NUPR Spring 2026

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR AND THE PRESIDENT

The political landscape is evolving with unprecedented speed, increasingly shaped by technology’s rapid integration into every facet of society. From the proliferation of artificial intelligence to the ethical dilemmas of digital privacy and governance, technological shifts are no longer merely tools of power; they are reshaping the very foundations of power itself. This redefinition of authority and influence intersects with complex issues of identity, economics, climate, justice, and beyond, creating a global discourse that demands new frameworks of understanding. We are entering an era where it is more important than ever to spread diverse, scholarly, articles filled with both fact and opinion.

At the Northeastern University Political Review (NUPR), we’re embracing this moment of transformation, recognizing that our current political climate does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it operates as a force deeply embedded within broader societal struggles and ambitions. As a student-run publication, our goals are to critically engage with how technology both challenges and enhances our understanding of governance, activism, and cultural movements, and to combat emerging censorship in higher education. Our contributors pour months of research and effort into crafting thoughtful, nuanced pieces that question established paradigms and push the boundaries of political thought.

NUPR continues to publish work spanning a wide array of topics, acknowledging that technology’s impact reaches across all dimensions of political life. Whether exploring the implications of new digital infrastructures or tackling broader debates on justice and policy, we strive to produce provocative content that invites readers to rethink their assumptions and engage with the complexities of our time. Join us as we navigate the intricate intersections of technology, society, and politics— where the future remains uncertain but open to exploration.

Thank you for your creativity this semester—we’re excited to present your Spring 2026 magazine!

Irena Zervas Editor-in-Chief

Laura Weppner President

MEET THE TEAM

EXECUTIVE BOARD

Laura Weppner, President

Irena Zervas, Editor-in-Chief

Veer Dave, Design Director

Mary Raines Alexander, Managing Editor

Zoe Jagelski, Internal Communications Director

Aishi Kapoor, Digital Director

Kennedy Little, Managing Editor

Claire Satkiewicz, Managing Editor

Aidan Stovin, External Communications Director

MISSION STATEMENT

Founded in 2010, the Northeastern University Political Review seeks to be a non-affiliated platform for students to publish articles and podcasts of the highest possible caliber on contemporary domestic and international politics, as well as critical reviews of political books, film, and events. We aspire to foster a culture of intelligent political discourse, promote awareness of political issues, and provide a forum for students to discuss their views and refine their options. We hope to reflect the diversity of thought and spirit at Northeastern, including the dual ethic of academic and experiential education our school embodies.

EDITORIAL BOARD FOR MORE INFORMATION

Mary Raines Alexander, Managing Editor

Kennedy Little, Managing Editor

Claire Satkiewicz, Managing Editor

Alex Booker, Magazine Editor

Yoojin Choi, Magazine Editor

Abby Greenblatt, Magazine Editor

Eleanor Hardy, Magazine Editor

Isabella Hill, Magazine Editor

Zachary Kwon, Magazine Editor

Dario Nardini, Magazine Editor

Shreya Sanjay, Magazine Editor

Sophia Schnabel, Magazine Editor

Melanie Vela, Magazine Editor

Alisha Werry, Magazine Editor

LAYOUT TEAM

Veer Dave, Design Director

Matthew Chavez Cruz, Layout Editor

Amy Eng, Layout Editor

Zoe Jagelski, Layout Editor

Aishi Kapoor, Layout Editor

Victoria Kenton, Layout Editor

Claire Satkiewicz, Layout Editor

Check out our website at nupoliticalreview.org Want to write for NUPR? Email nupreic@gmail.com. Questions? Email nupoliticalreview@gmail.com.

Magazines printed by Puritan Capital

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FEATURED

Small Powers, Strategic Innovation: The Potential of Nordic Disarmament

Diplomacy

Eleanor Hardy (6)

Gentrification: The Unintended Consequence of the “People Before Highways” Protests

Dario Nardini (10)

GLOBAL

A Country for Sale: The Hidden Costs of Greek Debt Repayment

Irena Zervas (16)

United States Policy in Venezuela: Regime Change, Resources, or Political Power?

Alexandra Vargo (20)

When Ice Melts Faster Than Law: Svalbard and the Arctic’s Quiet Shift

Sadie Zarris (26)

NATIONAL

On Executive Power and the Independence of Central Banking

Zachary Kwon (8)

Police, Prisons, and Premature Death in Black America

Gabriella Shafman (12)

The Cost of Justice

Aishi Kapoor (14)

Increased Youth Participation Is the Most Effective Way to Challenge Project 2025

Jennifer Yu (18)

Critical Infrastructure: Cybersecurity Beyond Voluntarism

Liam Dowd (22)

SMALL POWERS, STRATEGIC INNOVATION:

THE POTENTIAL OF NORDIC DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY

Conflict is the world’s greatest threat to stability.

ELEANOR HARDY / POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 2028

As multilateral institutions atrophy and hegemonic powers embrace militarism, small and middle powers (SMPs) must navigate a precarious future. Yet, the dissolution of unipolarity also presents opportunities for SMPs to lead diplomatic innovation by leveraging strategic coalitions with civil society and with each other. Should these states reject isolationism and invest in collective dialogue, global security could be strengthened through renewed peacebuilding efforts.

In the Nordic region, this tension is especially pronounced amid contradictory disarmament policies between conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). By uniting SMPs and civil society actors around humanitarian disarmament, the Nordic states can transform regional and global security, even as the pressure to rearm intensifies.

DEFENSE EXPANSION

million people worldwide continue to live under the threat of landmines and explosive ordnance.

Finland’s withdrawal signals an erosion of conventional arms norms among SMPs confronting escalating security threats with constrained resources. Between 2022 and 2024, Nordic defense spending rose by 22%, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

On April 1, 2025, Finland announced its intention to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, the international treaty banning anti-personnel landmines. This decision marked a stark departure from the region’s historical leadership in disarmament. The humanitarian stakes are significant: an estimated 100

expansion risks prioritizing scale over strategic efficiency, as its plans often prioritize growth over precision, at high Wcosts relative to little guaranteed gain. Mines are primarily deterrent tools with marginal operational impact in modern conflicts, as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes. Their proliferation weakens regional security and sustainable development goals. SMPs that weaken international humanitarian law not only jeopardize longterm peace but also risk eroding their own domestic and international legitimacy.

In this new context, civil society actors play a crucial role. Advocacy networks such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) mobilized against Finland’s with-

Economic Survey 2025. The decision also reflects immediate concern over Russian military expansion along shared regional borders. It also shows the broader regional security pressures that intensified following Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO.

the regional

Yet, the tactical utility of conventional weapons is limited. Europe’s defense

drawal, staging high-profile demonstrations, including painting the Broken Chair monument outside the UN Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. NGOs historically set normative standards by shaping the public discourse, which delegitimizes such rearmament efforts.

This role is also instructive, as civil society can directly shape policy creation and implementation. When the Ottawa Treaty was negotiated in the 1990s, NGOs like the ICBL and the ICRC directly shaped the drafting and adoption. The organization helped to secure over 40 necessary ratifications in just 10

months, setting the record as the fastest treaty to ever enter into force.

There is tremendous potential for lasting humanitarian policies when NGO and public pressure campaigns triumph. Such sustained campaigns lessen the political burdens of securing humanitarian policies and can help shape the global security consensus. They set the moral agenda for politicians, and can produce the public support needed for sustained political will. As ICBL director Tamar Gabelnick stated regarding Finland’s withdrawal, “Returning is not a show of strength — it is a sign of weakness and desperation, contrary to international humanitarian law.” NGOs and public responses will be vital in levying critiques of the decision and dissuading other nations from following Finland’s path.

COALITIONAL POTENTIAL

Despite conventional disarmament challenges, the Nordic region continues to lead in nuclear deterrence and coalition security frameworks, which align actors toward shared security goals. NATO membership provides small Nordic states with new avenues for cooperative security commitments and diplomacy. Rather than undermining disarmament, regional cooperation offers the mechanisms for maintaining credible defense while sustaining multilateral norms. This could present both a viable and economic alternative to withdrawal from the Ottawa Treaty and similar frameworks.

ship in disarmament will require reframing security. Norway’s humanitarian disarmament strategy for 2024-2029 exemplifies a “human-centered” approach in which regional and multi-stakeholder leadership converge to advance peace. Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) aims to harmonize political and military responses, allocating 13 billion euros toward long-term defense strategy and integrating 20,000 ground, air, and sea personnel in joint exercises such as

Similar initiatives demonstrate how security and disarmament commitments can coexist, even strengthening deterrence, such as commitments to early-warning mechanisms and joint aerial force integration. The initiative reduces the economic and material burden of security development and deployment and eliminates the burdens of gathering intelligence on potential threats that a single for This

anachronistic and endangers long-term global peace. Nordic SMPs have a unique armament and demonstrate the influence approach to arms leadership.

The Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, for example, convened sixteen non-nuclear SMPs to advance the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), reaffirming Nordic bridge-building capacity and commitment to international law. The initiative meets annually, which provides a reliable forum and resilient, advance international The for regional alignment.

small powers can have in shaping the global

The Nordic region represents a broad strategic example for SMPs globally. Despite recent setbacks in conventional disarmament in the Baltic region, like Latvia and Finland’s proposed withdrawals, the leadership and bridge-building capacity of Nordic SMPs represent a viable alternative to further backsliding from legal and ethical frameworks.

