Global-is-Asian Issue 10

Energy and sustainability • Democracy • Role of a public policy school

Issue 10 · Apr-Jun 2011

Column · Dean’s Provocations 4

The search for good governance

Spectrum 8

Asian parking policy surprises

10 Singapore’s demographic trends 12 Deconstructing domestic work: why it matters

Editor-in-Chief Sung Lee, slee@nus.edu.sg Editors Alicia Wong Elizabeth Ong, Designer Chris Koh,

14 Information technologies and the rise of Asia 16 The media’s role in public policy

elizabethong@nus.edu.sg

18 States and regions in East Asia and Europe: histories matter

chris.k@nus.edu.sg

Cover Illustrator Carolyn Ridsdale

As populations and affluence rise, countries across the globe wrestle with parking issues. 8

Illustrators Li Dan, Paul Lachine and Danny Snell Editorial Advisory Board Eduardo Araral, Preeti Dawra, Darryl Jarvis, Ora-orn Poocharoen, Astrid S. Tuminez, Stavros Yiannouka

21 Wanted and needed: women leaders in Asia 22 Europe’s importance in the global village 24 Predictable uncertainty: China’s rise and U.S.–Korea security dilemmas 26 What do businesses think of ASEAN? 28 ASEAN: in pursuit of a dynamic equilibrium

Editorial Office Research Support Unit (RSU) Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy 469C Oei Tiong Ham Building, Singapore 259772 +65 6516 4301 RSUlkyschool@nus.edu.sg

30 Book review Focus 32 Breaking the sustainability barrier 34 The future of nuclear energy

No part of this publication may be reproduced in whole or in part without written permission from the Editor-in-Chief © 2011, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS. Globalis-Asian is published quarterly.

38 The business case against nuclear power 40 Oil: a risky beneficiary of Japan’s nuclear crisis and Arab revolts

The views and opinions expressed in this publication reflect the authors’ point of view only and not necessarily those of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS.

42 Championing climate change in Southeast Asia: a role for corporate leaders

ISSN 1793-8902

Jan Peter Balkenende reminds Asia of the importance of Europe in the global village. 22

44 Quo vadis, energy policy?

46 Institutions of relevance Spotlight 50 Democracy and development 53 Preventing mass violence and genocide in the 21st century 56 Street, stage, shrine, and square: protest sites as contested terrain Alma Mater 59 Education for development 61 Mongolia: fastest-growing economy in the next decade Executive Education 64 Nurturing collaboration among Central Asian countries

Achieving sustainability 32

The future of nuclear energy 34

Back to oil? 40

66 The new year and a new vision for Kazakhstan Photo Essay 68 Do you live the change? research Sojourn 72 Scholars without borders 74 An exercise in climate change evaluation and letting go Column · Shrink Wrap 77 Psychology of a dictator

Public policy schools find it difficult to attain the right balance between theory and practice. 46

Accolades

The search for good governance Text • Kishore Mahbubani

Z

Kishore Mahbubani is the Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

hou Enlai, the legendary Chinese leader, was once asked by a visiting French minister, Andre Malraux, what he thought of the French revolution of 1789. Zhou Enlai famously replied, ‘It is too early to tell.’

If Zhou were alive today, he would probably give the same answer if he were asked what he thought of the recent revolutions in North Africa. President Ben Ali of Tunisia fled on 15 January; President Mubarak of Egypt resigned on 12 February; and the UN Security Council adopted its sanctions on Moammar Gadhafi on 27 February. In addition, we have seen remarkable demonstrations in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. So why did all these apparently stable societies suddenly explode? The simple answer is that nobody knows (and certainly nobody predicted these surprising developments).

However, some alternative narratives are emerging.

The Western narrative is clear. Democracy is an unstoppable force. Hence, just as democratic revolutions swept through the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and more recently, were rekindled in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), it was only a matter of time before they crossed the Mediterranean to sweep into North Africa. Roger Cohen, an influential New York Times columnist said these upheavals have shown that young Arabs ‘are focused on issues like democracy, accountability, transparency and the rule of law’. This Western narrative may well be true. If so, it is remarkable that several Western countries did not leap with joy when long-serving dictators were removed. The French foreign minister Michèle Alliot-Marie tried to defend the rule of President Ben Ali and suggested sending French security forces to help quell the uprising. The Obama Administration tried its best to save Mubarak. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pleaded with officials in Washington to delay Mubarak’s departure from Egypt so that Israel could have more time to prepare.

There is no comparable Asian narrative on the North African revolutions.

Most Asians believe that the lack of development is as important as the lack of democracy in fomenting revolutions. The main reason why these revolutions broke out in North Africa and the Middle East rather than in Asia is that many North African societies have remained socially and economically stagnant while Asian societies have focused on development. The lack of jobs and economic growth also fuelled this unrest. Since many Europeans now live in terror of the consequences of these North African revolutions, they

Image: Danny Snell

must be wishing they had stable neighbours like Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia rather than Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.

The fundamental lesson may therefore be crystal clear. To prevent instability, countries need to relentlessly promote good governance. As long as the common man on the street feels that with each passing year, his livelihood and the livelihood of his children are improving, there will be relative political stability.

To understand the gap between the North African and East Asian stories, it is good to remind ourselves that in the 1960s, Egypt had roughly the same per capita income as South Korea. Today the gap could not be more telling.

The recent North African revolutions should therefore accelerate the search for good governance. What makes this search extremely difficult is that we are not sure what we are searching for.

In the Western narrative, no good governance is possible without a package of political freedoms. In East Asia, no good governance is possible without social and economic growth and development. In short, the emphasis varies in different societies. Yet it is clear that we all have to come together to forge a global consensus on what the essential requirements for good governance are.

The American economy is struggling to re-stabilise itself because it has neglected some fundamental principles of economic

discipline. The most fundamental economic principle is that no country can live beyond its means forever. Unless America reduces its deficits, it could go the way of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, with horrendous consequences for itself and for the world.

America needs to pay more attention to economic fundamentals to achieve good governance. By contrast, while the Chinese economic system is thriving, China’s political system has to adapt and adjust to the aspirations of a rising and vocal Chinese middle class. China has to pay more attention to political fundamentals to achieve good governance.

One vital future role for the LKY School is to provide a forum for continuing debate and research on what constitutes good governance. It helps when former Prime Ministers like Tony Blair and Jan Peter Balkenende share their experiences at the School.

It also helps that the faculty has a dense research agenda on various aspects of good governance. Hence, in the global search for good governance, one essential place to visit may well be the LKY School. The time has come to develop a new global consensus on what constitutes good governance. To achieve this consensus, we will have to bring together the best of the East and the West. If we succeed, we may be less surprised by revolutions in North Africa and elsewhere. · Ap r-J un 2 0 1 1 · p 5

Asian parking policy surprises · Singapore’s demographic trends · Deconstructing domestic work: why it matters · Information technologies and the rise of Asia · The media’s role in public policy · States and regions in East Asia and Europe: histories matter · Wanted and needed: women leaders in Asia · Europe’s importance in the global village · Predictable uncertainty: China’s rise and U.S.– Korea security dilemmas · What do businesses think of ASEAN? · ASEAN: in pursuit of a dynamic equilibrium · Book review

Asian parking policy surprises As populations and affluence rise, countries across the globe wrestle with parking issues. Paul Barter looks at how the West and the East handle the demand and supply of parking spaces.

Image: ST Steve, flickr.com

‘East Asian cities, along with Singapore, have parking policies that avoid excessive promotion of automobile-dependence. Although these cities have apparently conventional parking policies on paper and still have minimum parking requirements, their parking standards tend to be applied moderately and pragmatically.’

P

arking policy is a hot topic in many cities, usually because of the conflict it provokes. Innovation in parking policy and technology is rapidly broadening the possibilities, but this area remains a minefield for many jurisdictions. There is also an increasing awareness of the importance of parking policy as a key influence on transport patterns. However, there is very little parking policy literature that provides any clear international comparative perspective or guidance for regions outside the North Atlantic.

Parking Policy in Asian Cities is a 90-page report that addresses this gap for the Asian region. It compares parking practice and policy in 14 cities across South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia with the help of assistants and generous collaborators in each city. It was funded by the Sustainable Infrastructure Division of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The study reveals some surprises about parking policy in the region and striking contrasts among the cities that were studied.

Worldwide, the most common approach to parking policy requires every building to include on-site parking — enough to cater to all the parking demand it generates. This approach originated in the United States and it is in American suburban areas that this conventional approach takes its extreme form, to the point that a suburban office campus may be required to have more parking space than actual office floor space.

However, this conventional parking policy — based on minimum parking requirements — is usually regarded to be ill-suited to dense urban environments, such as those found in the older parts of most cities. Therefore, in dense areas of Western cities, a different approach is usually taken, in which parking is intensively managed by local governments as a shared resource for whole neighbourhoods, with as much emphasis on managing demand as on ensuring supply. This ‘parking management’ paradigm has been the main alternative to the conventional approach so far. Recently, it has been joined by another alternative: the so far untested market-oriented approach championed by Professor Donald Shoup of UCLA and author of the book The High Cost of Free Parking.

As mentioned above, Parking Policy in Asian Cities reveals some surprises. Most Asian cities have high urban densities, relatively low car ownership and high use of public transport. So, we might expect them to take a parking management approach in their parking policies. Instead, all of the 14 cities studied apply minimum parking requirements. Surprisingly, they appear to be following a conventional approach. In fact, most of the South Asian and Southeast Asian cities in the study are adopting parking policies that promote parking supply in the same ways that automobile-dependent suburban areas in the West do, albeit to a lesser extent for now. Such policies are helping to fuel the growth of car ownership and traffic.

On the other hand, the East Asian cities, along with Singapore, have parking policies that avoid excessive promotion of automobile-dependence. Although these cities have apparently conventional parking policies on paper and still have minimum parking requirements, their parking standards tend to be applied moderately and pragmatically. In some, such as Singapore, this involves making an effort to ensure that parking requirements are not excessive. In others, such as Tokyo and Taipei, it involves simply setting parking requirements at a surprisingly low level and not worrying too much about the possibility of a spillover. This may be because parking policy in East Asia generally assumes a strong role for shared private sector and public sector parking.

Thus, the affluent cities in the East Asia region have been shifting away from efforts to expand parking supply despite having parking policies that give the impression that they are promoting automobile-dependence. Nevertheless, it is still surprising that these cities are turning only slowly towards parking management, an approach that would seem well-suited to their needs. Seoul is alone among Asian cities in the study in explicitly using parking maximums as a traffic demand management measure.

Paul Barter is an Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. paulbarter@nus.edu.sg

Singapore’s demographic trends Singapore’s total fertility rate is falling. This is a phenomenon shared by other developed nations. Yap Mui Teng looks at the figures and ponders what should be done next.

Image: Li Dan

S

ingapore’s total fertility rate (TFR) at the time of full independence in 1965 was about 4.7 births per woman.

Nearly 56,000 babies were born that year.

The TFR fell to the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman a decade later, in 1975, as the number of births fell to about 40,000. Singapore has experienced belowreplacement TFRs since 1977. After a decade of below-replacement fertility, and

the TFR falling to a then unprecedented low of 1.4 births per woman in 1986, the government ended the anti-natalist policy that it had adopted since independence and replaced it with a selectively pro-natalist one in 1987. The ‘Stop at two (children per family)’ policy was replaced with ‘Have three or more, if you can afford it’.

Both the TFR and the number of births rose sharply following this change.

However, these could not be sustained even though measures were also introduced to ease the financial costs of having children and the conflict between women’s work and family roles. Measures previously put in place to discourage large families were also removed. Since the early 2000s, Singapore has ranked among the countries with the lowest TFRs in the world. The numerical target

on family size was removed in 2004 and the policy has since been to provide a supportive environment for Singaporeans to marry and have children. The latest available preliminary data show that Singapore’s TFR has reached a new low, at 1.16 births per woman, in 2010. There were fewer than 38,000 babies born. The downward slide has continued in spite of the gamut of measures introduced and enhanced over the years to support family formation.

To be fair, the first decade of the 21st century has been a particularly turbulent one for the Singapore economy and for its people who are used to steady growth at fairly high rates. Economic shocks were few and far between. Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98, however, Singapore has encountered several severe economic shocks due mainly to it being a small and open economy in a globalised and highly inter-connected world (Figure 1). The country experienced economic downturns in the early 2000s associated with events such as the September 11 attack on the US, the dot-com bust, and the SARS epidemic which heavily affected Singapore’s tourism industry. In 2008–09, it experienced another episode of uncertainty associated with the global economic crisis following the crash of the property market in the US. The predictions then had been dire, with the crisis likened to the Great Depression. Unemployment rose to its highest level in decades in 2003 and could have peaked again in 2008–09 if not for the job-saving programmes put in place.

In the event, Singapore and Asia survived the recent economic crisis relatively unscathed. IPS’ Survey on the Marriage and Parenthood Package 2008 carried out in September 2009 showed that the childbearing decisions of 18 per cent of Singapore’s resident population of reproductive ages 20–49 years had been affected by the crisis. Among these, the majority were postponing their births — 12 per cent would have children when the economy recovered. The remaining six per cent, however, would not have any more children, either because they felt they were too old to have children or because the cost of living was too high.

Apart from the impact of short-term shocks, Singaporeans’ marriage and childbearing behaviour seem also to have

Figure 1: TFR and GDP growth rate, 1997–2010

Source: Department of Statistics. Population 2010, Key Annual Indicators and Time Series on GDP at 2005 Market Prices and Real Economic Growth.

changed over the past three decades. Singaporeans are increasingly delaying marriage or not marrying at all. Those who are married are also having fewer children.

The declines in marriage and family size have remained in spite of declarations of desire among singles to marry, and among the married to have 2–3 children.

What more needs to be done? Marriage and childbearing are indeed matters of personal choice. However, barriers to achieving desired personal goals in turn have national implications. The Marriage and Parenthood packages had been put in place specifically to help overcome barriers to achieving these desired outcomes.

IPS projections based on assumptions of a constant TFR of 1.24 births per woman from 2005 onwards, gradual rise in life expectancy and zero net migration show that population decline would set in from 2020. There will be a growing proportion of the old (defined as those 65 and over) and declines in the proportions of youth (aged 0–14 years) and the working age population (aged 15–64 years). The potential support ratio is projected to fall from more than 8.6 persons of working ages per elderly to 2.5 in 2030 and 1.7 in 2045–50 under these assumptions.

Immigration ameliorates the pace of ageing and decline. However, massive immigration also brings its own set

of challenges. Apart from physical and infrastructural constraints, there are also issues of integration and social cohesion.

These are especially important in a small and densely populated city-state like Singapore where differences are encountered at close quarters.

Studies elsewhere suggest that globalisation and its attendant consequences of increased uncertainty and competition in the labour market are making it more difficult for youths to attain traditional adulthood markers, including getting married and becoming parents. The perceived costs of having children, both financial and time-wise, in view of perceptions of what is needed to give children a leg-up on the competition, make becoming parents a daunting prospect.

Perhaps the young in Singapore, as those elsewhere, need assistance to cope with the challenges posed by globalisation and greater competition. Greater flexibility in education and employment require the collaboration of all stakeholders, including the government and employers. After all, where will future employees and tax payers come from if the stork will not deliver in the first place?

Yap Mui Teng is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. yap.muiteng@nus.edu.sg

· Ap r-J un 2 0 1 1 · p 1 1

Deconstructing domestic work: why it matters Text • Nicola Pocock

Image: Neo Kae Yuan

Domestic workers contribute in many ways to Singapore society and economy, yet their status is still an issue here. Nicola Pocock looks at the reasons why, and what can be done.

D

omestic work is underpaid and undervalued in most countries, including Singapore, where foreign female domestic workers (FDWs) plug a caring and domestic work gap. There are 250,000 live-in FDWs here, one in every six households, hailing from the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.

Legally, they are not entitled to a minimum wage or a mandatory day off. Why is domestic work devalued and underpaid, and why are foreign women hired to do it in Singapore?

Misconceptions and common views Some people claim that as FDWs perform ‘unskilled’ work, they need not be remunerated well, nor be affected by wage control laws. Yet, FDWs perform skilled work that includes cooking meals, childcare and eldercare. Further reasons cited in support of low wages include the following: that migration as an FDW is an individual choice, and that the salary FDWs receive is high compared to what they would be paid back home. This effectively negates debates about a minimum wage. But arguably, migration is not an individual choice if one considers the structural conditions in source countries (chronic un- and under-employment) that prompt migration. In addition, people are not rewarded in the labour market according to the value they create in society

(otherwise, investment bankers would be penalised for wreaking havoc in financial markets, and hospital cleaners and childcare workers would be better paid). Furthermore, wages are politically determined via immigration laws, rather than via a free market that rewards workers according to their productivity or value creation.

Part of the reason why FDWs do not enjoy the labour rights that other workers benefit from is that employers do not consider them to be like other types of workers. Raka Ray, a sociology professor at Berkeley, has eloquently put forward two possible reasons for this: First, the nature of an FDW’s work — caring for loved ones — means that employers expect FDWs to provide care beyond what any job description can specify. Most organisations rely on their employees to go beyond the scope of activities defined in their contracts, and in the household, this is magnified because it is seen as a private domain, and thus not subject to regulation. Secondly, hiring foreign women of a different class and ethnicity separates employers from their FDWs, making it psychologically easier to treat them differently. UN Women estimates that 84,967 FDWs here, ie. 34 per cent of the total, currently do not enjoy a day off. When UN Women launched a Maid Day Off campaign in 2008, it received practically no public support and little media coverage. Employers, without state intervention, are clearly unwilling to step up.

Foreign women address the lack of care resources in Singapore — a societal problem FDWs provide care services and housework that facilitate the labour market entry of Singaporean and expatriate women, enabling families to go about their daily lives with ease. At its core, employing FDWs is a private solution to a public problem. Hiring an FDW enables couples to avoid difficult conversations about who should do what at home, entrenching gendered divisions of labour between men and women. Angelique Chan and her colleagues in NUS recently conducted a survey on the role of FDWs in eldercare in Singapore. They found that FDWs assisted with 46 per cent of seniors’ activities of daily living. Given the vital role that FDWs play in addressing the lack of care resources in Singapore, the government should raise the status of FDWs by professionalising their work and the employment relationship. This could be achieved by legislating a day off and a minimum wage, professionalising their training and distinguishing between care workers and domestic workers. Of course, this means that lowcost ‘all-in-one’ labour would no longer be an option, something that is unpalatable to both the government and families. That is because the government places the responsibility of caring for the elderly and children on families, with minimal support except for occasional cash handouts. As a result, it is cheaper to hire a roundthe-clock FDW than to use nursing homes or childcare centres.

‘Singapore lags behind other countries with similar living standards and national income in the way they treat FDWs. In Hong Kong, FDWs have one day off per week and a minimum allowable wage (MAW) that is adjusted annually according to inflation.’

