Asian Trends Monitoring Bulletin 10: Aceh: Recovery and Reconstruction

The Asian Trends Monitoring Bulletin is a project sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, New York, the Centre for Strategic Futures, Singapore and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Centre for Strategic Futures, Singapore.

The Asian Trends Monitoring Bulletin focuses on three areas of strategic concern to Asia’s well-being and future development: trade and investment facilitation; health systems; and energy security.

The Asian Trends Monitoring Bulletins are designed to encourage dialogue and debate about critical issues that affect Asia’s ability to reduce poverty and increase awareness of the implications for pro-poor policy and policy development.

Disclaimer The opinions expressed in the Asian Trends Monitoring Bulletin are those of the analysts and do not necessarily reflect those of the sponsor organisations.

Frequency The Asian Trends Monitoring Bulletin will be produced ten times a year. All issues are available for free at www.asiantrendsmonitoring.com/download.

Production Manager, Production & Research Dissemination Chris Koh

Editorial Trade & Investment Facilitation Darryl S.L Jarvis Johannes Loh

Health Systems Phua Kai Hong Nicola Pocock

Energy Security Benjamin K. Sovacool Anthony D’Agostino

Image credits, with thanks Image on page 3 is copyrighted by foxxyz*.

Image on page 19 is copyrighted by Brooks Elliott*.

Image on page 24 is copyrighted by Phil Dragash*. *These images can be found on www.flickr.com

Contact details of the editorial team are available on the last page of this publication.

Permission is granted to use portions of this work copyrighted by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.

Please acknowledge the source and email a copy of the book, periodical or electronic document in which the material appears to chris.k@nus.edu.sg or send to

Chris Koh Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy 469C Bukit Timah Toad Singapore 259772

CONTENTS 1

At a glance

2

Disasters, Reconstruction and the Public Memory

3

rebuilding aceh after the tsunami

5

Disaster Risk Reduction Policies as Valuable Insurance

11

community empowerment

19

instruments of recovery

25

conclusion

27

acknowledgements

28

references

29

editorial team

1 | aT a GlaNCE

Cities in Asia Pacific are not prepared for complex urban disasters. At the end of June participants of the 5th Asia Pacific Urban Forum pointed out that governments are plagued by complacency. A panel of experts found that despite rising awareness for impacts of physical and material losses from disasters, responses tend to be ad-hoc and short-term.

A new ADB Publication “Taxation in Asia” identified the need for Asian governments to modernise their tax administrations.

Shadow economies account for up to 52.6% (Thailand) of GDP, followed by Sri Lanka (44.6%) and the Philippines (43.4%).

One highlighted recommendation included the implementation of highly automated information technology systems in order to streamline registration, audit and taxpayer education.

In July, Cambodia officially launched its own stock exchange. The Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX) is a joint venture between the Cambodian government and Korea Exchange, the operator of Asia’s fourth largest bourse. The listing process will take until the end of the year with currently three state companies preparing to be listed.

The newly elected government in Thailand has announced plans to raise the minimum wage to 300 baht per day. A study by the Thailand Development Research Institute said that a quick increase would not be possible without nationwide subsidies provided by the government.

Following the passing of the Food Standard Amendment (Truth in Labelling – Palm Oil) Bill by the Australian Senate, Malaysia has expressed concern about discrimination of the palm oil industry.

While the bill is seeking better labeling for palm oil in foods, “competing vegetable oils are not required to be labeled”, complained the Malaysian Minister for Plantation Industries, Bernard Dompok.

Follow Johannes loh for latest trends in trade & investment facilitation across Southeast Asia, critical dialogue and implications for pro-poor policy and policy development. @seASIAtrade

Thailand’s Ministry of Health revealed in June that they will be using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to assign doctors to different locations based on population size and expected demand for health services.

In Myanmar, UN agencies and the government launched a five-year plan to scale up the antiretroviral (ARV) treatment and reduce the HIV infection rate. US$49 million will be spent in 2011 and it will be increased to US$85 million in 2015. There are about 236,000 people with HIV/AIDS in Myanmar and about 76,000 need ARVs. In 2010, only 30,000 people received the ARV drug, says the UN. Indonesian students rallied on 10 June following the death of a poor patient who was turned away by hospital management at Tangerang General Hospital in Banten province. Students allege that the local government’s multipurpose health and education card is “useless” as it is not accepted by health providers and have appealed to the Health Minister to support the rights of poor residents to medical treatment.

Singapore’s Ministry of Health launched a review probing reasons behind the high attrition rate in the public sector, as 310 doctors (including 103 specialists) left in 2010, the highest yearly exodus to date. New health minister Gan Kim Yong says that money is “unlikely” to be the only reason behind the attrition, although the ministry will be reviewing the pay of public healthcare workers.

Experts called on Laos to take advantage of their approaching demographic dividend to generate economic growth and development on World Population Day. The working population, aged between 15–64 is expected to reach 63% by 2015. Director General of the Ministry of Planning, Somchith Inthamit, said that the government should begin to implement policies such as universal health insurance and pension schemes, saving and re-training programmes in anticipation of demographic changes.

Follow Nicola Pocock for health & health systems trends monitoring & futures scanning across South and East Asia with a pro-poor lens.

@healthSEAsia

The Asian Development Bank, with support from the Nordic Development Fund and participating governments, will begin pilot projects in biogas systems, improved cookstoves, and biochar kilns in rural Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam under their Energy for All Initiative.

The World Bank will support Vietnam in implementing a US$2.4 million national energy efficiency program. The Clean Production & Energy Efficiency Project will focus on key industrial sectors while providing technical assistance to foster the development of energy service providers.

The Philippines’ President Aquino signed an extension of the electricity Lifeline Rate for marginalised customers into law.

The programme’s two million beneficiary households, whom are unable to afford the full cost of electricity, will now be ensured low-price electricity until 2021.

A PTT Plc. gas pipeline leak into the Gulf of Thailand reduced natural gas supplies by 15% in late June. The energy conglomerate, Thailand’s largest, used stove oil as a replacement until the leak was repaired.

The World Bank will provide financial assistance of up to 80% of total project costs for Vietnam to develop the Trung Son Hydroelectric Project.

Indonesia anticipates higher than expected demand for subsidised gasoline and diesel oil. Consumption levels may exceed state budget quotas by 8.2% and 5.8% respectively. Electricity subsidies are also forecast to eclipse state budget targets by 63%.

Malaysia anticipates its first LNG import shipment in 2013 and could become a net importer because of rising power demand, despite its current status as the world’s second-largest exporter.

Electricity of Vietnam has forecast coal will become the country’s primary energy source for electricity in the next five years, taking over the place of hydropower.

Follow anthony D'agostino for Southeast Asia (ASEAN) energy & development trends, covering conventionals, renewables, aid, tech, climate change & everything in between. @ClimateWonkster

www.asiantrendsmonitoring.com/subscribe

OVErViEW | 2

DiSaSTErS, rECONSTruCTiON aND THE PubliC MEMOry The recent Fukushima Daiichi disaster, as with other largescale disasters, highlighted the immense generosity the global community can summon to support disaster victims.

The media spotlight shone on Japan for several weeks as fears of mass evacuation, nuclear plant meltdown, and radioactivity seepage kept global viewers entranced. As with all disasters, once the feverish peak is passed, public attention will then shift to the next crisis or tragedy to captivate viewers with fresh images of destruction.

The necessary clean-up and post-disaster reconstruction will take years and consume billions, if not tens of billions of dollars. How that money is spent has tremendous implications for the long-term development prospects of the affected areas. Few would doubt the value of using such an opportunity to “build back better,” to enforce stricter building codes for new construction, to adopt integrated landuse planning, and to establish the necessary government bodies to mitigate damages from future disasters.

The Asian Trends Monitoring (ATM) team recently traveled to Aceh, Indonesia, where the majority of losses from the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami had occurred. Six and a half years have passed and yet several hundred people still live in temporary housing, awaiting the relocation they were promised years ago. The ATM team sought to interview individuals from organisations that have been active in various facets of the region’s redevelopment to uncover the long-term challenges that disaster recovery professionals, government bodies and grassroots groups face. We hope that you will find their responses as illuminating as we have.

