Indonesian Pluralities Islam, Citizenship, and Democracy
Edited by
R O B E R T W. H E F N E R and
ZAINAL ABIDIN BAGIR
U N I V E R S I T Y O F N OT R E DA M E P R E S S N OT R E DA M E , I N D I A NA
University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 www.undpress.nd.edu Copyright Š 2021 by the University of Notre Dame All Rights Reserved Published in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
C O N T E N T S
Acknowledgments
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O N E
The Politics and Ethics of Social Recognition and Citizenship in a Muslim-Majority Democracy • Robert W. Hefner 1 T W O
Scaling Plural Coexistence in Manado: What Does It Take to Remain Brothers? • Erica M. Larson 000 T H R E E
Reimagining Tradition and Forgetting Plurality: Religion, Tourism, and Cultural Belonging in the Banda Islands, Maluku • Kelli Swazey 000 F O U R
Scaling against Pluralism: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Islamist Opposition to Pancasila Citizenship • Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf 000 F I V E
“Enough Is Enough”: Scaling Up Peace in Postconflict Ambon • Marthen Tahun 000
vi Contents
S I X
Gender Contention and Social Recognition in Muslim Women’s Organizations in Yogyakarta • Alimatul Qibtiyah 000 S E V E N
Religion, Democracy, and Citizenship, Twenty Years after Reformasi • Zainal Abidin Bagir 000 Contributors
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Works Cited
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Contributors
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O N E
The Politics and Ethics of Social Recognition and Citizenship in a Muslim-Majority Democracy R O B E R T W. H E F N E R
The question of how to live together in a religiously plural society is much in the air these days, and for good reason. In Western democracies, the confluence of mass immigration, ISIS/Daesh terrorism, and alt-right populisms has shaken public confidence in once widely held assumptions as to civility and citizenship in a context of deep social difference (Mouffe 2005). Calls heard in the 1990s for some variety of multicultural citizenship have long since given way to demands for the exclusion of new immigrants and the coercive assimilation of those long arrived, not least if they happen to be Muslim (Joppke 2017; Modood 2007). What is arguably a crisis of confidence in pluralist recognition and citizenship in the West is paralleled by an even greater sense of alarm in the Muslim-majority world, and nowhere more anxiously than in the Arab Middle East. By early 2013, the hopeful dreams of the 2011 “Arab spring� had given way to the somber realization that in all but one of the Arab Muslim nations, Tunisia (Zeghal 2016), progress toward pluralist democracy had not merely stalled but ended. Political observers spoke with good 1
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reason of a “crisis of citizenship” in the Arab-Muslim world (Challand 2017; Meijer and Butenschøn 2017). As if this inventory were not distressing enough, even in Southeast Asia’s once hopeful democracies, one hears today that, to borrow a phrase from the political scientist William Case (2011, 360), “After a long run of global good fortune, democracy has fallen on hard times.” It is against this backdrop of democratic hope and challenge that Indonesia today takes on its public and policy importance. With its population of 266 million people, 87.2 percent of whom are Muslim, Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world. It is also the thirdlargest democracy, having undertaken a return to electoral democracy in 1998–99 in the aftermath of thirty-two years of authoritarian rule. Some analysts, including the distinguished scholar of democratic transitions Alfred Stepan, have argued that Indonesia offers clear proof of the compatibility of Islam and pluralist democracy (Stepan 2014). But skeptics are not so sure. They argue that, however impressive Indonesia’s electoral achievements, the larger transition from the authoritarianism of the New Order regime (1966–98) to the democratic politics of the Reformasi era (1998– today) has been so marred by antiminority violence as to discredit any claim to democratic exemplarity (Harsono 2012). Although the issues at its heart remain vexing, this disagreement has had a salutary effect on ongoing studies of politics and civic coexistence in contemporary Indonesia. The debate has underscored that, in assessing the quality of democracy, plurality, and citizenship in Indonesia today, it is important to examine not just elections and state-centered politics but the less formal but more pervasive processes of social recognition (Taylor 1994; Honneth 2001) at work in this deeply plural society. Social recognition refers to the social-psychological, ethical, and political practices through which actors evaluate, acknowledge, and otherwise engage their fellows in society. If the related and no less important concept of “citizenship” refers to an individual’s relationship with a political community that conveys certain reciprocal rights and obligations between that individual and political community and/or that individual and the state (Berenschot and van Klinken 2019b; Isin and Nyers 2014), social recognition refers to the more general and less state-focused processes through which actors perceive, categorize, and evaluate their social fellows within a particular sociopoliti-