For a more secure future, Nordic SMPs must reorient their security paradigm from short-term militarism into resilient, realistic coalitions. By integrating with NGOs and with each other, SMP coalitions can strengthen international humanitarian law through sustained investment in defense diplomacy, setting the model for a more secure future.

ON EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF CENTRAL BANKING

ZACHARY KWON / POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ECONOMICS 2027

In early January, the Department of Justice issued the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) multiple grand jury subpoenas regarding planned renovations for two Fed buildings in Washington, D.C. The renovations themselves are outstandingly banal: in a July 17 letter to the Office of Management and Budget, Chair of the Federal Reserve Jerome Powell specified the renovations, noting that the Fed planned to remove asbestos, update the building’s fire detection, and install an improved HVAC system. In contrast, the Trump administration has claimed that the Fed ostensibly mismanaged the funds and that Powell gave false testimony in regard to the renovation’s costs, leading to a criminal investigation of Powell. Regardless of whether the Fed truly mismanaged its funds, it can

simple. By mandate,

He wants either himself or a loyalist to manipulate interest rates for short-term political clout, and dispatching Powell is the first step in doing so. “

given time: as a gross oversimplification, more money in the economy causes interest rates to fall, finance government bonds, or loan money for a small business. Less money in and nicks interest rates to ensure stable inflation and prices, which

hardly be argued that Trump’s swipe at Powell is due to supposed financial mismanagement. Rather, the Trump administration's menace of the Federal Reserve serves as a slight to its independence, with the chief goal of removing Jerome Powell as its Chair. It cannot be argued that the president holds the constitutional authority to do so. It is an open secret on Capitol Hill that Trump has wanted to remove Powell since at least July of last year. The reasoning is simple. By mandate, the Fed is tasked with maximizing employment and monitoring how much money is in the economy at any given time: as a gross oversimplification, more money in the economy causes interest rates to fall, making it cheaper for consumers to pull a mortgage, finance a car, buy government bonds, or loan money for a small business. Less money in the economy generally rears the opposite effect. The Fed bumps and nicks interest rates to ensure stable inflation and prices, which often cause negative effects in the short term but long-term predictability in the economy. Resultingly, individual policymakers often butt heads with the Fed, which is purposefully isolated from the hotheadedness of Capitol Hill. The Fed’s seven governors serve overlapping, singular,

makers. The Fed’s control of monetary

predictability in the economy. Resultingly, individual policywith the the hotheadedness of Capitol Hill. The

fourteen-year terms, ensuring that governors hold their tenure over multiple Congresses and presidential administrations. Similarly, the Chair is chosen among already-sitting Fed governors, whose four-year term is separate from their term as a governor. And, because Fed governors are appointed and not elected, they do not feel the need to adjust monetary policy to appease constituents. Still, voters often misappropriately attribute the injurious side effects of the Fed’s actions to individual policymakers. The Fed’s control of monetary policy indirectly affects issues that are most pressing to voters, such as grocery prices or gas prices. Because voters can’t expend their frustration at the Fed, they do so at the ballot box, whose candidates have public profiles that are much more prominent than those of the Fed’s governors. For example, in 1980, incumbent president Jimmy Carter swallowed the anger of voters after the Fed purposefully tanked the economy in the late ‘70s, leading to Ronald Reagan’s landslide victory in the election of 1980. Suppose, then, what might happen if the president—or any individual policymaker, for that matter—were

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able to set interest rates instead of the Fed. Likely, they would create shortterm booms to the economy by setting interest rates low, leading to bumps in approval ratings or popularity, but ultimately inciting an economic bust in the long-term. As demonstrated by his challenge to the Fed’s independence, that is the prerogative Trump wants to wield. He wants either himself or a loyalist to manipulate interest rates for shortterm political clout, and dispatching Powell is the first step in doing so.

Still, it cannot be argued that the president maintains the constitutional authority to remove the Chair of the Fed. The argument typically espoused by unitary executive theorists holds that the president is able to dispatch any member of the executive branch, citing the president’s authority to devolve—and logically, deprive—executive power to lower officers. This power can be found in the Vestings Clause of Article II: “the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”

But it can hardly be argued that the powers of the Fed constitute executive power. The Fed is chiefly concerned with raising or lowering interest rates from time to time, but it cannot exercise executive power as it is traditionally considered: the Fed cannot execute laws, conduct diplomacy, command the military, grant pardons, or administer the bureaucracy. It is not a part of the executive branch, nor does

that make it a hybrid “fourth branch” of government with a mandate to meddle in executive and legislative affairs. It is perhaps best described by the Supreme Court’s emergency judgement in Trump v. Wilcox: “the Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.”

But even if the Fed did exercise executive power, the Fed’s mandate to control monetary policy is granted by statute, not by devolution, through the Vestings Clause. The Federal Reserve exists because Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, not because the president ordered the Fed’s existence. Recent litigation concerning whether the president can remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission demonstrates how the president may not have inherent authority to remove members of the executive branch if their offices were created by statute. Thus, it is logical to conclude that members of the Federal Reserve are likely exempt from dismissal at the president's whim.

The very fact that a president has threatened the Fed’s independence in such a boisterous manner should be of enormous concern to the average American. Aside from disregarding its constitution, nothing can more effectively crumble the stability of a developed country than political control of its central bank. And, to a reasoned observer, that seems to be what the president wants.

GENTRIFICATION:

THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF THE “PEOPLE BEFORE HIGHWAYS” PROTESTS

DARIO NARDINI / INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 2027

In the midst of the Cold War, Dwight D. Eisenhower argued that if the United States was invaded by a foreign entity, roads would be needed for survival. As a result, he signed the Federal-Aid Highway Act in 1956 which allotted substantial funds to municipal governments for the construction of highways, giving life to the once forgotten Boston highway plan of 1948. City officials began implementing the plan –through evictions and the razing of buildings– much to the dismay of many Bostonians and were stopped short when protests arose. Following the cancellation, community members worked alongside the governor to develop the land into a public park and train line.

People Before Highways

While community activists succeeded in stopping the intrusive highway project, their additional success in developing their land has now made the surrounding neighborhoods more expensive and less accessible to longtime residents. This gentrification has quietly forced many people in Roxbury, Back Bay, and Jamaica Plain to leave the neighborhoods they once worked to defend. This paradox must be acknowledged when determining the causes of gentrification in the area and needs to be addressed by Northeastern students who are contributing to gentrifying these neighborhoods.

On January 25th 1969, thousands of Bostonians congregated on the steps of the State House. This “People Before Highways” protest was in direct opposition to the state’s proposed two-part highway plan. The first part of the plan was the Southwest Corridor Expressway, which was intended as an extension of I-95 into the city through the south. The second part was the Inner Belt, a loop that would have encompassed the city center. Both highway extensions would have cut through greater Boston in the south and Cambridge and Somerville in the northeast, dividing neighborhoods and putting thousands of homes at risk of destruction.

highway project and helped to develop the land are facing intense gentrification.

Gentrification In Boston

From 1990 to 2016, Boston experienced more concentrated poverty resulting from increases in housing prices and rent. As the cost of living outpaced median income, lower income residents began being forced out of their homes. Though this trend is prevalent across the United States, Boston stands out as an exemplary case.

The “People Before Highways” movement was historically significant in that it was the only successful public opposition movement to urban development in Boston at that time.

Former Governor Francis Sargent canceled the highway plan in 1972 and then worked alongside community organizers from Back Bay to Forest Hills to redevelop the already scarred land along the Southwest Corridor, turning it into Southwest Corridor Park and MBTA Orange Line in 1990.

Boston was ranked the third most intensely gentrified city in the United States between 2013 and 2017 in a 2020 study by the National Community

Today, the same predominantly low-income communities of color who organized against the

Reinvestment Coalition. Included in the list of gentrified neighborhoods are the South End, Jamaica Plain, and Roxbury, all three of which are situated along the Southwest Corridor. This should be a pressing issue for Northeastern students, as these neighborhoods are prime locations for those looking to live off-campus.

Gentrification in these neighborhoods, as with almost all cases of gentrification, does not have a singular cause. Redlining and intense university development, with the development of Northeastern and Wentworth University, is at least partly to blame.

Redlining was a practice performed in the 1930s, in which the federal government mapped neighborhoods, assigning “red” grades to those deemed risky to receive bank loans. The lack of investment into these “red” areas –which were overwhelmingly low-income communities of color– has since helped to facilitate contemporary gentrification.

Increased investment into universities like Northeastern encourages population growth, which can significantly alter the neighborhood where the university is located, particularly with the creation of large-scale student housing developments and the promotion of off-campus housing.

Though these two factors have contributed to gentrification, the development of the Southwest Corridor is much more detrimental.

The Southwest Corridor and Gentrification

Redlining and investments into institutions of higher learning have occurred in neighborhoods not affected by such intense gentrification. This then begs the question, what is different about the South End, Jamaica Plain, and Roxbury?

The development of the Southwest Corridor is the answer. Extensive scholarship has been produced discussing how public investment can lead to increased property values and neighborhood change. A UCB and UCLA study identifies public investments, such as rail transit and parks, as one type of catalyst that may help trigger or accelerate gentrification.

following their successful opposition to Boston’s callous urban development scheme, are now being priced out and forced to leave.