Readers will notice several key differences between this issue and previous issues. The team has set aside the customary focus on trade and investment facilitation, health systems and energy security to present a more holistic view of what is happening in Aceh. Before arriving in the

washed ashore in the 2004 disaster

province, the team contacted local and international NGOs that are engaged in a variety of sectors — including disaster preparedness, women’s rights education and waste management — and met with those who were available during our visit. The intent was therefore not to attempt a representative sample of all stakeholders, activities and opinions, but rather to showcase the diversity of community-driven development and act as a forum for grassroots groups. As such, the team was able to grant more space for voices from the ground so that readers can hear firsthand about their interventions and their reflections about the current state of affairs in Aceh. Hyperlinks for online audio and video recordings with various NGOs and community members have been inserted, where appropriate.

We invite you to share the ATM Bulletin with colleagues or friends who are interested in poverty alleviation in Southeast Asia. As always, the Bulletin is available for download at www.asiantrendsmonitoring.com/download, where you can also subscribe to future issues online as well. Additional contents and videos are hosted on the website and you can share your thoughts with us on this issue. Thank you again for supporting the ATM Bulletin, and as always, your comments and feedback are welcome.

Nicola Pocock Johannes Loh Anthony D’Agostino

rEbuilDiNG aCEH aFTEr THE TSuNaMi When Aceh, was slammed by the tsunami on Boxing Day in 2004, it was not prepared to deal with a disaster of such magnitude. As a result, Aceh was the worst affected area of all the countries impacted by the disaster. The 9.0-magnitude earthquake and the subsequent tsunami it created killed an estimated 169,000 people and left scenes of unprecedented devastation. More than 600,000 people were displaced and 141,000 houses were destroyed.1 The livelihoods of people dependent on fishing and agriculture were severely disrupted as 70% of the fishing fleet was wrecked and over 150,000 hectares of agricultural land rendered unusable from salt and mud inundation. Overall, the estimated losses and damages amounted to US$4.5 billion. Water destroyed more than

2,200 schools, 2,600 bridges and a thousand kilometers of arterial roads and highways. Unemployment soared from 6.8% to 30% as a quarter of the labour force instantaneously became unemployed.2 The scale of the disaster triggered an international response through which US$7.7 billion of aid was pledged and close to 500 agencies entered Aceh for the enormous reconstruction effort. The Indonesian government established the ministerial-level Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (AcehNias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency) in 2005 to coordinate activities undertaken by the NGOs and to hasten the reconstruction process. While the agency was tasked

“The figures of economic loss fail to adequately capture the impact of disasters on the poor, who suffer the greatest cost in terms of livelihoods and rebuilding their shattered communities and infrastructure.”

Najib Abdul Razak, then-Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia speaking at the Third Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, Kuala Lumpur, December 2008

with overseeing the sum of all efforts, emphasis was placed on community-driven development and participatory processes to gain community support.3 With regards to aid coordination, the Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias has been another significant actor in the reconstruction process, developed to mobilise donor support and to coordinate activities funded by the US$685 million received in donor grants.4 Aceh was not only ravaged by the tsunami, but also by a civil conflict that lasted several decades. Between 1976 and 2005, armed conflict in Aceh between the secessionist Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM or Free Aceh Movement) and the Indonesian Army, under the central government based in Jakarta, resulted in routine disappearances and unexplained deaths of villagers, as well as instances of rape and sexual violence against women.

Several of the organisations we interviewed confirmed that the Aceh of today is better off than the Aceh before

the tsunami. Donors insisted on the principle of “building back better”, often causing tensions with tsunami victims who wanted to see reconstruction results materialise more quickly. Many of the debates concerning disaster relief and aid disbursement are the same across different contexts — satisfying immediate versus long-term needs, deliberated preparation versus instantaneous response, and ensuring accountability and sustainability of the interventions. As of 2011, only a handful of international actors remain active in Aceh. Government bodies have reclaimed some of the core functions that were previously outsourced to non-governmental agencies due to capacity gaps. Hence, the organisations that remain are primarily local groups.

In the following sections, we will take a closer look at these organisations and communities in Aceh. We will also look into how they are dealing with disaster risk reduction, women’s issues, community empowerment and economic livelihoods and some of the emerging trends and threats they face.

"Disaster management requires urgent attention because Indonesia is the second most vulnerable country in the world in terms of disasters" Kausar A. Saleh, Director of General Governance at the Home Ministry, April 2009

dISASTER RISK REDUCTION | 6

Disaster Risk Reduction Policies as Valuable Insurance

The devastating tsunami and the subsequent reconstruction process have created significant momentum for increasing efforts in disaster risk reduction (DRR) in Indonesia. The Hyogo Framework for Action, a global blueprint for disaster risk reduction efforts from 2005–2015 adopted by 168 nations, lays out the principles and detailed steps to build a culture of safety and resilience and work towards a more effective response to natural disasters at all levels. That resulted in a paradigm shift on DRR approaches, moving the emphasis from response and relief operations to preventative actions in building disaster-resilient communities.5 Accordingly, studies by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank indicate that every dollar invested in disaster preparedness can save between US$4–US$7 in relief and reconstruction costs.6 Disaster preparedness therefore not only helps to save lives but also pays off financially.

Due to a growing commitment to DRR at the highest government level in Indonesia, disaster mitigation and management has been declared as one of nine national development priorities. While the integration of DRR policies on the national level has made significant progress, local level implementation has been slow, in particular with regard to community preparedness. This is especially problematic since local communities provide the majority of emergency recovery and first aid relief efforts within the first 24–48 hours of a disaster.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the military and international aid arrive only after a few days’ delay.

The tsunami forced governments to rethink about disaster preparedness During the recovery from the 2004 tsunami, many affected countries faced significant coordination issues among government bodies, aid organisations and local NGOs. In consequence, new regulations on disaster management and mitigation were introduced and in some cases responsibilities were streamlined into newly-formed disaster management agencies.

In Indonesia, a new Disaster Management Law, passed in 2007, introduced large-scale institutional and structural changes as part of the National Action Plan for Disaster Reduction. Prior to the new regulation, Coordination Boards for Disaster Mitigation were responsible for disaster management, but only acted after a disaster had occurred. The new law established a National Disaster Management Agency tasked with the operational role of directing disaster response as well as the protection against future disaster threats. Furthermore, Law 24/2007 stipulated the creation of a network of regional and local disaster agencies by district governments, which has yet to materialise. Complicated by Indonesia’s decentralisation policies, as of 2011, sub-national disaster management bodies have been established in only 23 out of 33 provinces and in 49 of 275 districts/cities.7 The need for a disaster management structure, functional on all levels, from national government down to individual

7 | dISASTER RISK REDUCTION

Figure 1: Mortality from different disasters in Indonesia

Source: National Disaster Management Agency (2011). Data & Informasi Bencana. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from http://dibi.bnpb.go.id/DesInventar/statistics.jsp.

neighbourhoods, are a key concern for 90 million Indonesians, who bear a high mortality risk from multiple hazards (see Figure 1).8 The process of setting up Aceh’s agency was delayed by over two years due to the ongoing reconstruction activities and the prioritisation of seemingly more urgent development problems. Established in 2010, the Aceh Disaster Management Agency is still in the early stages of development and struggling with building sufficient capacity to oversee the disaster-prone area. The Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Centre (TDMRC) on the other hand, is currently conducting capacity-building workshops with local government organisations to enable them to apply tools such as the Aceh Disaster Risk Map Database, developed in-house.

Asmadi Syam, Head of the Aceh Disaster Management Agency, described the situation in early 2011 as follows: “As young institutions, they [the Local Disaster Management bodies] still need more support from other organisations and related institutions to strengthen their capacity in disaster issues.�9

From knowledge to implementation of DRR: What are the main drivers?

DRR can be categorised into two broad categories: structural and cultural components. The structural component entails the building of early-warning infrastructure flood mitigation equipment including pump houses and functional drainage systems, and operational escape routes to higher grounds. In response to the 2004 tsunami, the Indonesian State Ministry of Research and Technology as coordinator, in collaboration with 20 different government institutions, has developed a comprehensive early warning system (EWS) called Ina-TEWS which combines seismographic and tidal sensors with computer modeling to determine whether and where a tsunami will occur.10 The EWS is the national extension of the international Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System initiated after the 2004 tsunami. The majority of attention was given to the first two out of three stages: Detection and Management & Warning Dissemination (see Figure 2), focusing on the more technocratic, technology-driven aspects of the warning system. Less emphasis has been placed on the last stage of public response, which includes decision-making at the local level and community preparedness in warning response.

dISASTER RISK REDUCTION | 8

Figure 2: Three inter-related stages of the early warning process

Source: Adapted from Mileti, D.S. and J.H. Sorensen (1990) Communication of Emergency Public Warnings: A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA.

