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The Stetson Gadfly

Department Of Philosophy Newsletter
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Is John Bolton a diplomat? An Inquiry into the Persistence Conditions of Status Functions
Status functions are institutionallydefined categories professor, President of the United States, Federal Reserve Note, parolee, and diplomat. When does something or someone come to count as an instance of a status function? This is the question I’ve been asking in my latest research. Before addressing that question we need to say a bit more about what a status function is. First, status functions carry a deontology of rights and obligations. A professor is obliged to grade assigned work and the President must submit a budget request to Congress. Diplomatic immunity is to be found among the various rights and obligations entailed by the status. Money gives one the right to extinguish a debt. When one falls under a status function one has reasons to act that one might not have otherwise had. Second, status functions have functions or purposes, and the deontic powers typically help advance those purposes. Presidents lead and professors teach and research. The function of a diplomat includes representing and protecting the interests of a state by way of the formal right to, e.g., negotiate a treaty. Money serves as a medium of exchange. Finally, many status functions come into being when certain constitutive rules or conference procedures are satisfied. One becomes President when one is elected. Diplomats are appointed. Dollar bills are printed by the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing.
So when does a person become a diplomat? The last feature of a status function suggests an easy answer to that question when he or she satisfies the constitutive rules. As soon as someone is appointed to the office and swears an oath of office he or she becomes a diplomat.
But then consider the case of John Bolton, who controversially served as U.S. Under Secretary of State from 2001 to 2005. Jeane Kirkpatrick said of Bolton: “He loves to tussle. He may do diplomatic jobs for the U.S. government, but John is not a diplomat.”
While he was appointed by President Bush, so satisfying the constitutive rules of the institution, he also infamously flaunted many of the deontic obligations entailed by the status of diplomat. Kirkpatrick suggests that Bolton is not a diplomat, despite having been appointed by the President. What gives? Maybe we shouldn’t be so quick to tie the persistence conditions of a status to the satisfaction of the status’ constitutive rules. Afterall, these statuses exist to serve a purpose or function and maybe something’s ability to realize that purpose or function ought to have something to do with the determination of the kind of thing it is. A computer that can’t compute may not be a computer. And a diplomat that doesn’t correctly represent the interests of the state shouldn’t be considered a paradigm case of diplomat even if that person satisfies the constitutive rules of the institution.
I’m not here claiming that Bolton isn’t a diplomat. But neither am I saying that he definitely is. If all status functions are metaphysically vague, as Lynn Baker thinks they must be, we can explain, rather than explain away, Kirkpatrick’s remark. Just as there is no fact of the matter as to whether a fertilized egg is or is not an animal, or whether a mostly completed boat is a boat, I argue that the best interpretation of Kirkpatrick’s remark has her drawing our attention to the indeterminacy Bolton’s status.
By Joshua Rust
As the End of Year Celebration, the Philosophy Faculty and Majors were enjoying so good times in conversation at the Café DaVinci in downtown Deland.

Quote:
“I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you.” -Socrates

WHOARE OURADJUCTS?



Louis Colombo earned his Phd in philosophy from the New School for Social Research in New York City, where he wrote his dissertation on Hegel’s conception of the infinite. Perhaps not surprisingly, as a semi-reformed Hegelian, he is still in love with the history of philosophy, and finds it hard to settle down in any particular area. Recurring areas of interest include the Cynics and the Stoics, as well the first wave of Critical Theory.
Louis has been fortunate to teach as an adjunct instructor for several semesters at Stetson, where he has enjoyed an active and engaged student population and a supportive environment. While he has been teaching Logic, he is excited to be teaching Introduction to Philosophy (and Logic) this coming fall. Although he has yet to figure out how to narrow down the history of philosophy to one semester, he hopes that his students will leave the class at the end of the term thinking not only about what philosophy is about, but equally about what it means to be a philosopher.
David DiQuattro earned his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Notre Dame. He moved to Central Florida with his family last year after teaching philosophy at Grove City College (his undergraduate alma mater) for seven years, also serving as chair of the philosophy department.


David’s main research interests are in ethics and St. Augustine. He’s interested in exploring the relevance of St. Augustine for thinking about the virtues, the good life, and human agency. He’s interested in philosophical analyses of modernity in the works of figures such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Iris Murdoch as well as earlier figures such as Nietzsche.
David has taught on a wide variety of philosophical topics and periods, and enjoys the opportunity to make connections between different areas and time periods of philosophy. So he has enjoyed the chance to teach introductory courses at Stetson. He enjoys student contributions in Introduction to Philosophy to discussions of such fundamental questions as the existence of God, the nature and limits of knowledge, and the nature of the virtues. David has also taught Introduction to Logic at Stetson, and enjoyed that quite a bit, as logic was a very formative part of his own undergraduate education.
Steven Smallpage will complete his PhD in political science at Michigan State University this August. He received an MA in Political Theory and Jewish Studies at the University of Toronto and a BA in political science at American University. He joins the political science department here at Stetson as an assistant professor this Fall. As a political scientist, his main research areas are empirical political psychology, American political culture and development, and the history of normative political philosophy.
As an adjunct instructor in the philosophy department at Stetson University, Steven taught several sections of Introduction to Philosophy where students read (almost line-by-line) recent translations of Aristotle's Politics, John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, and Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France. The noticeably political flavor of the class encouraged student discussions. Steven enjoyed teaching for the department enormously. As a political philosopher, Steven's work focuses on the political culture and psychology of liberal constitutionalism. His work draws heavily on historical figures like John Locke and Edmund Burke, and contemporary philosophers like Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau. Steven's recent work has focused on the philosophical nature of conspiracy thinking, anxiety, and fear in political liberalism