Remembering History

A University of Pennsylvania study shows how the 1980s extension of Boston’s Red Line directly contributed to higher property value and subsequent gentrification near Porter Square, Alewife, and Davis Square by making these neighborhoods more attractive to buyers. Additionally, scholars dubbed the term green gentrification to explain how proximity to public parks can lead to increased housing prices.

In the 1960s and 1970s when the “People Before Highways” protests were at their peak, its organizers and participants had seen the devastation of the West End, Haymarket Square, Adams Square, and Squally Square. They had experienced the brute force used by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) in enforcing eminent domain and kicking people out of their houses. They had witnessed the highway plan coming to fruition, with state-sponsored bulldozers demolishing 500 units of housing in the south end. Through their collective trauma, community activists in South End, Jamaica Plain, and Roxbury organized against the city of Boston in order to protect their neighborhoods, houses, businesses, and livelihoods.

Scollay Square area, Government Center, and West End areas, 1963 (Northeastern University Library).

The South End, Jamaica Plain, and Roxbury are located near Southwest Corridor park and multiple Orange Line stops. This proximity to a prominent public park and sophisticated transit line has led to increased property values and housing costs, which drives longterm residents out. Though this trend is expected given the literature produced on gentrification, it highlights a paradox. The same communities who worked alongside city officials to develop their neighborhoods,

And yet today, their neighborhoods are being gentrified, with residents from South End, Jamaica Plain, and Roxbury being quietly displaced. This paradox highlights an unintended consequence of the progressive anti-highway movement, accentuating the racist, classist, and altogether abusive system of historical urban development and its effects on gentrification today.

As this topic pertains to Northeastern students, these neighborhoods are popular off-campus living areas. Mission Hill, located in between Roxbury and Jamaica plain, is home to all Northeastern Greek Life houses, multiple athlete houses, as well as hundreds of Northeastern and Wentworth students. Though the power to reverse gentrification is not in the hands of university students alone, it is important for them to be cognizant of how they impact the existing communities, as well as be knowledgeable of their new communities’ history.

POLICE, PRISONS, AND PREMATURE DEATH IN BLACK AMERICA

GABRIELLA SHAFMAN / POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 2028

The United States is confronting a disturbing reality: the criminal legal system has become one of the most consequential forces determining who survives long enough to grow old. New evidence shows that the greatest threats to Black Americans’ life expectancy are not solely medical, but structural. Where policing, incarceration, and environmental injustice converge, premature death before age 65 is accelerating, creating a contradiction in a nation that promises security in old age through programs like Medicare. Many Black adults do not live long enough to receive it, and the areas with the highest exposure to incarceration and aggressive policing are now experiencing the sharpest rise in early mortality.

A recent study published in November 2025 reports a disturbing rise in premature death in the United States, especially among Black adults. The researchers analyzed mortality for adults aged 18 to 64 and found a significant increase in fatalities over the last decade, with Black Americans experiencing the sharpest rise. Because Medicare eligibility begins at age 65, more Black adults are dying before they ever receive the benefits they paid into throughout their working lives. This places a major issue into clearer focus: premature mortality among Black Americans is not only a public-health crisis but a justice-system crisis. The factors driving early death are intertwined with policing, incarceration, and the structural conditions shaped by the American criminal legal system.

health. Individual histories of incarceration and the broader incarceration rate of one's county are predictors of all-cause mortality, including overdose and cardiovascular disease. There is an elevated risk of death within the first two weeks after release, 12.7 times higher than that of the general population. This spike occurs because people often leave custody without stable housing, consistent medical care, or access to needed medications. Reduced drug tolerance after incarceration makes overdosing especially likely. Because Black Americans are dispro-

Beyond the immediate risks of lethal force or death in custody, the justice system shapes health through chronicdisease pathways. “

Mortality research increasingly identifies incarceration, police violence, and carceral-adjacent environments, such as proximity to toxic sites and poor infrastructure, as determinants of population

portionately exposed to arrest, pretrial detention, sentencing, and post-release supervision, these mortality risks fall unevenly across racial lines.

When the justice system determines who is more likely to be incarcerated, and incarceration itself raises the risk of premature death, the criminal legal system effectively becomes a mechanism shaping which populations live and which do not. This demonstrates the theory of necropolitics, which suggests that states exercise power not only by governing life but also by structuring exposure to death. Applying this framework makes clear that contemporary U.S. punishment

“

and policing practices function as a form of necropolitical governance: they allocate vulnerability, shorten life expectancies, and concentrate premature mortality within specific racial groups. Police violence also contributes substantially to these disparities. There is substantial under-reporting of fatal police violence, while Black Americans suffer a significantly higher mortality rate compared to White Americans across nearly four decades. Recent investigations into medical examiner record-keeping have demonstrated how official statistics can obscure the actual health burden imposed by the justice system. For example, in Maryland, deaths in police custody were reclassified as homicides. When the state fails to classify deaths accurately, it becomes harder to understand the scale of premature mortality affecting Black communities. The result is both a public-health blind spot and a democratic accountability problem. Beyond the immediate risks of lethal force or death in custody, the justice system shapes health through chronic-disease pathways. Incarceration is associated with elevated rates of hypertension, diabetes, kidney disease, and cardiovascular conditions. The Journal of the American Heart Association writes that cardiovascular disease is a leading cause of death among incarcerated individuals, with persistent racial disparities in these outcomes. For Black adults who encounter the carceral system at higher rates, the accumulation of untreated or poorly managed chronic disease increases the likelihood of early death long before the age of 65. Similarly, individuals with an incarceration history have reduced access to preventive care and delayed treatment,

compounding long-term health risks. This occurs because many lose health insurance during custody, face barriers to re-enrollment upon release, and return to communities with limited medical resources or provider discrimination. These findings reinforce the notion that incarceration operates as a negative health intervention, often accelerating biological aging and heightening disease severity.

The effects of incarceration extend beyond individuals. Research in the American Journal of Public Health and Demography shows that countries with higher jail churn, cycling of people in local jails, expemortality rates uals who were never incarcerated, suggesting community-level spillovers. These spillovers stem from disrupted family structures, eco- nomic instability, reduced social cohesion, and the circulation of infectious disease, all of which dispropor- tionately affect Black neighbor- hoods. Because Black communities are policed and incarcer- ated at higher rates, the community-level consequences of mass incarceration further deepen racial disparities in premature death.

These patterns unfold amid shifting federal oversight of the criminal legal system. In May 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it would no longer pursue specific consent-decree negotiations in several major cities. Consent decrees are legally binding court agreements used to reform police departments found to have unconstitutional practices. These practices can include excessive use of force, discriminatory traffic stops, unlawful arrests, or patterns of racial profiling. This policy shift affects ongoing federal oversight efforts in places such as Minneapolis and Louisville.

Although local governments pledged to continue reforms, the scope of these commitments varies. Some jurisdictions promised to revise use-of-force policies, expand de-escalation training, or strengthen civilian complaint systems.

Even with these efforts, the rollback of federal sight signals a retreat one of the primary historically used to discriminatory or police behavior. The of Justice also ended an environmental-justice agreement in Lowndes County, Alabama, a predominantly Black rural community suffering from sewage failures and associated health hazards. Because environmental

tices, and incarceration interact to shape community health, changes in federal oversight can indirectly influence premature mortality Decisions in the juswhether in policing,

Taken evidence shows premature Black simply a clinical but the result of interacting structural systems. Policing practices determine arrest rates; courts determine who enters jail and prison; incarceration affects both acute and chronic health conditions; reentry generates some of the most dangerous periods in an individual’s life. When combined with under-reported deaths in custody, inconsistent federal oversight, and longstanding racialized exposure to environmental hazards, the justice system plays a central role in determining who survives and who does not. This creates a profound equity crisis: a society cannot claim to value life or justice if the very systems meant to uphold public safety systematically shorten the lives entire racial groups.

The findings of the JAMA Health Forum study highlight a pressing need for policies that intervene earlier in the life course, before age 65. This includes investments in preventive

health care for communities disproportionately affected by incarceration, reforms to reduce unnecessary pretrial detention, reentry health programs that address the lethal early post-re- lease window, and robust transpar- ency requirements for deaths in custody. It also requires integrating incarceration rates into pub- lic-health surveillance, recogniz- ing them as social determinants of health income, and addressing legal sysin shaping life expectancy, efforts to reduce premature mortality among Black Americans will intersection lic-health ities of the clear that among Black a tragedy outcome of ity. When a justice system to produce avoidable death through incarceration, policing, and inadequate oversight, it undermines the foundational promise of health security in old age. Ensuring that Black Americans live long enough to benefit from Medicare requires more than health-care reform; it requires confronting the justice system as a determinant of life itself. That confrontation must take the form of structural change: independent federal oversight of police departments, meaningful decarceration initiatives for people with serious health needs, mandatory reporting of deaths in custody, and reentry systems that provide immediate access to healthcare during the most dangerous weeks after release. Without these reforms, premature death will not remain an irregularity but an expected byproduct of the system we have chosen to maintain.

THE COST JUSTICE OF

AISHI KAPOOR / POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 2027

The promise of equal justice under law, rooted in the Constitution and reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection, is a foundational principle of the United States — but access to that justice remains deeply unequal. Even though legal rights are formally granted, their enforcement often depends on factors such as access to professional representation, education, and income. In reality, the American legal system operates more like a tiered marketplace, where meaningful participation — and the likelihood of favorable outcomes — is closely tied to one’s ability to afford representation, rather than functioning as a universal safety net. This illustrates the paradox in American democracy: equal rights exist in theory, but their enforcement is frequently conditioned on access to counsel and financial resources.