The October 2010 tsunami, which killed 431 people on the Mentawai Islands, off Sumatra’s western coast, revealed the EWS’s lack of end-to-end integration.11 Warning sirens had not been installed on the islands to alert residents of the 7.7-magnitude earthquake, leaving officials with no effective means of initiating an evacuation. These deaths could probably have been avoided by installing solar-powered sirens connected via satellite to Ina-TEWS centres, at a cost of less than US$200,000.

To complicate the situation, communities in the most hazard-prone areas often belong to the poorest strata of society.

Local leaders tend to assign DRR a lower priority, perceiving issues such as poverty reduction, livelihoods, and natural resource management as more important. Politicians too, find it difficult to claim credit for avoiding high casualty rates in a disaster that has yet to occur and thus may be reluctant to commit local resources to better preparedness in the long-term.

The lead time from warning to tsunami landfall is so short that communities have to know exactly what to do and where to run. Community preparedness is not a one-off intervention; it is a “never-ending heavy duty”.12

On the ground, a polarisation between the top-down government approach focused on providing the technology and the bottom-up NGO approach emphasising community-based disaster preparedness opens up the question of who should be responsible for the provision and coordination of Community-Based Disaster Risk Management.14 In Aceh, limited district budgets do not allow for large-scale implementation of official prevention and training programmes for community leaders. But who will step in to fill the gaps? The inflow of US$7.7 billion in aid money created an environment in which traditional public goods are provided by NGOs due to weak or missing government structures. Six years later, the transition

Going the "last mile" in DRR The "last mile" of hazard EWS describes the “dissemination of a warning of an impending hazard to the largest number of people at risk in the shortest possible time”.13 If that linkage between the technocratic aspect of early warning and the human response is not functioning, the best EWS technology would fail to meet its objectives.

9 | dISASTER RISK REDUCTION

from aid-assisted reconstruction to self-sustained public service provision still represents a significant challenge.

NGOs rarely reach universal coverage and are no substitute for a government strategy for sustainable community preparedness in the long run. Still, the organisations are reaching out to the communities, such as the women’s organisation, Solidaritas Perempuan Aceh (SP Aceh), which conducts seminars for women to raise awareness for better emergency response and evacuation. “Many women died in the tsunami because they felt obliged to put on the hijab before leaving the house” says Donna Hardiani, Chair of the Executive Body of SP Aceh, suggesting that Acehnese women, in the midst of a disaster are more responsive to cultural and religious norms than their own survival needs.

Karina, from Caritas Indonesia, tries to integrate DRR into their work in climate change-vulnerable communities in order to better prepare them for more extreme and more frequent disaster occurrences. In monthly meetings with community groups, the organisation empowers the groups to become their own DRR managers. Karina has recognised that DRR is not a one-time response to a major disaster like the 2004 tsunami but requires a more longterm approach. “Our work is not yet finished, we are still working with the communities” says Kepler Silaban, Programme Coordinator at Caritas Medan.

Trends • There is a growing awareness for the need to emphasise community-based disaster management and local quick response capacity. Passing on basic knowledge on tsunami warning signs such as the rapidly receding water, or simply seeking higher ground after a strong earthquake can help to save lives, as was illustrated by the inhabitants of the Simeulue Islands. The inhabitants learned basic survival skills through the stories passed down from past generations of the disaster brought on by a tsunami in 1908. All but five islanders survived the 2004 tsunami.

• While the setup of DRR structural components has been integrated into the reconstruction agendas of donor organisations and governments (e.g. flood mitigation in Aceh, tsunami sirens, EWS and earthquake-proof homes), such interventions often lag behind the “soft”, cultural components of disaster risk reduction, (e.g. community drills, first response trainings, and etc).

• TDMRC advocates the formation and training of Disaster Response Teams, consisting of volunteers from nearby communities trained as disaster relief front-liners as well as facilitators of disaster prevention activities. It would be ideal to build a comprehensive network of response teams in each district.

Tsunami & Disaster Mitigation Research Centre Shortly after the 2004 tsunami, the Syiah Kuala University estab-

fatalities minute-by-minute, after tsunami sirens have gone off.

lished the Tsunami Research Centre and later the Mitigation Cen-

The end-result of the simulation illustrates a grim outcome: given

tre. In 2006, the two merged into the Tsunami & Disaster Mitigation

the city’s current infrastructure, not even sirens and clearly marked

Research Centre (TDMRC), with a vision of “protecting communi-

escape routes are sufficient enough to avoid high casualty rates in

ties through effective research based disaster risk management”.

another major tsunami.

TDMRC reaches out to policymakers to integrate DRR and disaster

The research centre focuses on activities in three main areas:

risk mitigation into local development plans and to set up regional preparedness programmes for their respective communities. They are exploring innovative ways to illustrate the importance of DRR interventions to decision-makers. For example, TDRMC has developed several scenarios for evacuating Banda Aceh following a tsunami warning. Using computer simulations, they are able to

Applied research & knowledge creation • A data-clearing house to hold all forms of data related to disaster risk reduction; • Multi-hazard risk mapping; and • International research collaboration on disaster management.

demonstrate escape routes and highlight evacuation shelters, as

Education and advocacy

well as the number of people fleeing, successfully rescued and

• Integrating disaster information into school curricula; and

dISASTER RISK REDUCTION | 10

• Riding on the back of the rapid penetration of information and communication technology (ICT), there exists a range of ICT applications for disseminating information and warnings, such as cell broadcasting, a one-to-many system applied in Sri Lanka or the SMS notification system used in Indonesia. The use of ICT in disaster mitigation is gaining momentum and may see greater uses in the future.15 • In remote areas with minimal ICT penetration, megaphones and hand sirens have proved effective in "reaching the last mile", as lessons from Bangladesh have shown.

Another primitive, yet practical method, is the use of emergency runners to spread warning messages in Sri Lankan villages which lack modern communication systems.

Threats • In many parts of Indonesia, civil society organisations have driven efforts to enhance community preparedness; however a lack of coordination between these initiatives and government actors has led to patchy implementation across communities.16 Moreover, there is no standardisation among agencies, whether it is in terms of curriculum development or skills training.

Aceh. It will be imperative for the agency to learn from the skills and experiences of local NGOs working on DRR, and at the same time, ensure a wide and equitable reach of training and awareness-raising interventions.

• Language barriers: Community-Based Disaster Risk Management initiatives by the government and civil society organisations are hindered by the lack of capacity-building materials in the national language or local dialects.

A failure to provide DRR material in the local dialect can jeopardise the goal of ‘going the last mile’ in early warning and preparedness.

• There is a risk of underinvestment in DRR as politicians remain unwilling to stretch their budgets for events that have not occurred yet. It remains a challenge to overcome such obstacles, especially in the face of other concerns, such as poverty reduction and natural resource management.

• Only since 2010 has the Disaster Management Agency started to prepare a local DRR strategy specifically for

• The failure to establish links between knowledge creation and research to policy implementation could retard the newly-gained momentum in DRR. Research can bring about useful applications, such as the multi-layered risk map. Such innovations however, sit in the knowledge banks of research institutions and fail to play an effective role unless the government can truly understand its function and commits the budget to put it into use.

• Information materials to raise public awareness on disaster-

When asked about how local residents are responding to DRR ef-

related issues.

Capacity building for government agencies • Workshops for government bodies in applying risk-mapping tools for development planning and the implementation of community preparedness and mitigation.

TDMRC tries to bridge the gap between knowledge creation and

forts, TDMRC's director, Dr. Dirhamsyah, replied that people are actually increasing their risk exposure. He said that "people are now relocating to dangerous areas because they want to be closer to their vocation and back to their early life, like fishermen." This underscores the importance of working with communities in disaster recovery and providing education about hazards and risks to vulnerable populations.

research to the implementation of DRR policies within the communities by providing local officials the necessary knowledge to apply the Aceh Disaster Risk Maps, which profile Aceh’s provinces according to disaster vulnerability. For 2011, TDMRC will map out risk profiles down to the district level to enable policymakers to integrate risks through micro-zoning. Local planning can then be based on the available disaster maps.

online video

Four evacuation scenarios developed by the TDMRC http://www.asiantrendsmonitoring.com/?p=1578

COMMuNiTy EMPOWErMENT The cumulative effects of the conflict and the tsunami on long-term development are evident today. According to the UNDP, the population growth rate in Aceh has fallen dramatically in recent years as a consequence of the prolonged conflict, out-migration of mostly male Acehnese to Europe and Malaysia and a deteriorating economy.