2. Hong Kong SAR Labour Department: Practical Guide For Employment of foreign domestic helpers – What foreign domestic helpers and their employers should know. http://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/public/wcp/ FDHguide.pdf

As NTU sociology professor Teo You Yenn asserts, ‘this is not a sustainable or desirable solution to a long-term problem’.1 Singapore lags behind other countries with similar living standards and national income in the way they treat FDWs. In Hong Kong, FDWs have one day off per week and a minimum allowable wage (MAW) that is adjusted annually according to inflation (The MAW was HK$3,580 in 2010.). Employers found breaching the MAW are liable to a maximum fine of HK$350,000 and three years’ imprisonment.2 Taiwan has similar differential minimum wage requirements for FDWs — NT$15,840, compared to the minimum basic wage of NT$17,280. Whilst differential wage laws for FDWs are obviously limited, it is a better deal than what Singapore-based FDWs get. Consider nannies and home cleaners in Western countries — they are revered and relatively financially well-rewarded in their labour markets.

If the government sent a strong message that domestic and caring work mattered, employers’ attitudes would change faster and abuse cases would decline.3 Employers are unlikely to grant their FDWs a day-off, or pay them more, even if the compulsory levy were abolished. I am not saying that this would never happen. But it would take longer for this to occur organically. Given that FDWs address a lack of care resources and facilitate higher female labour force participation, which directly contributes to Singapore’s economic development, it is about time their contributions are recognised.

3. Employers found guilty of physically abusing their FDWs are subject to the Penal Code, which provides up to 1.5 times the normal punishment (fine or imprisonment) for particular offenses. It does not cover psychological maltreatment or wrongful confinment.

Nicola Pocock is a Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. sppnp@nus.edu.sg

1. Teo YY: “Making choices amidst increasing burdens: a feminist analysis of Singapore’s prenatal policies.”

Conference paper, Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) conference, 5 March 2011. http://www.aware.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/TEO_Making_choices_rev.pdf

· Ap r-J un 2 0 1 1 · p 1 3

Information technologies and the rise of Asia Asia and its cities are fast taking over the reins of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) revolution from the U.S..

Dale Jorgenson and Vu Minh Khuong1 look at the growing figures.

The Rise of Asia ver the past few decades, Asia has surprised the world with its accelerated transformation towards sustained economic growth. China and India and developing Asia’s2 major economies have now joined the high-performance league. In the aftermath of the world financial and economic crisis, developing Asia has become the main engine of the global economic growth and a major power in the world economy.

The average GDP growth rate of the sixteen economies of developing Asia increased from 6.8 per cent in 1990–2000 to 7.4 per cent in 2000–08, whereas the seven largest industrialised economies (G7) experienced a sharp slowdown in growth, from 2.6 per cent in 1990–2000 to 1.8 per cent in 2000–08 (Table 1).

Developing Asia played an important role in boosting the world’s economic growth with its contribution to the world economy’s growth rising from 38.1 per cent in the first period to 43.3 per cent in the second. The group as a whole has surpassed the size of the economy of the US, whose share was 21 per cent in 2008. China and India have become, respectively, the second and fourth largest economies, with China behind only the US, and India behind only the US, China and Japan.

O

Contributions of ICT to the rise of Asia ICT contributes to economic growth via three channels. First, investment in ICT capital assets increases capital services and input into production. Second, the ICT-producing sector produces ICT goods and services, which makes a direct contribution to the value-added generated by the economy. The third channel is the contribution of ICT to improving the efficiency of the economy, which appears as growth of output per unit of input or total factor productivity (TFP).

1. We thank Alvin Diaz and Nguyen Chi Hieu for their excellent research assistance.

2. This study covers 122 economies, which are divided into seven groups: (i) G7, which includes the seven largest industrialised economies; (ii) Non-G7 Industrialised (17 non-G7 industrialised economies); (iii) Developing Asia (16 economies); (iv) Latin America (20 economies); (v) Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (22 economies); (vi) Sub-Saharan Africa (29 economies); and (vii) North Africa and Middle-East (11 economies). The Developing Asia group consists of the following 16 economies: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. Unless otherwise indicated, the data and results used in this article are drawn from Jorgenson and Vu (2010).

3. IT-BPO stands for Information Technology-Business Process Outsource. These data are from the NASSCOM (2005, 2010, 2011).

4. Computed from UN Comtrade data.

Image: how3ird, flickr.com

Table 1: Sources of GDP growth by period

Period 1990–2000

Period 1990–2000

Sources of growth (% ppa) Economy

GDP growth

Capital

Sources of growth (% ppa)

Labour TFP

ICT

Non-ICT

Hours

Quality

GDP growth

Capital

Labour TFP

ICT

Non-ICT

Hours

Quality

World

3.04

0.43

1.13

0.54

0.33

0.62

3.82

0.41

1.16

0.56

0.26

1.42

G7

2.55

0.58

0.99

0.33

0.29

0.36

1.79

0.40

0.67

0.08

0.24

0.40

Non-G7 industrialised

2.81

0.49

0.86

0.71

0.33

0.42

2.50

0.45

1.04

0.84

0.25

-0.08

Developing Asia

6.81

0.26

2.65

0.95

0.42

2.53

7.39

0.47

2.51

0.92

0.33

3.16

China

9.92

0.26

3.39

0.74

0.46

5.07

9.69

0.56

3.58

0.59

0.50

4.46

India

5.31

0.14

1.95

1.12

0.46

1.56

7.31

0.40

2.66

1.59

0.20

2.46

Latin America

3.16

0.20

0.79

1.14

0.39

0.64

3.71

0.34

0.93

1.43

0.19

0.82

Eastern Europe

-2.41

0.16

-0.53

-0.93

0.11

-1.23

6.02

0.35

0.24

0.35

0.20

4.87

Sub-Saharan Africa

2.62

0.24

0.57

1.92

0.54

-0.65

4.95

0.63

1.47

1.51

0.28

1.06

N. Africa & M. East

3.59

0.14

0.96

1.79

0.59

0.11

6.08

0.30

1.46

1.55

0.22

2.55

Through the first channel, ICT contributed 0.43 and 0.41 percentage points to the world economy’s growth in 1990–2000 and 2000–08, respectively. In particular, this contribution for developing Asia nearly doubled over the two periods, from 0.26 percentage points in 1990–2000 to 0.47 in 2000–08. This pattern was even more notable for China and India. The contribution of ICT went up from 0.26 percentage points in 1990–2000 to 0.56 in 2000–08 for the former, and from 0.14 to 0.40 for the latter.

Developing Asia is successful in adopting ICT and in embracing the market opportunities to become a major hub for the production of ICT goods and services.

ASEAN-6 nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and China together accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the global ICT hardware exports in 2008. In this market, China has become a major player with its share roaring from five per cent in 2000 to nearly 25 per cent in 2008 (Figure 1).

At the same time, India has been strengthening its position as the largest exporter of computer software and information technology services with the phenomenal growth of its IT-BPO, from $4 billion in 2000 to $12

billion in 2004 to over $50 billion in 2010; and in 2010, India claimed 55 per cent of the global sourcing market.3 For China, ICT hardware accounted for 28 per cent of the country’s total exports in 2008,4 while for India, IT-BPO contributed 26 per cent to its total exports in 2010 (NASSCOM, 2010).

Developing Asia and catching up: the long road ahead Developing Asia has made a quantum leap in becoming the main engine of the global economic growth and a major centre of economic power. However, an enormous gap remains between developing Asia, the US and other industrialised countries in the levels of per capita income and labour productivity.

Taking the US level in 2000 as the benchmark (=100), the level of per capita income, based on purchasing power parity (PPP), was only 14.1 for China and 7.0 for India in 2008. Furthermore, the level of labour productivity was only 11.9 in PPP terms and 4.8 in the nominal exchange rate term for China, whereas these figures for India were 8.7 and 2.6 respectively. It is also worth noting that for the most advanced economies in the developing Asia group, the level of labour productivity in

nominal terms was still significantly behind that of the US. This level in 2008 was 97.3 for Hong Kong, 67.2 for Singapore, 59.7 for Taiwan and 45.2 for South Korea, while it was 112.1 for the US. The policy response of Asian economies to the economic and financial crisis has shown that the group can continue its spectacular performance in the coming decades.

There is no doubt that ICT will be one of the most important drivers for developing Asia to succeed in this endeavour.

Dale W. Jorgenson is the Samuel W. Morris University Professor at Harvard University. djorgenson@ harvard.edu. Vu Minh Khuong is an Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. sppkmv@nus.edu.sg

References Jorgenson, Dale and Vu, Khuong M. (2010), ‘Potential Growth of the World Economy’, Journal of Policy Modeling, Volume 32, Issue 5, pp.

615-631, 2010.

NASSCOM (2005), NASSCOM-McKinsey report 2005: Extending India’s Leadership of the Global IT and BPO Industries.

NASSCOM (2010), The IT BPO Sector in India: Strategic Review 2010, NASSCOM. NASSCOM (2011), The IT BPO Sector in India: Strategic Review 2011, NASSCOM.

· Ap r-J un 2 0 1 1 · p 1 5

Image: Danny Snell

The media’s role in public policy Basskaran Nair defines the role of the media in forming public opinion and public policy.

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he mass media plays a critical role in message dissemination and shaping public opinion. For policy planners to successfully convey messages to their respective constituents, be they citizens, institutions or foreign entities, they must cultivate strong relationships with local, regional and international media. Effective media management strengthens the citizens’ confidence; boosts the marketing of public policies internally and internationally; facilitates the global search for talent; and builds the nation’s global branding.

Poor media relations can lead to misunderstanding and mistrust between the media and policy planners, and the stereotyping of the country.

A message conveyed by the mass media reaches a wider audience and creates credibility and confidence that beats logos, slogans and slick advertising. Trade mission

‘The mass media plays a critical role in message dissemination and shaping public opinion. For policy planners to successfully convey messages to their respective constituents, they must cultivate strong relationships with local, regional and international media.’

activities, tourism board advertising and other government-related initiatives still need to be actively pursued but the reach and effectiveness will not be comparable to solid and positive media coverage. Besides, almost all global rankings of countries, companies and outstanding citizens are conducted and publicised by the media.

Examples include the Wall Street Journal’s ‘Most Admired Company’ poll, TIME magazine’s annual TIME 100, a list of the most influential people, or Newsweek’s study of ‘The World’s Best Countries’.

Policies become salient and credible with regular, robust media coverage. On the other hand, media inattention can doom major public issues to obscurity.

In the US, UK and many European countries, the mass media effectively controls who gets to participate in the national dialogue. Consequently, knowing its importance, large corporations such as oil conglomerates, pharmaceuticals and financial institutions hijack the media agenda. They effectively use lobbyists, legislators, think tanks and supportive government officials.

Policy planners should learn from the media management professionals. They should be aware of basic communication strategies. First, at a practical and technical level, they should know the newsroom power dynamics. Who owns the media and what is their influence, if any?

In most countries, media ownership or management is concentrated in the hands

of a relatively small number of people.

In the US, UK and in Europe, the editors, producers, newsreaders, reporters and columnists of the leading television networks and prestigious press play a significant role in agenda setting. In most Asian countries, mainstream media is state-managed.

Another aspect of agenda setting is timing. The political climate and public receptivity often force policy makers to consider issues that they would ignore at other times. Two decades ago, it was ‘good to be greedy’, and therefore, excessive salaries were accepted. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the high salaries of executives was a highly contentious issue. Media stories paid particular attention to excessive salaries, playing up public disapproval.

The process of agenda setting and framing also means staying actively engaged with the manufacturing of news. A classic case study in the manufacturing of news, as part of agenda setting and framing, is related to September 11. Through news frames, patterns of selection, emphasis, exclusion and evaluation of events, one can see the different facets of framing.

In the US, the Bush administration communicated policy priorities simply and effectively by adopting cultural frames to streamline and simplify their message. The US media framed the September 11 event as a spectre of an international Al Qaeda operation and the growth of religious

fundamentalism that seeks to undermine global security. On the other hand, there was an anti-US political frame prominent outside the US. European governments and people were horrified with the news flow from the US positioning Bush as a war president and the US as a global police officer. The anti-American frame was most prominent in the Arab and Islamic world. Al Jazeera set the agenda for Arab television news.

Can these strategies for agenda setting and framing be applied to online media, which is increasingly the new form of communication? Certainly. However, if the policy planner does not have the habit of communicating in a mainstream media environment, he or she is unlikely to succeed in an online media environment.

Netizens themselves are the newsmakers and that poses great challenges to policy planners. Social media is increasing in popularity, notably among the younger generation, who eschew traditional media sources. Increasingly, youth these days are becoming politically aware and vocal online. In the 21st century, policy planners need to be able to manage both traditional and digital media.

Basskaran Nair is the Senior Vice President, Group Corporate Marketing and Communications, at CapitaLand Limited and an Adjunct Associate Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. He was previously an Equity Partner and CEO of an international communications firm. sppbn@nus.edu.sg

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States and regions in East Asia and Europe: histories matter Text • R. Bin Wong

Instead of looking at Western understanding and the perspectives of Western states, we need to improve the quality of our knowledge of East Asian history and political relations.

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ntil the late 20th century, statesmen, scholars and people generally accepted, without much reflection, the natural and necessary existence of states as the key actors in a larger international system with historical roots in European practices. The political assumptions of these beliefs rested on modern states being defined by a set of traits, including the rule of law, government bureaucracies and the consent of the governed, that were first formulated in Europe between the 17th and 19th centuries.

Moreover, the characteristics of international relations in the 20th century were normatively defined by principles associated with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, that aimed to define patterns and principles of relations among European political regimes at the close of the Thirty Years War. Today, we have come to recognise that in between the national and global level of international relations, there are regional political formations, of which ASEAN and the other groups Southeast Asian states have helped to found are major examples. For these regional political formations as well, European practices continue to define expectations.

The construction of the European Union (EU) leads analysts of contemporary international politics to expect regional political alliances in other world regions to be the norm. However, this standard is more

problematic than the national state model distilled out of European experiences for individual government regimes. For national states, the formal characteristics deemed desirable by a combination of abstract principles and Western practices produce metrics for assessing the performance of political regimes.

The EU is understood to have grown out of a history of shared cultural elements, political practices and efforts at co-ordination as well as competition. Other regions lack these particular features. Scholars and statespersons distill certain principles from EU practices and suggest that they can be applied elsewhere, but they do not necessarily have quite the neat collection of traits needed to form a portable package similar to the European-based model of a modern political regime.

Recognition of the regional context of EU development does not easily suggest to us ways to assess conditions in other world regions. If, however, we take more seriously that the historical dimension of

regional political possibilities in Europe is basic to its future set of choices, we might seek to emulate the knowledge we have about European political history for other world regions. We are disinclined to do so for two reasons: First, as social scientists, we feel we have developed some pretty robust tools for analysing contemporary conditions around the world. Our sense of satisfaction has increased as we have scaled back our aspirations for plotting long sweeps of historical change, either as accounts of the past or as plans for the future. Our social science tools can better identify causal mechanisms at work in particular situations, than they can assess the significance of the varied ways in which these somewhat similar situations are embedded in larger and different contexts, limiting our abilities to link specific conditions to larger dynamics of social change.

Second, we generally continue to think that the ideas and institutions proper for the contemporary world emerged out of

Western experiences and thus have little incentive to analyse ideas and institutions basic to other world regions, other than as impediments to the norms we think desirable. Consider for a moment what we might discover if we do look at the history of state transformation and state relations in other world regions. We might better understand the different types of state transformation that inform the possibilities of regional relations in different parts of the world.

Roughly 2,000 years ago, there were mighty empires in Asia and Europe.

Moreover, they shared some strikingly similar traits. The Han and Roman empires reached maximum territories of 2.3 million square miles and 2.2 million square miles respectively. Their maximum populations have been estimated at 59.6 million for the Chinese case and 60 million for the European. Our world today might look very different today if both empires had succeeded in reproducing themselves. Their political trajectories, of course, proved very different. Empire was repeatedly constructed 路 Ap r-J un 2 0 1 1 路 p 1 9

‘Scholars and statespersons distill certain principles from EU practices and suggest that they can be applied elsewhere, but they do not necessarily have quite the neat collection of traits to form a portable package to resemble the coherent components of a modern political regime.’

over two millennia of history in China — there were centuries of weak or absent rule from a single imperial throne, but from the 13th century to the early 20th century, largescale bureaucratic empire was the norm and its guiding ideology and institutions were formulated over at least the preceding 1,500 years.

Europe fragmented with the survival and transformation of empire, in what had been the eastern portion of the Roman Empire and a myriad of small and overlapping forms of political and religious authorities crystallising in Western Europe. The warmaking that was basic to European state formation did not end until 1945 and even then, the borders of national states in Europe were not permanently fixed. The late 20th century unification of Germany and division of Czechoslovakia remind us that European national states were more durable in principle than in practice.

Today’s EU is considered a forwardlooking political experiment that offers lessons to regimes in other world regions.

Yet, if we were to put the EU in a historical perspective spanning 2,000 years and include China in the same picture, we could also view the EU as a weak and limited

effort to achieve political and economic integration over a territorial space roughly approaching that of China.

In addition to thinking of the ways that EU policies can be models for other collections of states to consider, we might also think about how Chinese practices form a standard by which European fiscal and monetary policies, to take two basic contemporary government functions, seem weaker and in certain ways more problematic than they do in China.

Of course this kind of comparison immediately seems ill-conceived to many observers, perhaps especially in Western settings, but the limitations of this Chinese perspective on European political changes do not encourage most people to acknowledge the symmetric possibility that European patterns of political change may also offer limited guidance to explaining changes in China, either historically or today.

When we move to a larger spatial scale and ask about regional relations across Northeast and Southeast Asia, the presence of China as an actor of a larger political and demographic scale is obvious. It makes problematic some of the

expectations derived from looking at the EU experiences for East Asia. A different political vantage point could be gained by considering the history of the United States’ engagement with Latin America.

We do not typically think of this history when we want to consider regional political relations because the Americas have produced little material that can be easily considered normative.

Scholars and statesmen can see far more clearly how Europe’s current challenges and opportunities have emerged historically than they can discern the historically generated menu of contemporary possibilities in other world regions such as East Asia. Improving the quality of our knowledge of East Asian political relations historically matters not only to future possibilities but can inform our general social science thinking and supplement the understanding analysts and practitioners in other world regions have of their own situations.

R. Bin Wong is Director of the UCLA Asia Institute and Professor of History. He was a guest of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in March 2011. rbwong@international.ucla.edu

Wanted and needed: women leaders in Asia Text • Kirsten Trott

The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy addresses the issues of women’s leadership in Asia through a bold new project, Women’s Pathways to Leadership in Asia, in partnership with Asia Society. This first-of-its-kind project for Asia will include academic research, capacity building and networking and will seek to make a positive difference to women’s leadership in Asia.

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hen Helen Reddy topped the charts in 1972 with her hit single I am Woman,, only four per cent of MBA graduates were women. Inn the labour market, only 20 per cent of non-clerical, white-collar jobs and 17 per cent of all managerial positions were occupied by women. Almost forty years later, the figures are still so bad that one could be mistaken for thinking Reddy was talking about kilogrammes and not rights.