Civil court proceedings reveal these inconsistencies most clearly, particularly in the stark divide between criminal

and civil legal protections within the legal system. Unlike criminal cases, where individuals have a constitutional right to counsel, civil cases do not guarantee legal representation, protection against self-incrimination, or access to appointed experts and procedural safeguards. Although the justice system often neglects them, civil cases such as eviction hearings, custody battles, benefits determinations, and record-sealing petitions can significantly affect a person's economic and social stability. Absent personally acquired legal counsel, individuals are expected to represent themselves. Although some receive limited assistance through legal aid organizations, law school clinics, or unbundled legal services, they are chronically underfunded, unevenly distributed, and inaccessible to those who need them most. As a result, partial or short-term assistance often substitutes for full representation in proceedings with long-term consequences.

THE CIVIL JUSTICE GAP

The civil justice gap refers to the significant imbalance between the legal needs of low-income

Americans and the resources available to meet those needs. Research consistently demonstrates that civil legal needs are not satisfied, not because claims are without merit but because legal aid organizations are overextended and underfunded. Courts often treat self-representation as a workable substitute, framing it as a matter of efficiency or individual accountability.

Yet, legal systems are not neutral environments. Court procedures involve technical rules, strict deadlines, and legal jargon that presume professional training. It is unreasonable to expect people without legal knowledge to navigate these systems; it institutionalizes inequality while preserving the appearance of due process. The complexity of the law functions as a gatekeeping mechanism, disadvantaging those without resources while privileging those fortunate enough to possess them.

These barriers disproportionately affect populations already experiencing structural disadvantage. Veterans, immigrants, individuals with low incomes, and those with criminal records frequently encounter legal proceedings that offer minimal support.

For these groups, legal challenges rarely exist in isolation. Instead, they intersect with broader

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forms of instability, including housing insecurity, limited employment opportunities, and unequal access to health care.

Procedural obstacles can derail the efforts of immigrants navigating administrative law, veterans seeking benefits, or individuals attempting to seal records. When legal institutions fail to account for these compounding vulnerabilities, they do more than withhold support — they actively reproduce social marginalization. In this way, the legal system becomes yet another site where inequality is reinforced rather than remedied.

Access to Justice as a Democratic Issue

Inequitable access to due process has far-reaching consequences that extend well beyond isolated court cases or personal conflicts. As a visible manifestation of the rule of law, courts often represent the most direct and palpable interaction between citizens and the state. Public trust in the legal system begins to decline when these institutions seem unapproachable, overly complicated, or primarily punitive, particularly for those with limited financial or social resources. In addition to failing the impoverished, marginalized, and unrepresented, a justice system that consistently disadvantages them also compromises the system's legitimacy as a democratic institution.

Democracy requires more than the formal recognition of rights enshrined in constitutions or statutes. It is contingent upon citizens' ability to effectively and equally exercise those rights. Justice is perceived as transactional rather than guaranteed when access to it is dependent on financial resources, legal expertise, or expert counsel. Under such circumstances, rulings increasingly favor socioeconomic status rather than the merits of a case, meaning

political equality loses much of its substantive significance. This discrepancy signals to the public that the legal system’s neutrality is aspirational rather than operational, weakening its legitimacy as an impartial democratic institution.

This sense of exclusion fosters legal alienation, in which individuals come to view the legal system as distant, adversarial, or irrelevant — a perception that often spills over into broader political disengagement, increasing mistrust in public institutions and weakening

As long as access to justice remains contingent on wealth, the promise of equal protection under the law will remain largely rhetorical. “ “

civic engagement. Democratic norms deteriorate, and people lose faith in government when they no longer believe the state can or will adequately defend their rights. When legitimacy erodes, compliance with the law becomes fragile, civic participation declines, and democratic institutions lose their ability to function as credible arbiters of social Therefore, guaranteeing equal access to justice under the law is

essential to maintaining democratic legitimacy and public trust, not merely a question of legal efficiency or procedural fairness.

RETHINKING LEGAL ACCESS

Instead of relying solely on symbolic commitment, structural reform needs to address the access-to-justice crisis in civil cases, where legal representation is not guaranteed. Practical steps toward a more equitable system include increasing legal aid funding, creating a civil right to counsel in high-stakes cases such as housing and family court, streamlining procedural requirements, and implementing automatic record-sealing policies for nonviolent offenses. These changes reflect political priorities rather than radical shifts.

The persistence of the civil justice gap is not inevitable. Instead, it is the result of deliberate policy choices that treat legal protection as a private service rather than a public good. As long as access to justice remains contingent on wealth, the promise of equal protection under the law will remain largely rhetorical.

A legal system that excludes many from justice cannot truly serve the people. Justice in the United States will remain a privilege instead of a right until access becomes a democratic obligation rather than a commercial good.

A COUNTRY FOR SALE: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF GREEK DEBT REPAYMENT

IRENA ZERVAS / INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND HISTORY 2026

Seventeen years ago, the 2008 Debt Crisis brought Greece to its knees, pushing unemployment above 27 percent and shrinking the economy by a quarter. With three relief packages totaling 289 billion euros from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Union (EU), the country faced a difficult road to recovery. Finally, Greece has begun to claw itself out. This year, Greece repaid 5.3 billion dollars of its debt six years ahead of schedule and is expected to save itself 1.6 billion dollars of interest by 2041. Additionally, it was one of just six European countries to end 2025 without a financial deficit.

However, while Greece’s debt payments are surpassing expectations, its people continue to feel the effects of a broken economy. The cost of living in major cities has skyrocketed, yet income has remained stagnant. Debt repayment is a positive development, yet it has exacerbated one of the Greek economy’s biggest weaknesses: state mismanagement of funds and a lack of industrial ownership.

The Tax Curse

Greece’s relationship with taxation has been notoriously tumultuous. Inefficient taxation and rampant tax evasion were two of the main factors that led to Greece’s debt crisis. From 2009 to 2024, the

Greek government lost about 81 billion euros in potential revenue from uncollected value-added taxes (VAT). Despite tax reform being a key component of its bailouts, 2024 was the first year in which tax evasion was addressed through the expansion of POS systems, auditing overhauls, and collection mechanism changes. These measures have been effective, with Greece’s VAT gap shrinking from 11 percent to 9 percent from 2023 to 2024, but have come far too late.

Taxation is not the only area of financial mismanagement within the Greek government. Costs of government initiatives and public works in Greece run higher than they otherwise would because corruption inflates them. For example, an EU audit in 2018 found that three newly built Greek highways cost taxpayers 1.2 billion dollars more than they should have. This remains true even though the minimum wage in Greece is significantly lower than the European average, lowering Greece’s cost of labor. Bribery in the public procurements sector runs rampant in Greece, leading to higher costs of government contracts.

Interestingly, Greece’s fragile financial state has not hindered politicians from taking bribes. In the midst of the 2010 debt crisis, transportation minister Tasos Mantelis received a three year suspension for receiving 230,000 euros in bribes from German automation company Siemens.

Widespread corruption means that the Greek government pays more for services, which restrains its fragile economy, and already-struggling Greeks are forced to watch as their taxes get squandered. A government that is diminishing its earning potential and mishandling the few funds it does have cannot expect economic prosperity.

The Great Sellout

To recover from its debt crisis, the Greek government decided to privatize large public entities. In doing so, these entities were sold to non-Greek companies. In 2016, two thirds of the stake of Piraeus, the largest port in Greece and one of the largest in Europe, was sold to Chinese shipping company Cosco. While the port has been modernized under Chinese leadership, this presents a larger issue.

Piraeus now prioritizes Chinese shipments and products, and consequently, Greece is dependent on China to maintain the commerce it hopes to oversee. Greece has little control over how the port is run, and even worse, takes in significantly less of the profits that the port makes. Foreign investment is usually a positive for struggling economies, but foreign ownership means reduced control over profits and a stifled potential for longterm growth.

This corruption is not limited to just infrastructure. The European Public Prosecutor’s (EPPO) office is currently investigating the Greek Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aids (OPEKEPE) for fraud and the misappropriation of 3.82 billion euros of agriculture subsidies from the EU. The EPPO alleges that individuals who misrepresented themselves as farmers obtained farming subsidies from the national reserve, backed by EU funding.

Piraeus is not the only Greek entity sold off to a foreign conglomerate. 14 of the majority shares of Greece’s airports, including its two largest in Athens and Thessaloniki, were sold to German company Fraport in 2015. While Fraport agreed to improve airport infrastructure, like the case of Piraeus, this comes at a cost. Payment for the Greek airport system was 1.23 billion dollars for 40 years of ownership, but it is only expected to make the Greek state 8 billion dollars over these 40 years.

Additionally, the already financially burdened Greek government has been expected to pick up the costs of any contractual penalties of Fraport’s efforts to expand and improve the airport. This meant pay compensation for termination of leases and employment contracts, compensation for workplace accidents, and compensation for contract extension fees when projects were delayed.

Large profits that had the potential to be invested back into the Greek economy are flowing outside the country. For a country

that has historically lacked export power, ownership of entities that produce large profits is especially important.

