Urban Contingency Practice and Planning (Urban Ecological Planning, NTNU, Trondheim, Norway)

Urban Contingency Practice and Planning Semester booklet, Spring 2020 Urban Ecological Planning (UEP) Master’s Programme Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

AAR5220 Urban Contingency Practice and Planning Semester Booklet, Spring 2020 Urban Ecological Planning Master’s Programme Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

Course Coordinator: David Smith Assistant professor and doctoral researcher, NTNU

Course Lecturers:

David Smith (Resilience) Assistant professor and doctoral researcher, NTNU Mrudhula Koshy (Uncertainty and Contingency) Lecturer and doctoral reseacher, NTNU Peter Gotsch (Scenario Planning) Professor and Program Leader (UEP), NTNU

Guest Lecturers:

Ilan Kelman (Disaster studies) Professor, UCL, London, UK Stian Antonsen (Societal safety) Research Professor, NTNU

External Examiner:

Wang Yu Senior Researcher, NTNU

Booklet Layout and design:

Nick A. Kiahtipes Student Assistant, UEP

Foreword The ‘Urban Contingency Practice and Planning’ course (7.5 credits) is held every spring semester in association with the Urban Ecological Planning (UEP) Master’s program at NTNU, Trondheim, Norway. By discussing various concepts such as uncertainty, contingency, resilience and scenario planning at the intersection of spatial planning, disaster risk reduction, contingency planning and humanitarian response, the course equips students to recognize and synthesize uncertainties of various levels and intensities, and to develop contextual and multi-scalar plans and design responses that are flexible and adaptable.

The premise of this group assignment was to prepare a contingency plan for a hypothetical crisis of unexpected floods in Trondheim. Like many cities around the world, Trondheim faces a range of risks and threats. In such cases, rather than viewing uncertainty as a catastrophe, envisioning different scenarios can be seen as a catalyst so that institutions, organizations, and communities can enable visions for radical and transformative change.

The general objectives of this group work were to: 1.

Explore the range of perceived and documented risks, threats and uncertainties in Trondheim.

2.

Analyze the various stakeholders, institutions and organizations in Trondheim, which are dealing with (perceived) disruptions and the ways they could prepare, respond, adapt and transform.

3.

Understand that the range of scenarios and different constraints can lead to different outcomes in plans and strategies. While it might be tempting to adopt generic practices since it is a hypothetical scenario, it is important to

remember that the existing morphology, spatial structure and geographical location of the selected area in Trondheim can have substantial influence on your proposed plan.

4.

Document best practices and cases from other disaster-prone and vulnerable areas that are appropriate for your scenario.

5.

Propose a contingency plan based on the hypothetical scenario and, through it, outline a response strategy, implementation plan, operational support plan, preparedness plan and budget. This can also include sets of flexible tools, strategies and frameworks that can deal with unexpected and unprecedented uncertainties and enhance planning for contingencies based on this exploration.

Each team was given one hypothetical scenario with a different set of resources, institutional, spatial and climate change constraints. Within the given constraints, students prepared a contingency plan which comprises a set of frameworks, tools and strategies that are flexible and adaptable.

We hope you enjoy reading this compiled booklet of the students’ hard work as much as we enjoyed teaching the course!

Kind regards, Mrudhula Koshy and David Smith

NYHAVNA

A Transitional Strategy for a Flood Resistant Harbor City Jayati GROVER Vilde Andrea BORCHGREVINK LUND Yoann ROUZIÈRES Fabian WILDNER

Figure 1: Exceptionally rare high tide is pictured reaching the harbour of Trondheim where the Norwegian coastal transport company Hurtigruten docks in Trondheim. Photo: AFP Source: thelocal.no

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Abstract Contingency is defined as something that might possibly happen in the future, usually causing problems or making further arrangements necessary, by the Cambridge Dictionary (2020).

This definition states the condition of uncertainty in the future. All the cities in the world pose a threat of uncertain future events (both natural and manmade) that could lead to disaster. This presents us with an opportunity to make necessary arrangements, through contingency planning for the present and future to prevent a disaster. In this paper we discuss a transitional contingency plan for the area of Nyhavna, which is proposed to be redeveloped based on current conditions and a given hypothesis of sea water level rise and flooding in the low density city of Trondheim. This paper is written in the current situations of the COVID-19 pandemic, which limited our methodology.

Introduction Keyne defined uncertainty in economics by suggesting that uncertainty is an unquantifiable fundamental in economics that brings about surprise and the need for reasonable economic decisions (Bateman, 1989). This theory can be applied to the urban environment in the condition of unforeseen future events. This brings us to the importance of a contingency plan for a place (local, national and international) to prevent disaster by decreasing the vulnerability of the city

and its population. This can be done by working on various steps of contingency plan : response strategy, implementation plan, operational support plan and preparedness. We selected the area of Nyhavna which is a harbor area on the coast and is proposed to be redeveloped.

Nyhavna is a port in the Brattøra area of Trondheim, located between Nidelva and Lademoen. Today the harbour district’s main function is commercial and industrial. (Figure 2) There are a few harbour activities still working since the time it was developed in the late 1930s. The area is currently being planned to become a predominantly residential area.

Scenario Our given scenario is: • Trondheim is a very low-density city and is prone to floods caused due to sea level rise.

• The municipality has substantial resources but does not have a disaster management authority.

• Our hypothesis includes that Trondheim could be hit by a 1000 year storm that could lead to flooding and sea water level rise from 2-3 meters, especially on the coast.

Methodology In order to make a contingency plan for the area we Figure 2: View from Nyhavna (Source: Sara Husby)

Figure 3: Flooded Area of Brattøra and Nyhavna, sea-level rise of 2m (Source: kartverket.no)

need to identify and collect information to analyze, that would help us build different components of the plan.

• A study of past events and current risks to Trondheim was done in order to understand and make a hypothesis that would be the basis of the plan. The data of this previous analyses done in Trondheim and the thereby presented risks was collected.

• Study of existing and best practices around the world. This also includes studying the current practices if any are existing in the site. This could help us to understand what is already being done in Nyhavna and how we can improve it.

• To understand the current scenario, we sent out Google Questionnaires to the stakeholders already present at site. We asked them if they are aware of any past flooding events in Nyhavna, if they are aware of the existing danger and if there are any current measures or evacuation practices.

Contextual Analysis of the Site Context of the site Trondheim is located where the Nidelva river meets the Trondheim fjord, and is the capital of the Trøndelag county in Norway. The city has today around 186.000 inhabitants (Statistisk sentralbyrå, 2020) and has ambitious expansion plans since there are a lot of more story apartment buildings getting built all over the city.

The area of Nyhavna is located on the seaside in Trondheim and is on the east side of the Nidelva river, next to the Brattøra peninsula. It is a mainly industrially used area that was used as a submarine bunker during the second world war. Although they were used only for a short period of time. Due to its heavy way of construction, it is not possible to destroy the massive concrete bunkers today and they function as landmarks for the area whereas one gets reused as a state archive.

Since 2008, the Trondheim municipality has been working on a re-development of the area. In the long term, a master plan will be created and the whole area will be redeveloped as a residential area, while the former users should be relocated.

Climate in Trondheim Due to the Gulf Stream, the climate stays moderate and the bay area of Trondheim stays ice free during the winter times. Trondheim has a humid continental climate, where parts closer to Trondheimfjord have milder climates than the inland ones. Mostly south-winds along the outer seaboard. Temperatures have increased about 2°C during the last 25 years. (FloodProbe, 2011)

Weather risks in Trondheim

Our hypothesis derives from the given and identified risks that Trondheim has been facing or could face in the possible future. Some of the risks are mentioned below: Storm-Surges Can happen a few times a year, when through the combined effect of low pressure, winds and ocean

Figure 4: Rendering 1 - scenario: urbanized Nyhavna and 2m sea rise level (Agraff+Rallar office illustration and photoshop)

Figure 5: Rendering 2: scenario: Urbanized Nyhavna and 3m sea rise level (Agraff+Rallar office illustration and photoshop)

tides sea level rises up to several meters above normal. (Figure 7) “In other words, if coastal flooding from storm surges and/or sea level rise is identified as a potential hazard for a specific planning area or object, the local authorities can require certain (flood-protection) standards to be met before granting building permits.” (DSB, 2017) Sea-Level rise Due to the worldwide changing climate conditions, also the water level in Trondheim is prognosted to rise in future times (DSB, 2017). (Figure 3) Quick-clay danger - Landslides “An overload of the quick clay makes the clay lose all strength and resistance, and it flows like a liquid.” (NGU, 2020) Almost the whole city of Trondheim is built on a layer of quick clay, which makes landslides happening on a regular basis.

system relies on the old sewage system that was built before 1965. The drainage system of the city as it stands nowadays, is not made to handle. In different places, the Trondheim drainage system is not conceived to deal with considerable volume of runoffs, therefore, reaching its full capacity faster, leading then to a prospective flooding situation in Trondheim (FloodProbe, 2011).

Recent regional studies (IPCC, 2012) are showing a future trend in important waves height and strong waves along the Northern European coast.

Although sea level rise is not considered a serious threat for Norway, it may have some negative impacts on infrastructures. The possibility of an increase in the frequency and magnitude of storms, including storm surges, is indeed a concern along Norway’s coast. Therefore, Trondheim may take

Trends & Analysis The hazard focus in this paper is the flood risk caused by storm surge or sea level rise. Flooding is an increasing problem worldwide for many cities. The management of floods risks has been a neglected point in urban planning for decades (FloodProbe, 2011). A flood occurs when the water covers land that is usually dry (Samuels & Gouldby, 2009). A flood is determined as a hazard when it may harm the receiver. The flood’s causes are diverse, yet this paper is focusing on floods caused by hydrometeorological events and sea-rise level on a long-time scale basis. Those events cause problems and inconveniences in the urban environment. Moreover, hazards are usually scaled in terms of frequency. This frequency is the estimation of how likely a flood might happen and the magnitude of the event (Landa Mendez, 2014).

Torrential rain has become a periodic event, making the handling of important quantities of rainwater a basic requirement in modern towns and cities. In the Trondheim context, one of the main causes is the heavy rain that may occur in the region. As mentioned before, Trondheim is located in the Northern part of Europe, in a region that encounters frequent episodes of rain or snowfall. Cities are privileging concrete cover in their streets making a permeable soil, stressing the draining system. The water may no longer infiltrate the soil and thus relies on the drainage system of Trondheim. Its drainage

Figure 6: Overview of affected buildings

Figure 7: Conceptual representation of storm surge.

Source: NOAA (2020)

into consideration this threat as the Northern part of the city is composed of seashores. According to Kartverket (2020), the sea level on shores of Trondheim could increase about 53 cm by 2090.

The rise itself will not affect big areas of Trondheim and Nyhavna but a 1 000 storm-surge would have bigger impacts and effects on the urban core of the city.

Possible impacts of a Hazard on the Nyhavna area This listing shows the possible impacts of a storm surge or a sea level rise on the Nyhavna area.

Destroyed buildings Nyhavna consists mainly of industrial buildings.

There are also companies seated on the site with offices, along with construction areas for boats or other products. Moreover, sensitive and costly machines are exposed and might be damaged by arising floods. (Figures 4,5 and 6) Hazardous materials washed into the sea Besides the endangered buildings, the junkyard situated on the peninsula in Nyhavna is a potential danger if washed into the sea. The metal waste contains hazardous materials that can have negative impacts on the natural environment and the ecosystem. Also during the upcoming constructing phase, when the redevelopment of the area will take place, the possibility of dangerous building materials getting washed into the sea will increase.

People in danger if they can’t get evacuated Lack of information in case of a sudden storm flood may bring people in danger who don’t manage to leave the area in time. Even if there are not many residents in the area today, a proper evacuation system needs to make sure that all people are informed to leave the affected area as soon as possible. Trapped people in offices or flats that can’t leave their building because of a high water level put themselves and the rescue teams into a potential danger.

Collapse of Drainage System A rise of the sea level may be a potential danger for the surrounding drainage system. Too much water can lead to an overload of the capacities so that the system collapses and grey water gets pumped uncontrolled into the sea. The spread of diseases

may be the possible outcome.

Identified Stakeholders The Norwegian organisation system is mainly divided into three levels; local, regional and national level. Responsibilities and levels of which the stakeholder act in, may differ in case of flood-related events. Often, there are no clear borderlines between the levels, and responsibilities change throughout the process of the event. We have categorised relevant stakeholders to our site, based on where they act in the system.

National level TThe five ministries; Petroleum and Energy (OED), Transport (SD), Justice and public security (JD9, Local and Regional Affairs (KRD) Environment (MD) (see figure 8) and the government are the main stakeholders on a national level. The government and parliament provide leading political guidelines, while the ministries serve a professional role by developing, managing and disseminating knowledge on their expertise to the government and the sub- levels. Guidelines and information are then followed and used by trans-sectional, regional and local levels.

Regional level The county governor and Trondheim county is the main stakeholder at the region level and serves a planning role. Though not relevant in our case, the county may take a coordination role between the national and local level, through the County Emergency Council, if a municipal authority is not present.

Cross sectional level The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) NVE has a central role in flood contingency planning NVE has a central role in flood contingency planning aimed to provide necessary information about floods, measures and vulnerable areas. Their coordinative role is to maintain communication between actors within different sectors, and be the main authority to guide politics related to prevention of flooding and landslides. They assess whether an area is flood safe and is responsible for monitoring unsafe areas. In addition, their role on a local level is to follow up on spatial planning, plan and implement safety measures, monitor and notify weather events, as well as research and investigation. NVE is providing information and

professional guidance to municipalities and police (as well as SVV and JBV), which is necessary for preparedness plans, managing risks and spatial planning (Lyngen municipality, 2016).

Local level Stakeholders on a local level take adaptive measures, before, during and after an event.

Locally adapted preparedness plans and crisis management. The main stakeholder at this level is Trondheim municipality, Trondheim Havn and the

Trondheim Havn Trondheim Havn IKS is an intermunicipal organisation with the responsibility for Nyhavna and the surrounding ports safety and contingency.

They are in contact with stakeholders at site, which mainly consist of industries and business. In this network, there is an exchange of information regarding improvements of the site and contingency towards risks. Additionally, Trondheim Havn is the main landowner at the site and is directly affected by flooding events.

Figure 8: Stakeholder - Mapping

community of Nyhavna.

Trondheim Municipality The municipalities are the local disaster management authority (DMA). They are obligated to assess dangers related to natural hazards such as floods and landslides. Information provided by NVE or from its own research, needs to be taken into account in both land use planning and building matters. They also have the responsibility for the local contingency, and to follow the national and regional guidelines in their work. A riskand vulnerability analysis with a contingency plan should be performed for preparedness and awareness of potential hazards. The contingency plans are locally adapted and aim to keep the community resilient towards weather events. The municipalities are in charge of most areas, except for infrastructures which belong to JBV or SSV.

Best Practices Copenhagen Copenhagen is the capital of Denmark and a regional metropolis located on flat coastal terrain with canals from the sea flowing through the old city center. Due to its coastal location, the city is vulnerable to sea-level rise and flooding. Flooding from increasing precipitation is also posing a threat, because of its build-up environment and a century-old underground wastewater system, which collects rainwater and is made to withstand only 10-year rains (Clemmensen, 2015).

In July 2011, the city faced one of the worst flooding disasters due to high rainfall and cloudbursts. The lack of permeable surfaces and weak storm water management system led to a loss of millions of dollars. It was named as a 1000 year flood and

left the city paralysed. This event pushed the city to identify and be prepared and prevent such disasters in future. The city of Copenhagen invested in research and prepared a comprehensive Climate adaptation plan in 2012 to prevent disasters and to prepare the city for any unforeseen climate changes. The climate adaptation plan also includes a Cloudburst plan which caused serious flooding in the city in 2011 and then in 2014.

The plan mentions broadly the following: • The current challenges : The city identified increasing temperatures, stormwater surging, irregular rain patterns, increasing precipitation, weak and old storm water management as some of their major issues.

• The adaptation response: The main adaptive actions comprise separating surface water (rainwater) from the underground wastewater system (making city resilient up to 100 year rains); refitting urban spaces to create rainwater channels along selected roads (Figure 9), leading to the lakes and/or the sea; greening and ‘blueing’ public spaces for local retention of water; climate proofing buildings and transport infrastructure; and generally

integrating adaptation concerns into other policy areas, including community regeneration (Clemmensen, 2015).

• Innovative solutions: New innovative solutions were prepared with the present city infrastructure like innovation street network design to direct the water towards collection areas or the sea and innovative public space that can serve as permeable ground or catchment area for water absorption in case the city faces another flood. These public areas will be accessible the rest of the time.

• Stakeholder involved and responsible: The Adaptation and Cloudburst Plans and accompanying measures aim to establish the co-sharing of adaptation between the City of Copenhagen, citizens and other private actors (Clemmensen, 2015).

• Implementation strategy: the city allotted special budgets for the climate adaptation plan and made responsible authorities combining the public and private actors.

Figure 9: Copenhagen Cloudburst project for urban resilience using GI for managing flood risk. (Sources: www. ramboll.com)

Figure 10: Impact analysis of flood in Dublin. (Source: Leahy (2009))

Dublin Dublin is a coastal city (Irish Sea) crossed by three main rivers (Liffey, Dodder, Tolka), canals (Royal Canal, Grand Canal) and many other rivers (Wad, Poddle, Camac) some of which are now underground. In addition, it is subjected to very heavy rains and many storms. In addition, two rivers (the Liffey River and the Dodder River) meet in the heart of Dublin. This confluence, combined with the presence of numerous small rivers, creates a complex hydrological and hydraulic situation in the Liffey estuary (Lhomme, 2019).

In 2002, Dublin was flooded due to a tidal surge.

(Figure 10) The rivers were flooded due to the surge and it flooded the whole city as it had a small catchment area. The surge damaged the infrastructure of the city including a dam, drainage system and major roads in the city. The city realized the importance of an action plan and released a Dublin Flood Initiative (DCC) to make the city safer. This strategy was allotted a huge budget and included steps like installing early warning systems, making more room for the river, maintenance of drainage systems and strengthening of dams etc.

In 2010, the risk of emerging pluvial floods was detected and new strategies were added to the previous plan. The strategy used the Scottish Government integrated 4 A’s approach (Leahy, 2010)(Figure 11). The approach was predominantly directed towards pluvial flooding and involved a lot of partners/stakeholder collectively working towards the strategy.

