, which was a novelty for Albania at that time. Members of local government councils composed the qark council, which was qark’s policy and governing body. Qark council’s mandate was to formulate an overall development strategy for the territory of qark, and undertake concrete projects of common interest to local governments and national government. Whenever local governments would not be able to carry out a certain function, they could delegate it to qark. However, unfortunately, qarks were never empowered and remained obsolete institutions of local government, due to both, legislation gaps and power dynamics at the level of municipalities.

Territorial development, on the other hand was and still is being largely driven by private initiatives and the central government as policy maker, regulator and also implementer, with the local level coping with the outcome (Aliaj et al., 2010). On one side, there are depressed municipalities, which continue to face population loss (due to internal and external migration) and therefore lack of human resources to sustain adequate services; On the other, there are [rapidly] growing urban areas that cannot supply appropriate infrastructure and service quality to the local communities (ibid). In other words, local and/or regional actors have not played as yet a decisive role in formulating strategies, setting priorities, attracting private investments and negotiating with the central government in financing those priorities. This has led to unbalanced development across the territory, with most of the natural resources in the mountainous remote areas, and most of the population and urban development in the Tiranë-Durrës metropolitan area.

To cope with the imbalanced territorial development at national level, the government of Albania has taken a series of initiatives, such as the adoption of the National Strategy for Development and Integration, and of a number of sectorial strategies, the application of an integrated planning system, and the establishment of a solid territorial planning system. Still, Albania has not embarked on a place-based approach to development so far, regardless of some initiatives related to regional development and planning (Allkja, 2018). For instance, instead of guiding internal citizen mobility and relocation by socioeconomically encouraging people not to move away from their historical locations, it is allowing for territorial concentration of human resources and economic activities in the Tiranë-Durrës area. This is done without due consideration to the carrying capacity of the territory, and social exclusion, and environmental problems that accompany this

20

rapid urbanisation process. This has been a one-option-only solution offered to people, instead of providing them with several opportunities to choose from and make use of accessibility and transportation for better linkages among places and activities (Barca, 2009).

In overall, Albania’s development has not considered its territorial dimension and has typically been sectorial and uncoordinated on a territorial level (Shutina & Toto, 2017).

This has resulted into inequalities and unsustainable and uncoordinated exploitation of natural resources, by seriously compromising the resiliency of socio-ecological systems.

1.2 Territory matters in development and governance As it was argued above, development is dependent on the territorial context, and on the governance system and mechanisms to facilitate its delivery. On the one hand, economic development processes have a specific territorial dimension – scale and place features, and on the other, economic growth takes place in distinct territories (Böhme et al., 2015) with unique features, which feed economic advantages or disadvantages (Capello, 2009). Hence, the economic activities are located in concrete places and interact with adjacent activities, generating impacts and flows that affect the territory where the activity is primarily delivered, as well as other territories and their resources.

In this context, the uniqueness and territorial features/diversities of each area will play a role on delineating its future development path. This emphasizes the notion of development as a geographical phenomenon, inherently linked to the spatial relations, which shape economic activities (Pike et al., 2017) that on their turn impact the territory formation patterns.

Thus, the location of people and resources constitute a primary factor in defining development paths. Furthermore, space formation/restructuring interventions such as urbanization, construction of infrastructures or lack of infrastructure, the urban-rural continuum and the formation of city-regions, metropolitan areas, and mega-regions, etc. also define development on the territory. For instance, projects and investments on infrastructure improvement define the extent to which an area becomes central, or peripheral in a development process, directly influencing competitiveness and sustainability of the actions (Böhme et al., 2011). Similarly, any political decision on accessibility, land use, decision-making on whether to maintain a polycentric territorial structure, or concentrate people in major urban centres of agglomerations, etc. affects

21

the growth of regions, and also the quality of life for the residents. Finally all these interventions shape also spatial formations and restructuring, through both, steering people and activities’ location and directing [public] interventions and investments in space.

The other critical aspect to discuss is the ‘appropriate’ territorial scale of, or for development. Pike et al. (2017) discuss the territorial scale in relation to development and define it as referring to the spatial level and size of areas. This is a geographical definition of the territorial scale – hence a geographically bounded area, over which actors claim sovereignty and exercise authority and power, reflected in modes of governance. However, the territorial scales are institutionally, politically, and functionally bounded as well (Agnew, 2011); (Keating, 2013); (Pálné, 2009); (Sagan, 2009); (Toto, 2018); (Pike et al., 2017); (Faludi, 2016). In this view, the territorial scales are not simply hierarchical, but are interrelated (Pike et al., 2017). They represent various levels of authority and governance (Keating, 2013), deal (to a certain extent) with the crisis and regression of the classical representative democracy (CanalesAliende & Romero-Tarín, 2017), and through these dynamic patterns they are produced and reproduced over time and space, constructed by actors for specific purposes.

Box 1. Territorial Rescaling in Europe Every European country has a specific form of governance organisation and institutions, as far as regions, regional development and regional government are concerned. Even those 5 countries (Kosovo, Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Lithuania) that do not declare for an intermediate form of governance have an institution (development agency, statistical region, planning region, regional committees for inter-communal cooperation, or metropolitan government) that in a way or another, addresses issues related to regions and their development (Toto et al., 2014). Depending on the typology of state organisation, some countries have highly decentralised regions and others have regions that depend on the national government (deconcentrated ones), planning regions, regional development agencies, regional governments, etc. (European CoR, 2016). Whether a strong or a weak entity, some form of region is always present, either for dealing with governance functions that ought to be delivered in an intermediate territorial and government level, or as the representation of a specific construct of representative democracy and multi-level governance.

22

These various dimensions of understanding scales lead to two specific necessities for discussing scales in development: 1) to understand what is the extent to which development can spread its effect. The extent can be spatial, therefore defined geographically, and can be social, consisting of social layers and stakeholders that benefit or are affected by development. The ‘extent’ is often used in regional development projects, to define whether a certain intervention can be considered as regional or not, based on the scope of intervention, and of future impact; 2) to understand how stakeholders’ interactions could be organised into networks of different sizes and purposes, which also interact among them on specific issues, over various territorial contexts. The networks are thematic and territorial, and exercise different degrees of power. The constellation of institutions involved in the network and their interactions constitute a polycentric system of cooperation, which leads to governance models and dynamics.

These governance models are intended to produce territorial development, which can only be achieved through cooperation, place-based initiatives, and territorially targeted solutions (CSD, 1999); (Böhme et al., 2015); (Barca, 2009). Place-based, placeinformed, place-sensitive, or explicit territorial focus, as Barca (2009) argues, means that strategies should tackle people and places, should account on places’ specificities and eliminate their handicaps by making use of their underutilized potentials, through multi-level governance and knowledge transfer. Places are identified from a functional perspective, and size is not necessarily a criterion, though regions (also a dynamic concept) constitute the core of the territorial delivery of the place-based cohesion policy (ibid). For instance, in Europe, territorial diversities and specificities are considered a particular spatial feature and are not to be neglected for the effect they have on the implementation of the various sectorial policies and on the impact that sectors have on the territory. The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) adopted in 1999, states that it is necessary to widen the horizon beyond purely sectorial policy measures, to focus on the territory, and take into account the various development opportunities that arise from the different regions (CSD, 1999).

There are at least three aspects that strike when discussing governance models: processes, institutions and territories of competence. In the conceptual and practical path from government to governance, all three concepts have experienced significant changes, without losing importance, but gaining new dimensions and being increased in level of complexity, especially in relation to interactions among them. Stoker (1998)

23

defined government based on its ability to define rules and impose them through authority, hence mainly as the group of formal institutions and the legal and policy framework defined by these institutions to “maintain public order” and “facilitate collective action” (p.17). Governance, on the other hand, has at its core the creation of the necessary conditions for pursuing collective action (Stoker, 1998), hence the entirety of processes, mechanisms, institutions (formal and non-formal) and rules (external and/or self-imposed) that are necessary to manage interdependencies within networks and systems and achieve sustainable outputs for development (Rametsteiner, 2009). This change in concept implies a shift from authorities that have power on territory, to ways for achieving development on the territory by engaging institutions, regulations, interests on resources and interactions. In this process, the link between development and territory has not weakened; on the contrary it has grown stronger (Shutina & Toto, 2017). After all, institutions and resources are territorially based, and targeted regulations are drawn to respond to the features and/or uniqueness of a given [territorial] context.

There is a mutual relation or contradiction between the role of territory in development and power relations. Thus, administrative borders and areas do not usually match with functional areas, while territorial development is strongly linked to the latter. As a result there is no one single public entity, or government that can carry out territorial development alone within a functional area (Böhme et al., 2011); (V.Ostrom et al., 1961); (V.Ostrom, 1972). The varying and diverse typology of regions in different countries is evidence to how difficult it is to create large regional administrations that are responsible for all services and development activities in one functional territory (V.Ostrom, 1972); (Aligica & Tarko, 2012). These kinds of administrations may sound as efficient solutions, and such that solve the dilemma of relating territory, development and politics to constituencies, hence guaranteeing legitimacy of the government (Toto et al., 2014). However, in practice it is difficult to create large democratic structures that are able to solve all kind of territorial issues, regardless of the level of horizontal and vertical interaction that is borne in each case (Aligica & Tarko, 2012). The response to this dilemma is territorial integration, meaning “the reshaping of functional areas to make them evolve into a consistent geographical entity” (Böhme et al., 2011, p.26). In practice, the level of interdependencies and interactions for territorial integration is so high and complex, that integrated territories most probably require an efficient system of polycentric governance to function at regional level, instead of large regional

24

governments. In certain cases, where current forms and levels of governance cannot achieve territorial development efficiency, might be as well needed that new governance levels are established, adding more to the complexity of interactions for territorial integration (Böhme et al., 2015).

However, as mentioned earlier, governance arrangements (including polycentric ones) are

context

dependent,

and

may

change

based

on

the

capacity

of

stakeholders/institutions to adjust to the institutional context (Böhme et al., 2015). This capacity is influenced by the societal and institutional culture as well as systems’ legacies (ibid). Culture includes trust and communication. Participation and partnerships – a feature of good [territorial] governance can hardly be established in a society were trust is low and communication is missing, or misleading (Nientied & Karafili, 2016). This would in turn affect the opportunity for place-informed governance. It could affect based on scale – for instance, place-based approaches are more likely to occur at the small community scale, where trust and cooperation are more prone to being present, due to people knowing each-other closely and for a long time. Legacy on the other hand depends a lot on the government and governance system and mechanisms evolving over time in a country. Hence, whether a country is experiencing decentralization or [re]centralization, has experience with [in]contestable public private partnerships, has or does not have various forms of citizen inclusion in decision making, etc., are factors that define the ability and the difficulties of the current institutions to engage in territorial governance and produce territorial development.

Of course, change in governance systems happens, but besides being affected by culture and legacy, it depends also on who is triggering it. Böhme et al. (2015) underline, based on a study of the European Commission for Territorial Agenda 2020, that drivers of change (either government or development) are often to be found at local and regional levels, because of their need for change, especially by being closer to the citizens – receivers of services and public goods. If the national government limited local governments’ scope of action through centralization processes geared by need for power, and justified it with the lack of local capabilities to deliver services, this would actually weaken the local ability for change, including related processes. Hence, again the governance mode, varying from authoritarian to self-governance (Araral & Hartley, 2013); (Arnouts et al., 2012); (Driessen et al., 2012) is a factor in delivering change, because, unless there is at least some tendency for enabling local governments and strengthening institutional capacities, rather than undermining them through authority

25

and/or national provision of local services, the local governments will remain weak and unable to trigger change for a long time. This will result into weak territorial governance and therefore also unsustainable territorial development.

The role of territory in development and governance and the related interconnections are explained by various authors, (especially those involved in polycentricity and territorial governance studies 7 ), and from a practical perspective are observed to a significant extent in the European regional policy and territorial development instruments. This section is aiming at providing a description of how development policies take, or should take territory into account, and the respective cases are taken from European Union policies and development instruments (discussed below). The aim of the discussion in this section is to lead towards the identification of gaps that exist in the theory and practice of the trinomial ‘territory, development, and governance’. These gaps and the overview provided in section 1.1 will then form the basis for the articulation of the research objectives.

1.2.1 The territorial dimension of EU regional policy The regional policy of the European Union has its origins as early as 1957, in the Treaty of Rome founding the European Economic Community (EC, 2008b). The Directorate General for Regional Policy was established a decade later and the European Regional Development Fund (a budgetary instrument of regional policy) was created in 1975, based on the first ERDF regulation of 1974 and especially out the necessity put forward by the first enlargement (Ireland, Denmark, and United Kingdom) in 1972. Since the Rome Treaty, one of the main tasks of the Community has been to promote harmonious development of economic activities. This has received further importance in subsequent community communications in 1964 and 1969, formulated as the regional policy in the common market, and highlighting the need for a coordinated community solution to regional problems and regional imbalances (EC, 2008b).

The 1st ERDF regulation of 1975 defined three actions as eligible for funding, namely investments in small enterprises and on infrastructures supporting the latter, as well as infrastructure investments in mountainous areas, eligible to the agriculture guidance fund too. These interventions were intended for application in regions lagging behind and in industrial regions in decline. In 1986, the Single European Act, as a major revision to the treaty of Rome, set the ‘Economic and Social Cohesion’ as an

26

accompanying policy to the implementation of its key objective – the internal market (EC, 2008b), aiming at overall harmonious development (EUR-Lex, 1987).

According to the article 130a, the aim of the Community to be achieved by this policy was/is “reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions” (EUR-Lex, 1987, p.9). Territorially speaking, the policy and the legislation place a focus on regions and on their socio-economic and geographical diversities, which bring to identification and examination of disparities. As for the ERDF, article 130c of the Act states that the fund “is intended to help redress the principle regional imbalances in the Community through participating in the development and structural adjustments of regions whose development is lagging behind and in the conversion of declining industrial regions” (EUR-Lex, 1987, p.9).

This Act gave birth to the Cohesion Policy in 1988. Further EU Treaties (Maastricht 1992; Amsterdam 1997; Nice 2001; and Lisbon 2007) reaffirmed policy’s importance and scope, adding also a territorial dimension (Hübner, 2008). While 1988 is recognised as a birthdate for the Cohesion Policy, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 was the one to introduce the Cohesion Fund, the Committee of the Regions and the principle of subsidiarity, and the Treaty of Lisbon8 in 2007 provided the territorial dimension to the policy.

Hübner (2008) highlights two aspects in the Cohesion Policy: first the continuous focus on regions in most need, which gives the policy its particular character, that of addressing disparities and aiming at achieving socio-economic regional balances. In this respect, the policy adopts a place-based approach (Barca, 2009) that considers each territory as a source of growth on its own; and second the establishment of a cooperation, management and control mechanism, which has given birth to the unique European Union system of multi-level governance based on accountability and partnership, where local and regional actors participate in design and decision-making, bringing in higher efficiency and more place-based knowledge. This leads to the understanding of the regional policy as a system of governance and development, based on a number of principles, set as of 1988 and valid to date, namely: Concentration; Programming; Additionality; and Partnership (EC, 2018f); (EC, 2008c).

For the current period, 2014-2020, the principle of concentration is displayed in three dimensions – as concentration of resources (regions), concentration of effort (themes), and concentration of spending (time). While this is a novelty introduced by the current programming period, it is not without implications. Thematic concentration and result

27

orientation are essential to the new approach, but remain against locally influenced decision-making because of the conditions placed by the basket of funding, the strong link with sectors rather than territories, and the term designated to achieve results that could be against the long-term strategic thinking (Tosics, 2018); (Böhme et al., 2015).

Similarly, the shift towards national programs instead of regional ones, also poses further challenges on the territorial [governance] dimension of Cohesion Policy, by undermining the place-based and governance dimensions and focusing on sectors instead of territories (Böhme et al., 2015).

On the other hand, additionality and partnership are two key principles ensuring the place-based character of the policy implementation. The previous ‘obliges’ states to employ a domestic regional development and cohesion policy that is adapted to local circumstances and implies also domestic funding; the latter requires the cooperation of formal and informal institutions at any level, as a means to guarantee not only locally targeted and tailored interventions and results, but also transparency on the use of funds and on the regional policy’s societal benefit.

Figure 1. EU Regional Policy and its Territorial Dimension 1957

Treaty of Rome: the roots of EU regional Policy

1958

Directorate General for Regional Policy

Task: Promote harmonious development of economic activities

1975 1964-69

Coordinated community solution to regional imbalances

European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)

Lagging regions are eligible for funding

1986-88

1992

Single European Act

Treaty of Maastricht

Economic & Social Cohesion Policy for Internal Market objective

Cohesion Fund

Reduce disparities between regions

2007 1999

ESDP

Treaty of Lisbon

Territorial dimension to Cohesion Policy

Multi-level governance

Territorial Agenda Focus on regions in most need

Concentration, Programming, Additionality, Partnership

Regional Policy as a system of governance & development

Place-based dimension of the policy (Barca, 2009)

Source: Author The regional policy is delivered through two main funds: ERDF9 and Cohesion Fund.

The latter in particular addresses lagging regions, those with Gross National Income below the 90% of the EU average and supports infrastructure and environment related projects. The Cohesion Fund accounts currently for over 1/3 of the EU budget (EC, 2018f), but the processes and documents related to the future programming period (2021-2027) show for a moderate reduction (EC, 2018b) of 7 percentage points (Tosics, 2018) of the Cohesion Policy funds. The cut is felt on the Cohesion Fund (reduced by almost one third (Tosics, 2018)), while the European Regional Development Fund remains mostly unchanged. The purpose of the European Commission is to increase funds for other new priorities, such as migration, research, innovation and digital era,

28

youth, climate and environment, security and external action (EC, 2018b). In order to increase funding for these priorities, the EC proposes savings in current programs, which come mainly through budgetary cuts in the delivery of the EU Cohesion Policy and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Both, the Cohesion Policy and CAP remain crucial to development in the Union; hence a modernization of these policies is also expected, to allow them delivering as usual on their core priorities (EC, 2018b).

The financial and policy priority changes as explained above pose a threat mostly to the territorial and place-based dimension of the Cohesion Policy. A generally felt reducing interest on the territorial dimension of the cohesion and EU policies (Böhme et al., 2015) is not good news in the view of increasing regional disparities across Europe, and especially in a context where new countries from the Western Balkan are aspiring more than ever to integrate into the Union. The Western Balkan countries bring their diversities and idiosyncrasies to a process being currently crafted to steer their future in EU, and this renders the translation of EU policies to local practice rather challenging (TG-WeB, 2018); (EC, 2018d). It is expected to be at least the same challenging also the absorption at EU level of the socio-economic and cultural impacts that Western Balkan countries will bring to EU area. After all, enlargement has contributed to a further and significant increase of disparities in the EU as processes of the past indicate (EC, 2018b); (EC, 2008c).

To date, Cohesion Policy has a territorial dimension, which is present both in objectives and expected results, and in the way the policy is crafted and delivered over the years.

Though territorial thinking has implicitly been part of the regional policy since earlier years, officially and explicitly the formulation of the territorial cohesion as a dimension of the Cohesion Policy happened in 2007 10 (Faludi, 2009). A first very important European policy development with spatial impact is the European Spatial Development Perspective belonging to the programming period of 1994-1999. ESDP “was adopted as a legally non-binding document providing a policy framework for or the sectororiented policies at local, regional, national and European level that have spatial impacts.” (EC, 2008c, p.17). ESDP put forward the objective of balanced polycentric territorial development for enhancing Europe’s competitiveness (Faludi, 2009), besides sustainable development and parity of access to infrastructure and knowledge. The Territorial Agenda initially prepared in 2007 11 and then revised as the TA2020 reinforces ESDP, which remains valid to date in terms of objectives. The European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON) as a program was established soon

29

after ESDP adoption (in 2002), in order to strengthen its application through the provision of territorial knowledge, as a basis for the territorial future of EU in the view of ESDP implementation and the implementation of other sectors affecting the territory12.

Europe 2020, as the overarching strategic document for policy implementation in EU, sets the tone for the Territorial Agenda 2020 and the achievement of the territorial cohesion within Cohesion Policy. The strategy incorporates territorial cohesion as part of its inclusive growth priority and ‘European platform against poverty’ flagship initiative. The strategy does not have a territorial dimension per se, and does not explicitly talk about territorial governance. The territorial outcome of the strategy is far from clear because the strategy itself is ‘spatially blind’ in its conception (Böhme et al., 2011). Furthermore, the convergence between the strategy objectives and those of the Territorial Agenda 2020 is still limited as the study conducted by Böhme et al. (2011) shows. However, multilevel governance and the place-based approach are part of it. By following the principle of subsidiarity, the strategy requires that the priorities of the Union are brought as close as possible to the citizens, strengthening the ownership needed to deliver the strategy, and this is done through the enhancement of the contribution of stakeholders at all levels – government and societal, through partnership, and collaboration in elaborating and implementing national reform programs (EC, 2010).

The stakeholders include both, institutions of government at different vertical levels and civil society and diverse actors’ networks. In this way the strategy indirectly recognises the territorial frame as a factor in implementation. However, the strategy defines targets agreed for the whole EU, representing measurable indicators that shall signal the achievement of its priorities (Böhme et al., 2013). Member states have made use of these targets to set their national targets in response to Europe2020. However, in 2011 it was recognised by the European Commission as well that regions should not be expected to reach these national targets, because it is unrealistic, especially in the context of high regional diversities (Böhme et al., 2013) and disparities. The adoption of the Territorial Agenda 2020 in 2011 at the meeting of the ministers responsible for spatial planning and territorial development in the EU, as a strategy that elaborates particularly on the territorial dimension of the EU 2020 strategy, was a concrete step in this regard; though as mentioned earlier, full alignment between objectives is not present.

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Territorial Agenda 2020 contributes to a better understanding and operationalization of the territorial dimension and issues of development in EU. Still TA2020 has received less attention compared to the Europe2020 strategy. On one hand, this is because its messages remain difficult for a large audience to absorb and address, primarily because of the complexity of the territorial matters and approach (Böhme et al., 2011). In fact, as Böhme et al. (2011) suggest the territorial [cohesion] debate should be extended beyond the people who directly work with the concept, and the territorial messages and actions should be more development oriented and effectively communicated to the general public. On the other hand, the limited attention versus TA relates to the process in which it was conceived, which is essentially collaboration between the spatial planning national authorities of the EU countries. As a result, TA2020 came merely as an update of the TA2007. While in principle TA2020 and Europe 2020 are supposed to reinforce each-other, the political processes that stand behind are different (Böhme et al., 2011) and thus do not lead to a proper convergence of objectives. Europe 2020 has a formal delivery mode, but in the case of TA2020 this is ‘trickier’ (Böhme et al., 2015).

According to the European Commission, territorial cohesion could be understood by: capitalising on strengths of each territory; managing concentration, with cities as the key focus; better connecting territories through access, transportation, energy and communication; and developing cooperation in a context where problems and solutions areas of influence do not match with administrative boundaries13. The purpose of the territorial cohesion is to contribute to the cohesion policy in reducing disparities, enhancing competitiveness, and promoting harmonious and sustainable development by means of polycentrism, a revised rural policy and, once again, cross border cooperation (Faludi, 2009). This territorial dimension of the cohesion adds to economic and social cohesion by involving citizens, enabling good territorial governance and taking account of the territory where issue take place and what the related opportunities and effects are (ibid).

Finally, the practice so far, but also the EU processes that have discussed the territorial presence of multi-layers stakeholders’ networks that manage resources in continuous interaction among them, make regions a very unique place for development, which is robust, stable and adaptable to changing contexts: 1. Regions show a number of territorial disparities. Dealing with development at the level of regions, means dealing with both: economic growth and reduction of disparities. This leads to the need for focusing on regions/territories that are

31

lagging behind and, through enhancing their diversities and raising institutional capacities, strengthening cohesion from a territorial, social and economic perspective.

2. The projects and results of the EU regional policy have covered areas such as infrastructure, transport, energy production, improvement of environment14, all with particularly strong effect on the territory (EC, 2008a); (EC, 2009), in terms of how the latter is shaped and how the communitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; welfare and performance could be increased in the future. However, there are also the so called soft projects that intend to strengthen capacities and invest on human resources, which, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, are crucial in defining the development path of a territory/region.

3. Competitiveness is one of the intended results of the EU regional policy and it is based on territorial diversities that spur growth. As defined in EC (2018f), the policy has evolved from a policy aimed at compensating regions for their handicaps to a policy that improves growth, competitiveness and stimulates jobs creation. By creating jobs and growth, investing in people and supporting enterprises, the policy has empowered territorial features that boost competitiveness and therefore growth and sustainable development.

4. Finally, the multi-levels governance model established to deliver the EU regional policy constitutes a first example of territorial and polycentric governance and could serve as a basis for other policy implementation processes.

Of course, it is a model that is established mostly through top-down interventions and in the way it has gained a stronger bottom-up dimensions. It is also a model that besides successful achievements, faces also challenges, such as: not being fully explicit or understood by larger audiences; a combined urbanrural dimension that still needs to be strengthened; difficulties with the horizontal coordination of sectorial policies; a continuously growing need for more and better knowledge on territories and territorial impacts of the policy/ies; and a high level of effort (institutional, financial, and capacity wise) in establishing and maintaining territorial partnerships (EC, 2009); (Tosics, 2018); (ERDF, 2013); (EC, 2014c); (EC, 2014b).

1.2.2 The need for territorial dimension in [future EU] policies According to ESPON (2018) the â&#x20AC;&#x153;territorial thinking should become an integral part of pan-European and national policy orientationsâ&#x20AC;?, as the mean to maximise territorial

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development potentials and promote the well-being of citizens (ESPON, 2018a, p.3).

The same paper raises also questions to be answered in order to achieve territorial thinking in development. Hence, scale and type of the territory – therefore the geographical principles, are the first issue of concern, to continue with opportunities in key development fields and methods and approaches to apply, in order increase the efficiency of policy interventions (ESPON, 2018a), which is the aim of the territorial approach.

In the case of geographical considerations there are a number of aspects to consider, such as: territorial polycentrism, the strength and the potential of urban centres, regions/territories with geographic specificities, inner peripheries, and functional areas.

Understanding territorial polycentricity patterns is important as the latter helps in strengthening “the competitive power of urban centres” (ESPON, 2018a, p.4), while at the same time contributing to reducing disparities and facilitating communication and functional relations among these centres and between them and the more peripheral ones (ESPON, 2005). Territorial polycentricity ensures not only the development of the powerful urban settlements and regions, but also the balanced functionality of the whole regional network, making use of accessibility, location, unique territorial values and the potentialities of each centre or settlement.

The knowledge on territories of geographic specificities (Gløersen et al., 2013) and of the inner peripheries (Noguera et al., 2017); (Tagai et al., 2017), is also supporting the recognition of the position that each place has in the territorial network. The inner peripheries tend to be usually disadvantaged, in both demographic and accessibility terms, sometimes being border regions and lagging regions. Similarly, regions with geographic specificities, such as sparse, mountainous or island ones, also tend to be more disadvantaged in terms of economic performance, activities, and demographic indicators. However, the disadvantaged regions may also have unique features, such as natural resources or ecosystem and biodiversity values that, if used properly and sustainably, could turn into development factors, providing that other factors such as connectivity, accessibility and human and institutional capacities will also be provided.

Last, but not least, functional areas constitute places worth identifying, recognising and working accordingly. According to the ESPON study on policentricity (2005), a functional urban area consists of an urban core and the area around it that is economically integrated with the centre. Functional areas, as the name defines it, are designated on the basis of the function/s chosen to use as criteria, and do not coincide

33

with administrative jurisdictions. On the contrary the functional urban areas are defined by the functional, mainly economic, interdependencies between settlements and among people, and might have “one or more urban centres of different sizes and economic importance” (Brezzi & Veneri, 2015, p.1) Discrepancies between “functional areas and administrative borders can create difficulties when trying to achieve a balanced territorial development in and around a city” (ESPON, 2005, p.132). In certain cases, when local governments have large territories and a mixed rural-urban character, functional areas may fall within the jurisdiction of one local government. However, as the functionality is relative and depends on what is to be measured – a watershed, labour market catchment areas, commuter catchment areas, the functional area of an urban centre, etc., often they fall onto different administrative areas.

In the case of thematic or strategic priorities for development, such as the knowledge economy, the circular economy, the SMEs development, and the low carbon economy, territory is again a crucial dimension (ESPON, 2018a). Simulating the knowledge economy and SMEs development is a precondition for enabling long-term competitiveness, resilience and development of the regions (ESPON, 2018a). The circular economy on the other hand is based on the notion of place-based development, because its aim is to maintain the value of the resources, materials and products within the economy for as long as possible. It is for these reasons that circular economy should become a guiding principle in territorial development and governance. Not only is the circular economy expected to reduce territorial disparities, but also to affect current territorial balances reproducing new ones.

The methods to increase the efficiency of policy interventions, thereby employing the territorial dimension in development and governance, are characterised by a set of features, as summarised based on ESPON (2018): the place-based approach; the territorial governance; cooperation among places; and territorial assessment of the policies that enhances the character of the place-based approach and territorial governance.

According to Barca (2009), the place-based approach “focuses on place-specific longterm strategies that are elaborated in multi-level governance with a strong involvement of local elites” (Böhme et al., 2015, p.16). This approach is developed around 4 principles, as defined in ESPON (2018), which include the territorial, thematic and financial integration, public private partnerships, and stakeholders’ engagement.

Territorial integration deals with development beyond administrative boundaries,

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which is also the core of territorial governance, and uses place opportunities for development – comparative advantages, uniqueness and critical mass. Thematic integration ensures the horizontal dimension in sectorial development. The latter is vertical by definition, but the effects of sectorial policies are territorial and therefore a cross-sectorial coordination and perspectives is to be undertaken, aiming at the wellbeing of places and populations (Toto, 2019) (CSD, 1999). Financial integration on the other hand aims at generating funds from diverse sources, public and private, in order to achieve territorial (regional) objectives. In this regard, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are a critical mean for ensuring these funding schemes, though specific programs and instruments that make use of public funds for place-based development exist and may be developed as part of regional development and cohesion policies – both EU and domestic. While PPPs are critical to funding, wide stakeholders’ engagement is critical especially to territorial and thematic integration.

Territorial governance incorporates the place-based or place-sensitive approach, and it is particularly characterised by the so-called ‘soft or fuzzy boundaries’ (ESPON, 2018a) (Finka & Kluvankova-Oravska, 2010); (Faludi, 2016); (Faludi, 2012). The latter imply that governance structures and solutions may be created and function to manage and provide solutions to: ad-hoc problems (for instance a planning exercise for a specific functional territory); issues that are not related to administrative boundaries as it is often the case with commons (natural resources, drainage and irrigation, etc.); and to crossborder issues. According to ESPON (2018), these structures are not alternative, but rather complementary to hard structures. This implies that there is no intention for these structures to replace the fixed governance structures, but rather to address issues of multi-level or multidimensional character that require the cooperation of several stakeholders (formal and informal), whose voting rights may fall under specific jurisdictions that do not necessarily comply with the territorial extent of the problem at stake (Shutina & Toto, 2017).

On the other hand, though occasionally the structures will be ad-hoc, this is not always the case (Shutina & Toto, 2017). The fuzziness of boundaries is not always an ad-hoc event. It is in several cases defined by the fact that administrative boundaries do not coincide with the natural boundaries of the issue at stake. For instance, in watershed management, or forest management, the boundaries are mostly stable overtime, but are not administrative and therefore the overlay of boundaries creates a fuzziness area or strip. The knowledge on the ‘fuzzy strip’ and on spatial/regional typologies that create

35

it is needed to understand what types of development strategies and actions should be applied to this area, but also to the core that is surrounded by the strip. For instance, in defining the value of ecosystem services for a territory and employing them into benefit-cost analysis during spatial planning, it is necessary to understand how the boundaries of the ES (that extend beyond the boundaries of the services-providing areas] fall within the fuzzy strip and overlay with demand on ES created in these areas, and with problems that affect the quality of the area and the welfare of the residing population.

A strong point of territorial governance is the soft territorial cooperation, born out of the existence of fuzzy boundaries. This soft cooperation increases the flexibility of organizations and therefore the ownership of issues and solutions (ESPON, 2018a).

This is strongly linked to the fact that actors and issues are related geographically, hence leading to a geographical focus of the solution. The fact that there is a large diversity of actors to deal with or set cooperation among may prove a challenge; but then again, knowledge on the geographical focus is exactly the solution to this challenge. In overall, this soft territorial cooperation, though may increase the challenge for democratic legitimacy (voters vis-à-vis the elections’ communities/areas) (Faludi, 2016); (Keating, 2013); (Hooghe & Marks, 2016) is the instrument that leads towards networking and places’ interaction, which are critical features of polycentric governance and polycentric territorial development.

1.4 Gaps, objectives for research and methodological approach The effort of this study to set so far a context in relation to territory, development and governance, reveals a set of [challenging] issues for further consideration: •

Sustainable territorial development is a global goal. This goal stands in a context, where development cannot be considered as merely economic growth, as it includes also social, environmental and territorial dimensions; and territorial disparities remain high worldwide, regardless of efforts to spur growth, eradicate poverty, and bring regional convergence.

•

As a result of the multidimensional character, measuring territorial development requires also new metrics, which reflect the various dimensions, therefore being place-informed. Various indicators are listed and indexes are built, but as the purpose of territorial development is/should be place-based, the

36

various indexes are/should often [be] modified to fit the context and/or new indexes are/should be developed to respond to concrete purposes and territorial specificities.

•

Besides metrics, measuring territorial development is also scale dependent.

Disparities may become visible or invisible if the territorial scale changes, and this is expected to have an impact on how territorial development policies are articulated and pursued.

•

Furthermore, scale dependencies related to territorial development have a mutual implication with power and authority dynamics as well. The balance and degree of centralization versus decentralization, authority versus democracy, multi-layers

partnerships

versus

solely

government’s

arrangements,

cooperation versus control and coercion, is a clear indication towards the likelihood of achieving sustainability in territorial development.

•

Recognising scales leads to the comprehension of the territorial diversities that make every territory unique in its own and prone to opportunities for development and growth. Territories are considered peripheral or central and this is a feature that apparently affects their ability for embarking on sustainable development practices. Knowledge of these geographies becomes therefore a preliminary step in the process and mode of achieving territorial development.

In practical terms this can be regarded as knowledge on spatial typologies, which should include also territories of fuzzy/soft boundaries, besides the merely administrative ones.

•

Territorial governance is needed to achieve sustainable territorial development.

This mode of governance represents an important shift in governance modes, as being polycentric and place-based, and functioning through a stable coordination and cooperation between stakeholders and sectorial policies.

•

In order to achieve sustainable territorial development, countries in the European Union have opted for territorial polycentricity and for a system of multilevel governance, which endorses (at least it is assumed so) the place-based approach and promotes cooperation among stakeholders and among sectorial policies. Empirical studies so far show that territorial polycentricity alone has not been sufficient to ensure convergence of development between regions and therefore reduce regional disparities. The multilevel governance, though

37

explored theoretically and applied in practice, suffers weaknesses that stand in the implementation of its own key features – place-based and cooperation. The multi-levels approach has not explored well its connection to the territory (Keating, 2013). Being multi-level does not necessarily mean a self-regulating network of stakeholders where all of them have decision-making power (Hooghe & Marks, 2003); (McGinnis, 2011); (Berardo & Lubell, 2016). What multilevel governance has not explored as yet (though it could have implied it) is the opportunity to establish polycentric interactions at different (overlaying) scales, or benefit from existing ones. These polycentric interactions take place among institutions (stakeholders at any level or group) and among institutions (meaning also individuals) and territorial resources, and are executed at various territorial scales (geographical or social construct) and are characterised by balanced distribution of decision-making powers between participating actors.

The analysis so far and the features, obstacles and weaknesses in the process of enabling sustainable territorial governance, suggest (among others) one specific gap that for the sake of this research is named as ‘the polycentricity gap’. As the theoretical analysis will show in latter chapters, polycentricity is a feature of territory and governance – hence, there is territorial polycentricity and polycentric governance. Both constitute policy objectives and policy results that should lead to polycentric territorial development. The question is, to what extent polycentricity is a practical concept and has it managed to move from a theoretical conception to a normative one, easily measured and aimed for? Burger and Meijers (2012, p.1145) emphasize that research on the “relationship between polycentricity and regional performance is of pivotal importance” for territorial cohesion, but more evidence is needed “to determine whether polycentric development as a policy concept is sustainable” and “whether the alleged benefits of polycentricity and polycentric development hold true or not”.

Furthermore, the definition on polycentricity and seemingly, also ways to measure it are not definitive. The methodology for measuring polycentricity, at least the territorial one, is debatable. The utility of the latter concept is challenged because empirical evidence 15 shows that polycentric countries have high regional disparities. So, the assumption that it reduces regional disparities is questionable at a regional level.

Polycentricity in governance and polycentricity in territorial developments are studied apart. Of course, there is a relation, but there is little work undertaken to show how can/does polycentric governance produce the desired effects of polycentricity. In the

38

broad myriad of literature, the theories and the discourse on both these concepts are mostly separate. There are few authors that explore the connection between the two concepts, to mention Finka and Kluvankova (2015), Finka et al. (2015) and Sovacool (2010). They argue that for sustainable and resilient territorial development to be achieved, both objectives – territorial polcyentricity and polycentric governance should be accomplished. While territorial polcyentricity reinforces the linkages between places and enhances their competitiveness factor and spurs economic growth, it does not necessarily ensure equity (as empirical evidence shows – see chapter 2).

Polycentric governance on the other hand is about collaboration and interaction between centres, or socio-institutional nodes that besides being centres of production and services consumption have some degree of decision-making power. So, it is not merely the territorial structure, but also the processes behind and the way these processes are governed (through various modes of governance), which guarantee the degree in which development and growth will occur. Finka and Kluvankova (2015) bring also a number of examples, where territorial development at the regional or subnational levels is produced as a result of convergence between territorial polycentricity and polycentric governance. However, in overall, empirical cases in support of this argument are not sufficient, not simply numerically, but also because as mentioned earlier, most of the studies on each topic happen separately and there is no deliberate alignment of findings. So, while intuitively it sounds appropriate that both polycentric systems (territorial and governance) are needed for sustainable territorial development, there should be more empirical evidence to support the argument.

In conclusions, for governance and territory the polycentricity gap is: •

Multilevel governance does not embrace the territory in deep, though there are significant efforts to emphasise the territorial cohesion as a dimension of regional policies;

•

Polycentric governance is very much about interactions and it does not necessarily deal with territory or territorial rescaling. The latter allows asking key questions and offering solutions about the construction of territorial systems and power within them (Keating, 2013);

•

Territorial governance is a representative of the polycentric paradigm, but suffers from little specification into policy domains and sectors (Toto, 2019).

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“Territorial governance is concerned both with the governance of territory and with the territorial dimension of governance” (Böhme et al., 2013, p.7); •

Territorial polycentricity is focused mostly on the territorial structure and flows of information, services and goods that go along with it. However, it does not have at its focus the connection with governance processes that stand behind polycentric territories.

In view of this preliminary context analysis, the overall objective, or external goal (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010) of this research is to contribute to the further theoretical development of polycentricity concept (both in governance and territory), assuming that convergence of the two systems will promote sustainable territorial development, by boosting competitiveness among regions/territories and eliminating disparities at any level. The research intends to add further to the repository of cases explored by other scholars under the argument that “polycentrism can combine the strengths of global and local action” and “exploit a middle ground between scales of action” (Sovacool, 2011, pp.3842-43).

To achieve the overall objective, on a specific objective = internal goal (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010)) level, the research uses as a case study Albania that at a European level is a peripheral region, while domestically is composed of various territorial diversities and structures that display unequal development among them. Taking European peripheral regions as a case study should inform the process of polycentric governance evolution from the perspective of a specific spatial typology. Due to sociopolitical systems’ shifts, peripheral regions of Eastern Europe (i.e. Western Balkans as a peripheral region included) have not gone through all those public administration formation stages that western countries have experienced (Toto, 2018). Besides having negative effects, the socio-political leaps can provide peripheral regions with a chance to learn from [past] mistakes and experiences of the ‘west’. The question arises on how could peripheral regions learn from the experience of the ‘west’, while creating models tailored to their realities, able to cope with their level of societal maturation, and to prevent or mitigate common problems.

The internal goal (specific objective) of the research is to provide evidence and argue that territorial rescaling at sub-national level (through regions) is a continuous process and should not be a fixed one, in order to guarantee that polycentric governance is conceived and made operational and that it enables territorial development, even in contexts where territorial polycentricity is weak or missing. The research intends to

40

achieve its specific objective (internal goal) by collecting empirical evidence, analysing conditions of polycentricity and territorial rescaling, and by conducting an assessment that critically reflects on current theories, to bring them a step further.

The sub-questions derived from the above specific objective are as follows. The text, which is in italics, represents the link between the objective and the sub-questions. This emphasis is made also to help with the identification and reading of the key concepts, which are further unravelled through the theoretical review and discussion and through the empirical research: 1. What are the patterns and model of territorial rescaling in Albania from a comprehensive â&#x20AC;&#x201C; territorial, social, ethno-historical, economic, geographical and socio-ecological perspective?

2. Where do Albania and its regions stand in terms of territorial polycentricy versus monocentricity?

3. In what way the territorial disparities being present in Albania affect [territorial] development, governance and regionalization (as representation of territorial rescaling) attempts?

4. What polycentric interactions leading to cases of polycentric governance happen on the territory?

5. What are the effects of these polycentric interactions on territorial development in Albania?

In order to build evidence that supports the analysis of the above argument, the research follows a number of steps (both theoretical and empirical research), which constitute the research framework: 1. Key concepts are identified and unravelled through literature review and critical theoretical discussion. The key concepts in the above objective are: territorial polycentricity; polycentric governance; territorial rescaling; sub-national level; territorial development; peripheral region. The theories to refer to are those of polycentric governance, territorial polcentricity, and the body of literature on regions, regional governance and regionalization, and territorial rescaling.

Besides, as Albania is the research case study, the country aspires EU integration and regional/territorial development and governance to achieve it are subject to the implementation of the acquis chapters, an overview of how the theoretical concepts are approached from an EU perspective is also provided.

41

2. Three blocks of evidences are built and used in the analysis: i) the historical patterns of territorial rescaling in Albania are identified and analysed to prove that rescaling happens continuously and it results into fixed territorial boundaries that serve a particular purpose, or function. Any time it has happened, territorial rescaling has affected social interactions on the territory, or the latter have been a factor for how rescaling has been finalised in terms of designated boundaries. The analysis should show that territory as a social construct and territory as a geographical space defined through a deterministic approach (Keating, 2013) cannot exclude one another in any related processesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; practical outcome; ii) an analysis of regional disparities and territorial polycentricity is carried out, to understand the level of disparities, the territorial scale where disparities are present, the features of territorial polycentricity and the resulting territorial development. This analysis intends to show the relation between predefined territorial rescaling (regionalization carried out for a specific purpose) and the way disparities display on the territory. It also intends to show where does Albania stand in the polycentric-monocentric spectrum of territorial structure, and whether there is a connection between territorial disparities and the territorial structure; iii) evidences are gathered on polycentric interactions on the territory to identify cases of multi-level [territorial] governance and/or polycentric governance, other governance models and the potential respective effects on territorial development for each case.

3. A discussion is made based on the results of the above blocks of empirical evidence and analysis, to show that territorial rescaling and especially the configuration of a meso-level, or subnational level (territorial and/or governance), or multiple overlapping territorial levels, is/are needed to enable sustainable territorial development. The discussion will also provide insights on whether this territorial rescaling is/should be finalised into a fixed territorial configuration (i.e. region) or is/could be a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;dynamic territorial rescaling modelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;.

4. Conclusions resulting from the analysis and any related recommendation are provided in two levels: i) as a contribution to the scientific and theoretical discourse on polycentricity (territorial and governance); ii) as concrete recommendations to governance processes and territorial development policymaking in Albania.

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Figure 2. Research framework

Source: Author The research brings a combination of the theoretical and practical-oriented research, because by design it is conceived to provide contribution to both: (i) scholarships on polycentricity and polycentrism; (ii) how territorial rescaling can support, or coexist with polycentric governance to enable territorial development in peripheral regions, where amongst others, territorial polycentrism will most probably not be present. As it was mentioned above, the conclusions and recommendations will consist of issues of both, theoretical and practical relevance.

Methodologically speaking the research endorses two approaches: the case study approach and the grounded theory approach. Both have advantages and disadvantages, but the combination of the two is necessary to achieve two objectives (related to the research process): acquire in-depth knowledge of the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; that is subject to this research; and codify this knowledge in a way that it gives space to comparison between empirical findings and existing theories. The case study approach is applied to the Albanian system of territorial and governance polycentricity. This is one single case where the territory, the governance system and the polycentric stakeholder interventions constitute the objects of research.

43

By engaging in this type of research during a 4-years period, working daily with the institutions that deal with the above objects, following their interventions, participating in events and roundtables, and documenting their actions and results, as well as building a database of cases and indicators (based on desk review and through secondary sources) that allows a detailed territorial analysis, it is possible to explore in depth the whole case, instead of dealing with units and variables as it would be the case in a sample-based reductionist approach. By combining territorial analysis, based on a large set of indicators with institutional and network analysis (based on meetings, semistructured interviews and mostly close cooperation and direct participation in governance processes), the research deploys both, quantitative and qualitative data analysis. The case study approach is particularly of relevance to the achievement of the internal goal (specific objective) in relation to the study of the practical case of Albania, and especially the ability to generate knowledge and recommendations that are useful to territorial rescaling and development, and polycentric governance in Albania.

Furthermore, the theories that are being analysed and tested for do not cover other contextual situations similar to a country like Albania. Hence, the grounded theory approach is necessary mainly for testing and converging the two current sets of theories (territorial polycentricity and polycentric governance) in a rescaling context of peripheral regions. In order to do so, a number of variables that characterise polycentric governance are assembled and unravelled for their meaning. These variables are used to code the cases of polycentric interactions. The variables are predefined based on theoretical review and on cases explored by other scholars. However, the codification basis is left open to include new variables that may arise as commonalities during the research on cases.

Both approaches include also limitations as follows: â&#x20AC;˘

As of the outset, it is expected for the number of polycentric interactions not to be very high. From a basic knowledge of the context, a preliminary assumption is made, which indicates that the current polycentric interactions are mostly influenced by external initiatives, such as donor projects, or by top-down government processes. This limits the number of polycentric interactions that resemble polycentric governance processes, based on the codification variables.

â&#x20AC;˘

The database of territorial disparities and polycentricity is built through figures obtained by the National Institute of Statistics (INSTAT), the Bank of Albania,

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the Ministry of Finance and Local Governments. A large dataset of more than 100 variables is then analysed. The above are official sources of information and in most cases provide also time series, which is very positive for the validity of the research, both externally and internally â&#x20AC;&#x201C; it is possible to compare the findings with European analysis using the same typology of data and similar methodologies. However, the official statistics have three features that could become handicaps in analysis: i) It may be the case that some of the data show a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;better image of the realityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, due to being government-influenced16; ii) The level of disaggregation is not the same for all datasets. For instance, most of the INSTAT data are provided at qark17 level and in some cases also at local government level, each comprising 12 and 61 units respectively. The data from the Bank of Albania represent the national level, while the local finances data from the Ministry of Albania are provided at the level of 61 municipalities. iii) Another issue related to the level of disaggregation is the time series.

Because of the national territorial administrative reform that took place in 2015, 373 small local governments were reorganised and merged into 61 larger ones. The time series are built for most indicators as of 1990, but since 2015 the lowest level of data that time series provide is that of the 61 local government units, the latter being territorially mixed in terms of urban and rural patterns. Hence it is also highly expected that disparities at lower territorial levels will not be [fully] revealed.

Furthermore, some data are thematically oriented. For instance, the data on environmental issues do not cover administrative units (such as municipalities), but are measured in specific locations in the rivers, watersheds, urban centres and forests. Hence, comparing between socioeconomic indicators on one hand, and territorial and environmental indicators on the other, may produce results of lower validity and reliability.

The first limitation is a fact that shapes the context of the research. It is not possible to compare the current situation to a situation where external influences or authoritative processes were not presents, because both this assumptions are not realistic. On the other hand, it is not the purpose of this research to deal with such a comparison, or

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measure the degree of external influence. The aim is to indicate whether there are polycentric interactions for governance at all, and if so, what types of interactions have taken place, in which territorial rescaling contexts, and with what challenges and achievements/effects. By analysing the interactions in terms of all variables defined for codification, it is possible to differentiate between types of interactions and compare them with the territorial setting, where the different types of interactions take place.

The second limitation can be overcome only through the certainty of applying the same margin of error in all data sets (given that all data are collected by and/or indicators calculated by INSTAT, and using continuously the same methodological approaches).

Furthermore, the large number of variables and indicators will allow for increased validity of data and findings.

In order to answer to the sub-questions of the research and therefore achieve its specific objective, a detailed methodological approach will be followed for each of the blocks of evidences as described above. These blocks of evidences constitute the core of the empirical part of this research. The respective methodological approaches are presented as follows. It is easily noted that there is a mixture of methods and that is based on two assumptions: i) The issues at stake are complex and have been studied before in several different contexts and for different purposes. It is not possible to deal with all of them (the issues) through using a unique universal methodology. The contexts to which the analysis of each issue is applied and the purpose of the analysis, affect the methodology being used, therefore heading to a set of approaches that might share similarities, but remain distinguishable. The theoretical discussion in chapter 2 will provide more ground to this assumption, when describing territorial typologies and peripheralities, territorial polycentricity, as well as related policy implications; ii) The analysis has a core territorial element and that is the region, as an intermediate territory that shows significant degrees of flexibility, both functionally and geographically, according to the criteria that stand on the basis of its formation in every context. This research is about territorial rescaling and the theoretical discussion will show how rescaling could be understood as socio-economic, institutional, and territorial process that happens between two layers already set in the governance continuum, namely the local and the central/national governments. This subnational, or regional layer is more than merely a fixed tier, it is a multi-dimensional interaction among stakeholders and between them and the territory, resulting into economic

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development approaches, territorial settings, administrative entities, institutions, power transfer, and any other social interrelation one could imagine. Keating (2013) describes rescaling as a migration of political, social, and economic systems to new territorial levels. When this happens, it has also spatial implications in terms of administrative units of governance (ibid), and this is especially the case when rescaling happens between local and national levels, resulting into processes of regionalization or regionalism and formation of new jurisdictions (Scott, 2009a); (Scott, 2009b); (Hooghe & Marks, 2016). While the region and related processes are discussed in greater detail in the theoretical chapter, it is worth mentioning here that region’s formation is a process of multifaceted character and largely affected by the purpose leading the process and the criteria employed (implicitly or explicitly) during the process.