Privatization and foreign investment are not inherently wrong, especially when they contribute to infrastructure improvement. However, the extent to which Greece has relied on foreign investment to dig itself out of crisis has set it up for long-term difficulties. State ownership of large entities means that the state sees direct profits from them.

The Tourism Trap

In an attempt to create industry post-debt crisis, the Greek government leaned into tourism, simplifying its visa process, upgrading hotels throughout the country, and advertising its islands more than it ever had. These were successful measures, and the annual tourist rate per year in Greece grew from about 15 million to about 41 million. Tourism now makes up for 25 percent of its GDP, a full nine percentage points higher than 2009. However, while tourism undoubtedly created jobs for Greeks in a time of crisis, they were seasonal and low paying. The jobs that tourism has created do not outweigh its downsides for average Greeks.

In 2013, Greece introduced the Golden Visa. This granted a five year residency permit to anyone who spent over 250,000 euros on property. While this program has brought over 5.5 billion euros into the Greek economy, it also has had detrimental consequences. Instead of living in the properties that they had purchased, foreign investors have repurposed them into rentals, meaning the rental income flows outside the country.

As tourism grew, so did the amount of homes that began to turn into short-term rentals, namely Airbnbs. Landlords quickly realized that they could make larger profits from turning their properties into short-term rentals than they could renting them to Greek residents. As houses have been taken out of circulation to become Airbnbs, supply for long-term rentals has

drained, raising their costs. The cost of buying a home has also steeply increased, as foreign investors have become willing to pay more than any average Greek ever could.

This problem has become especially bad in Athens, where many of the apartments in the city center sit vacant for most of the year as lifelong residents are forced to move farther and farther away from the homes that have been in their families for generations. Nearly one in three Greeks pay over 40 percent of their incomes towards rent. This number will continue to grow as income remains lower than it was before the crisis, all while housing costs continue to rise. Home ownership has declined by twelve percent, as the cost of owning a home has become too high for average Greeks.

Amidst this chaos, the Greek government has taken measures to reverse the damage. In 2024, it prohibited new Golden Visa applicants from using their properties as vacation rentals unless they spent 500,000 euros or more on the property and introduced initiatives to build middle-income housing on abandoned military bases in cities Athens, Thessaloniki, and Patras. This is certainly a start, but much of the damage has already been done. The Greek housing market has already been sold off, and cannot simply be bought back.

The Path Forward

Debt repayment has come at the cost of an affordable country for Greeks. While it might seem as though foreign incursion was necessary to dig the country out of debt, this is a misconception. The Greek government has put elite investors over average people repeatedly, and mismanaged the few funds it does have. While ineffective taxation is what caused Greece’s debt in the first place, adequately managing corruption might have meant that Greek entities did not have to be sold to the extent that they were.

Seeing such a grim future for their country has led to the mass exodus of educated, young Greeks leaving the country. Additionally, Greece faces a rapidly aging population and fertility rate, further suppressing Greece’s

taken initiatives to prevent these issues, such as subsidies for educated people to move to Greece or tax incentives for families with children, a permanent solution cannot be in effect until young Greeks feel that they have the earning potential to survive the cost of living.

This, however, cannot happen until Greeks have at least some ownership of their country. Greece needs to impose stricter regulations on foreign-owned entities operating within its borders. This means renegotiating existing contracts where possible to ensure a larger share of profits remain in Greece, continuing to implement windfall taxes on extraordinary profits from privatized assets, and requiring foreign operators to reinvest a percentage of earnings into Greek businesses and infrastructure.

The Greek government must also implement aggressive caps on short-term rentals, such as limiting each property owner to a set number of Airbnb listings and requiring primary Greek residency for owners. Athens and other major cities should also adopt rent control measures tied to local median incomes and continue to expand social housing programs.

None of these solutions matter without addressing corruption head-on. Greece needs an independent anti-corruption agency with real enforcement power. Transparency in public procurement must become mandatory with all contracts and bids publicly accessible online. Whistleblower protections should be strengthened, and convicted officials should face serious penalties that actually deter future misconduct.

Only when Greeks trust that their taxes are being used effectively will the social contract necessary for economic recovery be restored.

The path forward requires Greece to prioritize its people over its creditors for the first time in over a decade. Debt repayment means nothing if it comes at the cost of a country that Greeks can no longer afford to live in.

INCREASED YOUTH PARTICIPATION IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE

WAY TO CHALLENGE PROJECT 2025

JENNIFER YU / POLITICAL SCIENCE 2029

Young Americans are turning out to vote in unprecedented numbers, driven by an urgent need to defend the democratic ideals to which this nation was founded. Since President Donald Trump began his second term in 2025, his administration has pursued radical conservative policies championed by the Heritage Foundation in Project 2025. In targeting issues like immigration and social equality, Project 2025 leads reckless reforms at the expense of citizens’ rights. Motivated by the threat of these radical changes, increased youth participation has emerged as one of the most effective means of challenging the Project 2025 agenda. Sustaining these levels of engagement will be essential to protecting the stability of our democracy.

driving force in national Get Out The Vote (GOTV) campaigns that motivate increased civic participation among their peers.

figures have since grown to 20% and now 30% in the 2021 and 2025 election cycles. This increase indicates the success of a large movement to

“ “ “

Where Young Voters Are Recognizing Their Responsibility

Specifically, recent democratic victories fueled by young voters offer a newfound sense of optimism in the type of political influence young people will have in critical elections moving forward.

Despite historically low youth participation in the United States, the results of more recent election cycles suggest a positive change amongst the young electorate. Specifically, recent democratic victories fueled by young voters offer a newfound sense of optimism in the type of political influence young people will have in critical elections moving forward. Today, college-aged voters are a central

Similarly, education programs led by students such as New Voters are at the helm a greater movement putting young people at the precipice of the voting population.

As democratic candidates seek to inspire a revitalized “Blue Wave” in American politics, their victories can be attributed to a rise in youth participation. While states like New York saw only 8% of voters between the ages of 18-34 cast their ballots in 2013, those

mobilize young voters across the country.

The increase in youth participation that we observe today reflects a direct opposition to the hostile policies outlined by Project 2025. Youth polls continue to demonstrate young voters’ strong stance on issues of reproductive justice, DEI, and sustainability policies, which are all under direct attack by Project 2025’s agenda.

As a result, young voters feel a responsibility to use their voting power as a means of motivating change in their government. For example, as the Mandate for Leadership seeks to “ban the process of prescribing abortion drugs via Telehealth” young voters have led momentous efforts to protest these policies while providing practical assistance to women adversely affected by these restrictions. Together, these efforts reveal the broader willingness of young voters to become more involved in the civic process as a means of challenging and offsetting the impact of Project 2025.

Where Youth Voters Hold a Particular Advantage

access to information and growing ability to mobilize in the online space. Digital connectivity has fundamentally transformed the landscape of civic engagement. By broadening political discourse and increasing access to information, today’s youth have the ability to become the most well-informed and easily-connected civic community in American history. Through organized collective action,

this, it becomes critical that the young voters recognize their particular responsibility to respond to the threats that Project 2025 proposes.

Where youth movements thrive, there can be found hope for positive change and evidence of the genius built into our democratic system. The future of American government is as bright as the people who realize their political power. As a new generation of political agents enters the electorate, the exciting prospect of a renewed era of strengthened political participation offers optimism. Power in the United States will forever belong to the People—not Project 2025.

As a new generation of political agents enters the electorate, the exciting prospect of a renewed era of strengthened political participation offers optimism. Power in the United States will forever belong to the People — not Project 2025.

“

young Americans have the ability to become the most capable generation in modern history to challenge such threats to democracy. They must continue to recognize this power and use it as an effective means of resisting the policies of Project 2025.

Where Young People Lead, Democracy will Thrive

Today, young people are in the particular position to lead the fight against Project 2025 giving their unprecedented

American history serves as a testament to the resilience of this country’s people, especially in the face of Project 2025. Still, it requires a heightened level of civic awareness, participation, and a renewed belief in the vision for America set forth by our Founding Fathers. To

IUNITED STATES POLICY IN VENEZUELA:

REGIME CHANGE, RESOURCES, OR POLITICAL POWER?

n recent months, United States President Donald Trump has intensified American focus on Venezuela. In early September, a US Special Operations aircraft attacked a small speedboat in the Caribbean, promptly exploding the boat, its cargo, and the eleven individuals onboard. Justification for the strike was tied to the boat’s alleged association with the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua Cartel. After this unprecedented attack, aggression has only continued, with the United States military enacting twenty two strikes on boats accused of drug trafficking that have killed eighty seven civilians in total from the first strike in September to December 13, 2025.

ALEXANDRA VARGO / INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND ECONOMICS 2029

to propagate American democratic ideals abroad, extend US access to Venezuela’s immense mineral and oil wealth, and expand the political power of President Trump in the domestic sphere. Consequently, US strategic objectives rest on a combination of these ideological, economic, and political factors.

American military forces have additionally begun seizing tankers in the Caribbean transporting oil for Petróleos de Venezuela, the state-owned oil company of Venezuela. These seizures are tied to a warrant issued on the basis of the ships’ previous actions smuggling Iranian oil through an underground black market ring of petroleum vessels, an issue ongoing since 2023.

The US has historically fostered a sour relationship with the nation of Venezuela, mostly as the result of fundamental ideological differences between the countries’ leaders. After the election of former President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela saw a significant consolidation of power in the executive as well as the nationalization of important industries, such as petroleum, through the 1990s and 2000s.