In 2011, Dublin faced extreme flooding due to excessive rainfall. The city drainage could not

take the capacity of the downpour and the rivers flooded. This called for an emergency action plan.

Figure 11: Scottish Government 4A approach (Source : Leahy (2010))

In 2019 Dublin city council climate change action plan was released combined with the sustainability goals. This Climate Change Action Plan features a range of actions across five key areas (Council, 2019).

• Energy and Buildings • Transport • Flood Resilience • Nature-Based Solutions • Resource Management This involved all the Dublin Local authorities to make action plans for their areas. It mentions the goals of the city which includes infrastructure improvement, increasing awareness about risks and prevention schemes in the city, and stakeholder management.

Findings from best practices

Vision statement

The area of Nyhavna is a harbor area next to the Fjord, similar to coastal cities of Copenhagen and Dublin. In our risk analysis of the area of Nyhavna in Trondheim, we could identify few similarities.

Lack of permeable surface in that part of Trondheim and insufficient drainage system in case of a 1000 year flood, are some of them. Dublin is a city which adapted, redeveloped and modified its flood resilience strategies through time. Copenhagen and Dublin present a concept similar to ‘sponge cities’.

Peter Cook, a British architect, was the precursor in the 1970s of the sponge cities’ concept. This concept refers to a city that absorbs in its landscape overflow of water or a city called self-cleaning. The objectives behind the concept are by 2030, 80% of the urban areas will be able to absorb and reuse 70% of torrential rainwater during major events.

The sponge cities are set up in order to counter the effects of the floods which are happening in several cities around the world due to excessive concretization. As a result, the sponge cities want to be more resilient in the face of flooding episodes.

The model city for flood resistance (flood proof cities) Nowadays, cities around the world face constant stress when it comes to climate change’s impacts.

We want to make the city ready to cope with hazards by using the “Sponge City Concept” that should increase the city’s resistance.

The Trondheim municipality plans to redevelop Nyhavna into a residential area in the future.

(Figure 12) This brings us to the importance of developing a transitional time based strategy that includes the current scenario, the different stages of construction and the post construction phase.

A transitional strategy would make sure that the people on site are prepared at all times for an emergency.

Our vision is to ensure that the area can cope during its whole transformation process.

Figure 12: Illustration of upcoming development in Nyhavna (Source: Mad arkitekter, Holt O’Brien og BOGL - Bang og Linnet Landskab

CONTINGENCY PLAN Response Strategy We developed a response strategy considering a We developed a response strategy considering a transitional time based approach according to our given scenario. We defined the main stakeholders and actions that should be initiated before, during and after an event in all three stages of the development of the site. According to the knowhow gained from other case studies, and due to our unlimited financial resources some physical interventions are proposed to be integrated in the pre-construction planning process (find details in the preparedness plan).

Forecast registers upcoming storm surge First-Responders

16:55

recieve notification and alarm their offices/companies

Evacuation of buildings, placing barriers.

• Identifying the vulnerable population in all the stages • Identifying or creating one linking/common stakeholder/authority in all stages of the plan implementation that is involved throughout the whole process and keeps all the background knowledge. They would be important to add or remove any new or old stakeholders from the network. This assures smooth and consistent transition of the strategy through the phases of development on site.

Implementation Plan SHORT-term (Today-2025) Following the upcoming developments and the

STORM SURGE

17:05

Common clean up of devasted Less demolished areas. companies share their facilities with the other ones.

08:00

Offices can temporarily start to work again.

16:00

09:00

17:00 involved stakeholders

T...TrondheimHavn R...FirstRespondents P....Police F...Firebrigade

Figure 13: Hypothetical time-schedule in case of an upcoming hazard

Main goals of our response strategy are: Strategised and immediate responses to any threat: • Early warning system in place • Preparing, training and improvising firstrespondent network in every stage • Identifying the evacuation routes, safe houses and routines in all the stages;

Figure 14: The transitional response strategy

given hypothetical sea level rise of two to three meters, some immediate measures were developed to prevent the area from an eventual hazard. These short-term measures may be integrated without further time-consuming physical constructions, and can be adapted by using the given social resources of the area.

The short term measures will work with today’s situation of a mainly industrial area.

The key-element for the suggestions is to use TrondheimHavn as the main stakeholder to build up on an already existing network. Through a sent out questionnaire, we discovered that TrondheimHavn is already established as the main representative for the area. The certainty that TrondheimHavn remains a permanent actor in the area makes it even more suitable for this. Announcing an official “NyhavnaNetwork’’ builds the foundation for all further measures that should increase the Nyhavna area’s resilience to the hypothetical scenario. A network may facilitate bringing all stakeholders

together and to strengthen the community’s solidarity. Also, access to further resources can be simplified if applied as a network.

Creating NyhavnaNetwork as a connecting headorganisation.

• Bringing all local stakeholders together • Informing about possible dangers of hazards / Exchange of experiences • Strengthening the community • Organising courses to educate local people as first responders.

• Meteorological-Station from TrondheimHavn can be used as an early warning platform to inform of upcoming hazards.

Establishing certain community measures

to ensure the regulations are being followed. (see Preparedness Plan for more details) MEDIUM-term (2025-2035) The medium-term measures will focus on the phase of the construction and transformation of the area. The scenario is based on an expected start of the transformation in 2025. This phase includes the relocation of the industries and the removal of some of the buildings when there is an increased danger of loose material getting washed into the sea and the possibility of a rather ‘chaotic’ setting caused by ongoing works. Coping with eventual hazards in this situation is especially challenging. Therefore, the building companies get included into the adapted NyhavnaNetwork. The

NyhavnaNetwork An adaptive stakeholder network taking the role as a Disaster Management Authority (DMA)

SHORT TERM (from 2020)

MEDIUM TERM (2025-2030)

LONG TERM (2030-2050)

Representatives from 27 Businesses & Industries

Site Developers + Building Companies

Residents (1 representative of each building)

Landowners

Remaining Businesses

New Businesses

TrondheimHavn

Remaining Industries

New Industries

Emergency Services

Emergency Services

Emergency Services

Figure 15: The evolution of the NyhavnaNetwork

• Share your Space: In case of hazard, less affected industries/offices can share their space with the ones that got damaged. Thereby machines, or other things can be evacuated and therefore protected from damage.

• Identifying a safe space in the community where people can take shelter.

• Share of Human Resources: After the event, members of the network can help-out to clean up together. Re-organising buildings/offices that got messed up by the hazard.

• First-Response: Educated first-responders can help together to cope with the immediate effects from the hazard like e.g. saving locked up people in affected buildings, etc Planning policies Adaptation and implementation of new policies or development norms for the area. The masterplan for the new housing area also needs to include the measures of flood resilience and regular checks

phase ends when all constructions will be finished and all residents can move into the area. Before, there will be a transitioning phase making sure of a flawless transformation.

• NyhavnaNetwork taking in construction workers on site in the stakeholders and part of the first respondent network.

• Regulations on site about the construction equipment, toxic waste needs to be in place before the construction starts.

• New safer evacuation routes and safe houses should be informed to everyone on site.

• Physical structures that help to prevent hazards should be built before the construction starts by the Trondheim municipality. (see Preparedness Plan for more details) LONG- term (from 2035) With the completion of the constructions there

will be a completely new stakeholder group in the area. New residents should be introduced right from their first day of entry with the possible hazard situations. Similar to the composition as in the medium-term measures, the TrondheimHavn network should include members from all buildings in the area. There will be a compulsory membership in the network of a defined member of residents per residential building. Those representatives can be in charge of informing their co-residents about evacuation routes and of alerting in case of an upcoming hazard.

NyhavnaNetwork • Identifying the population of the area post construction and connecting the new stakeholders • Identifying vulnerable populations (elderly, disabled and children) or/and buildings (schools, kindergartens, etc.)

• Adding new first respondents into the network (residents and shop owners) • Identify more safe spaces and final evacuation routes needed for the new residents in the area.

Operational Support Plan The Operational Support Plan provides a clear

picture of how different roles and departments ensure information, financial and human resources, essential infrastructure and other support.

The main network that coordinates resources and distributes roles, are in our case done by the existing local network “Trondheim havn” on Nyhavna. During all the development phases of the site, Trondheim Havn will be the head of NyhavnaNetwork and a part of the institutional branch of contingency. Their role in Nyhavn Network is to make sure requirements are met, and monitor the implementation of plans on site for both physical structures and human resources.

The stakeholders in this network are expected to change as the site develops and is shown Figure 15.

With no authority and abundant resources, we have illustrated the communication between stakeholders in a given situation, in a schematic network (Figure 16). A more detailed distribution of roles are shown in Figure 17. With strong bonds to the municipality and other organisations, the budget is unlimited. The money is distributed from Trondheim municipality and NVE to the NyhavnaNetwork to be invested in different phases, which covers all costs related to the maintenance, development and protection of Nyhavna. With a cash-based approach, quick solutions may be

Figure 16: Communication between stakeholders in the NyhavnaNetwork

Alert the national ministries

Alert NVE

Alert JB (railways)

MET and Early warning systems

Alert SVV (road networks)

Alert County of Trøndelag

Alert Police and fire department Alert the hospital or health department

Alert Nyhavna Network Alert the population

First respondents at site

Evacuate the residents by priority

Take them to shelter (assigned areas close to site)

RESPONS IBILITY AREA

ACTIONS

RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATIONS/ STAKEHOLDERS

Pre-event First responder Second responder Post-event

​…. ​…. ​…. ​….

Cost

Low * Medium ** High ***

Forecast register. Inform DMA and municipality on situation

Meteorological Institute

…. …. ….

**

Organise rescue efforts, eg. fire department and volunteer org.

Police

…. ….

*

Provide information on flooding events, potential risks and instructions from authorities

Media/Newspaper DMA: public press conference

…. …. …. ….

*

Evacuate affected people to Dora 1, rescuing and alarm those affected

Trondheim Havn Police Fire department

…. ….

*

Provide health-care

St.Olavs Hospital Red Cross

…. ….

**

Flooding

Install flood proof barriers along the dock Remove excessive water from site

Fire department Communication with NVE

…. ….

***

Buildings

Prepare Dora 1 as evacuation spot

Trondheim Havn Dora AS

…. ….

*

Finding a semi-permanent housing option for residents

Trondheim Havn

…. ….

**

Inform site developers on current situation and purpose changes. Consider changes to the legal plan of the site.

Trondheim Havn Trondheim municipality Site developers and architects

….

*

Secure boats, loose objects and buildings

Trondheim Havn Fire department

….

***

Conservation of goods of cultural and historical value

Riksantikvaren

….

***

Monitor water quality

Municipality - Water Supply Enterprise

…. …. ….

**

Portable water provision

Municipality - Water Supply Enterprise Fire department Volunteer organisations

….

*

Electricity

Monitor electricity and correct damages. Provide aggregates and temporary solutions.

Trondheim municipality Electricity provider

…. …. ….

***

Sewage

Monitor the sewage systems capacity and implement necessary measures

Trondheim municipality - Wastewater Enterprise

…. …. ….

***

Transport

Transport evacuated people to safe zone

Taxi Police

…. ….

*

General

People

Drinking water

Figure 17: Role & function of stakeholders

implemented in a flooding-scenario, providing effective measures to decrease impact, maintain safety and living conditions for the affected. In the post-event phase, this approach may facilitate recovery. In Table 2, we also added a simplified categorisation of the estimated load of financial costs. The costs are based on our own assumptions and divide into three categories.

When the network receives early warning from the MET department, the Nyhavna Network will receive the information and it will flow in the system as shown in Figure 13. Alerting the local response network first could make sure that there is no loss of life.

Preparedness Plan This plan is prepared before the crisis to help prepare everyone and everything. The measures mentioned in this plan should be taken before any development starts at site to make sure that new development is flood resilient and ensure preparedness at all stages of development(present, during construction and post construction). The following shall be part of the Preparedness plan.

Regulations • There would be construction norms needed for the new constructions. Some of the regulations would be: • All ground floors of buildings within 500m distance from the coast, to be used for nonresidential purposes.

• The area to be developed with 50% permeable ground surfaces.

• Evacuation routes to be left clear at all times.

This includes the time during construction of buildings Old infrastructures Similar to cities like Dublin and Copenhagen, the old drainage system of the city could not handle the stress from cloudburst and storm surge.

As mentioned in a few reports from Trondheim Kommune, the city of Trondheim has also an old drainage system. In order to prevent the city, improvements in the existing drainage system of the city need to be realized.

Preparation for evacuation In order for the response strategy to work, the following things need to be identified and communicated to the response team.

• Identification of the most vulnerable or valuable buildings, (like cultural heritage, schools or houses with elderly). This would help the response teams´ work accordingly.

• Identification of high grounds or safe buildings in case of flooding. This place would be identifiable and accessible to all in case of crisis. On this site, Dora can be used as one of the safe houses.

Preventing water flooding into the site (Physical Interventions) • We propose building Dykes about 1.5-2 meters high along the coast, inspired by flood resilience

Figure 18: Proposed solution for flooding management on Nyhavna

Figure 19: In Nyhavna (Source: Hendelser på Nyhavna, Facebook)

techniques from the Netherlands. (Figure 18) These dykes could be developed as walking trails or public areas where people can walk or bike. These short (1.5-2m high) dykes would prevent the yearly flooding of the area which is caused by sea water level rise as a result of a storm surge.

• These dykes would also serve as a fence to the site to prevent any pollutants from going back into the water, especially if it floods during the construction phase of the site.

• Along with the dyke, there should be public areas that can act as sponges or catchment areas (inspired from Copenhagen). The site currently has very little permeable surfaces and is very flat. These catchment areas along the coast would help prevent water flooding by absorbing the excess both in case of heavy rains and storm surges and would function as public areas open to all at other times.

Budget The physical and organisational interventions in the site would need a lot of financial resources. As mentioned in our case, we do not have any disaster management authority but yet abundant financial resources. Thereby, the budget will not be an issue.

The question of who and how will the resources be managed still remains. In our contingency plan, the Nyhavna Network acts as the most important connection to manage and operate the contingency plan and thus the budget. Nyhavna network would manage resources directly from the municipality.

With reference to Table 2 (see above), we have divided the amount of resources required in three categories, which are low, medium or high. The financial resources would be invested not only on the physical interventions but on management of services like the Nyhavna network as well.

Discussion Due to the losing importance of shore-related industries and a shift to an increasing demand in services away from the port industries, coastal areas are often turning into city development areas. This happens also in Trondheim, where Nyhavna is after Solsiden already the second redevelopment of a former industrially used harbour area. These areas are often easy to develop and even to extend. Making them attractive for municipalities and investors to respond to the demand of new housing opportunities in growing cities. A lot of transport planners may argue that the infrastructure densification close to the centre (case of Nyhavna) helps the city become more sustainable. However, this development contradicts the present risks to the site, namely sea level rise, higher level of the weather’s unpredictability and increasing number of extreme-weather situations like storms. In Trondheim, storm surges are the most frequent scenario that may harm the structures that are directly built on the shore. The sea level rise is also forecasted to affect many other coastal areas of the city. With the help of an adaptive flood resilience plan we can let the development continue controllably and safely.

By introducing our time based transitional strategy, we managed to find a solution that can cope with the changing stakeholder situation in a developing area. Besides adding physical structures that should be specified already in the masterplan, our strategy focuses on a participatory solution.

All current stakeholders (depending on the stage of the scenario) will be connected through a newly created network. This will also lead to a strengthened level of solidarity and will increase the community’s social capital. Having this can support the stakeholders to cope with an upcoming hazard - sharing facilities and sharing human resources can all be made possible to respond even faster to a hazardous situation as soon as it happens.

Limitations All along the elaboration of the report, the team encountered some challenges. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the quarantine situation that occured in Norway during the spring semester 2020, the collection of qualitative data has been impacted. The lack of direct interactions and investigative site visits has therefore been made impossible. In order to counter this contrariety, we sent out a Google questionnaire to present diverse industries of Nyhavna. However, due to a small number of answers, it is important to put into perspective that the results are not representing in a reliable manner to all industries or stakeholders of Nyhavna. Due to a lack of expertise in carrying out a cost benefit analysis we had to make basic assumptions when creating the budget for our contingency plan and mention a general take on financial resource management in case of no Disaster management authority.

Conclusion This report should help to minimze the risk of a future sea-level rise in Nyhavna. The elaboration of a contingency plan for the next 50 years based on a specific scenario should therefore guide Nyhavna’s development towards a resilient neighborhood. Future real estate developers should follow the recommendations for Nyhavna and thus avoid the impact of sea rise level or flooding on infrastructures and inhabitants - also by including the community and the local stakeholders into all stages of the development process.

References Bateman, B. W., (1989) “Human Logic” and Keynes’s Economics: A Comment. Eastern Economic Journal, 15(1), pp. 63-67. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/40325218 Cambridge Dictionary (2020). Available at: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/ englisch/contingency [Accessed: 13.05.2020] Clemmensen, A. H. (2015) BASE, Denmark: BASE. Available at: https://base-adaptation.eu/ implementation-copenhagen-cloudburst-strategycopenhagen-denmark Council, D. C. (2019) Dublin City council.

Available at: http://www.dublincity.ie/mainmenu-services-water-waste-and-environmentclimate-change/climate-change-actionplan-2019-2024 [Accessed: 21.04. 2020].

DSB (2017) Integrating Sea Level Rise and Storm Surges in Local Planning. Tønsberg, Norway.

Available at: https://www.dsb.no/globalassets/ dokumenter/veiledere-handboker-oginformasjonsmateriell/veiledere/integrating-sealevel-rise-and-storm-surges-in-local-planning.pdf [Accessed: 13.05.2020].

FloodProBE (2011) Pilot Sites - Trondheim.

Available at: http://www.floodprobe.eu/ trondheim.asp (Accessed: 5.05.2020].

IPCC (2012) IPCC 2012: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. Available at: https:// www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/ global-and-european-temperature-1/ipcc-2012managing-the-risks. [Accessed: 03.05.2020].

Leahy, T. (2010) The flood resiliency project, Dublin: Dublin City Council. Available at: http:// www.dublincity.ie/sites/default/files/content/ WaterWasteEnvironment/waterprojects/ Documents/City_Council_Flood_presentation_ September_09_T.Leahy.pdf

Løkkevik, O. (2020) Ekstremværet «Elsa»: Trondheim nådde høyeste vannstand. Available at: https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/ i/0n7KOg/ekstremvaeret-elsa-trondheim-naaddehoeyeste-vannstand [Accessed: 13.05. 2020].