The prevalence of poverty in Aceh remains higher than in other Indonesian provinces — in 2010, the poverty rate (pegged to basic living costs) was 22%, compared to 14%

for Indonesia as a whole. Aceh’s Human Development Index ranking has also fallen, placing it 17th out of 33 provinces in 2010.17 Within Aceh itself, there are clear disparities in poverty rates among provinces. Generally, coastal, tsunamiaffected areas register lower poverty rates than inland areas that were more affected by the conflict (see Figure 3). This may also be the result of the influx of aid for post-tsunami reconstruction and development to coastal zones, which did not reach inland areas.

13 | community empowerment

Political processes are improving The tsunami, whilst devastating, signalled an opportunity for change and focused international attention on Aceh, which led to a peace deal brokered by the Finnish government between Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and Jakarta in 2005.

Since then, against the backdrop of nationwide decentralisation, community participation in Aceh has been improving. For example, the Financial Assistance for Village Welfare programme in Aceh now allocates block grants directly to sub-districts and villages such as Desas, so that villagers

can make their own decisions on the use of such funds in accordance with local priorities. Direct elections of government representatives at all levels are now possible thanks to country-wide electoral reforms. In 2009, 75% of registered voters in Aceh participated in the elections for national, provincial and local assemblies. As community participation has improved, civil society organisations (CSOs) have now turned their attention to “stickier� challenges like youth unemployment, gender empowerment and the re-integration of former GAM combatants into the local economy.

Figure 3: Human Poverty Index by districts in Aceh 2007

Source: UNDP (2010) Provincial Human Development Report Aceh 2010, p.20

community empowerment | 14

Women’s participation in politics and labour markets: still a way to go Encouraging women’s political participation in local government, helping women to generate incomes via micro-enterprise or participation in the labour market, and building confidence and capacity to express opinions in local media, were core activities for three of the organisations interviewed. With regards to income generation for example, Yayasan Pengembangan Kawasan organises savings groups comprised of mostly women, and Solidaritas Perempuan Aceh (SP Aceh) encourages their female members to generate incomes beyond “topping up” their husbands’.

Figure 4: Gender-related development progress

Why is there a focus on women? The UNDP notes discouraging trends in gender development in Aceh from 1996 to 2008. The Gender Development Index (GDI) has shown little progress in those 12 years, hovering around 60 (100 signals maximum gender development, zero signals minimum gender development). Meanwhile, the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) has oscillated up and down over the years, starting at a high of 57.3 in 1996 but finished lower by more than seven points in 2008 at 50.2 (GEM is scored similarly to the GDI). This runs sharply counter to what might be expected, since the most recent figures after 2005 lie below those measured during the years of conflict (see Figure 4).

Source: UNDP (2010) Provincial Human Development Report Aceh 2010, p.14

Reasons for this are complex. One challenge faced by organisations working on gender empowerment is a perceived lack of understanding of gender issues (which involve men too) by local political and religious leaders. “Gender is perceived to be a Western concept aimed at challenging the power of men,” according to the program coordinator at UN Women.

The re-instatement of Shari’a law in Aceh since 2002 poses challenges for advocates of gender empowerment due to the often conflicting interpretations of Islam and gender by both religious leaders and Acehnese women and men. Traditionally in Acehnese society, women have retained roles as homemakers or have engaged in unpaid subsistence work in fisheries and agriculture, whilst men are expected to take up formal employment. Though these gender roles are not fixed, changing them can be a long and incremental process.

Some interpret Islam as restricting women’s movement outside of the home, limiting women’s ability to engage in paid work. In 2008, the share of women in employment in Aceh was 25.3%, slightly lower than in the rest of Indonesia at 27.4%.18 This has been attributed to discriminatory employment practices, a lack of market-responsive skills (e.g.

business management) amongst women, low access to information about employment opportunities and low access to finance and capacity for self-organisation.19 Interestingly, a 2005 Bandan Pusat Statistik survey showed that labour force participation rates for women at opposite ends of the education spectrum were higher than for those with a high school education. Two-thirds of women with no schooling or primary level schooling were employed, as were 74% of university educated women. Only 39% of women who completed high school were in the labour force. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) notes that “the high levels of labour force participation among non- or low-schooled women may be related to higher poverty levels for those with lower educational background, which pushes women into the labour market”.20 This raises the question of what types of training and employment opportunities (in the medium-term) can be provided for women with little or no schooling.

As a result of the confusion surrounding gender and its perceived threat to local norms and customs, women’s organisations are changing the gender terminology used so that it is more palatable for religious and political authorities. Unfortunately, misunderstanding remains. To tackle this, UN Women targets government officials with gender mainstreaming training, delivered with a local partner, the Aceh Women’s Council (Balai Syura), as part of their “Women, Peace and Security in Aceh” project.21 At the community level, crisis centres in 23 districts, and the Indonesian Women’s Coalition (KPI) deliver training on women’s rights. Performances about domestic violence are also staged to facilitate the debate on this issue and group discussions have been

15 | community empowerment

organised to promote the concept of “substantial peace”, non-violence in the home, as well as counselling services for women affected by domestic violence in some villages.

Training and employment: unmet needs During our field interviews, respondents repeatedly voiced concern over opportunities for young unemployed men and women. ILO’s community employment assessment in six districts reveals areas of proposed skills training that would benefit unemployed youth. As Figure 5 shows, local residents believe that retail shops and services has growth potential as businesses expand. IT training is highest in demand, which can be used in various business sectors, as well as a perceived higher demand for domestic workers.

Additionally, mechanics, vehicle repair and sewing are seen as growth areas where additional training will be needed.22 A related concern is the shortage of skilled people in the public sector. In addition to the physical devastation wreaked by the tsunami — a total of 517 health facilities, from hospitals to polyclinics, were destroyed, as well as 3,415 schools — as

many as 2,500 teachers and 245 health workers (413 missing), 195 lecturers and 2,992 civil servants (2,274 missing) were killed.23,24 The civil conflict was also responsible for the deaths of 40 teachers between 1998 to 2003. Promisingly, the Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) in 2009 reported that nearly 40,000 teachers had been trained, but there is no mention of the type or duration of training. Sustaining the local economy and the future of the province in large part lies in building up the human resource base in both the public sector and the workforce at large.

Natural resources: giving communities a say Community advocacy is a key part of SP Aceh work in natural resources. A cement factory built 20km from Banda Aceh has contributed to environmental pollution, with blasting of the onsite quarry resulting in fragments flying onto nearby farms.

As a result, “agricultural productivity has not been good” for those farms. But according to SP Aceh Programme Coordinator Ms. Ruwaida community advocacy has paid off: “Blasting used to be done with dynamite, and they did not suppress the vibrations... these vibrations damaged people's homes.

Figure 5: Vocational training needs captured by community employment assessment

Source: Chatani Kazutoshi, ILO (2010): Skills gap analysis in Aceh, from reconstruction to sustainable growth through skills development. Discussion paper, ILO Jakarta Office

community empowerment | 16

After dialogues with the regional environmental planning agency, the negative impacts have been minimised because blasting is now done using other methods that minimise the harmful vibrations”.

online video

Ruwaida, Programme Director of SP Aceh speaks about her advocacy work http://www.asiantrendsmonitoring.com/?p=1562

SP Aceh works to bring women’s voices to municipal government, as their voices are often not heard in natural resource management. “In Naga Umbang village, when clean water became scarce, the main victims were the women, who found it difficult to find clean water for cooking, cleaning and irrigation”.

province. Community advocacy to government authorities will likely play a big role in the future to ensure that the negative externalities of foreign investment do not hurt local livelihoods or the environment.

The Aceh economy is ripe with opportunities for outside investors attracted to the natural resource abundance in the province (see Figure 6) that have yet to be seized due to uncertainty about the political situation. The threat is that new factories and industrial plants will result in environmental pollution. Despite the governor’s “green Aceh” aspirations, some community groups feel that this conflicts with the local government’s aim to increase mining activities in the

Trends & threats ahead • How can Shari’a law and gender empowerment be successfully reconciled, so that women’s participation in local labour markets is encouraged? There seems to be a bottleneck at the decision-making level compared to participation — for example, Acehnese women do not appear to be disadvantaged relative to men in education; women’s literacy is on par with men’s at over 98%.25

Human Resources Development Committee Founded in 2003 by a group of teachers, lecturers and professors committed to improving education in Aceh, the Human Resources Development Committee (HRDC) provides overseas scholarships to locals for undergraduate and graduate studies in engineering, teaching and English. Now funded by the Aceh provincial government, the HRDC provides scholarships with partner universities in Malaysia, Singapore, Egypt, Germany, Taiwan, US, UK, Australia, China and India.

