PERCEPTIONS OF DIGITAL LEAKAGE AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRIVACY PERCEPTIONS OF BYSTANDERS OF SMART IOT SECURITY CAMERAS AND THEIR USE IN SOCIETY
AIMS • Aim 1: To analyse and better understand the privacy perceptions of different users and non-users of smart IoT cameras in 2022
• Aim 2: To define potential areas for improvement in terms of bystander privacy in smart IoT cameras
• An investigative project to explore bystander privacy perceptions of smart camera deployments and use
• A mixed methods research approach involving two primary data collections:
OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT
•
A quantitative survey that measures privacy concern
•
A series of qualitative workshops that explore contextual privacy perceptions
• Capturing of data flows from two differing smart cameras, and brief analysis was performed. • Smart Cameras used: •
Amazon echo show 5
•
Yi cam yys.2016
OVERVIEW OF STUDY DESIGN
• Survey
• Workshops
• Camera data flow capture
WORKS COMPLETED • A review of relevant academic literature
• Ethically approved data collections
• Creation of data collection materials
• Analysis of collected data
• Recruitment of participants
SURVEY DATA COLLECTION • 59 participants in total
• 18 owned smart cameras and 41 did not • Overall results were evenly distributed from a low score of 56 to a high score of 126 • 15 participants put themselves forward for the workshop section
SURVEY DATA
WORKSHOP DATA COLLECTION • 5 workshops in total
• 8 participants all together • Mean average workshop time was 52 minutes • Workshop sessions were completed with single participants or two participants
• Workshops involved a scenario being described and then discussed with the participants ▪ Scenario 1: A neighbour living directly opposite you, e.g., the other side of the street, installs home security cameras that point onto the street and directly at your home.
▪ Scenario 2 - You arrange to meet up for a playdate with your children and a new acquaintance's children at their house, multiple smart cameras are installed in the house. ▪ Scenario 3 - When browsing a social media application like Facebook you see a video of you taken from an unknown person's home Surveillance camera?
WORKSHOP DATA – PRIMARY THEMES • Participants did not consider digital leakage when assessing potential negative security and privacy implications regarding smart camera use
Participant ID number
Participants did not consider digital leakage when assessing potential negative security and privacy implications regarding smart camera use.
Bystanders used similar methods to make contextual privacy assessments of smart camera deployments
Bystanders prefer active methods of contextual resolution
P1
•
•
•
P2
•
•
•
•
•
“They (neighbours opposite) could, I suppose technically be pointing their camera directly at us, but until you mentioned it, I've never really thought about it.” – Participant 4
• Bystanders used similar methods to make contextual privacy assessments of smart camera deployments "So if there's a camera pointed at your house and you know the person, or if you know they're just a family or something, then ok“ – Participant 3
• Bystanders prefer active methods of contextual resolution “It sort of highlights how people probably need some support on how to approach difficult situations like this. In this day and age, because if you had some strategies and how many support shows conversations, you might feel more comfortable” – Participant 7
P3 P4
•
•
P5
•
•
P6
•
•
•
P7
•
•
•
P8
•
SMART CAMERA DATA COLLECTION • Two smart cameras were tested: ▪ Amazon echo show 5 ▪ Yi cam YYS.2016
• Tests involved using a program named Aretha and a bash script of my own creation to capture and analyse data flows • Captures were ran for 5 hours • Destination domains and geographical information of destination servers were recorded
AMAZON ECHO SHOW 5 Data collection ran for
5 hours
Packets the device sent in the time
39393
IP addresses that had multiple packets directed at them
164
Individual IP addresses
3
Total IP addresses checked (excluding gateway)
166
Domains connected to
Amazon Technologies Inc. Amazon Data Services NoVa Amazon.com, Inc.
Google LLC Amazon Data Services Ireland Limited
YI CAM YYS.2016 Data collection ran for
5 hours
Packets the device sent in the time
5838
IP addresses that had multiple packets directed at them
8
Individual IP addresses (excluding gateway)
0
Total IP addresses checked (excluding gateway)
7
Domains connected to
Alibaba.com LLC Level 3 Parent, LLC (google)
Google LLC Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS • The study found from survey data that both those concerned and non-concerned about their privacy own smart cameras • The study found from workshop data that most participants did not consider the leakage of data, e.g. where the data may go / what may happen to it outside of 1st party owners • The study found from workshop data that participants use the owners, camera type / size and the potential for harm that the camera view imposes to assess level of privacy concern.
• Participants also showed that the line of ‘creepiness’ is drawn at the point of cameras invading their personal spaces or specifically targeting them • However, participants showed that in some circumstances / contexts they would not be too concerned about cameras that could see into some rooms of their houses