•

1st block of evidences: Historical patterns for territorial rescaling in Albania – the methodological approach

When discussing regional governance, regionalization, regionalism, regional development, territorial rescaling, etc. authors always list (among others) two fundamental aspects: time and historical backgrounds (see Hooghe and Marks (2016), Keating (2009), etc.). This is so, because the territorial rescaling process that includes all of the above processes, is dynamic, as old as governance is, and a continuous process, and continuously affected by historical events or situations. In these circumstances, by understanding how territorial rescaling has evolved in time, it is possible to understand better the most recent rescaling processes, as well as it is possible to capture tendencies, draw trends and be able to intervene objectively in [re]shaping territorial rescaling processes. For this purpose, in this research, a section is dedicated to the description and analysis of territorial rescaling in Albania. This includes an historical overview of regions, since when related records exists, and a more detailed description of the processes and institutions that could be linked to regions and regionalization for the last 30 years.

The historical overview is presented mainly through maps. There are little if not at all studies that cover the discussion on regions in Albania, and this is also due to the nationstate formation history. The 20th century could serve as a good reference point to initiate a regions’ discourse for Albania, while the last 30 years have had regions as a core topic in governance, economic development and territorial administration, though with various fluctuations. The analysis for this block of evidences is: graphical (through showing processes on the map), policy-oriented (describing evolution and results), and

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institutional-stakeholder (describing roles and responsibilities, together with principal changes).

•

2nd block of evidences: The analysis of regional disparities and territorial polycentricity – the methodological approach

Regional disparities were identified and measured for the first time in Albania by a UNDP and EU supported project named “Integrated Support for Decentralization”, implemented during 2009-2011. The approach was comprehensive, similar to other processes implemented in Bulgaria, Serbia and Croatia, and adapted to contextual conditions, especially to the availability of data. Furthermore, the first report of regional disparities (published in 2009) focused mostly on social-economic development and competitiveness. The territory-related chapters were also present, but with fewer indicators. Positively though, in the end the report had two types of classifications for the overall representation of disparities – one focusing on social-economic findings and the other one focusing on spatial and infrastructural aspects. This is considered positive because, methodologically speaking and in terms of finding, it was not possible to merge all aspects in a single index or typological classification of regions for disparities, so the team decided to keep both classifications. This decision was made in a context where, there was discussion among stakeholders about placing the emphasis on socioeconomic conditions only, or consider effects and relations to territory as well18.

The study of disparities undertaken under the frame of this research intends to improve previous approaches in a number of aspects: i)

Make a direct correlation of the objectives of the disparities analysis and the related indicators with the objectives addressing regional development in the National Strategy for Development and Integration 2015-2020. As it will be explained in chapter 3, Albania did not have a regional development policy and strategy at the time the data collection was executed, and it does not have one as yet. Therefore, identifying the strategic policy basis for referring to when selecting indicators is methodologically very important.

This gives (internal) relevance to choices made in terms of analysis and data/information collected.

Based on the NSDI 2015-2020 vision and regional development objectives, four areas are selected for the sake of this research: (i) Economic Growth based on Development, Competitiveness and Economic Resilience; (ii)

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Social Cohesion; (iii) Environmental Sustainability and Green Economy; (iv) Regions Accessibility and Territorial Development 19 . These areas represent also objectives for sustainable territorial development and for unravelling each of them a number of 2-4 respective sub-areas are identified, and then a number of indicators for each sub-area are listed.

Table 15 in Annex 4.1 contains 117 indicators. This is the initial list and it was built upon a preliminary selection based on the expected data availability. In the final study the list is reduced to around 100 indicators, due to final verification on availability. The table shows also sources of information and the lowest territorial level for which data can be found or produced. It is clear from the table that, while most of the data are available on the same territorial unit (mostly qark), there is also a considerable number of indicators with data available at municipal level, environmental monitoring station level, or statistical region level (the latter defined by INSTAT). The table does not include the data on polycentricity as in this case the analysis has a different methodology, which is explained in the paragraphs below. ii)

Increase the scope of the study. This does not include changes to the total geographical area under investigation. Hence, the final physical limits of research are the administrative boundaries of the state of Albania.

Furthermore,

at

lower

territorial

levels,

most

of

the

data

is

collected/analysed for qarks, municipalities and development regions.

However, by adding the accessibility and the territorial polycentricity analyses, new territorial subdivisions were added into the research process, such as Functional Urban Areas (FUA) and ad-hoc territorial units resulting from the specific purpose of the accessibility analysis. Besides making a difference in the depth disparities were researched (through strengthening the territorial aspect), the study is/was [internally] valid to other policy processes (besides regional development), such as proposals on regionalization scenarios, designation or regional development areas, etc.20. iii)

Increase the number of indicators, the length of data series for each indicator, and ensure the representation of some new indicators on lower spatial levels;

iv)

Incorporate the territorial polycentricity analysis, aiming at understanding the level of territorial polycentricity, comparing it with the EU countries,

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comparing the findings with those of the disparities analysis and drawing conclusions on the link between territorial development and territorial polycentricity in Albania.

In order to carry out the territorial polycentricity analysis the methodology is based on the following steps: i) Define geographically the polygons of the analysis, namely the Functional Urban Areas (figure 13). This is based on the INSTAT definitions of urban cores, urban agglomerations and commuters’ catchment areas, based on respective data from Census 2011, including the 1km2 grid (raster cells). The (base) maps were accessed through the online ASIG platform. ii) Define geographically the Potential Urban Strategic Horizons (PUSH) areas, through using the 45 minutes isochrones (from FUA centres), based on road public transportation and through own calculations on the Google map. This time limit is widely recognized as the most appropriate for work related daily commuting, and the areas included within the commuting radius provide cities with a better opportunity for functional integration. iii) Define geographically Potential Integration Areas (PIA). The hypothesis is that “cities with overlapping travel-to-work-areas have the best potential for developing synergies” (ESPON, 2005, p.13). These areas are approximated to “municipal boundaries, as municipalities are the potential building blocks in polycentric development strategies” (ibid.). The integration of the PUSH areas forms the so-called Potential Integration Areas (PIAs). iv) Analyse morphological polycentrism and construct a national polycentricity index composed of the size, location and connectivity indexes, each with an equal weight in the overall polycentricity index. v) Make a preliminary analysis of the functional polycentricity, or the functional specialization of the regions (of FUAs). This sheds light also on functional relations between regions. Functional specialization ensures diversity among cities, while also making sure there is integration, synergies and cooperation.

However, the analysis is only preliminary in this case, due to limited data availability for the 7 indicators that this analysis addresses. vi) Conclude on the territorial polycentricity in Albania.

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Regarding the accessibility analysis, due to lack of data, not all indicators suggested by the Spiekermann et al. (2015) TRACC analysis were used. Instead, only the following indicators were selected: Access time to motorway exits; Accessibility of people; and Availability of urban functions. The operationalization of these indicators is provided in the table 15 of Appendix 4.1.

In terms of data sources and methodologies referred to for calculating some of the indicators, the following was considered: i) For most of the indicators, the source of information is the Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT). The data are accessible on line in the INSTAT database, the Census 2011 data and studies, and the INSTAT web atlas 21 . Of great importance to the research are also the following INSTAT publications: “A new Urban Rural classification of the Albanian population” (2014) and “The typology of communes and municipalities” (2014), which provide the background material for the polycentrism analysis (for defining the FUAs) and provide information on the spatial typologies in Albania in a similar fashion as in Eurostat classifications. ii) Other data are obtained from the Bank of Albania and the ministries responsible on health and on education. The data on access is calculated based on the methodologies used in ESPON 2013, TRACC, Transport Accessibility at Regional/Local Scale and Patterns in Europe, Applied Research 2013/1/10, Final Report | Version 06/02/2015, Volume 2 TRACC Scientific Report (Spiekermann et al., 2015). Travel times are calculated through measurements made on Google maps and based on own travel experience. The territorial polycentricity analysis is made by following the methodology of ESPON 1.1.1, 2005, Potentials for polycentric development in Europe, Project report III. Territorial analysis of the Indicators.

The data are processed in excel and GIS and presented through tables, graphs and maps.

The base map, in all cases, was constructed by making use of the layers provided on line by ASIG (State Authority for Geospatial Information) Geo-portal22.

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3rd block of evidences: Identification of interactions on the territory, which personify polycentric governance – the methodological approach

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As defined earlier in this chapter, this research is looking at understanding the link between regionsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; typologies obtained in the territorial rescaling process and polycentric governance as a means for boosting sustainable territorial development and cohesion in a situation where the regions are peripheral and there is an expectation that disparities will be present. This raises the question on whether the territorial/regional typologies with their development profiles and the related territorial rescaling processes are linked to the presence of polycentric governance cases.

Defining territorial typologies is a matter of defining the objective to address when designating a specific territorial typology. Hence, as the objectives vary, the resulting typologies will be different, though the classification process is applied to the same territory. Different criteria are usually applied in each classification process and different weights are often given to each criterion. This results into various typologies.

For instance, measuring inner peripheries of Albania and then the lagging regions of Albania would result into different designation of boundaries, because the criteria applied for identifying lagging regions (national GDP versus regional GDP) are different than those applied for inner peripheries (economic potential, access to services, travel time to centres, etc.).

Polycentric governance, by definition is network governance (Berardo & Lubell, 2016); (McGinnis, 2011). It represents a very complex system that governs actorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; interactions regarding the sustainable use of resources and maximisation of benefits. Because it is highly based on actorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; interests and knowledge, on the emergence of new actors and actions, as well as on the functional linkages between the centres of decision-making, it is a system that evolves constantly and therefore its equilibrium is not a static concept, but a dynamic one. Any network is composed of nodes and linkages. Anytime a node transforms, appears or disappears, linkages between them are transformed, born or interrupted as well. This is an emerging and never-ending process that continuously gives rise to new constellations of actors and linkages (Boamah, 2018).

McGinnis (2005) in (Boamah, 2018) defines polycentric governance as a highly complex system that is multi-level, multi-type and multi-sector. This means that polycentricity in governance is defined by a number of critical factors, as follows: -

The national policy on governance should be one that allows decentralization at lower subnational government levels, and allows some autonomy in decisionmaking for various actors groups, or non-governmental entities, including communities. This is a basic precondition and it provides the initial clues for

52

what McGinnis (2011) calls as “gathering and dissemination of information regarding the conditions prevalent in a policy setting” (p.58). The following factors are most probably inexistent in a highly centralized governance context given that each of them is strongly linked to decentralization and networking.

-

The actors and/or centres of decision-making in the network should have at least one subject of common interest. For instance, water resources, tourism, economic development, etc. If no such subjects/areas of interest were in place, then there would be no network or interaction among the stakeholders. On the other hand, polycentric governance may happen around one specific subject within a given territory – for instance common forests governance, and other subjects on that territory may be dealt through other forms of governance (municipalities governing water sources in the forests). With this in mind, at a first sight, polycentric governance may not seem necessarily linked to the territory, but to the issue of interest only – the policy objective. However as the policy objective will always have a territorial dimension, polycentric governance will also be subject to the territory, where the policy objective is being addressed.

-

Being network governance, polycentric governance should have several centres of decision-making, independent but complementary to one-another, or highly interactive among them (V.Ostrom et al., 1961); (V.Ostrom, 1972); (McGinnis, 2011); (Boamah, 2018); (Berardo & Lubell, 2016). This means that even in the case of possible overlaps, still these entities find the appropriate way to deal with the specific policy objective / subject, in a cooperative and non-conflicting manner. These multiple autonomous actors, cooperate across scales and sectors through a network of functional linkages (Boamah, 2018); (Berardo & Lubell, 2016), otherwise recognised as a constellation of connections.

-

For cooperation to be achieved, there should be some minimal need or willingness for it. This means that the centres of decision-making or actors should have a common niche of attraction for genuine cooperation. This may be for instance the actors’ common desire to attract tourists in their respective area, in benefit of all – businesses offering tourist services, local community offering products to the service provision entities, local government achieving the objective of promoting its own territory and resources, increasing employment and overall local economic development, etc. This common niche

53

of attraction is what guarantees that individual actors engage in self-governance, and are willing to spend considerable amount of time and energy in crafting commonly accepted solutions and actively participating in its implementation (McGinnis & Walker, 2010). The ‘engagement’ in self-governance is what defines the difference between a common niche of attraction and subject of common interest (introduced above). The subject is broader, is a policy area and a policy objective, it defines the broader scope and if absent, then there is no need to discuss about cooperation at all. But for cooperation to happen, the stakeholders and centres of decision-making should identify a niche of attraction within the subject of common interest and start interacting to build it and make it functional. While the niche is common – for instance: increase the number of tourists in the specific area, the ways for stakeholders to engage with achieving it are not necessarily the same, but are complementary. In practice this means that there is a pool of win-win arrangements, where each stakeholder can pursue and accomplish its own and ‘selfish’ interest as part of the common niche of attraction, instead of competing for the same interest within the niche.

-

To happen, cooperation requires a space or a territory to materialise the autonomous, but simultaneously complementary interests/objectives of the actors. The specific features of the territory define or shape the common niche of genuine attraction for cooperation. In a natural landscape of forests and pastures, most probably, the common interest is common forests. In a coastal region, with interesting hinterlands, several urban settlements with plenty of urban services and adjacent rural areas with sustainable ecological agriculture, most probably a diversified and robust touristic offer is the common interest of all stakeholders. In a metropolitan region there will be several common interests, because of the large scale and complexity of issues. It is however in this case important to note how this region interacts with the administrative boundary of units in it, and what are key drivers (in terms of economic development) that [re]shape the territorial structure (Gabi et al., 2006). Hence the territorial typologies play a role in defining the subject/s of common interest and the need that brings actors or centres of decision-making together.

-

Finally, though in polycentric governance, the individual autonomy of decisionmaking centres is pivotal to the notion, this does not mean that each node operates in isolation. First the system itself operates through nodes that are in

54

constant interaction. It is arguable on whether interaction is feeble or highly pronounced, but is surely not absent. Second, even though it may seem as there is fragmentation due to size and overlapping scopes of the different centres of decision-making, as long as they take one-another into account in different competitive relationships, mutual value-added cooperation and conflict resolution, they are considered to be functioning as a system (V.Ostrom et al., 1961). These are interactions and function on the basis of a commonly agreed system of rules (Boamah, 2018), in order to avoid as much as possible overexploitation (tragedy of the commons) and under-consumption (free riders) dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990); (Alexander & Penalver, 2012). After all, in a polycentric governance system, providers face multiple options in their effort to procure public goods to their constituencies (McGinnis, 2011). In these circumstance rules to define and constrain activities of all actors are needed and established based on collective choice â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a process regulated through rules defined based on constitutional choice (McGinnis, 2011).

Methodologically speaking, the above factors can become measurable through setting indicators to quantify them or unravel their meaning: 1. The level of governance decentralization: This will be unravelled through the existing type of decentralization (political, administrative, functional and fiscal); the quantity and type of local government exclusive functions; the [quantity of] shared functions and the level of sharing between local and central government; the progress of fiscal decentralization in terms of legislation and implementation; the number and type of local forums that impact decisionmaking at local level and are established, or promoted by the municipalities, or cases of interactions for governing a policy objective.

2. Subject/s of common interest for decision-making making centres: This is unravelled through the type and/or number of subjects within the various territorial frameworks and policy cases that are explored. It can be defined in two different ways: 1) either by counting the policy areas and objectives defined into the various cases or approaches selected for study 2) or by identifying the issues that could potentially be subjects of common interest based on the diverse specificities of the territories being studied and based on local cooperation that happen regardless of being defined or not in government policies.

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3. The independent centres of decision-making: this counts for the nodes23 in the network that have a certain degree of autonomy in making norms and rules and enforcing them on others (Ostrom, 1999); (Carlisle & Gruby, 2017)] and the functional relations among them and deals with: the number, the heterogeneity of nodes, the levels (territorial and governmental) and the types of connections between nodes. The nodes are political, local (local government units), regional (the national government agencies), social (the community groups, the civic-society organizations, and media), market-related (the business groups and associations), and other actors that operate within the territory. Norms and rules as cited above, do not comprise only legislation pieces, but any type of agreed regulations that are created by a centre of decision-making and are imposed on a group that implements them. The scope of power and activity of the various decision-making centres may be overlapping (Carlisle & Gruby, 2017) due to the scale of the function and basin of beneficiaries. A critical factor in the case of overlapping jurisdictions is the flow of information and rules and how this is managed in order to reduce inefficiencies and costs and steer towards achieving the intended objectives (Ostrom, 1999). Referring again to Ostrom (1999) arguments, flows management is achieved by exchanging and combining local knowledge and performance with the strengths of larger systems in conflict resolution, and with acquisition of scientific knowledge.

4. Common niche of genuine attraction for cooperation: the purpose is to identify whether there is a specific need for cooperation and engagement in selfgovernance about a specific topic that comes from the actors themselves and what that need for it is. It will be quantified through the identification of cases of community self-governance and participation in projects and initiatives that lead to the achievement of a common cause.

5. Territories to materialise the common and autonomous interests: in this case, the various territories/regions, where actors come together into governance activities will be identified. These are territories where some governance activities are currently happening or could potentially happen, because there is a need for improvement of development. These territories could be administrative, politically designated, development â&#x20AC;&#x201C; related, planning regions, or territories of specific features (for instance ecosystems). The latter

56

comprise territories with natural and/or human-made specificities. These territories may be politically important, may not necessarily be accounted for in policy-making, or may be considered only in sectorial agendas. Watersheds for instance are such territories in Albania, but there are other cases to be considered as well.

It is expected that there will be several overlaps between the territories, but this will produce two types of information of interest: i) identification of the fuzzy areas/spatial strips – areas that emphasise the need for polycentric territorial governance as the only way to deal with the complexity of issues they contain and scale mismatches (Boamah, 2018) between issues that polycentric governance deals with and the related jurisdictions. Identifying these areas helps in smoothing out the level of abstraction in the “fuzzy boundaries” concept that territorial governance is confronted with in efforts of being materialised for democratic legitimacy and services delivery; ii) identification of potentially conflicting socio-ecological relationships between stakeholders that a polycentric governance system has to deal with. Identifying territories and their specificities is a crucial step in this research as the final aim is that of looking whether the various types of territories have an effect on the other critical factors of this list – hence factors that define the ability of a governance system to become polycentric. In practical terms this means that once the territorial typologies are defined and designated, and their diversities are described, the study of indicators for the other critical factors will follow per each territorial typology.

6. The system of rules accepted by actors in the network: this factor is rather difficult to measure, as it has to be defined separately for each subject of common interest. Common interest could be merely present or visible, and in more advanced situations is being accomplished through cooperation. For simplicity, only those subjects where common interest is both visible and is being pursued for achievement will be accounted for when describing the system of rules. The limitation of this choice is that of omitting the cases for potential polycentric governance. In this case, polycentricity in governance will be analysed in terms of what is currently happening and will not explore the opportunity to expand further the system. The system of rules includes: the

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existence of a common frame, the governance mechanism, the definition of the roles of actors, the rules for monitoring, enforcing, etc.

The above factors and the respective indicators subject to this research are summarised in the following table. The table provides also sources of information for each indicator.

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Table 1. Critical factors for assessing cases of polycentric governance in Albania Critical factor for polycentric governance

1. The level of governance decentralization

Indicators

Unit

Type and level of unravelling information Define type and describe the way it functions and what are limitations in rescaling

Type of decentralization

Political, Administrative, Functional, Fiscal

Local government functions

Exclusive and shared

Degree of autonomy in delivering each function â&#x20AC;&#x201C; legislation, policies, implementation, financial sources; Number of exclusive functions versus shared ones.

Local forums and/or networks that impact local decisionmaking

Types; Role: decision making or influencing

Describe those forums that are promoted by municipalities and government agencies; Created and rules provided rules by government

Source of information

Limitations

Law on self-governance and law on territorial reform Strategy on local government decentralization, Law on local finances Sectorial legislation Government reports and independent reports assessing decentralization progress and territorial reform as provided in the references Law on self-governance and sectorial legislation for shared functions Strategy on decentralization, Government reports on decentralization; sectorial legislation; independent reports as provided in the references.

Report on progress of decentralization strategy implementation.

Sectorial legislation; NTPAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s benchmark report on territorial plans; Donors reports and projectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s sites (PLGP, dldp) ADF reports and page (for RDF)

It provides information on decentralization of government, but not of governance.

Information about selfgovernance or decision-making power for non-government actors is not provided in this indicator.

The current law on local finances has entered in force in 2017. The effects of provisions on local financial autonomy are yet to be tested.

The law on local selfgovernance considers all functions as own, though the degree of real autonomy is defined by sectorial legislation Impossible to identify forums that are ad-hoc; Most forums/networks are project-based, therefore also functional in the short-term.

Created by government bur self-made rules Self-created and selfregulated.

Policy areas/objectives

Type defined per case; Is there a policy objective/area in place?

Provide the scope and describe. See if the policy area/objective is defined in strategies and plans.

Government institutions

Local and regional / central; number and role; territorial scope

Nongovernment entities

Type, number, knowledge, level of government or territorial where they belong

Define number and type for national and deconcentrated regional agencies and municipalities and administrative units Civic society, community, businesses, media, etc. Knowledge includes: political, social, scientific, and historical/traditional.

2. Subjects of common interest for decision-making centres

3. Independent centres of decision-making

NTPA and Ministry of Agriculture for 100+ Villages program Ministry of Finances for Urban Revival program and RDF Report on progress of decentralization strategy implementation.

Sectorial and cross-sector strategies; National Strategy for Development and Integration; National Territorial Plan; General Local Territorial Plans; papers and project reports (USAID and World Bank for forest commons); NTPA reports.

The territorial-administrative map of Albania; The Council of Ministers and Ministries’ websites; the law on local selfgovernance and sectorial legislation.

Ministries’ websites, independent reports and donor projects, Directorate for Development and Good Governance in Prime Minister’s Office; AMSHC website; Ministry of Finances, INSTAT, Donors’ projects; Regional Development Agencies; Continuous participation in or

Some of the strategies are outdated. Only 44 municipalities have a GLTP drafted/approved.

16 more have just started the drafting process.

These indicators does not imply that there is a common niche of genuine attraction – it simply states that there is an issue, often defined in policy documents, around which interest may arise.

Potential lack of updated information.

Very dynamic context and therefore impossible to ensure a complete identification. Not all NGOs are registered with AMSHC; information might not be updated, especially for NGOs, Knowledge is received from direct participation in events as a stakeholders or

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4. Common niche of genuine attraction for cooperation

5. Territories to materialise the common and autonomous interest

Linkages between centres / actors / nodes

Type of linkages; Direction of interaction;

Describe linkages based on interactions in forums, meetings, networking actions and workshops on subjects of interest: i.e. elections, projects, planning and budgeting, common pool resources.

Describe based on cases such as management of commons (forests), participatory planning, etc.

Type of attraction – define; Community self-governance and selfengagement

Number of cases and type; Cooperation/ interaction for nested enterprises

Regional typologies as per INSTAT/EU FUAs

Boundaries; features

Describe and delineate

Boundaries and features resulting from the polycentrism and disparities analysis

Describe and delineate

observation of stakeholders’ meetings and actions.

Directorate for Development and Good Governance in Prime Minister’s Office; AMSHC website; direct participation in events as a stakeholders or observer; donor projects; Central Elections Committee.

observer and not from welldocumented reports and records.

Limited information on the typology of forums and networks – often very local and unexposed.

Cases reports; web pages; Donor projects; Directorate for Development and Good Governance in Prime Minister’s Office; ADF; Ministry of Finances for RDF and Urban Revival; Ministry of Agriculture for 100+ Villages; municipalities for planning processes; Benchmark Report for local plans from NTPA; direct participation in forums and networks and institution’s activities INSTAT: Typology of Communes and Municipalities, 2014

Can only be defined by a limited number of networks. Based on cases, the territorial frames to be covered will be different.

Polycentrism Analysis for Albania (Author)

Morphological only

Pre-set, without a policy objective/purpose to respond

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PIAs

Lagging regions

Inner Peripheries

RMAs

Options for administrative regions

Natural regions

Boundaries and features resulting from the polycentrism and disparities analysis Boundaries and features resulting from the polycentrism and disparities analysis Boundaries and features resulting from the polycentrism and disparities analysis Regional Management Areas â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 3 qarks each area Option1: 4 regions

Describe and delineate

Polycentrism Analysis for Albania (Author)

Morphological only

Describe and delineate

Based on Polycentrism Analysis for Albania (Author) and Regional Disparities in Albania (ISD project, RDPA project, and Author)

Responding to only one policy objective

Describe and delineate

Based on Polycentrism Analysis for Albania (Author) and Regional Disparities in Albania (ISD project, RDPA project, and Author)

Responding to only one policy objective

Describe and delineate

Prime Ministerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Office, Directorate for Development and Good Governance, RDPA project, Author, Co-PLAN Co-PLAN, RDP Northern Albania (SDC and ADA project), Author.

Option 2: 6 regions

Describe and delineate

Co-PLAN, RDP Northern Albania (SDC and ADA project), Author.

River basins

6 official river basins

National Agency for the Management of Water Resources

Defined to facilitate regional management, but necessarily to represent territorial features and disparities Administrative regions, therefore embody several criteria and do not provide a clear picture of territorial features and disparities.

Administrative regions, therefore embody several criteria and do not provide a clear picture of territorial features and disparities.

Do not reflect the territorial development dynamics.

Describe and delineate

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6. System or rules accepted by actors in the network

Planning regions

Regions from the General National Territorial Plan

Describe and delineate

NTPA, General National Territory Plan of Albania

Areas based on self-governance networks Constitutional choice rules

Forest commons; 100+ villages regions Types of rules per selected case; Actors implementing the rules; institutional framework

Describe and delineate

Studies, Donor reports, NTPA The respective sectorial and/or framework legislation; National strategies and policy documents

Collective selfmade rules

Types of rules per selected case; Actors implementing the rules; institutional framework

Describe and analyse the roles of actors, rules over interactions, legislation where rules and interactions are based. Suitable for Urban Revival, 100+ Villages, Participatory planning.

Describe and analyse the roles of actors, rules over interactions.

Suitable for 100+ Villages, Participatory planning, and forest commons.

Donor and local projects; direct participation in the events and actions of the networks per each case.

Outcome of planning analysis.

Similarly to administrative regions, embody several criteria and do not provide a clear picture of territorial features and disparities.

Very small scale, large number of areas, often smaller than municipalities.

The rules are not present at all levels and for all actors and interventions in each case.

The rules are not present at all levels and for all actors and interventions in each case.

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II. Deepening the Theoretical Discussion 2.1 Theoretical concepts The 6 key concepts identified by the research based on its objective are: territorial polycentricity; polycentric governance; territorial rescaling; sub-national level; territorial development; and peripheral region. The term region is a sub-concept, which is also defined in this section, to clarify its use in the text. The following sections will deal in further detail with the key concepts, in order to bring theoretical views and policy practices that stand behind each concept. Initially, regions and regionalization as a process of territorial rescaling (at subnational level) will be discussed, with some emphasis on the related governance processes and peripheralisation as a phenomenon that is inherent to rescaling. Then concept of peripherality in defining spatial typologies will be unravelled theoretically and in terms of policy implications. In conclusion a section will be dedicated to the concept of polycentricity, which is the core of the study.

This concept will be examined in terms of both, polycentric governance and territorial polycentricity, and as a policy response to the necessity for territorial rescaling. In this case, the aim will be to show differences and ties that exist between both aspects of polycentricity (governance and territory) and their connection with territorial development. Most of the discussion on territorial development has already taken place in the first chapter of this study, as a means for setting the context of the research.

However, being an inseparable part of the polycentricity concept and objective, territorial development will emerge once again in the theoretical chapter.

For the sake of this research, each key concept encompasses dimensions or components that are examined so far and/or will be analysed in the remaining part of this chapter.

These dimensions/components stand in the articulation of each concept in the frame of this research as follows (based on literature review as follows in this chapter): â&#x20AC;˘

Territorial polycentricity is a normative concept, a policy objective, and a spatial feature that is assumed to produce sustainable territorial development by boosting social-economic growth and reducing territorial disparities. The metrics for measuring territorial polycentricity incorporate both, functional polycentricity indicators and morphological polycentricity indicators, as it will be shown in the following sections.

â&#x20AC;˘

Polycentric governance is a mode of governance where the power for decisionmaking is assigned to/conquered by various institutions (formal and informal),

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or groups of institutions that interact among them in a network and over fuzzy and often overlapping territories, in order to produce a good or service that has public value, utility and interest. This definition is based on the literature review as brought and discussed extensively in this chapter.

•

Territorial rescaling is a process of geographical, social, political, development and administrative/jurisdictional character, where territories as socio-political and geographical constructs are in a dynamic formation and reformation state.

Due to having this multidimensional character, it results into various typologies of space, namely regions of various characters. This definition is based on the extensive theoretical discussion made in this chapter.

•

Sub-national level is a territorial, government, and governance level that stands between the national and local scales of government and territorial representation. Regions and regional governments typically personify in practice the sub-national level.

•

Region, as a term for the sake of this research, has a broad meaning in terms of territorial (geographical and socio-ecological), socio-economic, administrative (political and governmental) dimensions. This is a social, political and geographical construct, which could be depicted as a sub-national level (see above) or as a broader European space, which is personified of common/interlinked features that identify it among other spaces. Albania as a country could constitute a region in Western Balkan, or south-east Europe.

Western Balkans could also constitute a [macro]region in Europe. Sub-national governments are regions; but planning areas or sub-national territories with a common development objective and strategy constitute regions as well. This research contains a multitude of regions’ typologies, based on its overall purpose of studying territorial rescaling.

•

Territorial development is both development (as defined in chapter 1) that happens on the territory and development that has a territorial dimension, hence it achieves territorial and socio-economic cohesion, is place-based, and is yielded through the harmonization of sectorial policies over the resources of a given territory. The definition is based on the discussion made in chapter 1 on this document.

•

Peripheral regions are defined based on their socio-economic position – usually disadvantaged, low accessibility (both distance and connection), limited or

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hidden opportunities for growth and insufficient capacities that are required to generate growth. This makes use of the ESPON research and academic studies as referred in the following sections. However, as the focus of this research is Albania, a Western Balkanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s country, at a secondary level, peripherality is understood also as the overall positioning of the country versus the European Union area.

2.2 Regions and regionalization as object of territorial rescaling Regions are unique spaces in terms of how they bring together various disciplines; give a territorial dimension to development, economics (Capello, 2009), governance and social interactions (Keating, 2013); show flexibility in terms of territorial character (social, historical, geographical, influenced by human interventions, etc.); and embrace a feature of fuzzy boundaries (Finka & Kluvankova, 2015). The region is a dynamic socio-political and territorial construct that appears and disappears, and it is subject to change of actors and/or institutions that develop the region, or participate in the socioecological interactions produced within its territory and its political framework (Ehrlich et al., 2015); (Entrikin, 2011). This is a process of rescaling, which is opposed to the idea, or belief that there is a right and fixed spatial scale for every socio-political role.

In view of the latter, Keating (2013) mentions as examples the spatial location theory, the concept of river basins as a territorial level for regional government, travel-to-work catchment areas, efficient scales for services delivery and economies of scale, etc. This does not mean that these concepts are to be dismissed. In fact, each of them stands on its own for what it intends to achieve â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a particular purpose in each case. However, the differences (sometime antagonistic) that exist among them reinforce the thesis that a large government, which is able to effectively and efficiently achieve all of the combined purposes intended in each concept, is most probably a utopia. Or, in the best case, it is less efficient than a group of smaller local governments and public agencies striving to manage their territories and provide services, while also overlapping in jurisdictions (V.Ostrom, 1972); (Aligica & Tarko, 2012); (Tarko, 2015).

Regions usually constitute an intermediate territorial and/or government level, where territorial rescaling as Keating (2013) defines it, is visible and present the most. Hence, regions are born and reborn out of continuous territorial, political, social and institutional/governance rescaling. Rescaling refers to migration of functional systems and of related regulations (be those socio-economic or political), across spatial levels,

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above, below and between nation states (Swingedouw, 2004 in (Keating, 2013, p.12 (8/31))). This rescaling of functional systems provides opportunities and constraints for the stakeholders involved, regardless of the territorial and institutional level they belong, and it is based on these costs and benefitsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; analysis that political decision about regions, regionalization and regional governments is made.

Regionalization has been a tendency in the second part of the 20th century, where in several cases smaller local governments have merged/consolidated into larger regional ones (Keating, 2013); (Keating, 1998); (Shutina et al., 2012). The purpose of regionalization in each country has been different. In some cases, political processes with an historical background and stemming from identity matters have been at the core of regionalization (Keating, 1998); in other cases a more functional pragmatic approach was followed, aiming at achieving a certain level of efficiency related to the delivery of services or implementation of development policies (Shutina et al., 2012). As a result, several types of regional governments, or regional institutions exist currently in European countries (Shutina et al., 2012); (Tosics et al., 2010); (Toto et al., 2014); (European CoR, 2016).

In some cases the regional governments have a number of functions, which are considered as not being efficiently provided by national or local governments and therefore should be transferred to an intermediate level. In these cases the regional governments ensure not only efficiency, or economies of scale, but also deal with policy functions that require a certain scale for planning and policy making, such as environmental protection, river basin management (hydrological determinism as Keating (2013) calls it), etc. These kinds of functions depend not so much on the population to serve â&#x20AC;&#x201C; hence a basin of service recipients, rather than on the geographical scope of their functionality, and on their territoriality features. For instance in the case of ecosystem-based management of natural resources and of the river basin, clearly the boundaries are natural and not artificially defined; are larger than those of one single local government; and do not necessarily coincide with administrative boundaries. The territory in this case is governed by a set of rules that are not merely political and economical, but are defined/affected by the basin of ecosystem services that are provided and received.

In other cases, especially later in the 1990s, in view of regional development and of the competitiveness objective within Europe, regions were formally established as spaces for regional development (Keating, 2013); (Toto et al., 2014); (Shutina et al., 2012). In

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some countries, these ‘development regions’ coincided with administrative regions and regional governments territorial boundaries (Toto et al., 2014). In other countries, the ‘development regions’ were designated as spaces that stand independently from administrative territories, and serve only the purpose of implementing the regional development policy that the respective country had endorsed (for instance, Romania, Kosovo, etc.) (ibid); (European CoR, 2016).

Besides regions that have a jurisdictional and/or development character, there are also the so-called statistical regions, such as the NUTS24 regions, designated as territories where statistics for the state of development are produced and used for measuring disparities among regions and for guiding European Union investment policies related to regional development and cohesion.

This multitude of regions’ types and scales is an on-going theoretical and policy debate, and is highly affected also by the governance system (Hooghe & Marks, 2016) adopted in each country and especially the respective level of decentralization. This implies also the influence of the historical background onto how regions are perceived and constructed in time, in various government and socio-political regimes. Hence, regional governments may function as decentralized entities with various autonomy levels of decision-making and power, or as deconcentrated ones, where functions are delegated by the national government for implementation at a lower territorial level. The previous implies a number of forms of power allocation and types of power allocated to the lower levels, varying from political, to appointment and election of local officials, decisionmaking and fiscal decentralization (Treisman, 2007); (Hooghe & Marks, 2016). These forms entail further sub-cases that depend on domestic political dynamics, the power of informal networks for self-organization and policy influencing, and on territorial features and organisation. The second is mostly administrative decentralization, but even in this case the power of the subordinate institutions to act under the decisionmaking framework supplied nationally, and their territorial coverage varies upon the context (Treisman, 2007).

In both cases territorial rescaling is present and it is not uniformly presented over territories. This process of rescaling demonstrates for a constant socio-political struggle between states on one hand, and subnational levels on the other, to regain control and regulation of functions, competitiveness, economic growth, etc. over territories, leading to continuous reversible shifts from government to governance and from centralization to decentralization (Keating, 2013); (Treisman, 2007). Keating (2013, p.72, 2/35)

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emphasizes further that the outcome of these two-sided shifts is a multitude of options reflected in a “territorial grid” that changes frequently, and, where regions emerge as functional spaces, gaining different meanings based on their different territorial scopes.

From a government and governance perspective regions as a conception emerge in the jurisdictions’ scale discussion. Hence, policy makers implement governance and territorial administrative reforms by confronting the pros and cons of large and smallscale jurisdictions. This can even generate a debate on whether regionalization is an attempt towards multi-scalar decentralization, or a milder form of centralization. In fact, the discussion on multilevel governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2003) shows that regionalization could be understood not merely as the establishment of a fixed intermediate level of government on an intermediate territorial scale, rather than multidimensional process of government’s pulling up and down (Hooghe & Marks, 2016) between levels, aiming at responding to different objectives (efficiency, equity, access, quality, stability) with diverse territorial and institutional arrangements. The latter are place-based and constitute different (probably overlapping) levels of decisionmaking and authority, distributed in a vertical-horizontal grid of cooperation (Hooghe & Marks, 2003), aiming at efficiently producing public goods.

Hooghe and Marks (2016) provide a summary of the benefits from large and small jurisdictions. Hence, having large jurisdictions reduces the per capita cost of non-rival public goods and/or large scale commons, where chief among them is governance itself, expressing partnership and communication between citizens, as described by Aristotle (ibid). Furthermore, large jurisdictions are better able to internalise the effect of government’s decisions, produce economies of scale in service delivery, and provide better insurance against disasters. Small jurisdictions on the other hand, are those where policy and decision makers are closer to people. Governance is therefore closer to community, taking a territorial dimension, being shaped by people and adopting different and targeted institutional features and arrangements for different contexts.

This leads to higher accountability and responsiveness on the government side, more flexibility in decision-making, innovation yield, institutional robustness and adaptability, and better representation of and response to socio-ecological peculiarities and uniqueness of territorial resources (Hooghe & Marks, 2016).

There are also cases where the regional government institutions carry out only planning functions (regional planning areas, as for instance in the Republic of North Macedonia (Novkovska, 2017)), or are merely regional development areas (such as the case of

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Albania) that serve national policy making processes for social-economic development.

In the latter case, these areas are established to serve a pure domestic economic growth interest and especially for harmonising the latter with the implementation of the European Union regional development and cohesion policy. The purpose of regional development and cohesion policies is to tackle disparities that exist among regions and support to boost economic growth. Regional development policies are not [or cannot be] uniformly designed and implemented across regions, due to the latters’ diversities, specificities (especially the territorial ones) and positions in terms of centrality and peripherality. Ehrlich et al. (2015) argue that it is often the case that European and national policies reproduce the model of the global city in regional policies, by focusing on, and promoting growth in metropolitan areas. The latter have become an interesting and key object of regional development due to being areas of concentration for worldwide economic activities (ibid). National governments have the tendency to focus on these types of regions because of their attractiveness and development power and immediate positive effect on national GDP. However, this inclination becomes (implicitly or explicitly) a factor that influences the birth of new, or consolidation of existing spatial peripheralization processes. This influencing process could be straightforward political, or it could also entail technical features, mainly found in planning initiatives. Planning that addresses shrinking cities for instance, may result into bold recommendations and then decisions of removing local population from peripheral locations to more central ones, as a more cost-effective solution compared to the provision of services and infrastructures for that fraction of the population in their historical location.

Furthermore, the power of people involved in the planning process and the language they use lead to the creation of perceptions for regions in terms of their centrality or peripherality (Ehrlich et al., 2015), as well as to the definition of core-periphery positions that will then latter get recognized as such. For instance, if the government decides to unilaterally designate development projects/programs for ‘remote’ areas, instead of allowing for bottom-up initiatives and local capacity building to take place, it means that the government has, in a way or the other, pre-set these areas as peripheral and unable to absorb funds or implement development projects for the long run (see chapter 3 – ‘Urban Revival’ and ‘100+ Villages’ programs).

Spatial peripheralisation may be a traditional presentation in the position of certain regions vis-à-vis other more central ones (Finka et al., 2015), due to geographical

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location (resulting in isolation) and/or historical circumstances. Or, as briefly mentioned above, it could also be induced through new division of power and legitimacy, which may result in changing spatial structures and related administrative borders, in changing institutional maturity or ability of self-organisation for governance (ibid), as well as in new – typically worsening, economic performance indicators.

Sometimes, peripheralisation is defined as the feature of territories that are located outside of the major agglomeration with contexts described in terms of rurality and distance/locational peripherality, or in terms of weak structures for mobilizing resources and self-upgrading (Leick & Lang, 2018). Peripheralisation could also be identified based on the factors that affect and promote growth. Thus, there is the expectation (arguable) that exogenous factors (multimodal transport, migration balance, FDI, etc.) play a role mostly for peripheral regions in economic growth, while endogenous factors (number of businesses, research and development expenditures, etc.) play a role mostly for core regions (Smętkowski, 2017). These diverse ways of understanding or talking about peripherality make peripheralisation a territorial rescaling process, which results in the formation and “persistence of core and peripheral regions” (Ehrlich et al., 2015, p.9), that are also diverse and context dependent.

Furthermore, peripheralisation also generates understanding on how socio-economic disparities are created and display across the territories (ibid.), and on how the peripheral regions could instead be supported, or guided towards overall socioeconomic welfare and resilience of socio-ecological systems. The understanding of disparities and of socio-ecological equilibriums is crucial in dealing with regions that are defined as peripheral, because it leads to clarity on where exactly do these regions stay in the dichotomous core-periphery scale. While the primary thinking on peripherality is based on polarization and a two-dimensional assessment scale, in fact the peripheral regions have various features and are not equal everywhere. Peripherality is to be understood differently in different cases, and different regions are considered peripheral for different reasons, such as location and connectivity, geographical barriers, population number and population density, institutional capacities, markets and economic activities, etc.

For instance, some peripheral regions are considered as of having low population densities – the latter being calculated as a ratio of total population with the total area of the region. However, in order to create as much as possible economies of scales in service delivery and service and local market access, the population is densely located

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in the few small urban settlements of the region. This leads to similar environmental and service provision problems as those in the larger cities and urban cores. On the other hand, there are peripheral regions, where the population is scarcely located all over the territory, making it very difficult and inefficient for local governments to supply basic services and infrastructure (see for instance (Carbone, 2018); (Onida, 2018) and (Kremlis, 2018)). In several cases, peripheral regions may be resource poor to command self-organisation and resilience (Hooghe & Marks, 2016), but in other cases, though the resources are plentiful, the local population is either not able to make sustainable use, or due to national policies does not benefit from the resources of its region. These are merely two examples, but the discussion on peripheral regions latter in the chapter, will provide more evidences and take the argument further. All in all, however, the cases show that peripheralisation is present in and through intersecting scales and a relational understanding of spatial disparities, which searches for concrete processes of the formation of disparities and for route causes (Ehrlich et al., 2015) is required to ‘classify’ regions as peripheral.

2.3 Peripheriality as a spatial typology – the Western Balkans “Making Europe more polycentric requires taking strategic advantage of existing regional diversity and further strengthening territorial cooperation and governance in order to target investments and reduce regional disparities” (ESPON, 2017, p.2). On a knowledge level, this means getting to know better and deeper the territorial diversities of various places within and beyond the EU area. It also means being able to classify regions/territories in a way that responds to both the local specificities and to the macroclassifications that tend to bring regions on a comparable level.

However, the European studies on the territory and on polycentrism hardly consider the western Balkan countries (Co-PLAN, 2018); (Cotella & Berisha, 2016); (TG-WeB, 2018). A typical map of ESPON shows Western Balkan as a blank space (See ESPON studies at https://www.espon.eu). This region is quite peripheral to Europe in various senses. Though Western Balkan countries are located in Europe and geographically surrounded by Member states, the spatial structure of the region does not show for any development corridors and population concentration continuum with the EU area (Cotella, 2018). Also, in terms of economic development, the countries lag behind with national GDP levels well below the 75% of the EU-28 average (Eurostat, 2017).

European territorial strategies and visions are focused on the EU area only and do not

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consider the links with the Western Balkan, with the exception of the macro-regional strategies, where Western Balkan is addressed in two strategies out of four25 (EC, 2010, 2014).

On the other hand, EU is advancing its strategy on the integration of the Western Balkan (EC, 2018d). The European Commission Credible Enlargement Perspective for Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkan considers the EU membership for Western Balkans as of geostrategic importance to the EU itself. Besides promoting development in the region, this credible commitment would pave the way for enhanced EU’s security, economic growth and influence (EC, 2018d). In order to foster a process of Europeanization for the Western Balkans, the Credible Perspective poses a number of criteria that the region has to meet. These criteria do not namely include territorial development (TG-WeB, 2018). However, the Western Balkan countries must also address the latter in their efforts of meeting the Credible Perspective’s criteria. This is important in order to achieve domestic results, but also as a prerequisite of achieving sustainable development, rule of law, democratic governance, enhanced connectivity and regional cooperation, as some of the prerequisites for joining EU (EC, 2018d).

The Western Balkan countries are thus equipped with tasks that embody also territorial development as a dimension and that, by being achieved, paves these countries’ way towards EU integration. In this context, it is necessary that European studies and strategies start considering Western Balkan features and issues of [territorial] development as well. Otherwise, lack of further inclusion, will impact territorial cooperation (not positively), will leave diversity aside, will reinforce the peripheral position of these Balkan’s regions, and will contribute to increasing regional disparities.

But, most importantly, it will augment further the knowledge gap between regions that will be very hard to deal with in the later stages of integration.

The Western Balkan is typically a peripheral region to the EU. The level of peripherality can be observed and measured in social-economic performances, connectivity and territorial structures continuity. The countries within the region vary among them as well, in terms of both, the level of peripherality and the pace of approaching EU integration (TG-WeB, 2018); (Berisha et al., 2018); (Cotella, 2018).

However, in all cases, place-based strategies and tools are needed to support these countries and their regions making a jump from lagging to prosperous ones.

Supporting lagging regions could be achieved through a set of means (ESPON, 2018a) that are all interconnected. Institutional capacities’ strengthening (Böhme et al., 2015)

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and valorisation of existing local knowledge and assets to increase the attractiveness of place for living and possibly also for migrantsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; return (ESPON, 2018a) are two most critical ones. The institutional capacity lies with both the public sector and nongovernment actors. The previous should be able to translate the strategic character of territorial development into implementable local actions, while the latter should have the resources and stability to engage in long-term participation and influence decisionmaking (BĂśhme et al., 2015). Enhanced capacities would then contribute to increased local knowledge, and therefore valorisation of the local assets as competitive advantages in territorial development.

Migrants return is also a factor of support and requires [among others] incentives for migrants to invest in the development of their region of origin, increased accessibility, connectivity and services for the region and creation and strengthening of knowledge networks. Access and services include investments in transport infrastructure, healthcare and education, ICT and digitalization (ESPON, 2018a). Finally, it is necessary to introduce and place these lagging regions in multi-actors networks and structures, where cooperation among formal and informal stakeholders of the public and private sectors is vital, and it is a factor for multi-level territorial polycentric governance.

2.2.1 EU classifications of spatial and regional typologies There are different classifications made to spatial typologies at European level, when it comes to defining territories of certain features and as a result also policy, strategic and financial instruments to address the performance specificities of these regions. In this section reference is made to some of the EU classifications and major projects undertaken by ESPON during all three phases of its implementation. Of particular interest are the territories mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty 26 (article 174), namely: urban/metropolitan regions; rural regions; sparsely populated regions; regions in industrial transition; cross-border regions; mountainous regions; islands and coastal regions (EU, 2008); (ESPON, 2011/a). Based on the text of the treaty, the ESPON Monitoring Committee decided in 2010 the use of the following typologies for analytical purposes: 1. Urban-rural 2. Metropolitan region

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3. Border regions – type A and B 4. Island regions 5. Sparsely populated regions 6. Outermost regions 7. Mountainous regions 8. Coastal regions 9. Regions in industrial transition.

Each typology contains a number of sub-typologies. For instance, the urban-rural regions include 5 categories from predominantly urban to intermediate and predominantly rural remote. The four categories of the metropolitan regions initiate with the capital city and then include smaller metro-regions. The mountainous and coastal regions’ sub-typologies are created on the basis of the population share that lives in mountain or coastal areas; while those in industrial transition are classified upon the existence and the diminishing or increasing importance of the industrial factor within the region. ESPON (2011/a) suggests that these typologies are to be used on a European context and scale and may therefore “not fully reflect national and regional specificities if used only at these levels” (p.3). This implies that for any analytical process undertaken on a domestic level, each government should look at the compliance of this classification to its own territory and revise accordingly if necessary. These classifications are used for analytical purposes, such as the application of socioeconomic development indicators that help analysing the status of and differences between regions in terms of development. However, this is a basis that does not include territorial specificities that might also be worth analysing depending on specific objective or transformation processes, which may affect the territory and its socioeconomic structures.

In the European territory, the territorial typologies were traditionally determined based on population size and density of local administrative units (LAU) at level 2, otherwise known as LAU 2. The latter include all sorts of local governments bodies, such as communes and municipalities (EUROSTAT, 2018/a). However, in order to avoid the limitations of the administrative boundaries in classifications and especially in comparative analysis between territories, EUROSTAT applies the designation of territorial typologies based on a population grid with cells of 1km2, identifying three types of grid cells or clusters: urban centres, urban clusters and rural grid cells. The

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density of the population and the minimal population are the criteria used to differentiate between the three typologies.

So, in the case of urban centres the contiguous grid cells have a density of at least 1,500 residents per square kilometre, while in the urban clusters the density is at least 300 inhabitants/km2 (Dijkstra & Poelman, 2011). The minimum of the population in each case is 50,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. The way the population is distributed among the clusters, hence percentage of population living in each of the typologies, and the share that each type of population (rural or urban) has into the total population of the region, are the criteria used to define the degree of urbanisation for LAU 2 areas and the urbanrural character for the NUTS 3 regions (EUROSTAT, 2018/a); (Dijkstra & Poelman, 2011).

Besides defining territorial typologies based on the degree of urbanisation and the urban-rural character – a morphological dimension, EUROSTAT makes use also of typologies that are based on a functional dimension. These are recognised as: the functional urban areas (the city and its commuting zone) and the metropolitan regions (EUROSTAT, 2018/b).

In order to define the functional urban areas, a two steps approach is followed, with the first consisting on the definition of the city and the second consisting on the identification of the commuting zone (Dijkstra & Poelman, 2012). The definition of the city is made on the basis of the density per km² (1,500), the population in the contiguous high-density cells (at least 50,000), the share of the LAU2 population within urban centres (at least 50%) and the link to a political level (Dijkstra & Poelman, 2012); (EUROSTAT, 2018/b). The definition of the commuting zone is related to the share of employed persons living in one city and commuting to another city (at least 15%), the share of employed residents working in a city (at least 15%) and the contiguity factor.

It is on the basis of the commuting zone that the FUA is then designated (EUROSTAT, 2018/b); (Dijkstra & Poelman, 2012).

The metropolitan regions on the other hand, consist of “NUTS level 3 approximation of the functional areas of 250,000 or more inhabitants” (EUROSTAT, 2018/b) and are divided into 3 typologies: capital metro-regions; second-tier metro-regions; and smaller metro-regions. Each metro-region is named after the principal functional urban area inside its boundaries. For instance the capital metro-region includes the national capital, etc.