National Assembly elections. In 2020, the United States government brought criminal narco-terrorism charges against Maduro due to his alleged involvement with Venezuelan drug cartels. In August of 2025, the reward for Maduro’s arrest was increased to 50 million dollars. These actions have culminated in his arrest and upcoming trial.

Ultimately, on January 3, 2026, the tensions created by American actions in Venezuela culminated in a strike operation successfully executed by the US Army’s Delta Force and CIA operatives to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and bring him to trial in New York. Maduro pleaded not guilty to drug, weapons, and narco-terrorism charges.

President Maduro, Chavez’s direct successor, has accelerated these patterns of authoritarian centralization with the suppression of democratic elections and violation of human rights, leading Hill contributor Krystal Kauffman to define him as “the perfect villain” on the international stage. While the legitimacy of Maduro’s extradition has complicated views on Trump’s stance, the administration’s public opposition to Maduro still yields domestic and international political clout by resonating with anti-authoritarian groups worldwide.

As US activity in Venezuela continues, the question of intent abroad remains. The Trump administration’s intervention in Venezuela provides the United States with opportunities

Initially, much of the rhetoric surrounding the US boat attacks aligned with such emphasis on American democratic ideals and the opposition to Venezuelan drug cartels. However, US actions have expanded beyond Maduro and his alleged ties to the drug trade, and grown into militant accumulation around and against the Venezuelan state. In addition to the boat strikes, Trump has mobilized almost 15 percent of the US Navy around Venezuela to posture for greater US military involvement within the nation. Two American fighter jets were also spotted tracking the Venezuelan city of Maracaibo and circling in the Gulf of Venezuela.

Perpetuating this anti-authoritarian narrative, the Trump administration has leveled numerous personal attacks against Maduro. In 2017, the Trump administration froze Maduro’s assets and barred trade with him in response to nationwide protests and alleged election fraud over emergency

Consequently, international responses to US pressure have been mixed. While some nations, such as Ecuador and Trinidad and Tobago, have publicly supported the US’s actions, the strikes and seizures have experienced condemnation from international actors like Russia and China, and mixed, if not cautious, responses from the European Union and United Nations. The Trump administration’s actions have also come under international legal scrutiny for piracy, war crimes, and sovereignty violations. As such, the ideological

under scrutiny

posturing of intervention for the sake of removing a dictatorial regime is weak.

American intervention also provides a potential economic benefit. Venezuela is famous for its vast oil and gas wealth, with the nation having the largest proven oil reserves of any state on earth. Oil export revenues account for a majority of Venezuelan state profits, and Venezuela additionally provides oil to adversaries of the US state, including Cuba and China. By hindering Venezuelan oil production–through the militant disruption of Venezuelan supply chains currently experienced via US threats on Venezuelan airspace and troop deployment in the Carribean–the US could enhance the power of its own oil resources, as well as the influence of US oil corporations, namely Chevron, in Venezuela. Trump has repeatedly mentioned oil as an American interest in post-Maduro Venezuela.

Further, the existence of Chevron’s operations in Venezuela imply a possible peaceful expansion of US access to Venezuelan resources, with the full lifting of US restrictions on Chevron’s actions in Venezuela being previously welcomed both by the corporation and by Maduro’s administration before his removal, decreasing the influence of economic factors on American actions.

Furthermore, Venezuela is home to a host of other essential mineral resources, ranking in the top fifteen international states for estimated reserves of iron, gold, nickel, and bauxite, with similarly high capacities of copper and coltan. Enhanced access to these materials could serve as another reason for American intervention in Venezuela. The US has recently illustrated its interests in natural resource extraction through brokered agreements with Ukraine, and may be looking to expand its investment in such industries within Latin America. Access to these resources, along with Venezuelan oil, could provide a significant reason for US interest in Venezuelan affairs.

Nevertheless, Venezuelan oil and mineral resources suffer from a lack of updated infrastructure for extraction, a setback which has resulted in a decrease in oil production by the nation. Just to access the state’s oil wealth, analysts estimate the state would have to dedicate almost 58 billion dollars to development–a high price to encourage such US aggression, considering the extent of preexisting domestic US oil production. These reasons, plus the risks of investing in the unstable nation, have led Exxon’s chief executive Darren Woods to label the nation “uninvestable.”

A final explanation for US policy actions comes from President Trump’s consolidation of political power at home. In a number of decisive moves, Trump has maximized his use of presidential powers to enhance his role as head of the nation. In his second term, these actions include his extensive use of executive orders, national emergencies, and the national guard. While the use of these powers by past presidents is not uncommon, the extent and prevalence of their use, especially within the first hundred days of Trump’s second term, has been extraordinary–with Trump issuing more executive orders and declaring more national emergencies than any other US president during the same period of time.

rejected.

Venezuela could similarly provide an arena for Trump to expand his political powers beyond congressional oversight. Under the 2015 National Emergencies Act, the US has maintained a “national emergency with respect to Venezuela” that allots over 120 presidential specific statutory powers beyond the supervision of Congress. Coupled with Trump’s designation of the Tren de Aragua cartel as a foreign terrorist organisation, expansion of the definition of the Venezuelan government, and the authorization of military force against Latin American drug cartels, Trump has greatly expanded presidential authority to conduct attacks and seizures against Venezuela. Venezuela could serve as a successful arena for Trump’s domestic political conquests.

With respect to the oil tanker, the Trump administration similarly has offered no concrete explanation of legality of the seizure, or of the ship, oil, or crew’s final destination, with Trump simply commenting “It was seized for a very good reason.” A war powers resolution, introduced in the Senate to place limits on Trump’s power in Venezuela following the seizure of Maduro, has been defeated 51-50. As a result, American initiatives in Venezuela continuously fuel Trump’s domestic push for consolidated political power.

Utilizing the label “narco-terrorism,” Trump’sactionshavegonelargelyunquestioned by Congress, with the administration providing limited legal justification for the boat strikes. Both Congressional resolutions to limit Trump’s power on the subject have been

Considering the inherent complexity of international conflicts, no single explanation accounts for the United States’ aggressive actions against Venezuela. Each factor–from Maduro’s authoritarian, internationally unpopular regime, to the vast resource wealth held within Venezuela, to Trump’s attempts to enhance domestic presidential powers–offer a partial explanation of the escalating conflict, while mobilizing supporters and opponents to the administration’s actions from each respective lens. With the boat strikes ongoing, troops still deployed, and the future of the Venezuelan government and people at dire risk, it remains imperative to understand the origin and fuel of US hostilities as to prevent further increasingly consequential escalation for the two nations within their wider region.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

CYBERSECURITY BEYOND VOLUNTARISM

Critical infrastructure refers to assets, systems, and networks essential for maintaining everyday life, including electrical grids, communication networks, water treatment facilities, healthcare systems, and transportation networks. These systems remain dangerously unprotected in the United States because of a fragmented regulatory landscape. When adversaries can damage, disable, or steal sensitive information from these decentralized systems, they gain immense power and directly affect real lives. To address these vulnerabilities, Congress should enact standardized federal legislation that transforms voluntary cybersecurity guidelines into enforceable requirements, mandates regular security testing, and establishes comprehensive workforce training programs across all critical infrastructure sectors.

The consequences of cyberattacks extend far beyond financial losses, as they threaten public safety and national security. In 2024, approximately 70% of all cyberattacks targeted critical infrastructure sectors. When Colonial Pipeline suffered a ransomware attack in 2021, it forced the shutdown of 5,500 miles of pipeline that supplies 45% of the East Coast's fuel. The attack caused panic buying, price surges, flight cancellations, and delays in transporting essential medical supplies. Countless incidents like this demonstrate the devastating ripple effects that one vulnerability can have. Attacks targeting medical services pose an even more direct danger to human life. In 2024, 72% of U.S. healthcare organizations experienced a cyberattack

LIAM DOWD / BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION AND COMPUTER SCIENCE 2028

that impacted patient care. Ransomware attacks against hospitals, which have increased by 300% since 2015, force IT systems offline and prevent access to electronic health records and medication systems. In a study of hospitalized Medicare patients between 2016 and 2021, mortality rates increased by approximately 33% during an attack, resulting in 42-67 deaths. Until these critical systems are properly secured, cyberattacks will continue to injure and kill.

Water infrastructure faces similar threats. In February 2021, hackers infiltrated a Florida water treatment facility and attempted to increase sodium hydroxide levels from 100 parts per million to 11,100 parts per million, which would have poisoned the drinking water supply and caused severe harm to residents if consumed. These incidents demonstrate that critical infrastructure cyberattacks are not merely technical problems but direct threats to human life and public safety.

While infrastructure remains vulnerable to targeted attacks, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) claims over 85% are preventable. Many flaws stem from simple configuration issues, such as the use of outdated components, with 95% of websites running outdated software. Despite abundant best-practice guidelines from agencies like CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the overlap among guidelines and lack of enforceable standards leave adoption inconsistent and incomplete across sectors. Understanding how this regulatory fragmentation developed reveals why

voluntary compliance has failed and what must change.

Policy Background

The legal framework governing critical infrastructure cybersecurity suffers from contradictory mandates and inconsistent enforcement mechanisms across sectors. Enforceable standards would establish clear, legally binding requirements with consequences for non-compliance, replacing the current patchwork of voluntary guidelines that organizations can ignore without penalty. Such standards would mandate specific security practices, require regular audits, and impose financial penalties or operational restrictions for violations, ensuring consistent protection across all critical infrastructure regardless of sector or organizational size.