Aceh’s governor has given HRDC the task of “building bridges” between scientists and businessmen. One innovative example of how HRDC does this lies in the hands of one talented engineering graduate student who recently returned from Japan. He designed a brick made of lightweight hard foam, unlike traditional bricks made of cement and clay. The brick requires no firing to produce, making them environmentally friendly to manufacture. “We are trying to establish links with factories to make the new brick” says Dr. Idris Ibrahim, deputy director of the HRDC. So far, the bricks have been used to build several schools in a pilot project.

One of HRDC's priority areas is to improve the quality of education in rural and remote areas. The HRDC is currently

developing a distance-learning programme with the Universiti Sains Malaysia, soon to be taken over by the Ministry of Education and rolled out to teachers based in remote areas. In 2011, the HRDC will also be launching a new pilot project in the Pidie district, that aims to upgrade the teaching methods of primary school teachers. Dr. Yusuf, head of the HRDC, reports that the committee is “training 36 teachers in four remote primary schools in what used to be a political/war zone. We would like to improve the quality of teachers, methodology and techniques of teaching math and science. This will be a model for our nation. We use a small amount of funds gathered from the ten of us to develop this programme”.

But the HRDC faces challenges too. “We would like to train people, but we can’t find people to train” says Dr. Idris, the deputy chair. This is because applicants must command a good level of English before they will be accepted by partner universities. There is also a common misperception that the scholarships are used to train the children of government employees — one that HRDC is keen to dispel.

For more: http://beasiswaaceh.wordpress.com/our-partner/

17 | community empowerment

Figure 6: SWOT analysis of the Aceh economy

Source: Chatani Kazutoshi, ILO (2010): Skills gap analysis in Aceh, from reconstruction to sustainable growth through skills development. Discussion paper, ILO Jakarta Office. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/--ilo-jakarta/documents/publication/wcms_143374.pdf

Women can attend university, but husbands or parents must give consent for them to start formal employment.

Similarly, there are four women in the 69 member local

parliament, despite the ruling that 20% of seats should be held by women. Intervention opportunities exist in funding educational initiatives that advocate for

Centre for Community Development and Education “Women were living in intellectual poverty” says Mr. Tabrani, the director of the Centre for Community Development and Education (CCDE), referring to a knowledge and skills gap observed in women and their missing voice in the local media. Set up in November 1993, CCDE’s purpose is to elevate women’s status through education and training.

One of the major strands of CCDE’s work has been in fostering literary talent amongst Acehnese women via basic creative writing workshops and Potret magazine, which features articles written exclusively by female writers across Aceh. As the only women’s magazine published in Aceh, Potret highlights areas of interest to women, on themes such as women in politics and the quota system, unemployment and government policies affecting women, like the recent implementation of a “virginity test” for brides-tobe. Articles on health (especially reproductive health) are also prominent. Now, the magazine is distributed in Aceh, Padang, Medan and even Bali. Mr. Tabrani has also attracted interest from Jakarta-based embassies and NGOs. “There are no shortage of contributions”, and writers receive a small payment of Rp. 100,000 per article.

women’s choices and the implementation of the 20% representation ruling.

• Governance and participation: Aceh will be expecting its second election since the peace agreement is scheduled for August 2011. There have been concerns that local tensions could lead to violence, as some former GAM combatants are dissatisfied with the current government.

Sporadic incidents of violence have taken place linked to internal GAM tensions as noted in a recent International Crisis Group (ICG) briefing. The ICG report notes that if violent friction on the ground can be prevented, then GAM’s internal divisions may add healthy competition to the electoral process and “produce better policies and improved governance” for Aceh.26,27 • Unemployment stands at 9.6%, compared with 8.4% in the rest of Indonesia. Demand-driven training in priority areas like IT skills and mechanics/sewing will require capacity building of potential local training providers, some of whom were featured in Figure 5.

CCDE’s other major strand of work is providing training in diverse areas, ranging from business management, budgeting, gender and women’s rights, and civic education, mostly with women but also with youth groups. To attend business management training, CCDE sends outreach workers to remote villages and buses women back to its training centre in Banda Aceh, where they are provided with meals and accommodation during training sessions of up to two weeks. CCDE also runs a scholarship programme for children and teenagers orphaned by the tsunami or conflict. To ensure that funds are well spent, CCDE holds the bank passbooks for guardians of scholarship recipients, disbursing the passbooks only when families request to buy educational items. The decision not to hand out cash is grounded in the awareness that “cash is easily spent, sometimes not on education” by the guardians.

For more information, please see: http://www.ccde.or.id online video

Tabrani Yunis speaks about CCDE's challenges as a local NGO http://www.asiantrendsmonitoring.com/?p=1506

• Getting women into the labour market: as this becomes culturally acceptable, training again is essential. Women should benefit from training in the priority areas mentioned above. The ILO also recommends initiatives like childcare facilities, credit schemes, training with employers to eliminate discrimination and encouraging the organisations of women workers. Importantly, men must be included in the process of change as they redefine their position regarding the division of labour at home and the roles of the breadwinner.

• Avoiding the resource curse and environmental pollution: informants stated that foreign investors (such as Chinese businessmen in Medan) are waiting to see the outcome of the August 2011 elections before making firm commitments to invest in Aceh. Given that this period could mark the beginning of a wave of FDI into Aceh, steps must be taken to ensure that the environment is not damaged by activities of new investors — community advocacy will likely play an important role as a “check” on these investors.

iNSTruMENTS OF rECOVEry The effects of natural disasters on communities are allencompassing and interconnected, impacting family networks, finances, mental health, and livelihoods. Still, steady income and access to capital can be viewed as linchpins upon which all other aspects of recovery depend. If nothing else, the circulation of cash and spending in the economy can jumpstart activity and expedite the process of achieving normalcy. When communities can shift from depending on donors and government handouts to becoming self-sufficient, response organisations can advance from providing emergency services to focus on long-term reconstruction.

Jumpstarting the local economy Organisations operating in Aceh, as elsewhere in tsunami affected areas, initiated a range of programmes to accelerate economic recovery and move disaster survivors into their prior, or new, livelihoods. “Cash-for-work” (CFW) programmes were one of the most notable of such interventions, rolled

out by agencies like Mercy Corps and Save the Children to provide immediate income streams and to complete urgent public works projects like rubble removal, road and ditch clearing, and building construction. A descendent of the “food-for-work” programmes that have long been used in disaster settings, CFW has since been implemented in conflict regions including the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan, as well as after natural disasters including floods in Bangladesh and Haiti's 2010 earthquake. While cash-based programmes have certain advantages over food delivery programmes — lower distribution infrastructure requirements, greater versatility of cash, and portability — some post-disaster and post-conflict contexts have benefited from both types of programmes operating in tandem.

CFW programmes have their limitations which programme designers must address in the early programme design stages. When programmes persist for too long, they distort

Cash-for-work in aceh Several well-known international NGOs operated CFW interventions in Aceh. Save the Children tallied an estimated 20,000 beneficiaries from its activities,28 while Mercy Corps at its peak in April 2005 distributed money to nearly 18,000. In an evaluation of its 7-month CFW programme, Mercy Corps and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health researchers surveyed cash recipients’ spending behavior to better assess intervention effectiveness.

Daily wages ranged from US$1–$7.65, depending on the tasks undertaken, and multiple family members participated in most households. Expenditures on food, clothing,

medicine and shelter accounted for an average of 60% of household spending. More than a third of beneficiaries reported the ability to save a portion of their CFW income.

The vast majority of recipients, according to evaluation surveys, stated that the money helped them return to their original residence.29 On the downside, some of the CFW programmes went on for up to two years, stalling the process of reintegrating workers into the recovering labour market and creating a false sense of security/stable income for CFW participants. Save the Children, for example, notes the rise of a “handout mentality” resultant from lengthy CFW interventions, hindering the transition to economic stability.

21 | iNSTruMENTS OF rECOVEry

“[A work for cash programme] is linked to measureable targets and labourers are rewarded on the basis of measureable productivity targets. Those who work well will have the incentive of earning more than is the cash on standard cashfor-work programmes.”

Disasters Emergency Committee (UK)

labour markets and inflate wages for manual labour jobs, and divert employees from other industries with lower pay scales. The imbalances are not only across industries, as people from unaffected areas may even relocate because the job prospects in affected areas are higher than at home. Not only does this result in an unnecessary drag on programme finances if identity verification procedures do not successfully screen for these individuals, but their employment may also come at the loss of disaster victims unable to gain employment. Similarly, CFW programmes are not immune to fraudulent activity and in Aceh-based programmes “ghost employees” existed on some payrolls.