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cal community and then draw on those processes of recognition to understand and enact their own identities, rights, and obligations in relation to those around them. In Western political philosophy, the concept of recognition has roots in Hegel’s notion of the “quest for recognition,” but the issue has today moved well beyond this early philosophical framework. Hegel’s achievement lay in his taking exception to the atomistic and introspective conceptions of the self developed in the work of Descartes and Kant, emphasizing instead that self-identity is a relational and dialogical process shaped by and dependent on the recognition of others. In more recent years, the concept of recognition has been explored further in relation to debates over multiculturalism and recognition in modern Western democracies (Fraser 2000, 2001; Honneth 1995, 2012; Taylor 1994). As in the works of Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, much of this new Western scholarship on recognition is of a prescriptively normative sort, challenging received liberal models of subjectivity, social justice, and human flourishing, and proposing a more intersubjective and dialogical alternative (see Zurn 2000). The approach to recognition deployed in this book builds on these precedents but differs from them in two basic ways. First, rather than arguing that one variety of social recognition is better suited for human flourishing, this book aims simply to examine the varied modes of recognition operative in different Indonesian locales and to assess their implications for citizenship and social coexistence. A second and related way in which the approach used in this book differs from its contemporary Western counterparts is that it seeks to extend the study of social recognition well beyond the confines of Western “liberal” societies, including in this case to the Muslim-majority nation of Indonesia. Although not developed in as explicitly dialogical a manner as in Western philosophy, ideas on and debates over recognition have been a central feature of public life in Indonesia since the dawn of the republic in the 1940s. In the broader Muslim world, questions of how to recognize social fellows in a religiously plural society have been a central concern of Muslim public ethics since the Prophet Muhammad formulated the Medina Charter shortly after his migration from Mecca to Yathrib (known subsequently as Medina) in 622 (Yildirim 2009). The charter extended rights of protection and autonomy to Jewish tribes as well as Muslims, including on matters of
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religious worship and social organization. Over the centuries that followed, Muslim jurists, theologians, rulers, and mystics devised a variety of ways for recognizing one’s fellows in an Islamic manner, not all of them consistent with the Medina Charter (Emon 2012; Friedmann 2003). But the question of how to recognize one’s fellows and non-Muslims remains at the heart of Muslim public ethics and is a striking feature of debates across the Muslim world today (Emon 2012; Moosa 2001; Ramadan 2009). These examples serve to remind us that social recognition is not merely a matter of psychological perception or normative debate; nor is it something that involves only actors’ interactions with the state. Instead, and much like the processes of everyday ethical evaluation on which it draws (Laidlaw 2014; Keane 2016), recognition is a pervasive feature of all social life, shaped by the judgments and relationships operative among people in a particular social setting and the “encumbrances” (Sandel 1984) of identity, difference, solidarity, and exclusion to which they give rise. Although in some scholarship social recognition is seen as more or less equivalent to the concept of national citizenship, in fact processes of recognition tend to be more varied and ubiquitous across the whole of social life. They are shaped, not just by actors’ vertical relationships with the state and other authorities (although these too are important), but by the lateral relationships in which actors find themselves involved, and the ethico-religious traditions and everyday practices through with which they learn to navigate these social realities. Processes of recognition in any given society are complicated, however, by one additional social reality. In any society at any given time, there may be not one but several ethico-political frameworks for recognizing one’s social others. The feelings and frameworks for recognizing and differentiating societal fellows can be grounded on religion, race, class, ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, national citizenship—or some intersectional combination of several of these. The processes through which these varied registers interact or compete with each other, and by which one among them may become hegemonic in everyday life, are matters that lie at the heart of the approach adopted in this book (cf. Berenschot and van Klinken 2019a; Karsenti 2017; cf. Stokke 2017). These issues of recognition and coexistence in a plural society, then, were the focus of the project that Zainal Abidin Bagir and I conducted with
