Returning to a fine tradition

Christopher Luxon outlines the Coalition government’s approach to foreign policy.

To achieve its economic and social goals at home, New Zealand must engage with the world. The changes being wrought in the global environment place greater pressure on New Zealand and Australia’s shared interests. The rules-based order is under stress. So, too, are regional orders, including the IndoPacific region, where military expansion and modernisation continue at a scale not seen in the region for more than half a century. And closer to home, climate change is a profound security threat. Apart from adjusting its foreign policy to these developing conditions generally, New Zealand seeks to strengthen its relationship with Australia.

My government is ambitious for New Zealand. By 2040 — the bicentenary of the signing of New Zealand’s founding document, the Treaty of Waitangi — I want New Zealanders to be living in one of the most successful small, advanced economies on the planet. We will know we have achieved that because we will have significantly improved the health and education outcomes of all New Zealanders. We will have surgically targeted inequality with our social investment approach and addressed the cycle of poverty that is holding back some of our communities. We will have lifted the productivity per hour of Kiwi workers and we will be well on the road to achieving Net Zero carbon emissions by 2050. But we will not get there by disengaging from the world. That is why my government is bringing more energy, more urgency and a sharper focus to our external engagement.

I intend to unpack our thinking by doing three things: l First, highlight the changes being wrought in the world that place greater pressure on New Zealand and Australia’s shared interests. l Second, outline New Zealand’s Foreign Policy Reset that responds to these changes. l Finally, I will describe my government’s ambition for strengthening our enduring partnership with Australia.

New Zealand’s prosperity and security depends on our ability to understand and influence our strategic environment.

So, how do we see that environment? It is very apparent that our strategic outlook is deteriorating more rapidly than at any time in our lifetimes. Tectonic shifts are unfolding in the global distribution of power, economic heft and strategic influence. Old assumptions are being upended. New Zealanders sometimes perceive themselves as buffered by splendid isolation. Geography still matters, and always will. But there is no opting out from today’s strategic realities.

Stresses system

First, the liberal rules-based international system built over the last 80 years is under stress. The over-arching trend is of rules giving way to power. We see states willing to abandon diplo- macy for war as they seek to alter the status quo. Most blatant is the illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

For all its imperfections, the international order that some are intent on dismantling has — and continues — to serve New Zealand’s interests incredibly well, and dare I suggest Australia’s, too. For instance, our two countries have a stake in an open, rules-based trading order. We are both resisting a concerning trend of countries retreating from WTO rules. For a return to a world where raw power is the primary determinant in advancing states’ interests would be a harsh world indeed; particularly, but not exclusively, for small states like New Zealand.

Second, we see regional orders under serious strain. Significantly, and concerningly, diplomacy has in some cases yielded to violence. Since 7 October 2023, the Middle East has faced new waves of instability: starting with Hamas’ deadly terror attacks; then the devastating conflict in Gaza, where an immediate ceasefire is urgently needed; and the ever-present risk of wider regional escalation.

It is a disturbing reality that we talk less today of the IndoPacific region as the engine room of global economic activity, and more as the locus of concerning flashpoints, including: l North Korea’s provocative actions and breaches of UN Security Council resolutions. l The militarisation of disputed features and unsafe encounters on the water in the South China Sea. l Increasing tension in the Taiwan Strait. Military expansion and modernisation continue at a scale not seen in the region for more than half a century. Absent transparency and reassurance about strategic intent, these changes impact other countries’ sense of security, and how they, in turn, secure their interests. Against this backdrop, we must be cleareyed in recognising the risk of conflict in our wider region has risen. But conflict is not inevitable. All countries have a stake in, and a responsibility to invest in dialogue and diplomacy.

Profound threat

Finally, and closer to home, in the Pacific, climate change is a profound security threat. As shorelines erode, and extreme weather events intensify, Pacific lives and livelihoods are affected in very real ways. Like Australia, we are alive to and responsive to those concerns; for they compound under a confluence of other pressures affecting Pacific states: fiscal stress, cost-of-living pressures and weak GDP growth; development challenges, and infrastructure deficits; and geopolitical pressure. Pacific nations face a stark set of challenges, often with fewer resources and options for dealing with them. In short, the world is getting more difficult and more complex, particularly so for those smaller states navigating increasingly stormy seas. However, we must engage with the world as it is, not as we wish it to be.