Trends • Given the scale and scope of CFW activities in disaster contexts like Haiti and Aceh, we anticipate increasing scrutiny over the most appropriate and effective implementation of CFW programmes. Not only does CFW have the capability of mobilising significant financial resources to accelerate emergency relief efforts, they also represent a sizable share of post-disaster expenditures and therefore we expect donors will demand more robust analysis about CFW’s capabilities and limitations.

• Significant experience with CFW has culminated in best practices to minimise such leakage, including the hire of outside supervisors and coordinators (more removed from the influence of local labourers), payments for partial workdays, and unannounced staff checks.30 • CFW programmes will likely shift to two-stage interventions: cash handouts in the immediate aftermath, followed by output-based labour payments to ensure

that pay is performance-based and that workers do not get paid simply for ‘showing up.’ In their report a year after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the UK’s Disasters Emergency Committee suggests that CFW be replaced with “work for cash” to ensure that programmes support meaningful work.31 • We believe that ongoing research projects and other post-relief evaluations will continue providing critical input to NGOs and government bodies for future postdisaster contexts about optimal CFW design, duration, and flexibility.32 Researchers on the topic have also noted the need for further research on coupling CFW with other relief interventions, like microfinance.

Threats • Numerous experiences with CFW programmes in postdisaster contexts have confirmed the importance of their timely curtailment to avoid disincentives to entrepreneurialism and longer-term service provision by the private sector. Interviewees indicated that CFW programmes must be implemented on an emergency and temporary basis to avoid aid dependence.

• Purchasing power can be dramatically eroded in the face of disaster-inflicted inflation. Year-on-year inflation in Aceh reached 41% in November 2005, dramatically cutting the robustness of CFW payments. Food-for-Work programmes are largely exempt from such pressures, except when disasters wipe out entire crop production areas, requiring higher import volumes from sources of limited supply. bringing the bank to the village Microfinance (MF), which encompasses microcredits, micro-savings, and other banking activities, has existed for decades as a substitute provider of financial services to the poor when traditional banking institutions are unwilling or inaccessible. Like CFW, MF had been successfully employed before the 2004 tsunami as a post-disaster intervention in places like Bangladesh and Central America.33 Channeled through either dedicated microfinance institutions (MFIs) or as targeted programmes within commercial or public banks, microfinance had a tiny foothold in Aceh before the tsunami, with only 24,000 households accessing credit or revolving funds. After a fact-finding mission in 2005, a joint GTZ/KfW research team reported that Aceh’s population “needed access to capital urgently before the tsunami and

instruments of recovery | 22

online video

See how a YPK savings group works for this woman in a village in Aceh http://www.asiantrendsmonitoring.com/?p=1573

[their] demand for credit has been even further increased by the tsunami.”34 According to the Grameen Foundation, only three of the nearly 100 NGOs in Aceh were providing MF services before the tsunami.35 After the tsunami, the Foundation facilitated the entrance of experienced MFIs from elsewhere in Northern Sumatra and Java to begin operations in Aceh. Yayasan Mitra Dhuafa (YAMIDA), operating in West Java at the time of the tsunami and active since 1997, was one such group that established a presence in Aceh with capital support from the Grameen Foundation, Abdul Latif Jameel Group, and the American Red Cross. In the four years following 2005, YAMIDA disbursed nearly 11,000 loans to more than 9,000 clients, exclusively female. Loans have supported the purchase of ingredients for making snack foods and cakes, building materials, and essentials for other professions like mat making and chicken breeding.36 YAMIDA has since expanded its operations to three branches in Aceh, with annual interest rates between 15%–18%, and opened up offices in Sulawesi.

MF services would seem a necessity when traditional lending facilities are absent and informal money-lenders charge 10% monthly interest. However, effective application in postdisaster contexts requires careful navigation. MFIs must not only examine how their operations can benefit borrowers, but must also be sensitive to threats that affect their own ability to provide long-term support to beneficiaries, such as those identified in Figure 7. A US-AID commissioned review of post-disaster MF services suggests that limiting the length of relief activities to swiftly shift to unsubsidised loans, and rescheduling debt loads may be more helpful than signing new loans.

Trends • It is anticipated that MFIs increasing their portfolio of services and scaling-down conventional products, like insurance, will benefit the poor. Microinsurance, while not a visible intervention in post-tsunami Aceh, is another product MFIs can sell to mitigate the poor’s vulnerability against natural disasters, so long as the institution

is sufficiently capitalised to honor its compensation guarantees. Functioning microinsurance channels could mitigate dependence on external donors in the recovery process, whose own budgets are subject to the vagaries of funders, and promote a greater degree of self-reliance and community-building.

• MFIs in the future will better coordinate with organisations implementing CFW programmes to ensure continuity of income in both immediate recovery and long-term rehabilitation stages, in a manner that avoids developing aid dependence or loan write-offs.

Threats • Successful post-disaster microfinance delivery depends crucially on timing; MFIs cannot compete when grants are freely available.

• Established MFIs, whose staff are inadequately trained in responding to natural disasters, may suffer long-term financial and reputational damage by reckless lending.

Cost-recovery is a prerequisite for sustained MFI growth which in turn can expand MFI benefits to a broader community, but this is hinged on lending to responsible borrowers and focusing on income-generating activities.

• Consumer-friendly measures like grant disbursement and loan waivers may appear as appealing measures to support disaster victims, however, such actions can deplete the MFI’s capital availability and its reputation which has implications for long-term repayment behavior. Ultimately, it compromises the MFI’s ability to viably provide financial services to the poor.

From livestock to livelihoods An alternative to direct cash or credit disbursement is the asset transfer scheme, like those promoted by Muslim Aid and various Caritas groups in Northern Sumatra. Through Caritas’ Mutual Income Generation scheme, the organisation purchases buffalo and lends them to programme beneficiaries. The ownership period is temporary, often about one year, and during this time the programme participant benefits from the field-plowing support the animal offers, as well as organic fertiliser produced from the dung. When the period ends, the owner sells the buffalo, compensates Caritas for their purchasing costs, and splits the profits halfway with the organisation. Given sufficient participation, the scheme could be sustained through revolving funds,

23 | instruments of recovery

Figure 7: The impact of disasters on MFI operating procedures

Source: Adapted from Nagarajan 1998

utilising repayments to extend asset purchases of additional draft animals or livestock to be transferred to new participants. The scheme's approach is innovative for twinning incentives of both beneficiary and lender, and improving the

organisation's sustainability. While the programme revenue for Caritas remains limited because of its recent establishment, the model can potentially serve as an effective fundraising tool enabling Caritas to sustain its programmes while

reducing its exposure to fluctuating levels of annual support.

Muslim Aid Indonesia is implementing a similar initiative of expanding livestock rearing and reproduction by artificial insemination as an income generation vehicle for small producers in Bireuen district. As one component of the US$50 million Economic Development Financing Facility (EDFF) umbrella grant, the programme aims to help 720 farmer households raise their income and gain skills in breeding and fattening cattle. Supplementary revenue streams for participants are possible through livestock manure as inputs for either bio-gas or organic fertiliser production. Pending programme success, Muslim Aid and its government partners anticipate transplanting this cattle-raising ecosystem model to other Indonesian provinces.

Trends Win-win solutions like the Caritas’ Mutual Income Generation programme can sustain programmes supporting long-term development goals, without being exposed to the problems of donor flight that have materialised in other development activities. When organisational health is tied to stakeholder benefit effectiveness, the organisation will only be able to continue its operations so long as stakeholders are advancing themselves. This will require more thought on the part of project developers, as their fate is tied into the fate of the programmes they design, but overall this suggests positive movement in the direction of increased aid effectiveness.

Threats Animal-borne diseases present a significant threat to the viability of such schemes. As the purchase price, and therefore the minimum amount needed to compensate the purchasing organisation, represents a significant percentage of an individual’s average annual income in Indonesia, excessive reliance on such a programme in the face of an animal disease pandemic could be destabilising.

Community-based microfinance in action — Yayasan Pengembangan Kawasan37 West Aceh-based Yayasan Pengembangan Kawasan (YPK) promotes income generation through their Economic Development Initiative, implemented in 40 villages in West Aceh and Nagan Raya districts. Founded in 1999 and supported by funding from international bodies like Oxfam and the American Jewish World Service, YPK initiated microfinance (MF) programmes in 2005 to fishermen affected by the tsunami.