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2.2.2 ESPON classifications of spatial and regional typologies – peripherality Geographic Specificities and Development Potentials in Europe: These regions were defined through a process of applied research under the ESPON project named as GEOSPECS, concluded in 2012. The efforts to identify, assess and explore the achievement of strategic EU targets in least favoured regions (including also areas with geographic specificities) is based on a large set of policy documents and processes, to mention few: •

The article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU) (EU, 2008) defines the basis for the identification of lagging, peripheral or disadvantaged regions in general. According to TFEU, these regions are recognised as the least favoured, where particular attention is to be paid to “rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition, and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as the northernmost regions with very low population density and island, cross-border and mountain regions” (EU, 2008, p.127).

•

The article 349 of TFEU, which mentions that specific measures are to be implemented in outermost regions (Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Madeira, the Azores, etc.), due to their remoteness and distance from the mainland, small size, difficult topography and climate, and economic dependence on limited products (EU, 2008, p.195) (EC, 2011).

•

The Territorial Agenda (TA) 2020 has the integrated development of cities, rural and specific regions as one of its territorial priorities for the development of the European Union. According to the TA2020, “cities should look beyond administrative borders and focus on functional regions including their periurban neighbourhoods”; “the development of the wide variety of rural areas should take account of their unique characteristics” (EC, 2011, p.6); “metropolitan regions should be aware that they have responsibility for the development of their wider surroundings”; and areas with specific geographical endowments have significant influence on the development opportunities of the EU regions, therefore making use of these potentials and solving problems should be a joint and integrated actors’ efforts (EC, 2011, p.7).

•

This same spirit of the TA2020 is present in the Green Paper in Territorial Cohesion (2008) where the purpose is on how to turn territorial diversity into

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strength, therefore use territorial assets to promote sustainable development of the places, especially of those regions that have particular features. The paper identifies regions with specific geographical features – 3 types: mountain, islands and sparsely populated, border and rural regions (EC, 2008a). It also raises the question on what kind of special policy measures areas with specific geographical features need, hence highlighting them as a particular scale and scope of the action. As a follow up, Monfort (2009) provides a clear definition and indicators of performance of 5 regions with geographical specificities, namely: border, mountainous, island, sparsely populated and outermost regions (Monfort, 2009).

The aim of the GEOSPECS was to “identify possible effects of geographic specificity on regional and local development processes” (Gløersen et al., 2013, p.18). Specific objectives include from development of a coherent perspective on the relevant territories, to the identification of their features, potentials for development and way of achieving European Union strategic targets. There are 6 types of areas with geographic specificities identified, plus a seventh category, that of the inner peripheries. The latter is not a typical geographic specificity because it is mainly defined by economic and social trends (Gløersen et al., 2013); (Pérez-Soba et al., 2013). The identification and designation of inner peripheries is undertaken by another ESPON project in later years, but a previous attempt to bring them as typology of geographical specificities is made within GEOSPECS. The territorial specificities are mostly described as geographic.

This includes the mountain, island, and coastal and outermost regions. However, there are three groups, where the definition of the GEOSPECS category is made based on mostly demographic factors and political factors. These include the outermost regions that besides geographical factors are defined also based on political ones; sparsely populated areas defined based on demographic factors; and border areas defined based on both demographic and political factors (Gløersen et al., 2012) (Gløersen et al., 2013).

Inner Peripheries: The identification, delineation and analysis of the inner peripheries in Europe is realised under the PROFECY applied research project of ESPON 2020 program. The political concern for the presence of this phenomenon at the European scale, the presence of features and processes that limit the potential of this areas to achieve sustainable development, and its distinguished features in comparison to other typologies representing lagging or disadvantaged regions, constitute the basis for undertaking the research (Noguera et al., 2017). Unlike other typologies, the inner

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peripherality does not necessarily consist of geographical peripherality. The latter may as well be a factor, but there are also inner peripheries, where distance to economic activity centres and population is either not present or does not play a role in defining their socio-economic disconnection (Noguera et al., 2017). The PROFECY project identified 4 types of inner peripheries with their features as follows: 1. Areas with low levels of economic potential – these are mainly transitory areas located between centralities with higher economic potential. Geographical location and transportation systems are considered as two key variables in defining this kind of inner peripherality. However, another important factor is the potential accessibility measured first in population and travel time and second as development. This potential accessibility is relatively lower compared to the surrounding areas; 2. Areas with poor access to services of general interest – this kind of inner peripherality is driven essentially by geographical distance, though only access to the nearest point or source of service delivery is taken into account. Services such as transportation, health care, education, culture activities, retail shops, banks, jobs, etc. are considered in the process of defining these areas. It is assumed that quick access to quality services will not only increase quality of life, but will also influence residents’ choices of where to live and their willingness for a permanent habitation. Besides geographical distance, factors of impact include also possible changes in technology, or institutional ones, such as privatisation; 3. Areas with low levels of socio-economic performance – depleting areas. The inner peripherality is considered as a process, characterised by closure of important industries, loss of population due to migration, diminishing GDP, increasing unemployment, closure of services, etc. As all these processes may lead to one-another, this is the case where regions enter into a vicious circle of increasing peripherality from a social and economic viewpoint. These kind of areas suffer usually also lack of influence, such as governance, or political one, therefore having limited opportunities to impact their own economic perspective; 4. Areas with low access – high travel time to regional centres. In this case, geographical location and accessibility in terms of distance and travel time to the closest regional centre are key variables in defining the peripherality of the

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area. Furthermore, as it happens in territorial polycentrism studies, the size of the city in terms of population and the transportation systems are other variables in identifying the inner peripherality in this group of areas. This is so, especially because the reference point in measuring peripherality in this group is the location of the regional centres that contain services of general interests.

Two or more types of inner peripherality may coexist, and certain regions, such as the mountainous, rural and intermediary (ESPON, 2011/a); (ESPON, 2011/b); (Dijkstra & Poelman, 2011); (OECD, 2011); (Brezzi et al., 2011) ones often display various types of inner peripherality. Furthermore, each type may be applied to different territorial scales, from local/town/rural to macro-regional (Noguera et al., 2017). This has two implications: on one hand, it allows to identify and analyse the features of and the conditions that designate places as peripheral at various territorial scales, and hence have the opportunity to design and implement targeted instruments for upgrading each area; on the other hand, it increases the scale of difficulty in applying indicators, which do not necessarily provide the same information or allow the same level of analysis at different territorial scales. Defining similar and comparable scales of analysis across the larger territory, or providing a comparative basis for the indicators to be applied can circumvent this limitation.

So, the PROFECY project covers a European territory, exceeding the ESPON space.

The first drawback faced in process was the lack of GIS datasets of equal quality for the whole territory, and especially lack of uniform data for each indicator for all regions within the territory at stake, and the diversity of territorial delineations (areas) to which the data set was applied. Hence, the results were not provided equally for all regions, due to data sets and GIS layers availability and gaps (SchĂźrmann et al., 2017).

The study of inner peripheralities for the entire ESPON territory (excluding Western Balkans) reveals that 45% of the territory is defined as inner peripheries, and most of these areas are considered peripheral for only one of the four categories above. On the other hand, is interesting to notice that only 10% of the inner peripheral areas has both, lack of access and poor economic growth/demographic situation as a main driver of its peripherality. For the other 90%, these two drivers are presented separately and on almost equal basis. Territorially/geographically speaking, the distribution of inner peripherality areas per type and main driver is also very diverse, and they tend to overlap mostly with intermediate, rural and mountain regions (Noguera et al., 2017) as per the EU territorial typologies described in section 2.2.1 above. There is one

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exception for the depleting areas, where the overlap is higher for the urban, intermediate and rural regions.

In making a policy assessment for the future of the cohesion policy as related to the inner peripheries, the PROFECY project suggests that the studies confirm the high relevance of the rural development and cohesion policies “in providing the necessary resources and policy tools driving processes of structural adjustment and innovation in different areas” (Noguera et al., 2017, p.46). However, good policy delivery and relations among policies depend on the degree and quality of multi-level governance and therefore on the capabilities of the actors to engage in and achieve it. As a result, for inner peripheries to succeed and get out of the disadvantaged vicious circle it is necessary both, embedding into innovation and development networks that break the boundaries of the peripheral region, and invest on strengthening the local social and human capacities for better polycentric multi-layers governance of resources and activities.

The PROFECY studies indicate also a need for further research regarding inner peripheralities. Besides the need for regulating scale by preferably creating delineations at a smaller and more disaggregated scale than that of the NUTS level 3 regions, it is necessary to increase the number of indicators, at least within the groups that are being measured. For instance, more services of general interest may be included in the analysis, and besides access by car the study of public transportation means should be included as well. Finally, the project highlights 4 important aspects/issues of concern to pursue in future research: the role of administrative borders; the relation between support and peripheral areas development; the challenge to keep workforce in the region as a means for overcoming peripheralization; and the role of transport infrastructure that may both, help in overcoming peripheralization and contribute to stopping out-migration (Noguera et al., 2017).

Lagging regions as a typology: Europe classifies as lagging regions those NUTS2 level regions that are poor, hence low-income, or have a low growth. The previous are characterised by GDP per capita levels in PPS below 50% of the EU average in 201327, while the latter28 have GDP per capita converging with the EU average up to 90% in the period 2000-2013 (EC, 2017); (Brown et al., 2017). “Lagging regions have lower productivity, educational attainment and employment rates compared to other regions in their country” (EC, 2017, p.iv) and this comes as a result of a number of factors, to start with the macro-economic situation of the country and the lack of incentives for

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youth, workforce and businesses to remain or invest in these regions, which after entering a vicious cycle of low growth of non-development, become even more prone to lower values in development indicators. According to the EC (2017) Competitiveness Report for the lagging regions, one can observe that though lowincome regions are less developed than the low-growing ones, the latter have experienced lower growth compared to the low-income regions, after the crisis of 2008.

This means that the low-growth regions, though starting from an overall better position in terms of the development indicators, could not restructure at the high pace of the low-income regions, after the crisis, therefore feeling its impacts harder than the lowincome regions. Also, public and private investments remained either stable or had a higher GDP rate in the low-income countries than in the low-growth countries after the crisis (Brown et al., 2017); (EC, 2017).

According to the same EC report, in order to promote competiveness and boost development, lagging regions need higher public and private investments, which improve productivity rather than fuelling the construction industry, as well as need to go through structural and governance reforms. Addressing structural reforms (such as employment and business environment ones) for their impact at regional level is important, because the latter does not necessarily reflect the overall impact that sectorial policies and structural reforms have on a national level (Brown et al., 2017). Hence, disparities are prone to arise among regions. Besides, lagging regions need further investments in terms of improved accessibility, transfer of technologies, education and investments in human capital as the means to attract or stop loosing population (EC, 2017). So far, low-income regions focus their investments in transportation projects, to improve accessibility, while the low-growth regions invest more on human resources and capacity building (EC, 2017). However, besides the fact that each region should implement policies that respond to their specificities and therefore have differentiated interventions, in all of the cases, the quality of governance should be improved. This includes from strengthening of the administration and institutional capacities, to provision of better business environments, better public services, increasing governance efficiency and transparency and bringing stakeholders into cooperation platforms to boost sustainable development

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2.4 Polycentric Governance â&#x20AC;&#x201C; between institutions and territory Regional development uses multi-interaction forms of good governance to achieve its results in an efficient and sustainable way (EC, 2017); (Tolkki et al., 2011), but does not necessarily happen through governance reforms, i.e. regionalization and/or decentralization. Although the state has a particularly strong role in [regional] development, the various theories show that over years this role has gone through transformations/shifts (Pike et al., 2017). Multilevel governance is a governance approach that best reconciles governance transformations/shifts with regional development. The latter is a phenomenon of economic and social and environmental character, achieved by a multi-stakeholders network that operates across levels, where public institutions hold an important position (Tolkki et al., 2011); (HĂźbner, 2008).

The most advanced form of multilevel governance â&#x20AC;&#x201C; if we look at governance (concept) shifts, is polycentric governance (Araral & Hartley, 2013) that brings together territorial development activities, territorial structures and stakeholders and institutions in a polycentric network of formally independent centres of decision-making (Polanyi, 1951); (V.Ostrom et al., 1961); (V.Ostrom, 1972); (Ostrom, 2008); (Aligica & Tarko, 2012); that are/can become complementary to each other under a specific set of rules (Boamah, 2018), and through synergies or competitiveness generate added value (V.Ostrom, 1972); (Aligica & Tarko, 2012); (ESPON, 2017).

Michael Polanyi was the first in 1951 to explore and define the concept of polycentricity, and it is from there that studies of polycentricity on law, territorial development and urban form, and on governance took impulse developing into broader theories (Aligica & Tarko, 2012). Ostrom et al. (1961) discuss polycentricity in governance by making reference to the governance of metropolitan areas, where by definition a large number of political units and governmental entities is present. These units are responsible on various tasks and/or services, with often overlapping jurisdictional boundaries. It was believed by various stakeholders and scholars in those circumstances that a single dominant centre of authority would constitute the ideal institution and model of governance for metropolitan areas. This kind of model would guarantee efficiency of service delivery and of the execution of the various tasks, especially because local governments that act independently have no regard for other public interests (beyond their administrative boundaries) in the metropolitan area.

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Ostrom et al. (1961) argue that the above statement has limited validity. Also, recent studies of ESPON, such as SPIMA, ReSSI and ACTAREA29, “conclude that there is no single governmental level that can fully meet the current social, economic and environmental challenges” (ESPON, 2018b, p.2), which are in fact governance objectives. The pattern of government in metropolitan areas with multiple entities resembles in fact to a polycentric system where: the acting units are independent; share culture and values; no one entity can have the monopoly; the system and its components have the ability to self-regulate; the entities have the freedom to entry and leave the system, have incentives to create, self-enforce and change rules, which implies the system can self-generate and/or [re]organize (V.Ostrom et al., 1961); (V.Ostrom, 1972); (Aligica & Tarko, 2012).

Ostrom et al. (1961) raised the concept of polycentrism in governance, placing emphasis on the independence of decision-making units – mostly local governments, to self-regulate their actions in a self-concerted effort, for achieving a policy objective related to sustainable territorial development. Other authors of governance studies consider polycentric governance as [probably] unable to produce the required level of sustainability and efficiency alone, without the intervention of other government layers, operating in a multi-level government framework. For instance, Homsy and Warner (2015) oppose to the ability of local governments to achieve efficiently their objective, by simply acting independently in a polycentric interaction. Based on empirical research, they define reasons why this is not possible and promote instead a multi-level governance framework imposed by the national government policy making, as necessary to raise the efficiency of local governments in achieving the objective – in their case it is environmental governance. They consider polycentric and multi-level governance as two approaches that belong to different theories of governance. This is so, because of the definition imposed on each case. Hence in the case of polycentric governance the focus is on the local capacity to enable independent municipal action (Homsy & Warner, 2015). Capacities of local governments vary from human resource technical and managerial ones to fiscal and political power. In the multilevel governance setting, several authors refer to what is recognized as movement of knowledge and information (regulations and processes) and policy, up and down the vertical levels of government (Homsy & Warner, 2015, p.53). The horizontal cooperation is merely recognized as local knowledge of the society, which should also be integrated to the large body of knowledge that is continuously transferred vertically.

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While it may be true that local governments do not always achieve sufficient efficiency in reaching their objectives, the theory and empirical work on the commons on the other hand, show that efficient polycentric governance based on independent actions of the units/institutions is possible, if a certain set of rules defined by the appropriators of the commons is in place and functional (Ostrom, 2008). These findings limit the validity or the “presumption that locals cannot take care of public sector problems” (ibid., p.9).

The latter, based on prejudices rather than facts about capabilities of the local governments, has led to legislation that often “places responsibility for local public services on units of government that are very large”, and are overwhelmed to carry out their assignment (ibid., p.3).

As a matter of fact, other studies, especially those that take impetus from the EU multilevel governance examination, do recognize two types of multi-level governance, based on the arguments and analysis of Hooghe and Marks (2003). In their study of multilevel governance, they start from the assumptions that “dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions is more flexible than concentration of governance in one jurisdiction… large jurisdictions are bad when they impose a single policy … centralized government is insensitive to varying scale efficiencies from policy to policy” (ibid., p.235). They identify two types of multilevel governance: type I multilevel governance is characterized by general-purpose jurisdictions, limited in number of levels with nonintersecting memberships and system-wide architecture. Type II on the other hand, is composed of an unlimited number of specialized or task-specific jurisdictions with intersecting memberships and flexible design (ibid.).

Governance at EU level is about the type I multi-level governance, while polycentric [territorial] governance at regional and/or metropolitan level is mainly about the second type, though in combination with the processes of the first type. Hence, a combination of both types and a focus mostly on the second type for the regional level produces territorial governance, as the ultimate shift towards polycentric governance (Toto, 2019). Territorial governance is recognized for: its fuzzy boundaries (Finka & Kluvankova, 2015) (Finka & Kluvankova-Oravska, 2010); functional interactions among stakeholders – different but non-conflicting (Davoudi et al., 2008) in the polycentric network; spaces and places that are not hierarchical to each-other, but instead constitute relational nodes, with multiple overlapping networks and flows of peoples, resources and knowledge (Faludi, 2016, p.43); and for the place-based knowledge and fit-to-context decision making, based on increased social awareness

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over the territorial diversity (Schmitt et al., 2013).

There are a number of issues of interest to take away from this discussion, which could as well be considered as the features of polycentric governance: 1. In a polycentric governance system, the independence of local actors to act and take decisions is crucial for the very existence of the polycentric system. This is not however excluding the presence of a hierarchical multi-level system of government institutions, which is supposed to have a specific and noncumbersome role in the interactions; 2. The local actors should have some internal motivation to engage in and/or embrace a policy action (Homsy & Warner, 2015). This is an important factor that feeds interaction and keeps the system running efficiently; 3. Polycentric governance does not happen within one level or scale only. On the contrary it is a multi-scalar interaction of actors that are responsible of, or have scopes of actions that belong to various territorial scales and even jurisdictions.

Therefore, what is recognized as multilevel is in fact a polycentric interaction within and among scales, following a given set of rules. These rules can change due to effects born out of primary interactions and this is an iterative process.

These rules define also the degree of autonomy in the interactions and it is important that this feature of polycentric governance is not contradicting with feature number one; 4. The expected positive effects of polycentric governance models are higher if well embedded into a multi-level governance framework, therefore one where interaction among actors happens within and across scales. This system is based on the individual autonomy of decision-making, but at the same time is supported by push and/or regulation factors that a multilevel governance framework can enable.

5. By recognizing territorial diversities and functional relations between places and between institutions, polycentric governance is able to embrace the territorial dimension and therefore a way for enabling territorial development.

2.4.1 Defining Polycentricity: objectives, measuring and scales The importance of polycentrism and polycentricity is set in governance and territorial studies and research, as well as in EU studies, initiatives and instruments for regional

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and territorial development. Still, due also to the multiple-domains use of the concept, the precise meaning of the term has remained elusive (Davoudi, 2003), at least in the European use of the term. As a matter of fact, the discussion on polycentricity in the various disciplines is different (though initiating from the Polanyi basics), leading to a considerable margin of diversity within the notion itself, and hence to the lack of an agreed definition (Rauhut, 2017); (Waterhout et al., 2005); (Davoudi, 2003). The diversity of studies and policy documents suggests for polycentric systems that comprise territorial polycentrism, polycentric development and polycentric governance.

Regardless of the various definitions of polycentrism and polycentricity within the myriad of studies for each component, these are components of the same system, affecting, or depending on one-another.

Polycentricity [in governance, development, and territorial structures] is praised for its support to territorial development, by contributing to increased sustainability, reducing disparities and bringing convergence between regions, and increasing their economic resilience (Rauhut, 2017); (ESPON, 2017); (Su et al., 2017); (ESPON, 2005). Though the concept of polycentricity is not new, its use among urban planners and policymakers in Europe has become popular mostly in the last 30 years. Initially, this was probably related mostly to the general concern that the urban form was becoming increasingly dispersed (Green, 2007). At European Union level, polycentricity – related mostly to spatial planning and territorial development discourse, has become a common policy language since its introduction in the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) in 1999. The latter, promotes: “the development of a polycentric and balanced urban system”; and “integrated transport and communication concepts, which support the polycentric development of the EU territory and are an important pre-condition for enabling European cities and regions to pursue their integration into EMU30” (CSD, 1999, pp.19-20). Lower disparities and higher regional convergence constitute the purpose of regional development (ESPON, 2017); (Tosics, 2018); (EC, 2018b); (EC, 2018a); (EC, 2018c); (EC, 2018e).

However, following further the arguments of Rauhut (2017), but also looking at how development indicators display among and within regions in different polycentric and monocentric countries (Brezzi & Veneri, 2015), one can also argue that disparities are sometimes higher in polycentric countries, or polycentricity does not necessarily contribute to increasing sustainability and competitiveness, and reducing disparities (Rauhut, 2017); (Zhang et al., 2017); (Homsy & Warner, 2015); (Brezzi & Veneri,

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2015); (Burger et al., 2014); (Meijers & Sandberg, 2008); (Green, 2007), or at least further empirical evidence is needed, next to revising methodologies for measuring polycentricity.

As a matter of fact, empirical evidence has not continuously supported the positive effects of the politically defined goal of polycentricity, that of sustaining cohesion and competitiveness. Brezzi and Veneri (2015) state that “empirical evidence on the links between polycentricity and economic development is not conclusive and results seem to depend on the choice of countries” (p.2), on the conceptual definition of polycentricity, on the indicators chosen to measure this characteristic of spatial structure, and on the fact that some areas previously defined as polycentric started a recentralization process, [see also (Zhang et al., 2017) and (Rauhut, 2017)].

Some studies as mentioned above, show that polycentric countries have a higher national GDP per capita, but – in the case of regional polycentricity – the GDP per capita is lower in polycentric regions compared to monocentric ones. This can be explained to a certain extent by the fact that highly competitive regions putting in the shade the other less competitive ones, have high GDP and population – two key indicators for morphological polycentrism at national level – spatially concentrated within their territory, therefore being monocentric. Hence the competitiveness goal is achieved, but the cohesion, or the balanced development objective is not necessarily accomplished within the respective regional territory.

At a first sight competitiveness and cohesion objectives sound as conflicting (Rauhut, 2017), or opposing to one-another. Meijers and Sandberg (2008) state that the more polycentric countries are, the higher are their regional disparities. Since the cohesion policy aspires to promote equal living conditions, regardless of where one lives in regional terms, this is a critical result. This brings again to the discussion on the definition and on the measuring methodologies for polycentricity. Hence, what kinds of indicators are used to measure polycentricity – do the current indicators measure competitiveness, or cohesion, or both? And second, what kind of [regional] development notion is being used – is it mostly focused on economic development and competitiveness, or it includes also quality of life, environmental quality and territorial sustainability? Some regions may probably not be highly competitive in terms of economic growth, but do provide a resilient and highly sustainable environment for living. According to Waterhout et al. (2005), polycentricity is about promoting both, regional balances and competiveness. The latter means concentration of resources,

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which is against balancing, and in polycentricity studies by resources it is usually meant population, firms and flows. In this case the paradox and the challenge are present. But, if development will also measure other factors of quality of life and socio-ecological systems’ resilience, then the concept of resources’ concentration would be broader and would include a feature of diversity. In this case, polycentricity measurements would consider the concentration of specific resources in a certain area, and concentration of other types of resources in other territories.

This discussion leads to the argument that polycentricity is an evidence-based notion and depends on: the context; the measuring factors and indicators – the balance between functional and morphological polycentricity, as well as the type of interaction chosen to assess in the case of functional polycentricity; the place and scale where the assessment is applied; and the type of polycentricity that is being assessed, whether it is more focused on territorial development, or governance, or on both. Burger et al.

(2014) cite a large number of authors defining that the level of polycentricity depends on the indicators to measure, and in the case of functional polycentricity, a region may be polycentric for one specific interaction (for instance commuting) and very monocentric for other types of interactions (for example touristic offer, or firms’ interactions). Clearly the notion is very complex and probably it is impossible to define a final framework for defining polycentricity and the way of measuring it. However, it is necessary to clearly define a purpose for measuring polycentricity in a given context and then apply the appropriate indicators to this purpose. In policymaking, where polycentricity suffers the most from a lack of operationalization, this purpose relates to the policy question that needs to be solved. In the case of Albania for instance, the policy question has been for the last 15 years that of developing regions in a sustainable way and how governance can contribute to moving regions from being very peripheral to becoming more advantageous in a polycentric system.

As it was explained above, there is a large group of scholars who discuss polycentricity on territorial terms. Burger and Meijers (2012) summarise the views of these scholars into three groups: i) those who see polycentric development “as a normative planning strategy” applied to territories on various scales; ii) those who consider polycentric development as “a spatial process that results from the outward diffusion of urban functions” from core centres to the more peripheral/smaller ones; iii) the third group focuses on the “resulting spatial configurations of the contemporary urban areas” (p.

1128). Regardless of the differences that may exist among views, still this large group

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of authors focuses on polycentricity as a toolbox for achieving polycentrism of the territorial structures. Hence their discussion is not focused on governance. Still it is interesting to observe, as how the territorial polycentricity scholars raise questions about the morphological and functional dimensions of polycentricity and the balance between them, which in reality is a way of discussing territorial structures evolvement, territorial resourcesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; use and services distribution, which all happen as governance processes.

Furthermore, the studies show that polycentricity, considered as the way to achieve polycentrism (Rauhut, 2017), is both a relational and normative concept (ESPON, 2005) (ESPON, 2017); (Rauhut, 2017); (Green, 2007). Its normative character is linked to the fact that besides becoming an objective to be achieved in the ESDP, it is an aim of the cohesion policy as well. Hence it is a political goal, though not all European states have embraced it as a policy objective (Waterhout et al., 2005); (SchĂśn, 2009); (Wegener, 2013). Polycentricity became a normative concept after being introduced in the ESDP (Davoudi, 2003). The relational character on the other hand, is present in two features, namely the morphological and the functional aspects (Green, 2007); (ESPON, 2005); (Burger & Meijers, 2012). The morphological polycentricity is centred on nodal features (Burger & Meijers, 2012) and is measured and analysed through data on GDP, employment, population concentration and density, the urban-rural transitions and their fuzzy boundaries, the settlementsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; form and distribution, or dispersal, etc. (Brezzi & Veneri, 2015); (ESPON, 2005). The indicators used to assess polycentricity in this case do show a direct link between polycentric territorial structures and polycentric development.

The functional polycentricity on the other hand, counts for functions and relations between cities/centres (Burger & Meijers, 2012), and flows among them in terms of commuting, economic activities, education, etc. (Brezzi & Veneri, 2015) (ESPON, 2005). The functional aspect is associated also with the multi-sector character of polycentricity in governance (Boamah, 2018). Hence, the interactions among actors, institutions and economic activities form the core of the concept. However, these interactions happen in space and are shaped around territorial resources. This leads not only to the formulation and establishment of territorial structures, but also to the institutions that are responsible on drawing and managing these structures and hence to polycentric governance.

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Measuring polycentricity, hence defining whether a territory, region, country is polycentric or monocentric, requires first a definition on polycentricity to be concluded, and then the respective set of indicators to be set and quantified. In the case of European polycentricity, a serious attempt was made in 2005 by an ESPON project to measure polycentricity, both the morphological and the functional one. For the previous, an index was designed around three dimensions: size, location and connectivity (ESPON, 2005). These dimensions were applied to 1,588 Functional Urban Areas (FUA) in 27 countries. Three separate sub-indexes â&#x20AC;&#x201C; one per dimension were produced, following different methodologies, depending on the specific indicators per each case. Each subindicator had equal weight on the overall morphological index measured in figures from 0-100. According to the ESPON methodology, the higher the index, and the lower the level of polycentrism.

Besides constructing and quantifying the morphological index, the ESPON 1.1.1 project carried out also the functional analysis at FUA level. This analysis is based on the functional specialization (and as a result also relations between) of the regions (FUAs). Functional specialization is important as it ensures the diversity among cities, while also making sure that there is integration, synergies and cooperation. The good quality of the specialization analysis depends on the availability of data, which are gathered for the following aspects: decision-making in the public sector; decisionmaking in the private sector; population; tourism; industry; knowledge.

The morphological and functional analysis of polycentrism as conducted by ESPON 1.1.1 is descriptive to the current situation. The future changes to the current situation would depend on several factors, but it is important to know where there could be more potential for development towards a more polycentric urban system. This means identifying potential for new functional entities and increased territorial cooperation, beyond the existing urban nodes/centres. The analysis of identifying the future potential remains still morphological as the potential for polycentricity is based on morphological proximity. As such, the results do not guarantee that cooperation will happen exactly where the analysis identifies potential for it. Based on ESPON 1.1.1, this analysis designates for each FUA, areas that can be reached within 45 minutes by road travel (the 45 min. isochrones). This time limit is widely recognized as the most appropriate one for daily commuting (daily working trips within the work catchment areas), and the areas included within the commuting radius provide cities with a better opportunity for functional integration. The hypothesis is that â&#x20AC;&#x153;cities with overlapping

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travel-to-work-areas have the best potential for developing synergies” (ESPON, 2005, p.13). “These areas are then approximated to municipal boundaries”, as municipalities constitute the “potential building blocks in polycentric development strategies” (ibid., p.13). The areas established in this way are named as Potential Urban Strategic Horizons (PUSH) and their further integration forms the so-called Potential Integration Areas (PIAs) Rauhut (2017) lists four more attempts of measuring polycentricity, accomplished by ESPON in 2007, Meijers and Sandberg in 2008, Green in 2007 and Brezzi and Veneri in 2015. The latter try to do so on a global level, hence applying their methodology to OECD countries. The studies share similarities, especially in terms of indicators employed and for lying on morphological and functional dimensions of polycentricity as well as on FUAs. Out of all, perhaps the methodology used by ESPON in 2005 remains the more influential, though carrying also a certain level of controversy, especially in regard to data (Rauhut, 2017).

Scale is another important feature of polycentricity, which being a multi-scalar notion, operates at local, regional and national levels (Rauhut, 2017); (Davoudi, 2003); (Brezzi & Veneri, 2015); (Schön, 2009); (Taylor et al., 2008); (Burger et al., 2014); (Boamah, 2018). Each level has a different meaning, not only territorially speaking (size, structure and resources), but also in terms of politics, policies, governance and institutions/stakeholders (Rauhut, 2017). For instance, the spatial structure is very important at the metropolitan scale, for labour productivity and for efficiency and economies of scale in the provision of public services (Zhang et al., 2017); (Brezzi & Veneri, 2015). The latter is a governance issue and therefore will impact the policymaking processes at local and regional level. Land use, concentration of services, and proximity of services and natural resources to housing are also a question of governance and city making discussed at the metropolitan scale. This metropolitan spatial structure could be very monocentric, or perhaps organised around complementary nuclei of activities that share the employment catchment area, with the latter resulting in a functional territory that often exceeds administrative boundaries.

Zhang et al. (2017, p.19) argue that the latter is common when an agglomeration’s area expands beyond a certain scale and the created “agglomeration diseconomies open the possibility for spatially polycentric balance”. The presence of such balance shares the effects of the agglomeration among the comprising neighbouring cities in contrast to the crowding effects that emerge inside cities/monocentric places and are to be faced

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by the city alone. With this reasoning, metropolitan polycentricity can be seen from a morphological urban/land development perspective and promoted as a model of urban land development that opposes to dispersal and sprawl, or to highly monocentric cities (Brezzi & Veneri, 2015).

On the other hand, at the regional level, polycentricity is mostly seen in the functional relations and connectivity between various urban areas that are somehow closely located (Davoudi, 2003); (Brezzi & Veneri, 2015) â&#x20AC;&#x201C; though morphologically not connected, and are complementary to one-another in terms of economic sectors.

Sometimes, this leads spatially to the creation of large agglomerations. In other cases though, un urban-rural continuum is not present and the centres communicate through a network of infrastructural channels established in the natural landscape. The use of the regional resources and investments in infrastructure in this large setting becomes a regional or national concern, and is highly influenced by politics.

On a national level, polycentricity is a policy and political discussion. It often focuses on the decision to be made between (on one hand) promoting large concentrations of population, infrastructure investments and economic resources as a means for enhancing competitiveness; and (on the other hand) spreading funds and subsidies to several cities and regions, especially to the lagging ones (Dijkstra et al., 2013) to ensure regional balances and reduce regional disparities.

Furthermore, the assumptions or rules defined in a methodology for measuring polycentricity cannot be applied uniformly to all areas that are subject to a study, due to the diverse territorial features that the areas have. If all areas are included in a study as of the outset, this problem is addressed through a methodological appraisal that will consider any particular aspect. However, applying an existing methodology to a territory that was not considered in the initial assessment, would definitely lead to adding new assumptions, and probably also omitting/modifying criteria and rules that have been considered otherwise important. For instance, applying the ESPON 2005 methodology on measuring polycentricity in Albania (as it is done later in the research) would most probably require a revision on the FUAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s criteria, due to the small size (population and area) of cities in Albania.

2.4.2 Polycentricity and polycentrism in EU policies EU strategic and policy documents that emphasize particularly the role of territory in

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development and governance, such as the European Spatial Development Perspective (1999), the EU territorial Agenda 2020, etc., promote the concept of polycentric territories and polycentric development. The notion of polycentrism and polycentricity entered the EU vocabulary first with its application in the ESDP in 1999 (CSD, 1999) and since then it earned a key role in the EU Cohesion Policy, mainly for its “ability to fuse together the two primary and conflicting perceptions of spatial economicdevelopment, cohesion and competitiveness” (Rauhut, 2017, p.1).

“Polycentricity is a concept that encourages regions and cities, working with neighbouring territories, to explore common strengths and reveal potential complementarities, which brings added value that cannot be achieved by the individual regions and cities in isolation. … a polycentric approach allows for joining existing assets in order to increase their competitive power, efficiency of using limited resources by avoiding duplicating roles and functions and bringing more benefits for local inhabitants using the combined resource potential.” (ESPON, 2017, p.1) ESPON studies on polycentrism suggest that policy makers should increase flows of interactions among places and actors, as a means to increase competitiveness through combination of assets and knowledge at different places, for different resources and stakeholders (ESPON, 2017); (ESPON, 2005). Interaction, where critical mass is clearly an indispensable factor, will boost [territorial] cooperation, while also contributing to the reduction of regional disparities and establishment of balances between territories and urban and rural areas. According to the EU studies, polycentric territorial development is by definition place-based; promotes development and competitiveness which is more than merely economic – hence bringing a new shift/stage in the regional development conception (Pike et al., 2017); and induces the right or the optimal mix in the specialization-cooperation binome of the territories, nodes, networks and regions (ESPON, 2017).

A critical concept in polycentric territorial development is the fact that it does not intend to promote massive investments for growing bigger; on the contrary and even better, is about making use of existing resources for combined and balanced growth among territorial structures (ESPON, 2017). This again is in line with a new understanding in regional development, where growth is not necessarily the intention of regions – in fact sustainable development is (Pike et al., 2017), development through cooperation, efficient use of resources, resilience of the territories, complementary use of resources and human capacities of neighbouring territorial structures to “ensure spill-over effects

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for the development of wider regions” (ESPON, 2017, p.2).

The ESPON (2017) policy brief on polycentrism provides a number of policy messages that are to be implemented at national, regional and local scales and that link territorial polycentric structures with polycentric governance and development. Besides reinforcing the principle of collaboration through promoting the strengthening of urban nodes simultaneously to flows and interactions among territorial structures (regardless of size, function and centrality) and emphasizing the bottom-up engagement, these policy messages place a strong focus on how peripheral regions, or nodes could also play an crucial role on promoting polycentrism.

First of all, one could not speak of polycentrism if development is focused on the developed and central locations/structure only. Then development should not be regarded as merely economic growth of big/mega urban centres. On the contrary it implies socio-environmental and resilience dimensions, which cannot be safeguarded or promoted, unless flows of interaction and cooperation are established and sustained under a governance mechanism among the less-dense and more peripheral regions, and between them and the more advantaged and developed ones. Hence there is clearly a necessity “to develop links among small and medium-sized urban areas and larger metropolitan areas by developing complementary/supporting businesses and business clusters, ensuring knowledge transfers, using metropolitan areas as gateways for attracting interest for cultural and touristic resources in the regions” (ESPON, 2017, p.3).

For this network of cooperation to function successfully, it is necessary that local-toregional-to national leadership and political willingness to advance territorial development is assured, next to the possibility of engaging a large network of ‘informal’ stakeholders into the so called ‘place-based inclusive governance’. This is a critical factor for territorial polycentric development and governance. However, again referring to the ESPON policy recommendations, the governance structures and capacities should become neither a primary issue, nor an obstacle in the process of developing regions through cooperation. The vision should precede the structures and capacities.

Hence, dedicating large amount of funds to the establishment of structure as of the outset of territorial/regional development process/reform is not wrong, but it may lead to failure or stalling. After all, the stakeholders – those who contribute to and benefit from development, would like to see first development activities taking place and results being provided. The regional actors would not engage into cooperation merely

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because heavy and â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;well-setâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; institutional structures are in place. Hence, finding a right balance between funding structures and establishing institutional capacities on one side and funding and promoting cooperation for development activities on the ground on the other, is crucial to the success of territorial development.

The European Territorial Agenda TA2020 suggest for the design of place-based strategies developed locally to address local conditions as part of the integrated and partnership-based governance and planning for urban-rural interdependencies and territories (EC, 2011). It also defines polycentric and balanced territorial development as its first priority and key element for achieving territorial cohesion. The TA2020 aims for polycentric development at different levels: macro-regional, cross border, national and regional. Policy efforts should contribute to the avoidance and/or reduction of polarization and disparities between capitals, metropolitan areas, and small and medium sized cities/towns (EC, 2011, p.4).

The quality of institutions at the local level is however particularly important for placebased Cohesion Policy to be effective (ESPON, 2018a, p.14). By institutions it is not meant only the government structures, but all formal and informal entities that engage in processes, aiming at achieving a common outcome (Ostrom, 1990); (Ostrom, 2005); (Toto, 2018). This requires bringing administrative and institutional capacities at an appropriate level for dealing with territorial development problems and for involving all stakeholders in decision-making, regardless of the territorial scale and the fussiness of the regional boundaries. These boundaries should be related to the issues at stake and not necessarily administrative. This capacity building is achieved not only through technical assistance, but through engaging in multi-level governance (ESPON, 2018a), which besides clear roles and responsibilities for each level and actorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; group (horizontal layers) embodies an understanding on the overlapping boundaries that the multitude of issues to be dealt with creates. This multilayers approach leads again toward the polycentric governance, which is an enhanced shift of the multi-level governance concept.

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III. Empirical Evidence and Analysis 3.1 The model of territorial rescaling and the resulting spatial typologies 3.1.1 Territorial rescaling in governance reforms When discussing functional determinism for territorial rescaling, Keating (2013) raises questions on factors that explain the geographical scale of the social systems and governments, and enquiries about what the scale should be. Often, in practical work, governance, and territorial reforms, efficiency is used as a criterion for decentralization of power, and for territorial amalgamation or fragmentation of local governments.

Decentralization trends define the level of sub-government, where power and competencies are allocated and based on the existing structure of the government, this level could be local or regional. The region is an intermediate government and territorial level with size, structure, competencies, and boundaries varying from one country to the other. Amalgamation or fragmentation is often carried out for political purposes (power distribution and influence on elections results), but is officially executed under purely technical arguments, with efficiency being ranked as one of the top priorities.

However, as cases will show in this section and afterwards in the chapter, efficiency of the scale [alone] does not explain the existence of a very particular scale, and there is no reason to think that territorial organisations/structures will [re]appear, or disappear merely because functional calculations have changed (Keating, 2013).

The power shift between levels of government is a result of governance shifts in a territory, from centralization to decentralization (including also informal arrangements) and vice-versa, and from administrative down-scaling to up-scaling (Hendriks, 2006), reflected also in territorial patterns of government units. Besides political interest of holding or sharing power, trends are often created about the preferred size of governments as a means of making governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s tasks delivery easier or more controllable, and for bringing public goods and services closer to citizens (Keating, 2013) under the framework of democracy and governance accountability. The choice of the small scale is often made to emphasise the need for closer links between governments and citizens (receivers of services and public goods), which makes accountability processes easier and more achievable. However, governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s scales are reflected into fixed administrative territorial boundaries, which leave unresolved issues of socio-ecological relations that wave across scales, or do not fit with either the small or the larger/regional scale (Toto, 2019). Furthermore, small scales lead to territorial fragmentations, which may negatively affect redistribution. Thus, territorial

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disparities tend to happen locally – at the small neighbourhood scale within a city, in areas within a metropolitan region, or between neighbouring rural and urban zones.

Very fragmented local governments would not allow for cross-subsidies and for overcoming social and economic fragmentation, or its effects, unless a perfect system of cross-scales and inter-governments cooperation and networking were in place.

Because, cooperation and functional interactions are often considered as utopia due to institutional sophistication and development required, governments prefer to seek for the designation of optimal levels or sizes of government on the territory. The processes behind the definition of boundaries or new territorial competencies vary from one country to the other, based on political dynamics, and on historical ties and territorial identities, as well as the power of the latter to influence policy reforms 31.

The territorial rescaling discussion in Albania is strongly related to governance and history. It has usually emerged always around times of governance reforms (Toto et al., 2014). In Albania, the major governance shifts after World War II are recorded in 1945 (establishment of the communist government and centralised socio-political and economic regime), in 1992 (political decentralization), in 2000 (administrative, functional and fiscal decentralization) and recently in 2015 (revisiting decentralization).

Each stage is immediately followed or shortly preceded by a territorial administrative reform.

The first regional and local administrative subdivisions of Albania as a nation-state are reported on maps and laws of the 1930s with the representation of prefectures and subprefectures. At the time, Albania had 10 prefectures (deconcentrated territorial units of governments), which coincide to a considerable degree with the boundaries of the current qarks and prefectures32 (figure 3) (Toto, 2010/a) (Toto, 2010/b). In 1930, the current qark of Kukës was part of the prefecture of Gjakovë33; the prefecture of Shkodër included also most of the territory of qark of Lezhë; the prefecture of Gjirokastër in the south Albania included also Sarandë, which is currently part of the qark of Vlorë; the prefecture of Durrës encompassed Kurbin and Kavajë, which currently belong to different qarks from that of Durrës; and the qark of Fier used to be part of the prefecture of Berat.

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Figure 3. Prefectures of 1930 versus qarks in 2018

Source: Prepared by author based on (Selenica, 1930, 2014) The prefectures in 1930 assembled sub-prefectures, which were regions of distinguished historical identities and are provided in a map of Toto et al. (2014). The historical continuity of territories and historical ties were safeguarded in the Albanian administrative divisions of the modern state prior to World War II. This is visible also through the comparison between two historical maps ‘regions’, namely provinces of the antiquity period and principalities of the pre-ottoman period (figure 4) with the boundaries of prefectures and sub-prefectures. These historical identities within the current Albanian state territory were interrupted administratively twice: i) during the centuries of Ottoman Empire, the ‘vilayet’ and ‘sanjak’ system (namely provinces and

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preserved their identity relatively intact in time, whilst others have been divided or subjected to continuous change. This has happened due to the shifts of power, or because the geographical and natural factors have influenced in the preservation or loss of the territorial identity. In the map, we can distinguish a number of hotspots with regards to the division into regions based on the historical criterion: 1.The regionsof of Pukë, and Lezhë, as border was areas have often changedbased the borders the sub-provinces the Mirditë caliphate system) established onofterritorial continuities region they would belong to.

between settlements mostly inhabited by Albanians; ii) after World War II, territories 2. Hasidistinguished and Tropoja, for cultural and historical reasons, and asand a resultwith of previous were power for civic of most historical identity a divisions, presumed considered as the Prefecture of Gjakova under the ruling of King Zog.

engagement or unrest were subdivided administratively and therefore also in terms of 3. Vlora has often changed the regionparts to which it belongs. to different district and later on qarks. political representation, with belonging

Figure 4. Historical maps: provinces of the antiquity VII-II b.c. (map on the left), and Figure 23: Principates c. XIV-XV a.c.

Figure 22: Historical divisions.Provinces in antiquity principalities XIV-XV c. VII-II b.c. a.c. (map on the right)

Prepared by: Co-PLAN Source: Cabanes, P. et al, (2008), Archeological Map of Albania, Pegi

Prepared by: Co-PLAN Source: Albanian Academy of Science, History of Albanian People, ISBN 99927-1-623-1

Source: Cabanes, P. et al., 2008, Harta Arkeologjike e Shipërisë (Archeological Map 48 of Albania), Botimet Pegi – the map on the left; and Albanian Academy of Science, 2002, History of Albanian People, 604, Tiranē, ISBN: 99927-1-623-1 – the map on the right. Both maps are published in (Toto et al., 2014, p.48).

After the World War II, in the framework of centralised economy and political system, decentralization of governance was an inexistent concept. The government was organised into national and local institutions, all representing centralised power.

According to the constitution of 1976, the ‘People’s Councils’ were defined as local institutions of the state administration that carry out governance processes at the territorial administrative units, in cooperation with citizens and are ‘elected’ every 3 years. Similarly, the members of the executive organ (Executive Committee of the People’s Council) were elected by the citizens through general, equal, direct and secret voting. However, in reality, the elections were far from democratic; the ‘elections’ were

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commanded, resulting continuously in appointed people. The territorial organisation of the country was based on two principles: i) the power and control of the party in force should be distributed and be present all over the territory; ii) the territorial organisation should be carried out in a way as to maximise economic efficiency, which was an objective of the centralised economy. In these circumstances, in principle, the role of any ‘local or regional’ administrative unit was to perform as a ’transmission belt’ for the exercise of power and control of the ruling party in the lower institutional, administrative and community levels.

Technically speaking, by the end of the communist system, Albania had its government’s system organised locally as follows: there were three levels of local governments – one for urban areas (neighbourhoods and cities), one for rural areas (villages and united villages), and the district. The territory (compared to after 1990 reforms) was highly fragmented with 2,848 villages, 539 united villages, 306 neighbourhoods, 67 cities, and 26 districts (Toto, 2010/b). The districts were similar to the 39 sub-prefectures of the 1930s, but less in number due to merging territories of proximity and historical similarity.

This pre-1990s model had a strong influence on the territorial structure and local and regional government’s organisation in the first decade after the socio-economic and political shift of Albania from a centralised regime to the market economy and pluralistic political system. The state structures were unprepared to deal with the change, while authoritative and elites ties, or legacies of the past were strongly present within social groups and networks.

The governance and government reform, aiming at decentralising power at local levels, was initiated in 1992. Political decentralization was the first step, followed by administrative decentralization. During the first decade (1990-1999), the territory was organised into 36 districts out of the 26 that existed in the previous decades. In 1998 and 2000, the government of Albania adopted and ratified the European Charter of Local Self-Governance and soon afterwards it drafted and adopted its first decentralization strategy. The charter provides the general guidelines for establishing the meaning and scope of local governments, including their right to associate (cooperate) and the right to protect local boundaries. The principle of local autonomy also derives directly from the articles of this charter, as does the principle of subsidiarity.

With regards to the subsidiarity, article 4 paragraph 3 of the charter states that “Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which

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are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy.”

(Council of Europe, 1985, p.2) In the year 2000, the parliament adopted the first law ‘On local governments organisation and functioning’, 8652/2000 (currently abolished), that organised local government in two levels, namely: i) the first level composed of municipalities (65 urban areas) and communes (309 rural areas), which latter turned into 373 local units, due to the amalgamation of two municipalities on one, for efficiency purposes; ii) the second level composed of 12 qarks, each carrying a number of municipalities and communes within its territory.

The territorial-administrative subdivision was legally set through the law no. 8653/2000 ‘On territorial administrative subdivision of Albania’ (currently abolished). The territorial administrative division law recognised also 36 districts, but their role was not about governance. Their designation and recognition by law, was mainly facilitating transition between systems and was especially valuable for administrative data and statistical purpose. As these data were generated on the district level, and INSTAT offices gathering administrative data were operating at this level, it would be easier for this process to remain intact. Furthermore, several regional directorates (from the various ministries) were previously established at district level and the transition to qark level was not necessarily deemed as appropriate from a functional perspective.

From a function and fiscal decentralisation perspective, municipalities, communes and qarks had powers to exercise on the territory. Municipality and communes differed between them only in terms of the territory to manage, with the previous being predominantly urban and the latter being predominantly rural. Both types of units had equal powers organised into: exclusive/own functions; shared functions; and delegated functions. In reality most of the functions were mainly shared rather than own or shared.

Hence, even in the case of exclusive functions, such as urban planning, or local economic development, municipalities had to share power with the national government based on the detailed legal prerogatives made in the sectorial legislation.

Services such as, solid waste management, water and wastewater, city beautification and green areas, local transportation, public lighting, and local roads were considered fully exclusive, operating on local basis and making use of local tariffs. Still, sectorial legislation and policies were and are approved nationally (Albania being a unitary state) and fiscal decentralization was never achieved in full as to set a well functioning local

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autonomy. Therefore, most of these services were and still are supported financially to a great extend through national grants34.

Similar to all other Southeast European countries, the local government system of Albania was established in two levels, with qark being recognised by the Constitution as the second level of local governance, where harmonisation of regional strategies was to happen. Besides this role, the territory of qark was set by Constitution as the territory for implementing the national elections system. Particularly the second role has given stability to qark as a conception in the Albanian local governance. This is an important fact to mention, as besides this role, qark has almost no other roles, resembling to an entity with vague competencies or no competencies at all. Initially, in 2000, similarly as in the other Southeast European countries, the stakeholders took the decision not to fully accomplish the governance reform for the second (Toto, 2010/b). In a context of major changes and system shifts, it was considered as premature by and for all the political stakeholders to engage simultaneously on a two-levels reform, local and regional. Therefore, it was agreed by them that once the reform would get consolidated results for its implementation at the first level of local government, the political stakeholders could start implementing or reviewing the implementation of the reform at the second level, hence the qark.

According to (V.Ostrom et al., 1961), “the multiplicity of political units in a metropolitan area is a pathological phenomenon” (p.831) and though it could be assumed that this leads to overlapping or duplicating jurisdictions, it seems being unavoidable. However, there is again the political understanding that efficiency can be increased and duplication avoided in case a single governance organization is set for the entire metropolitan, or the regional area. The reasoning behind low efficiency is not only duplications and large number of staff, but also the fact that the many local governments units operating within the region have a local interest limited to their territory only and have no concern for the effects that their activities may have in the region, or on the communities of the neighbouring units. It is under this reasoning that Qark was established in 2000 in Albania and defined as a second tier of local government rather than a regional entity. The purpose was not to give qark well differentiated competences of governance, rather than to create a body that monitors, coordinates and oversights what the first-tier units are doing, and therefore prevent or remove any ‘free-rider’ or ‘tragedy of the commons’ effect on the territory, born as a result of lack of cooperation and isolated local governance.