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a small research team over a twenty-month period from late 2015 to late 2017. It is also the concern of the chapters in this book. The project was entitled “Scaling Up Pluralism: Local-National Collaborations for Civic Coexistence in Contemporary Indonesia.” The research was funded with the generous support of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, under the direction of R. Scott Appleby (now dean of the Keough School of International Studies) and in collaboration with Mun’im Sirrih, a scholar of Islam and Indonesia also at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute. At its heart, the aim of the project was to explore the public contentions and normative traditions that have shaped the values and practices of social recognition and coexistence in different areas of Indonesia. On the model of recent studies of social recognition and “cultural citizenship” in Europe and the Middle East (Beaman 2016; Bowen 2010; Joppke 2017; Karsenti 2017; Meijer and Butenschøn 2017), the project sought to examine the discourses and practices of recognition operative in each of the research locales, explore their relation to each region’s ethnic, religious, and political groupings, and assess their implications for public life and coexistence in Indonesia as a whole. In the remainder of this chapter, I explain the research rationales and methodologies for the case studies on which the chapters in this book are based. I then step back from the individual cases in an effort to explore the distinctive challenge of social recognition, pluralist coexistence, and citizenship in contemporary Indonesia as a whole. My remarks also seek to situate the Indonesian example in relation to larger theoretical and policy debates over the challenge of social recognition, coexistence, and cultural citizenship (Beaman 2016) in our late modern world.
PLURALITY, RECO GNITION, BELONGING
The research around which this project was organized involved four exercises to investigate the ideals and practices of social recognition and belonging in each of the research locales. The exercises themselves illustrate both the theoretical challenge to understanding recognition and social coexistence, and the distinctive social legacies Indonesians brings to these processes.
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The first exercise each researcher was asked to carry out was to create a map of the main currents of practice and public-ethical reasoning with regard to plurality and social recognition in each field setting. From the beginning, of course, we recognized that the map could not be exhaustive. Our guiding principle, however, was simple: each researcher should begin by identifying the most influential organizations, movements, and public discourses operative in her or his region and from there move outward to identify the main rivals or challengers to these dominant groupings and the discourses of social recognition they promote. As the chapters in this book make clear, this first phase of research was premised on two assumptions: first, that neither formal citizenship nor individuals’ relationship with the state need be the primary ethico-political referent to which Indonesians look in recognizing, evaluating, and engaging each other in society; and, second, our mapping portion of the project should not be limited to actors or associations promoting a democratic and/or pluralist model of recognition and coexistence. Rather than just focusing on “good-guy” pluralists or the formal discourses of citizenship and state, our mapping sought to identify the most influential actors and organizations shaping processes of public recognition in each region and to explore the “agonistic plurality” (Mouffe 2000; Hefner 1998) of discursive practice to which they give rise. Public Reasoning and Coexistence in Agonistic Plurality After having mapped the dominant groupings and discourses with regard to social recognition and plurality, investigators in each research locale next looked more closely at the content of the discourses deployed by different groupings and their implications for relations among local residents. The features of each recognition discourse we sought to highlight included the sources and content of its values, the extent or breadth of their application across society, and the ethico-discursive principles whereby the tradition includes some categories of actors while excluding or marginalizing others. Thus, for example, in a setting like the Christian-majority city of Manado in North Sulawesi (Larson, chapter 2), we asked: When a local social movement that self-identifies as Protestant presents its views on plurality, recognition, and coexistence, does it justify that discourse solely with reference to Protestant doctrines or traditions? And does it use that religious refer-