Since then, the foundation has expanded its range of MF offerings and coupled them with professional skills training.

Men and women interested in YPK savings groups must first obtain membership by depositing an initial, interest-accruing amount of Rp. 50,000–Rp. 100,000 followed by Rp. 5,000 monthly for six months. Deposits are akin to YPK shares such that members who fully withdraw their savings also revoke their membership and consequently their right to borrow.

At each site YPK staff introduce their MF and training offerings to prospective members, limited to one per household and only those who do not hold a steady job. Selected participants are clustered into Savings and Loan Groups based on location and business interests. They undergo training in skills like handicraft production, motorbike service, handphone repair, and furniture-making. At the end of the training they can decide to join the savings group as an entrepreneur or try to find employment with an established business in the region.

Groups are self-governed and those that demonstrate a successful 6-months track record marked by savings growth, are eligible for MF capital or matching funds to further expand their businesses, with seed capital sourced from public budget programmes like the Programme Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri. To further support these groups, YPK operates a Trading Centre where they may sell their finished products, including furniture and carvings created from tsunami wood, to the public.

The intervention has generated interest by NGOs from as far as Myanmar who have come to visit YPK to learn more about the different steps of project implementation. online video

YPK Director Mr. Irwansyah shares his experiences in Aceh http://www.asiantrendsmonitoring.com/?p=1535

Conclusion It is important to note that the ATM team met with a limited number of organisations who are engaged in programme delivery, and that this Bulletin is not an exhaustive account of all development programmes in Aceh. The extent to which interventions can be replicated outside the Acehnese context depends on the intervention’s appropriateness to different cultures and environments. Still, the team has sought to identify several key lessons which will be applicable in other post-disaster environments and help to bridge the transition from mere reconstruction to long-term development.

Key lessons Numerous post-Aceh studies have summoned a litany of best practices. The following are some lessons we found to be most intriguing and of interest to policymakers tasked with crisis response and disaster prevention. We also encourage readers to review key lessons identified by leading disaster risk reduction and post-disaster scholars at the Overseas Development Institute, the International Recovery

Platform, the Disasters Emergency Committee and the Save the Children Alliance.38,39,40 • Support bottom-up response preparedness. Community members in Aceh served as the first responders and performed a majority of the rescue work within the first 24 hours. National military and international aid workers may take several days to arrive and can provide services that are not mission-critical. As a result, it is imperative that communities receive sufficient training to both manage their own needs and help neighbours in the event of a disaster crisis. This is especially the case in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia where the social ethic of gotong royong, or mutual aid, is prevalent. • Avoiding inequitable two-track development. The influx of aid to tsunami-affected coastal areas set a different development trajectory to those living inland. One interviewee noted the resentment felt by some inland,

CONCluSiON | 26

washed ashore by the tsunami, the 2,600-ton electric generator ship PlTD Apung 1 now serves as a power generator for the Acehnese in the vicinity.

conflict-affected communities at the relative disparities of wealth, new housing construction, and water and sanitation access, created by the reconstruction activities. In post-conflict and post-disaster Aceh, a two-pronged approach is needed to address development needs.

• Matching immediate and long-term needs. Donors should be responsive to the immediate and long-term needs of beneficiaries by providing them appropriatelydesigned materials and equipment (e.g. seeds they know how to use, farm equipment that they have the necessary skills to operate), but also considering their long-term needs. When replacement parts are required six months later, will the local population be able to source them, or will they spend significant sums and long waiting times to source from overseas vendors? Are there low-tech solutions to recurring problems? Low-tech solutions with locally-sourced parts whose low-cost will enable donors to maximise their reach. Organised constituencies in the donor country who lobby for their equipment or services to be used in reconstruction projects represent a countervailing force.

• Don’t promise what you can’t deliver. Inflationary pressures affect input costs and therefore the ability of NGOs and government bodies to deliver on their reconstruction promises. In Aceh, these directly impacted the scale and reach of NGOs’ abilities. For example, local drivers hired by international NGOs were paid up to Rp. 4 million a month, greater than the pre-tsunami wages of trained engineers, which raised service costs across the board.

Similarly, Jakarta revised its own budget of housing costs, from Rp. 30 million per unit to Rp. 60 million.41 Price inflation scenarios should be incorporated into target-setting,

though the degree to which beneficiaries are exposed to inflation depends on circumstances (e.g. the Yogyakarta earthquake reconstruction was not influenced), making the process an iterative one.

• Focus on your core competencies. Disaster response groups are pressured to “follow the money” and interest of donors. As a result, they sometimes engage in functions for which they have no experience, leading to delays in service provision and frivolous expenses. To avoid this, a government body should be tasked with screening and permitting organisations with an established track record to engage in a particular type of activity — this ensures that quality is safeguarded and kept as uniform as possible, as in housing construction.

• grow a thick skin. In the aftermath of the reconstruction process, implementing organisations were criticised regardless of what activities they performed. If it appeared that their pre-project planning and preparation took too long, the media, international observers and funding bodies would criticise them for not promptly meeting community needs. If they rushed to provide immediate support, especially through infrastructure, then quality corners would need to be cut and they would be criticised years later for having chosen inferior materials or failing to ensure that finished products were of sufficient quality.

Implementing bodies need to grow a thick skin because no matter what, some coalition or stakeholder group will be dissatisfied. As reconstruction is a long-term process, less emphasis should be placed on appeasing media outlets that are looking for immediate solutions and more on identifying resettlement and livelihood strategies that will sustain the long-term recovery of affected people.

27 | Acknowledgements

This issue of the Asian Trends Monitoring Bulletin greatly benefited from the insights of Kepler Silaban (Caritas Medan); Tabrani Yunus (Centre for Community Development and Education); Qismullah Yusuf, Idris Ibrahim, Hizir Sofyan, and Taufan Teuku (Human Resources Development Committee); Muchtar Razali (Muslim Aid); Donna Swita Hardiani and Ms. Ruweida (Solidaritas Perempuan Aceh); Ir. M. Dirhamsyah, Nasaruddin, and Mukhlis A. Hamid (Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Centre); Nigel Landon (UNDP); Farid Muttaqin (UN Women); Safriza Sofyan and Harry Masyrafah (World Bank); Karmalisnoor (Yayasan Paramadina Semesta); T. Irwansyah and Ade Irma (Yayasan Pengembangan Kawasan).

references | 28

References 1. Oxfam International (2006). The Tsunami Two Years On: Land Rights in Aceh. Oxfam Briefing Note, 30 December, 2006.

2. Thomalla et al. (2009). “From Knowledge to Action: Learning to Go the Last Mile.“ Stockholm Environment Institute.

3. BRR. (2005). “Aceh and Nias One Year After the Tsunami: The Recovery Effort and the Way Forward.”

4. Multi Donor Fund (2009). Five years after the tsunami: Continuing the Commitment to Reconstruction. MDF Progress Report.

5. Torrente et.al (2007). Regional Experiences on Institutionalisation of CBDRM in South-East Asia.

Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, Bangkok.

6. UNESCAP (2008). Asia-Pacific Governments Can Save Lives and Money By Investing in Disaster Preparedness. UN Press Release No. G/61/08.

Retrieved June 6th 2011 from http://www. unescap.org/unis/press/2008/dec/g61.asp.

7. BNPB (2009). Chapter 4 Lessons learned in disaster risk reduction. National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction 2010-2012, p.89.

8. GFDRR (2011) Disaster Risk Management Programmes for Priority Countries, The World Bank: Washington DC, USA. 9. TDMRC (2011). Workshop on Strengthening the Capacity of BPBA and BPBD Staffs about DIBA. Retrieved June 5, 2011 from http://www.tdmrc. org/en/workshop-on-strengthening-the-capacityof-bpba-and-bpbd-staffs-about-diba.jsp.

14. Ibid.

15. UN APCICT/ESCAP (2010). ICT for Disaster Risk Reduction. Case Study 2. Incheon City, Republic of Korea.

16. Thomalla et al. (2009). See endnote 8.

17. UNDP (2010) Provincial Human Development Report Aceh 2010.

18. Chatani Kazutoshi, ILO (2010): Skills gap analysis in Aceh, from reconstruction to sustainable growth through skills development. Discussion paper, ILO Jakarta Office. http://www.ilo.org/ wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/--ilo-jakarta/documents/publication/wcms_143374. pdf

30. Ibid.

31. Clermont, Carine; Sanderson, David; Sharma, Anshu and Helen Spraos. 2011. “Urban Disasters – Lessons from Haiti.” Report for the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC).