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The law on local government functioning and organization defined a set of loosely clear roles for the qark: i) harmonisation of local strategies at qark level and harmonisation between local and national strategies at the territory of the qark; ii) implementation of services and functions that municipalities and communes would delegate to qarks in case of failure of achievement by their own administrations; iii) functions delegated by the national government; iv) territory planning at qark level, i.e. drafting of territorial plans. This last function did not include the delivery of building permits, unless any municipality/commune would delegate this function to the qark for its own territory.

The planning function was rarely executed because its relevance was absent at the moment qark was not entitled to control the territory. Carrying out planning at qark level was considered mostly a harmonisation task rather than a necessity that leads to or guides development. The latter was fully based on local plans and other planning instruments developed by the municipalities and communes.

An analysis made by Toto (2010/a/b) lists a number of reasons why Albania did not achieve decentralization in full at both local levels and those reasons go beyond the publicly communicated one – lack of stakeholders’ preparedness. Thus: •

Full decentralization means for national government loosing a great deal of competencies, including political control and power during the transition period;

•

There was lack of financial and human capacities to manage a very complex process resulting from full decentralization;

•

Decentralization at the second level would mean initiating a regionalization of governance reform. Albania was not aware of the process details and the expected impacts;

•

Local governments, once set, were very unwilling to support a governance regionalization process as this would mean for them to give up a number of competencies or have their just received competencies modified. (Toto, 2010/a); (Toto, 2010/b)

Finally, as described earlier in the text, qarks did not fully represent historical identities.

Several reforms or consultation processes undertaken in later years with and among qarks representatives provide evidence of this lack of identity and/or historical belonging. In these circumstances, considering also the weak functional profile, qarks became more and more vulnerable and misused by politics. After all, changing boundaries, once they were set and the first elections were implemented on that basis,

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was considered very risky for governments and political factors, because it would affect political representation on the territory. Therefore, what was initially considered as a cautious and mature step of not advancing decentralization at qark level, due to lack of institutional preparedness, turned into a lost opportunity for deepening further the governance and territorial-administrative reform. From 2000 to 2014, the process of territorial rescaling was paused, and government’s attempts to build and implement a regional development policy were the only moments, where discussion around territorial rescaling would evolve.

However, two phenomena became evident after the year 2000: i) low territorial, economic and institutional efficiency of delivering services at the local government level. Communes and municipalities were considered as very small and fragmented to offer qualitative services, though being close to citizens, while central government institutions operating at local/qark level were overlapping territorially and in terms of competencies and characterised by unnecessarily high staff numbers (Toto et al., 2014); (Shutina, 2015); ii) territorial disparities were reported at various territorial levels, predominantly between urban and rural areas (Shutina et al., 2016); (Shutina, 2015); (GoA, 2014/a) (GoA, 2014/b). In order to cope with these problems, the government that took seat in mid 2013 initiated two reforms – the territorial-administrative reform and the [revisiting of] decentralization of government reform. Both took place during 2014-2016 and were concluded with the adoption of two laws, the law no. 115/2014 ‘On administrative and territorial division of local government units in Albania’ and the law no. 139/2015 ‘On local self-governance’. The latter was preceded also by a national crosscutting strategy on the decentralization of local government.

The territorial and administrative reform was based (at least theoretically) on the following criteria: i) political representation. This was key to defining the final designation of boundaries for municipalities, so as not to affect negatively the expected elections results in favour of the party ruling with the majority of votes. For instance, the division of Kamza and Tirana in two separate municipalities, regardless of their territorial continuity, was made on political basis. The aim was for Kamza citizens, historically voting in favour of the [current] opposition party, not to affect local elections’ result in Tirana; ii) efficiency of delivering public services. The study preceding the territorial reform implementation was substantially pinpointing at this criterion (more than the other one). The total number of local administration employees was considered as too high to handle services in an efficient way; iii) economy of scale.

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This was also a key criterion from the perspective of the study undertaken on the reform before hand. Based on this criterion, the principle and concept of ‘functional area’ was imported and implemented for a significant number of municipalities; iv) local selfdetermination (V.Ostrom et al., 1961) (V.Ostrom, 1972). This criterion was mainly considered in the implementation phase following the study and law on the territorial reform, and it was used especially together with political representation in the decision to designate the ethnic minority communities as separate municipalities; v) administrative historical ties and boundaries. This was mainly considered in the decision to merge existing municipalities, and maintain historical administrative boundaries, rather than basing the new subdivision on historical local communities and geographical features.

As a result of the territorial reform, the 373 local government units of Albania were merged among them in September 2016, resulting into 61 municipalities. The new municipalities became not only larger in size (Tirana being the largest one and growing from 45km2 to 1,100km2), but also more complex from a territorial structure perspective. Each municipality encompasses all types of territories, urban, rural, agricultural, and natural resources such as mountains, forests, pastures and waters resources. The mixed territorial typology is to be reflected in significant changes regarding the governance of the territory, and increases the amount of legal framework that municipalities have to deal with, in order to manage their territory in a sustainable way. This represents also one of the key challenges in the implementation of the reform, as the municipalities should diversify more their human resources, both technical experts and lawyers. Furthermore, the territorial planning (also reformed during 20142015) process increases the functional burden of the municipalities, because they have to plan and regulate land use not only for urban areas, but for the other types of the territory as well. Territorial planning is only one of the several services provided by local governments, and one of the several examples used to show that this central government-led territorial rescaling, implemented for the sake of increasing economies of scale and efficiency, has to face issue of human capacities that are required to implement properly the reform (GoA, 2014/b); (Toska & Gjika, 2018). Hence, territorial rescaling in physical terms – change of boundaries, and in legal terms – review of legislation and services arrangements is only the beginning of the reform. Its implementation and the effects it will have on the territory and on citizens’ welfare are

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the important milestones to follow, which in fact will provide the final verdict on this case of territorial rescaling (as process and as results).

The decentralisation reform on the other hand was supposed to achieve [among others] two major objectives: i) decentralise further functionally, by adding new responsibilities/functions to the municipalities and by correcting mistakes envisaged during the implementation of decentralization in the previous 15 years; ii) revise and improve fiscal decentralization, by drafting a law ‘On finances for local selfgovernments’, which was approved by parliament in 2017 (no. 68/2017) (GoA, 2015).

The law did not revisit the articles of the previous law on qark. As a matter of fact, the new law and the reform simply remained ‘indifferent’ towards the qark matter, without taking any decision, neither in support of strengthening decentralization further at regional level, nor in deciding to abolish the notion of qark and therefore all of the redundancy related to its institutional existence.

Furthermore, the law on local self-governance omitted shared functions and assigned only exclusive functions to the local governments, while also increasing the number of functions. New functions were added, such as forest management, administration of secondary and tertiary parts of irrigation and drainage system (for agriculture areas), administration of primary and secondary schools facilities, etc. While all functions were defined as exclusive to local governments, in reality most of them (alike in the previous law) are administered as shared between central government and municipalities. For the majority of the exclusive local government functions, the law on local selfgovernance is defining that administration/management will be carried out in compliance with the sectorial legislation, therefore ‘delegating’ the power of defining local autonomy over the function to the ministry that is responsible on the respective sector and on the relevant sectorial legislation.

The above reforms were about the first level of local governance, hence municipalities.

The public discussion on qark was avoided by the government’s authorities, but was revisited in 2014 and earlier in 2009 by non-government organisations, donor programs and professionals who were interested on the future of the qark as an institution, on the advancement of the decentralization reform at regional level, and on regional development. As a result of these interests, since at least 2009, there have been two lines of debate and experts’ work taking place in Albania, focusing either on the institutional development of qark, or on regional development, and at times on both issues. Regional development is mainly discussed in the following section. However, a

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summary of proposals made on regionalization (for different purposes and by different institutions) is presented below.

There are at least 6 proposals for territorial rescaling that imply forms of regionalization, four made by public institutions and two made by private and non-government institutions. Thus, in 2016, the government of Albania approved the General National Territorial Plan. This is a comprehensive territorial plan that complements from a territorial perspective the National Strategy on Development and Integration. The Plan proposes a number of planning regions (figure 5), which are defined based on geographical similarities and proximity, ecosystemsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; interdependencies, economic relations and social and historical connections. These could be considered as functional regions, though functionality as well depends on the criteria chosen for its definition.

In any case, these regions are not to become administrative and are different from the regional management areas defined by the government for the purpose of regional development policy implementation. So far, the government has not made use of these planning regions. However, as understood from meeting with NTPA representatives, the national planning agency is interested on and will refer to them in future planning processes at regional level.

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Figure 5. Planning regions as per GNTP (urban system and spatial connections)

Source: NTPA (2016, p.158), General National Territory Plan of Albania During 2013-2014 the government published and promoted a number of proposals on sectorial regionalization options. Hence, each ministry was analysing its sector/s and coming up with proposals on how the sector could be more efficient, while increasing the quality of the services and/or production. These proposals were published also in the government program for the electoral mandate 2013-2016. As a result, the Ministry responsible on tourism proposed 4 regions for the management of tourism in Albania, considering the natural and cultural resources. Three of them are territorially distinctive, while the fourth one â&#x20AC;&#x201C; areas with cultureâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s development potential, was crosscutting over the territory, in the form of centres proposed according to the distribution of historical

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and cultural monuments. The other three areas are: 1) mountain tourism; 2) coastal tourism; and 3) eco-tourism. A map that interprets geographically the location of the areas (based on the government program) was prepared by Toto et al. (2014) as follows (figure 6).

Figure 6. Regions for tourism development as proposed by the Government of Albania in 2013

Source: Toto, R., Shutina, D., Gjika, A. and Aliaj, B. (2014, p.43)

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Besides tourism, the government undertook an analysis of agricultural production efficiency and productivity related to the territory and climate conditions and on this basis it proposed a regionalization of produce and agricultural activities. The proposal was aiming at guiding the efforts of the Ministry and farmers to regionalize the activity and therefore increase efficiency of the sector and its contribution to the national GDP. The proposals are summarised below, based on Toto et al. (2014). Geographically speaking, the proposals were built on the basis of qark boundaries (figure 7). However, the government never pursued these proposals for implementation.

Figure 7. Regionalization of agricultural production and activities as per Government Figure 19: Distribution of agricultural and pastoral activity by Qark of Albanian proposal in 2013

Source: Toto, R., Shutina, D., Gjika, A. and Aliaj, B. (2014, p.44) Co-PLAN, a local non-government organisation has worked for years on issues related to regionalization and regional development in Albania. Based on its experience, longterm research (policy and scientific) on the topic of regionalization and knowledge of the political dynamics in Albania, it has often offered proposals on regionalization, some of them being more of an analytical character and others as contribution to

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concurrent policy making processes. For instance, based on Co-PLANâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s work, regionalization could follow statistical regions (established by the Institute of Statistics in Albania and for years influencing policy processes through evidence), or regions based on their economic development and poverty indicators (figure 8).

Figure 8. Statistical regions (on the left) and regions that match EU criteria on development (on the right)

Source: (Aliaj, 2008) in Source: Toto, R., Shutina, D., Gjika, A. and Aliaj, B. (2014, p.32) However, in 2014, as a contribution to the process initiated by the Government of Albania on the territorial and administrative reform of the 1st tier of local government, Co-PLAN and POLIS University in Albania, provided policy proposals on regions to the largest political audience. Hence, a thorough study on administrative regions was published and discussed among key stakeholders. The study suggested two possible models of territorial rescaling, one with 4 and the other with 6 regions. The latter was mainly proposed as an alternative, in case there would be critical positioning of local actors in the north and east of the country. The proposals were very ambitious and daring, by suggesting models of rescaling which did not respect in full the existing qark boundaries, and neither the boundaries of municipalities. This was so, because both models made a serious jump from current political dynamics, and or models of authority

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and power installation, by giving precedence to historical ties, socio-ecological interactions, and most importantly, to requests made by different local stakeholders (especially representatives of qark institutions).

Figure 9. Territorial rescaling models proposed by local actors on the regionalization of Albania

MALESI E MADHE

TROPOJE

MALESI E MADHE

TROPOJE

KUKËS

KUKËS

SHKODER

HAS

SHKODËR VAU I DEJES

SHKODER

FUSHE ARREZ

VAU I DEJES

PUKE

FUSHE ARREZ

PUKE

KUKES

LEZHE

KUKES

LEZHE

MIRDITE

LEZHË

HAS

SHKODËR

MIRDITE

LEZHË DIBER

DIBER

MAT

KURBIN

DIBËR

DIBËR

DURRËS KRUJE

DURRËS

KLOS

KRUJE

BULQIZE

DURRES VORE SHIJAK KAMEZ

TIRANE

TIRANE

TIRANË

TIRANË

LIBRAZHD

KAVAJE

LIBRAZHD

KAVAJE

RROGOZHINE PEQIN

ELBASAN

DIVJAKE LUSHNJE

BELSH

RROGOZHINE PEQIN

PERRENJAS

ELBASAN

DIVJAKE LUSHNJE

POGRADEC

BERAT

SELENICE

KORÇË

SKRAPAR

KORCE

BELSH

KUCOVE

FIER

MALIQ

POLICAN

FIER

URA VAJGURORE ROSKOVEC BERAT PATOS

MALLAKASTER

MEMALIAJ SELENICE

POLICAN

VLORË

Kufinjte e NjQV te reja

GJIROKASTËR

LIBOHOVE

HIMARE

Kufinjte e Qarqeve ekzistues 4 Rajonet e propozuara

PERMET Kufinjte

GJIROKASTER

e NjQV te reja

KORÇË

SKRAPAR

KORCE

DEVOLL

MEMALIAJ

Legjenda KOLONJE

TEPELENE

VLORE

MALIQ

BERAT

DEVOLL

PUSTEC

GRAMSH

KELCYRE

Legjenda

PERRENJAS

CERRIK POGRADEC

PUSTEC

GRAMSH

URA VAJGURORE ROSKOVEC BERAT PATOS

MALLAKASTER

ELBASAN

ELBASAN

CERRIK

KUCOVE FIER

KLOS BULQIZE

DURRES VORE SHIJAK KAMEZ

FIER

MAT

KURBIN

KELCYRE

Kufinjte e Qarqeve ekzistues

6 Rajonet e propozuara

DELVINE

KOLONJE

TEPELENE

VLORE

VLORË

GJIROKASTËR

PERMET

LIBOHOVE

HIMARE

GJIROKASTER

DELVINE

DROPULL

SARANDE LIVADHJA

KONISPOL

DROPULL

SARANDE LIVADHJA

KONISPOL

Source: Toto, R., Shutina, D., Gjika, A. and Aliaj, B. (2014, pp.72-73) Besides the above proposals which had a political and administrative character, POLIS University provided regionalization models on the basis of planning and development initiatives to be undertaken by the government of Albania, with the aim of leading towards the implementation of a territorial development vision by 2030. These ideas were in fact taken on board – though partially modified, by the National Territory Planning Agency, which later in 2016 approved (as described above) the national territorial plan, designating also planning regions.

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Figure 10. Polycentric planning and development regions proposed in Albania 2030 Manifesto

Source: (Aliaj et al., 2014, pp.118-19) Besides the above proposals, which have been either more significant, or have significantly contributed to policy processes, there have been also other proposals on regions, which have been discussed among smaller stakeholders’ groups and with less or no impact. Still their presence demonstrates that, while government may not have taken concrete steps in finalizing a regionalization reform, the subject of regions has been and remains highly important to stakeholders, especially those at the local level.

The latter have always connected territorial rescaling and regionalization with better development opportunities and better access to better services. This clearly suggests for an implication of both, development and government/governance when regions are discussed among stakeholders in Albania.

However, the ambiguous role of qark and its definition as simultaneously a local government institution (law on local governments) and as a regional development territory (constitution) has been a critical cause for ‘confusion’ about where to draw the line between regional development reforms and governance and local government’s reform. Therefore, regional development discussion in Albania has so far “been closely linked to whether or not, and how to restructure the second level of local government in a way that improves coordination between national and local policies in support of

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socio-economic development and better services for citizens” (Imami et al., 2018, p.9).

As this discussion has somehow side-lined the regionalisation aspect, considered as too complex, the governance and decentralization reforms have not provided an effective result for qark (ibid). Regional Development Reform on the other side, undertaken in 2007, 2009, 2011 and recently in 2016 onward, have been very ambiguous about the discussion on territorial boundaries of regions.

3.1.2 Territorial rescaling in regional development In recent decades there has been an “increasing consensus that linear development support tools are neither sufficient nor effective in addressing societal challenges and realizing changes, which are esteemed necessary to respond to these challenges” (Noguera et al., 2017, p.44). Similarly, in Albania the need for an integrated approach in regional development was widely shared among stakeholders, focusing on how to address spatial disparities and economic growth and build institutions and institutional processes that are multi-layers and able to deal with the large array of issues in regional development and its governance (André & Wallet, 2016). But, one of the major challenges in Albania, alike all eastern block countries was and still is to guarantee a safe bridging from dismantling a centralised regime to Europeanising a national model (Kruglashov, 2013). Hence, to date there is the conflict, or a debate over how to reconcile the domestic development systems for domestic interests with the European requirements for integration (including the regional policy), while crafting and safeguarding a fit-to-context solution.

The year 2000 is the initial milestone of regional development efforts in Albania. In September 2000, Albania adopted the Millennium Declaration together in the United Nations Global Summit, which was followed in 2003 with the approval by the Parliament of Albania of the resolution of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

In this way, the government committed itself to the achievement within 2015 of targets in the areas of security, peace, governance, human rights, environment and development. As a result, during 2002-2005, the UNDP mission in Albania supported qarks in drafting regional development reports and/or strategies in line with the local and domestic context and priorities, as well as with a strong focus on the MDGs. In 2005, regional development strategies were produced for 6 qarks and analytical reports were for the other six, considered as a means of empowering qarks in their institutional

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and economic development process. The documents would also serve to the donor community to structure and focus their interventions in Albania at the sub-national level.

The public debate during the process of drafting the above document had direct and indirect policy effects. Thus, a new law on local taxation was endorsed by the Parliament in 2006 and a national regional development strategy was approved by the Council of Ministers in 2007. The government drafted also a law on regional development in 2007, but this was never submitted for approval and the process was discontinued. Both the strategy and the law were prepared right way after Albania signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with EU institutions. The strategy and the law had qark as the territory for the government to implement regional development. Qarks, as institutions, being very weak, did not have the leverage to push for the strategy and the law to be fully endorsed and implemented.

The goal of this first strategy in regional development was to ensure a coordinated approach to the sustainable socio-economic development of all regions and to create links at all government levels among institutions and other stakeholders interested in sustainable development and alleviation of socio-economic disparities (METE, 2007).

The strategy proposed two investment programs – one for the development of the regions and other dedicated to the disadvantaged areas. Institutionally, it proposed the establishment of the National Regional Development Agency, 12 regional development agencies (one per qark), 12 Qark Partnership Councils and the National Partnership Council for regional development. The institutional structure was fully in line with the EU system of multilevel governance for the implementation of regional cohesion policy in the years 2000s. The strategy was very ambitious in scope, trying to converge EU requirements with domestic needs for regional development, and the structure it proposed was large and with a large number of stakeholders. This made the strategy sound very complex in terms of implementation, and Albanian authorities at the time were simply unprepared institutionally to deal with such a composite structure of multilevel governance, imported from EU models. As a result, the added value of the strategy and of pursuing regional development goals was considered by the government stakeholders as ‘unworthy’ to continue putting extra efforts over its implementation.

Furthermore, the strategy was not supported by a financial mechanism for the implementation of the regional policy, therefore remaining a ‘wishful’ document.

Two years latter, in 2009, UNDP initiated the implementation of a new program on regional development, named ‘Integrated Support to Decentralization’ (ISD), co

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funded by EU and UNDP. The technical assistance had in focus capacity building and institutional strengthening at the level of the national government. At regional level, 4 pilot qarks were involved in the process. ISD analysed (for the first time in a structured and thorough way) regional disparities at qark and local governments levels (the latter encompassing municipalities and communes). The conclusion was (and still remains valid as it will be shown further in the chapter) that disparities do exist and are moderate among qarks, but high among local governments of the 1st tier, and between urban and rural areas.

Additionally, the program supported the government of Albania in improving the Regional Development Fund. This fund was established in 2005-2006 by the government, aiming at providing funds to local governments (mainly on infrastructure) on a competitive basis. Initially it was known as the ‘Competitive Funds’. In 2007 it was turned into a regional development fund, but still performing as ‘fragmented financial support’ to local governments, mainly ‘used politically’ by the party holding the majority of seats in the parliament and forming the government. ISD considered the RDF as a key financial instrument in the advancement of effort for setting up and implementing a regional development policy. It also prepared a policy concept for the future merge between domestic and EU regional development policies.

The efforts made under the ISD implementation had their momentum in 2010, in light of the progress Albania was making towards its candidacy for EU membership, entailing eligibility for the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) component III (Imami et al., 2018). With ISD support, the government prepared the first report on Chapter 2235, and drafted the Regional Development Policy Framework 2010-2020.

Simultaneously, a decision on NUTS 2 subdivisions was made, complying with Eurostat requirements (population) and with no consideration on regional development financing opportunities, population change scenarios, and on how statistics should inform policymaking. As Albania was not granted the candidate status, neither in 2010, nor in 2011, the government’s interest in regional development vanished away, and the reform process was halted for few years.

In 2011, the Swiss Development Cooperation initiated the implementation of a Regional Development Program for Northern Albania. The territorial focus of the project was the area encompassed within qarks of Shkodër and Lezhë. The project was aiming at supporting the government of Albania to create a model of domestic regional development and regional policy, which was implemented at qark level. This initiative

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considered qarks as the regional unit in Albania and therefore aimed also at supporting qark to develop institutional capacities to carry out functions as defined by the law on local governments and bring forward the regional policy for domestic purposes. From a territorial rescaling perspective, the project identified a number of stakeholdersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; network operating in the mountainous territory (both qarks are mostly mountainous and peripheral) and based on findings, proposed the concept of sub-regions. The latter was supposed to be a flexible territory, composed of initiatives and development projects, representing common stakeholders interests for development and respecting historical ties among communities to the best degree possible (figure 11).

Figure 11. Sub-regions in the northern Albania (the case for qark of ShkodĂŤr â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 2 maps*)

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Source: Regional Council of Shkodra (2014, pp.31 and 37)

*The upper map shows sub-regions based on agricultural potential and cooperation. The second map shows sub-regions based on touristic potential and activities.

The project was successful in terms of achieving its regional results â&#x20AC;&#x201C; creating strategies and streamlining them towards implementation; identifying subjects of common interest and actions to engage people in niches of attraction; creating recommendations to contribute to the policy framework on a national level. However, as for the latter, it could not finalise a national policy, due to the low interest of national government for embarking on regional development processes. Furthermore, the institutional partner at the national level was the Ministry of Interior (Deputy Minister for governance), which had mostly an interest on resulting governance processes and structures, rather than on regional development. As a matter of fact, this project, which lasted 3 years, was a tentative to bring together formal and informal discussion on government and regionalization in one side with regional development and related governance processes

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on the other. It did not succeed in merging these two processes, because the level of government’s understanding was low, the interest on regional development was low, and the confusion for both matters (regionalisation of government and regional development) was quite significant. One could also say that the institutional parties were not ready to embark on such a process.

In 2014, the government revisited the necessity for regional development and proposed a Regional Management Mechanism (RMM) to be used for harmonising sustainable socio-economic development. The RMM was largely based on the regional development objectives of the National Strategy for Development and Integration 2015-2020 (reduce disparities; increase competitiveness; boost capacities for multilevel governance in regional development) and on the institutional model of integrated planning that the government was adopting (at least theoretically) in the early years of its mandate (2013-2015). The RMM was materialised through the designation of four regional development/management areas (composed of 3 qarks each, with no administrative competencies, and different from NUTS 2 areas) in 2015 (figure 12). To reiterate, GoA proposed a delineation of 3 NUTS II regions in 2011 as follows: the North (Durrës, Shkodër, Lezhë, Dibër and Kukës); the Centre (Tiranë and Elbasan); the South (Berat, Korcë, Fier, Vlorë and Gjirokastër) (Shutina et al., 2012). This NUTS II subdivision was largely based on the population criterion and did not consider time implications of future GDP changes (ibid), which is an economic criterion in the allocation of the cohesion fund among regions.

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Figure 12. Regional Management Areas (RMAs) in Albania

Source: Council of Ministers (2015), information based on ASIG (2018) Soon afterwards, in December 2015, the decision of the Council of Ministers on the institutional framework of regional development (no. 961/2015) was approved. This decision formalised the boundaries of the 4 regions as provided above â&#x20AC;&#x201C; recognised as Regional Management Areas (RMA), as well as the establishment of the National Agency for Regional Development (NARD), the Regional Economic Development Agency (REDA), and of the four Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). NARD was never established in practice. REDA was established and made functional under the

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Ministry responsible for economic development. The 4 RDAs, one per each regional management areas were established and in absence of the NARD, were operating alone and with some guidance, and/or control from the Prime Minister’s Office. Through these institutional steps, “the government made a choice (explicitly or implicitly) to separate regional development as a policy from regionalization, and pursue regional development reform in line with EU regulations and complying with Chapter 22 requirements” (Imami et al., 2018, p.12).

However, in 2017, the government undertook some unpredicted steps with regard territorial rescaling for deconcentrated agencies. Hence, some agencies operating on behalf of the line ministries were reorganised and/or regrouped at the level of the regional management areas. The first ministry to pursue this approach, by reorganising the 12 Regional Agricultural Directorates into 4 Regional Agencies of Agricultural Extension, was the Ministry of Agriculture. The ministries responsible on health and on social protection followed next. While this initiative was undertaken, the government repealed the decision of the Council of Ministers no. 961/2015 through the decision no. 438/2018, allocating all regional development functions to the Albanian Development Fund36. The new decision of the Council of Ministers abolished NARD as a new agency and transferred its functions to ADF, as well as assigned the 4 RDAs under the responsibility of ADF. The ADF is currently revising the structure of RDAs and reducing the staff. ADF is also working on developing a national policy for regional development, together with the respective law, and in this endeavour is receiving support from the Regional Development Program in Albania, initiated as of 2017, with the financial support of the Swiss Development Cooperation. This process is an indication of the government’s decision to pursue regionalization and government reform separately from regional development reform, without though taking a position on the future of qark, and without defining whether the regional management areas will remain

merely

development

regions,

or

will

transit

slowly

into

administrative/government regions. However, it is clear so far that regionalization (or the regional governance reform) is not to date part of any policy discourse.

3.2 Territorial polycentricity37 As it was already argued in chapter 2, territorial polycentricity is an objective rooted in European Union key policy documents, aiming at achieving sustainable territorial development, through converging two ‘conflicting’ aims – competitiveness for economic growth and cohesion for reducing disparities. Polycentrism was initially

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presented as an objective of the European Spatial Development Perspective in 1999, assuming that polycentric urban systems are more efficient, more sustainable and more territorially balanced than both monocentric territorial structures (all activities concentrated in one centre) and dispersed territorial structures (all activities equally distributed over space). The ESDP emphasises the need to pursue the objective of polycentricity, as a means to “ensure regionally balanced development”, “offer a new perspective for the peripheral areas through a more polycentric arrangement of the EU territory”, ensure a “graduated city ranking”, ensure highly efficient infrastructures development, “strengthen a balanced settlement structure”, overcome development disadvantages of border areas, develop functional complementarity between urban areas regardless of size, solve common problems in cities which are relatively far apart, and promote cooperation on strategically important infrastructure and environmental projects (CSD, 1999, pp.20-21).

At

the

national

level,

polycentric

development

is

mainly

about

encouraging regional specialization and the division of labour between urban regions, and improving access to urban services across the national territory (CSD, 1999). Thus, (according to ESPON (2005)), a polycentric urban/regional/national system would ensure: i) Efficiency – a solution to a context where large centres can exploit economies of scale, but suffer negative effects of over-agglomeration, and dispersed centres are too small to support efficiency; ii) Cohesion – to oppose to spatial polarization and dispersal of territorial structures, standing as two extremes of a relationship between competitiveness and segregation, on one side and equality and lack of social interaction opportunities for citizens on the other; iii) Environmental protection in the frame of sustainability – the use of energy for services and transportation in a highly polarized (monocentric) or in a dispersed system is bound by environmental disadvantages.

According to ESPON (2017) and ESPON (2005) the European countries show different levels of territorial polycentricity, measured through the polycentricity index, and its sub-indices of morphological and functional polycentricity. Kloosterman and Musterd (2001, p.628) consider as polycentric urban configurations those that are assumed to have at least the following characteristics: •

Consist of a number of historically distinct cities; 123

•

Lack a clear leading city that dominates political, economic, cultural and other aspects, though size wise one city may dominate others;

•

Consist of a small number of larger cities that do not differ that much in terms of size or overall economic importance, together with a greater number of smaller cities.

•

Are located in more or less close proximity (mainly within maximum commuting distance) therefore being concentrated in one specific part of a country.

•

Are spatially distinct and constitute independent political entities.

Green (2007) refers to the polycentricity definition of Spiekermann and Wegener (2004) as the most precise one – at least as far as morphological polycentricity is concerned. According to their definition, territorial polycentricity can be identified and measured in terms of the rank-size distribution of settlements in an urban system and should meet 4 prerequisites: •

“In a polycentric urban system, there is a distribution of large and small cities

•

In a polycentric urban system, the rank–size distribution is log-linear.

•

A flat rank–size distribution is more polycentric than a steep one.

•

A polycentric urban system is not dominated by one large city”. (Green, 2007, pp.2081-82).

According to Burger et al. (2014), in polycentric regions, the centres are equally important from a functional perspective within the network and this is defined through the position they have in the hierarchy of cities’ interactions. On the other hand, in a functionally monocentric territorial structure, there is hierarchy of centres. The hierarchy is both morphological and functional. Morphological polycentrism is concerned with the size of the centre and its domination in this respect, hence with distribution of people, companies, employment, financial resources, etc. among the centres. In the case of functional polycentricity, the measurement is based on the multidirectionality of the interactions within the urban network (Burger et al., 2014).

Besides regions/territorial structures that are polycentric, there are also a number of cases in Europe where there is potential for spatial polycentric development (ESPON, 2017) and these are summarised as follows: •

Regions where all criteria for polycenstrims are satisfied: there are settlements of different sizes and structures; the various territorial structures and practices

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interact functionally; and there is high intra-regional accessibility to achieve cooperation and functionality.

•

Regions with relatively dense territorial structures and good accessibility, but with less developed cooperation.

•

Regions with relatively dense territorial structures, but low or poor accessibility.

•

Regions with weak urban structures that may be either close to consolidated large urban structures, or may be in the verge of moving toward urban consolidation, but due to lack of accessibility and resources have not been able so far to achieve this strengthening process.

This section deals with the level of and/or potential for territorial polcyentricity in Albania. In order to measure polycentricity, the methodology of ESPON (2005) project “Potential for a polycentric development in Europe” is followed. The methodology is already explained in the section 1.4 of this document. The first step is that of defining the geographical polygons of the analysis, namely the Functional Urban Areas (figure 13), the 45 minutes isochrones (from FUA centres), the Potential Urban Strategic Horizons (PUSH) and the Potential Integration Areas (PIA) as the overlay of the PUSH areas (ESPON, 2017) (ESPON, 2005).

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Figure 13. Map of the functional areas in Albania (FUAs)

Source: Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s calculations based on agglomerations of INSTAT (2014/a) The mapping and designation of FUAs is made by using the INSTAT definitions of the Urban Cores, Urban Agglomerations and commutersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; catchment areas in Albania, based on the respective data from Census 2011, including the 1km2 grid (raster cells).

This signals for a modification in the way FUAs are defined in the ESPON (2005) project. The is so due to the very different territorial structure that Albanian territory and urban settlements have (especially in terms of area and population size) compared to the 27 EU member states that ESPON (2005) considered as subject to the polycentricity study. The (base) maps used in the case of Albania were accessed

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through the online 38 ASIG 39 platform. For the designation of the PUSH areas, the calculation of the 45 minutes (road public transport) isochrones from the FUA centres is made through own calculations on the Google map. Road public transportation is considered for this purpose.

The second step is conducting the analysis for morphological and functional polycentrism through seven indicators/indexes in each case, at national and FUA level.

The morphological polycentrism is analysed by constructing indexes and sub-indexes, as defined in the ESPON methodology. However, the analysis for the functional/relational polycentrism is not completed in full, due to low data availability for the respective indictors. As a result, out of the 7 respective indicators, 6 are shown in this analysis.

In order to measure morphological polycentricity, the respective index is composed of three sub-indices, namely those of size, location and connectivity. Each has an equal weight in the composition of the overall index. The size index is built on the prerequisite that for polycentricity there should be a distribution of large and small cities, and that a polycentric urban system should not be dominated by one large city. The ideal ranksize distribution in a territory is log-linear and the flatter the rank-size distribution (regression line) is, the more polycentric a region is (ESPON, 2005); (Spiekermann et al., 2015).

The indicators that compose the size index are GDP per capita and population, as size is measured in terms of both, population and economic position, or importance of the respective FUAs. For both, the slope of the regression line and the deviation of the largest city from the line are calculated. The analysis shows that in the case of the size index, Albania has an extremely monocentric territorial structure, with 26% of the national population and 36% of the country’s GDP concentrated in the Functional Urban Area of Tirana, and with respective primacy rates of 1.1 and 1.96. Tirana is an outlier, but Laç functional area stands also quite distantly from the other FUAs, because it includes the urban Tirana in its FUA as well. In fact, primacy rates of Laç versus Durrës (the 3rd higher values for population and GDP among FUAs) are 3.4 and 2.5 respectively and are higher compared to primacy rates of Tirana FUA versus Laç FUA.

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Figure 14. Regression lines for the population of FUAs, with and without Tirana Population of FUAs (not including Tirana)

800000 Laç

700000

ALBANIA Slope -2.3 Primacy 3.4

600000 500000

y = -23094x + 354932

400000 300000 200000

Durrës

Korçë

Lezhë

100000

Sarandë

0 -100000

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Rank

900000 800000 700000 Population of FUAs

ALBANIA Slope -3.1 Primacy 1.1

Tirana Laç

600000 500000 400000 300000 200000

Lezhë

Durrës

Sarandë

100000 0 -100000 0 -200000

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Rank

Source: Author calculations based on INSTAT, Census 2011

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Figure 15. Regression lines of FUAs GDP for 2016, with and without Tirana 600,000,000 500,000,000 GDP of FUAs (in 000 ALL)

ALBANIA Slope -1.7 Primacy 1.96

Tiranë

400,000,000

y = -2E+07x + 2E+08

300,000,000

Laç

200,000,000

Fier

100,000,000

Lezhë

Kukës

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

(100,000,000) Rank

GDP of FUAs (in 000 ALL, no Tirana)

300,000,000 250,000,000

ALBANIA Slope -0.9 Primacy 2.5

Laç

200,000,000 150,000,000

Durrës

100,000,000

Vlorë

50,000,000

Lezhë

Kukës

0 (50,000,000)

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Rank

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT, Vjetari statistikor Rajonal (Annual Statistics for Regions, (2018, p.107): Table 1. Main economic indicators, 2016

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Figure 16. National Size Index of Albania versus EU – 27 countries

Source: Author’s calculation based on INSTAT Census 2011, and ESPON (2005) However, calculations show for a completely different and even reversed pattern in the case of the location index. The location index assumes that a polycentric urban system is one, where the main urban centres are equally spaced from one-another and are not clustered in one small part of the country/territory. Because of historical territorial development (see section 3.1), and especially due to the implementation of a national policy aiming at creating uniform spatial distribution of the urban centres during 1950s1980s, the FUA centres are currently distributed uniformly all over the national territory.

This results into a location index that leads to moderate polycentrism. Technically speaking, the location index (in this case) is the Gini coefficient of inequality of the size of the Thiessen polygons of the 17 FUAs centres. The closer the Gini is to 0, the more equal is the distribution of the sizes of the areas of the 17 FUAs and the more polycentric a region/country is. The map of the Thiessen polygons (figure 17) and the Gini coefficient (included in the Lorenz curve of the polygons’ sizes values) show that

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the geographical location of the centres is rather uniform. However, this should not be interpreted as an indicator of polycentrism, but as a good opportunity for Albania to develop its territory into a polycentric structure, due to favourable locations of the main urban centres. A â&#x20AC;&#x153;uniform distribution of cities across the territory is more appropriate for a polycentric urban system than for a highly polarized oneâ&#x20AC;? (ESPON, 2005, p.60).

Figure 17. Thiessen polygons of the 17 FUAs: Service areas of FUAs

Source: Author

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Figure 18.The Lorenz curve of the FUAs size and Gini coefficient of inequality 100% 90% Gini of the service area = 0.28

80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30%

Equality Lorenz

20% 10% 0% 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Source: Author Figure 19. Polycentricity location index

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Source: Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s calculation based on INSTAT Census 2011, and ESPON (2005) Furthermore, using Green (2007) line of argument, this locational opportunity for a polycentric territorial network of urban settlements is present in Albania due to historical-political processes, rather than a deliberate pursuit for polycentrism in the current national policies. The fact that locational poycentrism is not a current top-down outcome has both, advantages and disadvantages. On one hand it shows that there is a genuine possibility for the territorial structures to develop into a polycentric network, which is supposed to be more sustainable overtime. On the other hand, it shows that lack of governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s interest to push for developing polycentric territorial structures may lead towards growing spatial polarisation opportunities, both as a policy decision and a natural bottom-up trajectory.

The third index is that of connectivity, which assumes (according to ESPON, 2005) that there should be a functional division of labour between cities. The latter implies that the channels of interaction between urban centres must be short and efficient. To measure the connectivity index, the potential accessibility of FUAs (figures 20 and 21) is used, i.e. the potential accessibility that each urban core in a FUA has to the rest of the other FUAs in the country. The potential accessibility of an urban centre is higher, the higher the population (or GDP) that it reaches in the other urban centres is and the fastest the reaching routes are (travel time used for travel costs). The slope of the potential accessibility regression line and the Gini coefficient are the two sub-indicators used in this index.

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Figure 20. Potential accessibility of FUAs (Index)

Source: Author’s calculations The two sub-indicators (figures 21 and 22) have a similar interpretation: “the flatter the regression line is, the more accessible the lower-level centres are compared to the primary city, and the lower the Gini coefficient, the less polarized is the distribution of accessibility” (ESPON, 2005, p.61). The connectivity index of Albania is 72.2 and shows for week polycentricity patterns. The FUA of Saranda has the lowest accessibility, more than 40% below the average.

The dominant FUA is that of Laç, which stands around 30% above the average. Laç is the second largest FUA in terms of population and is better located compared to Tirana, in terms of time connections with all largest FUAs in the country. On the other hand, the accessibility of Laç to Tirana is higher than the other way around, because Tirana has a larger population. This argument reinforces the fact that Tirana dominates and the national territorial structures is highly polarized instead of being polycentric. Last, but not least, the FUAs of Durrës, Tiranë, Laç and Lezhë have overlapping areas of

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influence and this shows for their higher potential of creating a polycentric system within their common territory, getting thus polarized more and more from the rest of the country.

Figure 21. Potential accessibility of 17 FUAs

La Lu ç sh n Pe je sh ko P o pi gr ad e Sa c ra nd Sh ë ko dë r Ti ra në V lo rë

G

Fi er jir ok as të r K av aj ë K or çë K uk ës Le zh ë

rë El s ba sa n

ur D

Be r

at

140% 130% 120% 110% 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT Census 2011 data Figure 22. Regression line and slope of potential accessibility

Potential Accessibility of FUAs

2000 000

Slope of potential accessibility = 1,3

1800 000 1600 000 1400 000 1200 000 1000 000 800 000

y = 1.3295x + 843448

600 000 400 000 200 000 -

-

100 000 200 000 300 000 400 000 500 000 600 000 700 000 800 000 Population of FUAs

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT Census 2011 data

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Figure 23. The Lorenz curve of potential accessibility and the Gini coefficient 1 0.9

Gini of potential accessibility = 0.14

0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3

Equality

0.2

Lorenz

0.1 0 0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Source: Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s calculations based on INSTAT Census 2011data Figure 24. Polycentrism connectivity index

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Source: Author’s calculation based on INSTAT Census 2011, and ESPON (2005) In conclusion to calculations for each of the components of the morphological polycentricity, the final composite index is constructed, where (as mentioned above) each of the three indices has an equal weight of 33.33%. The table 2 and figure 25 show the value of Albania’s morphological polycentricity index versus European countries included in the ESPON (2005). The values so far demonstrate that Albania is a polarized country in overall, and it is extremely polarized in terms of economic potential (GDP and population). Still, because of the effect of low values of the location index, the overall morphological polycentricity appears at similar levels with some other EU member countries (i.e. Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, etc.). This location index is related to distribution of key settlements – hence, instead of normatively looking at it, it is important to factor in the thinking also historical and geographical factors. In this view then, distribution or location of settlements steers towards the existence of a relatively good potential to become polycentric. However, this clearly is not enough. As a matter of fact, the location opportunity would fail to promote polycentricity, if the economic potential remains locked in Tirana and in the Durrës – Tirana – Laç area. The latter would contribute to the further increase of domestic regional disparities and further weakening of the territorial cohesion, as the data under section 3.3 of this study tend to show.

Table 2. The morphological polycentricity indexes in Albania and Europe – 27 Country Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Switzerland Cyprus Czech Republic Germany Denmark Estonia Spain Finland France Greece Hungary Ireland Italy

No. of FUAs

Size Index

Location Index

Connectivity Index

Polycentricity Index

17

97.0

28.0

72.2

65.1

24 21 31 48 4 25 186 35 10 105 35 211 45 77 7 253

63.3 86.6 77.1 82.9 75.7 79.2 86.4 71.6 64.7 81.6 73.9 66.4 36.6 61.6 63.1 87.5

39.3 60.5 80.2 57.9 100.0 51.7 56.1 90.9 94.8 30.7 32.1 77.3 95.9 57.7 100.0 52.0

77.1 67.1 52.6 62.3 89.1 63.5 75.2 59.3 26.4 62.3 50.6 60.9 73.6 50.4 70.6 65.0

57.4 70.3 68.5 66.6 87.3 63.6 71.2 72.5 54.3 53.6 49.1 67.6 63.4 56.1 76.1 66.3

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Lithuania Latvia Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Sweden Slovenia Slovakia United Kingdom ESPON Space

8 8 39 36 48 44 59 47 6 27

76.5 35.5 86.0 75.1 84.1 49.0 78.3 80.4 76.0 83.5

83.5 97.0 60.2 22.3 83.1 55.8 80.9 37.3 91.6 77.0

18.5 52.4 73.8 52.7 58.7 73.3 46.6 69.0 72.0 41.6

48.9 56.3 72.2 44.4 74.0 58.3 66.3 58.9 79.1 64.2

146 1588

77.3 88.5

55.5 35

70.6 57.9

66.8 56.2

Source: Author’s calculations for Albania and ESPON (2005, p.73) for the Europe-27 countries Figure 25. Polycentricity Index – Albania versus Europe

Source: Author’s calculation based on INSTAT Census 2011, and ESPON (2005)

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The next step of the analysis is to understand the functional polycentricity (presence and opportunity for) and for that, the identification of the functional specialisation at FUA level is conducted. However, the analysis contains limitations, due to data availability. 6 dimensions are investigated as follows, and reveal that: 1. Decision-making in public sector: All of the 17 urban cores (one per FUA) are municipalities – hence, local governments. Their roles and functions are defined in the law ‘On local self-governance’, 139/2015 and on the sectorial legislation (planning, natural resources, energy, environment, infrastructures, transportation, economic development, tourism, etc.) that provides detailed regulations on decision making power and authority at different government’s levels, therefore defining the level of governance decentralization in Albania.

12 out of the 17 FUAs are qark centres (the 2nd tier of local governance in Albania). All of the 17 urban cores (one in each FUA) used to be district centres (previous units and denominations for local government) and in some of the FUAs there are more than one district centre. Because of these classifications (municipalities, qark centres and former district centres), several regional agencies and institutions of the national government (depending on line ministries) are located within the territory of each FUA. From a public sector decision-making perspective, the FUAs, with the exception of Tirana, do not differ in specialization. The municipality of Tirana hosts in its territory the parliament and related institutions, and all national government institutions (the Prime Minister’s office, ministries, national agencies, and the national institutions of the judiciary system). So, again, Tirana’s FUA appears as an outlier compared to other FUAs. 2. Decision-making in the private sector: The figures provide information on the location of the 50 biggest companies in Albania. 28 out of them are located in the municipality of Tirana and 14 in the municipality of Durrës40. The large companies influence significantly the development of the urban system, and the strength of the latter relies also on its current attractiveness to private investors and companies. In the case of Albania, the current location shows that development activities decision-making in/of the private sector remains highly concentrated in the Tirana-Durrës metropolitan area.

3. Population: The number of inhabitants represents the level of economic activities in a region, both for intensity and diversity. In Albania, at least 1/3 of the population is located in the Tirana-Durrës metropolitan area, hence in two

139

overlapping FUAs. Similarly, the situation is presented for most of the services and activities provided to/delivered from the population.

Figure 26. Comparison of PUSH population with FUA population 1100

y = 0.9587x + 128.46

1000 900 PUSH Population (in 1,000)

800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 0

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800 FUAs Population (in 1,000)

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT Census 2011 data and INSTAT Raster cells Table 3. Comparison of PUSH population with FUA population Name of No. PUSH/FUA Population FUA Population PUSH 1 Berat 116,653 213,117 2 Durrës 206,979 961,451 3 Elbasan 155,969 268,733 4 Fier 170,499 419,211 5 Gjirokastër 44,464 51,232 6 Kavajë 55,949 270,735 7 Korçë 107,901 163,151 8 Kukës 28,526 51,017 9 Laç 696,962 540,83 10 Lezhë 73,165 167,462 11 Lushnjë 79,468 230,611 12 Peshkopi 77,025 61,08 13 Pogradec 45,118 182,523 14 Shkodër 165,241 230,198 15 Sarandë 39,696 46,581 16 Tiranë 761,814 950,764 17 Vlorë 105,209 184,687 Source: Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT Census 2011 data

140

Figure 27. Number of persons reachable from FUA centres within 30km of linear distance

Source: Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s calculations based on INSTAT Census 2011 data

141

Figure 28. Population density

Source: INSTAT Census 2011 data 4. Tourism41: The performance of this sector provides indications on the current and potential attractiveness of the regions. Albania has an enormous touristic potential in terms of natural resources. However, the development of infrastructures and facilities related to tourism and accessibility in and towards the sites, including the concentration of the private investments in the TiranaDurrĂŤs metropolitan area, are highly correlated with the location of the hotels.

Thus, around 400 hotels (all categories) are located in the metropolitan area of TiranĂŤ-DurrĂŤs. Only 11% of the hotels are located in the North (from Kruja and above). There is also a concentration of hotels along the western coast

142

cities/FUAs with 70% of the hotels. From a geographical point of view, it is clear that there is no correlation between the location of hotels (investments and services) and the touristic attractions (natural sites and leisure activities). It is also worth mentioning that the recorded hotels are only those that operate in the formal market. The number of hotels (touristic accommodation of all categories) is much higher, considering the accommodation facilities that operate informally.

Figure 29. Distribution of hotels (all categories)

Source: Ministry of Finances and Economy (2018)42 5. Industry: The strongest FUAs in terms of GVA (Gross Value Added) in industry are Elbasan, Fier, Shkoder and DurrĂŤs. This is certainly linked to the industrial activities located in these qarks and show for a potential of new urban

143

transformations taking place in these areas.

6. Knowledge: For this function the number of students attending higher education institutions in 2015-2016 is calculated. The FUA of Tirana scores obviously and convincingly higher compared to other FUAs in terms of knowledge institutions and number of students. On the other hand, there is a relatively uniform distribution of the high education institutions and students in some of the other qarks and in their respective FUAs. While figures show for some balance, the quality of the institutions is not necessarily uniform across the territory, with Tirana again making a difference. In any case, the figures are about university education. Institutions of elementary and high school education are distributed among FUAs proportionally to population.

Figure 30. Number of students attending tertiary education

Source: (INSTAT, 2018)

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The morphological and the functional analysis of polycentrism shows that Albania has a polarized territorial structure, with Tirana being an outlier at all cases of analysed indicators, and Tirana-Durrës metropolitan area following. Both cases have major gaps from the other municipalities, regions and FUAs. However, the morphological and functional analysis is descriptive and a ‘photograph’ of the current situation. Besides understanding the current structure (a typical normative analysis), it is also important to understand what could be potentials for territorial polycentricity. Polycentrism is not only about territorial structures, but functions and stakeholders’ interactions as well.

However, at this stage of the analysis, functions are considered only those that one can read in the territorial structure, and do not include potential functions that rise due to stakeholders’ cooperation and presence of networks. This means that if a territorial structure has the potential to become polycentric (from a morphological perspective), this does not guarantee that cooperation and networking will happen in the future exactly where territorial potential is present.

In order to understand the territorial structure potential for polycentricity, the analysis (which remains morphological in character) defines the Potential Urban Strategic Horizons (PUSH areas) and the Potential Integration Areas (PIA) (see methodology in section 1.4). The results are indicative to planning and governance processes and could be used as a guide in steering development and polycentric governance in the future. In order to identify PUSH areas (based on ESPON, 2005), for each FUA, the respective area that can be reached within 45 minutes by road public transportation is defined on the map. The resulting polygons are named as the 45 minutes isochrones. This time limit is widely recognized as the most appropriate and common for daily commuting, therefore defining the so-called work catchment areas. The areas included within this commuting radius provide cities with a “better opportunity for functional integration”, based on the hypothesis that “cities with overlapping travel-to-work areas have the best potential for developing synergies” among them (ESPON, 2005, p.13). The work catchment areas are further approximated to municipal boundaries, because the municipalities, as ESPON (2005, p.13) defines, are the “potential building blocks in polycentric development strategies”. This approximation results into the PUSH areas.

The further integration of PUSH areas results into the designation of PIAs (figures 31 and 32).

145

Figure 31. Potential Urban Strategic Horizon areas (PUSH, intersection 45 minutes isochrones)

Source: Based on authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s calculations

146

Figure 32. Potential Integration Areas (PIA, at municipality 61 level)

Source: Based on author’s calculations The analysis of PUSH areas and PIAs in Albania shows that 20% of the municipalities, or 23% of the territory are not covered by any PUSH polygons at all. Geographically, this coincides with the most mountainous area of the country (in several cases being also border areas), which as shown in section 3.3, has also very low accessibility. The municipalities located geographically in the middle (from Durrës and Tirana in the north, to Fier and Lushnje in south) remain advantageous in overall (similarly to the FUAs situation). This is strongly related to accessibility potential (both from the polycentricity analysis perspective and as shown in section 3.3 – accessibility analysis), to the presence of most of the agriculture land within this territory, and to the concentration of population and most of work and services activities.