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ence to justify the exclusion of non-Protestants or the creation of a differentiated and stratified model of recognition and citizenship? And what does this pattern of recognition imply for multireligious and inclusive models of civic coexistence, like those associated with Indonesia’s official political philosophy, the Pancasila (the Five Principles)? Among its formal principles, the Pancasila affirms that Indonesia is a religious state but not an Islamic state and that Indonesians from all recognized religious backgrounds should enjoy equal citizenship rights (Elson 2013). In principle if not always in practice, the Pancasila thus eschews any variety of ethnic or religious supremacism in favor of a religiously undifferentiated recognition and citizenship. To take another example, when a hard-line Islamist movement like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI; Ahnaf, chapter 4) enters into public debates over plurality and recognition, does it justify its views solely in relation to the Qur’an, the Sunna (traditions) of the Prophet, and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)? If it does, and inasmuch as the practice and meanings of Islamic shariah are always socially contingent and epistemologically plural (Daniels 2017; Hefner 2016), on what grounds and by what methodologies does HTI identify and enunciate the Islamic principles said to be derived from these sources? And if the movement claims to ground its views on a putatively paramount shariah law, how do its proponents regard the principles of belonging and coexistence held dear by other Indonesians, such as the ideals of nationhood and religiously inclusive citizenship associated with the Pancasila? As these examples illustrate, the case studies in this volume were premised on three assumptions with regard to traditions and practices of social recognition: first, that the latter are not static discourses but traditions that coevolve in relation to broader political and ethical changes in society, including for example Indonesia’s Islamic resurgence or its recent adat revival (see below); second, that practices of recognition in a particular community are not necessarily defined in relation to the state or official understandings of citizenship; and, third, that the traditions in question do not exhaustively “constitute” the subjectivity and worldview of all who claim to identify with them. As Talal Asad (1986, 2003) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) have both emphasized, and as Timothy Daniels (2017) has recently shown in his study of shariah meanings in contemporary Malaysia, a
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“tradition” is better understood as “an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined,” with its own standards of rational justification and inquiry, and through which actors come to understand “our own commitments or those of others . . . by situating them within those histories which made them what they have now become” (MacIntyre 1984, 12–13, 350). Equally important, and somewhat contrary to MacIntyre’s otherwise thoughtful exposition (cf. Laidlaw 2014), although actors may claim to base their views on plurality and recognition on just one discursive tradition, our research presupposes that in everyday living individuals differ in the degree to which they identify with the tradition with which they claim affiliation and in the degree to which they regard its values as exclusive of other discourses of recognition and belonging operative in society (Glenn 2011; Hefner 2016; Schielke 2015). As this last observation implies, all societies are characterized by a significant measure of ethical and legal plurality, not least with regard to matters of recognition, belonging, and coexistence. In exploring practices of social recognition and coexistence in a particular locale, then, it is more helpful to look first at the plurality of discourses and practices for recognition before engaging in any examination of formal citizenship or even the relationship with the state (formal or informal) as such. In many modern societies, the ideals and practices of formal citizenship may in fact play a lesser role in determining real and existing patterns of recognition, belonging, and interaction among residents in society. This fact was tragically illustrated in the sectarian violence that swept eastern Indonesia in the early 2000s, as well as many Middle Eastern societies in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. The fact has also been made painfully apparent in the culture wars raging over immigration and national belonging in the contemporary West (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015; Hashemi and Postel 2017; Meijer and Butenschøn 2017; Modood 2007; Taylor 1994). No less significant, even where official citizenship ideals appear well established in a society, their understanding and practice are inevitably influenced by legacies of ethics and recognition derived from other traditions, practices, and power structures operative across society, including those of religion, ideology, class, ethnicity, and gender (Doorn-Harder 2006; Isin 2008). The resulting pattern of “cultural” (Beaman 2016) or
