Memorandum of Decision (12-2-2021) by NJHRC

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS The Honorable Michael J. Blee, P.J.Ch.

1201 Bacharach Boulevard Atlantic City, NJ 08401-4527 (609) 594-3386

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION Pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(f) TO

Frank L. Corrado, Esq. Barry, Corrado & Grassi, P.C. 2700 Pacific Avenue Wildwood, NJ 08260 On Behalf of Plaintiff

Brian M. Hak, Esq. 34 Mountain Boulevard, Building A P.O. Box 4922 Warren, NJ 070559 On Behalf of Defendant

South Jersey Against Aids, Inc. d/b/a South Jersey Aids Alliance, D.G., R.K., and F.J. v. City of Atlantic City

DOCKET NO.

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NATURE OF MOTION(S): Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause seeking preliminary injunctive relief. SUBMISSIONS BY PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT: 1. ON AUGUST 29, 2021, PLAINTIFFS FILED AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE SEEKING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PURSUANT TO RULE 4:52, AND A BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 2. ON OCTOBER 21, 2021, DEFENDANT FILED OPPOSITION. 3. ON NOVEMBER 3, 2021, PLAINTIFFS FILED A REPLY. 4. ON NOVEMBER 12, 2021, ORAL ARGUMENT WAS CONDUCTED. HAVING CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE MOVING PAPERS, AND HAVING CONSIDERED ORAL ARGUMENT I HAVE RULED ON THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MOTION(S) AS FOLLOWS: Requested Relief Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause seeking preliminary injunctive relief.

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Material Facts and Procedural History This matter comes before the Court by way of South Jersey Against AIDS, Inc. d/b/a South Jersey Aids Alliance, and individual plaintiffs D.G., R.K. and F.J.’s (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) Order to Show Cause seeking a preliminary injunction against the City of Atlantic City (hereinafter “Defendant” or “the City”) to prevent City Ordinance No. 32 of 2021 to take effect pending the outcome of this litigation. Plaintiff operates the region’s only syringe access program (“SAP”), informally known as “Oasis.” The program, located at 32 Tennessee Avenue, provides injection drug users with access to clean, new syringes, free of charge, on a one-for-one “exchange” basis. In addition to its syringe access program, Oasis also provides, free of charge, HIV and Hepatitis C testing, sexually transmitted infection testing, and wound care treatment services. The SAP came about by way of two earlier Atlantic City Ordinances, Ordinance No. 55 of 2004 and Ordinance No. 85 of 2007. The City approved Ordinance No. 55 in June 2004, which implemented a local needle exchange to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS. The Atlantic County Prosecutor and Office of New Jersey Attorney General opposed adoption of Ordinance No. 55. Ensuing litigation over the needle exchange ordinance resulted in the enactment of the N.J. Bloodborne Disease Harm Reduction Act, N.J.S.A. 26:5C-25 et seq. (hereinafter “Harm Reduction Act”), which permitted SAPs to be established in certain New Jersey municipalities that satisfied the following three prerequisites: (a) Where the municipality has adopted an ordinance authorizing a SAP; (b) Where the municipality is home to at least 350 people living with HIV or HIV/AIDS; and

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(c) Where the municipality has a prevalence rate of HIV attributable to intravenous drug use (“IDU”) of at least 300 persons per 100,000. Atlantic City meets these three prerequisites. In 2007, the City enacted Ordinance No. 85, which also had the effect of enabling the establishment of a SAP in Atlantic City. Plaintiff began operating its SAP in Atlantic City in 2007 and has operated the program continuously thereafter. Since the Oasis SAP opened in 2007, the Department of Health has reported a 91% decrease in new HIV cases among Atlantic City residents reporting IDU as a risk factor. The program is almost entirely funded by the New Jersey Department of Health through program-specific grants for evidence-based services. The most recent statistics from the New Jersey Department of Health (dated Dec 31, 2018) demonstrate that Atlantic City has the ninth highest number of cumulative HIV/AIDS cases in the State, and that the rate of transmission of HIV/AIDS to Atlantic City residents through injection drug use totals 45%. On July 21, 2021 the City Council held a public meeting via Zoom at which time the Council heard extensive public comment regarding Ordinance No. 32 prior to taking a vote on same. The record demonstrates that 49 members of the public commented on the proposed Ordinance. Of the 49 members of the public who spoke during the public comment portion of the meeting, two favored terminating the program, 45 urged the city to continue the SAP, and two requested further study. At the conclusion of public comment, the Council voted to enact Ordinance No. 32 of 2021, which repealed Ordinance 55 of 2004 and Ordinance 85 of 2007 and required Plaintiff to terminate its SAP by October 12, 2021. On September 29, 2021, the Honorable Julio Mendez, A.J.S.C. granted a temporary injunction preventing the City from enforcing the Ordinance or taking any action to hinder or

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obstruct the operation of Plaintiff’s syringe access program. The Assignment Judge assigned the matter to the undersigned. On November 12, 2021, this Court heard oral argument from the parties on the issue of Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. At oral argument, the Court found that the City failed to comply with its statutory obligation to notify the Commissioner of the State Department of Health of its action to terminate the SAP as required under N.J.S.A. § 26:5C-28(c) (stating that if a municipality may terminate a SAP “if its governing body approves such an action by ordinance, in which case the municipality shall notify the commissioner of its action in a manner prescribed by regulation of the commissioner”). The Court ordered Defendant to serve Commissioner Judith M. Persichilli with the following: a copy of City Ordinance No. 32; copies of City Ordinances Nos. 55 and 85; copies of the temporary restraining order and Order to Show Cause entered by Hon. Julio L. Mendez, A.J.S.C. on September 29, 2021; and this Court’s November 12, 2021 Order continuing temporary restraints. The City served Commissioner Persichilli via hand delivery on November 16, 2021. To date, the Commissioner has not issued a response.

Arguments of the Parties Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Temporary and Preliminary Restraints Plaintiff argues that the City council adopted Ordinance No. 32 without any assessment of its public health implications and against the advice of its own experts. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the City’s Director of Health and Human Services, Dr. Wilson Washington, Jr., recommended that the program remain at a fixed location within Atlantic City, and that the City’s Business Administrator, Anthony A. Swan, also supported that position. Plaintiff argues that the Ordinance contains no rationale or informed analysis as required by New Jersey law.

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Plaintiff argues that published public health data confirms the critical need for the Alliance’s continued services. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the closure of the City’s Baltic Avenue Clinic in 2015 enhanced the need for the Alliance’s services. Plaintiffs argue that an injunction should issue because Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of their claims. Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief. Further, a balance of the equities favors issuance of the injunction. Plaintiffs argue that they are likely to prevail on the merits because the Ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful under the State constitution and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”). Defendant’s Opposition Defendant argues that restraints should not issue because Plaintiffs do not have a reasonable probability of success on the merits of their claims. Defendant argues that Ordinance No. 32 is entitled to a strong presumption of validity and is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Defendant argues that the Ordinance was enacted in accordance with specific statutory authority set forth in the Blood Borne Harm Reduction Act, and only after the City Council heard extensive testimony from concerned citizens at their July 21, 2021 Council meeting. Defendant argues that the City Council considered the SAP’s effect on the overall general health, safety and welfare of all of the City’s residents. Defendant contends that the Council’s enactment of the Ordinance does not violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the New Jersey Constitution, nor does it constitute disability discrimination under NJLAD. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs will not be irreparably harmed if injunctive relief is denied because they will still have access to other similar SAPs and related healthcare services at other facilities throughout the state. Defendant argues that the balance of the equities favors denying injunctive relief because the harm to the City if preliminary restraints issue will be

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greater than harm to Plaintiffs. Specifically, the City contends that preliminary restraints will harm the public interest because the Council has made a decision that the city is suffering the deleterious effects associated with maintaining the SAP, and has made the determination that the obligation of hosting a SAP should shift to other communities. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs will not be harmed if the injunction does not issue because they will still be able to access other SAPs throughout the state. In their opposition brief, the City relies on a hyperlink to a recording of the July 21, 2021 City Council Meeting (https://www.acnj.gov/pages/councilmeetings). The Court has reviewed the relevant portion of the Council Meeting (timestamp 1:23-4:00) via the provided link. On November 19, 2021, the Court requested that Defendant provide a transcript of the Council Meeting. To date, a transcript of the meeting has not been provided. Plaintiffs’ Reply In reply, Plaintiff argues that strict compliance with the Crowe factors is inappropriate in this case, and instead, the court should issue an injunction designed to preserve the status quo. Plaintiff contends that, because the Ordinance involves the public health, the subject matter of the suit (i.e. the SAP’s clients who are in poor health) could be impaired or destroyed if the injunction does not issue. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the Act does not absolve the City of its obligation to legislate rationally. Plaintiff contends that the City legislated irrationally for several reasons. First, Plaintiff argues, of the 49 members of the public who spoke at the July 21, 2021 Public Hearing prior to the Council’s vote, only two favored terminating the program; 45 urged the city to continue the program, and two requested further study before acting. Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s reasoning that other municipalities should bear the “burden” of an SAP fails is

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irrational because under the Act, only two cities in South Jersey meet the prerequisites necessary to to implement an SAP: Camden and Atlantic City. Additionally, Plaintiff cites a speaker at the public hearing who commented that eliminating the SAP because no other municipality has one is on its face illogical and irrational. Plaintiff argues that, given the poor health of the SAP’s clients, the Court should grant the injunction to protect them while this matter proceeds. Plaintiff also contends that closure of Oasis will result in harm to the City. Plaintiff argues that they are likely to succeed on their Constitutional and NJLAD claims. Discussion I.

Injunctive Relief It is well-settled that the issuance of an interlocutory injunction requires the court to

consider the four factors set forth in Crowe v. DeGoia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982). Each factor must be “clearly and convincingly demonstrated.” Waste Management of New Jersey v. Union County Utilities Authority, 399 N. J. Super. 508, 519 (App. Div. 2008). The factors that an applicant must demonstrate in order for a preliminary or temporary injunction to issue are as follows: (1) Substantial, immediate, and irreparable harm; (2) A settled legal right; (3) A reasonable probability of success on the merits; and (4) The balance of the relative hardships to the parties weighs in favor of granting the relief sought. [Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132-34.]. The issuance of an interlocutory injunction “must be squarely based on an appropriate exercise of sound judicial discretion.” Waste Management, 399 N.J. Super. at 520. That is so because the injunction remains “the strongest weapon at the command of the court of equity,” Id. at 538 (quoting Light v. Nat’l Dyeing and Printing Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 506, 510 (Ch. 1947)), and 7

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“often remains the most effective means to avoid an inequity.” Ibid. (citing Banach v. Cannon, 356 N.J. Super. 342, 347 (Ch. Div. 2002)). Lastly, where the case presents an issue of “significant public importance,” the court must consider the public interest in addition to the Crowe factors. McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Comm'n of N.J., 176 N.J. 484 (2003). a. Preserving the Status Quo Although it is generally understood that all Crowe factors must weigh in favor of injunctive relief, a court may take a less rigid view than it would after a final hearing when the interlocutory injunction is merely designed to preserve the status quo. See Sherman v. Sherman, 330 N.J. Super. 638, 642-43 (Ch. Div.1999); Co. v. Gem Vacuum Stores, Inc., 36 N.J. Super. 234, 236-37 (App.Div.1955). When limited to preserving the status quo during the suit's pendency, the exercise of sound judicial discretion may permit the court to place less emphasis on a particular Crowe factor if another greatly requires the issuance of the remedy. Waste Management, 399 N.J. Super. at 520; Christiansen v. Local 680 of Milk Drivers, 127 N.J. Eq. 215, 219-20 (E. & A. 1940) (per Heher, J.) (holding that “justice is not served if the subject-matter of the litigation is destroyed or substantially impaired during the pendency of the suit”); N.J. State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Assocs., 22 N.J. 184, 194 (1956); Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 268 F.2d 569, 573 (3d Cir.1959). Here, the Court grants the injunction under the relaxed standard of Waste Management, as the requested relief is designed merely to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of litigation. 399 N.J. Super. at 520. This Court finds that, if an injunction does not issue, there is significant danger that the subject matter of this litigation (i.e., Oasis clients) will suffer harm, or even death. Christiansen, 127 N.J. Eq. at 219-20. For this reason, it is necessary that the SAP service continue

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at this juncture to ensure that Oasis clients continue to have access to critical healthcare services pending the resolution of this case. Although the analysis could end here, the Court also finds that Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief under all Crowe factors for the following reasons. b. Does Plaintiff demonstrate substantial, immediate, and irreparable harm? Under the first Crowe factor, the movant must show that preliminary relief is necessary to prevent irreparable harm. 90 N.J. at 132. Harm is generally considered irreparable in equity if it cannot be redressed adequately by monetary damages. Ibid. “In other words, plaintiff must have no adequate remedy at law.” Subcarrier Communications, Inc. v. Day, 299 N.J. Super. 634, 637 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Green v. Piper, 80 N.J. Eq. 288, 293 (Ch.1912)). When a state action effectively eliminates a public health service, the irreparable harm “is obvious, imminent and severe.” St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church V. Hoboken, 195 N.J. Super. 414, 420 (Law Div. 1983) (granting preliminary relief enjoining enforcement of ordinance closing homeless shelter where such closure would have adverse public health consequences). Here, if allowed to take effect, the Ordinance would require the region’s only SAP within sixty miles to shut down within thirty days. The record demonstrates that the Oasis SAP is a vital source of public health care for the individual Plaintiffs as well as hundreds of other Oasis patients. SAP clients who are currently able to access Oasis on foot would be required to seek out the next nearest SAP, located in Camden, New Jersey. Without an accessible SAP, many patients may become ill or die. Preventable infections and overdoses clearly amount to irreparable harm, and such harm is not adequately redressable by money damages. For these reasons, this factor favors granting injunctive relief.

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c. Is there a settled legal right? The Second Crowe factor recognizes that Courts will generally not grant injunctive relief absent a showing that there is a clear legal basis for the claim. Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133. However, an exception to the general rule is recognized when it is necessary to preserve the subject matter of litigation, notwithstanding that the action is not based upon rights which are clear as a matter of law. Pfaus v. Feder, 88 N.J. Super. 468 (Chan. Div. 1965). As discussed above under “Preserving the Status Quo,” this factor favor favors granting the requested injunctive relief in order to preserve the subject matter of litigation in this case (i.e. Oasis SAP clients). Waste Management, 399 N.J. Super. at 520; Christiansen,127 N.J. Eq. at 219-20. d. Is there a reasonable probability of success on the merits? The third Crowe element requires that a plaintiff must show “a reasonable probability of ultimate success on the merits” to prevail on its application for interim relief. 90 N.J. at 133. Therefore, “a preliminary injunction should not issue where all material facts are controverted.” Ibid. Nonetheless, “mere doubt as to the validity of the claim” is not an adequate basis for denial of the relief. Ibid. Here, as discussed below, Plaintiffs have proven by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability of success on the merits. Specifically, as discussed below, the evidence on the record at present supports a finding that there is a reasonable probability that the City’s action in enacting Ordinance No. 32 was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. 1. Arbitrary and Capricious Exercise of Municipal Authority Municipal action generally enjoys a presumption of validity. See Bryant v. City of Atl. City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998). However, a court will overturn municipal

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action where it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Ibid. To survive a challenge, municipal action must have been “exercised honestly and upon due consideration.” Ibid. Where a municipal ordinance is enacted without a valid basis or rationale or “in conclusory fashion, without any supporting evidence,” the ordinance should be vacated. See Borough of Glassboro v. Grossman, 457 N.J. Super. 416, 435 (App. Div. 2019) (municipal declaration vacated where purported basis for the action was the mere “say so” of the municipality without objective support). See also R. Neumann & Co. v. City of Hoboken, 437 N.J. Super. 384, 395 (App. Div. 2014) (when municipalities fail to demonstrate the appropriate evidentiary support, their actions “must be vacated”); Trombetta v. Mayor & Comm’rs of Atlantic City, 181 N.J. Super. 203, 225 (Law Div. 1981) (per Gruccio, J.) (municipal action is arbitrary and capricious if it lacks “a reasoned, significant basis”). Even when acting pursuant to statutory authority, a municipality’s obligation to legislate rationally is not abrogated. But see Blackman v. Iles, 4 N.J. 82, 89 (1950) (holding that legislative intent to abolish common law standards must be clearly expressed). Additionally, where the statute in question is a public health measure, it should be construed liberally to advance its purpose and held strictly to the requirements of valid legislation. See Dep’t of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 100 N.J. Super 366, 382 (App. Div. 1968), aff’d, 53 N.J. 248 (1969). The city argues that it acted rationally because it held a public hearing prior to adopting the Ordinance as required under N.J.S.A. 40:49-2. However, mere compliance with a statutory requirement does not obviate a city’s obligation to act rationally. Blackman 4 N.J. 82 at 29. The City’s reasoning on the record is thin. At the July 21, 2021 Meeting, the Council cited certain alleged harms associated with the SAP (including the presence of needles on the streets

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of the city), and indicated that other municipalities should bear the “burden” of operating their own SAPs. Council President Tibbitt implied that a bag of hypodermic syringes he gathered from the streets was an indication of the harmful effects of the Oasis SAP. However, the City has not presented evidence of how loose needles on the streets of the city are solely attributable to Oasis’s one-for-one needle exchange program. Additionally, the City reasoned at the Council Meeting that other local municipalities should host SAPs. This argument belies the fact that, under the current prerequisites set forth by the Harm Reduction Act, only two municipalities in South Jersey are eligible to operate SAPs: Atlantic City and Camden. The City does not explain how Oasis clients are supposed to access the next nearest SAP, located nearly sixty miles away. Furthermore, eliminating the program simply because no other municipality has one, may not satisfy the “due consideration” standard under Bryant based upon the record from the Council meeting. 309 N.J. Super. at 610. Furthermore, the Council did not address whether it considered the evidence on the record demonstrating the Oasis SAP’s continued success in reducing HIV/AIDS transmission in the City. Nor did the Council discuss its decision to forego the recommendation of the City Health Director, Dr. Washington, who recommended that the SAP continue at a new location within the City. In fact, per his exchange with Administrator Swan at the July 21 meeting, Council President Tibbitt said he could not recall a Zoom meeting with members of the Council, Mr. Swan, and Dr. Washington, at which Dr. Washington recommended that the City keep the needle exchange. Plaintiff certifies that discussions were held between Oasis and the City during which the City expressed concerns about the program’s location in an up-and-coming business district. In

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response, Oasis expressed a willingness to move to a new location within the City. The Council does not explain whether it considered this option. Lastly, the City does not explain why the Ordinance afforded Plaintiff only 30 days to shut down a program that has been in effect for 14 years, which serves a vulnerable population often difficult to notify of changes. Plaintiffs have met their burden of proving that there is a reasonable probability of success on the merits based upon the record. The record of the proceedings surrounding its adoption establishes that Council considered neither the benefits to the community provided by the Oasis SAP, nor the significant adverse public health consequences if the ordinance takes effect. The available objective data weighs against the Council's action. The SAP's critical mission of serving a vulnerable segment of Atlantic City's community, and its positive effect on that community is acknowledged by public health professionals, including City officials. The Harm Reduction Act - enacted by the state Legislature after establishment of the City's SAP contains specific findings and declarations acknowledging the effectiveness of sterile syringe access programs, noting that “every scientific, medical, and professional agency or organization that has studied this issue. . . has found sterile syringe access programs to be effective in reducing the transmission of HIV.” N.J.S.A. 26:5C-26(e). e. Balancing of the Equities The Fourth Crowe factor states that a balancing of the equities involves demonstrating that the harm that will occur, if the injunctive relief is not granted, outweighs any inconvenience, imposition, or harm to the defendant. Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, 47 N.J. Super. 26 (App. Div. 1957). Moreover, the applicant must establish that he will suffer irreparable injury if relief is denied, that his claim is based on settled legal right, that material facts are substantially

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undisputed, and that harm to him if the injunction is denied will be greater than harm to the opposing party if the injunction is granted. Ispahani v. Allied Domecq Retailing USA, 320 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 1999). Additionally, a mandatory injunction will not issue if the benefit to a Plaintiff will be grossly less than the expense imposed upon the defendant in carrying out such an injunction. Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133. The final test in considering granting a preliminary injunction is relative hardship to parties in granting or denying the relief. Id. Here, Oasis clients rely on the SAP to prevent the transmission of potentially deadly diseases. The record demonstrates that, at present, the nearest SAP outside of Atlantic City is some 60 miles away. On the other hand, as discussed above, the City has presented limited evidence of the alleged harmful effects of the SAP on the City. As such, a balance of the equities favors protecting the hundreds of vulnerable clients who rely on the Oasis SAP while this matter proceeds. f. Public Interest Lastly, where the case presents an issue of “significant public importance,” the court must consider the public interest in addition to the Crowe factors. McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Comm'n of N.J., 176 N.J. 484 (2003). Here, the City opted into a program designed by the State Legislature to reduce the transmission of HIV/AIDs and other bloodborne pathogens. The Legislature’s findings assert that that the program serves the public interest by benefiting both intravenous drug users and members of the general public. N.J.S.A.§26:5C-26(f) (“Sterile syringe access programs are designed to prevent the spread of HIV, hepatitis C, and other bloodborne pathogens, and to provide a bridge to drug abuse treatment and other social services for drug user; and is in the public interest to establish such programs in this State in accordance with the statutory guidelines designed to ensure

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the safety of consumers who use these programs, the health care workers who operate them, and the members of the general public”). As the City rightly argued at oral argument, the Act also affords the City an “off-ramp” to hosting a SAP. To terminate a SAP program, a municipality must only approve “such an action by ordinance” with the appropriate amount of due consideration on the record and notice to the Commissioner. N.J.S.A. § 26:5C-28(c). The Court is sympathetic to the City’s argument that the City has shouldered the burden of providing this program for residents throughout much of Southern New Jersey for the past fourteen years. However, at this stage in the proceeding, Plaintiffs have met their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that an injunction serves the best interest of the public. At this juncture, Defendant has several options. Defendant may engage in discovery and participate in a plenary hearing regarding the issuance of a permanent injunction. Alternatively, Defendant may wish to rescind the present Ordinance, and introduce a new Ordinance with an opportunity to create a more favorable record. If the City’s major concern is the location of the SAP, the City may wish to resume negotiations with Oasis regarding the possibility of a new location for the SAP within the city. Lastly, the City may wish seek relief from the State legislature as discussed in the hearing below to allow additional municipalities to establish their own SAPs throughout the state. Conclusion The Court finds that the injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs is necessary to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of this litigation. In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they will suffer substantial, immediate, and irreparable harm absent the issuance of injunctive relief. Plaintiffs have established by clear and convincing evidence that

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they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, and that the balance of the equities favors protecting client access to the SAP at this time. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s application for preliminary restraints, enjoining the operation of Atlantic City Ordinance No. 32 during the pendency of this litigation.

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Date of Decision: December 2, 2021

Michael J. Blee, P.J.Ch.