It is true that female students now represent 48 per cent of MBA students worldwide (Quacquarelli Symonds) and 34.8 per cent of MBA programmes in the US (Catalyst). Turning closer to home, female students at the LKY School represent between 33 per cent to 46 per cent of students enrolled in the Master in Public Policy, Master in Public Administration (the mid-career programme) and PhD programmes. Notably, however, only 25 per cent of the students in the Master in Public Management course, in which only those who have had experience as senior managers are enrolled, are women.

Research from outside of Asia indicates that this is the case. A 2007–08 survey by Catalyst found that overall, 60 per cent of women start on the post-MBA career ladder at entry-level positions, compared to 46 per cent of male graduates. On average, women make US$4,600 less than male colleagues in their initial jobs, even after accounting for experience, industry and region. Of the MBA alumni who graduated between 1996 and 2007, women senior leaders were more than three times (19 per cent for women versus six per cent for men) as likely to have lost their jobs due to

downsizing or closure. Further, only four per cent of women in the US, two per cent in Europe and one per cent in Asia have line responsibilities on executive committees (Deutsche Bank).

While these research findings merely confirm what many women already know, it was hard to reconcile the dire state of women’s leadership with the presence of 130 inspirational women leaders at Asia Society’s Women Leaders of New Asia Summit held in Singapore from 31 March to 2 April. Over three days, women leaders from 22 different countries discussed a diverse set of issues pertaining to women’s leadership. Those at the summit included Margaret Alva, Governor of Uttarakhand State in India; Chua Sock Koong, CEO of Singtel; Shelly Lazarus, Chairman of Ogilvy & Mather worldwide; Marina Mahathir, activist; Saw Phaik Hwa, President and CEO of SMRT; Teresa M Ressel, CEO UBS Securities; Debra Soon, Managing Director, Channel NewsAsia; and members of parliament from Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, Bangladesh and Singapore. They led the discussions on the role of women leaders as drivers of organisational success and as entrepreneurs in technology, in the public sector, in media, on boards, as agents of social change and in powering economic growth.

Shabana Azmi, a women’s rights activist and a member of the Indian parliament, gave an exquisite recital of the poem Aurat, written by her father, Kaifi Azmi.

The poem, which was written almost 60 years before women in India were given the same rights as men to inherit ancestral property in 2006, asks women

to stand shoulder to shoulder with men.

It is this sort of equality that was the aim of the Summit as stated by Asia Society’s President, Vishakha Desai, in her opening address: ‘Today’s Asian female leaders aspire not only for “a seat at the table” but for an active role in defining a new table shared equally by women and men’.

In order to foster an environment in which men and women can design Asia’s future together, more needs to be understood about women’s leadership in Asia and about the policies, practices and socio-cultural factors that help or hinder women’s progression to leadership positions in the region.

The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy hopes to address this through a bold new project, Women’s Pathways to Leadership in Asia, in partnership with Asia Society. This first-of-its-kind project for Asia will include academic research, capacity building and networking and will seek to make a positive difference to women’s leadership in Asia.

Including women is not only central to Asian economic development and to achieving a return on investment for development aid. With research showing that a critical mass of women on corporate boards improves profitability, competitiveness, compliance and governance, gender-parity in leadership is the key to Asia’s ongoing competitiveness. Whatever the motivation, one thing is clear: Asia can no longer afford to ignore the talent of half its population.

Kirsten Trott is Senior Manager at the Research Support Unit (RSU) at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. ktrott@nus.edu.sg

Europe’s importance in the global village Jan Peter Balkenende, former Prime Minister of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, reminds Asia that Europe is important in the global village today, where the sharing of power, not dominance, determines membership.

‘New players have taken to the world stage: emerging economies, multi-nationals, powerful families, private donors, religious groups and independent aid organisations. Of course, governments still have tasks to carry out, but more and more, they have to do so by working with others.’

The Flag of Europe: the stars represent the peoples of Europe in a circle, a symbol of unity. [Image: Ssolbergj, Wikimedia]

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he world at large is slowly recovering from the global financial and economic crisis. Little by little, economic activity is starting up again. Much needed reforms are being adopted. One lesson is clear: our global system of governance is out of balance.

It should be re-assessed, so that we can find a new balance: A balance that does justice to the new reality of interdependence between countries and between issues.

Before we think about a new form of global governance, we need to first accept that the traditional paradigms are out-of-date.

The world is no longer ruled by sovereign nation-states and their leaders. The Indian-American Parag Khanna shows this convincingly in his book How to Run the World. I agree with Khanna that globalisation, which allows capital, employment and information to circulate without regard for borders, has eroded the power of national governments. New players have taken to the world stage: emerging economies, multi-nationals, powerful families, private donors, religious groups and independent aid organisations. Of course, governments still have tasks to carry out, but more and more, they have to do so by working with others.

The balance of power is shifting. We have all read Kishore Mahbubani’s book: The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Power to the East. It contains many sound insights. Asia is booming, which rightly makes Asians more confident. Partly in the light of Parag Khanna’s analysis, I prefer to speak of a ‘sharing of power’ rather than a shift of power. After all, such shifts have been a fact of life throughout history. We have always seen changes in the power balance, whether economic or political. More importantly, I don’t believe that any one country or continent is going to run the world. The global challenges we face require global solutions: Solutions we can only bring about through global cooperation. We have to meet those challenges together: countries, regions, continents, multinationals, NGOs and so on.

In this light, I see major opportunities for Europe in the global village. Europe has 500 million people and a GNP of 13 trillion euros. By comparison, the US has 300 million people and a GNP of 11 trillion euros. Then there is China, with 1.4 billion people and a GNP of four trillion euros. Now, I know that these statistics tell us nothing about the future but I will say this: Europe can

prove its value in these new global conditions. It has a proven record of dynamism and a tremendous capacity to adapt.

Europe reinvented itself in the second half of the 20th century, after an extremely turbulent period. Cooperation has brought us peace, prosperity and stability. We created the internal European market and the euro. We brought many former Eastern Bloc countries into the EU. Given our history, these are all major achievements.

Today as well, we are taking major steps forward. Take the new agreements on the Stability and Growth Pact. Take the Pact for the Euro, agreed some weeks ago by the heads of government at the European Council. The euro countries are bolstering their competitive position. They will coordinate more closely on economic, financial and fiscal policy, all with a view to protecting and strengthening the currency. Of course, I have also read the analyses of the economists who are predicting the impending collapse of the euro, and let me tell you this: the euro will survive.

Those economists are ignoring the euro’s political dimension.

The euro is more than a currency. It is part of the very foundation of the EU. If it crumbles, the entire structure will be at risk. After all, the euro is linked to the European market and to the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital — the entire process of European integration. We will never abandon these things. We will stand by the euro. The euro belongs to us.

Is Europe perfect? No, of course not. It may be the largest economic bloc in the world, but we are not living up to expectations. As in other parts of the world, the financial crisis has shaken Europe to its foundations. It has also been a wake-up call. There has never been such widespread commitment to working together to move forward. I sense it wherever I go in Europe. I hear it from everyone I meet. All in all, that means Europe will continue to play a prominent role on the world stage — not as the dominant world power, but as a continent that plays a leading role in the global sharing of power.

Jan Peter Balkenende is the former Prime Minister of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This is a summary of his public lecture at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy on 28 March 2011.

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Image: rudenoon, flickr.com

Predictable uncertainty: China’s rise and U.S.–Korea security dilemmas Text • Michael Raska

An insight into how China’s military modernisation spells out critical implications on the future of U.S.–Korea alliance in East Asia.

or over a decade, there has been an intense debate about whether China’s widening geopolitical ambitions, coupled with its ongoing military modernisation efforts and future power projection capabilities, may intensify regional security dilemmas and competition, particularly with the US. While most policy analysts agree that China’s rise in global economic and security affairs is likely to shape the direction of the emerging strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region, no clear consensus has emerged on its likely shape and character. A closer look at the perennial body of literature covering China’s rise may suggest that there is no single school of thought — the ‘China threat’ debate has been subjected to diverse theoretical perspectives and contending policy-oriented viewpoints from the European, American and Asian vistas.

Arguably, however, no other issue has generated as much promise and ambiguity. As Lee Chung-Min, Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University in Korea noted, ‘while China’s continuing economic growth trajectory has amplified regional co-operation based on trade, economic incentives and the importance of managing commercial ties, China’s geopolitical and strategic position coupled with its military modernisation has progressively posed higher threshold dilemmas for Asia as well as the international system.’

Indeed, China’s growing geopolitical influence and strategic interests in the region, propelled by soft- and hard-power attributes, may reshape traditional security alliances in East Asia led by the US. This does not mean that China is gradually forcing the United States out of the region or making it irrelevant, nor that regional states in East Asia are rushing to China in zero-sum terms.

On the contrary, it implies that there is a mix of centripetal and centrifugal drivers linked to China’s rise that may impact the future of US alliance

relationships in the region. In this context, one of the key questions is how China’s rise will affect the future of the US–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance.

To begin with, Chinese authorities have become increasingly attentive and responsive to critical security developments on the Korean Peninsula over the last decade. Indeed, China’s geopolitical and economic rise, coupled with its integration in the global community, has given its diplomacy more leverage in managing tensions and crises on the Korean Peninsula. Since 2003, Beijing has been more proactive in mitigating the North Korean ‘hybrid’ security conundrum. It has provided a vital economic lifeline to North Korea, inherently preventing its economic collapse, while quietly exerting moderate pressure on Pyongyang to return to the stalled Six Party Talks and resolving North Korea’s nuclear issue through multilateral coordination. In doing so, Beijing has aimed to mitigate tensions between the two Koreas, as well as risks and costs associated with potential confrontations, spillovers or crises that may require both US and Chinese intervention.

A more contending view is that Beijing is trying to avert a North Korean collapse to prevent the Korean reunification, which would likely undermine China’s leverage in international and regional relations and lead to the loss of the strategic buffer zone provided by North Korea for the past 60 years. The modalities of Beijing’s growing influence, interests and involvement in Korean security issues amplify strategic dilemmas for the US–ROK alliance by increasingly constraining the alliance’s policy options and freedom of action. This can be seen in the aftermath of North Korea’s covert and unprovoked sinking of the Cheonan on 26 March 2010, which China reluctantly scrutinised. Beijing showed an assertive stance toward US–ROK responses — particularly vis-à-vis the joint naval exercises off the west coast of South Korea involving the George Washington Aircraft Carrier Battle Group, which China ‘resolutely opposed’.

At the same time, defence planners in both US and South Korea have been closely observing the People Liberation Army’s (PLA) military modernisation drive, its sharper power projection

capabilities and long-term aspirations.

Over the past decade, the PLA has accelerated its ‘mechanisation and informationisation’ drive — a comprehensive defence transformation process that includes revamping military doctrines, organisational force structures and operational concepts, while developing and integrating selected advanced weapons systems, platforms and technologies.

While many analysts tend to systematically downplay assessments of China’s military capabilities, in the long term, it is likely that China’s military modernisation and strategic priorities will tabulate ‘diversified missions’ that include capabilities for securing access lines to energy resources and regional anti-access/area-denial capabilities. As Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Obama’s principal military advisor recently noted, ‘China is shifting its military focus from a land-centric focus to an air- and maritime-focused capability.’ In other words, one could argue that China’s naval and air forces will be increasingly visible in the region.

Meanwhile, the US has been also transforming its regional force posture, operational concepts, and weapons procurement and deployment. Throughout the last decade, the US military has aimed to move beyond its Cold War static posture towards a more mobile, lighter and agile force posture — having ‘strategic flexibility’ to meet new roles and missions. With regard to the Korean Peninsula, this has implied that the nature, size and configuration of US forces deployed in Korea are increasingly conceptualised in more regional or even global terms rather than addressing traditional static peninsular defence.

Accordingly, as a response to growing Chinese military capabilities and presence in the region, both the US and South Korea may adopt ‘stealth benchmarking’ strategies in their respective defense planning strategies in order to deny, de-limit or even contain China’s extending geopolitical ambitions. Stealth benchmarking implies adopting a portfolio of ‘capability domains’ or competencies that may mitigate a potential adversary’s military capabilities and freedom of action. For South Korea, this means not only the need to maintain its collective security

mechanism with the US and a robust force posture to meet traditional defence and deterrence needs vis-à-vis North Korea; It also means the need to address, at the same time, emerging security issues that have a strong Chinese imprint, including regional resource competition and the protection of energy access lines.

South Korea has already embarked on an ambitious military modernisation trajectory, with key emphasis on the procurement of advanced weapon technologies and systems: multi-role fighter aircraft, multi-role helicopters, state-of-the-art conventional submarines, destroyer experimental vessels, precision-strike assets, early warning systems and an array of advanced command, control and communications systems.

Depending on the evolving security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula, modalities in the US–ROK defence management, and the transparency of China’s strategic capabilities and intentions, security uncertainties linked to China’s rise may offset the prevailing and in most cases, optimistic linear projections of Asia’s rise. While there are a number of economic incentives such as surging trade that may provide potent centripetal forces in future US– ROK–China relations, China’s growing power projection capabilities, if sustained, are likely to have a significant impact on regional security conceptions, and may shape the future defence planning trajectory of the US–ROK alliance.

In order to mitigate security uncertainties, tensions and risks, it is imperative to enhance communication channels and cooperative dialogue between China, the US and South Korea in order to build the mutual understanding of core interests and mechanisms for defusing potential crises. For starters, this would entail the need to better understand the modalities and country-specific responses to potential North Korean non-linear contingencies and scenarios, ranging from explosion to implosion.

Michael Raska is a PhD candidate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. His areas of interest are comparative international security and defence policy, geopolitical trends, security conceptions and defence strategies in East Asia and the Middle East. michaelraska@nus.edu.sg

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What do businesses think of ASEAN? Text • Marn-Heong Wong

The ASEAN member states are forging ever-closer ties. But do the businesses affected by this regional intimacy see this as an advantage?

Businesses are the fundamental creators of economic wealth but it is governments that affect the environment in which businesses operate. ASEAN, in its bid to enhance the dynamism and competitiveness of the region, began implementing a blueprint in 2008 towards the formation of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015. The AEC will be characterised by a single market and production base. Throughout the global economic crisis in 2008–09, integration efforts had been ongoing and ASEAN as a whole has navigated the crisis fairly well.

How do businesses view ASEAN’s attractiveness for trade and investment in a post-crisis global economy? How do they perceive the impact of ASEAN policy initiatives to deepen economic integration? A survey of businesses in ASEAN conducted by the author in the second half of 2010 for the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ASEAN-BAC) offers some answers.

Survey results show that businesses from across various ASEAN countries, firm-size categories and different nationalities of ownership find ASEAN to be an attractive region for investments. This is especially so for small firms that are attracted by the region’s potential as a market for their goods and services.

In addition, effective implementation of ASEAN policy initiatives towards an AEC can play an important role in influencing business trade and investment decisions and in affecting business costs.

The survey collated responses from 355 ASEAN-based companies, predominantly in Thailand and Singapore. As the ASEANBAC is a grouping of prominent business people appointed by ASEAN Heads of State and Government as the primary vehicle for private sector feedback, interim survey results were presented by ASEAN-BAC to ASEAN leaders at their annual dialogue session at the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Hanoi in October 2010.

The responses to several questions point to the finding that ASEAN is attractive to businesses. Over a three-year horizon (2010–12), 85 per cent of the respondents indicated that their firms had plans for investment or expansion in at least one ASEAN country. The top investment destination was Vietnam, followed by Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia (Figure 1). The predominant reason for investments was to access a new or growing market.

Figure 1: ASEAN countries that businesses plan to invest or increase investments in over the next three years (2010–2012)

Note: Each respondent is allowed to select multiple responses; percentages do not sum up to 100%. Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data.

About half of the respondents identified an ASEAN country as the most attractive country in the world for their firms’ offshore direct investments between 2010 and 2012, with Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia among the more popular choices, while 29 per cent of the respondents identified China as the most attractive country for their investments. Small firms (with less than 50 employees) tend to perceive ASEAN member countries as offering the best prospects for their offshore investments, while a higher share of large firms found China to be more attractive (Figure 2).

On the impact of ASEAN policy initiatives to deepen economic integration, nearly three-quarters of the respondents considered implementation of the AEC Blueprint to be of at least medium importance in their decision to expand exports and investments in ASEAN. Among the respondents, 65 per cent indicated that the cost to their business if ASEAN were to fail to form an AEC by

Figure 2: Countries offering the best prospects for business’ offshore direct investments over the next three years (2010–12)

Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data.

Figure 3: Satisfaction level with the implementation of the AEC Blueprint by policy areas

Note: The ratings on all areas are statistically different from the mean satisfaction rating of 5.00. Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data.

2015 would be medium to very high. A majority of businesses assessed AEC implementation to be behind schedule and that AEC would be unlikely to be achieved by 2015.

Respondents expressed above-average satisfaction (on a scale of 0–10) with the implementation to-date of measures across 12

policy areas under the AEC Blueprint but there were differences in the degree of satisfaction. Businesses were more satisfied with the implementation of measures related to investment protection, the establishment of transparent and predictable investment rules, and the elimination of tariffs. They were less satisfied with the dissemination of information on AEC initiatives, consultation with businesses, the removal of restrictions on services trade for priority sectors, rules of origin and harmonisation of standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures (Figure 3).

In view of the potential impact that unsatisfactory and unfulfilled AEC implementation has on business, the ASEAN-BAC has emphasised in its policy recommendations the importance for ASEAN members to ensure full and timely implementation of commitments in the AEC Blueprint. ASEAN-BAC has also suggested that ASEAN gives priority to intensifying the dissemination of information among businesses, both in raising general awareness of ASEAN and in providing specific information on ASEAN policy measures.

Given that a higher share of smaller firms find ASEAN attractive as an investment destination compared with large firms, and that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) account for 96 per cent of all enterprises in ASEAN, a final key recommendation from ASEAN-BAC is for ASEAN to step up its efforts to promote the internationalisation of local ASEAN SMEs, in particular, the engagement of SMEs in intra-ASEAN trade and investment activities.

Marn-Heong Wong is an Assistant Professor with the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Her research interest is in how trade, investment and technology linkages affect business performance, industry evolution and economic growth. sppwmh@nus.edu.sg

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ASEAN: in pursuit of a dynamic equilibrium Text • Denni Cawley

ASEAN has moved from the era of non-interference to constructive engagement. This shifting role is being tested by internal conflicts and the rise of global powers such as China and India.

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ollowing the 18th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Jakarta on 7–8 May 2011, there is still no resolution in sight to the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand. The conflict, possibly foremost among the ASEAN ministers’ minds entering the Summit, revolves around the contested lands surrounding two temples.

Given this context, it would be good to revisit ASEAN’s beginnings and the principles that guided its initial success in regional cooperation. A recent multimedia case study on ASEAN Regional Cooperation was prepared by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Executive Education for the Executive Leadership Development Programme of the Asian Development Bank’s Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Institute. The case study features distinguished thought-leaders who have witnessed the advent of ASEAN. In it, they share their views on the strengths and future challenges faced by this group of nations.