However, the most interesting finding is that the highest number of intersections is found in the area composed from municipalities of Krujë, Shijak, Peqin, Lushnje, Belsh,

147

Cërrik, Roskovec and Ura Vajgurore. These are some of the smallest municipalities in the country, located at the periphery of the major urban centres (such as Tirana, Durrës and Fier), with 11% of the total population of Albania, and, with the exception of Lushnje, do not constitute urban cores to any agglomerate, or FUA. These municipalities constitute inner peripheries, which have a very strategic location, within the commuting basins of at least 5 FUAs/Urban cores; and do have a potential for hosting functional specialization that the current urban cores either do not have (due to congestion and high densities), or need to have in complement to their major functions and activities. These features increase the opportunity for these municipalities to be integrated into a polycentric urban system, if significant investments in infrastructure and services are made, and business opportunities are explored.

3.3 Territorial/regional disparities and/or competitive advantages While “early regional development theories did not pay attention to processes of spatial polarization and peripheralization”, since at least 50 years, countries and policymakers engage in the analysis of spatial disparities (Ehrlich et al., 2015, p.5), as a means to understand development on the territory and tackle problems through an integrated multi-disciplinary and multi-policy framework. Studies of spatial disparities are undertaken in Albania as well, and are in a continuous reviewing process in order to feed regional development policy efforts since 2009. The earliest study of regional disparities43, was conducted for the period 2000-2009, showing that Albania was in a peripheral position (from the regional development perspective) compared to EU countries, while disparities at local level were significantly more pronounced than those at the regional44 level. The current analysis (of this research) has extended the time series to 2014-2015 (depending on the availability of data). The geographical area of analysis has changed as well, and it is represented by: i) the regional level – four regional development areas designated by the Government of Albania through the DCM no. 96145. This Decision of the Council of the Ministers is currently abolished, but the 4 regional development areas are still effective based on DCM no. 438 approved in 2018 46 ; ii) the qarks – INSTAT data are produced and/or published at this geographical level, therefore qark is an important unit of spatial analysis; iii) local government level – 61 municipalities. The key data analysed at this level are those related to local finances.

In order to identify territorial disparities, a list of 116 indicators is compiled and, due

148

to data availability, around 90 indicators are analysed, either at all of the above levels, or at one or two of the levels. More information on the indicators is provided in Annex 4.4. The summary 47 of the analysis and related conclusions are organised upon the following sections: economic growth and development, socio-economic cohesion, environment and sustainability, territorial development and accessibility.

Economic growth and development One of the important macroeconomic indicators to measure economic growth and development, and conclude on economic disparities is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Data from INSTAT show that till 2008 (the world pre-financial crisis period) GDP levels show variations, but have generally an increasing trend. Then, an overall decline is recorded from 2008 to 2013, and from 2014 to date GDP peaks an increasing path again. The year 2008 is often indicated in graphs, because it represents the year of global financial crisis, probably the strongest since the Great Depression in 1930. While Albania was not immediately hit by this crisis, its effects were gradually felt after 2008.

In real terms, GDP increased with 2.2% in 2015, or 0.4 percentage points more compared to the previous year. Quarterly data for real GDP suggest that in 2016, real GDP grew 3.36% and in 2017 with approximately 3.84% (based on preliminary data from INSTAT).

Structurally, Albaniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s GDP consists primarily of services (45%). Agriculture is also a key sector in the Albanian economy accounting with approximately 18% of GDP, higher than industry with 11%. On the other hand, due to changes in the planning legislation and practice, the construction sector has diminished in size, representing 9.5% of GDP in 2014 from 15.8% in 2008. The data are not present as yet, but it is assumed that the construction sector has increased again its contribution after 2015, when the construction moratorium was lifted and several municipalities started to issue building permits based on their new territorial plans.

149

Figure 33. Albania GDP year on year growth rates (in %) (GDP at current prices) 16%

before 2008

after 2008

14% 12%

11%

10% 08% 06% 4%

04% 02% 02%

02%

00% 2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT Albania has a consumption driven economic model, with strong domestic demand (the main driver of economic growth in the last 20 years financed mainly from: remittances, public assets privatization, and inflows of foreign direct investments) and high imports of consumption and investment goods. However, the external financing sources are also experiencing decline and privatization is close to an end. The migration cycle seems to be changing its patterns (well educated people are looking for opportunities abroad), and the crisis of some European labour markets has obliged several Albanian emigrants to return home. This reduction of sources, combined with diminishing financial intermediation from the Albanian banking system, led to reduction of private investment levels. GDP levels have increased latter, after 2013, due to public investments in the infrastructure sector, and due to investments on the (housing) construction sector after 2016-2017, when most Albanian municipalities had their territorial plans approved, and initiated delivering construction permits.

Thousands

Figure 34. GDP by Qark at current prices, in ALL Million (lhs) and GDP annual growth rates in % (rhs48) Vlorë

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Fier

Berat

Tiranë

Elbasan

Shkodër

Lezhë

Kukës

Durrës

Dibër

Growth rate

1 600

16%

1 400

14%

1 200

12%

1 000

10%

800

8%

600

6%

400

4%

200

2%

-

0% 2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data

150

Nominal GDP breakdown by 12 qarks emphasizes some permanent patterns over time, such as: the contribution of the qark of Tirana dominates broadly and constantly GDP formation, generating on average 37.7% of total nominal GDP over 15 years. Sectorial analysis for Gross Value Added (GVA) data show that the main contributors in the case of Tirana are the wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and household goods, hotels and rest, transport and communications, financial, real - estate, renting and business activities, and construction.

The second largest contributor to overall GDP formation is the qark of Fier with 12.6% of total nominal GDP in the last 5 years. This may be related to the sectorial contribution in the GDP, mainly to agriculture and industry. In the case of Fier, sectorial analysis of GVA shows that agriculture, hunting and forestry, and fishing are the main contributors in the qark’s GDP. Figure 35. Average weight of nominal GDP per qark (% versus total) PBB 2015 Gjirokastër 3%

Korçë 6%

Vlorë 6%

Dibër 3%

Durrës 10%

Kukës 2% Lezhë 3% Shkodër 5%

Fier 13%

Elbasan 7%

Berat 4%

Tiranë 38%

Source:

Author’s calculation based on INSTAT data Figure 36. Contribution of qarks at annual (nominal) GDP growth rate (in percentage points) and GPD annual growth rate (in percentage)

151

16

Dibër

Durrës

Kukës

Lezhë

Shkodër

Elbasan

Berat

Fier

Gjirokastër

Korçë

Vlorë

GDP YOY

Tiranë

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

-4

Source: INSTAT & Author’s calculations At regional level, GDP formation is historically broadly dominated by the contribution of Region 2 (Tirana, Durrës and Dibër). Region 2 has contributed for more than 50% of total GDP over the last five years. Dibër as a qark had a minimal contribution over the years, but this becomes invisible when Dibër data are merged with Tirana and Durrës in one region. This may lower the overall positioning of region, but still it does not affect its position compared to other regions. This lowering effect may however be beneficial from a future structural funds’ distribution prospective, as it keeps the region at eligibility levels. It also contributes to ‘artificially’ lowering the disparities between regions – hence while local disparities might be significantly pronounced disparities between regions are less prominent. This could also affect the distribution of the regional development fund among regions or localities, in way that might not necessarily positively influence the reduction of disparities. The second region with largest GDP is region no. 4, composed of Fier, Vlorë and Gjirokastër qarks. Fier qark is the dominant qark in this case affecting figures at regional level. Region 1 (Shkodër, Lezhë and Kukës) is the lowest scoring region.

152

Figure 37. Contribution of regions in (nominal, total) GDP (in % points) and GDP annual growth rate (in %) Region 4

Region 3

Region 2

Region 1

GDP_yoy growth rate

25 20 15 10 5 0 2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

-5

Source: INSTAT & Author’s calculations However, though qark/Region contribution to national GDP displays growth patterns, the same cannot be stated for the values of GDP per capita (Albanian Lek). Though on average, GDP per capita has increased, the growth rate per year has slowed down.

Figure 38. Nominal GDP per capita (in lekë) 600,000

Average 462,948 lekë

500,000

Average 320,636 lekë

400,000 300,000

Average 201,625 lekë

200,000 100,000 0

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data

153

Figure 39. Growth rate of nominal GDP per capita (%) 25%

before 2008

after 2008

20% 15% 10% 05%

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

00%

Source: Author’s calculation based on INSTA data The decreasing rate is mainly due to decreasing income per capita in Fier, Gjirokastër and Kukës. The GDP per capita values and their indexes (both at qark and regional levels) are useful in providing a better understanding of the disparities and the nature of the sectors’ development within each region. Over years, Tirana has remained constantly above other qarks and above the national average. Yet, in the recent years, the gap between Tirana and the national average results seem to be narrowing somewhat. The other qarks show rather moderate differences among them, with the northern qarks (Dibër and Kukës) remaining still in the most disadvantageous position.

154

Figure 40. GDP per capita by qarks, indices (Albania = 100) Vlorë

Vlorë

Viti 2015

Korçë

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Gjirokastër

Fier

Fier

Berat

Berat

Tiranë

Tiranë

Elbasan

Elbasan

Shkodër

Shkodër

Lezhë

Lezhë

Kukës

Kukës

Durrës

Durrës

Dibër

Viti 2014

Dibër 0

25

50

75

100

125

Vlorë

150

175

0

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Gjirokastër

Fier

Fier

Berat

Berat

Tiranë

Tiranë

Elbasan

Elbasan

Shkodër

Shkodër

Lezhë

Lezhë

Kukës

Kukës

Durrës

Durrës

Dibër

Dibër 25

50

75

100

125

150

50

75

100

125

Vlorë

Viti 2013

Korçë

0

25

175

150

175

Viti 2012

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data Clearly in this case as well, Region 2 scores above the national average and is better positions compared to other regions, due to Tirana and Durrës qarks being part of it.

The other regions have similar indices, with Region 1 being in a slightly disadvantageous position.

The Gross Value Added (GVA) is another important indicator that besides helping in understanding better GDP figures provides also an understanding on each qark and region sectorial contribution in the overall economic growth. GVA formation is dominated from the contribution of the qark of Tirana during 2000-2015. The second and third main contributors are the qark of Fier and Durrës respectively.

155

Figure 41. Participation of Qarks at Gross Values Added formation, (weights in %) 100

Vlorë

90

Korçë

80

Gjirokastër

70

Fier Berat

60

Tiranë

50

Elbasan 40

Shkodër

30

Lezhë

20

Kukës

10

Durrës Dibër

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Source: INSTAT & Author’s calculations Figure 42. GVA weight (%) by qark for each economic sector and sectors’ GVA (weight in %) versus total (Albania) in 2015 Agriculture, forestry & hunting, fishing: Albania = 22.9%

Vlorë Korçë Gjirokastër Fier Berat Tiranë Elbasan Shkodër Lezhë Kukës Durrës Dibër

Industry: Albania = 14.7%

Vlorë Korçë Gjirokastër Fier Berat Tiranë Elbasan Shkodër Lezhë Kukës Durrës Dibër 00

10

20

30

40

50

00

10

20

30

40

50

Vlorë Korçë Gjirokastër Fier Berat Tiranë Elbasan Shkodër Lezhë Kukës Durrës Dibër 00

10

20

30

40

00

50

10

10

20

30

40

50

20

30

40

50

Real Estate: Albania = 7.1%

20

30

40

50

00

10

20

30

40

50

Education, Health and Public Administration: Albania = 12.7%

Financial & insurance activities: Albania = 2.9%

Vlorë Korçë Gjirokastër Fier Berat Tiranë Elbasan Shkodër Lezhë Kukës Durrës Dibër 00

10

Vlorë Korçë Gjirokastër Fier Berat Tiranë Elbasan Shkodër Lezhë Kukës Durrës Dibër

Information & Communication: Albania = 3.2%

Vlorë Korçë Gjirokastër Fier Berat Tiranë Elbasan Shkodër Lezhë Kukës Durrës Dibër

00

Trade, transportation, hotels, etc: Albania = 18.0%

Construction sector: Albania = 9.8%

Vlorë Korçë Gjirokastër Fier Berat Tiranë Elbasan Shkodër Lezhë Kukës Durrës Dibër

Scientific & professional activities:Albania = 5.8%

Vlorë Korçë Gjirokastër Fier Berat Tiranë Elbasan Shkodër Lezhë Kukës Durrës Dibër

Vlorë Korçë Gjirokastër Fier Berat Tiranë Elbasan Shkodër Lezhë Kukës Durrës Dibër 00

10

20

30

40

50

00

10

20

30

40

50

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data Some sectors, such as financial, communication and information and scientific and professional activities have a very low weight in GVA formation. Agriculture on the other hand dominates GVA formation in all qarks, with the exception of Tirana. Next

156

sectors that dominate GVA formation are industry and services. In the case of industry, Fier has the major contribution, but in the other sectors, Tirana is a major contributor.

Tirana is the main contributor to GVA in overall, but its position has fluctuated overtime, with significant decrease during 2011-2014. The latter is mainly due to the construction and trade sectors’ negative performance during this period. In case of construction, the negative performance is related to the ceasing of construction permits delivery that happened, due to the territorial planning reform. Fier, on the other hand keeps more balanced contribution overtime – most probably due to the stable role of agriculture and industry.

At a regional level, GVA formation is dominated by the increasing contribution of Region 2 (Tirana, Durrës, Dibër), which accounts on average for more than 50% of total gross value added of the country. This is due to Tirana and Durrës respective contributions in several sectors, and also Dibër contribution in industry. Differences remain high though between Region 1 and Region 2 (specifically), and between Region 2 and all three other regions.

Figure 43. Participation of Regions at GVA formation, (weights in % vs. total GVA) 100 Region 1

90 80 70

Region 2

60 50 40

Region 3

30 20 10

Region 4

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data

157

Figure 44. Contribution of Regions GVA, (in pp) and GVA annual growth rate (in %) 14

Region 4

Region 3

Region 2

Region 1

Albania

12 10

09

8 6

05

04

4 02

02

2 0 -2 2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data GVA at regional level shows that agriculture, hunting and forestry and fishing accounts for more than 30% of total region GVA in regions 1, 3 and 4, with the highest value in Region 3 (37.5%), due to the dominant contributions of Korçë and Gjirokastër. In Region 2, on the other hand, agriculture, hunting and forestry and fishing contributes with less than 10% to the region’s GVA formation, and this is due to the strong role of Durrës and Tirana in the services, construction and real estate sectors, as well as Dibër in industry. Region 2 has a multidimensional growth profile compared to the other regions, therefore being more diversified. Region 4 has a better representation of the industry sector (24%) compared to other regions (less than 12%) and this is due to the role of Fier qark. It actually suggests for a rather diverse economic character of Fier qark, which constitutes both an advantage and a disadvantage for the overall profiling and visioning of future economic growth. The disadvantage is mainly environmental, because agriculture, tourism and the oil extraction industry compete for resources and land within the same territory.

Labour market The labour market indicators are subject to frequent changes from a methodological perspective. Shifting from administrative data to labour force surveys (LFS) data has led to changes in labour market indicators 49 . In general and over the years, the administrative data for unemployment show lower rates compared to those of LFS. For instance, in 2016, the overall unemployment rate according to the administrative data was 10.3%, while LFS was reporting an unemployment rate of 17.9%.

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Unemployment rate is one of the most important indicators to describe the labour market development, because it signals for the health of the economy, labour market frictions and also living standard conditions. At the national level, unemployment rate for the age group 15-29 was 32.5% in 2014 and 28.9% in 2016, quite high compared to other age groups. This may suggest on one side for friction and rigidity of the labour market in absorbing the available human resources, and on the other for inappropriate quality of the labour force or mismatch between offer and demand in the labour market.

Unemployment rate by gender for this age group is higher among males than females.

The age group 30-64 years had an unemployment rate of 13.3% in 2014 (gradually increasing since 2007) and decreasing in 2016 to 11.8%, with males’ unemployment again higher than that of females.

The distribution of unemployed jobseekers by qarks seems to be almost uniformly distributed. The highest number is registered in the qark of Tirana (about 16% in 2016), followed by Fier and Elbasan with 11% each, though over the years Fier has had slightly higher figures than Elbasan. The lowest levels are in the qarks of Gjirokastër and Berat with 4% in each case. The data for long-term unemployed jobseekers is similar. The fact that Tirana, Shkodra, Lezha, Elbasan and Fier have higher numbers could be, to a certain extent, related to higher numbers of working age population in these qarks, due to better living conditions and job opportunities, but also perhaps because the salaries are also at better levels.

Figure 45. Registered unemployed jobseekers at qark level (% versus total) 100% 90%

Vlorë

80%

Tiranë Shkodër

70%

Lezhë

60%

Kukës

50%

Korçë Gjirokastër

40%

Fier

30%

Elbasan

20%

Durres Dibër

10%

Berat

0% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data

159

Table 4. Registered unemployed jobseekers at region level (number) Total

Females

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Region 1

44,723

44,856

44,610

45,428

41,154

21,206

21,130

44,610

22,052

19,993

Region 2

38,390

37,950

37,651

35,925

37,413

20,635

20,740

37,651

19,202

19,597

Region 3

32,371

31,872

32,128

32,691

32,377

15,823

16,053

28,964

16,429

15,967

Region 4

28,351

27,808

28,142

28,604

31,054

15,193

15,021

28,142

16,012

16,909

Albania

143,835

142,486

142,531

142,648

141,998

72,857

72,944

139,367

73,695

72,466

Source: Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s calculations based on INSTAT data Disparities are even less visible in the case of the distribution of the registered unemployed jobseekers at a regional level, because of the equal mix, in each region, between qarks with low and high figures of unemployed jobseekers. Region 1, which has also low figures on productivity, has slightly higher levels of registered unemployed jobseekers. Region 2 (so far the best performer in most of growth indicators) is ranked second in terms of higher levels of registered unemployed jobseekers. This indicator is closely related to other structural indicators, such as demography and trust on the employment support system. The lowest level of unemployed jobseekers is registered in region 4 with only 20.2% of total unemployed jobseekers. The lowest figure here may be due to the potential of the region for rather diversified economic sectors and probably also due to informal employment. This is also a region highly impacted by emigration.

As unemployment has decreased over the last 4 years, employment has slightly increased, though it has not reached the levels prior to 2008. Employment rate is higher for male, than female employees, and it is higher than the national average.

160

Figure 46. Average employment rate (%, average of employment rate for age groups and gender) 70 60 50 40 30

Total

Men

20

Women 10 0 2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Source: Auhtorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s calculations based on INSTAT data In terms of age groups, employment is higher for ages 30-64. Employment rate for 1529 age group females is lower compared to males. The gender gap is persistent over the time series, indicating for low results of gender equality policies. High unemployment within this age group carries implications for overall social and economic development, education outcome and investments, increasing informal employment and brain drain.

Table 5. Employment rate per age and gender (%)

Gjithsej

Meshkuj

Femra

2007 40.2 67.5 56.6 50.3 44.1

2008 31.3 64.6 53.9 46.3 35.9

2009 35.6 65.6 53.5 47.5 41.1

2010 34.3 66.4 53.5 47.5 39.3

2011 42.8 68.2 58.7 51.9 48.0

2012 34.5 66.4 55.9 49.6 38.8

2013 28.2 61.8 49.9 44.1 33.7

2014 28.2 62.7 50.5 44.3 33.0

2015 29.8 65.2 52.9 46.2 35.8

2016 32.4 67.2 55.9 48.7 36.3

77.2 64.0

76.5 63.3

79.8 64.5

79.2 63.1

76.7 65.7

75.4 62.2

70.8 57.3

72.7 58.0

74.8 60.5

75.4 61.9

57.3

54.0

57.0

55.9

58.6

55.9

50.7

51.4

53.3

54.7

15-29 30-64

36.4

27.2

31.0

29.6

37.3

29.4

23.0

23.3

23.1

28.0

58.0

54.1

52.5

54.4

60.1

58.3

53.9

53.6

56.3

59.3

15-64 15+

49.3 43.4

45.6 39.4

43.6 38.9

44.5 39.5

51.8 45.3

49.6 43.5

43.1 38.0

43.4 37.6

45.5 39.2

49.7 42.8

15-29 30-64 15-64 15+ 15-29 30-64 15-64 15+

Source: INSTAT The highest employment level is registered in the qark of Tirana (around 34% of total employment in 2016) followed by Fier (13.8%) and Elbasan (13.5%). These qarks have high population numbers, but also sector employment dominances. For instance both Fier and Elbasan have an employment dominance of the private agricultural sector, while Tirana has an employment dominance of the non-agricultural private sector.

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Employment levels in the qarks of Durrës, Korçë and Shkodër present similar patterns, while Gjirokastër has the lowest level of employment (2.9% in 2016) followed by Kukës.

Figure 47. Qark contribution in overall employment (in %, weight) 100% 90% Vlorë

80%

Tiranë 70%

Shkodër Lezhë

60%

Kukës Korçë

50%

Gjirokastër 40%

Fier Elbasan

30%

Durrës Dibër

20%

Berat 10% 0% 2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data From a regional perspective, Region 2 has the highest employment level and Region 1 has the lowest, while 3 and 4 stand in similar positions. Furthermore, most of the employment is registered in the private agriculture sector, followed by private nonagriculture. Employment in public administration is similar among all qarks, but still Tirana is a dominant qark and therefore Region 2 also dominates in terms of employment in this sector. Furthermore, Tirana is dominant also in employment in private non-agriculture as opposed to Elbasan, Kukës, Fier and Korçë, where private agriculture sector dominates convincingly.

Figure 48. Employment per sector and qark (2016) Public administration

Private non-agriculture

Private agriculture

Kukës

Shkodër

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Berat

Dibër

Durrës

Elbasan

Fier

Gjirokastër

Korçë

Lezhë

Tiranë

Vlorë

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data

162

Entrepreneurial spirit The business demography statistics, such as the number of active enterprises, birth rate etc. mirror broader developments in the economy, i.e. job creation and dynamism of economic growth. Birth of new enterprises is important to increasing competitiveness of a region or country enterprises, pushing them to become more efficient. Births and survival together simulate innovation and adoption of new technologies, therefore increasing productivity. The stock of active enterprises had an increasing trend till 2008.

After 2008, growth rates slowed down, becoming negative in 2012 and increasing again afterwards. As for most of the economic activity, active enterprises are located mostly in the qark in the qark of Tirana (33.2% of the total of active enterprises in 2016). This is due mainly to the better business infrastructure and service offered in Tirana and proximity with institutions that facilitate businesses operation. Second in classification is Fier with 12.8% of the total and with growing trends in the last three years, while Kukës and Dibër have the lowest number of active enterprises with 1.1% and 1.8% of the total respectively. These very low figures explain also their low contribution in GVA formation.

Table 6. Active enterprises, stock at the end of the year Berat Dibër Durrës Elbasan Fier Gjirokastër Korçë Kukës Lezhë Shkodër Tiranë Vlorë Shqipëria

2010 4,366 2,097 12,316 6,972 9,416 2,926 6,673 998 2,844 6,258 39,656 8,516 103,038

2011 4,545 2,142 12,918 7,611 9,924 3,022 6,843 1,053 3,104 6,607 42,117 9,153 109,039

2012 4,470 1,945 11,625 7,311 9,527 2,642 6,610 986 2,954 6,543 43,295 8,929 106,837

2013 4,557 2,077 10,599 7,442 9,830 2,814 6,728 1,062 3,189 5,945 47,477 9,363 111,083

2014 4,302 2,164 9,578 7,859 9,693 2,681 7,311 1,068 3,388 5,446 49,467 9,580 112,537

2015 7,205 2,850 13,125 11,493 19,199 3,661 11,609 1,543 4,902 10,299 54,237 12,165 152,288

2016 8,300 2,935 13,310 13,301 20,497 4,600 14,032 1,780 5,550 11,349 53,405 11,620 160,679

Source: INSTAT The distribution of active enterprises by economic sector and qark shows that trade and services dominate in general the activity of the enterprises in all qarks. However, in Fier, Korçë and Berat agriculture enterprises constitute 44.3%, 44.5% and 42.7% respectively, scoring noticeably higher compared to other sectors. For instance, the second more prominent sector for active enterprises in these three qarks is trade, with

163

26.8%, 24.1% and 26.8% respectively. In the case of Tiranë and Durrës, the agriculture sector constitutes only 2.4% and 3.9% respectively (the lowest weight among all qarks), while services in general, accommodation, and trade constitute the majority of the enterprises activity. The situation is similar for Kukës, Lezhë and Dibër. This is an indication of a rather sluggish economy in the latter qarks given their low population figures low quality of infrastructures generally.

Figure 49. Active enterprises by sector and qark in 2016 Bujqësi, peshkim, pyje

Industri

Ndërtim

Tregti

Transport dhe magazinim

Akomodim dhe shërbim ushqimor

Informacioni dhe komunikacioni

Shërbime të tjera

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Vlorë

Tiranë

Shkodër

Lezhë

Kukës

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Fier

Elbasan

Durrës

Dibër

Berat

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data Table 7. Active enterprises by qarks per 10,000 inhabitants (number) Qark Berat Dibër Durrës Elbasan Fier Gjirokastër Korçë Kukës Lezhë Shkodër Tiranë Vlorë Albania

2010 285 142 464 225 285 356 285 109 202 273 531 454 353

2011 304 149 479 248 305 385 297 118 222 293 552 495 375

2012 305 138 424 240 298 354 291 112 213 294 554 489 368

2013 314 150 385 246 309 382 297 123 231 268 602 512 383

2014 299 157 347 260 306 368 325 124 246 248 622 524 389

2015 510 211 473 388 612 514 521 182 360 475 673 664 528

2016 621 231 471 466 675 687 650 221 428 543 626 617 559

Source: INSTAT While Tirana constantly has the highest number of active enterprises at qark level, figures on the stock per 10,000 inhabitants do not necessarily favour always Tirana.

The figures per 10,000 inhabitants are important to get an interpretation of the dynamic

164

entrepreneurship patterns among qarks. Hence, Berat, Fier, Gjirokastër and Korçë have experienced growth by 100% in terms of enterprises per 10,000 inhabitants in 2016 compared to 2013 and 2014. Dibër and Kukës on the other hand, have very low figures showing for pronounced disparities that have persisted over the years and emphasises the fact that most economic activities are concentrated in Tirana.

Figure 50. Indexes of stock of active enterprises per 10,000 inhabitants (2016) 2010, Albania = 100

2012, Albania = 100

Vlorë

Vlorë

Tiranë

Tiranë

Shkodër

Shkodër

Lezhë

Lezhë

Kukës

Kukës

Korçë

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Gjirokastër

Fier

Fier

Elbasan

Elbasan

Durrës

Durrës

Dibër

Dibër

Berat

Berat 0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

0

25

2014 Albania = 100

50

75

100

125

150

175

2016, Albania = 100

Vlorë

Vlorë

Tiranë

Tiranë

Shkodër

Shkodër

Lezhë

Lezhë

Kukës

Kukës

Korçë

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Gjirokastër

Fier

Fier

Elbasan

Elbasan

Durrës

Durrës

Dibër

Dibër

Berat

Berat 0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data Similarly as for other indicators, at regional level, Region 2 scores higher in terms of the stock of active enterprises and active enterprises for 10,000 inhabitants, due to the presence of Tirana and Durrës. Region 1, where Kukës and Dibër are located is highly in disadvantage compared all other regions.

Table 8. Active enterprises by regions, stock at the end of the year (number) Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4

2010 10,100 54,069 18,011 20,858

2011 10,764 57,177 18,999 22,099

2012 10,483 56,865 18,391 21,098

2013 10,196 60,153 18,727 22,007

2014 9,902 61,209 19,472 21,954 165

Albania

103,038

109,039

106,837

111,083

112,537

Source: INSTAT In terms of the entrepreneurial activity Albania has experienced decline of the new enterprises birth rate from 2008 to 2013 and afterwards the rates have more than doubled in 2014 and 2015, to experience again decline in 2016. At a qark level, Gjirokastër and Kukës have the highest rates in 2016 with 30.9% and 27.5% respectively. This might be due to the formalization effort made in 2016, when several small businesses were obliged to register in the formal market. The lowest values of new enterprises birth rates were registered in the qarks of Durrës, Tiranë and Fier with values that stand between 17% and 18%. This is explained with the fact that these three qarks have a large base of existing active enterprises. As the birth rate is calculated as the proportion of newly born versus this base, then the ratio will be lower compared to other qarks with a limited number of existing active enterprises and subject to the formalization of the economy.

Figure 51. New enterprises birth rate Total

40%

Women admin.

37.3%

35% 30% 25% 20%

15.4%

19.5%

15%

14%

10% 05%

5%

05%

0% 2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data

166

Figure 52. New enterprises birth rate per qark and gender based (2016) Total

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Vlorë

Tiranë

Shkodër

Lezhë

Kukës

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Fier

Elbasan

Durrës

Dibër

Berat

Women administrator

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Vlorë

Tiranë

Shkodër

Lezhë

Kukës

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Fier

Elbasan

Durrës

Dibër

Berat

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data At a regional level, Region 2 has the highest number of the total newly created enterprises, as well as the highest concentration of female owned/administered new enterprises versus total female owned/administrated new enterprises in Albania.

However, the highest birth rate of new enterprises was recorded in Region 1 (22.8% in 2014), about 7.4 percentage points above the national average. The same dynamics might be notices in the female owned/administrated new enterprises birth rate where the value recorded for Region 1 in 2014 stands about 10.0 percentage points above the national average.

Competitiveness The economic competitiveness refers to the ability of economy to grow and compete for human capital, investments and other resources. Competitiveness is measured by a set of indicators. The Global Competitiveness Report measures indicators in 12 pillars, among which institutions, infrastructures, ICT adoptions, business dynamism, skills, market size, financial system, etc. This report, for 2015-2016 ranked Albania 94th out of 140 countries, scoring 3.9 out of 7. In 2018, Albania was ranked 76th out of 140, with

167

a global competitiveness index of 4. In overall, Albania had improved scores in most of the pillars, but had also worsening values for the infrastructure and labour market pillars50. Being a new objective to Albanian policy-making, data on competitiveness are not generated as yet at qark or regional level.

In the case of high technologies exports as % of manufactured exports. Albania had a figure of 0.5% in 2013, quite low in comparison to other countries in the region and to the 14.3% ratio of the EU countries.

Figure 53. High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports) 25

ALB

ITA

BIH

GRC

MKD

EU

20 15 10 5

0 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Source: World Bank Database http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx For technological competitiveness data on spending on research and development as % of GDP, and the ratio of high technologies export as % of manufactured export are used as a proxy. Data on R&D expenditures as a % of GDP for Albania are available for 2007 and 2008. According to these data, R&D expenditures in Albania are the lowest compared to some surrounding countries in the broad region (Italy, Greece, Republic of North Macedonia, the previous two also being main trade partners), and remain below EU levels.

168

Figure 54. R&D expenditures in selected countries ALB

ITA

GRC

MKD

EU

2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5

0.1

0.2

0 2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Source: World Bank Database http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx The data show that Albania still lags behind the neighbouring countries and main trading partners in terms of competitiveness, which not only sets it in a peripheral position, but also suggests that the government should invest more towards education and training of human resources, and selection of high productivity investments projects, aiming at the tradable sectors of the economy. This should contribute to uplifting Albania from the peripheral position as well as strengthen its competitiveness factors, both towards other countries and within its territory. The existing abundant natural resources constitute a good basis for use in economy, but lack of knowledge and innovation undermines efficiency of resources’ use and therefore of productivity and sustainability.

Education Education is highly important as an economic growth driver as it defines the quality and specialization of the workforce. Gross expenditures dedicated to education increased in annual terms by 51% during 2013 and decreased by 4% in 2015, compared to 2014, following fiscal consolidation policies of the government. Education funds are highly concentrated in the qark of Tirana (64.3% of the total in 2012 and 35% in 2015).

Kukës and Gjirokastër have the lowest expenditure allocation shares for the period 2012-2015.

Table 9. Expenditures in education by qarks (% of total) Qark 2012 2013 2014 Berat 2.7 4.3 4.1 Dibër 2.8 4.4 4.5 Durrës 1.1 7.9 7.5

2015 4.1 4.3 7.7 169

Elbasan 5.4 10.9 10.8 10.4 Fier 4.6 7.9 8.0 8.0 Gjirokastër 2.6 4.2 4.1 3.9 Korçë 4.1 6.5 6.4 6.1 Kukës 2.1 3.5 3.4 3.3 Lezhë 2.3 4.0 4.0 4.1 Shkodër 4.1 7.9 7.6 7.2 Tiranë 64.3 32.9 33.8 35.2 Vlorë 3.8 5.7 5.8 5.8 Albania 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Author’s calculations based on Ministry of Finance data.

At a regional level, gross expenditures in education are the highest in Region 2 compared to the other regions, but have however diminished overtime due to decreasing values for the qark of Tirana, which dominates figures in the region. Around 47% of total education expenditures were allocated in Region 2 in 2015. The lowest level is allocated to region 1 (only 15% in 2015), though this region has experienced significant increase of expenditures from 2012 (9%) to 2015.

Table 10. Expenditures in education at development regions level (% of total Region 2012 2013 2014 2015 Region 1 9 15 15 15 Region 2 68 45 46 47 Region 3 12 22 21 20 Region 4 11 18 18 18 Albania 100 100 100 100 Source: Ministry of Finance and Authors calculations.

The number of schools in basic education (primary and lower secondary) has diminished during 2009-2015, mainly in rural areas, which is in line with the overall decrease of rural population over the selected period (by 13% during the same period).

The qarks of Tirana, Elbasan and Fier account for the largest number of basic education institutions. Disparities among these three exist, but are not so high. Tirana stands at 192% against Albania = 100, while Elbasan and Fier stand at 161% and 139% respectively (academic year 2013-2014). Berat, Dibër, Durrës and Vlorë have similar indices among them, around 20 percentage points below the country average. Korça is almost equal to the country average, while Gjirokastër has the most disadvantageous position with 38%. The divergences are high among all 12 qarks, but not as extreme as in the case of GDP, or population, etc. Disparities are stronger when comparing schools in urban versus rural areas. Tirana has more than half of the schools in urban areas and around 28% of the urban areas’ schools were located in Tirana in 2014. Dibër, Kukës and Gjirokastër (very mountainous geography, sloppy terrain, low population) have a

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very low number of schools in the urban area compared to rural ones and to the other qarks. This could also be positive as it means that pupils can access schools in their villages. However, if schools are close to the community and far from the urban area, it means that an efficient strategy for schools maintenance and teachers’ employment and distribution has to follow as well.

Table 11. Distribution of schools for basic education by qarks (in %) Qark Berat Dibër Durres Elbasan Fier Gjirokastër Korçë Kukës Lezhë Shkodër Tiranë Vlorë Albania

2009 - 2010 Total Urban 6.4 5.8 6.1 2.9 7.1 10.0 13.7 8.0 11.0 10.2 3.8 3.3 8.2 6.2 6.6 2.0 5.3 5.1 9.2 8.0 15.5 30.1 7.3 8.6 100 100

2010 - 2011 Total Urban 6.5 5.6 6.6 2.7 7.2 10.3 14.2 7.6 11.4 10.6 3.2 3.1 8.5 6.1 5.5 2.2 5.1 4.9 9.1 8.3 15.9 29.7 6.9 8.8 100 100

2011 -2012 Total Urban 6.4 5.7 6.7 2.8 7.1 9.9 13.4 7.8 11.7 10.6 3.2 3.2 8.6 6.2 5.6 2.1 5.2 4.8 9.2 8.5 16.2 29.2 6.7 9.2 100 100

2012 - 2013 Total Urban 6.4 5.8 6.6 2.8 7.1 9.9 13.5 7.8 11.6 10.4 3.2 3.2 8.5 5.8 5.6 2.1 5.4 5.3 9.4 8.8 16.0 29.0 6.9 9.2 100 100

2013 - 2014 Total Urban 6.4 5.8 6.6 2.5 7.2 9.9 13.5 8.1 11.5 10.1 3.1 3.0 8.5 6.0 5.7 2.3 5.5 5.3 9.4 9.2 15.7 28.3 6.8 9.4 100 100

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data The number of teachers per 10,000 inhabitants helps assessing the relation between education provision/access and population dynamics. The number of teachers for 10,000 inhabitants (for basic education for the 5-years period) is highest in the qarks of Kukës (130.3) followed by Gjirokastër (116.6), Dibër (112.5) and Shkodër (104.3). The lowest level of this indicator is registered in Tirana (68.2) and Durrës (78.2) and in both cases is also lower than the national average of 86.5. This indicator is higher in the more mountainous and remote areas, due to depopulation, and lower in the most urbanised and central areas of the country, such as Tirana and Durrës, due to overpopulation.

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Figure 55. Number of teachers per 10,000 inhabitants at qark level (2014) 140 120

TOTAL ALBANIA

100

Albania = 86.5

80 60 40 20 0 Berat

Dibër

Durrës

Elbasan

Fier

Gjirokastër

Korçë

Kukës

Lezhë

Shkodër

Tiranë

Vlorë

140

URBAN AREA 120 100

Albania = 67.5

80 60 40 20 0 Berat

Dibër

Durrës

Elbasan

Fier

Gjirokastër

Korçë

Kukës

Lezhë

Shkodër

Tiranë

Vlorë

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data At a regional level, the average highest number of teachers for 10,000 inhabitants (for basic educations in 5 years) was in Region 1 (106.6 teachers for 10,000 inhabitants) and the lowest level was in Region 2 (75.7 teachers for 10,000 inhabitants). Disparities exist but are not extreme and are less extreme than in the case of qarks. The figures at regional level reflect to a considerable extend the composition of the region by qarks.

Figure 56. Number of teachers per 10,000 inhabitants at qark level (2015)

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data In the upper secondary education the number of schools has remained almost constant over the last 5 years, at national, qark and regional level. (500 in 2009-2010 and 512 in 2013-2014). 447 schools out of 512 are located in urban areas. However, the distribution of upper secondary schools shows for considerable variation among qarks.

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Around 20.1% of upper secondary schooling institutions were located in the qark of Tirana in 2013-2014, out of which 83.5% in the urban area. The qark of Fier accounted for about 12.5% of upper secondary schools, out of which 92.2% in urban areas and Elbasan had 10.4% of the total, out of which 90.6% in the urban areas. Gjirokastër and Kukës have the lowest levels, with 4.3% and 3.7% each. The largest number of upper secondary schools in Albania is located in urban areas, with Kukës as an outlier, where all upper secondary schools are located in the urban area. This is in contrast to the basic education, as the location of upper secondary education facilities is not correlated with geography, transport and demography. This could be an efficiency-related choice, but also a legacy of the previous political systems, where the dominant policy was to invest on schools and dormitories concentrated in urban areas, rather than on road network, housing for teachers, and transportation schemes.

The number of teachers in upper secondary education decreased during the academic year 2010/2011 by 0.9%, registering 8,179 teachers from 8,250 in the previous year, and had a slight increase in the academic year 2013-2014 when about 8,606 teachers were recorded. The highest number of teachers is located in the qark of Tirana with about 2,310 upper secondary schools. There’s a high divergence between the qark of Tirana and the other qarks, as well as differences among the other qarks themselves.

The differences are similar for urban areas. During 2011-2015, the average number of teachers in upper secondary education per 10,000 inhabitants was 29.0. It did not change much over time, (28.3 in 2009-2010 and 29.7 in 2013-2014) and it is higher in urban areas (average, 33.0 per 10,000) – also higher than the national average.

The highest number (5-years average) of teachers for 10,000 inhabitants (for upper secondary educations) is in Gjirokastër (37) followed by Shkodër (35), Vlorë (31.7) and Berat (31.4). The lowest numbers are in Dibër (23.6) and Durrës (23.8). The factors behind the high figures may be related to demography, but also (in the case of Gjirokastër), because a large number of teachers is graduated in the local university. In Gjirokastër, these newly graduated teachers come from the city itself as well as the surrounding areas of the south Albania and most of them, after graduation, keep living in their hometowns.

There is variation among qarks regarding the number of graduated pupils in the upper secondary schools per 10,000 inhabitants. Disparities are not extreme, but Kukës stands around 57 percentage points above the national average, being thus an outlier in the group. The lowest level of those graduated in upper secondary schools per 10,000

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inhabitants is found in the qarks of Gjirokastër, Korçë and Vlorë, with 17-30 percentage points below the national average.

Figure 57. Number of pupils graduated per 10,000 inhabitants at qark level (2015) 180 160

140

Albania = 100

120 100 80 60

40 20 0 Berat

Dibër

Durres

Elbasan

Fier

Gjirokastër

Korçë

Kukës

Lezhë

Shkodër

Tiranë

Vlorë

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data At a regional level, Region 2 has the highest concentration of upper secondary education facilities (32.0%, or 164 schools in 2013-2014 – due to the impact of Tirana), out of which 41.0% (or 141 schools) located in the urban area. In terms of teachers per 10,000 inhabitants, disparities are higher among urban areas of the regions than among regions.

Health care The number of hospital beds has experienced decrease overtime, while the differences between the qarks have only slightly changed. In 2016, Tirana had 2161 beds (the highest figure), followed by Elbasan with 1034. All of the other qarks have 3-digit numbers in terms of hospital beds, while the lowest levels are recorded in Gjirokastër and Lezhë with 352 and 323 beds each. The total number of beds has decreased each year in Albania from 2009 to 2016 to account for a total decrease of 633 beds. The graph on Tirana is used to illustrate this decrease that has actually happened in all of the qarks.

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Figure 58. Hospital beds per qark (2016, % of total)

8%

5%

Berat 6%

Dibër 6%

26%

13%

8% 7% 4%

4% 4%

9%

Durres Elbasan Fier Gjirokastër Korçë Kukës Lezhë

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data Figure 59. Number of hospital beds in the qark of Tirana (2009-2016) 2 260 2 240 2 220 2 200 2 180 2 160

Tiranë

2 140 2 120 2 100 2 080 2 060 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data The indexed graph shows for high disparities among qarks in terms of public hospitals capacity, where Gjirokastër stands more than 80% above the national average, followed

by Diber with 40%, while Durrës and Fier are well below the national average with 3040%. Tirana is only 20% above the national average. This scenario is reversed when considering the quality of the services in the same qarks. Access to the health care service in different locations is faced with the challenge of both capacity and quality, which means that different investments policies are needed for each qark.

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Figure 60. Index of the number of beds for 10,000 inhabitants, at qark level (2016) 200% 180% 160% 140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40%

Vlorë

Tiranë

Shkodër

Lezhë

Kukës

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Fier

Elbasan

Durres

Dibër

0%

Berat

20%

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data From a regional analysis point of view, the number of service providers and hospitals shows for moderate divergences, with Region 3 having a higher concentration and Region 2 having a lower one. As in the case of education this is due to population dynamics. The larger number of health care facilities (at any level of the service) is in Tirana, but the population in this qark is so high that on a per capita level the quality of the service and access to the service is still lagging behind. In other regions, access stands in much better levels, but the quality of the service and of the facilities is very low, which obliges most people from other qarks to seek for healthcare services in Tirana hospitals and health clinics. The reported data cover only public facilities, but a good portion of the service is provided privately and this is not accounted for in this study.

As far as infant mortality is regarded, there has been a declining trend during 2011 – 2015 in Albania. The average infant mortality rate was 8.7% in 2011, declining to 7.1 in 2015, with Shkodër going from 12.6% in 2014 to 4.2% in 2015. The opposite trend was registered in the qarks of Fier and Dibër.

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Figure 61. Infant mortality (for 1,000 live births) Vlorë

Tiranë

Shkodër

Berat 14.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0

Lezhë

Dibër

Durrës

Elbasan

Fier

Kukës

2011 2013

Gjirokastër

2015

Korçë

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data At a regional level, Region 1 has the highest infant mortality rate followed by Region 2. However, while all regions have experienced decline with the exception of region 4 (Gjirokastër, Vlorë and Fier), which has been subject to growth in infant mortality rate.

This is due mainly to the path this indicator has gone through in Vlorë and Fier.

Figure 62. Infant mortality (for 1,000 live births) (regions 2011-2015) Region 1 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 Region 4

0.0

Region 2

2011 2013 Region 3

2015

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data Poverty A key source of information with regard to living conditions and poverty in Albania is the Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) conducted at household level. There are four LSMS-surveys implemented by INSTAT in Albania, respectively in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2012. Poverty indicators from LSMS are available at qark level only

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for 2012. Prior 2008, higher GDP growth rates, increasing wages and pensions have determined a decrease in overall poverty. The share of population whose real per capita monthly consumption is below the poverty line51 of Lek 4,891 (deflated in 2002 prices) fell progressively form 25.4% in 2002 to 12.5% in 2008. Also, for the extremely poor population52, the headcount indicator decreased from 4.7% in 2002 to 3.3 in 2005 and to 1.2% in 2008, showing that more people were lifted out of poverty and extreme poverty. However, after 2008, in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis, and with the weak economic growth rates in the succeeding years, poverty in Albania has increased. The share of population whose real per capita monthly consumption is below the poverty line of Lek 4,891 (in 2002 prices) increased from 12.5% in 2008 to 14.3% in 2012. The same is for the extremely poor population, which increased from 1.2% in 2008 to 2.3% in 2012.

The highest number of poor in 2012 was in the qark of Kukës (22.5%) followed by Lezhë (18.4%), and the lowest headcount was in the qarks of Gjirokastër (10.6%), Vlorë (11.1%) and Elbasan (11.3%).

Table 12. Poverty indicators by qark (in %) Headcount Depth Severity Albania 14.3 3 1 Berat 12.3 2.3 0.7 Dibër 12.7 2.3 0.7 Durrës 16.5 3.6 1.3 Elbasan 11.3 2.3 0.7 Fier 17.1 3.4 1.0 Gjirokastër 10.6 2.4 1.0 Korçë 12.4 2.5 0.7 Kukës 22.5 3.8 0.9 Lezhë 18.4 4.7 1.8 Shkodër 15.5 3.7 1.6 Tiranë 13.9 2.7 0.8 Vlorë 11.1 2.4 0.8 Source: INSTAT LSMS 2012 Lezhē has also the highest levels of poverty depth and poverty severity in 2012 with 4.7% and 1.8% respectively. Kukës has the second highest poverty depth (3.8%), but has a lower severity compared to other qarks as for instance Durrës and Shkodër. So, the headcount has a diverse distribution among qarks and is not necessarily related to the geography and locational peripherality. It seems to be impacted more by population number and access of people to a diversity of living means and sectorial employment, as well as to the dominance of rural/urban structure that is present within each qark.

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Figure 63. Poverty headcount ratio by qark (in %) 25

20

Albania =14.3%

15

10

5

0 Berat

Dibër

Durrës

Elbasan

Fier

Gjirokastër

Korçë

Kukës

Lezhë

Shkodër

Tiranë

Vlorë

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT LSMS 2012 Region 3 and region 4 have similar levels of poverty with 12.0% and 12.9% respectively, and stand below the national average of 14.3%. In region 2, about 14.4% of the individuals are poor, which is very close to the national average, probably because of the large number of population and diversity of population strata and of economic sectors presence.

Figure 64. Poverty headcount ratio by region (in %) 20 18 16

Albania =14.3%

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Region 1

Region 2

Region 3

Region 4

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT LSMS 2012 Region 1, on the other hand has the highest poverty headcount, gap and severity, with all three indicators standing above the national average. Region 3 is the best performer having the lowest levels in all three indicators.

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Figure 65. Poverty gap and poverty severity by development regions (in %) 4.5

1.6

4.0

1.4

Poverty gap Albania =3.0% 1.2

3.5 3.0

Poverty severity Albania =3.0%

1.0

2.5

0.8

2.0

0.6

1.5

0.4

1.0

0.2

0.5 0.0

0.0 Region 1

Region 2

Region 3

Region 4

Region 1

Region 2

Region 3

Region 4

Source: INSTAT LSMS 2012 and Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s calculations

Environment and services Albania is very rich on natural resources, which are high risk of pollution, depletion and even extinction (the latter mainly due to climate change effects). Different data on environment is accessible at different geographical scales, making it difficult to study disparities among qarks and among regions. Individual studies show among others, a high concentration (above norms) of heavy metals (mainly lead, iron, copper, cadmium, chromium and nickel) and nitrates in water (the latter mostly due to use of chemicals in agriculture, but also wastewater discharge). Heavy metals originate from industrial sources and are also an effect of the crude oil drilling/spilling industry. These pollutants cause serious damage to water sources, aquifers, agricultural land and products, and biodiversity, thus as a result also to human health.

One of the main causes of natural resources pollution is urban waste. The urban waste per capita (tons per inhabitants) at the national level has increased progressively during 2003-2012 (in 2008, the data doubled those of 2003) and in 2012 the production more than tripled the quantities of 2003. In 2013 there is a drop in quantities per capita (0.286 ton/capita or 0.106 ton/capita less than in 2012), and the quantities increase again afterwards, till 2015 to experience some decrease in 2016 and 2017. However, while the total urban waste is decreasing the amount per capita is increasing on a national level. In a context where population is also decreasing and urban population increasing, this means that people are generating more urban waste on per household level. These data refer to INSTAT.

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Figure 66. Urban and inert solid waste (total and per capita, 2013-2017) Ton

Kg/capita/year

1,600,000

450

1,400,000

400

1,200,000

350 300

1,000,000

250

800,000

200

600,000

150

400,000

100

200,000

50

0

0 2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Source: Author based on INSTAT data The urban waste data at qark level are available only till 2013. These data show that the increase of solid waste has happened in all of the qarks, with the highest level of waste generation in Gjirokastër and Vlorë and the lowest in Kukës. Usually, urban waste generation is higher in those qarks or regions presenting better economic conditions and thus having higher consumption per capita. In correlation to other indicators the qarks of Tirana, Vlora, Gjirokstra and Korçë have the highest levels of urban waste generation per capita (above the national average, till 2013), and the qarks of Kukës and Elbasan have the lowest levels and below the national average.

Figure 67. Urban waste per capita in 2013 (ton per inhabitant) by qarks 0,001 0,001 0,000

Albania = 0.392 ton/inh

0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000

Berat

Dibër

Durrës

Elbasan

Fier

Gjirokastër

Korçë

Kukës

Lezhë

Shkodër

Tiranë

Vlorë

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data Demography The population of Albania is in continuous decline since 1990, due to both outmigration and decreasing rates of the natural growth. The rate of population decline has increased from 2002 to 2008, to decrease afterwards till 2015. After 2015, the decreasing rate has grown again to reach -0.3% in 2017. The trend is mainly as a result of the population emigration abroad. Furthermore, internal migration has had a major impact on the territorial structure. Urban population has increased steadily, and the metropolitan area of Tiranë-Durrës has received more than 1/3 of the country’s population.