As we look outwards, we see many others — including Australia — working to buttress the system of rules and norms through engagement, reassurance and deterrence. New Zealand, too, must be a participant and a contributor — not an interested bystander. That is not simply because it is the right thing to do, but because it is in New Zealand’s interests. My government is determined to build a prosperous resilient economy, but we cannot achieve prosperity without security. Together with my Foreign, Defence and Trade ministers, the four of us are collectively bringing more energy, more urgency and a sharper focus to New Zealand’s external engagement. Together, we are marshalling all instruments of statecraft — development, diplo- macy, defence and commerce — in a co-ordinated way. Bringing purpose and clarity to the relationships we are investing in, and the issues and challenges we are focusing on.

I pay particular tribute to my deputy prime minister, Winston Peters, who is among the most activist and impactful of New Zealand’s foreign ministers in a generation. Bringing his wisdom, experience and extraordinary networks to the portfolio, he is reshaping our foreign policy. And he sets an absolutely cracking pace: in just nine months, he has visited 30 countries, getting New Zealand and our interests back in the game. When he was last foreign minister, Winston Peters drove an uplift in New Zealand’s engagement in the Pacific. That was the right policy then; and it is the right policy now.

Intensive focus

So we are sustaining that intensive focus on our immediate neighbourhood. We want to be great partners to our Pacific friends. That means listening to their priorities and partnering with them on real solutions. Already, I have met nine of the region’s leaders, hearing first-hand about their challenges. As a country, we have got the tools to make a big impact.

l Thirty government departments with some form of engagement with Pacific counterparts, ranging from Health to Customs, from the Reserve Bank to Corrections.

l Economic ties underpinned by PACER Plus, the regional trade agreement, together with our seasonal worker programme.

l An aid programme delivering $600 million in support to the Pacific every year.

l Defence and police forces partnering with their Pacific counterparts to do things such as supporting the Solomon Islands election, searching for lost fishermen, working with Samoa to deliver CHOGM and delivering relief supplies.

l And a close partnership with Australia, which is indispensable to the region.

Last August, I attended my first Pacific Islands Forum, where my focus was on understanding my counterparts’ priorities for our region. New Zealand is committed to listening to our Pacific partners and respecting the principle of Pacific Islands Forum centrality to translate the Forum leaders’ Blue Pacific goals into action.

The foundation of our Foreign Policy Reset is our collaboration with long-standing partners, who we know best and with whom we have deep reservoirs of trust. We are deliberately deepening our relationships with Australia, as well as other Five Eyes partners. This is my third visit to Australia in less than a year. Half of my Cabinet has been here. That is deliberate: we are committed to a deep and broad relationship with Australia, which I will return to below.

Australia is first and foremost, but we are also building depth into our relationship with other close partners. With the United States, we are improving the architecture of our relationship with annual foreign ministers’ talks and a technology dialogue. We are also doing more together. In our Pacific region, we are working with the United States to build resilience. Another example is our contribution to the collective effort, under US leadership, to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and restore the important principle of freedom of navigation.

Ukraine support

With the United Kingdom, we are contributing almost a hundred personnel to train Ukrainian infantry. As I have assured President Volodymyr Zelensky, whether by helping Ukraine defend itself or sanctioning Russia, New Zealand is in it for the long haul. That is because we demand that international rules are respected. It is because security is indivisible, with what happens in Europe reverberating in our own region.

While at the NATO Summit, I met Prime Minister Justin Trudeau: and he, Anthony Albanese and I have put out three statements jointly this year. Each of these is a clear enunciation of our views on the Middle East. Each of these is a great example of how we three are stronger when we project together.

And, our strategic and our economic interests are most acutely engaged in the Indo-Pacific region — the part of the world in which we are lucky enough to reside. Sustaining economic growth at rates of more than 5 per cent of GDP — year-in, year-out — South-east Asia is an incredibly dynamic part of the world, one that is turning to us at precisely the same time we are re-energising our commitment to them. I am committed to lifting New Zealand’s relationship with our South-east Asian friends by building holistic and strategic partnerships with them, by being more present and by being more responsive to their needs.

Thanks to Anthony Albanese’s kind invitation, I was able to meet with all the South-east Asian leaders in Melbourne in March 2024. Since then, I have either hosted or visited with my Singaporean, Thai, Philippine and Vietnamese colleagues. And I intend to visit more of the region shortly. In 2025, we will mark a special anniversary, commemorating 50 years of New Zealand’s relationship with ASEAN, our partners in regional integration. That will be a major priority for me.

India’s significant influence is both profound and growing. My government is determined to broaden and deepen our relationship with New Delhi. We have started as we mean to go on.

The foreign minister has visited India once, my Trade minister twice and he was there again in August wearing his Agriculture hat. At the same time we welcomed India’s president. Prime Minister Modi and I have connected, and I look forward to meeting him in person.

Longstanding partner

Japan is an important and long-standing partner, so I was pleased to get to Tokyo early in 2024, to strengthen our security ties, lift our co-operation in the Pacific and advance new opportunities for trade and investment.