History repeating ASEAN was born out of the political conditions and dynamics of the Cold War. Its success was anchored on the principles of consultation and consensus backed by political will and leadership. This is observed by Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of the LKY School, in the multimedia case study. He says: ‘There are two words that ASEAN used since the early days: musyawarah and muafakat (consultation and consensus). So, instead of trying to arrive at rigid and legalistic decisions, everyone spoke to each other and tried to get a kind of consensus built up gradually. Over time, the consensus got stronger…. When I first went to the meetings in 1971, there were 5–6 countries in the room, but the room was full of suspicion and mistrust….It was amazing that when I came back as the permanent secretary in the 1990s and led the Singapore delegation to ASEAN meetings, everything had changed. You could cooperate and settle things because years of cooperation had changed the whole mood, the tone and chemistry of ASEAN meetings significantly.’ Could this positive spirit of cooperation be

harnessed by ASEAN as it facilitates the resolution of the Cambodia–Thailand dispute?

In addition to consultation and consensus, ASEAN leaders today can leverage on the mechanisms and concepts embodied in the 2008 ASEAN Charter. Tommy Koh, Ambassador-at-large at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore shares his recollection: ‘We realised that we had a deficit in ASEAN, and what was that deficit? That we had weak institutions, that we didn’t take our own commitments seriously, that we are not sufficiently faithful to the rule of law. This whole exercise of drafting and adopting a charter, adopting new institutions, a commission on human rights and the rights of women and children — these are all part of a new game plan.’

We also see in the 2011 Summit a recurrence of Indonesia’s important role in ASEAN. Praising Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa for his diplomatic efforts (Indonesia holds the chair of ASEAN in 2011), ASEAN Secretary-General, Surin Pitsuwan notes, ‘There has never been one single special meeting of the foreign ministers on an issue between states before, ever. We have made history under Indonesia. There has never been an attempt by the chair to go to the two capitals, hold hands, talk and try to convince them that this is something that we will have to work out together.’1 In the multimedia case study, the various speakers echo the fact that credit has to be given to Indonesia in the days of President Suharto for supporting the early development of ASEAN by acknowledging the other countries as equal partners.

Future challenges While its inception was political in nature, ASEAN has managed to build on its strengths to become a key economic block. K. Kesavapany, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), remarks in the multimedia case study that ‘Nobody is 1. Padden, Brian. 4 May 2011. “ASEAN Leaders will discuss Thai-Cambodia Conflict at the Summit”. Voice of America News. <http://www.voanews.com/khmer-english/news/ASEAN-Leaders-Will-Discuss-ThaiCambodia-Conflict-at-Summit-121253544.html>.

Image: Li Dan

interested in Singapore’s market of six million or Brunei’s market of two million. The internal challenge is to show to the world that ASEAN is vibrant and [is an] economically growing concern with a population of half a billion with a high purchasing capacity, and a network of productions.’ Furthermore, he said that, ‘we have to show that the whole of ASEAN works on the basis of law, competition and transparency: all the rudiments that make for an economic community.’

ASEAN must also continue its efforts to build on other areas of functional cooperation. Rodolfo Severino, Head of the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS and former ASEAN Secretary-General cites: ‘ASEAN’s decisions are meant to preserve peace and stability in the region and [ASEAN countries] also cooperate where they can in terms of economic progress and dealing with social and other functional problems like environmental degradation, piracy, transnational crime, international terrorism, communicable diseases and so on.’

Ong Keng Yong, Director of LKY School’s Institute of Policy Studies stresses: ‘We now have convinced people that having trade liberalisation, free trade arrangements and market access are good.

However, that is not the end of the story. The end of the story is that we have to develop our own respective strength and governance so that we can deliver much more equitable and positive outcomes for our respective populations. So, the next stage for ASEAN is really

to go beyond all the buzzwords. We have the ASEAN charter, connectivity and community, and now we have to deliver on the basic things inside the ASEAN countries.’

In pursuit of a dynamic equilibrium ASEAN faces both external and internal challenges. Geopolitically, it has become an important stabilising power particularly for Northeast Asia, being as Mahbubani says in the case study, the ‘one place in the world where all the great powers can meet and talk to each other’. The recognition of ASEAN as a key geopolitical and economic player is highlighted with the appointment of the first US Ambassador to ASEAN, David Carden. The question is: how will ASEAN manage its role with new powers China and India at its doorstep? Internally, as seen in the Thai–Cambodian conflict, ASEAN must mend historical differences by a show of political will and leadership and by strengthening its legal and institutional framework. Kesavapany recalls the words of Pitsuwan that ASEAN has ‘moved from the era of non-interference to constructive engagement’. This is part and parcel of ASEAN’s necessary evolution as it goes in pursuit of the ‘dynamic equilibrium’ proposed by the current ASEAN Chair.

Denni Cawley is an Associate Director and Head of the Executive Education department at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. dennij@nus.edu.sg

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Book review Text • Zhao Hong

T

he past years have witnessed the most rapid improvement in the China–Taiwan cross-strait relationship in decades. In April 2009, Beijing and Taipei inked agreements on launching regular flights across the Taiwan Strait, enhancing financial cooperation, jointly cracking down on crimes and offering mutual judicial assistance.

In June 2010, mainland China and Taiwan signed an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). ECFA heralds a new era in cross-strait relations as it will largely help to reduce cross-strait hostility and bring about a higher level of stability and prosperity for the whole region. All these should be attributed to the consistent endeavors made by both sides, to the development and fundamental changes in China’s Taiwan policy.

In this book, the authors offer a concise and insightful overview of the evolution of China’s Taiwan policy over the past six decades. They state early on page three that today, ‘China’s Taiwan policy is no longer made to address the problems of crossstrait relations per se but to promote regional stability and prosperity, as well as to promote Beijing’s strategic interests in the international system’. It has taken Beijing more than five decades and four generations of leaders to reach this stage.

In the 1950s, Beijing tried to keep the Nationalists involved but the US out of Taiwan affairs (Chapter 1). That strategy was based on the shared Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-Chinese National Party (KMT) determination to keep Taiwan within China, and ‘its aim was to drive a wedge between Taipei and Washington whenever possible while working out a de facto modus vivendi with the KMT in order to maintain China’s de jure sovereignty over Taiwan’. Under Deng Xiaoping, Beijing and Washington established a strategic framework based on a one-China context. Deng further put forward his ‘one country, two systems’ formula as a solution to the Taiwan issue. However, because of China’s refusal to recognise the sovereign status of the Republic of China (Taiwan), the formula led to little improvement in cross-strait relations (Chapter 3). Under Jiang Zemin, Beijing made a remarkable effort to accommodate Taipei’s demands for cross-strait parity by broadening the interpretation of the one-China principle (Chapter 6). While those changes fell short of resolving the inherent contradiction between the intra-national and international dimensions of Beijing’s approach toward Taiwan (it acknowledged Taipei’s intra-China equality but refused to recognise the Republic of China internationally), they nevertheless created some common ground for China and the US in handling the Taiwan situation and maintaining the strategic framework.

Under Hu Jintao, Beijing’s approach toward Taiwan has focused on the promotion of ‘peace, stability, and development’ across the strait on the basis of the one-China context. From Beijing’s perspective, this policy will inevitably lead to further socio-economic integration between the two sides, which will in turn lay a solid foundation for eventual peaceful reunification (Chapter 8). The shift in policy priority from peaceful re-unification to peaceful development in cross-strait relations marked a fundamental policy change in Beijing’s approach toward Taiwan.

This policy readjustment signaled not only Hu’s growing confidence that time is on China’s side but also his efforts to integrate China’s Taiwan policy into the country’s peaceful development strategy. Indeed, China’s role as a stakeholder in the international system has increased the importance of the Taiwan issue for China and the international community alike. It was under these circumstances and such ‘new thinking’ that Beijing had adopted a pro-status quo approach, and we have witnessed the rapidly growing socio-economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait despite the existing political separation.

However, the authors also hold that the status quo, by its own nature, is essentially a fragile and transitionary arrangement aimed at managing a difficult situation rather than a long-term solution (Conclusion). I agree that ‘it essentially reflects a delicate balance carefully maintained among the three players, Beijing, Taipei and Washington, whose fundamental interests are in conflict with each other’. For Taiwan, the problem remains that Taipei lacks a legal role in cross-strait and international relations. It is still looking for more international space. For China, the status quo approach does not resolve the difference between Beijing’s and Washington’s perceptions of the ‘peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem’ where Beijing sees maintaining the status quo as a means to re-unification, while Washington sees it as an end in itself (Chapter 3). Thus Beijing, Taipei and Washington should push for further efforts to achieve consensus and transform the current crisis management model into one of strategic management so as to maintain and promote long-term trilateral interests proactively.

Zhao Hong is a Visiting Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National Unversity of Singapore. His current research interests include the political economy of China and Southeast Asian countries, Asian economic community and China’s and India’s energy strategies. eaizh@nus.edu.sg

Energy and sustainability Breaking the sustainability barrier · The future of nuclear energy · The business case against nuclear power · Oil: a risky beneficiary of Japan’s nuclear crisis and Arab revolts · Championing climate change in Southeast Asia: a role for corporate leaders · Quo vadis, energy policy?

Breaking the sustainability barrier Sustainability guru John Elkington asks if bold political vision and innovation can carve a new growth path for the world.

Image: Li Dan

W

ith world oil prices back in the headlines in the wake of the convulsive changes in the Arab world, there is growing unease about the consequences of climate change and, on the other hand, of a possible ‘Peak Oil’ scenario playing out. But what if there was a solution that potentially tackled all of these challenges at once? Well, recent work in Europe suggests that there is one — and that it could eventually play out around the world.

Wherever in the world I find myself, I am increasingly talking to audiences about the sound barrier. I take them back to the late 1940s and early 1950s, when test pilots were slamming into an invisible but deadly obstruction in mid-air as they tried to fly ever faster. Aircraft broke apart as the shock waves tore their wings away. But then one pilot did something crazy, probably in desperation: in a power dive, he found his controls locked. Instead of pulling the control column back, he pushed it forward. Quite unexpectedly, the aircraft recovered.

Then, I make the connection between then and now: as growing numbers of technologies and business models crash into today’s ‘Sustainability Barrier’, many are beginning to come apart in the air. It started with things like insecticides, asbestos and chlorofluorocarbons, and is now spreading out to a growing range of carbon-intensive markets. To survive, politicians and business leaders will increasingly find that they need to reverse the controls on their economies, value chains and companies.

Now, a new study published by Germany’s Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety makes the same point even more powerfully, using the latest mathematical models.

Entitled A New Growth Path for Europe, the study was undertaken by a group of five organisations, including two universities (Oxford in the UK and the Sorbonne in France), the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and the European Climate Forum.

For anyone who believes that tackling climate change with increasingly tough emission targets represents a net drag on the economy, the results will come as a shock. At a time when the European Union has 20 per cent greenhouse emission reduction targets, and many business leaders complain that this is damaging the prospects for future growth, prosperity and job

creation, the new study says, ‘Nonsense, it is time for boldness.’

The problem with the 20 per cent target is not that it is too aggressive, we are told, but that it is too weak. The global financial crisis has shown that existing economic models have serious weaknesses — and the same is true of existing mathematical models that track the interactions between climate policy and the economy. Traditional models have a single stable equilibrium: one point where there is a win-win outcome. By contrast, emerging models suggest that multiple growth paths are possible, some of which encourage positive feedback between emission, economic and employment agendas.

Instead of sticking with 20 per cent, the scientists conclude that Europe needs to set truly stretch targets, with ‘a decisive move to a 30 per cent target’. If this is done well, the models suggest, by 2020 the rate of European growth could be boosted by up to 0.6 per cent a year and European investments would rise from 18 per cent to up to 22 per cent of the GDP. The GDP itself would grow by up to six per cent both in the old (EU15) and new (EU12) member states, and up to six million additional jobs would be created Europe-wide.

There are other surprising conclusions.

For example, the new growth path would benefit all major economic sectors — agriculture, energy, industry, construction and services, with the greatest benefits experienced in construction. Perhaps most surprising of all, the economic opportunities linked to tighter emissions targets would be available whether or not 2012 sees a global climate agreement after the Rio+20 UN summit meeting.

The question is: why do the latest models show such different outcomes with tighter emission controls? The latest models assume that tougher controls trigger greater additional investments, stimulating what they call ‘learning-by-doing’ across the entire economy, particularly in sectors focusing on such areas as advanced construction materials and renewable energy.

Learning-by-doing, in turn, increases competitiveness and spurs further economic growth, boosting the expectations of investors and fuelling further investment.

After the Great Depression, Europe saw a surge of investment as nation-states began the hugely expensive and horrifically destructive

process of rearmament. While increasing global competition for natural resources could easily trigger another arms race and a vicious downward spiral, sustainable development could trigger a virtuous upward cycle of investment, innovation and prosperity.

As for solutions, we need to shift to more energy-efficient construction and to natural gas and renewable energy, rather than rely on coal. Technologies like photovoltaic and carbon capture and storage, and nuclear power will make very little additional contribution by 2020, but should also be invested in for the longer term.

Among the macro-economic measures that will help are the use of emission trading revenues to fund carbon reduction efforts in Eastern Europe, the inclusion of low-carbon growth standards in public procurement, and the encouragement of entrepreneurial efforts through tax-breaks. Among the micro-economic measures that are needed are revised building codes requiring greater energy efficiency, standardised smart power grid infrastructures, smart household appliance codes and the creation of learning networks linking innovative companies.

None of this will be automatic. Instead, changing the system requires bold political vision, sustained government commitment to low-carbon innovation, clear policy targets, and incentives for innovators, entrepreneurs and investors.

What is very encouraging about the new economic analysis is that it is based on long-established and well-proven lessons from other parts of the economy, including, strikingly, aviation.

Just as our species went from balloons and powered box kites to machines that could break the sound barrier and, ultimately, reach the moon and go beyond, so green growth sectors can push our economies onto radically new trajectories.

The key step will be to break out of ‘the straightjacket of the mind’ that assumes that tackling our energy security and climate challenges will inevitably damage prospects for growth and prosperity. In a time of growing stress and danger, doing the unexpected thing may save not just one test pilot but also our economies and, in the longer term, our entire civilisation.

John Elkington is the Executive Chairman of Volans and Non-executive Director of SustainAbility.

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The future of nuclear energy Image: Paul Lachine

The recent nuclear-related disaster in Japan has brought to the fore anxiety and fear about the use of nuclear energy. T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj evaluates the situation and clarifies the reality of nuclear energy and its uses.

J

apan’s nuclear crisis has provided fresh arguments for opponents of nuclear power everywhere. It has increased public fear and anxiety about nuclear power plants, and resurrected certain perceptions about radiation and cancer risks. Extensive but natural media coverage of the Fukushima accident has heightened public concerns about nuclear reactor safety and the long-term health effects of such events.

The nuclear industry thus faces a tremendous challenge to allay public concerns following the wide publicity after Japan’s worst nuclear accident.

The Fukushima accident, however, is not necessarily an indictment of nuclear safety standards. Nuclear power so far has a better safety record than most industries.

Japan’s current nuclear crisis was triggered by a rare natural disaster, which complicated the emergency response. Although the reactors withstood the massive earthquake, the tsunami overwhelmed all the defences and safety backups that were in place to protect them when things went wrong.

The accident has raised concerns about site location and the adequacy of installed defences. As revealed recently, regulators and plant operators had apparently failed to take corrective action against identified and known problems before the accident. Lessons from previous nuclear accidents and timely action would have helped to significantly reduce such errors, enabling modern nuclear power plants to achieve high levels

of safety. The prudent policy, then, is to learn from this accident and address the remaining deficiencies in reactor safety for dealing with such situations in the future.

This will help the building of even safer nuclear reactors and help convince the public about the merits of nuclear power.

However, there is widespread misunderstanding about the health and environmental risks of nuclear power.

Asymmetric information about risks, the professional competence of core practitioners as well as the potential efficacy of recommended alternative means to mitigate risks is inherent in the health sector.

Health risks associated with nuclear radiation are particularly evident with respect to such asymmetries. Japan’s nuclear accident is a reminder of the difficulties in understanding the nuances and complexities of nuclear power. The nuclear industry cannot escape its share of responsibility for this situation because its lapses and continuing reluctance for transparency have eroded its public credibility. The culture of secrecy and impunity — hallmarks of most military nuclear programmes — can be observed also in civilian nuclear programmes. Government ownership of nuclear utilities can make it difficult to ensure the independence of regulators. In countries where private nuclear utilities operate, regulatory capture, a feature seen in other regulated industries, undermines public confidence in the industry. Hence,

the Fukushima accident is likely to set back nuclear power, certainly temporarily and possibly for a long time, in democracies where public acceptance counts.

Given these conditions, is nuclear power sustainable in the long run? Nuclear power is arguably sustainable and necessary to achieve long-term environmental goals and energy security. It can greatly help international efforts to stabilise, and eventually reduce, carbon emissions. While public misgivings and institutional problems should be seriously addressed, they do not warrant outright condemnation of nuclear power. Policy responses based on misinformation and emotion rather than analytical consideration are unhelpful in any context.

In the case of energy, it will hamper global efforts to wean away from fossil fuels.

Analyses based on unassailable information and objective evaluation of risks and benefits suggest that most asserted risks of nuclear power are out of proportion to the actual risks, which are manageable.

An increased use of nuclear power will have the biggest impact in moderating coal use. While the sources of coal pollution have been addressed in many developed countries through various policy instruments and engineering solutions, albeit at significant cost, developing countries are lagging behind in controlling non-carbon pollutants from coal combustion. Most developing countries continue to burn coal and oil with only modest environmental

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controls, resulting in serious health and environmental problems. A 2001 study by an international team of scientists measured, over the Asia-Pacific region, a large brown cloud patch (also known as the Asian Brown Cloud) that is known to have caused millions of respiratory illnesses and deaths. Diesel fuel, adulteration of petrol, and biomass burning are well-known sources of fine particulates.

These micron-sized particulates can be a serious health hazard because they get deposited deep in the lungs. Cities suffering from problems associated with air inversion suffer worst because emissions from coal plants and other industrial activities can remain suspended locally for several days. Fossil fuels also generate pollution during the process of extraction, refining, transportation and storage. Adding carbon emissions and the potential problems associated with it — global warming and climate change — reflects the sheer scale of future impact due to continuing dependence on fossil fuels. Currently, fossil fuels contribute around 85 per cent of the world’s primary energy needs.

How, then, does one solve the energy problem without sacrificing the goals of industrial development and environmental sustainability? Renewable energy sources and nuclear power could play an increasing role in achieving these goals. However, renewable energy sources alone are unlikely to solve the world’s energy problems. While they offer substantial environmental benefits and represent a potentially large resource base, they also face major technical hurdles and carry significant environmental burden. For example, solar and wind are intermittent and require the construction of very extensive installations in order to capture energy that is available only at low densities. Hydropower, which is not always environmentally benign, competes with nuclear power. Currently these two sources show the greatest promise in replacing fossil fuels.