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Figure 68. Population trends (annual change of population every 1st of January in %) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 0.0 -0.1

-0.09 -0.13 -0.11

-0.2

-0.22

-0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9

-0.72 -0.79

-0.74

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data Massive displacements from remote and peripheral mountainous areas towards the western coast and central Albania resulted into: increased population density and concentration of economic activities in the recipient areas, therefore leading to higher economic production in one single territory in the country; dynamic and chaotic urbanization; and significant relocation of the workforce, economic resources and investments. This population reallocation resulted into two major typologies of cities: i) cities experiencing dynamic and fast growth together with the pressure from development, lack of infrastructure and services investments – insufficient to respond to the development pressure, and negative environmental consequences; ii) depressive shrinking cities that lost population and inherited vast brown/greyfields – areas of previous industrial activity that were either abandoned, or shut down for future decision making and privatization.

Next to these two major typologies, it is noticeable a third one, still in formation, without any clear distinct features, composed of formal and/or informal settlements established in the outskirts of the traditional cities, or on agricultural land. This third typology constitutes the continuum of urban areas towards rural ones, some kind of suburbanisation close to developed centres, but still far enough to benefit from lower land prices and better environment. This is dispersed development – the sprawl that has fragmented agriculture land and increased the demand for services and infrastructure along the western coast in Albania, from north to south.

As a result, despite overall population decline some qarks and municipalities, such as Tiranë and Durrës, have experienced an increase of population. Other qarks facing population decline are Gjirokastër, Dibër, Berat and Kukës.

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Figure 69. Population changes 2016/2001 (as by January 1) by qarks (in %) 40 36

30 14

20 10 0 -10

-06

-20 -30

Albania

Vlorë

Tiranë

Shkodër

Lezhë

Kukës

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Fier

Elbasan

Durrës

Dibër

-38 Berat

-40

30 19

20 10 0 -10 -20

-06 -17

-19

-18

Region 3

Region 4

-30 -40

Region 1

Region 2

Albania

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data Similarly, as for absolute figures, the density of the population has declined in all of the qarks, but in Tiranë and Durrës. Not only the trends of these two qarks are reversed, but their differences compared to other qarks are outstandingly high. In 2016, Durrës population density per km2 stands at around 350% the national density, while Tirana at almost 500%. The qark of Tirana had 491.3 inhabitants per km2 at the beginning of 2016, from 484.7 inhabitants per km2 in the same period of the previous year. At least theoretically speaking, in larger cities, there are density-competition effects showing that these cities must be more productive than smaller ones, and the better is the connection among larger cities and between them and smaller cities, the higher will be the regional productivity (Dijkstra et al., 2013). However, larger cities and city regions, are often associated with agglomeration effects, not all being positive, such as the higher environmental pressure (on resources and the quality of infrastructures) and possible social segregation.

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Figure 70. Index of population density by qarks (2016) 500 2001

450

2006

2011

2016

400 350 300 250 200 150 100

Albania =100

250

2001

2006

2011

Vlorë

Tiranë

Shkodër

Lezhë

Kukës

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Fier

Elbasan

Durrës

Dibër

0

Berat

50

2016

200

150

Albania =100

100

50

0 Region 1

Region 2

Region 3

Region 4

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data The second qark with the highest density of population in Albania is Durrës with 363.9 inhabitants per km2, followed by Fier with 165.3 inhabitants per km2. The lowest levels of population density and below the national average are in the qarks of Gjirokastër (24.4 inhabitants per km2), Kukës (35.4 inhabitants per km2) and Dibër (51.9 inhabitants per km2).

The most urbanized qarks, in terms of urban population (population that lives in the urban areas as per INSTAT definition of the latter) for 2016 are Durrës (83.3%), Tiranë (76.0%), Vlorë (69.8%), and Lezhë (63.8%). The lowest urbanization level was noted in Dibër (27.3%), Kukës (36.6%), and Elbasan (40.0%). The indexation of urbanization data shows that the two most urbanised qarks have different tendencies in time. Thus, the urbanization ratio of Durrës has increased during 2001-2016 compared to the

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national average, while the one for Tirana has decreased. Nevertheless, both qarks stand above the national average.

Figure 71. Index of urban population per qark 200 180

2001

2006

2011

2016

160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Berat

Dibër

Durrës

Elbasan

Fier

Gjirokastër Korçë

Kukës

Lezhë

Shkodër

Tiranë

Vlorë

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data Structural changes in the population of Albania are further analysed using the age dependency ratio calculated as the ratio between the young people aged 0-14 years and elderly over 65 years, against the total working age population (those 15-64 years).

Based on this methodology, in 2016, the age dependency ratio in Albania was 46%, higher than in 2014 (45.2%). The highest level of age dependency ratio is found in Kukës (52%), Dibër (49%) and Lezhë and Elbasan (each 48%). The lowest age dependency ratio was registered in Vlorë (43%), followed by Tiranë and Gjirokastër (each 44%). In general, Albania is experiencing population ageing, with the number of births decreasing overtime and emigration of young age population (abroad) increasing.

This will increase further the dependency of older age population on the younger age population in the country. This fact signals for the need for policies and interventions that address population ageing, which “can focus on improving the provision of social and healthcare infrastructures and services activating business and employment opportunities in these sectors” (ESPON, 2018a, p.14).

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Figure 72. Age dependency ratio at qark level 2016 (in %) 54% 52% 50% 48%

Albania = 46% 46% 44% 42%

Vlorë

Tiranë

Shkodër

Lezhë

Kukës

Korçë

Gjirokastër

Fier

Elbasan

Durrës

Dibër

38%

Berat

40%

Source: Author’s calculations based on INSTAT data

Accessibility of Regions Accessibility within Albania is measured in two different ways, hence as access that people and settlements have towards main transportation corridors and major cities and hubs, and as accessibility of functional urban areas towards FUAs with higher GDP and population. The latter was already presented and analysed in the polycentricity analysis.

The previous is used by earlier disparities’ studies conducted in Albania, but in this case it is complemented (for as much as data availability allows) with the methodology developed by Spiekermann et al. (2015) in their applied research for the TRACC (Transport Accessibility at Regional/Local Scale and Patterns in Europe) ESPON project 2013-201553.

The first step of the accessibility analysis was to determine travel distances (km) and time (hours) as access of qarks to hubs and national communication corridors. This information is particularly relevant for the qarks that are considered peripheral, due to geographical location and relatively long travel time to reach the core metropolitan area of Tiranë-Durrës. Albania, as the analysis so far has shown, has a monocentric territorial structure, with most activities, population and economic productivity concentrated in the Tiranë-Durrës metropolitan area. Therefore, considering the metropolitan area as a central location and the settlements/cities of the remote and mountainous areas as peripheral is a typical and preconceived thinking on the hierarchy of settlements and cities in Albania.

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The hubs are functioning airports and ports with international connections. In Albania, there is one international airport located in the FUA of Tirana54, just north the city and the international port (for freight and passengers) of Durrës. The port of Vlorë has also international connections for the transportation of goods and people, but to a very limited degree and very few connections compared to Durrës, and it is used mainly for people living in Vlorë and surrounding municipalities. This port as well as the one on Lezhë have the potential of becoming future hubs, but for the time being are rather isolated and with under quality infrastructures and facilities. Therefore, the present analysis considers only the Port of Durrës.

Accessibility to national corridors considers their hierarchy based on function (i.e. direct connection among municipalities’ centres and between each urban centre and the metropolitan area of Tiranë-Durrës) and not based on the hierarchy defined by the Road Code (law no. 8378, date 22.7.1998, ‘The road code of the Republic of Albania’, as amended). The Code’s hierarchy considers both function and technical features of roads.

In principle and technically speaking, if a road (by Code) belongs to interurban roads, it does not provide the same accessibility level or connection opportunities as a highway.

However, in Albania, the highways’ network is not completed yet as to offer equal access and connectivity for all major urban centres. Instead, a national network composed of highways and interurban corridors provides the direct connectivity opportunity. This network is the one considered for the sake of accessibility and connectivity in the analysis in this research.

The geographical analysis (on the map) shows that that 11 qark centres out of 12 (excluding Peshkopi in Dibër) and the main cities along the coast have direct access to national corridors. Due to (as described above) the different road typology (highway or interurban road) the travelling time in the different segments of the national corridors is different, but once people and freight transport from the qark centres get on the national corridors, there is direct connectivity with the hubs and with other qark centres.

Still, the mountainous qarks (Gjirokastër, Korçë and Berat) have access to second and even third category of national roads/corridors (as defined by the Road Code). It takes 3.5-4 hours to travel by road from the qark centres of Gjirokastër and Korçë to Tirana and the hubs.

Dibër is not linked as yet with a national corridor. The situation is expected to change when the construction of ‘Rruga e Arbrit’ (Arbri Road) is finalised. This segment (an interurban corridor) will provide Peshkopi (the centre of Dibër) with direct connection

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with Tirana in less than 2 hours travel time. So far, the distance of different settlements in Dibër (apart from those situated along the road) to the current national roads is above 25 km, while in the other three other southern mountainous qarks, this distance varies between 11 and 25 km. Dibër is in the most disadvantageous condition so far. The travel time to Tirana and the hubs for several parts of the qark exceeds 2 hours and can be extended up to 7 hours. The travel distances range between 150 km and 310 km and the roads are typical low speed curvy mountainous ones.

On the other hand, the inhabitants of more than 90% of the settlements in Tirana and Durrës travel less than 1 hour to the hubs (airport/port) with travelling distances within the range of 12-40 km and commute daily for work purposes within the metropolitan area. The urban centres of the qarks of Fier, Shkodër and Lezhë, Kukës municipality, the northern part of qark of Berat and the plain area of the qark of Elbasan consume 12 hours of travel time to reach Tirana and the hubs. The travelling distances vary between 41 and 140 km. Besides location and topography, investments made on new highways and interurban road segments constitute a key factor in the improved accessibility and connectivity.

While the above improvement is positive in terms of people getting access to services and markets, it is not so positive in regard to the economic performance of the qarks/municipalities where people come from. There is an overall tendency for people from other cities/settlements in Albania to seek for access to services, markets and work in the FUA of Tirana, because of lacking access in their locations of origin or due to very low quality of services. Once again, the monocentricity pattern reflected in functions, population and productivity is emphasised through the road network and connectivity opportunities for people across the territory.

The ESPON TRACC methodology for accessibility considers three types of indicators: the travel costs (cost or time), the cumulated opportunities (number of people/activities that can be reached within a certain given time) and potential accessibility 55 . The indicators provide indications on the locational advantage or disadvantage of the regions and on where and how [future] transport policies should focus and [re]direct their investments.

The travel cost indicator is measured as time of people living in the 61 municipalities to reach the motorway exits, assuming that only a specified set is relevant for the accessibility of a given area and not all of the possible destinations. The destinations in this case are the motorway exits, assuming that once people/goods make it to the exit

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to a high-speed road, they either enter the commuting area of main urban centres, or are able to travel to their destinations and back within the day, due to good connectivity as explained earlier. For this analysis/map only the road axes where the travel speed can remain unchanged at values above 70km/hour for more the 50% of the trip are considered. This network of roads and exits coincides with the one analysed above for connectivity. As it is noticed from the map, the more mountainous and remote qarks and municipalities have low accessibility, with travel time exceeding 60 minutes. In the coastal area (plain topography) accessibility as travel cost remains always within the commuting limit of 45 minutes. Similarly, the same time limit is maintained also for settlements/areas situated along and with immediate access to the road corridor that passes through the country from west to east.

Figure 73. Travel time (in minutes) of people (from municipalitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; centres) accessing motorways exists

Source: Author based on travel time calculation using Google maps and ASIG Albania

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The travel cost analysis is extended further to measuring the time people spend travelling from their administrative units to the qark centres. The administrative units are the smaller territorial units that compose a municipality. This provides the opportunity to assess accessibility towards locations (activities and markets), within regions and at a higher level of territorial desegregations, which is suitable to understanding spatial disparities. The low access area in this case is found again in the mountainous part, but it creates a continuous belt from north to south, with higher access areas bordering in both west and east.

Figure 74. Travel time of people (from administrative units) to urban centres by road and public transport

Source: Author based on travel time calculation using Google maps and ASIG Albania

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The second indicator – cumulated opportunities, is based on the assumption that people are interested to travel to destinations that they can reach with a fixed budget for travel, expressed in the study as the time limit that one accepts to travel, hence 60 minutes.

People who commute daily prefer travelling no more than a limited amount of time.

They choose their destinations on this basis (among others). To carry out this analysis, the urban centres equal to, or with more than 10,000 residents that can be reached within 60 minutes by the qark centres are identified. The limit value of 10,000 inhabitants is recognized as value of population figures that divides small cities from larger urban centres. The related map shows for a clear dominance of Tirana and Durrës, a vertical division between west and east and between the coast and mountainous areas, and for a dominance of Korça in the east. This map has a similar pattern with travel time of people from administrative units to qark centres. Though Korça qark is located in high altitudes above sea level, the fact that a good proportion of its territory is plain, makes it possible for a bigger number of people to reach the qark centre in 60 minutes or less.

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Figure 75. Cities with at least 10,000 residents within 60 minutes by road

Source: Author based on travel time calculation using Google maps and ASIG Albania Finally, the cumulated opportunities are analysed also for the number of higher secondary schools reached within 45 minutes of travel (public transportation). The choice is made based on the fact that most high schools (outside urban areas) are located in the major villages and students from more remote villages should commute to school.

The higher cumulated opportunities are clearly concentrated along the coast, from ShkodĂŤr to VlorĂŤ and this is due to advantage of the plain terrain and because most high schools are located in regions with high population density. As usual, also the concentration of high school buildings is higher in the qark of Tirana.

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Figure 76. Access to higher secondary schools (45 minutes by road and public transport to FUAsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; centres)

Source: Author based on travel time calculation using Google maps and ASIG Albania

3.4 Polycentric interactions on the territory â&#x20AC;&#x201C; polycentric governance The existence of multiple urban centres located close to one-another does not necessarily imply that there are strong functional links between those centres (Burger et al., 2014). The technical analysis undertaken by the government for the implementation of the territorial and administrative reform in 2014-2015 did identify functional urban areas on the basis of territorial structure as proximity of urban centres on the territory. Distribution of functions across these urban centres, such as employment, markets, public institutions for services of general interest and commuting was then drawn on maps to designate the functional area for each potential

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new municipality. However, the analysis did not account for interactions; it simply identified institutional and markets’ locations and directions of communication, without understanding the degree and type of communication. A “polycentric urban region cannot exist if there is not interaction among the composing parts” (Burger et al., 2014, p.818), and as long as this interaction is not verified through knowledge on the degree of network formation, on real communication, socio-economic activities and on governance mechanisms distributed over the territory (Burger & Meijers, 2012), it is difficult to draw conclusions on whether the region is really polycentric, or it is a hierarchic network of settlements that depend on the core urban centre.

The modes of governance implemented by stakeholders on the territory do say a lot about polycentric networks in the region. In a polycentric political and governance system no one has an ultimate monopoly (Aligica & Tarko, 2012). This applies also to resources, and in polycentric systems the use of the latter is regulated by an entirety of rules composed of those that exist in the legislation and those set unofficially among stakeholders at different levels. In Albania, political groups do not easily let power diffuse among social actors, or institutions in the large meaning of the term, as defined

by Elinor Ostrom. This is felt not only at the level of decision-making power that nongovernment institutions may or may not have, but also at the level of local governments.

It is already argued above that rather than strengthening their position within a decentralized government framework, municipalities are losing power. Municipalities, as local governments of the 1st tier, are responsible on delivering public services for citizens within their territories, based on the law no. 139/2015 ‘On local selfgovernance’. Their territorial boundaries are set upon the law no. 115/2014, and define the territorial scope of their competences. Municipalities [can] establish and/or promote the establishment of local forums and networks as instruments for facilitating publicprivate partnerships and guaranteeing transparency in policymaking. However, still municipalities do not allow these forums to play a role in decision-making. Mostly, and in the best of cases, local forums influence decision-making indirectly, through means of continued communication and cooperative planning, and gradually during projects’ implementation.

Municipalities have not been very keen on embarking into territorial reforms (as explained earlier in the text), as this would mean a change to their authority. Moreover, municipalities do not see a need for a regional level, because this means that certain competencies and therefore authority and financial resources, could shift from the local

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level to the regional one. Still, the municipalities cooperate with non-government actors to a significant degree, and that is due to a number of factors, such as: i) presence of and pressure by donor interventions and initiatives for territorial development; ii) presence of the civil society that either undertakes territorial development initiatives, or acts as a pressure group; iii) the need of municipalities to perform their tasks within a given standards’ framework and in absence of internal capacities leading to working with non-governmental actors as a solution to implementing tasks such as strategic planning, territorial planning, local economic development programs, etc.

The number of non-government organisations has increased steadily in Albania, at least until 2016, to reach 2465, according to INSTAT56 to decrease at 2272 by the end of 2017. More than half of the NGOs operate in Tirana. The rest have a relatively even distribution among the other qarks. The information from the Agency for the Support of Civil Society also provides an indication of how government funds for supporting NGOs are distributed over the territory. Hence, the agency has in its database only the organisations that have applied for funds from the government – the most recent data show that out of 582 NGOs registered with the agency, 67% are from Tirana.

Territorially speaking they operate in and outside Tirana. However, usually they partner up with the municipalities on whose territories they implement their projects, rather than with local organisations. These data reinforce the monocentric pattern identified during the territorial analysis with regard functional relations among the FUAs. Table 13. Number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) per qark57 Qark No. of NGOs Tiranë58 392 59 Durrës 11 Dibër60 9 Elbasan61 24 Fier62 12 63 Berat 8 Korçë64 32 Gjirokastër65 16 66 Vlorë 29 Lezhë67 7 Shkodër68 30 69 Kukës 12 Source: Agency for the Support of Civil Society, 2018 It is interesting though to understand not only distribution of NGOs but also how various forms of cooperation are conducted and where in the territory. First of all, all cooperation initiatives, resulting into local/regional forums, networks of local organisations, and inter-municipal cooperation have always been promoted and pushed

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for by projects funded by international donors. Currently in the territory of Region 1 (Lezhë, Shkodër and Kukës qarks, as reported by the director of the regional development agency) there are a number of initiatives, such as the Shkodër Farmers Federation, Handicraftsmen Association, Wine-growers Consortium, etc. all supported by donors. As long as there is funding and technical support, these organisations perform satisfactorily. Their interest is very high on the respective subjects of common interest and they have a territorial representation. However, their financial sustainability is weak, and it is subject to the economic growth and performance of members.

One of the most interesting examples of regional partnerships and networks are the Local Action Groups (LAG) that were established across Albania during the early 2000s, and the Mountain Areas Development Agency (MADA). As reported by Kuqi and Lukesch in 2012, 3 LAGs were established in Albania with the support of Oxfam and DFID (in Vlorë, Shkodër and Dibër), and the LAG for Bjeshkët e Namuna (cross border with Montenegro and Kosovo) was established with the support of the Dutch SNV and Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. MADA, established by the Government of Albania and IFAD, extended its support to all mountainous areas in Albania and organised among others 17 forums of advocacy and exchange (Kuqi & Lukesch, 2012).

The LAGs had/have a non-government organisation status. Various other NGOs and donors have supported LAGs overtime, but their structure and activity were continuously hampered by the fact that Albanian LAGs did not have the same status as EU LAGs, therefore not being eligible to EU funding (Kuqi & Lukesch, 2012), and donors support was/is key to their sustainability. MADA on the other hand operated with IFAD support until 2013 and then it was annexed to the Ministry of Agriculture.

Polycentric approaches in terms of scales, actors/ institutions and mechanisms/ instruments can foster equity, inclusivity and adaptability (Sovacool, 2011). This is the assumption made by Sovacool (2011) in analysing governance approaches for climate change and energy use. The analysis relates mostly to governance modes rather than territorial polycentricity. However, by choosing climate change and energy as the core object of the case studies, indirectly a choice is made to consider also territorial dimensions. Sovacool refers to the latter usually as mixing, overlay or combination of scales. As a matter of fact, both systems have a significant scalar implication, from very small-local to large-international, and all of the transitory scales in between. This is due to the link of these sectors with natural resources and their exploitation and governance

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by a range of stakeholders that operate across and within scales, through various mechanisms, forms of cooperation, and institutional representation. Finka and Kluvankova (2015) take a similar approach to Sovacool (2011) in arguing that the combination of spatial polycentrism with polycentric governance will be able to address challenges of managing external shocks and providing robust and adaptive frameworks for ensuring the long-term sustainability of urban systems. In both cases, as well as in the study of large-scale forest commons by Toto (2018), successful approaches are reported, but a conclusion is made that more research is needed to establish whether polycentrism is the most effective mode of governance for territories and resources, especially when the scale is dynamic, is diverse, and is subject to change and shifts of power across it.

As mentioned also in the overall objective (external goal) of this research (thesis), the aiming is to contribute to the repository of cases explored by other scholars under the argument that “polycentrism can combine the strengths of global and local action” and “exploit a middle ground between scales of action” (Sovacool, 2011, pp.3842-43).

Therefore, a number of Albanian cases are explored in order to identify and understand polycentric approaches to governance. For this purpose, the selected cases are assessed in terms of self-governance and decision-making, communicative networks or networking, common interests between stakeholders, territory that connects them, and system or rules. This analysis follows the critical factors for assessing polycentric governance defined in section 1.4. The choice of cases comes from empirical research, based on the following criteria: -

Clear connection to the territory: the case as a project, or form of interaction happens within a clearly defined territorial setting, and has an interest on the territory and on territorial impacts. This is articulated either in the objectives of the stakeholders that run each case, or in the results of the intervention.

-

Success and failures: Of course, the preference is for successful cases leading to a ‘true or false’ answer to the question, or hypothesis that polycentric modes of governance are effective in and will produce sustainable territorial development. However, cases that tend to comply with most, or some of the critical factors for polycentric governance, or even go against some of the critical factors are also good cases, as their outcome (positive or not) will help answering the central question (the hypothesis).

-

Interpretation and connection to the territorial development profile: So far,

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disparities and territorial polycentricity are analysed and assessed. This builds a territorial development profile that is the result of policies on economic development and territorial structure, as well as the result of governance modes, shifts and rescaling. Governance rescaling is already discussed, but polycentric modes of governance are yet to be explored, and their connection to the territorial development outcome is to be set.

-

Diversity of cases and multi-sectorial approach: The cases should be thematically diverse and cover initiatives that range from fully bottom-up to fully top-down. Furthermore, initiatives that happen within various sectors make sure that polycentric governance and its connection to the territory is covered from different sectorial perspective and different scale angles.

-

Territorial coverage – diverse, from small to large: The cases should cover the whole territory of Albania, a specific region, or small community or ecosystem scales.

As a result, the following cases are selected and discussed in this section.

1. RDF supported Urban renewal program, implemented under the name ‘Urban Revival’.

‘Urban Revival’ was the ‘regional’ development programme implemented by the government during 2014-2018, extending to 70 urban areas, and in almost every municipality in Albania. The aim of the program was to regenerate major public spaces in city centres or key urban core locations, considering these interventions as having a catalytic effect not only in the urban fabric, but in the region as well.

Being considered by the government as a regional development program, it was funded through the Regional Development Fund (RDF). It is not clear whether the whole RDF, or a portion of it was dedicated to the Urban Revival program, as this is not reported by the government. As a result, it is difficult to provide an exact figure on the implementation of the Urban Revival program. However, based on the data provided by the annual budget laws and on an interpretation of the RDF data provided by the Ministry of Finance and Economy, it is possible to establish an understanding on how the fund has operated territorially.

Thus, during 2014-2018, almost all of the urban centres in Albania acquired funding of between 200,000 Euro – 30,000,000 Euro for projects related to the upgrading of public spaces, design of central squares, and related activities. As a matter of fact, if the

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infrastructure, tourism and economic improvement projects are included, the values become even higher, as it will be shown below.

In order to interpret the information related to RDF, from the Ministry of Finances and Economy, the RDF projects implemented during 2014-2018 are classified (for the purposes of this study) under the following categories. The classification is made based on the description and name of each project: -

Infrastructures (roads, water, wastewater, etc.)

Education Economy Tourism Information Technology (IT) Studies Urban renewal and landscaping

Referring to the above classification, it is not fully clear what part of the RDF is deliberately dedicated to the ‘Urban Revival’ program. However, based on this classification (made for the purpose of this study) and based on the government public information in media, as well as by tracking as many cases as possible to understand the nature of the projects, it is assumed that projects from the last category, that of urban renewal and landscaping, correspond better with the purpose of the ‘Urban Revival’ program. If the total amount of planned RDF for 2014-2018 is around 43-milliard lekë, the total of the urban renewal projects stands for around 18-milliard lekë, or 41% of the RDF. These are 159 projects out of the 367 projects funded by RDF as reported by the government till the end of 2017.

Figure 77. Distribution of urban renewal and landscaping projects per municipality 14 12 10 8 6 4

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Ministry of Finance and Economy, treasury system, 2018

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VORË

VLORË

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Figure 78. Distribution of urban renewal funds (from RDF) per municipality 4E+09 3.5E+09 3E+09 2.5E+09 2E+09 1.5E+09 1E+09

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Ministry of Finance and Economy, treasury system, 2018 The territorial distribution of the funds shows that out of 61 municipalities, Tirana has received the largest number of projects (13) and funds (around 3.7-milliard lekë), followed by Durrës with 10 projects and less than 2.5-milliard lekë. Fier, Korçë and Himarë have received half or less of the amount received by Durrës, but still significantly higher values compared to all of the other municipalities. In terms of number of projects, Elbasan and Shkodër have implemented 6 projects each (the same as Himarë), but project values are notably lower by 60% or more.

Besides funding the implementation of development catalysing projects in urban areas, the Urban Revival program intended also to promote the establishment of territorial partnerships. In principle RDF is supposed to support capital investments at local/regional level. The fund has been / is distributed on competitive basis to support infrastructure improvements (i.e: roads, education, health, water and sanitation, irrigation and drainage etc.) and has historically been allocated to line ministries or other relevant institutions for capital expenditures. The major institutional change made to RDF during the Urban Revival implementation was that of consolidating funds (previously allocated to ministries) under RDF, and distributing them to local governments on competitive basis. As a result, RDF values increased, marking an important jump in 2015 and then decreasing in 2016 (Dhrami & Gjika, 2018). In 2017 there is again a slight increase, but planned values for 2018 onward decrease again.

However, any year after 2015 has higher RDF values compared to years prior to 2015.

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VORË

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VAU I DEJËS

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Bashkia

500000000

Figure 79. RDF in years (000 000 Euro) 000 000 EURO 140

115.2

120 100 80

69.2

60

42.3

45.7

73.1 53.8

53.8

53.8

2018*

2019*

2020*

45

40 20

22.3

14.6

12.7

2007

2008

17.7

15.4

2012

2013

2.3 0

2006

2009

2010

2011

2014

2015

2016

2017

Source: Annual budget laws per each year, Official Gazettes, *the planned figure is provided for these years Because data on RDF and on Urban Revival program are mostly aggregated, it is difficult to draw conclusions on the potential effects that these investments had on local and regional economies. Data from the disparities analysis for the years 2014-2017 do not reveal any improved regional development profiles, while disparities remain at same levels as in earlier years, or are even higher for some indicators. This may suggest that the program had an effect on city/urban landscape by improving urban quality, but not necessarily on development indicators. A final conclusion can be drawn probably after 2018, as in general development indicators do not increase immediately after the implementation of a development program.

Still, it remains a fact that RDF intended to have a regional impact through the Urban Revival program, but instead ended up supporting projects of local relevance. This is not in favour of the official nature of the fund â&#x20AC;&#x201C; support for regional development.

Furthermore, the fund aims to promote regional partnerships, but it was allocated through top down decision-making and in direct communication with the municipalities, avoiding the other interested stakeholders. In a way, the Urban Revival was claimed to be designed as a program that represents multi-level polycentric governance â&#x20AC;&#x201C; hence, bottom-up initiatives should feed top-down programming and decisions on implementation should be taken through partnership framework and structures. However, in reality it did not work in this way. The priorities were set at the central level therefore undermining decentralised and multi-level management; the network of independent centres of decision-making for priority setting at local level was avoided or bypassed, and the common interest was narrowed down to political interests of government actors at central level; the competitive process was reduced to direct negotiations between mayors and the committee responsible on the RDF

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allocation, which as a result undermined the system of rules by imposing a degree of informality on the implementation of rules already set in legal acts. Most importantly, the RDF and the Urban Revival were lacking a general policy of regional development to back up programming and then disbursements. The allocation of fund was not based on the objectives of the National Strategy for Development and Integration, and it did not consider territories of specific features, such as lagging areas, inner peripheries, disadvantageous areas in terms of disparities, territorial structures that reflect monocentricity, etc. Several projects were implemented in territories of specific features, but decision making for selecting these territories was not made on the basis of a respective strategic document.

2. Integrated program for rural development – ‘100+ Villages’ The Integrated Rural Development Program, known as ‘100+ Villages’ program is an initiative of the Prime Minister and of the ministry responsible on agriculture and rural development. It is aiming at coordinating development interventions in rural areas – more than 100 Albanian villages, by conducting a cross-sectorial and multi-stakeholder approach, in line with the objectives of regional development as defined in the National Strategy for Development and Integration, and as a model that moves away from disconnected and fragmented interventions on the territory.

The implementation of the program is planned for the period 2018-2020 and the funded projects will be executed mainly by municipalities and other public agencies such as the Albanian Development Fund and the Mountain Areas Development Agency.

However, implementation is not limited to public institutions only. The purpose is that partnerships, which include the local population and local businesses, are established for implementation.

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Figure 80. Villages that are subject to the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;100+ Villagesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; program

Source: National Territory Planning Agency and Ministry of Rural Development and Agriculture, 2018 To have a better understanding of the nature of the projects, one should look at the specific objectives70 and strategic interventions of the program: 1. Improvement of public infrastructure (support for road infrastructure, revitalization of public spaces, community infrastructure, environmental

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infrastructure, tourism, monuments of cultural heritage, multifunctional centres etc.); 2. Economic development through diversification of economic activities (improvement of tourism potential in rural areas, agro tourism and rural tourism, investment in improving trade services, investments in the production of traditional products and other economic and financial services etc. Support for incubators of products rural tourism, promotion and marketing of rural areas, transportation services, fairs and local holidays, etc.); 3. Development of social and human capital (support for the creation of rural networks, local action groups and civil society in rural areas, vocational training for young people and women, cultural heritage support, support for the promotion of traditions and livelihoods in village, etc.); 4. Establishment of the Albanian agro-tourism network, which aims at supporting about 27 new agro-tourism ventures and 150 inns; 5. Establishment of a network of traditional product incubators, which consists in creating facilities that provide ready-made infrastructure for the entire product value chain, ranging from manufacturing / storage facilities, packaging and marketing lines, support for standardization and certification; 6. Creation of the branded / traditional products store chain, a process that has started with the identification of the brand of 'Edua'71 shops, and will enable the increase of the sales percentage for Albanian traditional local products. (Ministry of Agriculture, 2018) At the moment the program was launched – early 2018, it did not have a clear financial portfolio, as it does not have one now. The government stakeholders involved in the process were willing to push forward for its implementation, but were not clear on how to unravel the complex objectives and strategic priorities into concrete implementable projects, which besides reflecting the government’s interests, do address local issues.

This lack of clarity on which projects to pursue for implementation was then reflected in the absence of government’s decision making on the respective fund. So far it is only clear that funding will come from various sources, such as the Regional Development Fund, the investments’ budgets of the various ministries, potential private public partnerships, and municipalities.

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In order to resolve the missing clarity and push implementation forward, a major revision is currently made to the institutional framework of the whole process. A mechanism for multi-level governance is built and it is currently in its first phase of implementation. Thus, the program is being politically managed by an inter-ministerial committee, composed of the ministers responsible on agriculture and rural development, infrastructure and energy, tourism and environment, and culture. This committee will also approve allocation and distribution of funding.

At the technical level, the advisor to the Prime Minister on planning issues and the National Territory Planning Agency, are coordinating the process. NTPA in particular has a key role on managing content related issues and making sure the achievement of convergence between bottom-up requests and top-down priorities. In order to achieve convergence, a planning and programing process is designed and it is being implemented with the involvement of universities, such as the Polytechnic University of Tirana, the Agriculture University, POLIS University, etc. NTPA has assigned each university a group of villages (groups defined based on villages’ territorial proximity and functional relations) and launched in spring 2018 the ‘100+ Villages Academia’, which is producing development visions for the rural communities and will conclude with projects for implementation. The output of the Academia will also guide budgetary provisions for 2019.

The universities have involved internal and external experts, as well as students in the process, and have conducted extensive fieldwork in the selected territories. The fieldwork, besides serving as a mechanism for generating, gathering and exchanging knowledge, it entails also a process of communication and negotiation with the local communities. The proposals that the working groups are elaborating contain the views and requests of the local communities. This is not merely to justify the requirement for participatory processes (as defined in the planning legislation), but it is considered a necessity, or a fundamental mechanism for affecting territorial constructs in a sustainable way.

This case, similarly to the ‘Urban Revival’ program is a top-down initiative that along its implementation it has explored ways for decentralising management. However, decision making-remains centralised. Municipalities play a role in facilitating communication and knowledge exchange between communities and experts, therefore also with national government representatives. Municipalities and communities do not have a say in the approval of programming documents, visions and projects proposed.

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They influence the outcome only by being involved in the design phase. The whole multi-level governance mechanism is similar to MLG type I as described by Hooghe and Marks (2003). Hence, a pyramid-like scheme of interactions is set up from the institutions positioned in upper scales, and it is being implemented in cooperation with institutions at lower scales. By having a territorial representation – hence operating on a territory of common interests, the scheme guarantees both vertical and horizontal interactions between several centres of decision-making, but it concentrates the latter to the top institutions in the pyramid.

All stakeholders in the scheme have a common niche of genuine attraction for cooperation. The central government institutions look for the identification of fundable projects to take place in rural territories of inner peripheries and lagging regions, as means to guide harmonious and sustainable development (direct objective and interest).

Through cooperation with local and informal stakeholders who are interested for development catalysers in their territories, they will not only identify fundable projects, but will be able to pack all initiatives into one financial portfolio to control during allocation and implementation (indirect objective and interest). This second objective is related to power and authority, both becoming valid once financial support is also enacted. Finally, by organising the Academia and series of actions agreed upon in a common action plan, this network of stakeholders has also agreed on a set of rules to be implemented during projects’ identification phase and during implementation and funds’ allocation. It is early to conclude on a verdict whether the program and the ‘polycentric’ scheme through which it is being implemented will have a positive effect on the territorial development of the selected villages, and of the region where they belong. This assessment should take place after the projects are implemented. However, it is clear that differently from the ‘Urban Revival’ program, implementation for the first phase of the ‘100+Villages’ has endorsed a multi-level and territorial governance approach, with decentralised management and centralised decision-making.

3. Forest commons To date, there is no any definitive figure on the total forest area in Albania. The government has embarked on an initiative of building the forests’ cadastre, which is expected to provide accurate and updated figures on forests and forests typologies, including fragmentation and decrease of the total area over the years. However, this is a process in progress. According to Corine 2012, broad-lived, coniferous and mixed

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forests constitute 27% of the territory. If transitory woodland shrubs are included, the total forest area (2012 data) accounts for around 40% of the territory. However, the forests area in 2018 is expected to be lower based on the reasoning that during the first decade after 1990, Albania lost some 12% of its forest area, during the second decade (based on Corine interpretation) it lost around 3%, and after 2010 the illegal forest exploitation activity has increased further and shares similar tendencies as those of the first decade (Toto, 2018).

Figure 81. Forest land cover in Albania

Source: Corine, 2012

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Figure 82. Categories of land cover in Albania

Source: Corine, 2012 In order to protect forests and manage them sustainably, the government has revised several times the forest management law, to include also a 10-years moratorium on timber export approved in 2016. Institutionally speaking, a major change was the introduction of forests governance as an exclusive function of local governments in 2015, through the law no.139/2015, on local self-governance. As a result, to date, municipalities are responsible for the management of 82% of the forest area in Albania, 3% of forest land is privately owned, and 15% are forests classified as environmentally protected areas and are therefore managed by the ministry responsible for environment (Muharremaj et al., 2009); (National Agency of Protected Areas, 2015).

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Legally speaking, the national government does not recognise a regime of common forests governance, hence forests that are owned, or held, or governed in common by the communities that live nearby these forests. However, the research of Toto (2018) on forest commons governance shows that at least 30% of the local forests (those under the responsibility of municipalities) are governed through a system of common pool resources (CPR). This means that this portion of forests is ‘informally’ considered as a CPR and is therefore being governed as such. These forests are usually located on altitudes of 800-1200 meters above sea level, and adjacent to rural settlements (Toto, 2018).

This proximity factor is important in linking people to these forests for a number of reasons: i) Because forests are in a close distance to where people live, it is easier and feasible for communities to take care of the forest; ii) People value forests provisioning, regulatory and spiritual services. In fact, due to historical ties between families and forest properties located close to villages, the spiritual values are very important to families through generations (Toto, 2018). In order to receive all three types of services in the long term, the forest ecosystem should be resilient. People have enough traditional knowledge to be capable of making this reasoning and by living close to this ecosystem, people feel directly affected by its services. For instance, the inhabitants are aware that a healthy forest will protect them from erosion and floods, besides providing food for families and cattle. When forests are located in long distances to villages, which decrease direct benefits for the local population to a level of non-being perceived at all, people tend to ignore the forest; iii) Historically, in Albania before 1944, a portion of the forest land used to be governed in common and this was recognised in both customary laws and modern laws, the previous even stronger than the second (see (Gjeçovi, 1925) and (Ministria e Ekonomisë Kombëtare, 1930)). A practice of common pool resources for forest governance was established since a long time and people, though not owning these forests as full owners, had proprietary rights, as the term is defined by Elinor Ostrom and several other scholars who work on ownership systems for common pool resources.

Therefore the connection between people and forests’ ecosystems was consolidated and the CPR management practice for common forests was a normal routine. Historical ties were/are so strong and local population’s memory is so vivid, that currently, though forests CPRs have ceased to exist in legislation and have no formal institutional

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structures since more than 70 years, people expect it to be given the right to govern common forests and benefit from their services, the same way their families and relatives of the past generations did (Toto, 2018).

On the other hand, municipalities, lacking appropriate finances and human resources to manage forests, have ‘informally’ agreed to allow rural communities to manage forests as CPRs. Municipalities have the duty of conducting a number of general tasks such as production, protection and provision, consumption control, financing, coordination, monitoring and dispute resolution, and rulemaking, as defined by McGinnis 2011, but they are weak especially in regard to monitoring and control, as well as protection of the resource. This is due to lack of funds and presence of large territories, where limited human resources (in number) cannot exert their control on a daily basis. This leads to lack of information collection and dissemination and therefore lack of ability to enforce legislation. In absence of these key conditions for forest management, municipalities have ‘allowed’ or even ‘promoted’ the establishment of collective action entities that ‘informally’ manage forests and conduct all of the governance tasks as defined by McGinnis. Local communities have established internal sets of rules upon which each family takes care of its ‘share’ of common forests and all families together take care of monitoring (Toto, 2018). Besides this village level organisation, a number of more than 200 local forests associations exist, all acting on behalf of the local commoners and supporting (whenever possible) them financially. The National Forest Federation is the highest-level entity in this nested system of complex governance for forest resources and supports the lower levels/nodes in the polycentric system not only through projects and funds for forest management, but also with technical advice and especially lobbying and advocacy at the national policy-making level.

The forests’ CPR system of Albania is a fully decentralised one, characterised by a polycentric structure, where levels (hierarchically nested) and nodes (stakeholders in the net) have various degrees of power and decision-making across the territorial scales.

Commoners are usually bound to limit their powers within their local territories, while the forests associations coordinate activities among commoners at the level of administrative units (subdivisions of municipalities). The federation coordinates and cooperates with the associations and carries out a coordination and bridging role with the national government (mainly the ministry responsible on environment and the parliament). Commoners and local associations cooperate with the municipal officials.

This complex system of polycentric governance performs based on a set of internal

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rules, implementing requirements from the forests legislation, and in absence of a legal framework designed particularly for the sake of its activity. All critical factors for polycentric governance are fulfilled and the system is operational. The fact that forest commons are not recognised by law affects negatively two aspects: the degree in which this practice is implemented country wise, because it depends very much on the willingness of the municipal staff, on whether they would decide to cooperate with commoners or not; and the opportunity of the forest associations to access government funds for forest maintenance.

4. Territorial planning forums and networks Territorial planning is government function that is shared between local and national institutions. Municipalities are responsible at the local level to carry out territorial planning and development. Municipalities draft territorial plans (for both, their whole territory and for specific parts of it) and the local councils adopt them. However, local territorial plans that are comprehensive and address the whole territory are approved also by the National Territory Council. Therefore, final decision making for general (whole territory) local territorial planning rests with the national government. Besides this, the National Territory Planning Agency acts as a technical body that follows local planning work, provides advice in the process, and issues compliance acts (compliance with the legislation and national territorial plans), which function as a preliminary step for sending a plan to approval stages. Therefore, though NTPA is not a decision-making body, it has the authority and capacity to either lead local governments successfully towards finalisation, and approval planning processes, or objectively impose obstacles and limitations that delay approval.

The planning system resembles a pyramid scheme of decision-making. However, the legislation itself has foreseen for the involvement of various actors during the planning process, from initiation to decision-making, hence constitutionalising a network of territorial governance interactions. Informal stakeholders, such as communities and interest groups do not have the authority to make decisions. They can though influence decisions, either through pressures exerted along with their participation in the public hearings and working groups, or through the development power they may entail, such as in the case of developers and businesses that operate on a certain territory. On the one hand, the constitution of participatory planning in the legislation 72 is positive as it reveals the awareness that exists among stakeholders (especially the government institutions) on the need to discuss planning actions and products with beneficiaries and affected parties (Allkja, 2018). It also shows for “strength of formal institutions” and “level of centralised authority vested in governmental actors”, which

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affect the structure of polycentric governance (Berardo & Lubell, 2016, p.11). On the other hand, it suggests for rigidisation of the process, potential loss of ingenuity in the outcome of the participatory planning, higher chances for the process to be controlled and manipulated, and therefore lower independence in shaping the planning results and taking decisions (ibid). So far, one could list three cases of participatory planning mechanisms that are implemented in the multi-level network of spatial planning in Albania, following a system of rules accepted by actors in the network. There are other ad-hoc initiatives, which may improve the polycentricity of the governance system from one territory to the other, but the following mechanisms provide a nested system that is partially constitutionalised, and partially agreed by stakeholders themselves to improve their influencing power in the process: The Forum for Local Planning Coordination: This is a single forum established by NTPA with the participation of public institutions (local and national) that have a role and competencies over the territory in Albania. The aim is to promote strategic discussions and coordination between public institutions, therefore ensuring vertical cooperation.

Horizontal cooperation is partially achieved â&#x20AC;&#x201C; only among deconcentrated levels of public agencies, as this forum does not include other stakeholders besides public institutions. However, the participation of various ministries and related agencies guarantees that sectorial aspects and issues (vertical decisions) are addressed during territorial planning (horizontal coordination and decision-making over and on the territory).

Legally speaking, the forum has no rights of decision-making or conflict resolution. It simply serves as a platform of strategic discussion in the frame of multi-level governance for planning.

It is established by NTPA, and while the types of institutions remain unchanged in any planning process, there is variation of representatives, depending on the municipality and regional agencies that have competencies over a certain territory.

The forum was established as of 2015 during the formulation of the first territorial plans and is active at any time a planning initiative is in process. According to NTPA, During the 20162017 (as verified in NTPA webpage), a period which coincides with the launch of GLTPs drafting by the new municipalities (after the territorial reform), a total of 29 coordination forums have been organized with broad participation of representatives from the Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture Tourism and Environment, the Protected Area Administration Units, the Monument Institute, the Albanian Road Authority, etc.

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The local planning forum is established on voluntary basis in each municipality, promoted by the mayor and being functional for planning purposes. The municipal staff consults the territorial plan and other local planning initiatives at least with this forum, though it can also seek for other forms of citizen cooperation. The forum can and should legally be invited also for other policymaking initiatives at local level, such as strategic planning, annual and midterm budget planning, fiscal packages, and action plans for various local services.

The forum can remain totally informal as an initiative and citizens’ group, or can formalise a memorandum of understanding with the municipality. While the establishment of the forum is a requirement for municipalities when they undertake comprehensive territorial planning in their territories, formalisation and further cooperation is carried out only on voluntary basis for both parties. All 44 municipalities that have a plan approved in Albania till mid-2018, have a local planning forum as well. However, the forum is not equally active everywhere, depending on the level of citizens’ engagement, and on the open communication from the respective municipality. 16 municipalities out of 61 are currently drafting territorial plans and are therefore looking for citizens’ initiatives, which would lead towards the establishment of the local forums.

Citizen Advisory Panels (CAP): constitute so far one of the most prominent and well functioning mechanisms of direct participatory democracy at local level in Albania so far. It is a voluntary-based forum and builds on the experience of the citizen committees that were operational for a certain period in various municipalities during the years 2000 for purposes of strategic planning. CAP has an advisory role and has no decisionmaking power. It can though influence municipal council decision-making, as has often been the case in some municipalities (i.e. Kuçovë, etc.) depending on its organizational and networking strength. It has a comprehensive representation. It has played a role especially in planning processes, but also on budget and action planning at local level.

CAPs were established initially in 2012 through a USAID Program on Planning and Local Government in 15 municipalities: Berat, Burrel, Durrë, Elbasan, Fier, Kamza, Kashar, Korça, Kuçova, Lushnje, Paskuqan, Patos, Saranda, Vlora and Vora, based on the law no. 8652/2000 ‘On local governance organization and functioning’. These CAPs were readjusted to the new municipalities after the territorial reform of 2015. The model was replicated in 10 more municipalities, supported by other donors and in all of the municipalities that have drafted/approved a territorial plan (the local planning forum). The latter has happened on the basis of the decision of Council of Ministers no.

671/2015, ‘On the approval of the territorial planning regulation’.

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CAP participants include but do not limit to: representatives of local NGOs, youth, women and vulnerable groups, and media. There could also be proactive citizens that represent community and are not members of a specific thematic group. Each CAP has 15-25 members, with the exception of Kuçova, which has 40 participants. The latter is the most solid CAP and has its roots in the previous citizens committee established 20 years ago. More than 60% of the CAP coordinators were/are women. CAPs have also an internal regulation covering these aspects: agreement or acceptance by local government; criteria for becoming a member of CAP; identification of candidates for CAP; a group initiating workshop; election of the CAP coordinator; calendar of activities; rules for calling a meeting and for addressing local issues through position papers and other communication means.

Looking at the 6 critical factors for polycentric governance, territorial planning is positioned better compared to the several other sectors and initiatives, as it fulfils in part or completely all of the 6 criteria. However, the system is not fully decentralised and the authority is shared among actors at local and national levels, excluding local communities or informal institutions.

The management and approval structure is clear, with clearly defined sets of rules and in this structure, the informal institutions do not have the authority to impose their decisions; their role is limited to participation by hearing and influencing the design stage. There is a contradiction though resulting from the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;invisibleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; or indirect role that developers and powerful local businesses have on the planning decisions. They lobby to achieve their vested interests on the territory, by either negotiating or putting pressure on the municipality/NTPA. All these interactions are carried out in a nested system of stakeholders and networking relations clearly defined on the territory, where powers and authority are not equally shared but differ among participants.

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Figure 83. The polycentric network of institutional interactions in territory planning in Albania

Source: Author

3.5 Discussion 3.5.1 Territorial disparities and peripheralisation Ehrlich et al. (2015), emphasizing Beetz (2008), argue that peripheralisation is or can be defined as a phenomenon, in which actors and institutions lose their capacities to act, and therefore become unable to undertake policies and actions that make their communities and places prosperous. Indicators wise, this could result in less employment, less governance capacities and quality, less education opportunities, higher school drop rates or les enrolment, lower GDP and GVA, etc. but not [necessarily] into fewer or lower quality of natural territorial resources (if the latter are present in the territory). All this adds to the question on whether peripheralisation is imposed and/or induced over a territory, or it happens internally by being or gradually becoming an inherent feature of the respective place and community.

So, if a territory consists of valuable endogenous resources, then to what extent and in what way do the respective institutions (including communities) and networks play a role in how resources are used to make the place/s better off? If the networks are loose and institutions weak, most probably they will not be able to make proper use of the resources, by unsustainably exploiting them, or ignoring their protection. Hence, if a

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territory has plenty of unique resources, and still is peripheral or lagging behind in terms of social and economic development, this might be, at least partially, due to weak local institutions (including communities). The weakness could be witnessed in both, low internal knowledge and capacity to benefit from resources, but also in the application of top-down policies (from the government) that instead of removing development constraints do impose them on certain places at the advantage of other places.

So, in a way or the other the governments have the purpose, or the tendency to focus their efforts and support exclusively on large cities, rather than pursuing place-based development and “tailor policies to local needs and opportunities, while taking into account higher level goals and priorities” (Dijkstra et al., 2013, p.349). This is affected by political power and dynamics, but also implemented under the efficiency argument.

Following on this, Dijkstra et al. (2013) emphasise further that development policies should not focus merely on large cities, because the aggregate gains driven by urban regions when assessed versus potential aggregate gains driven by secondary and smaller regions, may not necessarily result the most beneficial on a societal scale. This depends a lot on the value system used as a reference when costs and benefits are assessed. After all, size is not a good predictor for growth (ibid), neither it is a positive factor in favour of prosperity, as territorial disparities and polycentrism empirical findings often tend to show (chapters above).

While striving for cohesion and enhanced growth and competitiveness, it is crucial to get an understanding of the places’ features and create territorial typologies, which lead the stakeholders towards relevant and functional policies for achieving the aim. The knowledge on typologies is crucial, as different policies have different impacts on the territory and policies learn from the territory. The territory, in its entirety, does not change, but the aggregation of its parts into regions (for as broad as the term ’region’ may be) according to different criteria and aims, leads to different territorial and socioecological constructs, which should not be underestimated, or ignored.

Unfortunately, this knowledge is lacking in Albania, or is being ignored, and leaders with better connections, or more political power and authority push for short-sighted policies that are usually assumed to satisfy the majority of voters. The latter may also sound reasonable at first, but in Albania, more than half of the population is concentrated in the Tirana-Durrës areas, where territorial resources are becoming more and more scarce and environmental pollution is increasingly growing to be the major concern for citizens (see the disparities analysis in section 3.3). On the other hand, the

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Albanians who live in rural areas, and in more peripheral or lagging urban centres, are close to territorial resources, but yet unable to use them.

Concentration of development policies in one single place, has not resulted so far as sustainable in Albania because: i) the governments have merely benefited from the positive effects of agglomeration economies. A logical reasoning on how sustainability objectives can be pursued by taking into consideration the territory at large and the resilience of the Tirana-Durrës metropolitan area is in the best of cases bypassed by the authorities; ii) Albania’s peripheralisation is strengthened and made visible through territorial disparities, which exist at different levels; iii) the country has a highly monocentric territorial structure, low national and regional competitiveness and low cohesion.