Lyngen municipality (2016) Lyngen kommune.

Available at: https://www.lyngen.kommune. no/beredskap-og-krisehaandtering. 5235234349232.html [Accessed: 09.05.2020].

NGU (2020) NGU.Available at: https://www.ngi. no/eng/Services/Technical-expertise/Landslides/ Quick-clay-slides-in-Norway [Accessed: 09.05.2020].

Oppla (2020) Oppla. Available at: https://oppla. eu/casestudy/18017 [Accessed: 09.05.2020] Rambøll (2013) NVE. Available at: http:// publikasjoner.nve.no/rapport/2013/ rapport2013_01.pdf [Accessed: 13.05.2020] Samuels, P. & Gouldby, B. (2009) FLOODsite Language of Risk - Project Definitions 2nd Ed., s.l.: FLOODsite. Available at: http://www. floodsite.net/html/partner_area/project_docs/ T32_04_01_FLOODsite_Language_of_Risk_ D32_2_v5_2_P1.pdf Statistisk sentralbyrå (2020) Population and land area in urban settlements. Available at: https:// www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/beftett [Accessed: 13.05. 2020].

List of Figures Figure 1: Exceptionally rare high tide is pictured reaching the harbour of Trondheim where the Norwegian coastal transport company Hurtigruten docks in Trondheim. Photo: AFP Source: thelocal. no Figure 2: View from Nyhavna (Source: Sara Husby) Figure 3: Flooded Area of Brattøra and Nyhavna (Source: kartverket.no)

Leonard by VINCI (2019) Les « villes-éponges », entre mythe et réalités. Available at: https:// leonard.vinci.com/les-villes-eponges-entremythe-et-realites/ [Accessed: 05.05.2020].

Figure 4: Rendering 1 - scenario: urbanized Nyhavna and 2m sea rise level (Agraff+Rallar office illustration and photoshop)

Lhomme, S. (2019) The resilience of the city of Dublin to flooding: from theory to practice.

Cybergeo : European Journal of Geography.

Environment, Nature, Landscape, Volume Document 651. Available at: https://journals. openedition.org/cybergeo/33480

Figure 6: Overview of affected buildings

Figure 5: Rendering 2: scenario: Urbanized Nyhavna and 3m sea rise level (Agraff+Rallar office illustration and photoshop)

Figure 7: Conceptual representation of storm surge. Source: NOAA (2020)

Figure 8: Stakeholder - Mapping Figure 9: Copenhagen Cloudburst project for urban resilience using GI for managing flood risk.

(Sources: www.ramboll.com) Figure 10: Impact analysis of flood in Dublin.

(Source: Leahy (2009)) Figure 11: Impact analysis of flood in Dublin.

(Source: Leahy (2009)) Figure 12: Illustration of upcoming development in Nyhavna (Source: Mad arkitekter, Holt O’Brien og BOGL - Bang og Linnet Landskab Figure 13: Hypothetical time-schedule in case of an upcoming hazard Figure 14: The transitional response strategy Figure 15: The evolution of the NyhavnaNetwork Figure 16: Communication between stakeholders in the NyhavnaNetwork Figure 17: Role & function of stakeholders Figure 18: Proposed solution for flooding management on Nyhavna Figure 19: In Nyhavna (Source: Hendelser pü Nyhavna, Facebook)

Better Together - Community Resilience for an Uncertain Future A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR HOMMELVIK Arne Jenssen Hamish Hay Karla Cristina Flores Nikoo Mohajermoghari

Abstract

Introduction

Flooding one of the most significant risks facing urban areas today, and climate breakdown and human development will continue to worsen their impact on communities. Traditional ‘hard’ engineering solutions to flooding are seen as increasingly unaffordable, whilst ‘soft’ engineering and adaptive approaches can offer resilience in the face of uncertainty. This report examines flood risk from rivers and surface water in Hommelvik, Norway, in the scenario of limited resources but with Malvik Kommune as the Disaster Management Authority, and proposes a Contingency Plan.

Background

Using academic frameworks for assessing resilience, it examines the significance of flood risk for infrastructure, buildings, people and institutions and concludes that despite strong social networks within the community, there is a very low level of awareness of flood risks, a lack of community and household-level preparedness, and little investment in physical protection.

The Contingency Plan proposes building on the existing strengths of the community including social, physical and natural assets. By building widespread awareness, strengthening network capital and enhancing water retention through Natural Catchment Management approaches, the resilience of the community could be enhanced.

Furthermore, by embracing uncertainty (Kato & Ahern, 2007) through continuous monitoring, learning and adaption, the approach offers insights for communities around the world in long-term resilience building.

Figure 1: Map of Hommelvik

As part of AAR5220 Urban Contingency Planning and Practice, we were given a group assignment to prepare a contingency plan on a hypothetical crisis of unexpected floods in the Trondheim area.

Our outline of a hypothetical scenario consists of: Risk and threats in a low-density area can provide its own unique challenges and opportunities.

LOW DENSITY

We can expect more and more intense floods due to heavy rainfall. Rivers running through populated areas are especially exposed.

FLOODS DUE TO HEAVY RAINFALL

Forces us to be creative to raise necessary funds and making low cost spatial interventions

LIMITED RESOURCES

Helps make the required changes and implement plans that can decrease the risk of disaster.

DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT Figure 2: Characteristics of scenario

LOW, MEDIUM AND HIGH RISK SCENARIO 1

LOW: Seasonal surface water flooding

Seasonal surface water flooding can be problematic and cause preventable structural damage each year

2

MEDIUM: 1-in-200 year flood

Based on the NVE 200-year flood map of Hommelvik. This is a more intense version of the seasonal surface water flooding scenario.

3

HIGH: Future ice dam event

"Shock" event based on the ice dam event that occurred in 2002. A dam breach together with intense floods can create a shock effect to the flood caused by heavy rainfall.

Figure 3: Scenarios

The case: Due to our scenario outline we have chosen to examine the village and the administrative centre of Malvik municipality, Hommelvik, as it fits well with the given scenario. The village is home to around 5400 people, and lies by the Trondheimsfjord, 25 kilometres east of Trondheim.

The river, Homla, runs through the village.

There are examples of extreme flooding in the past (NRK,2002) and the risk of yearly flooding due to snowmelt. This poses risk to the nearby buildings and its inhabitants.

future. According to The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), the Homla is prone to a water rise of 6 – 7 meters due to a potential 200-year flood. The area affected by the flood, outlined by blue shading in Figure 4, contains many homes and important institutions, like the primary school.

Scenarios with low, medium and high impact will be the basis for this report and the contingency plan. Each of these scenarios are described in more detail in the contingency plan.

The Homla is prone to extreme flooding in the Figure 4: Flood risk map for Hommelvik

NVE Aktsomhetskart for Flom MaksimalVannstandstigning 2-3m 4-5m 6-7m NVE Aktsomhetskart for Flom Flom_aktosomhetsomrade

Approach and Theoretical Background Flooding is the most widespread natural hazard affecting urban areas (Liao, Le and Nguyen, 2016).

In the last decades, there has been a change from structural and large-scale flood protection to adaptive flood risk management (FRM). This acknowledges that floods cannot be prevented and explores how to reduce the suffering and vulnerability of disaster-prone communities (Schelfaut et al., 2011).

While traditional flood management is focused on controlling and fighting water, an adaptive flood risk governance approach accepts flooding as a natural phenomenon and is meant to accommodate water through strategies such as ‘space for the rivers’ and ‘managed retreat’ to reduce the impacts of floods (Mees, Driessen and Runhaar, 2014).

However, resilience is not just about built structures and can also depend on communities.

The characteristics of resilient communities is the ability to reduce, prevent and cope with the flood risk. They must be able to demonstrate the ability to buffer the event, self-organise before, during and after, and adapt and learn from the event (Schelfaut, Pannemans et al. 2011, Keogh, Apan et al. 2011). In order to do so, they improve their capacities in different phases of the contingency plan. Community awareness and preparedness for flood are two important entities of resilient communities (Schelfaut et al., 2011).

For instance, the understanding of the essence, cost and effectiveness of people’s action can increase community awareness. Based on an study conducted year 2006, monetary damage of flooding in urban areas can be reduced by around 80% if the residents exhibit self-protective behaviour.

However, another study conducted in Glomma, Norway found that less than half the participants would immediately obey an order to evacuate, and a third would wait and see, which was a result of poor community awareness (Keogh, Apen et al.

2011).

Apart from the raised awareness and preparedness, a bottom-up involvement is also needed where local knowledge and concerns of Figure 5: Overview of Hommelvik

local communities are translated back into flood risk management.

Local communities should become an active player in the whole, rather than merely executing higherlevels decisions. For instance, this principle is laid down in the Swedish Government’s legislation as ‘proximity’. This means that major emergencies should be managed locally where they occur by authorized public personnel at the lowest possible decision making level, only assisted by regional and national levels when necessary (Mees, Driessen and Runhaar, 2014).

For communities to be confided with such responsibility the authorities must ensure they understand the rationale behind decision-making.

Private sector of flood damage control and flood recovery raises the issue of whether citizens (1) have sufficient sense of urgency of what is at stake and (2) have the capacity to take action on flood remediation and flood recovery, and to what extent this might result in differences in flood risk allocation and actual flood damage.

Irrespective of the type of arrangement, for these private responsibilities to be perceived as legitimate, public authorities must take responsibility for the communication of flood risks on a continuous basis. Public authorities could also play a role in increasing the capacity of more vulnerable citizens/ neighbourhoods through, for instance, subsidy programs for adaptive building measures, and/ or ensure equal access to insurance programs (in some countries, flood insurance does not currently exist) (Mees, Driessen and Runhaar, 2014).

Analysis Methodological Approach Our methodological approach aims to achieve our vision of building long-term, sustainable flood resilience in Hommelvik whilst considering constraints such as the limited resources available, and the need to account for process uncertainty and environmental uncertainty, (Zandvoort et al., 2018) especially due to climate breakdown.

Reflecting our focus on people and communities, resilience in this context is: “the capacity of the community of Hommelvik to function in the face of flood risk so that those living and working there can survive and thrive” Adapted from Arup’s City Water Resilience Index (Arup, 2015)

Developing a framework The team integrated multiple academic approaches suitable for low-resource contexts. ‘A framework for urban climate resilience’ proposes an operational framework for urban climate resilience (Tyler and Moench, 2012) as shown Figure 6. In particular, it identifies how agents and institutions can build resilience by increasing: • Responsiveness e.g. ability to predict, plan for and prepare for a threat; • Resourcefulness e.g. ability to mobilise assets, such as community buildings, in the face of a disaster; and

Figure 6: Resilience planning, after Tyler and Moench, 2012

SA FE

AGENTS

SHARED LEARNING

S EM

AG E

NT RESPON SIV S EN ES RESOU S RC + EF L UL NE

RE

UNDERSTANDING VULNERABILITY

IVERSITY ST Y&D LIT SY IBI NDANCY EX EDU FL &R Y IT AR

FA IL MO U DU L

RN EA SS

CLIMATE EXPOSURE

BUILDING RESILIENCE

SYSTEMS

TION ACCE ORMA SS INF ISION MAKING DEC

ITUTIONS INST

INSTITUTIONS

LOCAL KNOWLEDGE

CATALYTIC AGENT

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

STEPS FOR STAGE OF CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS PLANNING

PRACTICES FROM PHILIPPINES

after Ohara et al., 2018

1

UNDERSTANDING CURRENT CONDITIONS

2

IDENTIFYING RISK

Flood Risk Simulation workshop understandable by the community Understanding the probability of events with different impacts

3

Identifying problems communities may face in the event of a flood

4

DEVELOPING RESPONSE STRATEGIES

A workshop where the participants were requested to share opinions on necessary actions

5

6

SHARING EVIDENCE-BASED CONTINGENCY PLANS

The community and local authority developed a contingency plan based on the previous steps, with the help from the experts.

The developed contingency plan has been shared among community members and with other municipalities.

Figure 7: Contingency planning steps

PRACTICAL METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES FOR HOMMELVIK

after Tyler and Moench, 2012

Administering interviews and questionnaires to local government officials Interviews at selected individual households

ANALYSING IMPACT

DEVELOPING EVIDENCE-BASED CONTINGENCY PLANS

APPROACHES TO RESILIENCE PLANNING

IDENTIFYING CURRENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF HOMMELVIK THROUGH SURVEYS.

UNDERSTANDING VULNERABILITIES IN AGENTS, SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS

IDENTIFYING SCIENTIFIC AND LOCAL KNOWLEDGE

UNDERSTANDING CURRENT AND FUTURE RISK OF FLOODING THROUGH SURVEYS DESKTOP ANALYSIS, AND THE LEVEL OF UNCERTAINTY

EXAMINING THE IMPACT PATHWAYS AND RECEPTORS THROUGH SURVEYS AND SITE VISITS.

USING CASE STUDIES TO INSPIRE RELEVANT RESPONSES

BUILDING RESILIENCE IN AGENTS, SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS HARNESSING SCIENTIFIC AND LOCAL KNOWLEDGE TO IDENTIFY APPROPRIATE RESPONSES

DEVELOPING FIVE CONTINGENCY PLANS

SHARING AND CRITIQUING THESE PLANS

• The capacity to learn e.g. ability to internalise past experiences, avoid repeated failures, innovate and improve performance.

As highlighted by Rauws (2017), embracing uncertainty (both environment and process uncertainty) in planning involves “supporting learning and adjustment over time”, implying a continuous process of learning and adjustment .

The framework demonstrates resilience planning as an-ongoing loop of understanding vulnerability, and building resilience.

A second academic inspiration was ‘A Framework to Evaluate Community Resilience to Urban Floods’ by Ming et al. (2020). It identifies five indicators of community resilience to urban floods, which were developed through quantitative methods in three villages in Nanning, China. Our temporal approach to development the plan was the ‘six steps of evidence-based flood contingency planning’ proposed by Ohara et al. (2018), which was also applied to a case in The Philippines. The stages of our approach, and associated theoretical inspirations, are summarised in Figure 7.

Research Methods for data collection Our approach to data collection includes qualitative and quantitative, with the aim of understanding the risk of flooding, the resilience of the community, and how the strengths of the community can be built-upon to ensure long-term resilience into the future.

Site Visit During the early stages of the process one member of the team carried out a limited site visit with the aim of understanding the dimensions of community resilience (as explained in Figure 12). In particular, it aimed to: • Confirm the location of buildings and infrastructure and the public realm in relation to sources of flood risk (part of ‘the built environment’ dimension) • Understand the character of the community in terms of social networks, social cohesion and demographics, attitudes to and awareness Figure 9: An unmaintained drainage channel in Hommelvik

Figure 8: Bridge over the river Homla

of flood risk (‘socio-economic status’ & ‘organisations and institutions’ dimensions) • Recording the nature of the natural environment in and around Hommelvik, particularly around green spaces, planted areas and slopes which can influence the incidence of flood events (‘natural environment’ dimension).

As part of this, the team member conducted informal outdoor interviews, recorded observations and took photographs.

Online engagement and survey Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, arranging formal and informal face-to-face interviews proved difficult. Therefore, we produced an online survey in Norwegian and posted in on Facebook groups representing various local organisations in Hommelvik. The full survey is available in the Appendix.

“A survey is a systematic method of collecting data from a sample of people to provide a statistical description of the population from which the sample is drawn” (Ringdal, 2013) The questionnaire can be composed in many different ways dependent on the goal of the questionnaire. When forming a survey, it is important to not ask leading questions, not use difficult language and to form questions in such a way that every person should interpret the question in the same way.

It is important with sufficient amount of answers in a survey for a general population to be able to generalise the answers. This is because the answers should be representative for the whole population to be used in any conclusive matters.

To get the desired people to answer a survey one must make it broadly available in relevant forums. It is integral that people outside the desired population do not answer the survey, so it should only be made available in the right forums.

(Ringdal, 2013).

Data collection This report is based on the theory used in AAR 5220 - Urban Contingency Practice and Planning.

Relevant complementary sources were found according to NTNU’s site about finding and be critical towards sources (NTNU, 2020).

Figure 11: Screenshot of our online survey

Figure 10: The river Homla

Analysis Methods SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

How accurate are the flood risk forecasts for Hommelvik?

How exposed are building and infrastructure to flood risk?

Is the public realm designed to account for this, including flood defences and green infrastructure?

Do relevant contingency or disaster preparedness plans exist at present?

SOCIAL

The stakeholder analysis proceeded to identify the different organisations at the national, regional and local levels that would intervene in the event of a disaster, as shown in Figure 13.

THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

Are the right organisations in place to take on the role of Disaster Management?

NATURAL

The Directorate for Civil protection and Emergency Planning (DSB) In the area of national preparedness, DSB is an organization that works at national level in the area of emergency preparedness, it has the mission of coordinating, developing and maintaining emergency, preparedness and response plans, it works in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice and the Police. As well as assessing and reporting to the Ministry and the Government in connection with national crisis management. Aims to identify risks and vulnerabilities in the community, in order to prevent accidents and crises and its objective is to maintain a full overview of the risk and vulnerability in society. (European Commission, 2017)

SOCIAL ECONOMIC STATUS

Stakeholder Analysis

PHYSICAL/ MANUFACTURED

APPLICATIONS TO COMMUNITY RESILIENCE TO FLOOD RISK IN HOMMELVIK

What is the level of uncertainty?

AND INSTITUTES

As explained in Figure 12, community resilience to flooding can be considered in terms of five ‘dimensions’ (Ming et al., 2020), which can be closely mapped to the ‘5 capitals’ approach to sustainable development (Forum for the Future).

SOCIAL

ORGANISATION

Mapping community strengths and assets

THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

CAPITALS

SOCIAL/ECONOMIC /FINANCIAL

Does the river catchment help attenuate or mitigate floodwaters?

Are residents aware of or prepared for flood risk?

What is the level of social cohesion?

Are there individuals or groups with a very high level of vulnerability?

Figure 12: Indicators of resilience to flooding

The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE): Due to the fact that a contingency plan is being developed in case of flooding, one of the authorities that would intervene on behalf of the national government is the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, which operates under the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.

