AESTHETIC EMOTION: THE PARADOX OF FICTION

ByMadeleine

The paradox of fiction is best expressed as three premises:

(P1) In order to experience a rational emotional response to something, one must believe that it exists

(P2) People have rational emotional responses to fictional things

(P3) People do not believe that fictional things exist

These are evidently contradictory, which has led to much debate in the philosophy of art. In this article, I will consider various responses to the paradox.

RESPONSE ONE: IRRATIONALITY THEORY:

Our first response is to reject (P2). Colin Radford took this view with his Irrationality Theory, which states that, although it is irrational to have an emotional response to fiction, it is still possible.

There are various problems with Radford’s theory.

1. Rationality is normative. That means that we should behave rationally. Therefore, if something is irrational, we should stop doing it.

2. If all emotional responses to fiction are absolutely irrational, then they are all equally irrational. But I’m sure you can think of examples of emotional responses to fiction which seem more rational than others – such as being sad rather than happy over Ophelia’s death.

3. We see fiction as offering moral or spiritual guidance for our lives, and lots of this guidance is transferred through emotional reactions. How can this be the case if the emotion itself is irrational?

RESPONSE TWO: ILLUSION THEORY:

Our second response is Illusion Theory, which rejects (P3). It states that when we engage in fiction, we forget that it’s unreal and so do indeed believe that the events and characters exist. This is obviously false. Although we reference a “suspension of disbelief”, this is not literal.

However, a weaker version of the Illusion Theory could be more viable. Jonathan Frome distinguishes between global and local appraisals. Local appraisals are lower-level observations about what things are, such as “that chair is red” or “that painting is round”. Global appraisals are higher-level observations, such as determining whether something is real or a representation. Therefore, we can argue that emotional responses to fiction are prompted by mere local appraisals.

This even has psychological backing. When you perform an action, your motor command neurons fire in a specific way. There is a type of neuron called a “mirror neuron” which will mimic this firing when you watch someone else perform the same action. Irvin and Johnson theorise that emotional responses to fiction are thereby manufactured in the brain.

RESPONSE THREE: QUASI-EMOTION THEORY:

Our third response is Kendall Walton’s QuasiEmotion Theory, which again rejects (P2). It states that we don’t really have emotional responses to fiction – we merely participate in the fiction by pretending to have these reactions. Instead, we have quasi-emotions, which give us the same physical and psychological responses, and we merely pretend that these are part of an emotional response.

Walton outlines three differences between quasi-fear and real fear:

1. Quasi-fear is compatible with emotions that real fear isn’t. We can enjoy quasifear but not real fear.

2. They have different behavioural consequences. When you experience quasifear of the actions of a movie character, you don’t actually call 999.

3. Quasi-fear doesn’t depend on existence beliefs. This means that we don’t actually have to believe that the object of our fear exists.

There are many objections to this, so I will discuss only the most pressing.

First, this theory goes against the evidence of our own experience. Quasi-emotions feel identical to real emotions.

Second, our reactions are involuntary: we can’t help but feel these quasi-emotions. Therefore, Walton’s idea that we willingly participate in them appears flawed.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the three differences paint a ludicrously simple view of emotions.

1. Quasi-emotions and real emotions are compatible with the same emotions. You can enjoy watching a scary film (quasi-fear) and you can also enjoy skydiving (real fear).

2. Although quasi-emotions and real emotions have different behavioural consequences, this is not necessarily due to the emotions in themselves. We could argue that our behaviour is more affected by our beliefs. For example, when you’re about to have an injection, you might feel scared, but you stay there because you know it’ll help you. Similarly, when you watch a horror film, you feel fear, but you don’t call 999 because you don’t think the events are actually occurring.

3. The only remaining difference is that quasi-fear doesn’t depend on existence beliefs. This isn’t enough – the very question here is whether we can experience emotions towards non-existing things!