In more concrete terms, territorial typologies that build on disparities are constructed based on the following findings: 1) As both, the disparities and the polycentricity analyses show there are two territorial typologies where disparities are most severe and persistent: i) between urban and rural areas. Till 2015 (before the territorial and administrative reform) when possible in terms of data and indicators, the disparities analysis was conducted on the level of local government units, which were municipalities and communes – 373 units. The fact that municipalities were urban and communes were rural was very useful in informing about the urban and rural disparities. Clearly the previous disparities analyses (2009) showed for high disadvantages of the rural areas versus the urban ones. When indicators were aggregated at qark level, the disparities among qarks would decrease significantly, therefore hiding the situation that was present at the more granulated context. Similarly, as currently there are only 61 municipalities and their territories are a mixture of urban, rural, agriculture land and natural resources, disparities artificially decrease again.

Hence disparities between the 61 municipalities are less pronounced than disparities between the 373 territories of the former local governments; ii) between Tirana and the rest of qarks/municipalities/FUAs. In more than 90% of the indicators considered in the analysis, Tirana (as a FUA, qark, and municipality) holds an outstanding position compared to other qarks. Tirana appears as an outlier in graphs and tables by ‘artificially’ increasing national averages (in positive and negative indicators), and appropriating most of the attention and financial and human resources.

2) Disparities between municipalities and especially between rural and urban areas are higher than between qarks and have increased further (Toska & Gjika, 2018).

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Indicators on demography, accessibility, environmental pollution, territorial structure, and local finances provide the basis for this argument, in a context where disaggregated data for the other indicators are missing. INSTAT’s analysis of poverty provides as well insights on differences between urban and rural areas. The poverty data are not recent, but based on the consistency of values over years for the other indicators it is assumed that poverty divergences remain unchanged as well.

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With the current territorial reform (61 municipalities instead of 373 local governments) 55% of the population lives in 10 municipalities. The analysis of population data shows that those municipalities that were the largest before the reform, have remained so after the reform as well (Toska & Gjika, 2018). Similarly, Toska and Gjika (2018) inform that the % of investments in the large municipalities has increased; and at country level only 27% of the financial resources in average are from own revenues; and the municipal debt remains on very significant levels.

Hence the recent territorial rescaling has produced new and more territorial complexities in absence of sufficient financial and capacities support to achieve its aim, and in a context where proximity to voters/citizens has decreased, and dependency on national decision-making has increased. This all seems to be leading towards stronger monocentricity of the territorial structure and less cohesion, in opposite to the objectives of the territorial and decentralisation reforms, as stated by the government.

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Rural areas are uniformly distributed all over the country and their typology varies in terms of population, economic activity and especially accessibility and topography. Accessibility issues become strongly evident for the mountainous areas, where distance to urban centres is significant and geographical isolation is present.

In the case of rural areas of the coastal plain in the west, in the qarks of Fier, Shkodër, Lezhë, and Tiranë, dependency on urban centres (especially for services and employment) and presence of activities (mostly agriculture and to a lower degree tourism) are key factors in defining peripherality. The previous areas include in some cases (in the southeast Albania) also coastal regions. In the case of the mountainous regions, inner peripherality is defined mostly by poor access to services and regional centres, high rate of depopulation and abandonment of settlements, and to a certain degree also by a depleting process taking place in regard to previous industries and economic activities. However, these areas do not suffer from lack of important natural resources, and are not transitory areas located

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between centralities with high economic potential. In this case, long distance and difficulties in mobility play the key role in defining peripherality.

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However, the regions located in the west plain are typically areas with (really or perceived) low levels of economic potentials, not because of geographical location (though transportation as a service is relatively inadequate) rather than because of poor access to services of general interest and single land use dominance (mostly housing). They also have low levels of economic performance and in several cases, this is linked to insufficient human resources, closure of important industries, poor governance structures, or presence of economic activities that exploit territorial resources (such as the case for Fier) but with very low returns for the locality or the local community.

3. Disparities among the qarks (excluding Tirana) are not very high. Of course, there are divergences, mainly for GDP and GVA, population data and pollution factors. In the case of GDP and GVA the factors that stand behind divergences are related to size (population) and the territorial structure in terms of land use (agriculture, versus urban – industrial development and versus forests). For instance, GDP (total and per capita) has constantly been higher in Tirana, Fier, Durrës, where most of the population and activities are concentrated. The same qarks have the highest contribution in GVA formation, with Tirana notably exceeding the other two qarks. This is related to the strong position that Fier holds in agriculture and industry, Tirana holds in all of the other sectors (but industry), and Durrës holds in all sectors as well but at lower levels compared to Tirana. From an environmental perspective though, the picture is reversed, with peripheral qarks (Dibër, Kukës, Korçë, Berat, Gjirokastër) scoring notably better compared to the metropolitan area Tiranë-Durrës. Again, this is related to the pressure from population and services, and industrial activities in the central qarks. Hence, it reinforces the above argument that the larger Albanian cities benefit from agglomeration economies, not from sustainable policies of development, while the lagging regions, because of non-activity, experience pressures in forest resources and fisheries (informal exploitation), but otherwise do not experience pollution from human activities.

4. Albania has qarks and areas (municipalities and/or urban centres) with territorial specificities and unique features, which are the least favoured, regardless of the development potential (in terms of natural resources) that they possess. After all, disparities do not reflect the presence of resources and/or potential, rather than a picture

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of the reality of territorial development performance. Hence as analysed above, regions with abundant natural resources (forests and pastures, minerals and mines, water resources) such as for instance Dibër, Kukës, Gjirokastër, Berat, etc., are less developed than Tiranë, Durrës or Fier. The potential for economic development – in terms of resources, hence specific features, is found in the peripheral and lagging regions, instead of the central ones.

This is strongly related to the demographic changes (migration) and urbanisation path followed by Albania after 1990, leading to displacement of population towards the central regions in search for better services. Hence people moved away from resources to go closer to services. As people constitute a valuable resource per se, this movement (unplanned and unguided by development policies) resulted in the detachment between workforce and territorial resource, and as a result reduction of opportunities for more economic activities and more respective diversity. These shifts in economic regime explain (to a certain extent) also the current distribution of economic sectors and high dependence on services, transportation, construction, and administrative activities.

Exception is the agriculture sector, where the territorial resource (land), human resources and other related services and activities are all located in the same area, and in the coastal plain. What is considered an advantage (the location) for the efficient development of the agriculture sector, constitutes also a disadvantage. Most of the informal housing of the last 30 years is developed on agriculture land, leading to land fragmentation (reducing efficiency, average farm size 1.5 ha) and reduction by more than 40% (leading to low productivity) (Toto, 2018).

This mismatch that exists in the location of the human resources and economic activities vis-à-vis territorial resources has negative effects on both types of regions: the central and more developed ones on one side and the peripheral and lagging ones on the other. Tirana for instance may experience development in terms of some economic indicators (GDP, employment, etc.), but is pursuing negative scenarios in terms of environmental sustainability and social development. Its growth leads to further occupation of the surrounding agricultural land, (implying a bigger ecological footprint), increased pollution, higher prices due to land [development] market speculation, and therefore also greater social imbalances. Tirana has so far an unsustainable development model of frontier economics, with little, if not at all, regard on the negative pressures over environment and social integration. Furthermore, in order to sustain its growth economically, Tirana needs the rest of the country’s

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resources and it needs resilient models for their exploitation. But, if population and productions activities are concentrated in Tirana only, this connection to the rest of the country is not only possible; on the contrary it will produce further unsustainable exploitation effects for the natural resources over Albania.

5. Exploring disparities among the four development regions is not so worthy from a solely domestic perspective, but is necessary when comparisons between regions are made on a European scale, especially in case these 4 development regions or their aggregates will be deployed as NUTS II regions. The high level of territorial integration leads to invisibility of disparities. The only important finding is that region 2 composed of Tiranë, Durrës and Dibër qarks represents the same situation as Tirana and Durrës versus the other qarks. Being one of the most disadvantageous qarks, Dibër affects region 2 figures to a certain extent, but it does not significantly lower them. In fact, this might bear risks for Dibër when project funds are considered on the basis of the four regions’ performance. The notable dominance of Tiranë and Durrës could be a factor in less funds being transferred to region 2 and therefore less benefits for Dibër. Of course, the distribution of funds will depend not solely on the disparities, but also on the policy that the government will chose to use for fostering territorial development.

An attempt is made below to categorise qarks based on the disparities’ analysis. It is not possible to group qarks by considering all of the indicators, due to especially factors analysed above in relation to peripherality and territorial specificities. Hence, some qarks are doing well in terms of economic indicators, but are scoring low in the case of environmental indicators. In general, the disparities analysis shows positive correlations among all social and economic indicators, and negative correlation with the environmental indicators. Accessibility indicators have a mixed correlation with the other indicator groups. In such circumstances it is possible to group indicators for constructing typologies in two major groups: socio-economic development or disparities and environmental disparities and territorial structures. In the case of socioeconomic development, qarks are grouped as follows: -

Best performer: Tirana Good development potential: Fier, Durrës, Elbasan, Vlorë Low development: Korçë, Shkodër Highly disadvantageous: Lezhë, Kukës, Berat, Gjirokastër, Dibër.

In the case of environmental disparities and territorial structures, qarks are grouped as follows:

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-

Metropolitan area, high pollution and environmental risks: Tiranë and Durrës The central area, medium level pollution and significant environmental risks: Shkodër, Lezhë and Fier The transitory territories, mixed pollution levels low to medium and environmental risks: Vlorë, Korçë, Gjirokastër, Elbasan The peripheral territories, low pollution, presence of environmental risks: Dibër, Kukës and Berat.

Figure 84. Regions’ (qark) typologies based on disparities (socio-economic development)

Source: Author, based on disparities’ analysis

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Figure 85. Regionsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (qark) typologies based on disparities (territorial and environmental performance)

Source: Author, based on disparitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; analysis The above classification is made on the basis of indicators at qark level and it does not represent a categorization that would results if indicators were grouped at municipality level. For instance Elbasan city has a very good access to the areas with high GDP and population as a result of territorial proximity and good infrastructural connection.

However, the rest of the qark, which is highly mountainous in territorial structure, has very low access. On the other hand, Elbasan city is highly polluted due to inherited and current industrial pollution and is at high risk of floods and riverbanks erosion. The mountainous area is environmentally clean, but forests are at a high risk of informal exploitation and forest fires. Hence the qark presents a mixed territorial situation. As

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an analysis of all indicators at qark level â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;hidesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; territorial disparities, a regional classification on the basis of qark may also be insufficient in directing development strategies and rescaling policies and processes. Hence, once again the need for analysing disparities at lower territorial scales (municipalities and urban and rural areas) becomes evident. The following INSTAT maps, prepared on the basis of population census 2011 provide a more granulated net of territorial typologies. Perhaps, disparities indicators could be analysed for this scale and for each typology.

Figure 86. Territorial typologies based on local governments territorial specificities prior to the administrative and territorial reform

Source: (INSTAT, 2014/a) (INSTAT, 2014/b)

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3.5.2 Polycentrism in Albania In this research, polycentrism in Albania is discussed in terms of both, territorial polycentrism and polycentric governance, looking at potential convergences, or present divergences. This is done in relation to economic development and disparities. The latter are present at all territorial levels and are high among municipalities and between urban and rural areas. But as the territorial polycentricity shows, disparities are significantly pronounced between the functional urban areas (FUA) as well. FUAs, as Brezzi and Veneri (2015, p.1) recap, â&#x20AC;&#x153;are spaces where people live and work, and where the bulk of economic interdependencies takes placeâ&#x20AC;?. This means that also governance related interactions are expected to be focused mostly on these areas, considering governance, as Keating (2013) explains, as both, a set of rules and regulations upon which socio-economic interactions are pursued, and as mechanisms and ways for problem solving or to respond to the needs of the citizens and improve their welfare.

The latter meaning of governance especially is linked to the objective of achieving cohesive growth on the territory, which matches the objective of territorial polycentricity for promoting convergence of growth and competitiveness on one side with a balanced, cohesive, and equitable development opportunities for regions on the other.

As discussed in the theoretical chapter, some scholars argue that, based on empirical evidence, polycentric territorial structures and functional relations are not always necessary or sufficient, to achieve cohesive growth on the territory at and between all territorial scales. There are cases that support and oppose this argument, which shows that more research is needed to define the success of territorial polycentricity. It was also argued theoretically, that it is often the governance modes, operating at different territorial scales with stakeholders interacting among them in/through nested and complex networks, that are able and/or needed to grasp the territorial specificities and make proper use of human interactions with resources and the territory. This leads to cohesive growth in the sense of problem solving as mentioned above. These governance modes, moving between strong centralization and strong decentralization and network governance, are complemented or preceded by territorial rescaling. Rescaling happens as a mean to support governments achieving their objectives, including those of power and authority, such as for instance the territorial administrative reform undertaken by the government of Albanian in 2015. However, rescaling happens also in the presence of governance interactions that do not have rescaling as an objective and should

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therefore be accounted for in governance approaches. Example to this is the governance of natural commons, such as the forest and pastures in Albania, analysed in the previous sections.

Böhme et al. state that governance arrangements are context-dependent and their effectiveness depend on the actors’ capacity to adjust to the institutional context and influence its modifications. In the view of this statement, forest commons governance in Albania is a very genuine bottom-up process, based on traditional ties and knowledge of the forest communities, and on the pragmatic need of local institutions to find mechanisms that support them in carrying out their tasks, in a context of diminishing or missing financial and human resources. Legislation does not formally recognise this form of governance, which however, in the Albania’s empirical reality, produces sustainable and balanced results and is characterised by interactions borne within a nested polycentric system, which has a territorial representation. The latter is to be considered. Of course this does not mean that a territorial administrative reform, which reflects forest commons boundaries should be carried out. However, the networkgovernance model of forest commons should be reinforced because: i) it is a model with proven efficient results on the territory; ii) and it has a territorial extent that should be recognised legally, because it impacts the competences of local governments, regardless of their territorial boundaries.

Hence, governance approaches lead also to ‘unintended’ territorial rescaling. In polycentric territorial governance territory has fuzzy boundaries (Faludi, 2016); (Finka & Kluvankova, 2015); (Finka & Kluvankova-Oravska, 2010). A number of studies on polycentric governance do not even refer to the territory, because of being mostly concerned with the network interactions among the stakeholders and other factors, such as institutional rules and distribution of the decision-making power between actors. For others though, territory is a key discussion, because, i) any model of institutional framework that represents polycentric governance entails property relations – the latter being always materialised on territorial resources, ii) polycentric governance comes as an alternative to the large regional government that is supposed to take over / carry out several tasks, with the purpose of achieving services and development efficiency over the territory (see for instance Ostroms’ work, Aligica and Tarko (2012), Araral and Hartley (2013), Ramiro (2016), McGinnis (2011), etc.), and iii) networking and cooperation, which is paramount in polycentric governance, is characterised by “territorial proximity between stakeholders, regardless of whether the physical

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perimeter is fixed and permanent or it is fuzzy and flexible” (ESPON, 2018b, p.3) and actions situations are adjacent to one another by mutually influencing each other’s performance and values (McGinnis, 2011) on this territory defined by physical proximities.

Finally, each stakeholder has a territorial interest, which is materialised on territorial resources. The scale may be different in each case, but the collection of similar interests, or of different interests that affect the same territorial resource (for instance energy production through different alternatives implemented within the same ecosystem, or use of one water system – resource for various interests such as energy, irrigation, drinking, and protection of biodiversity) establishes a territorial scale, which will be the object of polycentric governance. The network of several actors, or the multitude of several decision-making centres within a network has therefore also a territorial representation. The more complex is the network, or the more layers it has, the more overlaying territorial scales are present, and the fuzzier are the boundaries of this territorial representation, leading to dynamic rescaling processes that are continuously modified to represent purposes and interactions.

Figure 87. Sample of ‘fuzzy strips’ in the Albanian territorial context – Fier Municipality

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Source: Author In the case of the ‘Urban Revival’ program, ‘100+ Villages’ program and participatory spatial planning in Albania, one can observe how, when moving from one case to the other (in the sequence provided), the multi-level interaction between stakeholders changes from hierarchical and with low decision-making powers for the local government levels, to more decentralised and self-regulated (aka network like). Still, even in the case of participatory planning, some decision-making centres are more powerful than others. The real network governance is observed in the case of forest commons. In each case, new levels of actions (Keating, 2013) emerge continuously, but the multi-level governance arrangement has different degrees of decision-making autonomy for different levels. As a result, the polycentric system in each case has a different territorial representation.

In the case of the ‘Urban Revival’ and ‘100+ Villages’, the model of multi-level governance that is used to implement the program, delivers efficient results at the national scale, making Albania better off on an aggregate level, or improving its competitiveness versus other countries in the region. However, looking at the lower territorial levels (regions, municipalities, urban-rural areas, etc.), the chosen governance system leaves local stakeholders out of the decision-making scheme. They are involved in a hierarchic polycentric network, which more than polycentric is multilevels, due to entailing several levels and various stakeholders with powers; but most of them have powers that are of an influential nature, not approval ones. In these circumstances, regardless of where the various projects are implemented, decisionmaking power and development growth remain concentrated territorially speaking.

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Both programs, though assessment of results is yet to happen, do not seem to have much of an impact on cohesive territorial growth and development, rather than tend to improve overall national development indicators (i.e. total of local infrastructure investments, construction industry – developers are not from the local areas).

However, in the case of the participatory spatial planning, and more so in the case of forest commons, because governance is implemented through self-regulating networks, the development’s result is territorially more balanced. Resilience and sustainability increase at various territorial levels (forests ecosystems across the country), and local economic growth is reported at better levels for different municipalities after territorial plans are approved and implementation has started (Allkja et al., 2018).

The territorial polycentricity analysis provides similar results to the polycentric governance analysis. It is noticeable from the previous analysis that Albania, as a country has a monocentric spatial structure. It has gained this feature especially in the last 28 years, because the spatial structure was more balanced prior to 1990. The economic structure was balanced as well, though the instruments to keep it so were not sustainable and were based on command and control, instead of democratic governance mechanisms and functional relations shaped within polycentric decision making. To date, population and GDP (hence economic activities) are concentrated in the metropolitan area of Tiranē-Durrës region, leading to an outstandingly high size index of 97 (in fact the highest compared to the 27 EU countries for which the analysis was conducted in 2005). This is the direct result of lack of national and local policies that guide development in the territory by ensuring both growth and cohesion. Due to the inherent antagonism that exists between competitiveness and cohesion, as well as in a context of total socio-economic, political regime and governance shift, in principle one would not typically expect Albania to become a polycentric country from a territorial perspective. Hence, the fact of moving from a state of total control over population location and mobility to a state of free movement in lack of policy guidance was expected to produce new territorial constructs and settlements’ concentrations with a very diverse structure.

However, figures go beyond any prediction. To date, Albania is confronted with a relocation of more than 2/3 of its population in one single location, leading to formation of agglomeration economies and a new metropolis, and to a tendency of human capacities draining from remote rural areas to qark centres, and from urban and adjacent rural settlements to Tiranë-Durrës. The latter endorses (as defined in the disparities

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analysis) sustainability failures in economy, environment and social development.

Institutional fragmentation, weak governance mechanisms, absence of unified spatial planning for a very long-time, inadequate legislation (Su et al., 2017) political struggles, and state capture are the underlying causes of these failures and of challenges that regions, including the metropolis, have to face.

Accessibility of, within, and among regions (FUAs) and connectivity among them is also quite low for most of the regions, and is imbalanced. Albania has a connectivity index of 72.2 that ranks it as 6th in the list of 28 countries (EU 27 + Albania). This index is linked to the accessibility that each FUA has on GDP and population (of other FUAs) and, in a context where size index is extremely high and Tirana as a centrality is substantially visible (also physically), it is to be expected that a significant territorial monocentricy would prevail also for the accessibility index.

Connectivity as related to communication is also lagging behind. Regardless of investments made in road infrastructures, especially during 2005-2013, the national network is incomplete and favouring mostly the inner part of Tiranë-Durrës area, with moderate to low connections with the rest of the country. Hence, all mountainous areas and inner peripheries located in the north, south and east connect to Tiranë, Rinas airport and Durrës port in more than 2 hours travel time by road transport. Exception in this group is made for Kukës city and the villages located along the Tiranë-KukësMorinë highway, which have direct exits to the motorway. Settlements located in the qarks of the west (Shkodër, Lezhë, Durrës, Tiranë, Fier, and Vlorë) can reach these destinations in 2 hours or less, as long as they are located in the non-mountainous territories of the qark. The same is for Elbasan. In general, good access to motorways’ exits is limited to settlements located just along the national corridors (Shkodër – Vlorë, Durrës – Kukës, and Elbasan-Tiranë). So, inhabitants who live in mountainous villages, though close to the corridors in aerial distance, take often 2-3 or even more hours to reach a motorway exit.

The connectivity situation as discussed above is very much related also to the current radial layout of the network of national roads. Hence, all corridors go through Tirana reinforcing territorial monocentricity also for mobility layout. For instance, there are no direct highway connections between qark centres of Korçë, Kukës and Dibër – all located along the eastern border of Albania, or from Korçë to Gjirokastër and to Vlorë.

Furthermore, while construction of new roads improves travel times, it affects accessibility of FUAs to GDP and population for some of the FUAs, but not for all of

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them. And then again, due to the road network layout, concentration of population and economic activities in Tiranë, and lack of cohesive development policies across the country, the accessibility of other qarks to Tiranë-Durrës area is high, but is only oneway. This reinforces further the strong position of the Tiranë-Durrës area and weakens the position of other urban centres, such as Kukës, Korçë, Peshkopi, Berat, and Gjirokastër. In the long run this may not result as positive for Tiranë-Durrës as well, due to missing economic exchange between areas with natural resources and areas with human resources.

Thus, new roads should be built as these will improve communication and decrease travel times further, which will contribute to higher efficiency in economic activities.

But this will also lead to more commuting to Tirana. The latter should be an issue of concern and should be carefully assessed for optimum levels between commuting and distribution of economic activity and population across the territory. Hence, infrastructure networks strategies should not happen in the vacuum of economic development policies. On the contrary they should complement national and regional development policies and vice-versa. While connectivity should improve to bring people faster and closer to [current] activities and recourses, other actions should be undertaken to promote development within areas, even the more remote ones, as long as this is reasonable for resilience and sustainability.

In some locations, such as the case of Korçë and Gjirokastër, poor communication with Tirana is to some extent counterbalanced by enhanced communication (economic exchange) with cross border areas in Greece. It still takes for the core urban settlements of both qarks 3.5 to 4.5 hours to reach Tirana and less than 2 hours to connect with Ioannina or Thessaloniki. While this may be positive for local development, and it provides evidence of good cross border cooperation with neighbouring regions, it does not contribute much to the national accounts, because of isolation of these border areas from the current economic engine of the country (Tiranë-Durrës area).

Location wise, a reverse picture is depicted, with a location index of 28 (notably low – hence positive), ranking Albania as second in the list, just after Norway with 22 (in 2005). This index of location is due to the current balanced distribution of [potential] urban centres (qark centres and FUAs centres) across the national territory as a result of the socio-economic policies and territorial politics of the state during the centralised economy of the socialist system. During 1945-1989, the government would regularly prepare central economic development plans every 5 years, resulting in the emergence

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of new economic activities (mining, hydropower plants, industries, etc.) and subsequently on related territorial restructuring. Hence new settlements were created from time to time in order to bring workforce closer to the resources and economic activities. Similarly, the existing historical centres were continuously reinforced with location of industries and the transfer of the workforce (various professions) to economic centres and to services. This was made in parallel with the decision to distribute services equally over the territory and bring them closer to citizens in a deconcentration scheme (Aliaj et al., 2014); (Toto, 2010/b).

In order to achieve this balanced distribution of territorial structures, the government was implementing two key policies: controlled population movement and [re]location; and subsidies for controlled and centralised regional development (Shutina et al., 2016); (Toto, 2010/a); (Aliaj et al., 2014). Because of these policies, in 1990 Albania had a polycentric network of territorial structures, with urban and rural nodes of various sizes and complementary activities and with potential for further empowerment. However, the socio-economic and political change, together with governance shifts, did merely not consider at all this inherited socio-ecological and territorial structure, which was not wisely used by authorities and people after 1990 to build a more cohesive economy.

Instead, because of belonging to the so much hated centralised regime legacy, it was neglected, regardless of its potential for the future. However, the major historical centres (FUA centres) remain present on the territory and though in high misbalance with Tirana, constitute still key territorial elements that could potentially contribute to more cohesion and growth, and polycentricity, if regional policies and territorial rescaling with polycentric governance would be implemented and would make use of the advantages that these centres and the surrounding settlements offer through their territorial specificities. The proximity of some of these centres to each other and their location within the coastal plain increases the potential of territorial polycentricity for some inner peripheries as well, such as Peqin, CĂŤrrik, Belsh, Roskovec and the area in between. This area could become a future centrality due to the current overlay between FUAs and their potential integration areas. This potential centrality does not suffer from poor connectivity, but has low access to markets and services of general interest and low human resources.

However, the potential territorial polycentricity as depicted above has to confront two types of challenges. First, what territorially (morphologically) seems as a viable option (because of location and access to high GDP and employment basins) should also be

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complemented with socio-economic activities that attract people to these inner peripheries and promote growth. Second, the presence of these socio-economic activities will increase only if people are engaged into economic interactions where they also have the power for decision-making (at different levels and through different mechanisms), which will increase the potential for polycentric governance. The latter would entail several self-regulating actions and rules (maybe also overlapping ones, especially territorially) through which, people and institutions make decisions that are more sustainable in the long run and contribute to the resiliency of their socioecological systems.

3.5.3 Regionsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; typologies in Albania â&#x20AC;&#x201C; an empirical spatial classification Territories are inherently present in socio-ecological systems by affecting interactions or being changed by them. Territorial structures are often contested, changed, and then contested again in a never-ending process of territorial rescaling, where institutions and their governance shifts migrate to newer levels (Keating, 2013). As all human activities happen on the territory, the latter is a crucial dimension of institutional interactions and therefore of the related development and governance processes (Shutina & Toto, 2017).

There is a continuous dynamic in the representation of the territory, which is often visualised through territorial typologies. The various territorial constructs are built on views that support either spatial determinism (regardless of the criteria being used), or territories as meres social constructs where boundaries and or territorial characteristics play no role and societal results are usually reduced to other (social) factors (Keating, 2013). Nevertheless, whether completely fuzzy and invisible, or strong spatial determinants, territories contain a number of ecological features (often made known to people in the form of ecosystem services), which make them unique and strongly define how socio-ecological interactions are shaped in a given territory. As humans are in constant search for goods and services from ecosystems, hence making use (sustainably or not) of natural territorial resources, or affecting their resilience through human interventions, the spatial definition or designation of the territory is not be ignored and development policies should not be territorially-blind.

As it was discussed in chapter 2, there are several territorial typologies and are always defined for specific purposes. In any case, there has been always a need for generating new or systematic knowledge, in order to supply an evidence-base for the formation of new policies or the implementation of current ones. This was in fact supported also by

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the empirical findings in the territorial rescaling processes undertaken in Albania during 1992-2016. Due to these territorial rescaling attempts and/or results, a number of different territorial typologies have emerged, which reflect different development outcomes and different institutional organisations and governance models. Based on Keating (2013), the Albaniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rescaling model (represented in the following territorial typologies) will be discussed along three dimensions: functional, political and institutional and in various initiatives and for various purposes.

In the case of implementation of the territorial and administrative reform in 2015 rescaling was made under the argument that the proper or the right spatial scale with the optimal population threshold (Keating, 2013) for local government services and functions has to be found and assigned to municipalities, so that the high level of territorial fragmentation is avoided (GoA, 2014/a); (GoA, 2014/b). In order to fulfil this objective, the government defined a set of criteria: the functional area, the distance from the centre of each municipality to the rest of its territory, population thresholds, territorial continuity, and historical ties. It also made it clear that these criteria will not apply in the case of ethnic minorities (GoA, 2014/a).

However, the basic claim was that of revising territorial boundaries in order to increase the efficiency of local governments performance. Of course this was the initiating argument, because as the process itself showed on the way, the systems of governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; functions and services [should] operate at different territorial scales in order to reach efficiency. The government itself did not follow the criteria by the book. In most of the cases, the principle of the functional area was complied with, but in other important cases it was discarded.

For instance, the water supply system may and it often requires a different territorial scale from that of waste management, or administration of schools. The efficiency of the water supply service is very much related to the location and distribution of the water resources vis-Ă -vis the settlements and the location of population. Because of this reason, experts and actors who are active in water management have constantly asked for regionalization of water resources management for water supply purposes. This is regionalization of the service, and it is different from a comprehensive territorial reform on government regionalization, as well as it does not coincide with the boundaries of the river basins.

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Figure 88. Water supply enterprises versus municipal boundaries and river basins boundaries

Source: Prepared by author based on AKUK, 2019 In the case of waste management, the scale of the service will depend a lot on the efficiency gains of waste transportation to transfer stations and final treatment sites.

Hence the distance to sites will define the model of waste management based on economic efficiency. Similarly, a municipality will decide (based on efficiency gains) on whether to build new schools in remote rural areas, or increase the quality and number of public transportation lines to bring pupils to schools in more central locations.

Hence, the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;basinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; of the service users/beneficiaries is different in each case. Aiming

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for an area size, which encompasses all of the different service users’ basins, may lead towards mega regions and large government structures, as those described by Vincent Ostrom in 1960s and 1970s that are not effective and move away from the subsidy principle, due to increased distance between government institutions and citizens, but also due to the large fuzzy strip/area of the core region (see figure no. 87).

Figure 89. Administrative boundaries in Albania: 373 local government units (prior 2015), 61 municipalities and 12 qarks

Source: Government of Albania, TAR, 2015 Furthermore, any territorial reform has a political factor behind. In the case of Albania there were multiple political factors. One was for instance the ‘influence’ over future elections’ results, by constructing boundaries that either concentrate into one territory or fragment in space populations with distinct political positions. A typical example is the separation made between the municipality of Tiranë and that of Kamëz (situated north of Tirana), though territorially speaking both municipalities function as one

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continuous structure, hence being part of the same Functional Urban Area. Another political factor was the issue of ethnic minorities. These minority populations had for the last 60 years been territorially integrated with Albanian ethnic population. Therefore, ethnic minorities’ settlements were part of ‘mixed’ local government territories.

However, with the latest territorial reform, two new municipalities were established, inhabited by ethnic minorities (only or primarily). This was done under the commitments undertaken by the government vis-à-vis the European Union to prepare and implement a law on minorities, which gives them full rights in managing their territories, electing government structures represented by the respective ethnic population, conducting education in their schools in the respective ethnic language, etc.

To date, these municipalities have very small territories compared to the neighbouring local governments and consist mainly of rural areas and grouping of small rural settlements.

The administrative and territorial and decentralization reforms undertaken in Albania in 2015 and 2016 did not pursue (Dhrami & Gjika, 2018) the principle of balancing between structures and funding of development activities (ESPON, 2017). The process was characterized by a lack of development vision, which would be necessary to balance between government’s restructuring and capacity building on one side and funding development actions on the other (Dhrami & Gjika, 2018); (Toska & Gjika, 2018). The national government pursued restructuring actions that were aiming at [re]centralizing the power, rather than purging inefficiencies and strengthening local governments’ capacities. Dhrami and Gjika (2018, p.30) report that the regional development fund (RDF), “the most relevant funding mechanism for capital investments in local and regional infrastructure” is revised annually through the state budget law hence being unpredictable and unrelated to a long-term development program and to a multi-annual financial framework. One should keep in mind that with the current decentralization reform, RDF has increased significantly (merging in one investment fund, expenditures that were previously made by ministries separately) and constitutes a key basket for municipalities to benefit from.

The territorial reform of the 2015 is, as a matter of fact, the latest milestone in the series of territorial rescaling efforts of two decades. Initially, soon after 1990, Albania conducted rescaling on purely political basis in compliance with the governance decentralization reform, which was initially based on political criteria. The functional and institutional approaches were taken on board only after 1999, with the approval a

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full-fledge decentralization strategy, the inclusion of qark (the second tier of local government) in the constitution, and with a new law on territorial and administrative boundaries. Regionalisation attempts were made, on the basis of various stakeholdersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; claims and criteria, such as efficiency and economy of scales and historical identities, etc., but were never concluded. As a result, the subsidiarity principle â&#x20AC;&#x201C; that of bringing services at the most appropriate institutional level and closer to the citizens, was not fully achieved.

The political stakeholders did not consider rescaling at regional level in early 2000s, because it was deemed as too early to accomplish such an ambitious objective, in a context where stakeholders and institutions were not mature enough to deal with decentralization at local level, let alone at regional level (Toto, 2010/a). This in fact led to a loss of momentum, because at the end of the decade, stakeholders agreed that it was too late deal with regionalisation (ibid). Power dynamics and development contexts had evolved in such a way that political actors and authorities were merely not willing to reopen e territorial rescaling debate, which in reality would consist of power and authority rescaling. By deferring the discussion on rescaling at regional level in 2000 to a further moment without any indication of timing, Albania lost the opportunity to test and assess the links between regional government (as part of the decentralization reform) and regional development (a reform often initiated, but not concluded to date).

The regionalization options offered by experts, non-government institutions and universities during the last two decades were as well based on comprehensive analyses of functions, politics and institutions. These analyses included also comparisons with EU member countries, especially those from the south-eastern Europe, which had gone through similar historical and political processes as Albania, in the first half of the 20th century, to advance with a transition process after 1990s. In overall these independent (expert/NGO/University) analyses were focused on identifying: -

Tasks (corresponding to services for citizens and government functions) where efficiency was not achieved at the local scale, and qark was either institutionally unable to deal with or its territory was not optimal for implementing a certain function. The size of the government unit (physical and in terms of number of employees) affects the output and efficiency of service provision (Aligica & Tarko, 2012) â&#x20AC;&#x201C; this showed for asymmetric results among municipalities. Some of them were either two small, or too big, and few of them were in optimal conditions;,

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Territorial constructs, which would be appropriate for the implementation of the EU regional development and cohesion policy in the future (an objective of the 2015 territorial reform as cited by (GoA, 2014/b));

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Territorial typologies and scales where tasks that were not efficiently provided at local and national scale could be carried out – this was particularly the case for watershed management and protection and sustainable development of natural resources, regional transportation, final treatment of waste, vocational education, and regional development and planning;

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Institutional mechanisms and modes of governance that would most efficiently implement these tasks at the identified regional levels, including forms of cooperation and networking that were necessary to ensure efficiency;

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Financial sources and mechanisms to fund tasks implementation in a decentralised governance framework;

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Ways of how to transit from a current situation of no regional rescaling to a situation where local and regional rescaling were both present and functional under a decentralised governance mode, and with a multi-level governance system for the proper implementation of the regional (development) policy.

Making comparisons with other countries was helpful in identifying weak and strong points, learn from others’ mistakes and achievements and adapt optimal modes to the Albanian contexts. The above independent analyses led also towards proposals (made by the same independent experts, NGOs, Universities) of regionalization options. In a specific case (under the implementation of the UNDP/EC project of Integrated Support for Decentralization in 2009-2011), a proposal was handed over to the government73 with options for NUTS II regions. This proposal insisted that whatever typology of territorial subdivision Albania is to undertake in terms of NUTS II regions, it should be one that favours Albania’s benefit from cohesion funds in the future and not a subdivision based merely on population statistics.

These proposals were trying to offer a model that leads towards reconciliation between polycentric governance and regions and territorial structures that gather a number of services and competencies, where most of the criteria for better service delivery, natural resources management, economies of scale and cohesive growth, are met (Toto et al., 2014). Satisfying all of the criteria (as defined above) is undoubtedly difficult, not to say a ‘futile’ task, as even in case all are met, there will be new externalities borne, due to large scale. Proposing establishment of regions as an intermediate level of

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governance implies establishment of single large jurisdictions that are confronted with the problem of recognising and organising the various levels of subsidiarity of interests within the larger system (V.Ostrom et al., 1961). However, the methodologies applied were trying to identify and recognise territorial identities, communities and community interests beyond the formal administrative territories, and even beyond the one-city functional areas, and were extending to the wider metropolitan region. The methodologies were also considering the connection of the urban regions with the rural areas and the natural landscape/resources. The aim, more than identifying fixed boundaries, was to understand the extent of networks, community ties and socioecological interactions, as a means to understanding the potential for self-governance and the related territorial scale.

The above approach was theoretically and essentially one that supports both territorial polycentricity and polycentric governance. However, whether large or small regions, or promotion of overlapping networks of self-organised and self-governed communities within a region, these were all models that would entail significant power shifts and could therefore not receive the support and attraction of the political actors. While leaving aside regional governance models, political/government actors proposed two other typologies of regions: planning regions â&#x20AC;&#x201C; proposed by the National Territory Planning Agency in the National Territory Plan of Albania; and development regions â&#x20AC;&#x201C; recognised as regional management areas, proposed during the (still on going) process of modelling regional development policies in Albania.

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Figure 90. Planning regions versus development regions

Source: NTPA (2015) and the Council of Ministers (2015) These typologies or regions (also delimitations as presented above) are considered as soft territorial constructs in comparison to the hard regional government form. They are both dynamic and â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;volatileâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. NTPA proposes planning regions for the sake of better and sustainable exploitation of territorial resources. But their boundaries are neither mandatory (in the long-rung these may change shape), nor subject to the implementation of any government function. The government has proposed development regions to consider them for the purposes of the implementation of regional development programs and for measuring disparities. While the first purpose

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could be easily satisfied – a government policy needs territorial indications for implementation, the second is misleading. Not only lowers disparities among territories, it also hides them – for instance, it hides rural and urban disparities and it ‘ignores’ the position/conditions of Dibër versus other qarks, by placing it in the same region with Tiranë and Durrës.

Figure 91. Comparison between various typologies Figure 90/a. Classification of qarks into urban-rural territorial typologies as per INSTAT

Source: INSTAT, 2014/b

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Figure 90/b. Share of local territories for altitudes above sea level: 0-100m (on the left) and 100-300m (on the right)

Figure 90/c. Share of the local territories for altitudes above sea level: 300-500m (on the left) and 500-800m (on the right)

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Figure 90/d. Share of the local territories for altitudes above sea level: +800m

Figure 90/e. River basins versus qarks

Source: Author based on information from ASIG

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Furthermore, by being predefined, the regional management areas display a picture of territorial disparities. A different regional setting/layout would provide a different picture of territorial disparities. Hence the way boundaries are currently designated predefines the distribution of territorial disparities that policies should be tackling, and therefore also the way the regional policy is implemented and delivered territorially.

On the other hand, there is a time rescaling factor as well. So while the policy may tackle disparities in the current regional grid, those may instead be simply displaced into another grid and will become visible only if, at a certain moment in time, the territorial statistics will be gathered in that new grid. This, together with the large and territorially mixed character of the current development regions, raises a question for what could be the lowest level in which data have to be generated and collected and what could be the possible levels of aggregation (which may have different territorial boundaries) feeding different politics, policies and development programs.

The above discussion leads to the summary of the methods that were used in Albania in the last 25 years to classify regions, not merely as geographical locations, rather as the product of territorial rescaling.

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Historical and cultural ties and relations: This classification has always been present, but as the analysis shows, historical regions play an indirect role in territorial rescaling processes in Albania. Historical ties and territorial identities are recognised, but often are left aside, or used when of interest, mainly as a secondary argument. However, in territorial analysis (such as the case for TAR implementation) this factor is listed as a key criterion. In general, the tendency to bypass the historical factor is due to the ‘fear’ from traditional and strong community ties, which may result into self-organisation and therefore affect authority and power status quo.

•

Naturally defined regions: The natural boundaries constitute another key argument in rescaling, based on the assumption that these are regions of resilient socio-ecological systems. The river basins, or large ecosystems are such regions.

In Albania, river basins are often used as a proposal for rescaling at regional level. However, territorial politics and investments have developed into different directions. Human interventions on the territory, such as road networks or water front restoration can shift a territorial element (mountain or river) from being a territorial barrier to being a unifying and integrating space between

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regions that were otherwise distant and unconnected. As a result, river basins remain plausible options of regionalization when discussed about water resources management and forests and pastures governance, but economic factors, accessibility and especially political equilibriums outpace the importance of resilient ecosystems. â&#x20AC;˘

Classification by purpose or policy objective to achieve: this is the case of regional management areas and planning regions (defined by NTPA) as described above. These regions are defined based on the analysis of several factors, but by being purpose oriented, they reflect subjective territorial constructs rather than territorial realities. Furthermore, these regions have complex profiles, due to being defined on the basis of a large number of indicators and sometimes indexes. The best way to avoid subjectivity in policies addressing development and disparities in purpose-oriented regions is to define various typologies, each being the representation of a single indicator, or a small group of indicators. For instance, there could be lagging regions, inner peripheries, etc. These do not need to exclude one another. On the contrary, the presence of several typologies provides better indications on territories, regardless of the scale of analysis. However, at a domestic level, is better and more accurate if the analysis is conducted and data are generated at municipal or administrative unitsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; level, and then findings aggregated at higher territorial levels (qarks and various typologies of regions). This is important also because institutional interactions happen at different territorial scales, and often, as analysis shows, the lower the territorial scales, the more robust and resilient are the institutions and socio-ecological systems. By analysing development indicators at lower territorial scales, it is therefore possible to identify links between the territorial development outcomes and the [institutional] territorial interaction, hence between territorial structures/construct and polycentric governance processes.

â&#x20AC;˘

Classification based on administrative boundaries and scope of government: This is the most common form of defining regional/territorial typologies.

Besides

recognising

administrative

and

government

subdivisions

(administrative units, municipalities, qarks, prefectures) it is possible to use the delimitations of these regions as territorial levels to generate data. Furthermore, by having these pre-defined and fixed territories, it is easier to go through

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analyses for identifying their features and classifying them upon territorial specificities, and other development features/indicators. This is usually the way that INSTAT deploys when classifying territories.

•

Classification based on dichotomies, such as urban-rural, central-peripheral, polycentric – monocentric, mountain – valley, etc. and transitory or intermediate categories that [may] fall within each dichotomy. Dichotomies74 are important to recognise especially when analysis shows that there are contrasts of empirical evidences on the territory. For instance, as Albania is typically a monocentric country, it is important to understand what territory constitutes the centre and what implications for the rest of the country are. Also, in case of urban-rural dichotomies knowledge is produced on dynamic (usually urban) regions, which tend to produce innovation, and less dynamic (usually rural) regions, which face difficulties in absorbing innovation that comes from urban centres (Ehrlich et al., 2015).

Finally, the methods that were used by the stakeholders (government or not) to define regions as a product of [potential] territorial rescaling were also numerous and summarised below: -

Territorial polycentrism analysis – morphological and functional, for understanding potential for cohesive growth. This was not used by the government, but was proposed by independent reports. The polycentrism analysis presented in this study was also shared with the government as independent contribution to the process;

-

Territorial disparities analysis, least favoured regions and inner peripheries analysis, and identification of locations with territorial specificities, aiming at understanding development trends and territorial diversities that will turn into strengths for contributing to sustainable territorial development (Gløersen et al., 2013). In the GEOSPECS study, Albania is classified under two types of regions with geographical specificities, namely mountain (more than ¾ of the country) and coastal – the plain area in the western coast. It also contains sparsely populated areas in both the northern and southern mountains, which are categorised as poorly connected, based on the 45 minutes isochrone (Gløersen et al., 2012);

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-

EU classification of regions, deployed and adapted by INSTAT in the case of Albania;

-

Spatial planning as a process that leads to identification of areas for development as used by NTPA;

-

The watershed approach: combination between the three stream channel levels and the watershed areas based on altitudes above sea level – this is discussed between stakeholders, but not used;

-

Accessibility analysis from polycentricity studies and based on connectivity of regions – This respective analysis, which is part of this study was, at the time, also shared with the government as independent contribution to the process;

-

Governance analysis – for institutional networks of polycentric governance, efficiency of services provision, economies of scales for government functions, etc. This was used during the territorial reform in 2015.

3.6 Conclusions on Albania’s ‘Polycentricity Gap’ – the Way Forward This research is about territory, development and governance. The accounts on all three arguments have evolved significantly, especially after 1999, with the adoption of the European Spatial Development Perspective by the European ministers of spatial planning, towards developing interdependency connections. The same year is a breakeven point also for Albania, due to the reform undertaken at the time on decentralization of local government and the respective territorial rescaling. The need to understand development beyond merely economic outcomes, to harmonise development objectives on the territory as a key aggregate resource, and to develop governance mechanisms that are geared towards efficient and democratic achievement of territorial development, has become paramount in the work of various scholars and European Union regional policy.

Still, strengthening the territorial dimension of policies in the EU remains a challenge (see (Szlachta & Ulied, 2018) and (ESPON, 2018/c)), due to persistent territorial disparities and fragmentation, high Europe’s interdependencies to the rest of the world, and misalignment between geographical jurisdictions for policy-making and the geographies affected (ibid). These challenges are set in a context where the EU multiannual financial framework has lowered its overall budget for the cohesion policy

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(though the latter still remains the largest investment policy in the EU), it has increased (among others) funding for climate change and also for urban development (Tosics, 2018); (EC, 2018a); (EC, 2018b). Similarly, multi-level and/or polycentric territorial governance remains a difficult endeavour that has to deal with territoriality, distribution of authority, and power dynamics across government levels and stakeholders (see for instance Hooghe and Marks (2003; 2016), Faludi (2012; 2016), Aligica and Tarko (2012), Araral and Hartley (2013), Shutina and Toto (2017), and (ESPON, 2018/d)).

As it was defined as of the outset, this research is looking at understanding the interdependencies between regions’ or territorial typologies obtained in the territorial rescaling process, due to continuous governance shifts and emergence of polycentric governance, as a means for boosting sustainable territorial development and cohesion, in a situation where the regions are peripheral and there is a preconceived expectation that disparities will be present. The research was exploring whether polycentric governance models have an effect on territorial development and to what extent is this defined by territorial rescaling and regional typologies? The answer to this question should contribute to enhanced understanding on the ‘polycentricity gap’ and means to overcome it, which, based on the discussion of chapters 1 and 2 of this research, is shortly summarised as follows: -

Territorial disparities are present and to address them, development policies aim strategically for convergence between cohesion and growth;

-

Territorial polycentricity is an objective pursued to achieve convergence between cohesion and competitiveness, but empirical evidence shows that at a regional level, territorial polycentricity does not necessarily spurs cohesive growth;

-

Polycentric governance, as a mode of governance that embodies network interactions and different degrees of decision-making autonomy for the ‘nodes of the network’ (aka stakeholders or decision making centres), contributes to the achievement of the territorial polycentricity objective, by eliminating inefficiencies, improving the exchange and flow of information, increasing resilience of the institutional and socio-ecological systems and internalising the effects (positive and negative) resulting from the dynamics of territorial rescaling.

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-

Knowledge on regional/territorial typologies borne out of, or contributing to territorial rescaling, is needed to understand the modus-operandi of polycentric governance in a specific territorial context.

In order to achieve its objective, this research analysed: 1. Territorial rescaling processes in Albania, including factors that stand behind and policy and development results; 2. Territorial disparities, fragmentation and polycentricity/monocentricity in terms of territorial structure; 3. Cases of polycentric governance and related effects on territorial development; 4. Linkages between polycentrism (territorial and governance), territorial rescaling and development.

For the polycentric governance analysis in particular, the research was focused on analysing cases based on the following critical factors: a) Level of decentralization for the different types of subnational (local and regional) governments, mostly insights on the decision-making autonomy; b) The presence of network governance â&#x20AC;&#x201C; hence, of centres of decision-making, independent but complementary to one-another, or highly interactive among them, government and non-government ones. c) The existence of at least one subject of common interest for centres of decisionmaking in a polycentric governance network; d) The presence of a common niche of attraction for genuine cooperation between centres of decision-making â&#x20AC;&#x201C; hence a minimal need or willingness for cooperation; e) Existence of a space or a territory where the autonomous, but simultaneously complementary interests/objectives of the actors are materialised; f) The presence of a commonly agreed system of rules for interactions and functions, which guarantees that regardless of individual autonomy, decisionmaking centres do not operate in isolation, but intensively interact and cooperate among them.

It is assumed in this research that territorial typologies, or territorial constructs, resulting from rescaling processes with various delineations over time, play a role in defining the subject/s of common interest and the need that brings actors or centres of decision-making together.

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Albania is characterised by rapid accumulation of population and economic activities in key urban areas – those that were best fitted (location wise, residence of the government, and with the best offer of services) to welcome new residents after 1990.

These areas grew in size, expanded beyond historical boundaries, and strengthened their core position in development, leaving behind other locations that were and still are subject to shrinking, socio-economic distress and peripherality. The first phenomenon, that of creation of agglomeration economies and metropolis formation, is accompanied by loosening and fuzzy borders between urban-urban or urban-rural areas, therefore resulting into the establishment of city-regions (the case for Tirana, Durrës, and even Fier), or leading towards some kind of urban regionalization (Su et al., 2017). The second phenomenon, where remote areas become even more remote, has resulted into abandoned urban or rural settlements in some cases, and in other cases in weakening local economies, with decreasing population and subject to social depression. As paraphrased by Ehrlich et al. (2015), Keim (2006) states that peripheralisation implies centralisation, where some centres grow and attract population, economic activities, and infrastructural investments to the disadvantage of others. In overall this socio-spatial polarisation (Ehrlich et al., 2015) has led to increasing differences between territories in Albania. Territorial disparities have developed and grown persistently, being highly pronounced between urban and rural areas, among municipalities and among administrative units (territorial subdivisions between municipalities), and among functional urban areas. Disparities are moderately strong between qarks and visible between the regional management areas (the development regions).

This trend of increasing territorial disparities is reinforced also by a pattern of obvious monocentricity of the territorial structure. Albania has a high value of the polycentricity index, which shows for concentration of population and economic wealth within one single location – the Tirana-Durrës area. Accessibility and connectivity analysis support further this finding. Infrastructure investments, the road network, the access to motorways’ exits, travel times, as well as functional interactions between the functional urban areas, all do favour the Tiranë-Durrës metropolis development on one hand, and the draining of human resources form other parts of the country towards the metropolis, on the other.

Tiranë-Durrës metropolis, more than a mega-region as based on Su et al. (2017), is un urban agglomeration (Karafili, 2015); (Shutina, 2015) created around the two centres –

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Tiranë and Durrës, with the first prevailing over the second. Due to proximity reasons, the fast growing ‘thick’ suburbs of both centres are joining every year closer and, during this process, they are encompassing or encapsulating within their area of influence also smaller and adjacent urban or rural centres, being located among the two. The quality of infrastructures that connect the two urban areas and penetrates the region is still low/lagging behind, even though it has absorbed significant public investments compared to other areas in the country. The economic activities, on the other hand, do not create clusters or link into networks (Karafili, 2015). They benefit of economies of agglomeration and proximity, rather than cooperate among them to enhance their effects and outputs into broad networks (ibid); (Toto, 2015); (Shutina, 2015). Therefore, there is a tendency for these urban areas to benefit on synergies created, or advantages that go beyond their dimensions, but there is no cooperation within the network.