Figure 13: Stakeholder organisations in the event of a disaster

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND THE POLICE

MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND ENERGY

NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE

REGIONAL

DIRECTORATE FOR CIVIL PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY PLANNING (DSB)

COUNTRY ADMINISTRATION BOARD (COUNTY GOVERNOR)

LOCAL

NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL

MUNICIPALITY CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING

THE NORWEGIAN WATER RESOURCES AND ENERGY DIRECTORATE (NVE)

NGOs

LOCAL RESCUE SUBCENTRES (RSC)

The NVE overall responsibility is the prevention of damages caused by flood, in this regard some of its functions include assist local authorities to identify hazards, analyse and evaluate the risk associated with flooding and determine appropriate ways to eliminate or control flooding. (Ortega et al,, 2020) Ministry of Justice and the police: The Ministry of Justice and the Police are in charge of managing the coordination of work in “safety, security and emergency planning within the civil sector in general”. (European Commission, 2017).

This includes the responsibilities for decision making in the area of preparedness systems. The Council for emergency planning is responsible for managing the budget and creating policies along with other ministries.

Figure 14: Houses at risk of flooding.

County Administration Board (County Governor) “The County Governor is the government’s representative at the county level. The County Governor has regional coordination responsibility for civil protection.”. (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2018). One of their responsibilities is to prepare a risk and vulnerability analysis in collaboration with other regional actors in the County in order to maintain an overview of the situation and to have a common platform to anticipate incidents as well as to strengthen coordination between regional organisations. (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2018) Municipality Municipalities are responsible for the continuous functioning of essential services in emergency conditions. Their main responsibility is to address any peacetime emergency. One way to deal with these emergencies is to establish local crisis management plans. In addition, municipalities are required by law to undertake civil emergency preparation for the health sector. (European Commission, 2017)

Findings Site Analysis Hommelvik is a 2.85km2 village with a density of 1,900 inhabitants per square kilometre, lower than the density of 2,400 inhabitants per square kilometre experienced in Trondheim. It is nestled in a compact bay with steep wooden slopes running Figure 16: Stream in Hommelvik.

Figure 15: Play area in Hommelvik.

Figure 13: Houses at risk of flooding

down to the village from the east, south and west, with the sea to the north.

The residential areas comprise of primarily detached wooden houses, surrounded by large gardens with plenty of vegetation and significant spacing (>10 metres) between them, with wide roads and plenty of parking spaces, as shown in Figure 14. The areas have a very ‘village-like’ feel, with few barriers or fences. The eastern part of the village is considered a kulturlandskap verdifulle, or valued cultural landscape, for planning purposes.

As shown in Figure 17, there are a significant number of large cultural institutions dotted around the site, including a church, primary school, middle school, cultural centre, sports facilities and the buildings of the Malvik Kommune. The major north-south highway, the E6, runs to the south of the whilst the major Nordland railway line from Trondheim – Bødo runs just to the north of the village along an embankment adjacent to the sea. Both of these pieces of infrastructure are vital links between southern and northern Norway.

The catchment area around the village is heavily forested with primarily commercial forestry, with multiple small streams running down into the village through a number if disused dams. As significant area of upstream forestry is A områder hovednaturtype skog, or type A protected forestry, which is the ultimate responsibility of the Norwegian Environment Agency1. At the time of visiting, there was evidence of significant snowmelt occurring.

The Homel river itself runs to the east of the village directly adjacent to residential areas and sports facilities, and is fast-flowing and around 20 metres wide.

Site Visit The short site visit revealed important findings around the spatial and social landscape of Hommelvik through field observations and four informal interviews. The interviews revealed a strong community spirit, with people socialising and interacting on the street and inside institutions such as Café Rampa.

There was a very low level of awareness of the risks of flooding in the town, especially amongst the younger interviewees, and of risks to the village Figure 18: The river Homla. https://www.environment.no/topics/biodiversity/protected-areas/; https://faktaark.naturbase.no/?id=VV00003197 1

Figure 17: Cultural institutions include the Kommune (up), church (left), and Culture House (right)

Area of 1-in-200 year flood risk from rivers

TRONDHEIM FJORD

Schools Sports areas

RAILWAY STATION

Public institutions

KOMMUNE BUILDINGS

RESIDENTIAL STEEP SLOPES

ABANDONED DAM

ABANDONED DAM

CULTURE HOUSE

HEALTH CENTRE SMALL STREAMS

RESIDENTIAL STEEP SLOPES

ST

MIDDLE SCHOOL

MIDDLE SCHOOL

TEEP SLOPES

RESIDENTIAL

ay

H E

Rive rH om la

i H E6

w h g

Figure 19: Indicative map of Hommelvik

in general. Notably, the site visit took place during the Covid-19 global viral pandemic, and residents noted that this had little impact on their day-to-day life. The team noted that this could reflect a wider attitude towards risk management as a whole, and possible a low ‘capacity to learn’ from past events (Tyler and Moench, 2012).

The informal interviews have been developed into four personas, as shown in Figure 20.

Dimensions of vulnerability to flooding As described by Ming et al. (2020), the vulnerability of communities in Hommelvik to flooding has been outlined in terms of five dimensions as shown in Figure 21. These highlight existing strengths and weaknesses as well as opportunities for harnessing improvements that could form part of the contingency plan.

Particular strengths include the presence of public buildings outside of risk areas as well as strong social and economic capital and networks in the community.

However, weaknesses include a very low level of awareness of flooding and impermeable surfaces within the village itself.

WEAKNESSES

STRENGTHS

THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

ORGANISATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

“PRUDENCE”

“There’s a strong community spirit in town, with people helping each other out and looking out for each other. The corona crisis hasn’t really affected us to be honest, even though it must be the biggest disaster we’ve ever faced!

We’ve never experienced flooding except during the 2002 ‘ice dam’ event when children were briefly kept away from school. It didn’t affect us much though”

“Hmm, yes there is a minor issue with flooding. Especially, when we have heavy rain or snowmelt, the surface water comes rushing down and can cover the roads and flood peoples cellars. It’s never really been an issue though. I think the last time this happened was two years ago”

Two elderly ladies in their late seventies, enjoying a drink in Café Rampa, who have been retired for many years and lived in Hommelvik their whole lives.

An elderly lady recently retired, out doing her shopping in the local farm shop.

“ANDERS”

“MOKOLAJ”

“I’ve only lived here for about 10 years, but never heard of any flooding or flood risk before!”

“I’ve never heard of any flooding here”

Young working man who lives in the hills around the town.

A recent immigrant to the town who lives directly adjacent to the river..

Figure 20: Illustration Figure 21: Indicators of community vulnerability to flooding, based on Ming et al. (2020)

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NVE has identified flood risks within the village and data is freely available

Some existing flood defences and drainage channels adjacent to the village

Presence of Kommune and multiple social associations in village

Strong sense of community spirit and cohesion

Heavily planted, permeable upstream catchment

Some multi-story stone/brick public buildings are constructed away from areas of flood risk

Two health centres within the village

Evidence of mutual support during Covid-19 crisis

Much of the catchment is protected as a Nature Reserve

Primary school and some residential areas exposed to flood risk

No Disaster Management Authority (DMA) assigned at present

Very low level of awareness of flood risk in the village

Very steep slopes, streams, with some areas of deforestation around the village could lead to high levels of water run-off during heavy rains

Detailed data on return period of fluvial or surface water flooding is not available

Immigrant communities in the village may not have such strong socio-economic networks

High proportion of hard surfacing and few permeable/natural features within the village itself

Little evidence that the future risk of ice dams is considered

Potential to increase awareness of flood risk by harnessing existing strong social networks

Working with landowners to reduce runoff from the upstream catchment could control flood risk

Opportunity to conduct and publish more detailed flood risk mapping for Hommelvik

Permeable surfaces and ‘green’ features in the village centre could help attenuate floodwater

Opportunity to create flood warning systems for homes and public buildings in at-risk areas

Potential risk to transport infrastructure and services Cellars are particularly exposed to flooding

OPPORTUNITIES

“HILDE AND GERD”

Opportunity to use public buildings for emergency shelters during crises

Kommune has the potential to act as the Disaster Management Authority (DMA)

Opportunity to create drainage and water storage as part of the public realm

Potential to hardness existing community institutions for flood planning and response

Stakeholder map NATIONAL

Among the organizations included are Malvik Jager & Fiskerforening, Historielagt Hommelviks Venner y Lions Club Malvik Therefore, they should be included in the process as they will probably be the first to respond. An analysis was made of the power and willingness of these actors who would intervene if necessary as shown in Figure 22.

Outcomes of online survey The purpose of the survey was to get a broader understanding of the local knowledge concerning flood risk, risk management and the local community. The survey was posted on the Facebook group: “Hva SKJER i Malvik�.

The group is described as a bulletin board for everyone in Malvik Municipality, where one can share information about local events, pictures and companies. The group has 5500 members and it is the largest online forum one can reach the population of Malvik and Hommelvik.

The survey got 30 responses. This is generally not a large enough selection of the entire population to generalise the answers, but since many questions have written answers and many of the answers are quite one sided, they could still have use.

The survey and the answers can be found in the attachments.

LOCAL

EV

DSB

Malvik kommune (DMA)

County Emergency Council

P O W E R

Previously, several actors were mentioned who are part of the emergency response in Norway.

This intervention is taking place in a community with a low population density where communitybased social organisations have an important role, as they provide us with pre-existing links in the community.

REGIONAL

Malvik Jeger & Fiskerforening

Historielagt Hommelviks Venner

Lions Club Malvik

I N T E R E S T Figure 22: Stakeholders power-interest analysis

On a scale from 1 (no) to 5 (yes), are you aware of the flood risk in Hommelvik?

1 No 2 3 A little 4 5 Yes

36.7% 10%

43.3%

On a scale from 1 (weak) to 5 (strong), how strong is the "sense of community" in your local community?

26.7%

1 Weak 2 3 4 5 Strong

33.3%

36.7%

Figure 23:Results from survey

Case Study: Natural Catchment Flood Management Approaches “Healthy river catchments store water in the landscape and slow the flow of water downstream”, and ‘Natural Flood Management’ approaches aim to restore and replicate natural processes associated with rivers, catchments and floodplains (Catchment Based Approach, 2020). Flood risk can be reduced in the following ways: 1. Increasing water storage – storing water reduced peak runoff flows e.g. by restoring flood plains and creating attenuation ponds.

2. Increasing catchment roughness - reduces runoff flows by, for example, planting, creating hedgerows and meandering rivers.

3. Increase losses – removing surface water through infiltration or evaporation by, for example, reducing soil compaction, constructing infiltration ponds or plant cover.

Figure 24: An example of a ‘leaky dam’ constructed in the Upper Slad Valley for reducing surface water runoff intro Stroud.

Such measures can be trickier to implement when compared to traditional solutions (such as hard embankments), as they often require co-operation across an entire river catchment with multiple stakeholders, and the outcome of interventions can be hard to predict. However, when implemented effectively they can be low cost and bring multiple additional benefits.

In Stroud, UK, is a Natural Flood Management project with a tiny budget that worked with public bodies, private companies, farmers, other NGOs and local communities to restore natural drainage and reduce flood risk following a major flood in 2007. Similar to Hommelvik, Stroud is surrounded by steep-sided hills that are vulnerable to rapid water runoff. Across the 250km2 catchment over 400 small interventions were constructed over just four years.

These include ‘leaky dams’ for attenuating water, ‘soakaways’ to encourage infiltration into the ground, extensive tree planting and soil erosion protection. These were installed by forming close partnerships between multiple organisations including landowners and community groups and harnessing existing sources of funding. Required maintenance is minimal, the quality of the natural environment has been improved, and existing partnerships formed during the project should be maintained. Since completion of the project, riverrunoff has been dramatically reduced during storm events, and no flooding has been recorded.

Figure 25: A comparison of the downstream river stage before the project (2012) and during (2016) for a comparable rainfall event

Figure 26: Flooding in Stroud in 2007.

The Contingency Plan

01

02

03

04

05

06

HYP O P T H E T I C A L S C E N A R I O

Low impact: Seasonal surface water flooding.

Medium impact: 1-in-200-year flood.

High impact: Future ice dam event.

RESPONSE STRATEGY

Building a resilient community: Based on raised awareness.

Natural Catchment Management: Community-driven approach.

Change of building codes and regulations: Through research working in collaboration with universities.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Short-Term: Better preparation, developing Information resources and sharing them with the Community.

Mid-Term: The six-step evidence based contingency plan held by the existing DMA Long-Term: Play Out The Contingency Plan

O P E R AT I O N A L S U P P O R T P L A N The Disaster Management Authority as the main stakeholder, it is responsible for ensuring sufficient funds and proper communication between the other stakeholders

P R E PA R E D N E S S P L A N

In this case, preparedness is focussed around awareness, information, and coordination.

BUDGET AND TOOLS

Focussed on harnessing existing community assets wherever possible and identifying alternative sources of funding.

Figure 27: Overview of Contingency Plan

LOW IMPACT

Scenarios Low impact: Norway’s scientists predict that with worsening climate change there will be increased precipitation.

During the winter this mean greater snowpack on the hills and mountains. As for the spring this means more intense rainfall.

This scenario is described as the most highly probable, but with the lowest overall impact. Due to the high intensity of rainfall, the Homla river could overtop, causing mainly material damage and affecting infrastructure, mostly homes located along the riverbanks.

Without taking precautionary measures this scenario can be problematic in addition to causing preventable structural damage to infrastructure.

The affected houses would suffer damages such as flooding in basements and some roads would be affected causing mobility issues.

Medium impact: This scenario is based on the NVE 200-year flood map of Hommelvik. It is a more extreme form of the scenario described above. In this situation the Homla river could have a water rise of 6-7 meters.

In this scenario it is not only the houses that would be affected, along the Homla river several important institutions are located, from the school, banking institutions, shops, the stadium to the Hunting and Fishing Association of Malvik would be affected, as well as damage to roads and bridges that would impact the mobility of the area.

High Impact: Currently, about 30% of annual precipitation in Norway falls in the form of snow. Climate change is expected to change the contribution of snow and rain in different ways. As a result, the magnitude and frequency of precipitation in the face of snowmelt floods in Norway will also change (Vormoor, 2016).

In 2002, during the winter, accumulated ice masses caused flooding in Homla. Due to the lack of preparation for this event, the municipality was forced to try to dynamite the ice and finally use machinery. However, this resulted in several of the roads and garages being partially submerged (ElgĂĽsen 2002).

In this scenario, due to the snowmelt in the Homla the flooding would be extreme causing damage to important infrastructure, houses and roads.

On winter greater snowpack on the hills and mountains. As for spring more intense rainfall.

Most highly probable, but with the lowest overall impact.

Due to the high intensity of rainfall, the Homla river overflowed.

Mostly homes located along the riverbanks were affected. damages include flooding in basements, and affected roads.

MEDIUM IMPACT

Based on the NVE 200-year flood map of Hommelvik.

Extreme form of the scenario described above.

The Homla river could have a water rise of 6-7meters.

Not only the houses would be affected, also important institutions, as well as damage to roads and bridges.

HIGH IMPACT Currently, about 30% of annual precipitation in Norway falls in the form of snow.

Climate change is expected to change the contribution of snow and rain in different ways.

Based on 2002 flooding

Due to the snowmelt the flooding would be extreme causing damage to important infrastructure, houses and roads Figure 28: Scenarios description.

Response Strategy The main utility of a response strategy in a plan of contingency is developing appropriate humanitarian responses based on the defined scenario.

So far, we have identified the characteristics of our target community and context, Hommelvik, and we are taking into consideration the pre-defined elements of our scenario. Based on these we focus on the following main objectives to build our contingency plan upon: 1. Building a resilient Community Based on our localised flood mitigation approach, we would like to create resilience in the Hommelvik community. To do so, we need to first, raise awareness because based on our field research it seems like not many people are aware that there’s a risk of flooding.

Second by giving information in a simplified manner, understandable by most, we promote flood preparedness; and through our disaster management authority we create a local-level commission made of community gatekeepers to benefit from local knowledge and bottomup decision making and develop a contingency plan based on the six-step process suggested

by Ohara et al..

2. Natural Catchment Management Due to limited financial resources it’s not possible to count on robust flood prevention structures.

For example, in the Netherlands, it is estimated that building a new dike costs in the region of 200 million NOK/km per meter of dike raised (Aerts, Water and Climate, 2018) which we consider to be unaffordable for Hommelvik.

Part of the strategy is a community-driven approach to natural catchment management, by working with landowners to install costeffective catchment solutions – such as leaky dams and attenuation ponds.

3. Change of building codes and regulations through research Hommelvik is located close to Trondheim and many NTNU campuses.

This proximity to such a large knowledge and technology base can turn Hommelvik to a study case for flood prevention studies. In the longer run, these research and suggestion can result in change of building codes, zoning and regulations.

Figure 29: Representation of response strategy in practice.

Implementation Plan Figure 30: Implementation plan.

RESILIENT COMMUNITIES

NATURAL CATCHMENT MANAGEMENT

(0-1 YEAR)

SHORT TERM

Better preparation (e.g. Supply of sandbags, not storing valuables in basements)

Developing information resources and sharing them with the community (e.g. Information Campaign, Art Project)

CHANGE OF BUILDING CODES AND REGULATIONS THROUGH RESEARCH

RISK COMMUNICATION / DURING CRISIS PROCEEDINGS

Allocate proper resources to establishing network bridge Create a Catchment Management Authority

Install evacuation signs Create the network bridge between NTNU and Malvik Municipality

The six-step evidence based contingency plan held by the existing DMA

Construction of leaky dams, soakaways, infiltration ponds, plant cover

Play out the Contingency Plan

Monitoring and Maintenance

(5+ YEARS)

(1-5 YEARS)

MEDIUM TERM

The six-step evidence based contingency plan held by the existing DMA

LONG TERM

Improve flood modelling and warning systems (e.g. river height reading stations) Conduct research and suggest new regulations and master plans

Enforcement of planning legislation

Flood Risk Mapping Prepare an additional professional team on-call in case of flooding event.

(From Trondheim perhaps)

Operational Support Plan The main utility of an operational support plan is to identify the resources and the stakeholders available, the needs in a response and ensuring sufficient funds and communications between the stakeholders. It is important to focus on the operational support plan because we have an identified potential crisis and we want to involve the community in the preparing, implementation, and response part of the contingency plan. Example of such community groups also referenced in the stakeholder map are Malvik Jeger & Fiskerforening, Historielagt Malviks Venner and Lions Club Malvik.

The municipality are responsible the conduction of impact assessments for measures and planes that could have significant effects on the environment and society (Lov om planlegging og byggesaksbehandling, 2014). A cooperation with NVE would be beneficial here to assess the potential risk in the future.

In our scenario we have disaster risk management authority the main authority would be the Disaster Management Authority. They would oversee the training and the delegating of responsibility to different stakeholders and the community because of the limited resources.