Policymakers initially preferred voluntary frameworks to preserve industry flexibility, avoid stifling innovation with prescriptive rules, and respect the boundary between federal authority and private-sector decision-making. While these concerns have merit, they assume that market forces incentivize investments in cybersecurity. However, when cyberattacks can disable electric grids affecting millions or compromise healthcare systems endangering lives, the consequences extend far beyond individual organizations to threaten national security and public safety, creating outcomes too severe to leave unregulated.

Currently, cybersecurity rules are scattered across different agencies and industries with no unified standard. For

example, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation publishes cybersecurity rules that only apply to large electric providers, leaving smaller energy companies unregulated. This means a hacker could target a smaller utility service that falls outside these rules, potentially disrupting power for thousands of customers.

However, Congress has attempted to address coordination gaps with CISA. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018 established the agency to serve as the national coordinator for defending American technology. Following the agency's guidance is largely voluntary for non-federal entities, making requirements unenforceable for most private companies and state agencies. The voluntary nature of CISA's framework means that even organizations recognizing the value of these standards face no consequences for choosing not to implement them, particularly when cybersecurity investments compete with other business priorities.

Following the catastrophic Colonial Pipeline hack in 2021, Congress enacted the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022, which requires that cybersecurity incidents and ransomware payments be reported to CISA so the agency can respond promptly. In addition, Congress recently cut CISA's funding by $135 million for the next fiscal year, further undermining its ability to face current threats while increasing its responsibilities. Furthermore, various agencies still follow their own internal guidance rather than the CISA’s, creating conflicts between requirements and inconsistency in

standards across different sectors.

This fragmentation has consequences on productivity. A 2020 Government Accountability Office (GAO) testimony found that four federal agencies established conflicting cybersecurity requirements for states on password policies. Between 49% and 79% of these requirements contained conflicting parameters, and more than half of the state government employees surveyed reported that reconciling these differences led to a large increase in the time required to comply. When the GAO asked 14 agencies about information sharing on cybersecurity challenges, all responded that

they had not fully resolved this problem. Decentralized requirements lead to wasteful spending when streamlined regulations would allow for a clear-cut pathway to increased security and information sharing.

Understanding the threats facing American infrastructure does not require technical expertise. The core problem is simple: foreign governments and criminal groups are actively trying to breach the computer systems that run our power plants, hospitals, and water treatment facilities, and too often, they succeed. Some argue that no regulation can fully protect against determined foreign government hackers and that mandating specific security practices may become outdated as attack methods evolve. While sophisticated attackers will always discover new vulnerabilities, research shows that most successful breaches exploit well-known, preventable flaws rather than novel techniques. Addressing these weaknesses through enforceable standards would eliminate the readily exploitable vulnerabilities that currently enable both sophisticated and

In 2024, approximately 70% of all cyberattacks targeted critical infrastructure sectors. “ “

unsophisticated attackers to compromise critical systems.

Every day there’s a new report of a company, government agency, or major organization suffering from a cyberattack, each a damaging and costly crisis. A data breach in the United States costs $9.36 million on average, and cyberattacks cost the global economy $10.5 trillion per year. Making matters worse, organizations take an average of 258 days to even realize they have been hacked, giving attackers months to steal data or cause damage before anyone notices. These extended detection periods increase the operational and financial damage that organizations suffer.

These implementation measures are urgent given that foreign governments have systematically investigated and exploited weaknesses in American critical infrastructure. Testifying before Congress, FBI Director Christopher Wray warned that China's hackers are positioning themselves inside American infrastructure systems, waiting for the right moment to cause harm to American citizens. Chinese government-backed hackers have already assessed our electrical grid for weaknesses and breached the Department of the Treasury. Russian hackers have demonstrated similar capabilities, interfering in the 2016 presidential election and compromising thousands of organizations through the 2020 SolarWinds attack. Collectively, America faces skilled, well-funded adversaries whose full potential for disruption has not yet been realized.

The biggest security weakness in any organization is not computers; it is its people. According to Yale, deception-based attacks account for 98% of successful cyberattacks, highlighting the risk that trickery poses to unsuspecting employees. These attacks typically involve fake emails designed to lure employees into clicking on malicious links or revealing passwords. Last year, 94% of businesses reported receiving these deceptive emails, with the majority feeling negative effects. Around 75% of these attacks began with a deceptive email, and about 2.7% of employees unknowingly fell for them. That may sound small, but with over 1 million such attacks in just the last quarter of last year, an increase of 100,000 from the previous quarter, even a small success rate translates to thousands of breaches.

The rise of artificial intelligence has made these deceptive emails even more convincing, increasing the likelihood that employees unknowingly hand over sensitive information or compromise system security. This demonstrates that cybersecurity is not just about building better computer defenses. It requires training people to recognize and avoid threats, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive plan that addresses both system design and workplace training.

Proposal

To address inconsistencies across industries and enhance the protection of critical infrastructure vital to national security, Congress should enact new standardized federal legislation with four core components.

Currently, many organizations treat cybersecurity as an afterthought, only adding protections after a system is already built or, in some cases, neglecting them entirely. Congress should require critical infrastructure operators to consider security from the very beginning of any project, identifying potential weaknesses during design rather than trying to patch them later.

Organizations should be required to hire independent experts to test their defenses at least once per year by attempting to break in, just as a real attacker would. Currently, 18% of companies do not conduct these penetration tests, leaving vulnerabilities undiscovered until attackers find them first. Following a security audit, results would require executive acknowledgement and a documented plan to address identified weaknesses.

The federal government should turn CISA's cybersecurity recommendations from voluntary suggestions into legal requirements, standardizing compliance across the public and private sectors. This would establish a clear set of rules for all critical infrastructure, replacing the current patchwork system where different industries follow different standards, or none at all. Additionally, it would expand resource sharing for collective national defense and improve programs such as

the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative and the Joint Ransomware Task Force. Organizations must train all employees to recognize and avoid cyberattacks. According to the World Economic Forum, only 14% of organizations feel confident that their staff can handle cybersecurity threats. Many academic institutions do not require Computer Science students to take cybersecurity classes before graduation, and CISA argues that software developers should be considered part of the cybersecurity defense force. Additionally, most Americans lack basic knowledge of how to spot fake emails or understand online security. Training programs would require quarterly refresher courses to cover emerging threats, simulated deceptive email exercises with individualized feedback, and role-specific modules to address unique security responsibilities across different organizational levels.

National

Implementation and Feasibility

The practical implementation is demonstrably feasible given existing technical capacity and regulatory infrastructure. The proposed standards leverage proven frameworks already freely available through governmental and private sources, and the cybersecurity services industry’s 14.4% compound annual growth rate demonstrates capacity to support widespread testing requirements. Additionally, 78% of large operators already implementing robust programs agree that cybersecurity and privacy regulations are effective in reducing risk.

Implementation would occur in phases, targeting energy, healthcare, and financial services first before extending to all critical infrastructure over three years, with financial penalties and operational

restrictions scaled to organizational size. While mandatory standards raise concerns about economic burden, compliance costs are modest compared to the risks of inaction: security testing ranges from $5,000 to $50,000 annually and employee training costs $10-$72 per person per year; expenses that pale in comparison to the average $4.44 million data breach cost.

The voluntary approach to critical infrastructure cybersecurity has failed. Foreign adversaries continue to exploit the fragmented regulatory landscape, and preventable attacks keep happening because organizations face no consequences for ignoring best practices.

Congress must establish mandatory federal cybersecurity standards that apply across all critical infrastructure sectors. This means codifying CISA guidance into enforceable law, requiring regular independent security testing, mandating secureby-design development practices, and ensuring comprehensive workforce training. These measures would replace the current patchwork system with clear, consistent requirements and real accountability for non-compliance. The frameworks already exist, the industry capacity is there, and the cost of action is far less than the cost of continued inaction.

WHEN ICE MELTS FASTER THAN LAW:

SVALBARD AND THE ARCTIC’S QUIET SHIFT

resources once inaccessible, from shipping lanes to energy reserves. As always, there are great powers ready to secure advantage where governance lags behind opportunity.

For decades, Arctic governance rested on the premise that cooperation could be insulated from great power rivalry. This assumption shaped institutions, treaties, and the norms that held the region together. But assumptions are not enforcement mechanisms. When resources emerge faster than rules adapt, borderlands

become spaces where legal rights meet strategic presence— and where the gap between the two quietly grows wide.

This is not a story of

imminent conflict or treaty violation. It is a story of governance gaps that become visible in borderlands before they appear elsewhere, and of what happens when legal frameworks meet strategic realities they were never designed to manage. ARCTIC COOPERATION

the Cold War, but it

originated within the USSR. In his speech at Murmansk in 1987, USSR Premier Mikhail Gorbachev stated: “The Soviet Union is in favour of a radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region. Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. Let the North Pole be a pole of peace.”

This vision took root in the 1990s when Arctic states sought frameworks for environmental protection and resource management

that could operate independently from broader security questions. The premise was not that rivalry would disappear, but that it could be mitigated through institutional restraint and issue-specific cooperation. This philosophy was institutionalized through the establishment of

legal authority.