But nuclear power faces several technical and socio-political hurdles. Technical risks of nuclear power are associated with reactor safety and radioactive waste management. Health and environmental risks from nuclear power fall into three broad categories: risks from normal operation, risks from major accidents, and risks from

‘Japan’s response to Fukushima and the Soviet response to Che with relative transparency can m hypothetical accidents. Risk from normal operation is comparatively not significant relative to many other risks. Risks from major accidents clearly have local consequences, but can be managed well with proper emergency response. The response to Fukushima by the Japanese government and the Soviet response to Chernobyl illustrate the huge difference a responsive government with relative transparency can make during a nuclear accident. But, risks involving hypothetical accidents (eg. complete melting of the reactor core and dispersal of the entire radioactive inventory into the food chain) have been the source of most controversies and misunderstandings about nuclear power. Although several reactor safety studies have indicated that such hypothetical accidents are highly unlikely in the modern nuclear power reactors, evaluating the risks of possible catastrophic losses with very low probabilities of occurrence remains problematic. A similar problem arises in evaluating catastrophic consequences from global

warming at very distant futures. There are also avoidable incorrect comparisons of nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons.

The security benefits, if any, from the possession of nuclear weapons are unlikely to be comparable in scale to the potential environmental benefits of nuclear power development, and the risks of accidental or intentional explosion of a megaton weapon in largely populated areas are likely to be higher than that of a severe accident in a nuclear power plant.

Like reactor safety, finding an acceptable way to dispose of the radioactive waste generated by nuclear power plants remains a very costly, if not intractable, problem. The challenge lies in assuring the public about the safety of proposed technical solutions over tens of thousands of years in a credible manner. Radioactive waste management has become hostage to political and legal battles. Political and legal difficulties in addressing the problem have in turn created the impression that radioactive waste disposal faces insurmountable engineering

ernobyl illustrate the huge difference a responsive government make during a nuclear accident.’ difficulties. It is, in fact, more about finding a solution that will have broad social and political acceptance. Excessive focus on hypothetical risks from nuclear waste far into the future, leaving out more obvious and immediate threats, is short-sighted and perpetuates public fear about nuclear power. Dealing comprehensively with all potential threats from the last remaining isotope in the spent fuel is impossible when the policy planning time horizon is so long. Nevertheless, interim storage (either onsite or dedicated facilities) for a period of 50 to 100 years makes practical and economic sense instead of designing facilities to assure safety for 10,000 years to 100,000 years. This approach should be able to address most of the concerns about radioactive waste disposal.

Public concerns about various nuclear risks (reactor meltdown, nuclear waste disposal and radioactive effluents from power plants) essentially boil down to cancer risks from exposure to radiation sources. But humans are also exposed

to radiation risks due to lifestyle choices and occupational hazards. Humans are exposed to chemical carcinogens from a variety of sources in addition to the significant natural background radiation levels. Although high level radiations cause cancer, the relationship between cancer incidence and exposure to low level radiation is ambiguous. This issue has been intensively studied in medical history, but the studies suggest that at levels of radiation studied in most, the cancer risk is too small to be detectable statistically except in the case of Japanese A-bomb survivors and in the incidence of certain types of cancer following the Chernobyl accident.

No energy source is free from environmental burdens. If the goal is to move away from carbon-intensive energy sources, there are essentially two alternatives: renewable energy and nuclear energy. Although renewable and nuclear energy have a carbon footprint (through various emissions in the life cycle), they are generally lower than those of fossil fuels. This and

an appropriate pricing of carbon emissions will remove the current financial barriers to nuclear power. However, capital costs of nuclear power and renewable sources are still higher compared to fossil fuels.

Production cost that is comprehensive and includes all externalities is a more appropriate metric to compare the economics of various energy sources. Securing long-term energy security will most likely involve the use of a diversified energy portfolio comprising fossil, nuclear and renewable sources.

Renewable energy sources have a huge potential and could arguably meet all of the current energy demand. However, it is debatable whether they will be adequate to supply a large share of the world’s energy needs in the long run. Energy conservation and efficiency would also help. The nuclear resource base is also very large, even using the current fleet of thermal nuclear reactors which use uranium resources inefficiently. Breeder reactors utilising uranium and thorium can potentially meet energy needs for an industrial society for several thousand years. However, very few breeders are currently operating at a significant scale and there are still unresolved technical issues.

To summarise, an evaluation of nuclear power suggests that it can play a significant role in meeting future energy demand in a way that is environmentally sustainable. Public concerns about nuclear power are based on an understandable lack of knowledge about it and a fear of the unknown. The Soviet physicist Sakharov once put it succinctly: ‘The basic reason for anti-nuclear feelings among people is probably the fact that they don’t have sufficient information about the complex and very specialised problems involved. Due to this lack of information, the natural and legitimate concern of contemporary man for the preservation of his environment is misdirected.’ The best antidote to both is the dissemination of knowledge and an objective and transparent assessment of the risks and benefits based on adequate and reliable data.

T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj is an Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. The author wishes to thank Professor T.N. Srinivasan for providing valuable feedback and suggestions.

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The business case against nuclear power Text â&#x20AC;˘ Benjamin K. Sovacool

The oft-quoted mantra of nuclear power being clean, green and futuristic comes under the scanner.

Image: kmichiels, flickr.com

T

he relentless media coverage of the Fukushima nuclear crisis in Japan has centred on safety and reliability concerns with modern nuclear power plants. Such fears have prompted China to suspend its nuclear building plans, at least for the short term, and will also affect the prospects for new plants in Europe and the US. But this safety debate obscures an economic point that was already emerging before the Japan disaster: nuclear power makes little economic sense.

Modern nuclear plants are among the most capital-intensive structures ever built. Initial construction of a new reactor consumes close to 60 per cent of a project’s total investment, compared to about 40 per cent for coal and 15 per cent for natural gas power plants (the remainder goes to costs such as fuel, maintenance and operations).

The nuclear industry is typically the most capital-intensive business in any country that builds nuclear plants.

There are several reasons for this.

Nuclear plants are more like one-of-akind cathedrals than off-the-shelf cellular phones. Key components like computer systems and reactor technologies may be modular, but they still have to go into a facility uniquely and expensively designed for its site. A nuclear plant requires special cooling systems, emergency back-up generators, spent-fuel ponds, radiation shields and firewalls that must all work in tandem to ensure safety and reliability.

Then there is the cost of time. In places like the US, it takes on average nearly five years to gain approval to pour the first concrete. The average construction time for all global nuclear power plants built from 1976 to 2007 has been more than seven years. While experts may differ on how much of this is necessary, it is not unreasonable to argue that nuclear plants ought to be subjected to a greater level of scrutiny compared to conventional or renewable power plants, given the dangers involved.

‘Asian governments purport to have plans to build 110 nuclear power plants between 2010 and 2030. Achieving this would necessitate hundreds of billions of dollars of continued subsidies.’

These long times place nuclear power plants at greater risk than their conventional competitors for unforeseen changes in electricity demand, interest rates, availability of materials, severe weather, labour strikes and the like — all of which threaten the viability of business plans and contribute to severe cost overruns. One study estimated that between 1966 and 1977, when most of America’s light-water reactors were built, in every case the US plants cost at least twice as much as expected. The quoted cost for these 75 plants was $89.1 billion, but the real cost was a monumental $283.3 billion — and that excludes fuel storage and decommissioning.

The expense continues once the plant has come online. Jim Harding from the Keystone Centre, a non-partisan think-tank, found in 2008 that projected operating costs for new nuclear power plants were 30 cents per kilowatt hour of power for the first 13 years until construction costs are paid, followed by 18 cents over the remaining lifetime of the plant. That compares to less than 10 cents per kilowatt hour for coal, natural gas, and even wind, hydro, geothermal and landfill gas generators. Moody’s Investor Service projects higher operating costs based on the quickly escalating prices of metals, forgings, other materials and labour needed to construct reactors.

So how has anyone been able to afford to build any plants at all? In short: government support. The business model for nuclear

power generation relies primarily on extracting huge amounts of taxpayer subsidies.

This has been true since the industry’s early days. Nuclear power in the US received subsidies of $15.30 per kilowatt hour between 1947 and 1961 — the first 15 years during which nuclear technology was used for civilian power generation— compared to subsidies of $7.19 per kilowatt hour for solar power and 46 cents for wind power between 1975 and 1989, the first 15 years when those technologies came into more widespread use. Nuclear operators are also often protected by laws limiting liability that shift most of the expense of serious accidents to the public, thus shielding operators from the costs of insuring a potentially more dangerous technology.

All of this ought to raise questions in a lot of minds in Asia, where nuclear increasingly has been viewed as the next big energy thing. Asian governments purport to have plans to build 110 nuclear power plants between 2010 and 2030. Achieving this build-out would necessitate hundreds of billions of dollars of continued subsidies. Conservatively estimating a per-plant cost of $5 billion, and very conservatively estimating subsidies equal to one-third of project costs (it is closer to 70 per cent to 80 per cent in the US), that still works out to around $180 billion in subsidies simply to build the plants, let alone operate them.

Nuclear-power proponents often argue that the market should decide whether nuclear makes sense. They are right. The reality is that but for government support, nuclear is a terrible business proposition.

Asian policy makers should take note.

Benjamin K. Sovacool, an Associate Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, is co-author of the forthcoming The International Politics of Nuclear Power. Reprinted from The Wall Street Journal Asia. ©2011 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All rights reserved.

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oil: a risky beneficiary of Japan’s nuclear crisis and Arab revolts

Oil, which gave the impression that it was going to take a backseat, is back at the forefront of global demand, as a result of Japan’s nuclear incident. How will this affect the global oil market? James Dorsey gives a taster.

‘Oil’s enhanced positioning is underlined by China, the world’s second largest oil importer and India, its fifth, seeking to shore up their strategic oil reserves against the risk of a lengthy supply shock. The move could be a precursor for increased buying for protective purposes, which could send crude oil prices skyrocketing higher than Wall Street expects and test the limits of OPEC’s spare production capacity.’

G

oodbye nuclear; hello again, oil. That is the fall-out of the nuclear crisis at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant as a result of last month’s devastating earthquake and tsunami. For Arab oil producers, embattled by a wave of anti-government protests that have already toppled two presidents, that is good news.

Even though the crisis has focused attention on alternative energy resources, oil is likely to be the foremost beneficiary for years to come. With countries across the globe reviewing their nuclear facilities, demand for oil is bound to increase, filling the coffers of Arab oil producers. Increased demand could offset prices depressed by prolonged volatility in the Arab world.

The nuclear crisis also offers Arab states anxious about Iran’s nuclear development an additional stick with which to hit the earthquake-prone Islamic republic. Gulf experts and environmentalists warn that an incident at Iran’s nuclear reactor at Bushehr, a mere 250 kilometres from the Saudi-Kuwait border, would most immediately threaten Abu Dhabi and Dubai with radioactive fallout, possibly hitting Saudi oilfields in Eastern Province as well as Bahrain and Qatar.

Gulf states are pressing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that Bushehr complies with its standards.

The Gulf concern follows China’s hold on its 27 nuclear reactors currently under construction, reviews of nuclear facilities and expansion plans across the globe, and the suspension of German plans to extend the life of its 17 plants.

Increased dependence on Arab oil also serves the Gulf states a reassurance that the United States and the European Union, already reluctant to push Gulf leaders to enact

political and economic reforms, will be even more hesitant to upset the regional apple cart. As a result, the international community moved swiftly to impose a no-fly zone on Libya but has been far more lenient with Bahrain and Yemen, where authorities have also unleashed their security forces to suppress anti-government protests.

To be sure, oil is not the only beneficiary of increased concerns about nuclear energy — coal, natural gas, hydro and new wind and solar technologies will also benefit, but hydrocarbons will lead the pack. Other producers like Russia are gearing up to meet demand. The move away from nuclear and towards hydrocarbons is likely to accelerate efforts by Gulf producers to project themselves as pioneers of green technologies in a bid to enhance their image, exploit a business opportunity and avoid becoming renewed targets of environmentalists.

International Energy Agency (IEA) chief economist Fatih Birol anticipates that reduced nuclear energy will harm efforts to fight climate change, push up energy prices and set back goals to secure power supplies. Birol estimates that the halving of projected nuclear installations in the next 25 years will add 500 million tons of carbon dioxide to the global total in 2035 or the equivalent of five years of extra emissions growth. That, in turn, would make it harder to meet a goal agreed by 193 nations at United Nations climate change talks in Copenhagen in 2009 and Cancun in 2010 to try to contain global warming to two degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit). The level of emissions expected in 2035 would be reached in 2030, according to Birol.

Oil’s enhanced positioning is underlined

by China, the world’s second largest oil

importer and India, its fifth, seeking to shore up their strategic oil reserves against the risk of a lengthy supply shock. The move could be a precursor for increased buying for protective purposes, which could send crude oil prices skyrocketing higher than Wall Street expects and test the limits of OPEC’s spare production capacity.

China launched its strategic reserve programme in 2006 and completed the first 102 million barrel build-up two years later. It expects to add another 168 million by early 2012 and to reach 500 million barrels by 2020. Japan’s nuclear crisis and the protests rocking the Middle East are believed to have prompted China to speed up its programme.

India holds only about 10 million barrels of oil in reserve. With dependence on imports for 80 per cent of its consumption, it is even more vulnerable to a supply shock.

India intends to stockpile some 40 million barrels by the end of 2012, equivalent to two weeks of imports. Analysts also expect India to step up its buying with 200–250 million barrels of oil over the coming years.

Says Soozhana Choi, an oil analyst at Deutsche Bank in Singapore, ‘China’s and India’s actions are likely to be a feature of the global oil market not only this year but this decade.’

James M. Dorsey is a Senior Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. He is an award-winning journalist and served as a foreign correspondent for, among others, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor and UPI in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Central America and the US.

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Championing climate change in Southeast Asia: a role for corporate leaders

Climate change impacts in Southeast Asia are a cause for concern among the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s business leaders. Sumi Dhanarajan and Davina Loh look at why this is, and how they are responding.

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xtreme weather conditions in parts of Southeast Asia over recent months have served as a stark reminder that climate change is real and present. In March 2011, floods in Thailand affected some 10 million people in the southern provinces, leaving some dead, others homeless and many more deprived of their livelihoods. The damage estimated by the Centre for Economic and Business Forecasting ranges between 21.7 billion and 26.5 billion baht (US$ 866 million). Southeast Asia already endures frequent storms, droughts and other natural hazards. Climate change adds to this repertoire by increasing overall temperatures, raising sea levels and aggravating the intensity and frequency of heavy rainfall and winds associated with tropical cyclones, leading to more landslides and floods. Much

of the region’s population and economic activity is concentrated around coastal areas and its poor are highly vulnerable with low adaptive capacity. Many of its economies have a high reliance on ‘climate sensitive’ sectors such as agriculture and tourism.

Not long before the floods hit, Kan Trakulhoon, the CEO of the Siam Cement Group, one of Thailand’s largest companies said, ‘Today, it is not enough to just focus on your own business. You have to think about the planet and human beings.

You have to look to the long-term and have a good balance between profit, society and the environment.’ His views were echoed by a number of other Southeast Asian corporate leaders who gathered recently in Singapore for a meeting to discuss what role they could play to shift the trajectory on climate change approaches in the region. Acutely aware of Southeast Asia’s vulnerabilities as an identified ‘hotspot’ for climate impacts, and the material risks these pose for business operations and assets, there was a clear recognition that, as a collective of private sector leaders, they needed to raise the game.

Pressure to act As in much of the developed world, Southeast Asian businesses are facing a wave of pressures to engage in sustainability practices. From consumers to investors, citizens to governments, there has been a distinct ratcheting up in terms of corporate behaviour and operations. Key trends include: • Tightening legal and regulatory pressure: These may come from governments through legislation or through ‘soft’ powers such as certification and standards bodies.

The goals will be to trigger higher efficiency standards and stricter energy usage guidelines, trickling down towards more stringent legislation and taxes. Such policies may affect pollution standards, raw material certifications, fuel blending mandates and new building regulations, among others; • A rise in responsible buying and procurement: Companies that score well on environmental leadership will likely enjoy stronger brand value. Additionally, companies unable to differentiate their products from others based on quality alone, may find that practising environmental stewardship may expand their sales. Increasingly, retailers, manufacturers and suppliers are

making similar decisions. According to Lee Tzu Yang, Chairman of Shell Companies in Singapore, ‘The wider challenge is to work with our customers and our suppliers to help them build a sustainable business that is also a profitable one. Only if we work together can we achieve this.’ The story about US and EU retailers’ demand for sustainable palm oil is a case in point; and • Capital with conditions: Institutional investors are increasingly equating a company’s ability to demonstrate good environmental, social and governance standards with strong long-term investor performance. Some 784 signatories (comprising asset owners, investment managers and professional service partners) have signed up for the United Nation’s Principles for Responsible Investment, accounting for US$22 trillion worth of investments. Responding to this trend, Malaysia’s Stock Exchange, Bursa, plans to launch an Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) index in 2012 to encourage Malaysian companies to meet ESG screening criteria in order to be listed.

Addressing the barriers A significant barrier for many businesses in emerging markets is the common perception that investments in sustainability will constrain growth, a sentiment that is somewhat shared by governments in this region. There is however, growing evidence that it is possible to decouple economic growth from environmental impacts. This is resonating in some quarters.

Harish Manwani, Unilever’s President for Asia, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe clearly believes in this: ‘We want to grow our business, but at the same time we want to reduce our environmental impact.

We believe we can do both.’ Last year, Unilever unveiled its ambitious Sustainable Living Plan, designed to halve the environmental impact of its products (this includes greenhouse gas and waste management and water use) and source 100 per cent of materials sustainably by 2020. Raising the overall awareness on what needs to be done and what is possible is a game-changer.

For a business to implement effective climate change strategies, it is vital to have government support, incentives and sometimes penalties, in the form of appropriate policies and legislation. This is particularly

applicable to smaller companies and businesses that are closely entwined with public infrastructure. Governments are responding: all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bar Malaysia, Myanmar and Thailand have associated with the Copenhagen Accord. Indonesia and Singapore have indicated higher pledges conditional on international financing support and global agreement on a new deal, respectively. Furthermore, some countries have taken significant steps to promote a low-carbon economy, including a new Ministry of Green Technology in Malaysia, a new Green Financing Scheme in Indonesia, a Green Power Development Plan in Thailand and a Green Growth Roadmap in Cambodia.Whether existing climate policies are robust and ambitious enough to have the necessary impacts to counter climate challenges remains to be seen. Some business leaders believe that the time is right for a deeper dialogue with public policy decisionmakers. They speculate that sometimes governments have a lower expectation of what businesses are willing to do to adapt their business models to meet the climate change challenge than is actually the case.

Bringing on the champions Harnessing the influence of corporate leaders to drive progressive climate policies is not as immediately obvious as it is sometimes made out to be. We walk a fine line when what drives our desire for change is a heady and complicated mix of material and profit-driven motives on the one hand, and on the other, a belief in responsible stewardship for future generations of Southeast Asians. The risk of double standards when there are short-term conflicts between these drivers is clearly evident. Yet, the overwhelming potential for change that ensues when we enlist some of the most visionary and strategic minds to undertake one of the most complex and unpredictable collective challenges we face, is a risk that may be worth taking.