China remains New Zealand’s biggest trading partner and a country of undoubted influence, and a country with which we want to work to find solutions to shared challenges like climate change. Equally clearly — and as I conveyed to Premier Li Qiang when he visited New Zealand — the difference in values and systems of government mean there are issues on which we cannot and will not agree. Where we disagree, we will raise our concerns privately and also, when necessary, publicly in a consistent and predictable manner. When we speak out, we do so based on our interests and values. A good example of that was my government’s decision this year to publicly attribute a cyberattack on our parliamentary computer networks to a People’s Republic of China state-backed entity.

Finally, on the Indo-Pacific region, I champion the architecture, existing and evolving, that scaffolds the region’s prosperity and its security. Economically, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership is central. We want the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to build on its early promise, too.

Strategically, we are strongly supportive of the indispensable role played by the United States in the region, and the broader array of alliances and partnerships that buttress the region’s prosperity and security. We support constructs like the Quad and Partners for the Blue Pacific that amplify likeminded countries’ efforts to act in partnership, while respecting the centrality of regional organisations like ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum. And I was pleased to chair the third meeting of the ‘Indo-Pacific Four’ leaders at NATO, a grouping that, together with New Zealand, encompasses Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea, and which has an important contribution to make.

Across many of these examples, working in partnership with Australia is an instinctive and fundamental part of New Zealand’s approach. This is an opportunity to set out how we can do more together, and with greater effect. The bonds of history, geography, common values, our deep people-to-people links are often captured in a simple phrase — we are family. Australia is New Zealand’s indispensable ally, partner and friend. It is more relevant to us than ever as we forge our path in a more contested world. And, dare I say, we are more relevant to Australia than ever. My government has three broad ambitions for our partnership.

Shared security

First, we will bolster shared security. Early in 2024 we reaffirmed our shared commitment to the ANZUS Treaty, which formalises our alliance commitments to each other. New Zealand is committed to remaining a credible and effective ally and partner. In the coming months, my government will confirm a new Defence Capability Plan, which will outline our defence capability priorities and budget trajectory out to 2040. This will mean replacing and upgrading capability and infrastructure which is reaching end of life, as well as investing in new capability.

Strengthening inter-operability with our ally Australia will be a central principle of our capability decisions. It is important we can continue to deploy alongside each other in response to the growing array of security challenges we face, particularly in the face of rapid technological change. In this regard, we welcome AUKUS as an initiative to enhance regional security and stability.

New Zealand is not involved in Pillar 1 of AUKUS. Australia understands that our anti-nuclear policy remains unchanged. Pillar 2 of AUKUS involves co-operation on advanced technologies — including some, such as cyber, on which we have long co-operated with partners. New Zealand is exploring with the AUKUS partners how we could potentially participate in Pillar 2, including to understand what this means for our focus on ensuring inter-operability.

Our second broad ambition for our relationship is continuing to partner in the Pacific in support of Pacific priorities. New Zealand and Australia are both working as steadfast partners in support of our fellow Pacific Islands Forum members. Both of our countries have significant familial, cultural and geographic ties into the Pacific.

Like Australia we want to strengthen the region’s capacity to ensure the prosperity and well-being of future Pacific generations, especially through the Pacific Islands Forum. Together Australia and New Zealand contribute around half of all aid to the Pacific. We are working with Australia and Pacific countries to improve infrastructure and connectivity — the Pacific Connect cable is a great example.

Economic integration

Thirdly, we want to ensure prosperous economies on both sides of the Tasman. Between New Zealand and Australia, we are working to further deepen our own bilateral economic integration. Australia provides more than half of New Zealand’s stock of foreign direct investment. It is our second biggest trading partner. And, for Australia, New Zealand adds an economy the size of Western Australia. We provide our emerging companies markets to cut their teeth as first-time exporters.

There are further gains to be had through trans-Tasman integration. We need to do the basics right — through standards harmonisation. We need to ensure alignment of our regulatory environments for new technologies — whether the clean energy transition or artificial intelligence. This work is not glamorous or sexy. It is about scraping the barnacles off the bottom of the boat, so the boat goes faster. And I recommit to that essential maintenance.

To return to where I began, the prosperity it enables is crucial to ensuring that we are equipped to respond to the more challenging world around us. Making our way in a more challenging world demands more energy, more urgency and a sharper focus. New Zealand is a vibrant, globally connected, open trading nation. We are a nation with a contribution to make. And an international role to play. My government will return to the fine tradition of Kiwi activism on the world stage.

Rt Hon Christopher Luxon MP is prime minister of New Zealand. This article is the edited text of an address he gave at the Lowy Institute, Sydney on 15 August.