Figure 31: How the Disaster Management Authority works with other stakeholders.

DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY (MALVIK KOMMUNE / MUNICIPALITY)

FIRE DEPARTMENT

HEALTH DEPARTMENT

NTNU DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT

MUNICIPALITY COUNCILS: USER COMITTEES ELDERS COUNCIL SPORTS COUNCIL

NORWEGIAN CIVIL DEFENCE / NORWEGIAN MILITARY

YOUTH COUNCIL NVE

Municipal functions Government functions

NETWORK BRIDGE

POLICE DEPARTMENT

CULTURE COUNCIL

COMMUNITY LEADERS

Preparedness Plan Disaster preparedness is defined as the “knowledge, capabilities, and actions of governments, organizations, community groups, and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from [hazards]” (Chan and Ho, 2018). Preparedness planning focusses on actions that can be taken before a crisis to improve the response. In this case, preparedness is focussed around awareness, information, and coordination.

Greater Awareness

knowledge is sound information. Actions will include: • Partnering with local hiking or outdoors sports to report the presence of ice dams.

• Lobbying NVE to create more detailed longterm flood mapping of Hommelvik for multiple risk levels with predicted water depths and velocities • Working with the national government to provide automatic risk assessments for all addresses, based on the national folkeregister

Awareness involves ensuring the community “perceives” the risks of flooding and has the “preparedness knowledge” to respond appropriately. Chan and Ho note that “gender, age, education, and family income have potential to affect an individual’s emergency preparedness” and therefore a tailored approach is required (2018).

For reaching children, it is recommended that both the primary and secondary school integrate awareness of flood risk into their curriculums. It is proposed that a fund is made available for a lowcost art project (Figure 32) to highlight the risk of flooding in the face of climate breakdown, in collaboration with local associations.

Figure 33: Large-scale art used as part of climate protests in Bristol, UK

More Effective Coordination Building close relationships between existing associations, harder-to-reach groups (such as recent immigrant populations), the Kommune and national authorities such as NVE is an important tool for leveraging social capital and other community assets during a crisis. The Kommune will host a workshop with representatives of all local groups, businesses and educational/cultural institutions in order to: • Identify more vulnerable individuals and groups who are at greater risk from flooding.

Better Information

• Assign community ‘first responders’. In the event of a crises would be responsible for informing and working with vulnerable groups to help them move to places of greater safety.

“Less knowledge about the causes of flood events was associated with lower flood risk perception” (Chan and Ho, 2018, p. 97), and the basis of

• Allocating ‘safe spaces’ in community buildings, that can be used as emergency shelters in the event of severe flooding.

Figure 32: An art project in Bristol, UK, dramatically highlights the potential impact of rising seas levels (Trust New Art Bristol)

Budget and Tools The contingency plan is based on the assumption of a very limited budget, but a strong disaster management authority. Therefore, the approach is Estimated budget

Item

($ > $$$$$)

focussed on harnessing existing community assets wherever possible and identifying alternative sources of funding.

Source of funding

Comments

Short and medium term measures

Risk communication

$ (Relatively low cost – estimated at around 200 NOK per household)

Malvik Kommune

To include household-level information on flood risk in Hommelvik and mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery in the event of a crisis.

Installation of simple evacuation signs

Malvik Kommune, fundraising from local businesses, and the Arts Council Norway

Art project (biannual)

$$ (Relatively low cost, consider harnessing funds from other sources)

Community coordination workshop

$$ (Assuming venue is free, Malvik Kommune primary cost is staffing)

Hosting community coordination and preparedness workshop. Attendees to include community groups, police service, fire service, the Red Cross and others.

Flood risk mapping

N/A (Possible staff time from Malvik Kommune)

Lobbying NVE to create more detailed flood risk mapping for Hommelvik

Network bridge

$$

Malvik Kommune

Malvik Kommune NTNU

Household-level flood resilience

$$$$ The cost to individual homes could be in the order of 20,000-100,000 NOK for Individual households wet or dry flood proofing (Aerts, Water and Climate, 2018)

A bi-annual fund to promote community-level art to highlight the changing risks of flooding.

Knowledge sharing for better planning regulations The cost of building household-level resilience into properties at risk of flooding. Both ‘dry’ and ‘wet’ measures could be considered. ‘Dry’ measures and isolate and waterproof the house against floodwater, whereas ‘wet measures’ allow flood water to enter and retreat with minimal damage to assets.

Long term measures Changes to planning regulations and area masterplan(s)

N/A (Possible staff time from Malvik Kommune)

Malvik Kommune

$$-$$$ Around 4 million NOK (estimated from Stroud Rural SuDS). Cost if NVE, Malvik Kommune, Homla Catchment primarily for staff coManagement landowner contributions ordinating landowners for the construction of low-cost interventions.

Lobbying the Planning department to consider household-level mitigations for new developments. To ensure the mandatory use of Sustainable Urban Drainage (SuDS)

Creating a consortium for effective catchment management

Discussion & Conclusion Reflections on process and challenges The situation that Covid-19 has created can be a good representation of how timely contingency planning can mitigate the possible disturbances.

The probability of a pandemic happening has not been an unknown factor and many have predicted that as before a pandemic will happen again eventually. If the necessary measures have been taken after the last similar events such as SARS or Ebola outbreak, then today we wouldn’t have to spend months in quarantine. However, the lessons that can be learned from this event are quite priceless. National or international health care systems, individual lifestyles, politics, our approach towards globalization and how we are treating our surroundings might or might not change.

But the lesson we took in this course was the importance of interaction in a fieldwork. Unlike our experience last semester, this time we weren’t able to familiarize ourselves enough with the context of our study and the study lacks more one-on-one interviews that otherwise would have verified and evaluated the extent to which our approach can be efficient in Hommelvik.

Discussion Based on the scenario with flood due to heavy rainfall, limited financial resources, disaster management authority and a thorough analysis of the area we have created a contingency plan specific to Hommelvik. We believe that the contingency plan is general and flexible enough to be implemented in other areas with the same scenario, given that a local analysis of the area and its population takes place.

Due to the findings from the survey and the informal interviews we can conclude that the flood risk awareness in the area is low and according to the survey, the people do not know who or which organisation has the management responsibility in a flooding situation. This makes it difficult to create a tailored approach. When working with the community and the community leaders we can spread awareness, coordinate low cost physical preventative measures, and inform about the routines in the event of a crisis.

In many parts of the process the community can be integrated. With a small budget and a strong focus on community engagement, low cost, physical and natural preventative measures is a natural action. Examples of this is tree planting along the river in vulnerable areas to soak up the water and/or lots of small-scale dams upstream to reduce river-runoff during storm events.

For example, the characters that we have introduced and interviewed in our short site visit could behave as follows in this new approach. The hypothetical response of some local residents in Hommelvik to the proposed contingency plan is shown in Figure 34.

Figure 34: Personas

“HILDE AND GERD”

They are now active community gatekeepers and attend the flood mitigation community meetings regularly. DMA also benefits from their knowledge resulted from their long-term residence in Hommelvik.

Two elderly ladies in their late seventies, enjoying a drink in Café Rampa, who have been retired for many years and lived in Hommelvik their whole lives.

“PRUDENCE”

She has been a former NTNU student and now she is helping NTNU researchers to conduct interviews as necessary and helps creating the ‘Network Bridge’ between the Kommune and NTNU.

An elderly lady recently retired, out doing her shopping in the local farm shop.

“ANDERS”

“MOKOLAJ”

After getting familiar with natural catchment solutions in community workshops, now in his free time he helps the other volunteers to make leaky dams here and there in the woods – making some new friends at the same time!

He is very busy and might not attend the workshops but he is happy that now he knows more about his town and he has a stronger sense of belonging. As a result of the raised awareness now he stores sandbags in his basement, keeps valuables upstairs, and knows what steps to take if flooding event occurs.

Young working man who lives in the hills around the town.

A recent immigrant to the town who lives directly adjacent to the river..

MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 31 Members

CONTROL COMMITEE 5 Members

MAYOR

PRESIDENCY 7 Members

COMMITTEE FOR HEALTH AND WELFARE

COMMITTEE FOR CHILDHOOLD AND CULTURE

7 Members

7 Members

ADMINISTRATION COMMITEE 5 Members

COMMITTEE FOR LAND AND COMMUNITY PLANNING 7 Members

USER COMMITTEE

SPORTS COUNCIL

ELDERS COMMITTEE

CULTURE COUNCIL

YOUTH COMMITTEE

Figure 35: Malvik municipality political structure

When examining the Malvik municipality we were positively surprised that they already had many councils for different community groups like youth, elders, sports and culture. This made it easier to structure an operational support plan map where the existing councils could be used as a connection from the disaster management authority to the general population. The natural leaders of the community could be trained to be the first responders in a crisis, engage the community and relay information to the general population.

The lack of information and expertise in any contingency plan can create more, unnecessary uncertainty. A further, in depth dive into the different community groups at risk could make a more comprehensive understanding of the actions that need to be taken. Especially a deeper understanding of the schools in the susceptible area could help us make tailored measures.

Children needs greater guidance in an event that requires evacuation.

Tailored evacuation plans for the kids with yearly training exercises, like one would have fire exercises, could be a possibility. We hope that the municipality councils for the different community

groups can provide us with the necessary information. Further local analysis from NVE are also needed to make informative plans and measures.

Different scenarios based on impact creates the need for an approach that can map the procedures for responses and implementation and budget plan. Due to time constraint, word count and the difficulty of collaboration caused

by Covid-19 we have not implemented such an approach. To further improve this plan in the future, we recommend creating a decision tree analysis based on the different scenarios in collaboration with further studies from the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE).

A possible different approach can be to create a down selection or matrix mapping in collaboration with both the community and NVE to pinpoint the most pressing measures and the correct actions. The contingency plan should be updated frequently.

The climate is ever changing, and an updated plan is the best tool for preventing physical and humanitarian losses in an unpredictable event.

Conclusion Flood risks from rivers can be catastrophic and ruinous for people’s livelihoods, and as the risk of more extreme weather becomes more significant due to climate breakdown these could become even more of a threat. With limited resources, our approach has focussed on building on the existing strengths of the community in Hommelvik and harnessing the benefits of strong social networks to build long-term resilience using the principles of shared learning. These include focussing on solutions that increase preparedness and anticipation of flood risks within the community, using better and more targeted information to build household resilience and protecting the most vulnerable in the community. In the most catastrophic events (such as an ice dam collapse), networks and public buildings will be harnessed to provide places of safety and first aid. During more

regular surface water and fluvial flooding, losses can be minimised by integrating flood protection such as sustainable urban drainage (SuDS) and wet and dry household protection. Examples from around the world have shown how small, targeted solutions at catchment level (such as small leaky dams) can have a dramatic cumulative effect.

Through such an approach, flood resilience can be built a scales, from catchment level to household and street level, with loops of learning working to improve effectiveness over time. In an uncertain world with limited resources, such an approach could provide value across the developed and developing world.

Figure 36: Hommelvik from the surrounding hills

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Appendix 1: Survey Feedback Introduction:

Hvis du husker flommen i 2002, hvordan påvirket det deg?

11 responses • Husker ikke noe spesielt (4 personer) • Jeg bodde ikke så nærme at det påvirket meg (3 personer) • Ikke direkte påvirket, men mange jeg kjenner fikk kjellere fulle av vann (1 person) • Kjelleren full av vann (2 personer) • Høy vannstand, men ingen større fare (1 person)

Flood Risk: Risk management: Hvilken organisasjon tror du ville hatt ansvaret i en flomsituasjon?

30 responses • Vet ikke (4 personer) • Beredskapsteam i kommune, samt nødetater (7 personer) • Brannvesenet (1 person) • Politiet (1 person) • Forsvaret (1 person) • Sivilforsvaret (1 person) • Kommunen (12 personer) • NVE (3 personer)

The local community: Er du klar over mennesker i bygda som kan være mer utsatt for flom enn andre?

26 responses • • • •

Ja (18 personer) Ja, de som bor nær elva (5 personer) Ja, de som bor i Danielstrøvegen (2 personer) Nei (1 person)

Urban Contingency plan for Cultural Heritage buildings along Bakklandet and Kjøpmannsgata Trondheim AAR5220 Urban contingency practice and planning

Group 3 Emilie Helland-Moe Matthew Phillip Galibert Mikkel Evald H. Frengstad Shayesteh Shahand

Introduction Resting under the auspices of the Cultural Heritage Management office, cherished venues across Trondheim are designated under cultural protection, supporting so-deemed proper renovation and use. Though cultural protection of buildings grounds their forms in permanence amidst evolving culture, they must also withstand the evolving realities of climate change. This problem, of preserving cultural heritage, will be posed against a theoretical framework highlighting the need for local government to continuously review dynamic cultural heritage planning in the face of natural hazard risks. Uncertainties are lodged between Trondheim’s current abilities and lack thereof, to predict future conditions, future knowledge, readiness to reach agreements, and changing values.

This contingency plan operates using two different perspectives. With one eye it looks at reducing risks while bolstering responses to the emergency of more predictable short- and medium-term flooding scenarios. With the other, it seeks to develop ways to cope with the uncertain developments regarding sea level rise, climate change and the future network connecting actors in the private and public sectors. The result will be a plan which can readily react to changing circumstances, both internal and external to Trondheim kommune.

To get started, Trondheim kommune must focus on short-term interventions whilst establishing networks and precedents within the stakeholder network to maximize the effectiveness of longterm interventions and minimize and cope with uncertainty.

Though future conditions, knowledge and values are hazy to understand in this moment, investments toward cultural heritage protections are best made in the present. As an ancient Chinese proverb goes, “the best time to plant a tree was twenty years ago, no matter.” In other words, we must try to prepare today, even if we don’t know just how fruitful our attempts will be. We must create a plan to respond to future hazards - one which will be malleable and adaptive such that as the view becomes clearer, we can guide our plans accordingly.

Figure 1: Map of Trondheim with marking of selected case area.

Scenario

Case area

The contingency plan that we propose in this assignment is designed with intentions to deal with the hazards of flooding in Trondheim due to storm surge events: floods which could be potentially exasperated by rising sea level due to climate change. Within this hypothetical, the municipality possesses substantial resources and a central disaster management authority in coordination with local stakeholders. A range of stakeholders will play an important part in developing and implementing both physical and institutional interventions.

Our selected focus area lies on each side of Nidelva river and is demarcated by the Old City Bridge in the south and Bakke Bridge in the north. We chose this area because it has played an important part in the history of Trondheim and contains a large number of heritage buildings. Figure 1 displays a GIS rendering of the case area.

The assignment scenario states that Trondheim is a low-density city prone to flooding from sea level rise. Though sea level rise may induce increased flooding risks caused by heavy rainfall and saltwater intrusion, those outcomes are not directly addressed by this assignment.

Kjøpmannsgata was once the center of trade and commerce in the city and both riverbanks have traditional warehouses which had been used for storing goods which were loaded directly on and off ships. On the western bank, which belongs to the central peninsula called Midtbyen, Kjøpmannsgata (Merchants’ Street) runs parallel to the river. Along the waterline lie the traditional warehouses and atop the higher ground, the richest merchants of Trondheim had their residences.

The oldest warehouses in Kjøpmannsgata still standing today were built in the mid-18th century, while many date back to the 19th century. Some of these warehouses have been demolished and replaced by modern concrete structures (Byantikvaren, 2020). All buildings along the water were historically used by the shipping industry but today they host a range of business activities such as shops, restaurants, offices and even a parking garage.

Figure 2: Photos from the site

Traditional warehouses along Kjøpmannsgata

Bakke bridge

Gamle bybro (Old city bridge)

Traditional warehouses on the Bakklandet side

Figure 3: Map showing buildings of antiquarian value within the focus area (Riksantikvaren, 2020)

Cultural heritage within the case area

buildings

Protected buildings are divided across three classes depending on their assessed level of antiquarian value. The most important buildings belong to class A in Figure 3, which is “very high antiquarian value”. The buildings registered with “high antiquarian value” are class B and the buildings with “antiquarian value” are class C and.

These classifications indicate to what extent homeowners must apply before making replacements or altering parts of their buildings, depending on the associated antiquarian value.

The case area contains many registered buildings.

Among the row of warehouses along the Kjøpmannsgata waterfront, there are 26 buildings in total. Of these, 23 are listed as heritage: five with “very high antiquarian value” (class A), 13 with “high antiquarian value” (class B), and five with “antiquarian value” (class C).

On the Bakklandet side lies 75 buildings in total; of which 40 are listed as cultural heritage: one with “very high antiquarian value” (class A), 17 with “high antiquarian value” (class B) and 22 with “antiquarian value” (class C) (Trondheim kommune, 2020a).

Figure 4: Cross-section of Bakklandet and Kjøpmannsgata waterfront.

Bakke bridge is listed with “high antiquarian value” (class B), and Gamle bybro (Old town bridge) is listed with “very high antiquarian value” (class A).

Naturally, the entire area is registered as a cultural heritage consideration zone. This means that any alterations to existing constructions, new buildings or physical interventions must harmonize with the existing environment and be approved by the city council. (Trondheim kommune, 2020a)

Preservation and authenticity A building will always be exposed to wear from natural processes and human activity. In reality, preservation is about controlling and mitigating decay. Proper maintenance, it follows, includes regular painting and replacement of dilapidated parts. Replacing original parts of the building reduces the material authenticity of the building, so renovation measures should only be taken when necessary (Christensen, A.L., 2011). On the other hand, active use of historical buildings improves the success of their preservation (Trondheim kommune, 2013).

Figure 5a: Aerial photo of the case area with indicators corresponding to sections in Figure 4

The traditional warehouses along the river had been well suited to the riparian surroundings.

The foundation poles, however, have been replaced when necessary over the years. Modern functions, like residential space, shops and restaurants are, according to our correspondence with the Byantikvaren office, more sensitive to water intrusion than the old, uninsulated storage rooms.

Building technique The traditional warehouses were constructed in wood with gabled roofs. The gavlveggs face the street and the river; and most of these buildings extend farther out across the river yet are narrowly built between each other. The foundation of the buildings consists of wooden poles, driven deep into the mud.

Figure 5b: Huitfeldtbrygga: One of the oldest warehouses, middle wing built around 1766 and used as a lumber warehouse. (kulturminnesok, 2020). Photo: National Heritage Board’s cultural heritage base.

For many of the old warehouses that are not well maintained this poses a risk. If the poles were to collapse, it would cause the buildings to slide into the river. The buildings do not have a closed basement so when the tide is low the poles are made visible (Godal, 2019).

Figure 5c: Bruvakten: Erected 1795 for the guardians of Gamle Bybro, which was constructed in 1681. Today, it is used as a kindergarten. Photo: public commons, no copyright.

Theory An “adaptation pathways” approach focuses on the development of ongoing review of the unfolding situation and the various decisions which stakeholders can make along the way. The approach allows dynamic adaption as it emphasizes continual analysis of identifiable thresholds. As a decision-making tool, the adaptation pathways approach consists of a sequence of manageable steps over time. Choices and actions are initiated as each threshold to breaks (or in expectation of breakage), within the current situation. This calls for the associated stakeholder(s) to be aware of and to review their viable short-term options while calculating new potential long-term options.

Figure 6 shows an example of adaptation pathways, vis-a-vis coastal flooding, as a review of feasible options. As thresholds in the diagram are reached, decisions must be made to redirect the response toward a new range of best practices. As any of these new solutions become obsolete, options should be reviewed once more.

Thresholds points may be breached in two scenarios.

The first scenario, a tipping point, occurs when the current option is set to expire or is predicted to become no longer workable. An example of this ephemerality might be that as sea level rises over time, today’s solutions are rendered obsolete.

Drains and culverts may become inadequate over time as storm surges inundate larger areas.

Another type of threshold breach requires adaptations with protracted considerations. An example here may be when a storm causes the sea wall flood prevention system or dike levies to fail. This may necessitate major upgrades or infrastructure replacement. In this case, the next strategy chosen within the adaptive pathways framework would depend on the predicted “lead time”. This is a tricky situation, as the decisionmakers involved must analyze how much time is necessary for infrastructure design revisions, locating funding, and engaging the communities involved to negotiate the changes.

Figure 6: Example of adaptation pathways for coastal flooding by the Eyre Peninsula Climate Change Agreement Committee (EPICCA), South Australia (Siebenritt et al., 2014).

Figure 7: Models of adaptive pathways illustrating how reviewing and realigning strategies before each threshold is intended to prevent planning decisions from statically becoming maladaptive (Reisinger in Wise et al., 2014).

Adaptive pathways are meant to function as a tool to cope with uncertainty between the unfolding effects of climate change and evolving technologies, population size, urban morphology, economics, and public values. We will be able to better cope with uncertainties such as these by avoiding the maladaptions that may arise from static planning decisions - those which are not dynamic along changing conditions and knowledge. As a planning solution is understood to eventually fail at some point, it must be amended or replaced before the failure occurs. This is an act of steering planning away from the maladaptive space. Adaptation pathways approaches avoid breaching flood hazard thresholds by making considerations for alternatives that help Trondheim adapt to future conditions (see Figure 7).

Methodology We began with a literature review on topics of uncertainty and the adaptation pathways approach.

The case studies we reference include Venice, due to its ongoing effort to preserve culturally sensitive coastal builds and Rotterdam, due to its constant efforts to tackle sea level rise by drawing from a plethora of engineering and policy solutions.

Addressing the assigned scenario provided assumptions and available resources which affected our determinations of which interventions to use. Reflexive discussion with Byantikvaren throughout the process further informed us on the current contingency plan concerning sea level rise.

Responses from the municipality were useful to this planâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s risk assessment between natural hazards and current preparedness strategies, in addition to identifying current collaborative stakeholders.

Risk assessment Sea level is expected to rise on a global scale at least to some degree. As coastal cities such as Trondheim develop activity near the waterline, sea level rise makes efforts of cultural heritage increasingly tenuous.

In some areas, including most central parts of Norway, the effect of sea level rise is mitigated by land rise. Land rise is a result of the land being relieved of the weight of the ice cap that covered much of Northern Europe during the previous ice age. Around Trondheim the land rise is relatively high, progressing around three millimeters per year (Nordgulen et al., 2006) and when taking land rise into account, the sea level in Trondheim is estimated to rise with 53 centimeters by 2090.

Upstream, the Nidelva watercourse is blocked by several hydropower dams, which means that a flash flood caused by snow-melt and ice is not a threat. Although contingent events like a dam breakage or a tsunami induced by quick clay slides could occur, they are not included in our plan. Our scenario addresses only flooding due to sea level rise, and in this case hydropower damming could be an advantage as it de-stresses the floodplain by reducing the riverâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s flow during storm surges and unusually high tides.

Sea level rise is a slow process and does not pose the same immediate threat as a pluvial flood. This gives time to prepare and adapt to changes but the slow progression also gives contingency planning in Trondheim a measure of insulation, as time is expected to bear out the effects of climate change relatively forgivingly.

Case studies Responses to sea level rise Cultural heritage sites are threatened by climate change and sea level rise across the world. In cases of improper insulation, they can be damaged by changes in internal conditions such as temperature and humidity (Huijbregts et al, 2012).

Responses to the sea level rise are classified into five different groups, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in order to reduce the vulnerability and protect the coastal area from flooding. Appropriate responses are specified depending on geographical features, cultural context, benefits, and drawbacks associated with each intervention (see Figure 8).

The five response groups are: Protection: barriers to block the water such as dikes, seawalls, breakwaters and beach dune systems.

Accommodation: various interventions and combination of biophysical and institutional responses to decrease vulnerability amongst residents, human activities, ecosystems and the built environment such as raising buildings, planting salt tolerant crops, insurance and early warning system.

Advance: creation of new land above sea levels using fill materials and water pumping.

Retreat: moving people, buildings and activities to a safer zone with approaches such as migration, displacement and relocation.

Ecosystem-based adaptation: preservation and restoration of coastal ecosystems (Oppenheimer et al, 2019) Venice The Experimental Electromechanical Module or MOSE project is a mobile barrier system including 79 flood gates across three entrances. The gates link the Venetian lagoon to the Adriatic Sea (Mitchell,2017). This system separates the lagoon temporarily from the sea and can resist sea level rise up to 60 centimeters above current sea level (Munaretto et al,2012). Fig. 9 explains the details of this project.

Considerable debates continue to swirl the scientific, social, political and environmental impacts of this project. Much of the controversy stemming from its costs and consideration as a short-term solution. They are only effective until sea level rise eventually reaches over them (Mitchell,2017).

In addition, continual closure of these gates hinders natural tidal flushing, resulting in declining water quality (Meredith et al,2019). The cost of the project was nonetheless justified by arguing rehabilitation of damaged buildings after a flood is more expensive than infrastructure work such as this barrier (Oppenheimer et al, 2019). Various other actions have been taken in Venice including temporary barriers across doorways, pumping flood water with mechanical levies, designing waterproof walls, and elevating public surfaces (Fletcher & Spencer, 2005; Keahey, 2002).

Figure 8: Different types of responses to coastal risk and sea level rise. (Source: Oppenheimer et al,2019)

Figure 9: Diagram of the Experimental Electromechanical Model (MOSE) (Lor, 2016).

The Netherlands A complex water management system preserves the Netherlands in response to the circumstance that more than a quarter of the country lay below sea level and rivers and deltas constitute more than half of the country by area.

A) Reducing the total coastline length, leading to decreased the length of dikes necessary.

Having this relationship with the sea the Netherlands is now regarded as the gold standard as one of the best-prepared countries for sea level rise. Natural hazard risks are controlled by structural interventions such as locks, bridges, tunnels and storm surge barriers (Mitchell,2017).

C) Shipping has enhanced by connecting islands.

Delta Works is a massive chain of flood protection structures including 13 dams in the format of barriers, sluices, locks, dikes and levees. Fig. 4D demonstrates the location of these dams.

This project has benefited the Netherlands in various ways (Water Technology, 2020):

B) Drainage facilitation of low areas and flow control of saltwater from the sea, consequently supplying potable and fresh water for irrigation.

D) Offering new recreational facilities.

Figure 10: Location of flood protection structures in Delta Works project, the Netherlands (Water Technology, 2020).

Figure 11: Location of flood protection structures in Delta Works project, the Netherlands (Water Technology, 2020).

Stakeholder analysis Because the assignment scenario provides substantial resources and a disaster management authority, the main focus will be on institutional stakeholders. This strategy focuses on densifying the stakeholder network with more frequent and clearer connections, and should ensure that the substantial financial resources and personnel available respond efficiently and precisely.

The stakeholders listed here operate within hierarchical levels of governing influence, as illustrated by the stakeholder analysis diagram (Figure 12). This figure visualizes where we predict, based on their functions, the stakeholders fall on a low-to-high range of interest toward cultural heritage protections from flooding and the degree of power which they could exercise in the development of contingency plan projects (UKEssays, 2018). Each actor prepares, responds, adapts and transforms uniquely to disruptions regarding future sea level rise.

Norwegian cultural heritage management system The Norwegian cultural heritage management is a system in which actors across varying levels of government carry out different tasks.

The national, regional, and local levels consist mainly of administrative tasks which in some way regulate and protect cultural heritage. They impose guidelines and rules over how to physically manage the cultural heritage to the owners (Riksantikvaren, 2020).

Figure 12: Stakeholder analysis diagram.

Landowners, the most important actors involved because they host physical interventions, may be either public or private actors. They must ensure building conditions comply with the requirements of law and regulations formalized by the government (Trondheim kommune, 2013).

Ancillary Stakeholders: The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) NVE is responsible for managing the Norwegian water and energy resources. One aspect of their task is to supervise flood management. They examine and monitor water levels and inform and guide the authorities on national, regional and local flood hazard conditions (NVE, 2020).

To do so, they deploy early warning systems and forecasts. Through the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Varsomâ&#x20AC;? platform, which renders notification services, specialist knowledge and IT systems are made available to all concerned stakeholders. NVEâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s primary goal is to prevent loss of life and property associated with snow avalanches, floods, landslides, clay slides and ice conditions in Norway (Varsom, n.d.). Using their established platform and network, NVE provides crucial data regarding local conditions including within Bakklandet. NVE and Trondheim should develop a strong consultancy relationship to contribute in the development and implementation of future contingency plans in Bakklandet. In the case of an emergency situation, NVE becomes yet more

central of an actor by monitoring physical conditions of the area and providing up-to-date information, informing decisions at the municipality level.

Statskraft Statskraft AS is Norway’s largest power producer and is owned by the state (Rosvold, 2019a). Leirfossen vannkraftverk is a hydroelectric power plant situated along the southern course of Neavassdraget (Nidelva) in Trondheim and is owned by Statskraft (Rosvold, 2019). This hydroelectric power plant has a primary function to regulate the watercourse to provide a steady energy production. This function can be applied during a spring tide to reduce the water’s height by decreasing the throughput in the Leirfossen power plant.

Civil defense The Norwegian Civil Defense is a state reinforcement resource for the emergency and rescue departments in the event of major accidents and special incidents. They are subject to the Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) and are again subject to the Ministry of Justice and Emergency Management.

While the Civil Defense’s most important task in the past was to protect the civilian population from the dangers of war, the activities today are particularly aimed at major fires, floods, rages, oil spills and searches for missing persons.

Each year, the Civil Defence is summoned to participate in roughly 300 missions. They have competencies, and are organized and equipped to render operative support to the emergency and rescue departments. This stakeholder provides local training in areas of response and their specialized knowledge and training will contribute insights into safety measures, hazards identification, and mobility of personnel and equipment. They operate the country-wide public warning service in the event of immediate danger (Sivilforsvaret, n.d.), which may lead to a further densified adaptation network along with NVE and the Trondheim kommune.

Trondheim Municipality The municipality of Trondheim is a vital stakeholder, organizing and managing several tasks within this contingency plan simultaneously. They possess the jurisdictional decision making authority for land use and construction and can therefore plan toward transforming and adapting to climate changes. This involves a coordination responsibility which demands a leadership role. They must act as the leveraging stakeholder to establish linkages

between on-site, local stakeholders with those operating at larger scales, such as NVE, the Civil Defense, Red Cross, and Statskraft. Providing information before, during and after the event is an important municipal operation (DSB, 2018).

Red Cross The Norwegian Red Cross is a voluntary, humanitarian aid organization. They are involved in preparedness, search and rescue, before, during and after a crisis.The Red Cross is recognized as a supporting actor for the government. This means, among other things, that the Red Cross should be able to assist the authorities in emergency preparedness work at the local, county and central level (Røde Kors, n.d.). In Trondheim, the Red Cross has over 1000 volunteers that can be mobilized (Trondheim Røde kors, 2020).

During extreme weather and major events, the Red Cross could assist with both provisions and logistics tasks, search and rescue, information dissemination and staffing of the municipality’s evacuation and touchdown center. When it comes to cultural heritage they can contribute to clear the area, seek out and minimize the potential damage (Røde Kors, n.d.).

Community Members The community of Bakklandet and Kjøpmannsgata includes residents, shops, offices, cafes, and restaurants. The inhabitants and users have organized themselves to varying degrees. Some are independent while others have formed collective groups. “Bakklandet and Lillegårdsbakken resident association” maintains an active webpage and Facebook group (Blvel, n.d.). Group membership encourages community stewardship of the area and, to some degree, improves engagement and commitment. These assets could be strengthened if they are included as a recognizable component of the contingency plan’s input. Especially so, if the group is an outreach tool validated by Trondheim kommune.

The community possesses valuable knowledge about the area. Some information tends to be hidden and less available to outsiders, including professionals and scientists. They are therefore an important informational source when it comes to both physical and institutional interventions in the area. The community can also influence the municipal plans through participation, but also may act of their own volition.

Contingency Plan

Source: https://www.deviantart.com/tag/bakklandet

Response strategy

This contingency plan’s primary perspective is to manage two goals simultaneously: those of preparing and of reacting to the possible event of hazardous storm surge and eventual intrusion of sea level in the cultural heritage area. In preparation, both physical and institutional infrastructure shall be developed. In reaction, the further-developed network of stakeholders at all levels shall be leveraged to divert capital for rehabilitation and improvements of the protected sites when necessary, and for rapid response to on-the-ground assessments during hazard events.

Synergizing physical and institutional interventions is key to creating adaptation pathways that harness stakeholders at various levels. Codifying community-generated goals and establishing a precedent of governance will create the forwardlooking framework necessary to continually update contingency plans over decades.

Institutional instruments, when developed further, will create capacity for faster response and interdepartmental communication. They do so by leveraging knowledge networks, resources, and logistical practices that may more quickly respond to hazard events. Creating a sort of local consortium on contingency plans with ties to the neighborhood or district level upward to regional and state entities assists transfer of ideas, knowledge, and data. An important step in improving governance amidst changing hazards and sources of uncertainty is to create a precedence: a culture of ongoing review.

Importantly, the many stakeholders involved in cultural heritage, infrastructure, and residential and commercial space should be involved in the development of contingency plans. These same stakeholders should thrive within a system of accessibility amongst each other. Clear channels should be established between stakeholders, such that when a tipping point is breached beyond what one set of stakeholders can manage, other stakeholders may intervene and collaborate readily.

Physical instruments, such as public engineering works, performative architecture and cultural protection practices, address some of the weaknesses embedded in Trondheim’s current knowledge. These weaknesses, so to speak, are the gaps in knowledge that face efforts to cope with uncertainty arounds flooding hazards caused by sea level rise. Wherever the municipality’s assessments

can uncover or at least reasonably predict hazards today, works of engineering might be considered.

In a sense, physical instruments will be deployed in the short term in order to buy more time. This time will be used to evaluate the performance of such stop-gap engineering methods, to monitor regional climate change impacts, and to strengthen networks to better comprehend and prepare for the needs of the future. In other words, engineering works and architectural innovations will use today’s knowledge to better secure our ability to cope with uncertainty as the effects of climate change unfold.

They will do so by providing Trondheim buoyancy such that the municipality can spend resources on developing contingency measures rather than focusing entirely on response-oriented emergency actions — as might occur in places without developed contingency planning practices. It is thanks to the initial physical interventions that thresholds along the adaptation pathways can be identified.

Implementation plan Emergency Responses When a storm surge occurs, several actions must be implemented depending on the severity and level of water rise. Various factors such as duration,

speed, cause and source of flooding influence flood resistance measures. There are two approaches to protect old buildings from flooding: reducing the water entering the property and mitigating damage resulting from water entering the property Some types of flood protection buy valuable time to relocate people and possessions and to prevent indoor entrance of the water. Based on general guidance, floodwater over one meter in height should not be kept back unless it can cause damages to buildings (Pickles et al, 2015).

Water can enter a building through cracks in external walls, vents and air bricks, around windows and doors, gaps around pipes and etc. (Pickles et al, 2015). All of these openings in basements and ground floors should be sealed (homeowners held responsible). As an example, this might be executed by residents who are reminded by a local NGO partner like the Norwegian Civil Defense or Red Cross, and in coordination with the municipality.

A surge barrier should be activated before the storm surge arrives, if this is possible. The port authority, municipality, and NVE might coordinate this action whilst local authorities and the Bakklandet and LillegĂĽrdsbakken resident associations coordinate the removal of debris from drainage before a storm.

The barrier shall consist of a permanent wall along the waterfront, featuring moveable gates along the inlets of the canals. The entire barrier shall be located offsite from the case area, meaning it does not impair cultural heritage value.

Closing the flood barrier would result in the water flowing through the Nidelva river building up inside.

This can partly be adjusted by reducing the water flow through Leirfossen power plant. The excess water level will be furthermore accommodated through physical interventions on the riverbanks.

In the riparian corridor from Leirfoss to Stavne, where there are no buildings close to the waterline; this is already secured by natural vegetation and landscape.

When it comes to individual buildings, maintenance is the most important factor. Well-kept building facades are less vulnerable to degradation and neglected warehouses are prone to sagging as their wooden pole foundations rot or sink. Repairing or replacing the foundation poles of a warehouse can elevatie the floor level by more than a meter.

Organizational development Capacity to enact the plans above is increased if the stakeholder networks interleave more densely. This requires them to maintain methods of communication that are instantaneous, simple,

and clear. Long term relationships between the municipality and national stakeholders already exist but can be further strengthened. For example, annual drills and exercises might be executed to test practical preparedness.

The Bakklandet and LillegĂĽrdsbakken resident associations should have easy 24/7 access to national and NGO stakeholders and should be well-informed of the resources available during hazard events. Procedures should be trained at regular intervals here as well and the borettslag styre (neighborhood board) should work in conjunction with Trondheim kommune to conduct environmental reviews of the neighborhood, delineating opportunities for improvements during regular reviews.

A local architectural review board should study proposed changes and discern whether they pass the cultural heritage requirements while simultaneously bolstering defensible space against flood water.

Preparedness plan Surge barriers To prevent water elevation from inundating Bakklandet and Kjøpmannsgata, Trondheim could construct a surge barrier system akin to the MOSE project constructed in Venice. The scope of the installation would be on a comparatively smaller scale, due to a significantly smaller closure required and consist of one surge barrier at the river mouth of Nidelva and another to the west of downtown to close the canal, as indicated in Fig 13. NVE and Statskraft would be the presumptive essential collaborative stakeholders for operations of the surge barrier.

Increase in permeable surface area Land along the waterfront in the consideration zone, if it is not occupied by a cultural heritage building, should be used deliberately. If the land is not claimed already for dense activity, it can be redeveloped to improve the areaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s drainage capacity. Green spaces should be protected and developed throughout the entire city to destress the sites where sheet flow drains. An underutilized parking lot, as illustrated by Fig 15., provides a useful example of a location where this practice can be exercised.

Figure 13: Locations of surge barriers, indicated by the two larger rings, proposed infill and the case area location, indicated by an orange quadrilateral.

A park area known as Marinen can be converted into a flood plain. This green area lies on the western bank between Elgeseter bridge and Old town bridge and stretches from the Nidaros cathedral churchyard down to the river. Additionally, we propose to cover open spaces between buildings in Bakklandet and Kjøpmannsgata with ponds and vegetation that can withstand flooding and soak up some of the water. As an illustration, a parking lot located in Kjøpmannsgata can be transformed to a green area to collect spilled water from the river.

Legal protection The Norwegian planning and Building Act describe which constructions must be protected from flooding and to what extent. This is equal for all buildings depending on their function and importance. Heritage buildings are also protected by the Cultural Heritage Act (Lovdata ,n.d.).

Figure 14: Case contextual illustrations of surge barriers (top and middle) and infill development for permeability (bottom).

Figure 15: Case contextual illustrations of surge barriers (top and middle) and infill development for permeability (bottom).

The regulation does not however consider sea level rise, which means that the buildings will be less resistant to flood as the sea level raises over time.

An update of the law and regulation will make sure that this change is taken into account. Another

thing that could provide better adaptation will be to demand certain building materials, good drainage, and interiors in areas that are exposed to sea level rise, floods and storm surges.

Building maintenance and rehabilitation Even though the law and regulations in some ways protect new buildings from the flood zone, many existing buildings, including parts of Bakklandet and Kjøpmannsgata, are located below this zone.

Throughout time the buildings from mid 18th to 19th century have needed maintenance. The municipalityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s latest project was initiated from 2015-2018, and aimed to revitalize the buildings at Kjøpmannsgata. This was done to a couple of the buildings and the measures varied. Some of the physical interventions were improvement of the building foundation - and the facade, prevention of sliding and replacement of building poles (Trondheim kommune, 2020b). Renewal and maintenance of the buildings and surroundings are a key factor to keep the cultural environment.

Projects initiated by the municipality are a good instrument to start a big scale renewal/maintenance that is coherent.

Mapping and warning system (knowledgebased/Informative) NVE and The Norwegain Mapping Authority provides mapping service through a flood zone map (NVE, 2020b) and a storm surge and sea level map (Kartverket, n.d.). Predictions for storm surge events are part of the weather forecast and are conducted by the meteorological institute. The system operates with three levels of danger: yellow, orange and red. The hazard warnings contain information about the degree of danger (severity), i.e. how severe the weather will be according to criteria in the contingency plan. The warning will also contain information about the probability that the danger warning will occur, or that the storm is ongoing (Meteorologisk institutt, 2018).

Even though a mapping and warning system are well established and exist, it requires continuous updates to be useful for the users. In a time with increasing climate change and new technology, these services need to be prioritised and renewed.

It is an important information source that will provide guidelines on how the actors will act and prepare. Good and thorough information will also reduce the potential risk the flood can have.

Evacuation plan Trondheim municipality has prepared an overall

contingency plan, delineating an overview of their preparedness responsibilities, roles, pre-requisites, organization, dimensions etc.

(Trondheim kommune, 2017). A further way to tailor an evacuation plan is to have it placeoriented. The plan is going to include various aspects that will result in a comprehensive plan.

One aspect is to look at how, what, and where the community and visitors are going to go during a happening. Since they consist of both permanent, day and nighttime workers and visitors, a mapping would be necessary. Meeting points and exit routes will also be defined. The other aspect will be to look at the different stakeholders that are going to participate in the evacuation. They must know what to do, and which actions to take. It is necessary to bring in external actors that can help with the evacuation. An example of this could be to involve transportation actors like AtB, road authority that can help bring out and in people and materials.

Doing so the evacuation plan will help sort out the different ressources the stakeholders hold.

Adding a Cultural Heritage Protection Plan to the Comprehensive Planning Process Identified stakeholders: Riksantivaren, Fylkeskommune, Restaurant-, shop - and cafe owners, residents & resident association, landowners Today, the primary purposes of local planning processes are to: 1.Decide on appropriate uses of land and the spatial pattern of development.

2.Identify lands with development constraints, such as floodplains, wetlands, steep slopes, and shallow depth to bedrock, as well as lack of central water and sewage service.

3.Regulate the location, timing, and design of development.

4.Invest in gray infrastructure, such as sewer and water facilities, public buildings, roads, and transit, and in green infrastructure, such as parks, tree planting, green streets, and green roofs, to address current needs and to influence the siting, design, intensity, and sustainability of future development.

(Daniels, 2014) Cultural heritage protection can be worked into the above conversations. To prevent the exclusion of contingency measures during these developments,

the legal impetus to update a hazard-action strategy should be added to the local and regional comprehensive plans. The local planning office can expand its responsibilities to the following: 1. Explore the use of zoning overlay districts to protect features of cultural importance such as scenic rivers, ridgelines, viewsheds, and heritage buildings.

2. Explore state and municipal funding for the protection of cultural viewsheds and toward physical implements and/or actions of imminent domain: the government purchasing private property for public purpose.

3. Create partnerships with nonprofit groups for the preservation of important, unique, and historically important resources and buildings.

4. Deliberate creating a regional housing, supply storage/procurement, and volunteer network with neighboring municipalities.

Adding Cultural Heritage to Future Capital Improvement Programs Identified stakeholders: Riksantikvaren, Fylkeskommune, restaurant, shop and cafe owners.

Figure 16: Common color code to communicate threshold statuses along adaptive pathways map.

The city will implement a capital improvement program (CIP) as a short-range plan of 5-10 years to identify equipment purchases, infrastructure improvements, and to identify capital projects.

Figure 17: Theoretical diagram of adaptation pathways system approach embedded across stakeholder groups.

Upon each threshold breakage, stakeholders respond by leveraging adaptation strategies from the broader network.

Capital Improvement following:

Programs

feature

the

●Ranking projects in order of importance with criteria set by city staff. ●While criteria is officially set by staff, they should be informed via public participation, especially owners of protected buildings. ●Encouraging a timetable and financing plan for capital improvements. ●Justification for projects ●A listing of equipment, projects, and property to be purchased.

An example of this process follows: 1. Establish a capital planning committee with bylaws 2. Take inventory of existing capital assets 3. Evaluate previously approved, unimplemented or incomplete projects 4. Assess financial capacity 5. Solicit, compile and evaluate new project requests 6. Prioritize projects 7. Develop a financing plan 8. Adopt a capital improvement program 9.Monitor and manage approved projects within the CIP 10. Update existing/ongoing capital programs (ex. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2016) A primary goal of this contingency plan is to develop policies such as cultural heritage capital improvements programs, improving the municipal planning process, and implementing physical interventions with stakeholder inclusivity as a central tenant. Figure 18 illustrates this concept of recursivity by highlighting the many possible moments in which various stakeholders might provide valuable inputs.

Taking Stock: Periodic Environmental Audit Board Identified stakeholders: Riksantikvaren, Fylkeskommune, Red Cross, AtB, NSB, Norwegian Civil Defense, healthcare, police, fire brigade, residents & resident association An organization (local government, NGO, or state government, among possible others when they become known), should conduct environmental audits of the region and non-contiguous subareas such as Trondheim, the riverfront, the port shoreline, the uplands, lowlands, hinterlands, and any broader connecting areas of relevance. The

geographic extent most likely to consider can first be the simulated floodplain maps for various ranges (5-500 year floodplains, for example).

This board would be responsible for researching and translating to lay-terminology the current and future scenarios for natural hazard risks throughout Trondheim. This, naturally, would include the Bakklandet and Kjøpmannsgata location. Other project sites to be considered might include riparian or high density urban, so the auditors must decide on most appropriate evaluation criteria and make recommendations, depending on their chosen indicators and sizes of study area.

Establishing an organization as such can create a precedent of ongoing review, amenable to change according to the evolving situation in the area.

Regularized review can take into consideration new technologies, human movement patterns (migration or transportation), and weather phenomena, to name only a few phenomena.

The environmental planning review should take special care to include cultural heritage buildings as high priority items. Other auditing goals might include ensuring water and air pollutants will not be released during flooding events, evacuation pathways are protected, water can quickly and naturally filter and drain, flood plain maps are reevaluated, and the built environment remains in a safe-to-fail state toward key elements such as public transportation and the movement of goods and services.

Operational plan Short term

Operations for the surge barriers NVE and Statskraft are responsible for mapping and monitoring the river flow in Nidelva, it will therefore be necessary for them to coordinate operations with the porth authority and municipality. The daily activity of the barriers might be adjusted based on measurements from the river and weather forecast.

If a storm surge breaches the sea wall, the fire departments in Trøndelag, mainly owned by Trondheim municipality, will engage in water removal efforts following their best practices. They will also be responsible for clearing sheet flow storm drainage. In such a situation the community, voluntary organizations such as the Red Cross might contribute considerably.

Management of dam flow The river flow in Nidelva is monitored 24/7, as damming is already considered a critical operation.

This is done by NVE and Statkraft. The monitoring makes it possible to react instantaneously whilst the warning system and communication from the state take place.

Operations for drainpipe infrastructure management The municipality operates and maintains the city’s water and sewage system through the City Maintenance Services (Trondheim kommune, 2020c).

Outdoor area maintenance Public roads, green spaces and outdoor recreation areas will be operated by the City Maintenance Services run by the municipality (Trondheim

kommune, 2020c). As a supplement to the existing maintenance, a landowner-user contract may be negotiated so on-site management can be performed year-round and more frequently than the municipality’s work. This could, for example, result in more permeable ground area and better access for sheet flow to drain. The Bakklandet and Lillegårdsbakken resident associations may coordinate the removal of debris from drainage whenever a storm surge is expected.

Emergency response and materials The municipality, coupled with varied actors from homeowners in Bakklandet and Kjøpmannsgata, Maintenance service, Red Cross, AtB, NSB and so on, shall form a networked immediate response.

The most thoroughly-networked stakeholder will be Trondheim kommune and should therefore lead mobilization of the entire stakeholder grid. Perhaps

Figure 18: Contingency planning inputs concept map. Each stakeholder may expand into new advisory, response, and planning functions if communication increases while bureaucratic constraints decrease. The orange arrows linking functions highlight that some resources and actions can inform or improve the others.

the central-most fire station could conduct this mobilization, as it compliments their mission as an emergency response body.

time. The money could act as a buffer and a safety net when it comes to the different interventions that are going to be implemented.

Long term

Establish environmental review board Trondheim municipality should take the initiative to organize and make the audit board. The committee should be a representative selection and be relevant to the case. The board should be composed of actors within Bakklandet such as the Bakklandet and Lillegårdsbakken resident associations, cultural management office, environment directorate and the municipal department of planning and building.

To ensure progress in the audit board the members should meet regularly - for example, annually.

Stakeholder coordination and network densification The adaptive pathways approach is workable within multiple scales of governance. Within Trondheim, residents and the municipality would operate a pathways approach of multiple actions and thresholds that are relevant to their respective capacities to manage natural hazards. If those actions fail, are exhausted, or become too costly, then Trondheim itself has reached its own resilience threshold.

When this breakage is identified or expected, the municipality must engage its broader network of resources. Figure 17 illustrates this concept by showing how Haasnoot et al.’s (2012) conceptual framework for adaptive pathways can be embedded within multiple organizations which must coordinate reflexively. This underscores the importance of continuous development of communications and procedural clarity.

Extensive communication would be necessary for stakeholders to understand the systems in which other stakeholders operate. Therefore, rather than requiring a live update of the statuses for each adaptive pathways thresholds, a codified system such as Fig 16. as an example, may signal to operators at other levels of government or industrial sectors that collaboration may be required.

Emergency funds dispersal Although cultural heritage protection is legally the property owner’s responsibility, the public should actively contribute to protection. A potential mechanism for private-public cooperation is cultural heritage protection financial assistance; in particular, when protection implies additional costs to the owner (Trondheim kommune, 2013).

A well-established platform can help stakeholders to maintain contact in a tidy and transparent way.

It will also be easier for the public to follow the process regarding the buildings and surrounding environment.

A long term intervention could also be to actively invest and set off money in a fund which will work as an insurance coverage and relief aid. This needs to be organized and the money appropriated over

Budget It is a compelling argument that the restoration of damaged buildings is often difficult to budget and may end up more expensive than general maintenance. However, this does not come close to capturing the awesome scope of the infrastructure costs for concrete surge barriers, urban redevelopments, and reimagining aspects of government. For this, we turn to the argument posed by the United Nations in their comprehensively named address, “For Every Dollar Invested in Climate-Resilient Infrastructure Six Dollars Are Saved, Secretary-General Says in Message for Disaster Risk Reduction Day” (2019). Locally, the ongoing restoration of Huitfeldtbrygga on Kjøpmannsgata, designated “very high antiquarian value”, is currently being restored with a project budget exceeding 10,3 mill. NOK (Tradisjon AS, 2020).

This is but one renovation site in a city with hundreds of protected buildings. Landmarks such as the Old Town Bridge, and the traditional architectural design make the area a popular destination for tourists and elevates Bakklandet to a status of cultural importance within the city.

This prominence might make Bakklandet rather amenable toward policy and engineering models, as it is perhaps rather understandable to invest in its preservation.

Reflections This contingency plan addresses a considerable range of future scenarios.

Planners may more effectively leverage a robust network of stakeholders and policy practices to navigate the many avenues of scenarios and their solutions.

This is why we have proposed large short-term infrastructure projects alongside plans to make institutional hierarchization more pliable and responsive.

Some of the methods we propose may be superfluous while others must be developed with finer details. This harkens once more to themes of uncertainty and maladaptive space. An analysis of proposed institutional changes can only take us so far — refining these proposals begins by taking the leap and beginning. Stakeholder network densification may prove too messy or it may, in fact, reduce administrative processes in total, resulting in a relatively clear and unmessy stakeholder landscape. The physical interventions proposed here may indeed buy Trondheim more time to set up a precedent of strengthening contingency planning and to locate the maladaptations in the meta-designs of these plans.

Because cultural heritage investments can be an expensive yet worthwhile goal, we leave the reader with these quotes to illustrate (or perhaps belabor) the point. The novelist E.M. Forster, in 1935, posed that “[t]he hungry and the homeless don’t care about liberty any more than they care about cultural heritage. To pretend that they do care is cant.” Jamaican political activist, Marcus Garvey, provided quite the parry when he implored, “a people without the knowledge of their past history, origin and culture is like a tree without roots (1938).

We are aware of the possibility that this contingency plan may not hold purchase over the priorities and other goals as perceived by politicians and residents of Trondheim. We therefore lean heavily into the scenario of a large management authority and substantial resources for assurance that such prosessual and expensive interventions are, in fact, worthy.

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Contingency Plan for Sverresborg A Case of A Dam Failure at Theisendammen Laura Flora Podoski Mari Coward Phong Vuoc Tran Robin Surya Ursula Sokolaj

Introduction About the assignment and problem statement To prepare for a flood event, reduce flood impacts and know how to react when a flood is happening, a contingency plan should be created. UNHCR and UN Disaster Management Training programme defines a contingency plan as “a forward planning process, in a state of uncertainty, in which scenarios and objectives are agreed, managerial and technical actions defined, and potential response systems put in place in order to prevent, or better respond to, an emergency or critical situation” (Choularton, 2007).

This report is part of the subject “AAR5220 Urban contingency planning and practice” at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

The purpose of this report is to create a contingency plan with a response strategy, an implementation, operational support and preparedness plan, as well as a budget, based on analyses of the given context and scenario. The given scenario for the contingency plan is that Trondheim is a highdensity city, prone to floods due to heavy rainfall.

The municipality has substantial resources and a disaster management authority.

A technocratic approach has been followed, focusing on data collection and extensive analysis, leading to

the compilation of the contingency plan. The vision for this contingency plan is to have control of the situation, making the area more resilient, so that it does not become a catastrophe for residents, businesses or infrastructure in a chosen area of Trondheim. For this context, resilience can be defined as by Walker et al. (2003): “Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.”

Case background As the temperatures are rising due to climate change, Trondheim can become one of Norway’s most vulnerable cities regarding urban flooding (Førland et al, 2007). The municipality of Trondheim is aiming to have an environmentally conscious orientation in its different sectors, emphasizing that Trondheim, as the technological capital of Norway, has a special opportunity to take lead in the global green shift (Trondheim kommune, 2020:1). In order to become a pioneer as a climate and environmentally friendly municipality in Norway, Trondheim compiled a set of goals to be achieved within 2030. Goal number 3 states that “In 2025, Trondheim is robust to meet future climate change.” (Trondheim kommune, 2020:1), which at the time of writing, is within five years.

Figure 1a: Aerial photos of Sverresborg and Theisendammen

The chosen area - Sverresborg Trondheim is the third biggest city in Norway.

Byåsen is one of the largest districts in Trondheim with Sverresborg being one of its central areas, with approximately 3500 inhabitants (Eierskapsenheten, 2012). Theisendammen in Bymarka, west of Sverresborg (figure 1a and 1b), is one of the three dams that are in operation in the watercourse in Ila, called Ilavassdraget. It was previously a water supply for the city, but today the lake has no other function rather than being a recreational area for outdoor activities.

It is a relatively small dam, but its proximity to downstream roads and buildings puts it in the highest risk category, meaning that the potential impacts in case of a dam failure would be highly significant. The dam has therefore strict requirements for safety, supervision and maintenance (Trondheim kommune, 2019).