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“substantive citizenship” (Glenn 2011) is thus never simply the product of juridico-political principles or even actors’ relationship with the state but involves “recognition by other members of the community” (Glenn 2011, 3). That recognition is in turn based, not just on laws or constitutions, but “on a common culture that makes some citizens more or less accepted than others” (Beaman 2016, 852; cf. Ong 1996). In matters of social recognition and coexistence, then, an agonistic plurality of viewpoints and practices is more or less everywhere the norm, and the resulting plurality of ethical and legal norms in a society may well create “a situation in which two or more legal [and ethical] systems coexist in the same social field” (Engle Merry 1988, 870). The coexistent bodies of law and ethics may in turn “make competing claims of authority; they may impose conflicting demands or norms; they may have different styles and orientations”; the plurality also “poses a challenge to the legal authorities themselves, for it means that they have rivals” (Tamanaha 2008, 375; cf. Turner 2011, 151–74). As highlighted in the anthropology of Islam and the new anthropology of morality (Deeb and Harb 2013; Keane 2013; Marsden 2005; Schielke 2010a, 2010b; Simon 2014; Soares 2005), these other discursive registers may exercise a powerful influence on actors’ subjectivities and aspirations, not least with regard to how they categorize, recognize, and otherwise engage people around them. No less important, these discursive legacies inevitably influence the ways actors understand and utilize more formalized public ethical discourses, including, for example, those related to national citizenship. This latter fact has been vividly illustrated in many Western societies in recent years. In these latter settings, the egalitarian and inclusive ideals of formal democratic citizenship have at times been ignored in dealings with new citizen immigrants, not least those Muslim, as a result of an implicit “cultural citizenship” that reserves full rights of recognition only for those residents who share certain traits of race, ethnicity, religion, or gendered lifestyle (Beaman 2016; Glenn 2011). It was this confluence of ethico-legal and religious discourses on matters of plurality and recognition in post-Soeharto Indonesia, then, with which our research project sought to come to terms. The process whereby disparate normative discourses and registers become the object of sustained social discussion has come to be known in one wing of social and democratic theory as “public reasoning.” A few years back in a highly
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original book, the anthropologist John Bowen (2010, 6) described public reasoning as “the ways in which people deliberate and debate in . . . public settings” and as the “practices of deliberation” in which one justifies one’s beliefs and seeks areas of agreement. Bowen also observed that such public reasoning is not static or necessarily derivative of just one ethico-legal or religious tradition. Where there is such a plurality of options, just which ethical discourse an actor finds compelling or resonant often depends on the broader community with which she or he identifies. In the case of French Muslims, for example, Bowen (2010, 24) noted that Muslim activists involved in public debates on ethics and citizenship in France (the focus of his study) who happened to identify with transnational Islamic movements felt a special obligation to develop knowledge and discourses that were “legitimate in transnational terms” as well as being “pertinent to the situation in France.” The anthropologist Timothy Daniels (2017) highlighted a similarly contingent variation in the way in which Islamic shariah and national citizenship are interpreted in contemporary Malaysia. In the Indonesian project on which the following chapters are based, we asked researchers to attend to similar situational variation. In particular, researchers were asked to explore the ways in which locals’ identification with different social groupings—ethnic, religious, regional, national, or transnational— influences the choice of ethical registers those same actors use in recognizing their fellows in society, and the implications of this choice for patterns of recognition, cultural citizenship, social conflict, and belonging. Focal Incidents and Dramas of Contention Having mapped the primary currents of normative reasoning and practice with regard to pluralist coexistence in each research setting, each researcher was asked in the third investigative exercise to identify two or three “focal incidents” that had brought debates over plurality, recognition, and belonging in a particular region into focus in recent years. A focal incident, also known as a “drama of contention” in political sociology and anthropology (Holland et al. 2008; see also Daniels 2017, 150), is some confluence of events, debates, and mobilizations that illustrates the primary social forces and public ethical issues in contention at a particular time and place. In the present project we were primarily interested in those focal incidents