Referring to (Su et al., 2017), agglomeration and synergies are present, but there are no specialised clustered economies, though there are opportunities (the education sector, the administration, the concentration of services, etc.).

The development profile as depicted above shows for challenges that the society has to face ahead, as well as testifies for the policies used, or for lack of policies needed to guide development over three decades. Albania had to make tremendous political and socio-economic shifts, which resulted into planning and governance shifts as well. The planning and ‘contained development’ paradigm (Angel, 2011) aimed for in the beginning of 1990s, resulted unsuccessful on the territory, while the ‘making room’ paradigm (ibid.) was misinterpreted and misused in favour of uncontrolled urban sprawl, fragmentation of agriculture land, deforestation, unintended urbanisation, and unpredictable shifts of the territorial structure (Aliaj et al., 2010); (Aliaj et al., 2014); (Shutina, 2015); (Toto, 2018).

Brezzi and Veneri (2015) state that understanding links between territorial organisation and socio-economic conditions is important for policy-making processes. For instance, though spatial planning is not a European directive, it is so strongly linked to territorial development, that it has given rise to a paradigm of regional development that incorporates or affects planning and helps improving both national and regional growth and prosperity (Alden, 2006). In EU, especially the ESDP as a territorial development advocacy document has affected the planning agenda with the concept of sustainable polycentric development and by redefining the core-periphery model paradigm (ibid).

“This reorientation in spatial planning meant a shift in focus from the physical planning

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of space using functions such as housing, industry, transport and nature to the development of strategic frameworks and new visions for regional development.”

(Burger et al., 2014, p.816) However, empirical evidence on the territorial development – policy making links and more precisely on the links between territorial polycentricity (as a policy objective) and socio-economic development is not conclusive (Brezzi & Veneri, 2015). The theoretical discussion in chapter 2 concludes that on a country level, higher GDP is associated with high territorial polycentrism. Still, the same finding is not evident at regional level, where often the opposite may occur. Thus, various studies summarise that transport and public services efficiency and territorial disparities (inter and intraregional) are key policy issues that need to be addressed, in order to achieve the objectives of growth and cohesion, and territorial polycentricity alone may not be able or sufficient to tackle them.

This research showcases that in Albania territorial polycentricity and disparities are strongly correlated. The country is monocentric territorially, disparities are high and cohesion is low. In analogy to Burger and Meijers (2012), the monocentric type of spatial organisation dominates the regions and so does for the country; low territorial polycentricity is visible both, morphologically and functionally, leading towards the establishment of a socio-spatial polarization. Empirical research for Albania, showed that this socio-spatial polarisation has started as a process induced by the lack of regulations and policies to guide and/or restrain development flows, but latter has evolved as a process enhanced by national/local discourses, “which place higher value on particular regions and developments and thereby devalue others” (Ehrlich et al., 2015, p.10). To date, this is again typically the case for Tirana, where the Mayor and the municipal staff carry out their tasks under the objective of draining further population from ‘peripheral ’areas towards Tirana, and influence national decisionmaking not to direct investments in remote locations.

However, in conclusion to the territorial polycentricity – disparities discussion, it is currently not possible to indicate that lack of polycentric territorial development is the reason behind low cohesion. In this sense, more empirical evidences are needed to prove the cause-effect relationship between territorial/regional disparities and lack of territorial polycentricity.

The Government of Albania has gone through various processes of territorial rescaling, especially in the last 3 decades after 1990. Most of these processes are linked to

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decentralization of governance and others are related to territorial development and planning. As a result, the government has made three significant revisions of the local governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; boundaries. The first took place in early 1990s, resulting on the formation of 36 districts; the second in 2000, resulting in the establishment of 373 local government units (municipalities and communes) and 12 qarks (2nd tier of local government); and the third in 2015 resulting in the formation of 61 municipalities and the safeguarding of 12 qarks (though without any significant role to play, besides being the territory for national elections). Furthermore, under the frame of regional development efforts and regionalization support processes, 4 regional management areas were established in 2015, 3 NUTS II subdivisions were proposed in 2011, and a number of planning regions and decentralised regional government territories were proposed during 2011-2016.

Rescaling typologies, those that are government-related and those that are regional development-related, have been seeking, or have promoted and are pushing for new forms of governance (Tolkki et al., 2011). These rescaling processes have given rise to efforts for multi-level and/or polycentric governance in Albania, though the latter is characterised by weaknesses, which rest in both, the institutional form that multi-level governance approaches should embrace, and in the management of governance interdependencies with its territorial dimension. The 7 gaps of multi-level governance, as defined by Charbit (2009; 2011), are present and hamper its efficiency (Pike et al., 2017). For instance, regardless of interest in the EU integration process, the regional development efforts are bound by the information gap. The governance mechanism for regional development is still not in place, because the information on costs and benefits that the country and the community will experience from applying/adopting the EU regional policy is not analysed and made publicly available. Of course, this is related to the capacity gap as well. Capacities to deal with the future regional policy should be built gradually and be in place at the time of accession. Capacities are more than a milestone, or precondition for accession. Institutional capacities are needed for institutions to absorb IPA funds and get ready for societal integration.

The fiscal gap was largely reported above with fiscal decentralization lagging behind for local governments, for qarks having no investment and fiscal power at all, and the regional development fund being managed in a top-down fashion. Both the policy and the objectives gaps are reflected in the lack of a regional development policy to date, lack of policies to support the functioning of RDF, missing or poor links between the

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National Strategy for Development and Integration, the National Territorial Plan and the ambitions for regional development. The administrative gap is also present, though an administrative and territorial reform is implemented, aiming at closing this gap. The boundaries of the municipalities do not necessarily represent functional boundaries, though this was a key criterion during their designation. Furthermore, the absence of administrative regions (for policies and tasks that need a larger territorial scale than the local one) does not help much in aligning functions with administrative territories and authorities (Charbit & Michalun, 2009); (Charbit, 2011). On the other hand, there are functions (such as the forest commons, water resource management, community planning, etc.) that happen on a very small local / neighbourhood / ecosystem, or administrative unit scale, and whose governance is territorially different from the tasks that each municipality has the competence to administer within its boundaries. The mismatch between tasks and territories, as well as the fiscal gap lead to the presence of the accountability gap. Often, municipalities justify their lack of involvement or action in local tasks with the absence of financial means and autonomy for more resources, due to central government holding the financial power.

However, though the gaps of multi-level governance are present, this has not stopped cases on polycentric governance from being shaped and implemented. First of all, the territorial and administrative reform and the local government decentralization reform represent efforts of polycentricity in governance, by allowing a large number of stakeholders to get a position and influence territorial and governance rescaling in Albania. Both cases are initiated and implemented in a top-down fashion, putting at risk the presence of particularly the first key criterion for polycentric governance â&#x20AC;&#x201C; that of significant degrees of decentralised autonomy of decision-making among the stakeholders (centres of decision-making). On the other hand, both reforms went through a multi-level process of governance, with some of the gaps more visible, and others less relevant.

In the case of various small-scale territorial partnerships (such as forums, the local action groups, etc.), the experience was very good for as long as the process was supported by external assistance, or the case was built on local knowledge and direct stakeholdersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; interests and benefits. Several of the cases fulfil all key criteria for polycentric governance, but their long-term sustainability varies from one case to the other. The sustainability is usually related to the valuesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; systems that are implied in each case over the common niche for genuine attraction for cooperation. The case of

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Theth tourism structure in the north of Albania was initially supported externally, by GIZ (Kuqi & Lukesch, 2012). However, the model was based on the local knowledge, and on the direct and immediate interest of the local residents to pursue their own tourism-related businesses, making use of territorial specificities, relevant to their location. Similarly, the case for sustainable and place-based tourism in Gramsh (Ciro et al., 2019) was successful, because local partnerships were organised bottom-up and in a networking scheme, and were built based on the local knowledge of resources, and on the common need for creating small-scale local development initiatives that the local businesses were able to understand and implement (ibid).

Other types of partnership had a niche for cooperation, but this was mostly induced externally, such as some of the LAGs or the local forums supported by MADA. The need to cooperate in bringing more development to the remote mountainous areas, without a clear target (such as the tourism cases) was not endogenously strong, because there was/is the belief that development is to be provided by the government. Also, farmers for instance, feel that markets are controlled from the government and they are unable to compete with import for a number of products (Seidu & One, 2016); (Skreli et al., 2009); (Bombaj et al., 2016). This is crucial to know in a context, where agricultural land is highly fragmented and the average farm size is only 1.5 ha, and farmers associations (sometimes based on commons, such as pastures) are relatively limited (Toto, 2018); (Bombaj et al., 2016). It means that local farmers can dominate the market in two ways: either by consolidating land and increasing the farm size, or by introducing agricultural goods that constitute a niche in the Albanian market. In both cases, cooperation based on trust is needed, and this cannot be enforced externally.

However, local governments can play a role in promoting cooperation and building trust. This means that local governments should be able to eliminate the capacity gap.

So far, local governments feel insecure of promoting or participating in partnership arrangements for territorial development and governance. To a certain degree, the current legal framework is not very supportive to partnerships (Shutina et al., 2012), in the sense that it does not contain regulations, which would, in a way or another, provide directions on how partnerships could be established and be legally accepted. While this may sound as an impeding factor at first sight, in reality it might also be a positive factor (Shutina et al., 2012). Networks and partnerships are based on self-regulation (Berardo & Lubell, 2016); (McGinnis, 2011). Constitutional regulations â&#x20AC;&#x201C; hence laws, should not aim at setting [a large number of] limits as this would make partnerships

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frameworks very rigid and would move them away from their core purpose, for which partnerships are established (Shutina et al., 2012). Under this frame, it is necessary for local governments to be supportive to local initiatives and/or promote or push for new ones, without trying to regulate the institutional mechanism of partnership, rather than explaining the benefits, exchanging knowledge with the stakeholders, and providing guidelines for how partnerships can work best.

The knowledge factor is very important. The case of forest commons is successful, because knowledge about commons is available and is transferable among stakeholders and generations, and it can improve further if knowledge exchange on ecosystem services will also improve (Toto, 2019). In the case of forums for participatory planning, knowledge and dissemination and exchange mechanisms did increase the trust of the participants among themselves and for the public institutions organising some of the forums, as well as the participants’ willingness to be involved in the forum and contribute to the planning output.

Exchange of knowledge between experts, government officials and local communities, is also a key factor in the progress that the ‘100+ Villages’ is having so far. On the contrary, in the case of the ‘Urban Revival’ program, knowledge exchange was a missing component and the flow of information was only one way (from government to the beneficiary) and was crafted in a top-down fashion. In the case of LAGs, knowledge on benefits was not sufficiently made available. In the case of urban partnerships for land development – which to date continue to fail and are functional only in case there is funding from donors, knowledge is very weak, if not missing at all.

This is a typical case, where planning legislation has made enormous shifts (positively) to include a variety of financial instruments that allow for public-private partnerships taking place in cities governance and territorial development (Toto & Allkja, 2018).

However, with the exception of Business Improvement Districts (BID) – an instrument for improving city space in urban core commercial areas, none of the other instruments has made it towards implementation. BID has been ‘successful’ because it received substantial donor support. The BID associations (the network of shops’ and businesses’ owners in the central district of a number of Albanian cities) were established and have cooperated with the municipality in taking decisions on how to improve the shopping areas/streets in Shkodër, Berat and Korçë. However, the funds for the implementation of works were supplied externally (by a donor). The sustainability of the network will depend on their ability to implement the cooperation framework set among them (with

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the support of the donors), hence to implement the self-defined rules, and on the supporting/promoting role of the municipality. However, other land development financial instruments, such as betterment fees, are not being implemented at all, primarily because there is complete lack of knowledge on the instrument and its benefits. Yet more, there is the general thinking (among stakeholders) that such instruments will simply be used to collect more taxes, without bringing any benefits to the local communities, where the tax/fee was generated. This thinking is based on low citizen trust on local governments and on the negative experiences of public-private partnerships in land development implemented in Albania in the last 3 years (Toto & Allkja, 2018).

The territorial distribution of the cases studied for polycentric governance is also quite diverse. Most of the cases which tend to have a prevalence of centralisation of power and authority, can be depicted as with a hierarchical structure built around a strong centre and several small centres, or as a group of stakeholders dependent on the strong centre, which geographically speaking is usually located in the TiranĂŤ-DurrĂŤs metropolitan area. In the cases where decentralisation is higher (such as the case for forest commons or participatory planning), the territorial distribution is also decentralised, and represented by various centres of decision-making distributed across the territory.

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Table 14. Summary of polycentric interactions based on the key criteria for polycentric governance Critical factor for polycentric governance 1. The level of governance decentralization

2. Subjects of common interest for decision-making centres

3. Independent centres of decisionmaking 4. Common niche of genuine attraction for cooperation

5. Territories to materialise the

‘Urban Revival’

‘100+ Villages’

LAGs and Forums

Participatory Planning Forums

Central decisionmaking; Communication to other stakeholders in the network.

Yes: Urban regeneration of city centres

Central decision-making; Influencing of decision from beneficiaries and intermediaries (experts).

Decentralised decisionmaking; empowerment from external agents (donors).

Yes: Establish development practices for rural areas – selected villages; Enhance tourism potential; Increase economic opportunities locally.

Only the central authorities that manage the program.

The central authorities managing the program; The local villages in terms of influencing the outcome during design stages.

Yes: Sustainable local use of natural resources and agricultural potential; Rural infrastructure investments; Build local stakeholders’ capacities for economic development projects mobilization and implementation.

All participants in the LAG and in Forums.

Centralised – to – decentralised approaches: unequally distributed across the national territory.

Yes: The General Local Territory Plans approved by the Municipality and the National Territory Council.

Weak convergence between improved city centres and local need for better services and economic opportunities.

Centres of cities – urban cores

Economic/business opportunities and tourism activities for local management.

Each territory had a specific niche, usually always based on the unique territorial resources it possesses; Often identified and/or assumed through external intervention.

Clusters of villages each defining the core a

Sub-regions within qarks and/or within regions of

All three types of planning forums as nodes of a larger participatory planning network.

The concrete proposals made in the plans in regard to housing, commercial land uses, businesses locations and distribution, recreational activities.

Municipalities

Forest Commons

Decentralised decisionmaking.

Yes: Make sustainable local use of forests; Maintain forests legacy.

The commoners individually; the groups of commoners on village basis; the local forest associations; the National Forest Federation.

Common forests, located in proximity to the villages involved in the nested system of forest governance.

Forest ecosystems all over the national territory, fulfilling two

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common and autonomous interest

6. System or rules accepted by actors in the network

Legal rules and implementation frameworks only.

specific rural region, representing sub-regions

geographical specificities (for instance mountain areas)

Legal rules and implementation frameworks mostly. Rules of participation defined on the spot during design stage.

Internal network rules; designed by the external assistance.

Internal rules always. A minimum of legally defined rules for the national forum and for the local forums, not for CAPs.

criteria: close to villages and owned/managed in common historically before 1940.

Internal rules always.

Fulfilment of forest legislation as well, though it does not contain rules for forest commons.

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Territorial rescaling processes have had an asymmetric effect on polycentric governance. Hence, the territorial reform of the year 2000, which established 373 local government units in Albania, with the purpose of bringing government as close to the citizens as possible, did not produce efficient results in service delivery and policy making (Toto et al., 2014). However, the relatively high territorial fragmentation of local governments served as a driving force for models of inter-communal cooperation, sub-regional networks (LAGs) and thematic networks (in rural mountainous areas) established in various areas across the country.

The recent territorial reform consolidated the smaller local government units into larger ones, referring in several cases (but not always) to the functional urban area as key criterion for delineation of boundaries. The cases of inter-communal cooperation ceased to exist. LAGs and mountainous forums were also not sustainable, but mainly due to the strong role of the external assistance, not because of any potential conflict with the territorial rescaling. However, in the case of forests commons, the larger scale of the municipalities has helped in the formation of a new layer in the network, which strengthens further the forest commons. As the forest area that each municipality has to manage is increased, and the local administration does not have sufficient (human and financial) resources to administer forests sustainably, the local officials are cooperating for the latter with commoners. Though the system of forest commons is not defined in the legislation, this cooperation happens (genuinely) because of their common interest in governance and development of forests. Though not formalised, these processes strengthen the nested system of forest commons governance.

Also, the presence of polycentric governance has not affected official rescaling (the territorial-administrative reform), but has led to the production of territorial typologies that are being used in policy processes aiming at enhancing territorial development, as presented in table 14. Also, there are cases such as the regional management areas (another regional typology) established due to efforts in materialising the multi-level governance mechanisms of regional development in Albania. Furthermore, there is the proposal of planning regions contained in the national territorial plan. Though these are not administrative regions, they are being used in steering the planning process across the country, in terms of how clusters of municipalities are defined for planning support, and the 100+ Villages are designated for participation in the program. The Urban Revival program on the other hand is not embedded in the territorial rescaling processes, or has not affected them, because of lacking the decentralised management approach.

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Finally, qark as the second level of local government, has remained intact by the territorial rescaling processes, as well as has not affected polycentric governance practices. This is due to the absence of tasks, as interpreted in the legislation, and therefore absence of power and authority and also of political legitimacy. On the other hand, qark constitutes a regional territory â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a typology (reflecting several criteria) that affects so far statistical data (usually produced and/or aggregated for publication at qark level) and understanding of regional disparities, which in turn influences the way regional programs and development policies are, or will be shaped on the territory.

Empirical research, focused mainly on growth enhancing effects of devolution, has paid less attention to the effects of devolution on disparities, but for as much as country-case studies shows, the findings are mixed (Torrisi et al., 2015). In the case of Albania, territorial disparities have remained the same, if not increased with the implementation of the second territorial reform. Data series as presented earlier in the document, but also in the analysis carried out by Toska and Gjika (2018) reinforce this statement, and together with findings on polycentric governance, show that proximity and size are not sufficient for a territorial rescaling process to eliminate disparities and boost growth.

As Torrisi et al. (2015) defines, successful devolution is subject to government and governance accountability and strength of real democracy. Furthermore, growth policies are key to defining how the effects of territorial rescaling will present themselves on the territory. If a dominant metro-centric discourse and growth-only paradigm is prevalent (as it seems the case in Albania), the presence of lagging regions and inner peripheries will be a self-imposed policy, or a self-fulfilment prophecy.

The findings so far conclude that in order to establish adaptive and robust frameworks for the long-term sustainability of territorial systems, the polycentricity gap should be addressed, and this can be done through taking on board a combined spatial-territorial polycentrism and multi-level polycentric governance approach (Finka & Kluvankova, 2015). This remains however a relatively recent account, theoretically speaking, and it needs more evidence to prove that the connection between polycentric governance and territorial polycentricity is essential in promoting cohesive territorial development.

Using the words of Burgers and Meijers (2012, p.1128) on territorial polycentricity, â&#x20AC;&#x153;As regards polycentric development, progress would mean empirically establishing the actual merits of polycentric development as a strategy and establishing the environmental, economic and social consequences of a move towards polycentric urban systemsâ&#x20AC;?. The latter should not be understood in morphological and functional

262

(sectorial interactions) terms only, but also in terms of governance mechanisms that remove inefficiencies and produce cohesion growth.

Knowledge on polycentric governance is expected to entail knowledge on functional territorial polycentricity. The latter is about stakeholders’ interactions in regard to territorial development, and interactions are (as a minimum) affected or regulated by governance modes applied. It has yet to be proved whether territorial polycentricity as a relational phenomenon and polycentric governance are fully and positively correlated or not. Still, the case of Albania shows that, while monocentricity of territorial structure (morphological) and of governance are positively correlated, polycentric governance cases can coexist with traditional forms of top-down and/or formal governance, and in absence of territorial polycentricity. Their presence produces positive effects on territorial development and is connected to territorial rescaling processes, whether formal or informal ones. This leads to the understanding that even if the territorial system is not polycentric, development objectives can be attained through implementing governance modes that build on the coexistence of regulating and selfregulating bodies (Tolkki et al., 2011), on visible and invisible, or formal and informal levels of governance (Cole et al., 2015), which however have a clear connection with their territorial scale of interest, and extend their interdependencies to other scales, by transferring also knowledge among levels. Therefore, though polycentric governance may produce inefficiencies on the territory due to overlapping functional areas of the centres of decision-making, its positive contribution to territorial development, in aggregate terms, is higher than that of single government bodies administering alone large territories, such as the case of current municipalities in Albania.

Hooghe and Marks (2003, p.235) support multilevel polycentric governance with three statements: “dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions is more flexible than concentration” in a single one; “large jurisdictions are bad when they impose a single policy”; and “centralised government is insensitive to varying scales’ efficiencies from policy to policy”. Furthermore, EC (2017) and Brown et al. (2017) state that though the national economy is the sum of regional components, the macroeconomic conditions are not equal among regions and do not have the same impact on each of them. The same goes for the way in which the different policies are implemented (when a fully vertical approach is taken) and for the impact that structural reforms (undertaken nationally) have on the various regions. These assumptions and statements lead to the necessity for applying governance approaches that not only take

263

into consideration the specificities of the regions/places, but also have the ability to reconcile and converge reforms and policies and stakeholdersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; interests, in order to simultaneously achieve regional balances and development.

Regional or territorial typologies resulting from the territorial rescaling processes, be those formal or informal, provide knowledge on: i) territorial development profiles at different scales and various (often overlaying) territorial scales. This knowledge is as dynamic as the changing territorial scales are, and helps in shaping policies that are flexible enough to address problems at any level of disaggregation. In this way, by focusing on territorial specificities, formal and informal governance stakeholders can avoid static policies built on the basis of self-conceived development scenarios; ii) on the presence of polycentric governance cases and their outcomes, as well as on their linkage to the territory. This linkage is of particular interest, because governance that does not reflect the territorial construct, can work against territorial development and resilience of the resources.

This research provides a framework model for studying the polycentricity gap, encompassing critical factors against which to assess polycentric governance. By connecting the polycentricity gap with territorial rescaling processes and territorial development indicators, it is possible to measure the effects of polycentric governance and territorial polycentricity on the territory (growth and disparities) and draw conclusions on whether a combined approach of territorial polycentricity and polycentric governance is able to define the robustness of territorial systems and produce cohesive growth on the territory. The model needs to be replicated to other contexts and preferably in comparative terms, in order to produce final conclusions, based on a large database of empirical findings.

On a country level, the research findings are important to current and future policy processes, related to both, domestic development and tasks that the government and the societal actors are due to carry out in regard to the EU integration processes. In this framework, Albania needs to redevelop polycentricity in its territorial structure and this has to be a sustainable structure, sustained by formal and informal actors working together in a polycentric system of cooperation, instead of the governance system being imposed by the government. This might imply i) legislative revisions, especially with regard partnerships, territorial planning, strengthening of fiscal capacities at the local level, and regional development; as well as ii) transfer of decision-making power to informal or semi-public networks, such as a system of commonsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; governance for

264

natural resources and drainage and irrigations networks, participatory planning forums, and the implementation of regional development strategies and allocation of the Regional Development Fund.

Territorial rescaling should also be a continued process and be dynamic. The government should assess the short-term results of the decentralization and territorialadministrative reform (i.e. territorial effects, growth, disparities, efficiency of governance) and take adjustment actions. This process should happen on a regular basis every 2-3 years. Most importantly, the government of Albania should revisit the possibility for a territorial reform at the regional level. This should not necessarily aim for establishment of large regional government bodies delivering tasks that municipalities cannot and in a symmetrical way across the territory. The regions could also be asymmetrical in terms of size and tasks, depending on the specificities of territories and on the presence of self-governance networks. However, political powers and legitimacy should be given to any new form of governance.

In fact, a new reform should look at empowering existing self-governance networks and promote new ones. It is in this way that the government can move away from imposing territorial constructs and development decisions, to enforcing capabilities, hence enforcing collaborative governance arrangements, as Gunningham (2009) would name it. This also requires for the government to analyse how tasks that require network governance, such as common pool natural resources, [community] planning, river basin management, regional development, etc. could best be implemented. But then again this needs more decentralization of power and authority, strengthening of local and regional governments’ associations, strengthening of existing forums – even those at the small territorial scales, by supporting them with inclusion in policy frameworks, investments, and legal acknowledgement, to improve their long-term stability.

Finally, knowledge sharing and exchange is key to taking informed decisions, overcoming the information gap in governance, and increasing the capacities of informal forums and networks in governing specific territorial tasks, regardless of the scale. Polycentric development requires interdisciplinary inputs from various stakeholders and various knowledge groups, in order to produce integrated and widely accepted territorial development visions (ESPON, 2018b). Of course, this will require stimulating knowledge economy, in order to support further development in large urban centres (for instance Tiranë-Durrës metropolitan area) and revitalise at the same time lagging and peripheral regions. The knowledge economy is a combination of efforts

265

between education, incentives (monetary or not) for attracting high-skilled workers and companies, branding, and especially promoting policies that build on the place-based resources. After all, polycentricity as an objective will make it towards implementation only if the society at large, regardless of the position of individual members or groups, will engage into productive interactions and successful cooperation. This is largely based on enhanced knowledge of systems, both socio-economic and territorial ones.

266

IV. Annexes

267

4.1 Indicators on regions, development, accessibility and disparities Table 15: Areas, sub-areas and indicators for analysis AREA

Sub-AREA

INDICATOR NO. A1.1.1

NAME

Economic Growth

Gross Domestic Product (at current prices/constant prices/ EUR/PPP)

ALL/EUR/PPP

Qark

ALL/EUR/PPP

Qark

ALL

Qark

A1.1.3

Gross Value Added

Gross Domestic Product (per capita) Contribution of Qarks in GVA by branches of the economy (branches = 100)

Gross Value Added

Contribution of Qarks in GVA by branches of the economy (Qark = 100)

GNDI A1.1.6

GNI

A1.1.7 Employment A1.1.8 A1.1.9 A1.1.10 A1.1.11 A1.1.12 A1.1.13 A1.1.14 A1.1.15 A1.1.16 A1.1.17

TERRITORY

Economic Growth

A1.1.5

A1.1.

Economic growth and development

UNIT

A1.1.2

A1.1.4

A1 Economic Growth and Development

DATA RELATED TO INDICATOR

Employment Employment

Gross National Disposable Income (total and per capita) Gross National Income (total and per capita) Employment (by age, gender, sector, educational level, ratio of labour force) Employment (professional status/ownership)

PERIOD

INSTAT 2000-2015 2000-2015

INSTAT

2008/2015

Regional Statistical Yearbook 2015

ALL

Qark

2008/2015

ALL

National->Qark

2008-2015

ALL

National->Qark

2010-2015

Nr/%

National

INSTAT

No./%

Qark

2000-2014 2001/20082014

No./%

Qark

2010-2014

INSTAT

No./%

Qark

2010-2015

No./%

Qark

2010-2016

No./%

Qark

2010-2017

Employment

Employment in public administration Employment in private nonagricultural sector Employment in private agricultural sector Employment in local public administration

Employment

Employment in local public administration - communes

Employment

Employment in local public administration - municipalities

No./%

Qark

2010-2019

Employment in local public administration - prefectures

No./%

Qark

2010-2020

Unemployment rate by gender

%

National

2000-2014

Employment Employment

Employment Unemployment rate Unemployed jobseekers

SOURCE

INSTAT Own calculations based on methodology BOA INSTAT & Own calculations INSTAT

INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT No./%

Qark

2010-2018 INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT

Registered unemployed jobseekers (total, gender, age, schooling)

INSTAT No.

Qark

2010-2014

268

A1.1.18

A1.1.19

A1.1.20 A1.1.21 A1.1.22 A1.1.23

Registered jobseekers in long term unemployment (total and female)

No./%

Qark

2010-2015 INSTAT

Registered jobseekers receiving unemployment benefits (total and female)

No./%

Qark

2010-2015

Number of banks

No.

Qark

2007-2014

Bank of Albania

Number of exchange offices

No.

Qark

2014

Bank of Albania

Total credit (by maturity, sector of the economy, usage, currency)

ALL

Qark

2007-2015

Bank of Albania

Total deposits (by currency)

ALL

Qark

2007-2015

Enterprises

Total and new enterprises (by gender)

No.

Qark

2001-2015

Bank of Albania INSTAT

A1.1.25

Birth rate

New enterprises vs. total

%

Qark

2010-2015

INSTAT

A1.1.26

Non-agricultural active enterprises Newly created non-agricultural enterprises Foreign enterprises Origin of foreign enterprises

Non-agricultural active enterprises per 10000 pers.

%

Qark

2010-2015

A1.1.28 A1.1.29 A1.1.30 A1.1.31 A1.2.1 A1.2.2 A1.2.3

INSTAT

A1.1.24

A1.1.27

A1.2.

Competitive ness

Registered jobseekers in long term unemployment Registered jobseekers receiving unemployment benefits Bank distribution in Albania (nr) Exchange offices distribution (nr) Financial intermediation indicators Financial intermediation indicators

Active enterprises Active Enterprises by ownership Labour costs All of the indicators might be used in order to provide the framework of one

INSTAT INSTAT

Newly created non-agricultural enterprises per 10000 pers.

%

Qark

2010-2015

Foreign enterprises per 10000 pers.

No.

Qark

2013-2015

Foreign enterprises per origin country

No.

Qark

2013-2015

INSTAT INSTAT Active enterprises (by legal form, economic activity) Active Enterprises by ownership (Albanian, joint, foreign) Average labour costs per employee in full time units by economic activity (in Albanian LEK) Average labour costs per employee in full time units by size of enterprise, in Albanian LEK Average labour costs per employee in full time units by economic activity

INSTAT No.

Qark

2010-2015 INSTAT

No.

Qark

2010-2015

ALL

National

2013

INSTAT Labour Cost Survey 2013

ALL

National

2013

INSTAT Labour Cost Survey 2013

ALL

National

2013

INSTAT Labour Cost Survey 2013

269

of the competitive advantaged of Albania (labour cost advantages)

Components of the annual labour costs per employee in full time units by aggregated economic activities

ALL

National

2013

INSTAT Labour Cost Survey 2013

A1.2.5

Structure of labour cost by economic activity and size of enterprise

ALL

National

2013

INSTAT Labour Cost Survey 2013

A1.2.6

Coefficient of variation for annual labour cost by NACE Rev 2 sections

ALL

National

2013

INSTAT Labour Cost Survey 2013

ALL

National

2013

INSTAT Labour Cost Survey 2013

Euro

National

2013

No.

National

2010-2018

A1.2.4

A1.2.7 A1.2.8 A1.2.9 A1.2.10 A1.3.

Economic Resilience

A2 Socio-Economic Cohesion

A2.1.

Education

Comparative labour costs Doing business Rank Tertiary education

Coefficient of variation for average hourly labour cost by economic activity Average hourly labour cost per employee in full time units in different countries Doing Business Rating by category Nr of students graduated (total/by discipline)

No.

National

1997-2017

Economic Growth Change Employment Change

Gross Domestic Product (at current prices/constant prices)

ALL

Qark

2000-2015

Employment

No./%

Qark

2007-2015

A2.1.1

Expenditures in Education

% of Central Government budget for education

ALL

Qark

2000-2015

A2.1.2

Pupils enrolled in basic schools Pupils teacher ratio in basic schools

Nr of pupils enrolled in basic schools (by gender)

No.

Qark

2000-2015

Ration of nr of pupils per teacher in basic schooling

%

Qark

2000-2015

A2.1.4

Success ratio in basic schooling

Pupils enrolled/pupils graduated in basic schooling

%

Qark

2000-2015

A2.1.5

Public schooling success ratio Graduation ratio in secondary schooling

Pupils enrolled/pupils graduated in basic public schooling (by gender) Ratio graduated/enrolled number of pupils in secondary schooling (by gender)

A1.3.1 A1.3.2

A2.1.3

A2.1.6

and size of enterprise, in Albanian LEK

INSTAT Labour Cost Survey 2013 Doing business Ministry of Education/ INSTAT INSTAT & Own calculations INSTAT & Own calculations Ministry of Finance (RD till 2008) INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT

%

Qark

2000-2015 INSTAT

%

Qark

2000-2015

270

A2.1.7 A2.2.1 A2.2.2 A2.2. Health

A2.2.3 A2.2.4 A2.2.5 A2.3.1 A2.3.2 A2.3.3 A2.3.4

A2.3.

Poverty alleviation and social inclusion

A2.3.5 A2.3.6 A2.3.7 A2.3.8 A2.3.9 A2.3.10 A2.3.11

A2.4.

Criminality

A2.4.1 A2.4.2

Pupils teacher ratio secondary education Expenditures in Health Hospital beds per 10000 residents Health services

Ration of nr of pupils per teacher in secondary schooling % of Central Government budget for health Number of beds per 10000 inhabitants Health centres, hospitals, polyclinics, etc.

Indicators of social care Infant mortality ratio Poverty indicators by region Average monthly expenditures Real consumption per capita Education attained for 21 years & above by area and economic status Dwellings conditions and access to services

Institutions and persons per institution (houses of children, elderly, etc.)

Possession of durables Wages Families under social assistance Social Assistance Fund

Householdsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; possession of durables (car, refrigerators, etc.)

Average gross monthly wage per employee in public sector Average nr of families benefiting social assistance Average monthly social assistance fund by prefectures

Average income by social services Expenditures for Social Assistance and PLA Penal offences by type

Monthly average social protection for family (by family size) % of Central Government budget for social assistance and persons with limited abilities Penal offences (trafficking, drugs, etc.)

Domestic violence

Domestic violence

Infant mortality ratio/1000live births Poverty indicators by region: headcount, depth severity Average monthly expenditures by type and region Percentage of real consumption per capita by region

Qark

2000-2015

ALL

National/ Qark

2000-2015

No.

Qark

2000-2015

No.

Qark

2009-2017

INSTAT INSTAT No./ratio/%

National

1999-2008

%

Qark

No.

Qark 4 Regions of Instat 4 Regions of Instat

2001-2008 2002-20052008-2012 2002-20052008-2012 2002-20052008-2013

4 Regions of Instat

2002-20052008-2015

%

Qark

2002-20052008-2014

%

Qark

2012

ALL

Qark

2010-2014

ALL

Qark

2010-2014

ALL

Qark

2010-2014

ALL

Qark

2000-2013

ALL

Qark

2005-2015

No.

Qark

2014

%

Qark

2010-2014

All %

The highest diploma attained for persons 21 years and over by area and economic status Access to basic needs by economic status

INSTAT Ministry of Finance INSTAT

Ministry of Health INSTAT LSMS INSTAT LSMS INSTAT LSMS

INSTAT LSMS INSTAT LSMS INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT

Ministry of Finance INSTAT INSTAT

271

A2.4.3 A2.4.4 A3.1.1 A3.1.2 A3.1.3 A3.1.4 A3.1 Agriculture

A3.1.5 A3.1.6 A3.1.7 A3.1.8

A3 Environment and Sustainability

A3.1.9 A3.2.1 A3.2.2 A3.2 Environ. sustainability

A3.2.3 A3.2.4 A3.2.5 A3.2.6 A3.2.7 A4.1.1

A4 Territorial Development and Accessibility

A4.1 Demography and Spatial development

A4.1.2 A4.1.3 A4.1.4

Prisoners under 18 years old/ Total prisoners Prisoners rate per 10.000 inhabitants

% %

Qark Qark

2010-2014 2014

Land use Agricultural holding Total arable surface No. of agriculture machineries

Agricultural and non agricultural (ha)

ha

Qark

2000-2015

Number of agricultural holdings Arable land with field crops, vegies, permanent crops etc.)

Number of agriculture machineries (by type)

No.

Qark

2013-2015

ha

Qark

2009-2015

No.

Qark

2015

Livestock Livestock structure in livestock unit Farm size Emigrant contribution in Agriculture Total livestock production

Livestock by category

No.

Qark

2009-2015

Dimensions of livestock units Farm size

000/Livestock unit ha

Qark Qark

2015 2000-2015

Number of emigrants and number of farms with income from emigration

All

Qark

2012

Livestock production (by type)

Ton

Qark

2009-2015

Urban waste

Urban waste (total, per capita, inert) Content of pollution of air in main cities Bacterial pollution of sea water in main beaches Quality of river waters as compared to standards

Ton

Qark

2003-2017

Âľg/mÂł Various indicators Various indicators

2002-2017

Soil erosion Water supply Volume of water billed for sewage and volume of wastewater treated Population (total, female - male, rural - urban)

Ton (no/m3)

Cities Monitoring stations Monitoring stations Monitoring stations Qark

m3

Qark

2013-2015

No./YOY/km2

Qark

2001-2017

Population density as % of national average

%

Qark

2001-2017

Own calculations, INSTAT

Urban/Total Population ratio

%

Qark

2001-2017

Own calculations, INSTAT

Average population by age and gender

No./%/km2

Qark

2017

INSTAT

Juvenile crime rate Prisoners rate

Air Pollution Sea Pollution Quality of river waters Soil erosion Water supply Sewage Population Population density as % of national average Urbanization ratio Population age structure

INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT 2012-2017 INSTAT 2017 INSTAT 2010-2015 2013-2015

INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT

272

A4.1.5 A4.1.6 A4.1.7 A4.1.8 A4.1.9

Age dependency ratio Gross, net international migration ratio Construction permits

Age Dependency Ratios (old, young, total, by gender)

New surface build Overall forecasted dwellings based on permits approved

%

Qark

2011/2017

Difference between % incoming and % outgoing flows Construction permits (total and for housing)

Percentage points

Qark

2017

No.

Qark

2010-2017

New surface build (total and housing)

m2

Qark

2010-2017

Own Calculations, INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT

Overall forecasted dwellings based on permits approved

m2

Qark

2005-2017 INSTAT

A4.1.10

A4.1.11 A4.2.1 A4.2.2 A4.2.3 A4.2.4 A4.2 Local finances

A4.2.5 A4.2.6 A4.2.7 A4.2.8

A4.3 Accessibility

Current dwellings based on approved building permits

m2

Qark

2005-2017 INSTAT

m2

Qark

2005-2017

LGU expenditures by budget program

ALL

Municipality

2010-2017

www.financavend ore.al www.financavend ore.al www.financavend ore.al www.financavend ore.al www.financavend ore.al

Expenditures by purposes LGU Investment Expenditures per capita Classification of LGU by Revenue level

LGU expenditures for salaries, investments, operating expenses

%

Municipality

2010-2017

www.financavend ore.al

All

Municipality

2010-2017

www.financavend ore.al

Low-mid-High

2017

Total roads

Road network length

Qark

2014

www.financavend ore.al Ministry of Transport/ INSTAT

Road vehicles for passenger

Road vehicles for passenger (car/business/Minibus)

Qark

2010-2013

INSTAT

Revenues

LGU total revenues (total/per capita)

ALL

Municipality

2010-2017

LGU autonomy

Own revenues/Total revenues LGU governmental transfers/Total revenues LGU expenditures (total and per capita)

ALL

Municipality

2010-2017

ALL

Municipality

2010-2017

ALL

Municipality

2010-2017

Dependency ratio Expenditures Expenditures by program

A4.3.1 A4.3.2

Current dwellings based on approved building permits Current surface of dwellings (building permits)

Km No.

273

No. No.

Fixed phone users Mobile phone users

Cars per 1000 inhabitants Road vehicles used for good transport by type Fixed phone users per 1000 inhabitants Families where at least one person has a mobile phone

No./%

Qark

Internet users

Users having an email address

No./%

A4.3.8

Road accidents

Road accidents (total, killed, injured)

A4.3.9

Irrigation capacity

Area irrigated (actual vs. potential) Distance from the centres of the 61 municipalities to the nearest motorway exit (min) Travel time of people from the municipality/commune centre to the Qark Centre, by road and public transport No. of cities with a population >10,000, located in Qark with a distance 60 minutes or less from the Qark centre

A4.3.3 A4.3.4 A4.3.5 A4.3.6 A4.3.7

A4.3.10

A4.3.11

A4.3.12

Cars Road vehicles for goods

Access time to motorway exits Accessibility of people Availability of urban functions

INSTAT INSTAT

Qark

2001-2013

Qark

Qark

2010-2014 20012008/2014 2002-20052008-2012 2002-20052008-2012

No./%

Qark

2010-2014

%

Qark

2012/2014

Minimum

Municipality

2017

Own calculations

Minimum

Municipality

2015

Own calculations

No. of cities

Qark

2015

Own calculations

No. Qark

INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT INSTAT

274

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Notes

“Total value of all income or final product accruing to residents of a country derived from within and outwith that country” (Pike et al., 2017, p.20) 1

2 “Total value of all income or final product created within the borders of a country.” (Pike et al., 2017, p.20) 3 United Nations Development Program. For more on HDI see http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/humandevelopment-index-hdi.

4

For more see https://ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/.

5

For more see http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-development-index-gdi.

6

For more see http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii.

The discourse on territorial development, polycentricity and governance is provided in greater detail in the chapter 2 of this document.

7

8

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

9

European Regional Development Fund

Territorial cohesion was considered as the third dimension of Cohesion Policy based on articles 2, 6, 16 and 158 of the EC Treaty (TEC). In the current EU functioning treaty (TFEU), article 3 promotes economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among Member States, while article 4 defines economic, social and territorial cohesion as one of the shared competences between the Union and Member States. Articles 174-178 are dedicated to economic, social and territorial cohesion, covering aspects of the main purpose (reducing disparities and supporting lagging regions, defining funds to support the related actions and focusing especially on the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund.

10

11

In the view of the territorial cohesion framework.

12 ESPON operates in phases. The second phase was aiming at supporting policy development “in relation to the aim of territorial cohesion and harmonious development of European territory” (Böhme et al., 2011, p.15). The current (3rd) phase, ESPON 2020 is aiming at supporting “the reinforcement of the effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy and other sectorial policies and programmes under European Structural Investment (ESI) funds, as well as national and regional territorial development policies”, through producing and disseminating territorial evidence12 (ESPON, 2016, p.2).

For more on territorial cohesion see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/what/territorialcohesion/.

13

These areas are also defined in the article 177 of the TFEU. According to this article, the Cohesion Fund shall provide financial contribution to projects in the fields of environment and trans-European networks in the area of transport infrastructure.

14

15

For details on this debate refer to chapter 2.

This is based on personal analysis of the INSTAT data and protocol of publishing and providing information to third parties. As such it can also be argued that it is a personal judgment. It has been the case that data shown on maps (www.instatgis.gov.al) are different from those on excel tables and publications, with the previous providing a relatively worse off picture than the excel tables.

Furthermore, INSTAT protocols for providing access to data are very strict and it is impossible for researchers to have access to the database. Government reports on economic growth, social development, environmental quality, etc. are based on INSTAT data and in some cases are produced by INSTAT. In this respect, INSTAT constitutes the most powerful comprehensive database in Albania and has a stand that represents government’s position towards data, description of reality and analysis of sectors and territory.

16

Qark is the second level of local government in Albania and this is defined in the constitution. The law no. 139/2015 “On Local Self-Governance” defines qark as a territorial administrative unity composed of a number of municipalities (first level of local government) that have geographical, traditional, socio-economic and common interests. Qark is territorially equivalent to NUTS 3 subdivisions. Most of the statistics are generated/consolidated at qark level. There are 12 qarks in Albania. The government has established also 4 development regions, each comprising 3 qarks.

17

18

Source of information: Author, based on previous engagement with ISD project.

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19 NSDI 2015-2020 Vision: “Albania - a vibrant democracy on the path to integration with the European Union, with a competitive, stable and sustainable economy, and with guarantees of fundamental human rights and liberties” (GoA, 2016, p.2).

Regional Development Vision in NSDI: Balanced development and cooperation among the regions of the country thus enhancing Albania’s global competitiveness.

Regional Development Specific Objectives in NSDI: O1: Increasing regional competitiveness for sustainable socio-economic development of regions and their communities; O2: Strengthening regional cohesion and decreasing regional disparities; O3: Improve the efficiency of management of regional development (GoA, 2016, p.191) The facts brought in this paragraph are based on the author’s participation as a stakeholder and as an observer (for the sake of this research through the case study approach) in various policy-making processes taking place at national and regional level during 2015-2016. In this period the government was intensively engaged with implementing the territorial administrative reform and [re]initiating a regional development reform.

20

21

www.instat.gov.al and www.instatgis.gov.al

22

http://geoportal.asig.gov.al/

23

For classifying nodes, reference is made to (Boamah, 2018).

24

Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics

25 The EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region, covers the territories of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, Greece and Italy; while the EU Strategy on the Danube Area covers the territories of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and a number of other Balkan and Central-East European countries.

The treaty was approved as of 2007 and entered in force in 2009. The intention was the reformation of the functioning of the European Union following the two waves of enlargement, which have taken place since 2004 and which have increased the number of EU Member States from 15 to 27 (EU, 2008).

26

27

Mostly regions in central-eastern Europe: in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Poland (EC, 2017).

This group includes almost all of the less developed and transition regions in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal (EC, 2017) .

28

These are ESPON’s targeted analyses, namely: SPIMA - Spatial dynamics and strategic planning in metropolitan areas (2016-2017), https://www.espon.eu/metropolitan-areas; ReSSI - Regional Strategies for Sustainable and Inclusive Territorial Development: Regional Interplay and EU Dialogue (2017), https://www.espon.eu/ressi; and ACTAREA – Thinking and Planning in Areas of Territorial Cooperation (2016-2017), https://www.espon.eu/actarea.

29

30

European Economic and Monetary Union (CSD, 1999).

31 See for instance the cases described by Keating (1998) on the rise and development of the New Regionalism in Europe.

32 Currently Albania has 12 qarks (2nd tier of local government) whose boundaries match fully with those of the 12 prefectures (national government power delegated at local level – deconcentrated government bodies).

33

Gjakovë is a region in Kosovo.

34 Detailed information on local finances in Albania is provided at www.financatvendore.al. The portal provides data and makes analyses based on the data generated by the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury system.

35 The EU’s Chapter of the acquis no. 22 on ‘Regional policy and coordination of structural Instruments’ consists mostly of framework and implementing regulations, which do not require transposition into national legislation. They define the rules for drawing up, approving, and implementing Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund programmes reflecting each country’s territorial organisation.

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36 ADF is a development organisation, created in 1993 and operating based on Law 10130/2009. The ADF’s field of activity is to promote socio-economic development, and to support state development policies through guaranteeing sustainable, balanced, and cohesive development at regional and local level (Imami et al., 2018).

This section of the thesis is drafted as of 2015 and was published in a Co-PLAN report, containing an independent proposal on the designation of the development regions in Albania, referred in the text as Toto et al. (2015). Comments received by colleagues and the study of the process endorsed by the Government in designating these regions, were used during 2016-2017 to revise the chapter as presented in this document.

37

38

https://geoportal.asig.gov.al/map/?auto=true

39

State Authority for Geospatial Information

40

The data are for 2016.

The data belong to 2016. The source of information is INSTAT and administrative data published by the Ministries and related agencies.

41

The information is obtained in the database that the Ministry of Finances and Economy has provided in 23rd of April, 2018, to the Regional Development Program in Albania, based on official communication through the latter with protocol number 7104, of the abovementioned date. I had the possibility to access the information due to the links with the project, within the case study approach applied in my research. The information is however open to the public.

42

43 Regional Disparities Analysis, Integrated Support for Decentralization, 2009-2011, implemented by UNDP, funded by EU and UNDP. 44 This study was conducted at two spatial levels: the regional level equal to 12 qarks (NUTS III level in Albania), defined by the Constitution of Albania as the second tier of local government; the local level represented by 373 municipalities and communes, given that the study was finalised prior to the territorial-administrative reform of 2015.

Decision of the Council of Ministers no. 961, date 2.12.2015 on “The Establishment, Organisation and Operation of the National Agency for Regional Development, Regional Development Agencies and the Agency for Regional Economic Development”, December 2015.

45

Për kalimin e funksioneve të Agjencisë Kombëtare për Zhvillimin Rajonal (AKZHR), Agjencisë së Zhvillimit Ekonomik Rajonal (AZHER) dhe Agjencive Të Zhvillimit Rajonal (AZHR) te Fondi Shqiptar i Zhvillimit (FSHZH).

46

As a researcher, I have participated in the disparities’ analysis undertaken by the UNDP/EU project on Integrated Support for Decentralization in 2009. The current analysis makes use of the ISD methodology, but improves it and increases the number of indicators. This section provides a summary of the more extended analysis that I have conducted for the strict purpose of my PhD theses during 2015-2016.

47

48

Right hand scale.

49 The labour force survey is a household-based survey including all individuals aged 15 years and above in the selected territorial samples, in accordance with Eurostat methodologies. Administrative data on employment and unemployment are collected based on the Official Statistical Programme of INSTAT. Data regarding the non-agricultural private sector are obtained from the National Employment Service, which collects information from employment offices and from the General Directorate of Taxation. Due to the lack of administrative sources for agricultural private employment data, information on the latter is collected only through household/farmers surveys. As of 2007 employment in the agriculture sector is estimated based on the labour force surveys.

More information at http://reports.weforum.org/pdf/gci4-2018/WEF_GCI4_2018_Profile_ALB.pdf.

Methodological details at https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitveness-report-2018/ 50

Cost of obtaining a certain minimum quantity of calories augmented allowing for non-food basic necessities – Source INSTAT. 51

52

According to INSTAT: those with difficulties meeting basic nutritional needs.

53

More information is available at https://www.espon.eu/tracc.

54

Tirana International Airport ‘Mother Tereza’ located in the village of Rinas.

293

55 According to the reference study, “accessibility is the main ‘product’ of a transport system. It determines the locational advantage of an area relative to other areas” (Spiekermann et al., 2015, p.1) 56 Information is provided at http://www.instat.gov.al/al/temat/industria-tregtia-dhe-shërbimet/regjistristatistikor-i-ndërmarrjeve/#tab2.

57 The information is based on the latest update of the Agency for the Support of Civil Society (AMSHC) website in the following link, accessed on May 24, 2018: http://www.amshc.gov.al/web/ojf/.

58

Updated on 25.4.2018.

59

Updated on 6.2.2018.

60

Updated on 13.7.2016.

61

Updated on 19.4.2018.

62

Updated on 6.2.2018.

63

Updated on 26.4.2018.

64

Updated on 21.5.2018.

65

Updated on 21.5.2018.

66

Updated on 24.4.2018.

67

Updated on 14.11.2017.

68

Updated on 25.4.2018.

69

Updated on 19.1.2018.

70

More information is available at www.bujqesia.gov.al.

71

Albanian for ‘I want it’

Law no 107/2014, ‘On Territory Planning and Development’, as ammended and 3 bylaws on planning, land development and public space.

72

I was personally involved in this project and engaged, among others aspects, specifically with the preparation of the analysis and the related proposal on the subdivision of Albania into NUTS II regions.

73

I explored dichotomoies in the study I conducted for the purposes of this thesis on regional disparities (Shutina et al. 2016) and polycentrism.

74

294