32. More information about this project is available at http://www.odihpn.org/report. asp?id=2761.

33. Grameen Foundation USA. 2005. “Recovery from the Tsunami Disaster: Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development through Microfinance.”

GFUSA Special Report.

19. Vianen, Inge, ILO (2006): Women, gender and work in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam province. http://ocha-gwapps1.unog.ch/rw/RWFiles2006. nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/KHII-6XP5MEfull_report.pdf/vFile/full_report.pdf

34. Hammerich, Ursula; Hamp, Michael; Hartig, Peter and Riza Primahendra. 2005. “Designing a Microfinance Development Strategy as Part of Economic Recovery and Employment Promotion in Post-Tsunami Aceh.”

20. Ibid.

35. Grameen Foundation USA 2005.

21. UN Women (2009): Women, peace and security project factsheet. UN Women Singapore. http://www.unwomen-nc.org.sg/library/programmes/AcehFactsheet.pdf

36. Grameen Foundation USA and American Red Cross. 2009. "Tsunami Recovery: Rebuilding Aceh."

22. See reference #18 (Kazotoshi 2010) 23. Aidwatch / Eye on Aceh (2006): A people’s agenda? Post-tsunami aid in Aceh. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/0ECAB7 B7E4ABD4D549257126002DA37F-eoa-idn-28feb. pdf 24. BRR (2009): Education, health, women empowerment: preparing quality generation.

10. Pribadi, S. (2009). Indonesia Tsunami Early Warning System for Disaster Mitigation.

Indonesian Agency of Meteorology Climatology and Geophysics (BMKG). Retrieved June 6, 2011 from http://ipac.kacst.edu.sa/ eDoc/2009/182408_1.pdf.

25. Provincial Bureau of Statistics Aceh (BPS) (2006): Literacy rates. Cited in: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/ BRRIndonesiaEDDY.pdf

11. SciDev.net (2010, December 8). Mentawai tsunami warning 'failed at the last hurdle'. Retrieved June 8, 2011 from http://www.rss.scidev.net/en/ news/mentawai-tsunami-warning-failed-at-thelast-hurdle-.html.

26. International Crisis Group: Indonesia: GAM vs GAM in the Aceh elections. Asia briefing no.

123, 15 June 2011. http://www.crisisgroup.org/ en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B123indonesia-gam-vs-gam-in-the-aceh-elections.aspx

12. Suhardi, I. & Pariatmono (2008). Towards an effective tsunami early warning for Indian Ocean.

International Conference on Earthquake Engineering and Disaster Mitigation, Jakarta, April 14-15, 2008.

27. Grayman, Jesse: Notes on ICG’s Latest Indonesia Report: “GAM vs GAM in the Aceh Elections”. Blog post, 19 June 2011. http:// jgrayman.wordpress.com/2011/06/19/ icg-gam-vs-gam/

13. Thomalla et al. (2009). “From Knowledge to Action: Learning to go the Last Mile - A participatory assessment of the conditions for strengthening the technology–community linkages of tsunami early warning systems in the Indian Ocean.“ Stockholm Environment Institute.

Post-Tsunami Aceh.” Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and Mercy Corps.

28. Save the Children Alliance. 2008. “Mid-Term Evaluation Report.”

29. Doocy, Shannon; Gabriel, Michael; Collins, Sean; Robinson, Courtland and Peter Stevenson.

“The Mercy Corps Cash for Work Programme in

37. Yayasan Pengembangan Kawasan. 2005.

“Income Generating Programme: Economic Development Initiative in Post-Tsunami in West Aceh.” Aceh, Indonesia.

38. Haughton, Rachel, Overseas Development Institute (2005): Tsunami emergency lessons from previous natural disasters. http://www.recoveryplatform.org/assets/recoverycases_reports/ tsunamibriefing05.pdf 39. International Recovery Platform (2005): Post-tsunami lessons learned and best practices workshop. http://www.recoveryplatform.org/ assets/submissions/200909020442_lessons_ learned_and_best_practices__government_of_indonesia.pdf 40. Disasters Emergency Committee (2010): Urban disasters – lessons from Haiti. Study of member agencies’ responses to the earthquake in Port au Prince, Haiti. http://www.dec.org.uk/download/856/DEC-Haiti-urban-study.pdf 41. Masyrafah and McKeon 2008.

29 | Editorial team

Trade & investment FACILITATION Darryl Jarvis is an Associate Professor at the LKY School of Public Policy. He specialises in risk analysis and the study of political and economic risk in Asia, including investment, regulatory and institutional risk analysis. He is an author and editor of several books and has contributed articles to leading international journals. He has been a consultant to various government bodies and business organisations and for two years was a member of the investigating team and then chief researcher on the Building Institutional Capacity in Asia project commissioned by the Ministry of Finance, Japan.

His current research is a large cross-national study of risk causality in four of Asia’s most dynamic industry sectors. He teaches courses on risk analysis, markets and international governance and international political economy.

His email is darryl.jarvis@nus.edu.sg

Johannes Loh is working as a Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.

He holds a Master’s degree in Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. His previous research experience includes international student mobility, visual political communication, aid governance and public sector reform in developing countries. Recently, he completed a research project on Success Factors for Police Reform in Postconflict Situations with the German Technical Cooperation.

Prior to joining the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy he has also worked for the United Nations Environment Programme in Geneva, Transparency International Nepal and the Centre on Asia and Globalisation in Singapore.

His email is johannes.loh@nus.edu.sg and you can follow his updates on trade & investment facilitation on Twitter, @seasiatrade.

HEALTH SYSTEMS Phua Kai Hong is a tenured professor at the LKY School of Public Policy and formerly held a joint appointment as Associate Professor and Head, Health Services Research Unit in the Faculty of Medicine.

He is frequently consulted by governments within the region and international organisations, including the Red Cross, UNESCAP, WHO and World Bank. He has lectured and published widely on policy issues of population aging, healthcare management and comparative health systems in the emerging economies of Asia. He is the current Chair of the Asia-Pacific Health Economics Network (APHEN), founder member of the Asian Health Systems Reform Network (DRAGONET), Editorial Advisory Board Member of Research in Healthcare Financial Management and an Associate Editor of the Singapore Economic Review.

Nicola Pocock is a research associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. She is also the research manager at aidha, a non-profit financial education and entrepreneurship training school for migrant domestic workers in Singapore. Prior to joining the LKY School of Public Policy, she was the general manager at aidha. She has interned as a Fast stream trainee in the UK civil service at the Home Office and as a research volunteer at Amnesty International.

Her research interests span health and social policy, health systems financing, social impact assessment, gender, migration and financial behaviours.

Her email is sppnp@nus.edu.sg and you can follow her work on health systems on Twitter @healthSEAsia.

His email address is spppkh@nus.edu.sg

ENERGY SECURITY Benjamin K. Sovacool is an Assistant Professor at the LKY School of Public Policy. He is also a Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Programme at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation.

Anthony D’Agostino is a research associate at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG) with research interests in energy policy, climate change adaptation and environmental decision analysis.

Dr Sovacool has worked as a researcher, professor and consultant on issues pertaining to energy policy, the environment and science and technology policy. He has served in advisory and research capacities at the U.S. National Science Foundation’s Electric Power Networks Efficiency and Security Programme, Virginia Tech Consortium on Energy Restructuring, Virginia Centre for Coal and Energy Research, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Semiconductor Materials and Equipment International, U.S. Department of Energy’s Climate Change Technology Programme and the International Institute for Applied Systems and Analysis near Vienna, Austria.

Prior to joining CAG, Anthony worked with the Institute of Water Policy at the LKY School of Public Policy, using system dynamics to address public policy and water policy challenges. He has worked with the Greenhouse Gas Protocol at the World Resources Institute and at UNEP-ROAP, respectively focusing on corporate GHG emissions and sustainable buildings. In addition to consultation work on transportation and corporate environmental reporting, Anthony has worked for organisations in India, Australia, New Zealand and the US on rural development and sustainable agriculture issues.

Dr Sovacool has published four books, more than 80 academic articles and presented at more than 30 international conferences and symposia. His email address is bsovacool@nus.edu.sg

His email is sppald@nus.edu.sg and you can follow his work on the Southeast Asian energy sector on Twitter, @seasiaenergy.

The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy is an autonomous, professional graduate school of the National University of Singapore.

Its mission is to help educate and train the next generation of Asian policymakers and leaders, with the objective of raising the standards of governance throughout the region, improving the lives of its people and, in so doing, contribute to the transformation of Asia. For more details on the LKY School, please visit www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg