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ARISTOTLE FOR A MODERN WORLD

My book concludes with “Afterthoughts: Aristotelian Piety for a Liberal Politics,” and some of the implications of my study for liberalism and its critics. In many ways, Aristotle’s political teaching is a liberal one. Human beings are the source of political authority, not a divine dispensation that orders human life or that confers authority on rulers, not a wisdom belonging to a select few that merits their ruling political communities, nor a moral righteousness that warrants an imposition of a way of life on others. Choice, defined by Aristotle as the outcome of deliberation, is the origin of action and serves as a definition of the human (1139b4–6). Politics is understood as shared rule, in contradistinction to despotism. Key elements of Aristotle’s political thought are therefore consistent with our liberal institutions and practices, even if he would understand them in a different way and justify them on different grounds. Aristotle therefore has something distinctive to contribute to liberalism. For example, liberal theorists appeal to the rational choice that satisfies desires and to the industry and discipline that serve life and economic prosperity. Although Aristotle appreciates such goods, he knows that they are not the highest, even if they are its conditions. He would approve of liberal institutions and practices because of their potential to foster both deliberation about the good and virtuous actions in concert with others, that is, the capacities belonging to beings who can think divine thoughts and who can initiate acts of beneficence.

The modern separation of church and state sought to protect civil peace from sectarian conflict and to protect religious liberty and freedom of thought from political interference. If successful, a secular politics would serve both civil life and religion and philosophy. This liberal solution nevertheless left humanity’s spiritual life, moral aspirations, and devotion to truth without any authoritative support, as individuals are allowed and even encouraged to pursue happiness as they see fit. Such permissiveness, which accepts no imposition of order or rank of goods, encourages a moral relativism that asserts that ways of life are equal, that the good is whatever we desire, and that moral distinctions are arbitrary. Liberalism has been criticized almost from its inception for the quality of life that emerges under its auspices, such as Rousseau’s criticism of the