For two decades, this model held. By separating functional cooperation from security concerns, the Council created space for collaboration on environmental causes, scientific research, and emergency response. Flexibility was an asset; consensus allowed participation without requiring alignment on resource or sovereignty issues.

But this framework rested on the assumption that states would continue to value cooperation over positioning.

to one power alone. Since the 17th century, the archipelago has been a space of competing claims and shared resource extraction—whalers from multiple nations working its waters, mining companies from different states operating mines side by side. When the Svalbard Treaty was signed in 1920, it formalized this pattern. Norway gained legal sovereignty,

but only on the condition that all signatory states of the treaty were guaranteed “liberty of access” to the land and its resources. The result wasn’t a resolution of competing claims, but their institutionalization—a legal basis for foreign nations to continue extracting Svalbard’s wealth.

Article I of the treaty grants Norway “full and absolute sovereignty” over Svalbard, but the treaty’s remaining provisions constrain how that sovereignty can be exercised. Article III guarantees all signatory states access to the land and right to economic operations “on a footing of absolute equality,” while Article VII mandates that Norway provide “complete equality”

instruments of opportunity.

In the Arctic, governance depends on norms rather than enforcement, allowing states to claim legal compliance while pursuing strategic advantage.

A system of restraint works when all actors accept its limits. When they don’t, norms become advantage.

periphoperates international and intergovernmental forum

facilitating cooperation in the Arctic since 1996. Notably, the Arctic Council was never created as a legally binding institution. It lacks treaty status, enforcement authority, and the capacity to adopt or influence binding regulations. Cooperation through the Council is intended to function through consensus, restraint, and shared goodwill, rather than

The Arctic is no longer a remote ery but a central stage for geopolitical competition. Svalbard, with its unusual legal structure and strategic position, reveals how that competition operates when treaty frameworks provide the rules of the game.

THE SVALBARD TREATY

Svalbard, located midway between Norway and the North Pole, has never truly belonged

regarding property and mineral rights.

Article IX prohibits Norway from permitting the establishment of “any naval base” or constructing “any fortification,” stipulating that the territories “may never be used for warlike purposes.”

Yet the treaty leaves critical terms undefined. What constitutes “absolute equality” when economic operations require Norwegian regulatory approval? What counts as “warlike purposes” when civilian infrastructure can serve dual functions? Norway

holds “full and absolute sovereignty,” but cannot limit foreign access, favor the interests of its own nationals, or militarize its own territory. Sovereignty becomes limited by treaty obligations defined clearly enough to govern, but vaguely enough to be interpreted in divergent and self-serving ways. Power on the archipelago is built by claiming rights the text neither explicitly grants nor clearly denies.

RUSSIA’S INTERPRETIVE POWER

Arctic operations today will define its geopolitics for decades to come. Russia understands this. Every action in Svalbard—from maintaining the Russian settlement of Barentsburg despite minimal economic returns, to contesting Norwegian satellite infrastructure through the treaty—is calculated positioning disguised as legal compliance. Russia does not challenge Norwegian sovereignty, but claims the rights guaranteed by the treaty. In doing so, it reveals how law designed for good-faith cooperation can evolve into a tool for competitive advantage.

building domestic narratives of Russian presence. The settlement serves a strategic function: continuous presence strengthens claims in a framework that lacks mechanisms to resolve disputes over interpretation.

When Norway attempts to regulate, Russia invokes the Svalbard Treaty’s equality provisions to contest Norwegian authority. In August 2025, on the treaty’s centennial, Russia accused Norway of “introduc[ing] new restrictions for Russia in performing economic and scientific activities in Svalbard”, framing environmental legislation as “incompatible” with Svalbard’s development and designed to limit Russian operations. Russia specifically contested permit requirements for scientific work and restrictions on movement as violations of Article III’s “equal liberty of access.” Russia also claimed that Western sanctions applied to Svalbard constitute a “discriminatory anti-Russia sanctions regime” that prevent full implementation of treaty rights. Russia has simultaneously accused Norway

using Longyearbyen civil airport, Norwegian naval visits, and SvalSat’s use by NATO allies as evidence of military presence disguised as civilian activity.

Russia frames this as Norway “building up its military presence” and “increasing its involvement into the orbit of NATO’s military political planning” in direct violation of the treaty’s demilitarization clause. Norway countered that such activities are “compatible with long-standing practice” and do not constitute “warlike purposes.” Both claims rest on interpretation. This exchange reveals the treaty’s core vulnerability. When critical terms lack definition, competing interpretations cannot be reconciled. Both invoke the treaty, neither can be authoritatively refuted. Ambiguity isn’t a bug in the system, it’s inherent in the system itself.

Russia positions itself as defending the treaty against Norwegian violations, claiming its presence will continue “developing and expanding in full compliance with the

Barentsburg makes this strategy visible. Russia’s state-owned mining company, Arktikugol, has operated the Barentsburg mining settlement since 1932, maintaining a permanent Russian population

IX’s prohibition on “warlike purposes.” In the same August 2025 statement, Russian officials cited Norwegian military aircraft

even as coal extraction has become economically marginal. State control is explicit: following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Barentsburg workers critical of the war were instructed by Arktikugol to stay silent. Patriotic displays in Barentsburg intensified in parallel:

1920 Treaty.” The selectivity is deliberate. The notion that a state currently waging an illegal war of conquest in Ukraine frames itself as the defender of treaty law in the Arctic would be absurd if it weren’t so calculated. Why resort to flagrant violations of international law when you can weaponize it instead?

Russia’s strategy can be

Svalbard

preventing

locations with high visibility, each serving dual purposes: antagonizing Norway while

summarized as bilateralization: portraying Svalbard disputes as matters between Norway and Russia under the treaty while preventing Norway from invoking NATO or multilateral bodies for support. This approach serves to frame, restrict, and ultimately erode Norway’s already limited ability to fully exercise sovereignty despite its official status. The treaty provides no

enforcement mechanism or third-party adjudication, meaning Russia doesn’t need to win any legal arguments—only assert them. Each contestation creates ambiguity where Norway seeks clarity, establishing leverage Norway cannot regulate without triggering accusations of discrimination. The actor willing to test boundaries holds the advantage in a framework that depends on mutual restraint but provides no recourse when restraint dissolves.

A NORWEGIAN DILEMMA

Norway faces a dilemma the treaty cannot resolve—and no good options. Push back, and Russia invokes discrimination. Stay silent, and presence continues to build precedent. Militarize, and Norway violates the very treaty it seeks to uphold. Norway holds sovereignty it cannot fully exercise, constrained by obligations it cannot unilaterally revise. The bind is legal, not political: the same treaty granting Norway authority limits how that authority can be applied.

Norway seeks legitimacy and allied support while Russia is comfortable presenting itself as revisionist. Norway wants to preserve the treaty system itself, Russia wants only to preserve access. As one actor needs the framework to maintain credibility and another simply uses it for advantage, the difference in stakes becomes the difference in power.

This bind reveals a challenge that extends beyond Norway. US and NATO Arctic strategy emphasizes deterrence and rules-based order, but Svalbard fits neither framework cleanly. You cannot deter actors claiming treaty compliance. You cannot enforce rules that are vague by design. Liberal order assumes law constrains behavior when norms are shared, that actors interpret in good faith, that restraint is mutual, that legal frameworks reflect underlying agreement about their purpose. Svalbard reveals what happens when that assumption fails. Treaties persist, institutions remain, but the trust that made ambiguity tolerable has dissolved. Rulesbased order has no answer to adversaries who follow rules without sharing their spirit, who invoke law as a tool rather than accepting it as a guardrail.

BEYOND SVALBARD

route, arguing that it lies within its territorial waters and requires permits for passage, while the US and others assert transit rights under international law. No mechanism adjudicates the dispute.

Instead, Russia and China reflect the pattern of presence as power observable in Svalbard. Through infrastructure investment and joint patrols, they collaborate to establish control through precedent while legal ambiguity persists. Extended continental shelf claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) create similar ambiguities in seabed boundaries. Subsea infrastructure, like cables and pipelines, occupy legal gray zones where strategic control and treaty rights intersect. In each case, legal clarity exists on paper while enforcement and interpretation remain contested. Borderlands reveal strain in governance systems before it becomes visible elsewhere.

WHEN TRUST THINS

Norway also interprets the treaty loosely. Military aircraft in civilian airports, satellite infrastructure serving NATO, justified through their own reading of Article IX. Yet there is a fundamental difference between treaty interpretations. It isn’t that Norway fully respects the treaty while Russia exploits it. Rather, Norway—as Svalbard’s legal sovereign—bears consequences for interpretation that Russia does not. method

This Arctic dynamic extends beyond Svalbard. As Arctic ice recedes, the Northern Sea Route (NSR)—which connects Europe to Asia through Russia’s northern coast—has become increasingly navigable, turning what was once a seasonal passage into a potential year-round

shipping infrastructure. Russia claims regulatory authority over the does

Svalbard remains peaceful. The treaty still governs. Cooperation still happens—in emergency response, in scientific research, in the logistics of coexistence. But stability now rests on assumptions no longer shared. Norway is unable to fully exercise its sovereignty. Russia maintains pressure framed as compliance. Both operate within a legal framework neither trusts the other to respect in good faith. The ice melts, the law persists, enforcement remains absent. Governance designed for restraint has no method to manage actors that claim compliance while abandoning core principles. Svalbard shows what order looks like when trust dissolves but treaties endure, and the gap between them quietly widens.