Sumi Dhanarajan is a Consultant for the Public Roles of the Private Sector programme at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG) at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. sdhanarajan@nus.edu. sg Davina Loh is a Coordinator of CAG’s Southeast Asia Corporate Leaders Initiative on Cliimate Change. davina_loh@nus.edu.sg

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Quo vadis, energy policy?

Dodo J. Thampapillai suggests that an underlying cause of the natural disaster in Japan may in fact be man-made.

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he disaster and tragedy in Japan has raised more questions than answers about the safety of nuclear energy. However, the real cause of the nuclear disaster may be rooted elsewhere — possibly fossil fuels and especially crude oil together with coal. Yet, there has been a real connivance on analysing this cause.

The reason: crude oil has gotten ingrained as the main energy driver for all economies. This is compounded by the fact that energy is a basic need — the availability of energy is a prime determinant of macro-economic performance. Backtrack some 40 years to the Yom Kippur war in the Middle East. In a world that had evolved around crude oil since the 1850s, the energy

shortfall resulted in a quadrupling of oil prices by the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This, in turn, generated prolonged spells of recession and inflation worldwide. The Iran-Iraq war of 1981–82 created further shortages and exacerbated the recessionary conditions.

The non-oil producing world had by then begun a search for energy alternatives.

It was also active in advocating prudent energy consumption behaviour. Wind, solar, geothermal and various other alternatives, though technically feasible, proved to be economically cost-ineffective. Persistence towards innovation however, was shortlived. Behavioural changes such as a more frequent adoption of public transport and

‘Whilst the world is moving at a slow pace of incremental transition towards energy alternatives, the need for a revolutionary and abrupt change is probably vital if not inevitable.’

a higher tolerance towards discomfort (for example, less cooling in warmer climates and less heating in colder climates) were also short-lived. The reason: the entry of the UK and Norway into the oil market in 1987 with North Sea oil. This entry transformed the oil shortage into a surplus.

The price wars initiated by OPEC in this instance drove down the real price of oil to levels almost similiar to those that existed prior to 1973. The late 1980s marked the beginning of a boom. Conservative behaviour was replaced by extravagance — SUVs found their way into the automobile market in volumes larger than before. The intensity of the search for energy alternatives slackened. But the search for new untapped oil reserves gathered momentum.

That search continues to this day.

Oil prices stabilised in the 1990s (barring the period of the first Gulf War).

However, it took an upward surge from the beginning of this century. Several factors underlie this change in direction. The first is perhaps efforts to enforce emission guidelines — mainly with reference to green house gases (GHG). The second is the acknowledgement (following the 2006

Image: Danny Snell

Stern Report) that the finiteness of crude oil in the worst case scenario could come to bear in as little as 50 years. Third, there were additional events that triggered oil shortages: the invasion of Iraq, Hurricane Katrina, and of course the disastrous BP oil spill. As I write this piece, political instability in the Middle East and the intervention in Libya are likely to help push the price up even further. Right now, crude oil is sitting on US$115 per barrel.

In the midst of this high oil price regime, how concerted are the efforts towards energy alternatives? The efforts do exist â&#x20AC;&#x201D; especially with reference to solar power, wind and bio-energy. Yet, there are also efforts to extend the reliance on crude oil and coal. The hitherto un-economic oil reserves in Cambodia, Myanmar and Sri Lanka are now supposedly economic given the high oil prices. The economic demand for coal from both China and India has been unprecedented and hence the worldwide exploration and acquisition of coal

mines by China. For instance, there have been reports that China was constructing a 500 MW coal power plant every four days.

The UN and its various entourages that circle the globe for consensus on GHG emissions seem to have overlooked some of the hidden dangers in prolonging the reliance on fossil fuels. It is an established fact that the mining and combustion of coal release into the atmosphere substances other than GHG. Prominent among these are cadmium that causes kidney disorders and mercury, which is a neurotoxin. It is perhaps a matter of little surprise that recent issues of the American Journal of Psychiatry report increasing incidences of mental illness in rural China where coal is indiscriminately burnt. Perhaps matters need to get much worse before the UN would decide to pursue another protocol.

There is also another body of contested literature that claims that the extraction of oil and coal beyond threshold levels could increase the frequency of

earthquakes. Some claim that this threshold level has been surpassed. Despite the controversy, the underlying thesis that premises the argument based on empirical observations is worth a hearing. The removal of crude oil and coal from layers beneath the earth prompts a significant reduction in pressure, which in turn induces seismic activity. Humankind, in its quest for readily usable energy, has extracted cumulatively unimaginably vast amounts of oil and coal. The correlation between the cumulative extraction load and the increased frequency of earthquakes cannot be readily disregarded.

Whilst the world is moving at a slow pace of incremental transition towards energy alternatives, the need for a revolutionary and abrupt change is probably vital if not inevitable.

Dodo J. Thampapillai is an Associate Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. spptj@nus.edu.sg

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INSTITUTIoNS oF rELEvANCE Text • Frank Hartmann

Schools of public policy allow for some of the best opportunities to bridge the gap between theory and practice, but achieving the right balance is difficult.

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ublic policy schools arrived late in the world of professional education. Most universities’ law schools, business schools and medical schools pre-date them by several generations. Yet, public policy schools, the latecomers, are desirable for universities for the following reasons: • They attract very high-quality students who are likely to be well-placed people with real promise. They would be valuable to the enterprise of government, to government-related activities, to the non-governmental sector and to all who deliver services to the public; • They help these students learn how to think, how and when to use analytic tools, and how to anticipate, approach and respond to difficult problems that affect the public good; and • They help these students learn to be reflective practitioners, enabling them to develop an effective theory of action to deliver tangible results that contribute to the public good.

Image: Paul Lachine

Once a university has such a school, it might set itself the goals listed below: • The school should be a powerful player in the realm of public ideas; • It should challenge the conventional thinking of all those entities and persons who deliver services to the public; • It should engage government(s) and NGOs cooperatively to address public issues and to be ahead of the curve in this work; • It should provide those who are responsible for serving the public with ideas and a variety of ways to develop effective policies, while simultaneously challenging these people; and • It should work cooperatively and

respectfully with the best practitioners to develop policies and put them in place.

Three of these points deserve further explication, starting with the notion of ‘ideas’. To be an influential player in the public forum of ideas is part of the mission of a school of public policy. One might think of these ideas in two ways: ‘big ideas’ and ‘applied ideas’.

Big ideas are those concepts developed by academics that reshape the way we think about and approach issues that affect the public. Robert Putnam’s research and writing on social capital has given policy makers a different way to think about civic enterprise. The roles and many facets

‘One wants in a public policy school both kinds of faculty: those who generate big ideas and those who work in the area of applied ideas.’

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of civic and private life are inextricably mixed — given this, how might all who deliver services to the public act?

Thomas Schelling’s work on game theory, for which he later won a Nobel Prize, was a foundation for the policy making of Western governments, particularly in terms of their policies regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the 1960s. David Musto of Yale School of Medicine wrote about the history of cocaine use in the United States in a way that allowed policy makers to see how laws followed and confirmed social norms, rather than the opposite. Kishore Mahbubani’s work on the place of Asia in the power structure of the modern world challenges conventional Western thinking about the current hegemony.

In each case, I can imagine policy makers saying, ‘I have never thought about it that way before. It helped me to reconceptualise the issues.’

The specific applications are open to interpretation, but the ideas are present and powerful, and cannot be ignored in the marketplace of ideas.

Then, there are what I call ‘applied ideas’. These are policy and management ideas about how public services are delivered. Those with which I am most familiar are about community policing, performance management in government, and the reduction of errors in the delivery of medical services. In each case, the informing ideas were developed in partnerships with practitioners, often with the latter leading the way. The result was that services to the public were delivered in new and measurably more effective ways.

Applied ideas necessarily involve a deep working relationship between academics and bright, committed practitioners who are responsible for delivering services to the public.

Working in the area of applied ideas means, among other things, that the ideas have to be more broadly accessible to the public for input, reaction and amendment.

Traditional academic publication is insufficient. In the United States, those working in the arena of applied ideas communicate their ideas in articles found in the New York Times Sunday magazine, the New Yorker, the Atlantic, and even in Parade Magazine, a breezy national Sunday supplement to many newspapers. One wants to deliver the ideas about the new ways in which services

‘To be an influential player in the public forum of ideas is part of the mission of a school of public policy.’ to the public might be delivered both to policy makers and to the broader public.

American policing in particular, and Western policing in general, were much affected by an applied-ideas research effort, in cooperation with the Boston Police Department, to reduce homicides among young people in Boston. The result was a reduction in homicides from 57 to zero, with the number staying close to zero for almost eighteen months. While often called the ‘Boston Miracle’, it was in fact no miracle. It was the result of the dedicated and ongoing partnership between police practitioners, different parts of the Boston community and a public policy school. It was an applied idea.

The second point regards the importance of teaching the art of reflective practice to people who implement policies that affect the public. The leader in this area is Ellen Schall, Dean of the Wagner School of Public Service at New York University. Schall was, for almost eight years, the Commissioner of Juvenile Services for the city of New York. Her leadership and management dramatically improved the situation for the children under the care of her agency. She writes wonderfully about the complexities of public service in an article called Learning to Love the Swamp: ‘The world of public service has more swamp than high ground.

Many of the tough problems that lure us to public service and test our leadership are “swamp” problems. To be effective in public leadership, people need the capacity to lead and manage in the “swamp.” There are no rules for this and no set techniques that guarantee the right answer.’

We want our students to take management, implementation and policy application theories, to try them, with a view to learning what works and what does not, to test further, and to share the ideas with

other leaders and managers. This is not the same teaching as that of teaching analytic techniques. It leads the learning of students so that, while they make the academic tools their own tools, they work to build on their basic strengths and work to modify their weaknesses. We want them to build their own informed theory of action and to ask themselves: ‘how will I act and manage in a swamp?’ and ‘how will I continue to learn and practise’?

This means that we should, along with sharing the tools of policy analysis with students, teach the art of reflective practice.

This is a practice that involves continuous learning in their careers as public managers.

I believe that while we teach policy analysis well, we teach the art of reflective practice less well. It is not a conventional learning enterprise, but because of the importance of serving the public, we should be masters at it.

Third, the existing structures of public policy schools do not fully support either of the two propositions above. Quality is most often determined by one’s ability to earn tenure. One’s quality is not determined by others in the public policy arena, but by others in the same academic profession — by economists for economists, by political scientists for political scientists, and so forth. Nothing in this arrangement supports the work of bringing applied ideas to bear on public issues, or the work of teaching the art of reflective practice.

One can make powerful arguments for tenure, but the issue is not about tenure; it is whether tenure should be the dominant driver to determine the work of faculty and the work of a school of public policy.

All of the persons mentioned as having contributed big ideas were tenured; those who contributed the applied ideas were not. One wants in a public policy school both kinds of faculty: those who generate big ideas, and those who work in the area of applied ideas. If a public policy school is faithful to what it is trying to do, it has to give structural place to the development of both kinds of ideas.

Frank Hartmann was a Visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy from December 2010 to February 2011. He is currently a Senior Research Fellow of the Programme in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at the Harvard Kennedy School. frank_hartmann@harvard.edu

Democracy and development 路 Preventing mass violence and genocide in the 21st century 路 Street, stage, shrine, and square: protest sites as contested terrain

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011 is also the year 20 AEH (After the End of History). On 8 December 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved by treaty, and in a book published a few months later, the American academic Francis Fukuyama famously declared ‘the end of history’. Fukuyama put forward the thesis that the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of humanity’s search for the optimal way to govern society. Henceforth, he argued, all societies, regardless of history, culture or religion, would eventually gravitate towards liberal democracy as the preferred form of governance.

Even in the heady years after 1991, when democracy seemed to be sweeping all before it, Fukuyama’s proposition did not go unchallenged. Samuel Huntington’s seminal work The Clash of Civilisations? (1993) has the best-known and most compelling of the counterpoints. Huntington argued that the post-cold war world would divide along civilisational lines with each grouping of nations adopting its own civilisation-specific forms of governance.

For the better part of the past decade and a half, the world seemed to be moving broadly in the direction predicted by Huntington. In the former Soviet Union, after often chaotic attempts at democratisation, most of the constituent republics slid back into various forms of authoritarian one-party rule. The Arab and neareastern Muslim world became engulfed in civil war, pitting autocratic secular or monarchist regimes against religious fundamentalists. The meteoric rise of China, with its blend of authoritarian one-party rule and state-directed capitalism, seemed to suggest that civilisation-specific models of governance were not incompatible with economic development and modernity.

Indeed, many commentators became so enamoured with the rise of China and its apparent resilience in the face of the economic crisis of 2008–09, that they revived the old argument that authoritarian government was in fact better for economic development than democracy.

While 2008–09 probably represented

‘Authoritarianism and democracy are very broad umbrella terms that cover an exceedingly diverse range of regimes and systems of governance.’

the nadir for those advocating the superiority of democracy over alternative models of governance, recent events in Tunisia and Egypt suggest that democracy may be staging something of a comeback. Hence, it may be appropriate to examine anew the question of whether authoritarianism or democracy is better for development.

Those who advocate that authoritarianism is better for development usually make the following key arguments in favor of such regimes: 1. They are able to move quickly in implementing policies necessary for development because they avoid the inevitable gridlock associated with democracy, where competing interest groups frequently disagree over which is the right course of action; 2. They are particularly well-suited for developing countries where the population at large lacks the education and civicmindedness necessary for a well-functioning democracy; and 3. Linked to the second point above, they are better at protecting property rights in the face of calls for re-distribution by the huddled masses and are thereby better at encouraging and facilitating the foreign direct investment that is necessary for economic development.

The poster children of authoritarianism have traditionally been China after Mao,

South Korea under the military regimes of the 1960s, 70s and 80s, Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew and Augusto Pinochet’s Chile. In turn, for authoritarians, the bogeymen have traditionally been India under Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, and the United States and Western Europe each time they experience protracted economic recessions.

Those who argue for democracy point out that democratic regimes: 1. Produce better outcomes over the long-run, because through debate and the balancing of competing interests, they maximise popular consensus around an optimal set of policies; 2. Avoid catastrophic policy choices — such as the Soviet Union’s collectivisation of agriculture and China’s Great Leap Forward — that can lead to misery and death for millions of people; and 3. Are politically more stable over the long run because they provide widely accepted mechanisms for leadership renewal and the peaceful transfer of power.

The poster children of democracy have been the United States, the United Kingdom, post-Second World War Western Europe and Japan, India (no revolutions and/ or famines since independence) and South Korea from the 1990s onwards. Predictably perhaps, for democrats, the bogeymen have been the Soviet Union, China under Mao, much of post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa until the turn of the century and the Arab world post September 11.

Of course, both sets of arguments contain truths but they are also fundamentally flawed. Indeed, the debate itself may be an exercise in futility.

To begin with, authoritarianism and democracy are very broad umbrella terms that cover an exceedingly diverse range of regimes and systems of governance. The term ‘authoritarian’ for instance has been used to describe countries as diametrically different as North Korea and Singapore.

Indeed, anyone who knows anything about these two places will know that Singapore has far more in common with Switzerland

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— a direct democracy where frequent plebiscites determine everything from the sewage systems to the surrender of sovereignty — than it does with the autarky that is North Korea. Comparisons, therefore, between authoritarian and democratic systems of governance become somewhat pointless given the degree of variation within each so-called system.

Secondly, following on from the above observation, most modern systems of governance contain elements that are democratic and elements that are authoritarian.

For example, constitutional scholars of the United Kingdom often describe the office of the prime minister as an elected dictatorship with a five-year term. This description stems from the fact that the constitution of the United Kingdom does not provide for the separation of the three powers of government: legislative, executive and judicial.

These all reside with parliament. Moreover, the electoral system tends to produce governments with strong parliamentary majorities even though the winning party barely commands more than 40 per cent of the popular vote. Finally, sovereignty in the United Kingdom rests not with the people but with the king or queen in parliament.

In theory, therefore, parliament can enact any laws it wants, including, for example, laws that might tilt elections in favour of the incumbent party. Hence, a prime minister, who by convention exercises all of the prerogatives of the monarch, enjoys significant powers particularly if his or her party commands a healthy parliamentary majority. Of course, in practice, the prime minister of the United Kingdom is not a dictator, and membership of the European Union has somewhat diluted the absolute sovereignty of the parliament. Nevertheless, the system, assessed purely on its own merits, clearly contains a number of undemocratic features.

Finally, democracy in particular is a very poorly understood term. In Greek, the term means ‘rule by the demos’, the citizen body of a city state meeting in free assembly and making decisions by voting:

one man, one vote. Hence, democracy is associated with free and fair elections. The problem is that most people, even seasoned democratic politicians, tend to stop there.

While free and fair elections are a necessary precondition for democracy, they are never sufficient. Indeed, there are plenty of examples in history where free and fair elections have produced decidedly undemocratic outcomes. In order to function properly, therefore, modern democracies require an institutional and organisational framework where free and fair elections are but one component. At a minimum, this framework needs to also include the rule of law as well as the fundamental freedoms of speech, worship, movement and association. The rule of law in particular is critical because it defines the rules of the game and ensures that they are accessible, capable of being understood, lead to predictable outcomes and apply equally to all members of a society including those in positions of authority.

Where then does the above analysis leave the question of which system of governance is best for economic development?

Like political development, economic development benefits greatly from the rule of law. A business environment where the rules of the game are accessible, capable of being understood, lead to predictable outcomes and apply equally to all is far more likely to encourage investment than one

‘Comparisons between authoritarian and democratic systems of governance become somewhat pointless given the degree of variation within each so-called system.’

which is subject to the arbitrary whims of those in power. Equally, economic development benefits from a certain degree of economic freedom and competition. This is irrespective of whether the underlying political system is or is not democratic.

India under Nehru and subsequently Indira Gandhi was a reasonably well-functioning democracy governed by the rule of law.

Unfortunately, in this case the rule of law included the infamous License Raj, which imposed significant restrictions on economic activity and competition, and as a consequence, acted as a brake on economic development for nearly four decades.

In contrast, authoritarian China under Deng Xiaoping had a much freer and more competitive economy and thereby gained a significant development advantage over India. The answer, therefore, to the question ‘which system of governance is best for economic development’ seems to be ‘that system which is best at delivering the rule of law and a relatively free and competitive economy’.

Notwithstanding the admonition that comparisons between authoritarianism and democracy are pointless, it may be tempting to conclude that an enlightened authoritarian regime may have the edge when it comes to development. Indeed, as early as the fourth century BC, Plato identified the Philosopher King as the ideal ruler of his Republic. The trouble is that the modern world can offer so few examples of real Philosopher Kings. Indeed, history is littered with examples of enlightened authoritarian rulers that, with the passage of time, degenerated into autocrats mired in corruption. While China today may be a reasonable example of enlightened authoritarianism, it is useful to remember that in all of its glorious 2,230-year history, its people have never been freer and its government more democratic than they are today.

Stavros N. Yiannouka is Executive Vice-Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. This article first appeared in the December 2010 edition of Globe Asia.

Preventing mass violence and genocide st in the 21 century Text â&#x20AC;˘ David Hamburg and Eric Hamburg

Tuol Sleng - S21 Genocide Museum in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Source: Wikimedia - Adam63)

I ‘People who live in pluralistic democracies become accustomed to diverse needs and learn the art of working out compromises that are satisfactory to all groups.’

t is exceedingly hard to comprehend how decent human beings could commit mass atrocities of war, genocide and slavery — over and over again, from decade to decade, generation to generation, century to century. The manifestation has been so despicable, and yet efforts have been made to deny the existence of genocides, to claim that the atrocities have been exaggerated, or to say that genocide is simply a natural disaster like a tsunami.

Mass atrocities have important shared properties, and often virulent prejudice predisposes a people or a nation to slavery, civil war or revolution. Under those conditions, the door is open to genocide as the norms and institutions that restrain atrocity are eroded. The killing of the discriminated becomes the order of the day and established targets become exceedingly vulnerable.

So, it is highly desirable and increasingly feasible for the international community — especially established democracies worldwide — to build up measures that can help to put out the fires of genocidal tendencies when they are small, yet visible. If not extinguished, these fires may well lead to mass violence of one form or another.

Political leaders make mass violence possible by lighting the fires of hatred, but they do not act alone. They are supported by the machinery of the state, the dominant political party, the police, paramilitary and military forces, as well as professionals such as lawyers, professors, doctors and engineers. Thus, warning time is typically not weeks or even months, but actually years. The years required to go from the initial jeopardy to mass violence offer an interval for the international community — if it is sufficiently alert, well-informed, morally committed and organisationally prepared — to take preventive actions. The earlier and more cooperative these interventions are, the better.

These shared properties suggest that there are principles for preventing mass violence. We must strive to understand and apply these principles. At the heart of the prevention of mass violence is the building of pillars for prevention.

As techniques of prevention become clearer, momentum has grown towards using active and non-violent problem-solving skills and promoting the sharing of experiences across national boundaries to learn

from the world’s experiences in different local conflicts. Tackling serious grievances as early as possible denies political demagogues and fanatics the opportunities to plant the chronic discontent that makes incitement to violence easier.

A democratic system of government can be a strong pillar of prevention. Democracies thrive by finding ways to deal fairly with conflicts and resolve them below the threshold of mass violence. They develop ongoing mechanisms for settling disagreements. That is why encouraging their growth is so important in an overall plan to prevent mass violence. People who live in pluralistic democracies become accustomed to diverse needs and learn the art of working out compromises that are satisfactory to all groups.

Democracies, even with periodic regressions, protect human rights better than non-democratic societies, and their elected officials are less likely to engage in large-scale, egregious human rights violations that create intense fear and severe resentment. Human rights abuse as a path to war or genocide is very unlikely in an established democracy.

Along with democracy, equitable socioeconomic development on a worldwide basis offers humanity its best hope for producing conditions favourable to preventing mass violence. This is a much more practical goal today than it was a few decades ago, even though a long rugged path still lies ahead. We must help build local capacity for honest and effective governance, sciencebased healthcare and technical capability. At a time of unprecedented advances in biomedical sciences and public health, it is urgent that research and development redirect its efforts and pursue the treatment and prevention of the world’s most devastating diseases — those concentrated in developing countries. This has a moral basis and also a very practical one — these diseases can readily spread and affect everyone everywhere. When disease goes unchecked in any corner of the world, we know that it can spread across oceans and continents. The spread of infectious diseases is not unlike the spread of hatred and violence — and this can have disastrous consequences.

A fundamental underpinning of successful socio-economic development, fair to all and not corrupt, is comprehensive

‘Prevention of mass violence starts with the recognition of the immense dangers of egregious, pervasive human rights violations, typically enforced by and in repressive states.’

Teeth and bones sit in a display case at the Killing Fields, Cambodia

education, from pre-school through graduate school, and life-long learning. This must include women on an equal basis, not only as a matter of equity but also as a matter of economic stimulus.

Prevention of mass violence starts with the recognition of the immense dangers of egregious, pervasive human rights violations, typically enforced by and in repressive states — human rights violations so crucial in preparing the ground for genocide and ethnic, religious and international wars. Eventually, these atrocities must be prevented, and bad outcomes averted, by promoting democracy, equitable market economies and the creation of strong civil institutions that protect human rights.

How do these principles apply to poor countries whose perils can readily become everyone’s perils?

First, we must support strong and sustainable democratic governments. Governments that respect the will of their people, that govern by consent and not coercion, are more prosperous, more stable and more successful than governments that do not.

Elections are important but not enough.

What happens between elections?

In the 21st century, capable, reliable and transparent institutions are the key to success — a strong parliament, an incorruptible police force, an impartial judiciary system, an independent press, an ethical private sector and a vibrant civil society. These give life to democracy because they affect everyday life.

There are wars over territories and wars over resources. Underlying tensions can be manipulated by unscrupulous leaders to get whole communities fighting among themselves. The world has many identities of tribe, ethnicity, religion and nationality.

However, defining oneself as an enemy of someone who belongs to a different tribe or who worships a different god has no place in the 21st century. People everywhere have common aspirations — to live in peace and security, to access education and opportunity, to love their families, build their communities and practise their faiths. An environment that allows that allows humanity to evolve and ultimately prevents mass violence.

David Hamburg is the author of the book Preventing Genocide (Paradigm Press, 2008). Eric Hamburg directed the documentary film Preventing Genocide, based on the book.

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Street, stage, shrine, and square: protest sites as contested terrain

Urban protesters and the public protest spaces adopted by them have reconfigured the history of many nations.

Text • Teresita Cruz-del Rosario

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ebruary 1986, EDSA (the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue).

The six-lane urban highway, worming its way through six municipalities of metro Manila, unconvincingly organises the flow of traffic in both directions. It is a most curious venue to stage an uprising.

Yet, 25 years ago, EDSA set the stage for a people-power uprising that toppled the two-decade-long Marcos dictatorship. No longer a neutral and empty territory, EDSA became a charged space: what William Sewell terms as ‘a matrix of power’.

In Argentina, the 70s and 80s was a period of the ‘murderous dictatorship’ of the military regime. Public spaces were invisible, the citizenry cowed into privacy and silence until fourteen mothers donned white scarves and invaded the Plaza de Mayo with their demands to know about the disappearances (desparecidos) of their loved ones. Soon thereafter, the square resurrected as Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, reconfigured as a protest space openly demonstrating against a repressive regime.

‘Protesters the world over, wherever they may be found, transform physical spaces and convert them into a kind of political pilgrimage site.’

Satellite image of Tahrir Square during the Egyptian protest against the government of Hosni Mubarak (Source: DigitalGlobe)

More recently, at the centre of Cairo stands Tahrir Square, a rotunda that witnessed the gathering of Egypt’s disaffected. Wired youths brandished cell phones in one hand and stones in the other, and they spoke to the teeth of power using Facebook. Eighteen days later, the curtains came down on Mubarak’s regime.

Protesters the world over, wherever they may be found, transform physical spaces and convert them into a kind of political pilgrimage site. There, they undertake a quest for personal and social redemption to find their courage and recover their lives from the grip of fear and prolonged repression.

They trek in large numbers to protect one another and to share a moment when new social meanings are being fashioned out of collective action. They convert these spaces into repositories of collective sentiments, drawing on one other to weave a grand narrative of history-making and nation-building. They are, suddenly, human agents of history and society.

Public spaces provide opportunities for refashioning what

political scientist Dag Angkar terms as ‘political architecture’.

Rather than being inherently constraining, these places present a crucial resource with which to apply spatial agency. In these sequestered sites, physical and metaphorical notions of space coalesce, so that what was once a mix of street, floor and cemented highway meld into symbol, sentiment and statement. Here is where the silence is broken.

However, protest space is also highly contested terrain. They are sites of social conflict and clashes over symbolic codes. They represent competing claims to legitimacy and control over power, battles over alternative visions of the future, and struggles to redraw the boundaries of community and society. Blood spills taint the pavements and cover the dead.

Remember Bangkok in 2010? In its fashionable Rajdamri district, where street vendors intersect with smart shoppers, the Red Shirts camped out as an affront to the urbanised enclaves of the upper- and middle-class Yellow Shirts. Right there, Major General Khattiya Sawasdipol who had gone rogue for the Red Shirts was shot in the head while speaking to several journalists.

Watch Libya unravel. Benghazi as contested territory has emerged not only as the most visible arena of Libyan resistance, but also as the most potent symbol of the irreversible course of change in Middle East politics. Watch Bahrain, Yemen and Syria too.

Parallelisms among all these countries are inevitable. Street action among everyday people interacts with formal institutions — the courts, the political parties, the media, the military, the mosque and the church. Where formal and informal processes intersect, political dynamics change. Within days, political careers will ebb and wane, new ones will be forged, and the world will yet again bear witness to another upheaval in human experience.

Above all, what these geographies of struggle provide is the very best application of human agency, of fearless improvisation and a resurgence of creativity, often times without structure and direction, somewhat like collective street jazz.

Yet, hope abides in this massive energy that refuses to be silenced. An illud tempus according to theatrical critic David Cole, a time to re-imagine an alternative universe of relationships and thus a place where there is no thought of surrender or defeat.

Teresita Cruz-del Rosario is Visiting Associate Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Her recently published book Scripted Clashes: A Dramaturgical Approach to Philippine Uprisings provides an explanatory framework for people power events in the Philippines over two decades. tdelrosario@nus.edu.sg

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YoUNG TALENT FroM AroUND THE WorLD, AvAILABLE AT THE CLICK oF YoUr FINGErS. Take a look at our latest student proďŹ les today and contact Sarah Bailey in the Professional Development Unit at sppsarah@nus.edu.sg to coordinate internships and permanent placements within your organisation.

www.spp.nus.edu.sg/Class_Profile_Books.aspx

Education for development Azul Ogazon Gomez, an alumnus from Mexico, shares her experience of how post-graduate education at the LKY School has given her the tools to understand public policies and effect change back in her home country.

D ‘Developing countries face many challenges, and the key to their success is to have people in government who are well-trained and who have the vision to turn obstacles into opportunities for economic and social development, as well as knowledgeable citizens who can keep their government accountable.’

eveloping countries face many challenges, and the key to their success is to have people in government who are well-trained and who have the vision to turn obstacles into opportunities for economic and social development, as well as knowledgeable citizens who can keep their government accountable. Education, therefore, plays a fundamental role in these countries.

However, in developing countries, those who have successfully completed secondary education and are enrolled in tertiary institutions comprise, on average, only 20 per cent of the total population.

One of the many reasons for this is the limited number of educational institutions offering tertiary programmes. However, the determinant cause is the opportunity cost tertiary education represents. Nevertheless, more and more people in developing countries are becoming aware of the returns that this investment can bring, as well as the positive externalities that it will effect in their society.

Applying for post-graduate programmes in such countries has become a tough challenge given the fact that the demand for such programmes has increased — while the number of scholarships and financial aid has not. In order to avoid such disappointing experiences, students should look beyond the typical educational paths and explore new opportunities.

Singapore is the perfect example of a country that has achieved a high level of development and is ready to help other countries to do so by offering scholarships in high-quality graduate programmes.

The LKY School trains new generations of leaders and has been offering generous scholarships in order to accomplish this.

The School offers a world-class education in policy making, complemented by regular interaction with current political leaders. With professors and students coming from more than 50 nations and from different professional backgrounds, political, historical and cultural debates as well as the sharing

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MPP Class 2010 planting a tree after the graduation ceremony.

of experiences take place every day.

As a student of the School who hails from a developing country that has been strongly influenced by American economy, politics and culture, my experience here has helped me learn from diverse Asian experiences and has changed my perspective about policy making.

Methods of learning at the LKY School are diverse and are structured in such a way that students get a good grasp of real politics. The courses have a good mix of theories and optimal policies, as well as mechanisms of policy delivery, which are fundamental for governments who want to minimise the multiple challenges that hinder the success of public policies. Through several case studies, I was able to realise that Asian governments in the newly-industrialised countries move from a vision of optimal public policies to focusing on practical implementation, leading to economic growth and social development.

During my two years as a student at

the LKY School, I developed my steering and co-ordination skills by taking part in the organisation of the 2009 GPPN Student Conference: Crisis as Opportunity — What Policies Do We Need for Sustainable Development Today?; the 2010 Consensus//Colloquium: Securing Food in ASEAN; and the launch events of the Asian Journal of Public Affairs’ print issues. Some of my classmates worked on their consulting and fundraising skills while supporting the functions of different NGOs. Others built up their presentation and research skills while attending conferences and presenting papers in our School and other universities.

Networking and the building of strong friendships during graduate school creates future opportunities for developing countries. At the LKY School I had the chance to share two years with amazing people whose main aim is to make a difference in their countries and consequently for the world. Knowing that

we are all targeting this common goal makes it reasonable to think that we will eventually meet again. What is important is the fact that we will gladly work together, knowing that our graduate dreams of enhancing economic and social development will have the chance to become a reality.

The transformation of public policies in developing countries is needed.

A more human, effective and equitable system that leads to true economic and social development must be pursued. But for that, change must take place, and this can come in different forms. The first change must take place in you. The question is, are you ready to pursue that goal?

If your answer is ‘yes’, then look beyond for opportunities.

Azul Ogazon Gomez, from Mexico, is a graduate of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy’s Master in Public Policy programme in 2010. She is currently an Executive with the Executive Education programme at the LKY School. sppaog@nus.edu.sg

Mongolia: fastest-growing economy in the next decade Blessed with an abundance of natural resources, Mongolia is slated to be one of the fastest-growing economies in the next decade. An alumnus of the LKY School, Aigerim Bolat, who is from Mongolia, talks to the Prime Minister of Mongolia Sukhbaataryn Batbold about the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s potential and opportunities.

AB: Mr. Prime Minister, first of all thank you very much for accepting our invitation and sparing your valuable time for this interview. During your talk you said that Mongolia’s natural resources are exhaustible. Do you think it is possible for Mongolia to become a knowledge-based economy rather than rely purely on natural resources?

Aigerim Bolat interviewing the Prime Minister of Mongolia.

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ongolia is a country approximately the size of Western Europe but has a population of less than three million, many of whom live a traditional nomadic way of life. As Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of the LKY School pointed out in his introductory remarks, the country is one of the last places on earth with large untapped mineral resources including coal, copper, gold and uranium. As a result, many foreigners are starting to invest in Mongolia. It is a dynamic emerging market economy with double-digit growth rates expected over the next five years. The IMF predicts that the nation will be one of the fastest-growing economies in the next decade.

Mongolians are, in general, optimistic and happy people, and although they are strongly traditional, they adapt easily to changes in their environment. Mongolians are also enthusiastic about modernisation and are open to the outside world. Although the transition from a socialist to a democratic system occurred less than 20 years ago, the majority of young Mongolians are open-minded and speak several foreign languages. Some fortunate ones have had the opportunity to study abroad. From this generation, new leaders are emerging who will pursue the social, political and economic development of the country.

The Prime Minister of Mongolia, Sukhbaataryn Batbold, is one of these new leaders. He is well-educated, open-minded and optimistic about his country’s future. He has a PhD in economics and before entering politics, he was a successful businessman with interests in cashmere, construction and mining. His holding company, Altai Holding LLC, is one of the most successful companies in Mongolia. Prior to becoming Prime Minister, he was elected twice as a Member of Parliament and has served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Trade and Industry.

On 18 February 2011, during his official visit to Singapore, he met with the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong, and opened the Chinggis Khan (Genghis Khan) exhibit at Marina Bay Sands. Prime Minister Batbold also spoke at the LKY School. His talk covered the Mongolian government’s outlook for economic growth and its national development strategy, focusing on managing the challenges and benefits of rapid growth.

I was privileged to interview him briefly after his talk:

SB: Yes, I think it is not only possible, but also necessary for Mongolia to become a knowledge-based economy. It has to become one through several stages: First, we should build its base, and that starts with improving the quality of education and related social programmes. In terms of the economy, we should encourage technology-based production. In other words, we need to look at the processing, evaluating and downstreaming to value-add. It means that we must do very comprehensive work to deal with these challenges. Mineral resources are exhaustible, but there are many things that could be developed. Agriculture, tourism and other industries can also provide many opportunities for Mongolia.

AB: Mongolia is blessed to have a constant supply of wind and sun. Are there any government plans to develop renewable or green energy sources from solar and wind power?

SB: Again, we are a very lucky country to some extent. We have not only been blessed with the people of Mongolia, a massive land area and mineral resources, but also with the natural resources of wind and solar energies. In the southern part of Mongolia is the world’s best wind tunnel that has been studied by international experts. Mongolia can produce renewable energy from solar energy, and more importantly, from wind. The government of Mongolia is working with relevant international agencies to develop new concepts of using and making better use of these resources jointly with our neighbours like China. We have proposed ideas and initiatives on this international collaboration on the usage of the wind and solar energies. Some of them even suggested the name ‘Gobi-Tech’. I think there is a definitely a great potential in how these resources can be used for Mongolia in the near future.

Nurturing collaboration among Central Asian countries Central Asian counterparts augment understanding and friendship at the LKY School.

Text • Aigerim Bolat

O

with Dushanbe during the Soviet nce a year for the past three ‘While sensitive economic period have ended and there are now years, senior officials from Cenno direct flights between these cities. tral Asian countries were brought and political issues are The same has happened between together at the LKY School by the normally not discussed Baku and Tashkent, as well as DushAsian Development Bank’s CAREC anbe and Baku. It is said that some (Central Asia Regional Economic openly, this is an meetings among these countries Cooperation) Institute. While sensihave ended in tears when water and tive economic and political issues opportunity for them to border issues were touched upon. are normally not discussed openly, Thanks to CAREC Institute’s this is an opportunity for them to meet their counterparts in leadership initiative, senior governmeet their counterparts in the region the region face-to-face and face-to-face and to discuss imporment officials from Pakistan, Turktant issues in a relaxed environment. menistan, Mongolia and the Chinese to discuss important issues While in Singapore, they also learn provinces Xinjiang and Inner Monabout Singapore’s development golia joined the Central Asia group in a relaxed environment.’ strategies by visiting various highto attend a six-day Executive Leadtech industries such as the Port of ership Development Programme at Singapore or the Jurong Island Inthe LKY School in March 2011. dustrial Park. The officials also were The first day of the programme is typically tense and participants are able to experience the rich variety of Singapore’s Southeast Asian food and culture, swim in the ocean at quiet and serious, but towards the end of the programme, there Sentosa, and enjoy the warm weather while it might still have been is a friendly and relaxed atmosphere and the room is usually filled with laughter. Officials gradually forget their government snowing in many Central Asian countries then.

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan positions and titles and participate more actively in practical case and Uzbekistan — six out the ten CAREC member states — have studies, simulations and group projects. These group exercises, many things in common: language, culture, religion, history and carried out in a casual setting, break the ice and help the parresource-rich lands. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Un- ticipants to get to know and understand each other better. It is ion, some of these countries have weakened their ties with one an- hoped that this will lead to improved government-to-government other. For instance, the 24/7 direct flights that connected Tashkent negotiations or dialogues later.

Painting “Samarkand. The Registan” by Russian artist Alexander Naumov (Source: Wikimedia - Alexander Naumov)

For instance, two officials from Afghanistan and Pakistan, while waiting for a bus to take them to the LKY School, decided to facilitate a meeting, once they returned home, to address the border and double taxation problems that exist between the two countries.

Ironically, they were supposed to have met officially beforehand, but the meeting was delayed. Having met at the LKY School, they now trusted the intentions of the other party and were committed to a fair and favourable trade environment that would also be beneficial for other neighbouring countries. The discussion ended with a friendly handshake just before the bus arrived at the hotel.

When I approached the delegates from Turkmenistan, Dovletgeldi Sadykov, Turkmenistan’s Deputy Minister of Finance, shared his impression of the programme: ‘Overall, the programme is very interesting and the topics we discussed in the last few days are relevant to our work. Public sector management and leadership and negotiation skills, taught by highly experienced and qualified academicians and practitioners, gave us many new ideas and insights. Of course, we will not copy Singapore’s development strategy but we will tailor it and adapt those policies that are suitable for our country and unique culture. Learning from the experiences of Singapore and other advanced countries also helps us avoid problems that have occurred in these countries.

One important aspect of this programme is the bringing together of senior officials from neighbouring countries. Each of us has a different mentality, and sharing concerns and challenges helps us to better understand each other. I hope there will be more opportunities like this in the future. The standard of the programme is very high, and this shows Singapore’s efficiency.’

Mr. Abdul Basit Khan from Pakistan, Senior Joint Secretary and CAREC Transport Focal Point from the Ministry of Communication, who missed the semi-final World Cup cricket match between India and Pakistan when he remained in class to listen to his counterparts from central Asia, said this of the programme: ‘The learning experience started from the moment we stepped off the plane at Changi airport. Singaporeans are very friendly and professional people. We felt very welcomed everywhere we went, whether it was Sentosa or the LKY School or the hotel and restaurants. Content-wise the programme is very useful. I found the Public-Private Partnership course to be especially interesting and useful. Participants received a lot of useful information throughout the six days. I hope to be able to attend more programmes like this at the LKY School.’

Aigerim Bolat is an Executive with the Executive Education programme of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. sppaika@nus.edu.sg

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The new year and a new vision for Kazakhstan Text • Aigerim Bolat

Bayterek Tower in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan (Image: msykos, flickr.com)

The LKY School’s Executive Education had the privilege of conducting an executive programme for the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan and his Cabinet Members in March 2011.

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n Astana, the morning is beautiful, the air is fresh and clear and the sun’s warmth offers a new hope. The day marks the beginning of spring when Kazakhs and most Central Asians, including Iranians, Persians, Albanians, Indians, Macedonians, Burmese and Turks, celebrate Nauryz (New Day) — their New Year. Every Kazakh makes a great effort to greet the New Year with happiness, cleanliness and a rich dastarkhan (table full of dishes) to usher in a prosperous year. An old Kazakh saying goes like this: ‘the way a family welcomes the first day of the new year is the way they will spend the rest of the year’.

On this morning, while ordinary Kazakhs were busy visiting their elders, friends and relatives, some Kazakh government officials started a two-day executive programme on public policy and management. Despite the proximity of the national election in early April, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Karim Massimov, requested to have the executive programme for his Cabinet and himself during the two-day new year holiday.

The programme was delivered at the Nazarbayev University in Astana from 22–23 March, 2011. Twenty-nine ministers, including the Prime Minister, attended the sessions on ‘Transformational Leadership in the Public Sector: Setting an Inspiring Direction, Building Strong Support, Implementing for Results’ given

by Vice-Dean (Academic Affairs) and Associate Professor Scott Fritzen as well as ‘The Evolving Globalisation Dynamics’ and ‘Strategies for Avoiding the Middle Income Trap for a Resource-Rich Economy’ given by Professor Mukul Asher, who is also the Faculty Lead for the programme.

Intensive interactions between the Faculty Lead Professor Asher and the officials of the two organisations had been of immense value in ensuring that the programme was relevant in addressing the challenges of sustaining high growth during the current globalisation phase and of strategically managing the public

sector. The programme aimed at exposing participants to analytical frameworks and international experiences in managing a resource-rich middle-income country during the current globalisation phase. It also provided an understanding of strategic management in public sector organisations. The focus was on innovative ways to make these organisations more effective in delivering high-quality public services.

The participants took the programme seriously. Although there was no guarantee that all of them would remain in the government after the elections, the participants were seriously engaged in the programme.

The sessions provoked interesting discussions and fundamental questions in a relaxed and unofficial setting. For example, former cosmonaut and Chairman of the Space Agency, Talgat Mussabayev, raised a question on whether Kazakhstan needed a space programme, pointing to the high cost of the programme, the few qualified specialists in the country and the progress that was needed for it to catch up with other countries. Another issue that caught the attention of the Prime Minister and most of the other participants was the middleincome trap that is experienced by many resource-rich economies.

At the end of the programme, one of the conclusions made was that the insights and lessons learned from Singapore and other advanced countries can help the decision makers in Kazakhstan leap into the New Year of the Rabbit with a new vision and new goals. We hope to see the participants as inspired leaders in the new government in Astana.

This year, the LKY School’s Executive Education is also delivering in Astana six rounds of customised weekly executive programmes for senior government officials of Kazakhstan at the Nazarbayev University from February to November 2011.

‘On the first day of the Nauryz, the Kazakh new year, while ordinary Kazakhs were busy visiting their elders, friends and relatives, some Kazakh government officials started a two-day executive programme on public policy and management.

Despite the proximity of the national election in early April, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Karim Massimov, requested to have an executive programme for his Cabinet and himself during the twoday new year holiday.’

Aigerim Bolat is an Executive with the Executive Education programme at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. sppaika@nus.edu.sg

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An exercise in climate change evaluation and letting go Anthony D’ Agostino shares candidly with Globalis-Asian what goes through his mind during his research field trip in the villages of Cambodia.

21 February, Phnom Penh n 8:30pm touchdown and the weather is perfect as the tuk-tuk driver sails through another neon night to the Chamkarmon district. I made the same trip only months before to interview UNDP staff and officials from the environment and agriculture ministries about the country’s first climate change adaptation project. Funded through the Least Developed Countries Fund, the project aims to mainstream climate impact forecasts into provincelevel policy making, and facilitate farmers’ adoption of improved seed varieties and climate-resilient cropping practices.

No one knows how successful this will be, hence the series of pilot-scale adaptation projects that bodies like the UNDP and World Bank are supporting around the world. Empirical testing will take time, but I have been considering the use of a ‘laboratory’ environment to get a sneak-peek view of how farmers might respond to climate change.

First, I need a clearer picture of what farmers are growing, the crop market prices, their current mix of farm inputs and their perceptions of climate change.

25 February, Phnom Penh–Kampong Cham Province Socheath picks me up from the hotel at 1:17pm. We have agreed on five days for data collection and two days for the report, which he will send by email. Three days earlier, I had purchased the country’s sampling frame from the National Institute of Statistics

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and identified the 20 villages and four provinces where workshops conducted by local consultants would be held. Fingers crossed.

27 February, Kampong Cham Province A Ministry of Environment consultant advised me to secure buy-in from local officials, so today we met the deputy director of the Provincial Department of Agriculture to brief him about the workshops. We are working in four provinces, but Kampong Cham is the most important because nine of the 20 workshops will be hosted there.

8 March, Singapore I am still waiting for Socheath’s report so that I can start drafting the profit values used in the 10 workshop rounds. After weeks of agonising over how best to elicit anticipated adaptation actions, I have settled on the simple approach of dividing a square drawn on a piece of paper into a 3x3 matrix. In each round, participants will be given a range of crops they can grow in each of the nine cells, with a profit value attached to each crop that varies by round. The options will be colour-coded and they will have green, yellow and brown markers to make their choices. At 10 rounds per workshop, I have leeway to introduce price uncertainty and climate uncertainty. How does risk aversion in climate uncertainty compare to price uncertainty? This has become the definitive question.

‘Funded by the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Fund, the project aims to set climate impact forecasts into province-level policy making and facilitate farmers’ adoption of improved seed varieties and climate-resilient cropping practices.’

10 March, Phnom Penh My brain is running like a 180 bpm soundtrack and the last strokes of the workshop rounds feel within reach. Tomorrow the translators will take over at US$9 a page.

12 March, Phnom Penh Training the two consultants took significantly less time than I had expected. The two pilot workshops in Prey Veng this Wednesday will help iron out any hiccups. Too many details remain outstanding: blowing up and laminating posters large enough for all participants to see, buying the markers, buying snacks and water for the participants, photocopying anything and everything, changing money into small notes for participant compensation and finding a place to stay.

15 March, Phnom Penh Do you have any idea how badly things can go wrong in a photocopy shop? There are several hundred printouts. Everything is in Khmer. You did not think this would be a problem until you find out the translator converted all the numbers into Khmer too. That previously sounded like a capital idea — a revolt against numerical post-colonialism! — until now. I feel like I have been removed from the equation. The part-timer running the industrial-strength printer is scoffing at the printouts. Meanwhile my senior consultant is too busy checking his Yahoo account for other job opportunities to coordinate the papers spilling from the 20-year-old machines.

Fieldwork is an exercise in letting go, and I am terrible at that.

16 March, Prey Veng Province First pilot workshop completed. I had expected the ten rounds to take significantly longer than they did, but the bottleneck was in the survey questions. Evidently, this was the first time many of the participants had been handed paper and pen. After we finished our first workshop in Pring, a drunk policeman entered the courtyard and ‘locked’ us in by closing the bamboo gate. ‘Yes, sir, what are we being charged with?’ He claimed, in a whiskey-soaked drawl, to have been instructed by the governor to personally escort the barang through Prey Veng as foreigners are to be treated as special

guests. This was absolutely comical and all broke into laughter, but the consultants called the district police chief anyway. The conversation lasted too long, but eventually the uncle relented and opened the gate.

Our second workshop was less eventful, aside from the cow who wandered into the adjacent rice field and interrupted Round 6 when her owner went to retrieve her. Apparently she ate through 50,000 riel of rice very quickly.

From today’s 30 participants I am already observing patterns.

Older women who are heads of households pay little or no attention to the profit information each round; they simply plant rice in every square, every round. Meanwhile, the young men are extremely price-aware and throw out their rubber trees whenever the price drops. Note to self: consultants must emphasise that rubber trees must grow for three consecutive rounds to get the full maturity profit value.

18 March, Kandal Province One of the participants realises today that he indeed has seven children. Two actual workshops done, out of 20, and the consultants are getting better. Note to future self: gain fluency before doing more fieldwork. I feel paralysed not knowing what the consultants are actually saying and am only able to smile, point, nod and mouth elementary Khmer phrases to the participants.

20 March, Phnom Penh Goodbye consultants. Our time together has been a non-stop negotiation for phone allowances, petrol money and per diems, but I hope we are all happy now. Please remember to emphasise the probabilities attached with a climate disaster. I will be thinking about you and hope the extra US$40 I have allocated for materials in the project budget will be enough to purchase yellow markers.

Do they really need to colour the whole square? Ask them to recap the markers before returning them. Please remember: this project is my baby and infanticide is not an option.

Anthony Louis D’Agostino is a Research Associate at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. anthony@nus.edu.sg

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Psychology of a dictator A

s the current wave of uprisings in the Middle East continue to push dictators out of office, it is easy to wonder what makes those leaders so different... so narcissistic. Gaddafi, for example, is hated by many of his own people. He is wanted out of office by the international community, and he has been described by neighbouring leaders as ‘crazy’. It is comforting to think that only a rare few could ever become like him but the truth may be very different.

Successful leaders have three things in common: a clear, inspiring vision that resonates with other people; the emotional intelligence to inspire people with a sense of connection to their cause; and the self-confidence to handle the hostility of people who do not believe them.

Acclaimed leadership guru and psychoanalyst Manfred Kets de Vries found that the primary drive for leadership is to compensate for emotional injuries experienced earlier in life. The allure of status and money, with the illusion of invulnerability that comes with power, is intoxicating to almost everyone. To someone who has experienced helplessness and a lack of selfworth during the formative stages, attaining leadership can be a deep raison d’être.

Studies show that a disproportionate number of men in senior leadership positions grew up having poor relationships with their fathers but good relationships with their mothers: for example, Bill Clinton, whose father died before his birth; Jack Welch, whose father was a train conductor and was largely absent; and Winston Churchill, who barely spoke with his father.

Several researchers suspect that they developed their leadership skills to compensate for their fathers’ failings or absence and to displace their fathers as ‘the man of the house’. The findings on women in leadership are less conclusive,

in part because fewer women hold leadership positions in business and politics than men, and in part because the data regarding women who have been studied is more complex. While some women have powerful and supportive mothers, others emulate those characteristics in their fathers. Several women in senior leadership roles grew up acting more like their father’s favourite son than daughter.

Many aspiring leaders unconsciously focus on compensating for earlier experiences just to hear ‘you’re great’ on a regular basis. Unfortunately, these external accolades rarely bring the desired reassurance. For example, soon after becoming a young Nobel Prize winner, a client of a colleague had a mild stroke. His mother chided him, ‘You’re just as much of a loser as your father. He had a stroke at your age’. Despite being one of the brightest minds in his field, he fell into a significant depression characterised by questions of self-worth. He had tried to heal himself of old psychological wounds by getting praise for his accomplishments as a scientist, but that medicine simply didn’t work and left him mentally and physically ill.

Even when leaders hear what they want, the effect is short-lived. In the unconscious hope that a bigger ‘fix’ will bring a more substantial cure, they use their increasing power to surround themselves with yes-men and dependent personalities who will shower them with the praise they seek. They also create an environment where they feel they are in control. Their self-awareness and empathy for others fade as the focus increasingly shifts to ‘me’.

Effective leaders need to be able to accept the disagreements and bruises to their egos that come naturally with power and position. The medieval kings of Europe used court jesters to check their

Jonathan Marshall is a full-time faculty at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy where he teaches leadership. An executive coach and psychologist, he heads the LKY School’s coaching programme and maintains a consulting and psychotherapy practice.

egos. The jester’s job was to criticise the king and say what others did not dare to.

Thomas Friedman, one of the most popular journalists today, was asked during his stay at the LKY School how he kept his ego in check. He replied, ‘I have a wife!’.

While he drew a lot of laughter from his remark, many leaders echo Friedman with statements like, ‘My spouse is the only one who is honest with me. Without that criticism to correct me, I’d look like an idiot.’

In the absence of checks, leaders start to believe what they are told and they graft their egos to their leadership role. So when their leadership is challenged, they feel a threat to the very core and may respond with disproportionate hostility.

Balancing the drive and determination that accompany healthy levels of narcissism with the humility to serve others is a rare skill. Leaders face a great challenge as they may be in positions to receive the praise we all crave, but that makes their egos grow in unhealthy ways. It is of those few who succeed in the balancing act that Lao Tze, author of the Tao Te Ching, wrote: ‘When the great leader is done and the work is finished successfully, the people will say this all happened naturally.’

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Faculty achievements Vu Minh Khuong Assistant Professor Published a journal article titled “ICT as a Source of Economic Growth in the Information Age: Empirical Evidence from the 1996–2005 Period”, Telecommunications Policy, Volume 35, Issue 4, pp. 357–372, 2011.

Together with Boyd Fuller, published a journal article titled “Exploring the Dynamics of Policy Interaction: Feedback among and Impacts from Multiple, Concurrently Applied Policy Approaches for Promoting Collaboration”, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Volume 30, Issue 2, pp. 359–380, Spring 2011.

Wong Marn Heong Assistant Professor Published a report titled “Findings from 2010 ASEANBAC Survey on ASEAN Competitiveness” for the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ASEAN-BAC).

Darryl Jarvis Associate Professor Co-edited a book titled ASEAN Industries and the Challenge from China, published by Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.

Ashish Lall Associate Professor Edited a book titled Facets of Competitiveness, published by World Scientific, 2011.

Student achievements Allen Lai Yu Hung PhD Candidate Invited to present a paper titled “The Emergence of Collaborative Capacities” for 2011 Public Management Research Conference, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, New York, US. Spoke on “The Disaster Research in ASEAN and the Role of AAMDER”, for Colloquium Consensus II: The Relationship between Academia and Disaster Management in ASEAN, Singapore.

Spoke on “Resilience and Collaborative Capacity in Crisis Learning” at the Graduate School of Community and Regional Planning (SCARP), University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

Andrew Billo & Ruth Schuyler House MPP 2010/12 Their case “Cambodia’s Land Reform: Institutions, Politics and Development” won the inaugural Public Policy Case Competition at the LKY School.

Angeline Goh Ai Ling MPP 2010/12 Selected to present a video titled “Rethinking Leadership: Having the Courage to Admit One’s Fallibility” at the 41st St. Gallen Wings of Excellence Award Symposium in Switzerland.

Nurina Merdikawati MPP 2010/12 Presented a paper titled “Improving PKH Implementation: Homeworks for Achenese government” in Malaysia.

Wang Runfei Phillie MPP 2009/11 Co-authored (with Teresita Cruz-del Rosario) an op-ed titled “Is China the New World Bank?” in Project Syndicate.

Xu Zhenqing MPP 2009/11 Presented a paper titled “The World Trade Game: What is the Next Move? The Multilateralisation of Trade in an Era of Regionalism” at the Asian International Model UN Conference (AIMUN) 2011 in Beijing.

Weng Huiqin Janice MPP 2009/11 Presented a paper titled “Recognition and the Politics of Identity and Inclusion in the 21st Century: Managing Diversity in Plural Societies” at the University of Hong Kong.

Maneka Jayasinghe MPP 2009/11 Her paper was presented at the BASAS Conference at the University of Southampton, UK. Naomi Jacob MPP 2009/11 Raghav Puri MPP 2009/11 Co-presented a paper titled “Attracting High Skilled Labour from Developing Countries: Can Europe Learn

from Singapore?” at the 3rd European Public Policy Conference (EPPC) organised by the Hertie School of Governance at the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, Hungary.

Shirish Jain MPA 2010/11 Emily Yan Shufen MPA 2010/11 Their essay on Sino-Indian relations won the inaugural GPPN (Global Public Policy Network) Essay Competition held by the Journal of International Affairs at Columbia University. The winning essay will be published in the Spring issue of the journal.

Zhang ZhaoMing MPM 2011 Elected as a committee member of Shandong Province, People’s Political Consultative Conference in February 2011, Shandong, China.

In the Julâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;Sep 2011 issue: Diplomacy in the 21st century What will diplomacy look like in the 21st century?

What has changed in diplomacy?

What will be the role of diplomacy and diplomats in a globalised world?

What is the impact of information technology on diplomacy?

Plus many more

Send your submissions to

RSUlkyschool@nus.edu.sg

Global-is-Asian is a quarterly magazine of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.

Image: UN Photos/Sophia Paris