Methodology Structuring the report, the lectures and the assignment description given by Mrudhula Koshy in the course “AAR5220 Urban contingency planning and practice” were used. The six steps of the contingency plan are based on these lectures. In addition, the similar assignments from 2019 have been used as inspiration, both for the structure and the content.

Data collection Most of the findings in this report are based on web search. The following refences are the most consulted. Maps from NVE (The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate) have been used to locate the vulnerable areas in Trondheim regarding flooding, and to choose an area to focus on. Kristine Nesset Stenvik’s research in “Urban flom som konsekvens av klimaendringer: En GIS studie” (2011) helped create a more specific scenario in Sverresborg. This study is a master thesis, supported by previous experiences of flooding in the area. Google Maps has been used to get an overview of the area and its facilities. For the stakeholder mapping, stakeholders from previous flooding events in Norway have been investigated, in addition to volunteer groups in Trondheim.

As Trondheim municipality plays a major part in preventing flood, their web page has also been used to gather information. The municipality has also provided free geodatabases through their WMS-

Figure 1b: Aerial photos of Sverresborg and Theisendammen

services, that consist of DTM (digital terrain model) and orthophotos. These have been used in GIS to create maps for topography analysis and to create base maps for the illustrations.

Case studies Numerous case studies have been reviewed, however four of them have been chosen as inspiration for this report. They are from very different parts of the world but have similarities to the given scenario regarding density and resource allocation. Learning and analyzing what has already been done helped in understanding the different forms of measures, both structural and nonstructural, that can be taken to prevent flooding.

Field visit The group decided to carry out a field visits seperately to Sverresborg for the site analysis, in order to understand the area from a closer viewpoint. A member of the team used a drone to capture aerial photographs of the current situation, to get an overview from a different perspective as well as use as illustrations for the report. During the field visit, the team decided that the area surrounding Theisendammen and Byåsen shopping mall would be the main focal point in our analysis.

COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic has made its impacts on the work with this report. Luckily, the group had

a chance to meet and get started with the project before all face-to-face meetings were restricted.

Later, Blackboard Collaborate has been used for virtual group meetings and a common OneDrive folder was created to better share information and findings. Other than not being able to do a field visit together as a group, the situation has not limited the work too much, as most findings could be done through web searching. However, in an early stage, the group discussed interviewing local residents in Sverresborg, to better understand their view on a potential flood, but this was found difficult to conduct due to COVID-19, and therefore eliminated.

Site Analysis Sverresborg is located approximately 4.5 kilometers southwest of downtown, as shown in figure 2. It is a popular residential area for people that wish to live close to the centre with good transport connections, yet in a quieter neighbourhood. With its versatile facilities, Sverresborg has an important role in peoples’ lives in Trondheim, especially for those living in Byåsen.

Figure 2: Location of the chosen area, Sverresborg

Important Landmarks Figure 3 shows, among other things, the major cultural heritages and public services around Sverresborg. Sverresborg is rich in history, as one of the county’s oldest shopping centers, Byåsen Butikksenter, has been located there since 1962 (Byåsen Butikksenter, n.d.). The church complex in Sverresborg is a spacious parish hosting different activities for its community (Andersen, 2018). Åsveihallen is the main indoor sports hall in the neighbourhood, located right beside the local school called Åsveien skole. Sverresborg Trøndelag Folkemuseum is one of the largest cultural historical museums in Norway. Another public service in the area is Byåsen Disability Housing (in Norwegian Bo- og Aktivitetstilbud), a housing and activity center for disabled people located in south-east of Sverresborg.

Infrastructure The chosen area is well provided with public transportation alternatives. Figure 3 also shows the metro bus route passing through Sverresborg, as well as the tram route further down towards the river. Additionally, the train line passes east of Sverresborg, along Nidelva. The area is also well equipped with multiple bicycle trails and pedestrian sidewalks along the roads.

Documented risks, threats and uncertainties Theisendammen is a relatively small artificial pond situated north west of the Sverresborg area, with a capacity of 2.2 million cubic meters (Myhre, 1996).

However, its closeness to roads and buildings downstream can result in great damage in case of a dam failure. NVE has classified dams by their damage potential in case of a failure. On a scale from 1 to 4, Theisendammen is classified as 4 (Trondheim kommune, 2019).

The analysis by NVE (NVE Atlas, 2020) shows that the chosen area in Sverresborg is not directly threatened by flood hazards in its central part, as illustrated in figure 4. However, there is a caution zone down Breidablikkveien, all the way to Nidelva.

Moreover, the city of Trondheim is mapped according to quick clay risk (NGU, 2015). Figure 4 indicates that there are no specific risk zones for quick clay slides in Sverresborg, but there are sensitive areas further down east, close to Nidelva. A flood

Figure 3: Important landmarks and public transportation lines

in Sverresborg could potentially trigger quick clay slides in this zone, depending on the paths the water will take.

Storm water management in Trondheim Stormwater and snow melting are creating large amounts of precipitation in urban areas with impervious surfaces, often causing flooding (USGS, 2016). The storm sewer systems in cities like Trondheim, are usually constructed long back in time, with a low ability to cope with the increasing amounts of rain (FloodProbe, 2011). When the drainage system reaches its capacity, the floods will take alternate paths as the drainage systems are unable to handle the entire mass. In addition, urban runoff can carry a mixture of pollutants, discharging them into streams and rivers.

Trondheim municipality has identified the areas exposed to risk of flooding. As security measurements, and prevention of future damages to infrastructure or societal functions, it is important to have functional flooding paths, often presented in awareness maps, that can handle these flooding events (Trondheim kommune, 2012).

New urban surface water routes and possible damages A GIS study by Stenvik (2011) shows possibilities for new floodway formations in Sverresborg, in case of urban flood. Figure 5 shows that the main roads – Byåsveien, Breidablikkveien and Osloveien – are most prone to floodwater. Figure 6 is showing residential buildings situated within five meters from the accumulated surface water. They are located in steep terrain, which can cause the water to accumulate speed.

Figure 4: Mapped flood zones and risk zones for quick clay slides in the chosen area

Figure 5: The surface water follows the paved roads down Breidablikkveien and on to Osloveien (Stenvik, 2011, page 57)

History of flooding in Sverresborg In addition to flooding in 1791 and 1844 (Trondheim kommune, 2020:2) caused by dam failures in Kobberdammen and Theisendammen, respectively, another urban flood in the summer of 2007 damaged basements and other properties in Byåsen. In the area along Breidablikkveien, the damage to buildings that was registered coincides with the new flood road preicted by Stenvik (2011).

Many of the recorded damages from the summer of 2007 are in the same areas as the identified flood paths from Stenvik’s analysis.

Stakeholder Mapping The following is an overview of some of the most important stakeholders involved during a flood event in Norway.

National level The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) has governmental responsibility for preventing damage from flooding, erosion and landslides. They provide professional and financial assistance to the municipalities by mapping and securing the most vulnerable areas (Politidirektoratet, 2011). The Meteorological Institute develops forecasts and alerts regarding rainfall. This helps authorities, organizations and residents to predict the consequences of the rainfall (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap, 2019).

In case of major accidents and disasters, The Civil Defense can provide extra crew and equipment if the emergency services need support

Figure 6: The possible routes of the urban flood water in Sverresborg (Stenvik, 2011, page 63)

(Sivilforsvaret, n.d.). The Norwegian Home Guard, part of the Norwegian Defense, can assist the police and is important to the County Governor during crisis like flooding, hurricane and larger accidents (Børresen et al, 2020).

Regional level The municipalities act as local emergency response authorities, and they are responsible for coordinating the different stakeholders during a crisis, like a flood event. Different parts of the municipality are contributing with different preventive measures.

Urban planning is the municipalities’ most important sector when working on safety against climate adaptation (NVE, 2020). The Norwegian municipalities also include engineers working with infrastructure and water/wastewater, as well as an emergency organization (Trondheim kommune, 2017).

Other stakeholders on the regional level are the emergency services, including police, fire department and ambulance. One of the fire department’s tasks is to assist in case of a flood event.

The police is responsible for implementing measures as well as organizing and coordinating relief efforts (Politidirektoratet, 2011).

In case of a flood, there are also voluntary groups that can contribute. Trondheim Red Cross has 1000 volunteers and is working together with Trondheim municipality and other emergency services. They focus on helping inhabitants in Trondheim to be prepared to take care of themselves in case of a crisis (Trondheim Røde Kors, n.d.). The Scout’s Emergency Response Group Trøndelag is disposal for emergency preparedness departments in search and rescue operations (Speiderens beredskapsgruppe Trøndelag, n.d.).

Another important stakeholder on the regional level is media, such as TV and radio, and relevant websites or newspapers, like Adresseavisa. They can contribute with information both before, during and after a crisis to inform the inhabitants about the situation.

Local level In case of evacuations, public buildings, such as schools, sport centers and churches, can provide shelter. In Sverresborg, Åsveien school, Åsveihallen and Sverresborg church center can provide close-by shelters or meeting points. Both the school and Åsveihallen are owned by Trondheim municipality (Trondheim kommune, 2020:3; Trondheim kommune, 2020:4). Byåsen Disability Housing (Byåsen Bo- og Aktivitetstilbud) is a public service, provided by the municipality, that also contribute to the same purpose (Byåsen Boog aktivitetstilbud, n.d.).

Byåsen shopping center can provide with shelter, food and supply in a crisis. Buses and trams can be used to transport evacuating people as well as transporting helpers to the critical areas or supplies. AtB is administrating the public transport in Trøndelag (AtB, n.d.).

The ihabitants themselves can do some preventive measures. In preparedness, establishing green roofs or making sure that gutters are free of leaves can be such measures. It is also important that the inhabitants are prepared for a possible flood event and know how to respond.

Case Studies Denmark Following the cloudburst of 2011 in Copenhagen, new plans like the Cloudburst Formula were developed, which shifted the focus from closed drainage systems to blue-green surface solutions.

These new measures aimed to not only solve the future extreme weather problems, but also create new urban spaces for recreational and social purposes. This duality in usage will in a long-term perspective be cheaper compared to the traditional model that does not add any recreational value (The Source, 2016). These forward-thinking solutions are the reason of studying the Copenhagen case, and have become inspiration for the physical implementations.

As seen in figure 7, attention is paid to the street infrastructure. By different interventions such as permeable surfaces, roadside beds and rain beds, roads remain functional during flooding events and protect other areas by detaining and storing some of the water. Another example of these multifunctional measures are water detention pools within playing fields and sport facilities (figure 8). These pools will be flooded during heavy rainfall, but during drier periods, the pools can act as paddle tennis courts, skate parks or other recreational areas (The Source, 2016). A similar idea is followed for green areas as well, as seen in figure 9. While making the city more vibrant and livable, these areas provide flood storage in the case of cloudburst (American Society of Landscape Architects, n.d.).

Figure 7: Surface solutions (The Source, 2016)

Figure 8: Water detention pools - hard surfaces (The Source, 2016)

Figure 9: Floodable park (Landezine, 2015)

Figure 10: How the elements link together (Flood Community of Practice, 2018)

Figure 11: The three steps in managing a flood (Flood Community of Practice, 2018)

Australia Flood Community of Practice is a membership between Queensland Government, James Davidson Architect and several other engineers, researchers and consultants which aims to provide expertise on flood risk and water management.

Taking inspiration from the Water Futures book by James Davidson Architect, after the flood event of January 2011, a vision for a livable and water smart South East Queensland was built. The case has been studied because the physical interventions proposed aim to build resilience and are well integrated into a framework. These solutions are adapted to different terrains and environments both built up and natural (figure 10) - but work together organized in three steps as in figure 11, to reduce flood impact across all the different landscapes (Flood Community of Practice, 2018).

South Korea South Korea is another country experiencing heavy rainfall with an increasing frequency due to climate change. Following the flood in Seoul in 2011, the city proposed a new disaster prevention system (Kim, n.d.).â&#x20AC;Ż This case has been studied because of its combination of structural and non-structural measures into a progressive response strategy, where progressiveness refers to the different types of action that need to be taken according to the increase in the level of hazard. This is visualized in the diagram in figure 12, which describes the management procedure for the flood disaster situation in case of heavy rainfall. The procedure is divided into three stages - readiness, warning and alarm stage - classified according to the amount of rainfall (Kim et al., 2007).

Figure 12 also describes the procedure of checking water stages and reservoir volume to prepare for any flood disaster. In case ofâ&#x20AC;Żdamages reported for lives or properties, then they have the procedure to be followed for a flood damage counteraction (Kim et al., 2007).â&#x20AC;Ż

Figure 12: Management procedure for the flood disaster situation in case of heavy rainfall (Kim et al, 2007)

Turkey The Emergency Action Plan prepared for the Seyhan Dam located in the city of Adana, Turkey has been studied because it provides emergency procedures specifically prepared for a scenario revolving around a dam failure. Among measures to be followed to minimize property damage and loss of life, importance is given to preparation of inundation maps, formation of warning systems, and especially organization of evacuation plan.

As shown in figure 13, the evacuation routes, the time of transportation and the safe zones should be determined ahead for the safe evacuation of the people.

Figure 13: Flood inundation area and evacuation routes to safe zones in Adana (Gazioglu et al., 2014)

Contingency Plan

Sverresborg. The main focus for the contingency plan will be on the extreme scenario, in order to prepare for the worst-case prognosis.

Scenario Based on the given scenario explained initially, the situation has been detailed and divided into a neutral, moderate and extreme scenario. Table 1 shows the similarities and the differences between the three scenarios, and table 2 the possible damages, respectively.

All three scenarios take place in springtime with heavy rainfalls, as well as snow and ice melting.

In both the moderate and extreme scenario, the current urban drainage system cannot cope with the amount of water runoff. In addition to the heavy rainfall, the worst-case scenario includes a dam failure, meaning that the dam mechanism in Theisendammen is blocked, preventing the water from exiting the reservoir in the designed watercourse towards Ila, shown in figure 14. Instead, the water is predicted to overflow and leave the pond in the direction of Sverresborg (see figure 15 and figure 16). In this case, both the increased spring precipitation and the water from Theisendammen will flood the streets of

Based on the aforementioned GIS study (Stenvik, 2011), the group decided to focus on Breidablikkveien and Osloveien, as the most vulnerable settlements, public transportation and cultural values are located along or in connection to these two roads, as shown in figure 17. Byåsen Butikksenter, Åsveien school and the roundabout at the end of Breidablikkveien are considered as the most vulnerable public structures along the estimated flood ways. As the water is flooding down towards Nidelva, it could gather at the lower points, interrupting important parts of the infrastructure, like the metro bus, the tram line and the train line. Additionally, several other public services could be affected indirectly, such as Sverresborg church, the sports facilities and Trøndelag Folkemuseum Sverresborg. High amount of water discharged into Nidelva could cause inundation in other areas down the river, like St. Olav’s Hospital. The topography of the area and major damages caused by previous floods were also taken into consideration when defining the most vulnerable areas for this scenario.

Table 1: Similarities and differences of the three types of scenarios

Scenario and influence factor

Neutral

Moderate

Extreme

Heavy rainfall: Due to extreme weather

Yes

Yes

Yes

Spring: Snow and ice melting

Yes

Yes

Yes

Drainage system: Sufficient capacity

Yes

No

No

Dam failure: Blockage

No

No

Yes

Table 2: Possible damages for the three different scenarios

Neutral

Moderate

Moderate

No critical consequnces

• Reduced transportation accessibility • Overloaded urban drainage system Basement flooding • Disruption of public services • Hinderance in mobility, education and business • Economic loss

• Infrastructural collapse • Collapse of the urban drainage system • Significant property damage (houses, cultural heritage, businesses) • Isolation and shutdown of public services and business • Lack of supplies of basic goods to Sverresborg • Very high economic loss • Normal life disrupted for the city overall • River pollution/Sea pollution • Quick clay slides down by Nidelva • Flooding of Nidelva • Loss of livelihoods • Loss of lives

Figure 14: The location of the dam failure mechanism and the estimated waterflow, Theisendammen

Figure 15: Estimated direction of the water when overflowing the pond, Theisendammen

Figure 16: Steep terrain down Breidablikkveien and into the neighbourhood of Sverresborg

Figure 17: The area assumed to be inundated in the extreme scenario

Response Strategy This contingency plan aims to increase the resilience of the neighborhood around the vulnerable area, while accepting the low probability of the possible hazard. Therefore, the vision is to control and embrace overflowing water from the dam throughout the area so that the transportation system, the daily life of the inhabitants, their properties and businesses, and certainly their health and safety are not affected.

In responding to the worst-case scenario, the strategies that will be used are divided into

two solutions that can be implemented in different time frames. The ultimate goal is to turn Sverresborg into an area resilient to floods, through infrastructural interventions. However, since it takes time to construct them, it is important to have an emergency response to deal with the potential flood event in the meantime.

Emergency Response in Sverresborg will follow some of the key points of the cases of South Korea and Turkey, which are progressive responses, public participation, and evacuation plan. As for the Long-Term Physical Interventions, infrastructural developments can be done to cope

Figure 18: Flooding management procedure in case of dam failure

with and lessen the impact of overflowing water from Theisendammen, inspired by the case studies in Denmark and Australia.

Implementation Plan Emergency Response Figure 18 illustrates the progressive emergency response procedure. The actions are listed according to each emergency status, and they will be enacted depending on how critical the situation is.

In the earliest stage, there are two actions that need to be performed continously throughout the following stages: monitoring the weather, to forecast possible heavy rainfall, and monitoring the dam water level. If there is a rapid increase

in the dam’s water level from rainfall or snow melting, the next stage needs to be enacted.

In the Readiness stage, the residents will get notifications about the current condition and the possible upcoming hazard in order to gain awareness. This could, for instance, be in the form of SMS or other predetermined information sharing platform. At the same time, an official team with a purpose of managing flooding situations, prepares to patrol the vulnerable areas that have been determined by the flood mapping.

If the current drainage system water continues to increase, the process will move on to the Warning stage. Participation from the inhabitants will be needed in order to get more accurate data, meaning that communication with the residents must be maintained. A flood-fighter

team will need to prepare and bring flood control equipment to the site. This can be a temporary wall to control flood stream (figure 19) and/or door barriers (figure 20).

In case the dam fails, the next stage, Closure, will be enacted. For this stage, temporary equipment is expected to be distributed. Activities, such as businesses and education will be closed, and the public transit route will be assigned to alternative routes. In this stage, families in vulnerable houses can evacuate the area by private vehicles or by service vehicles, provided by the flood-fighter team or AtB. Figure 19: Temporary lightweight wall to control flood stream (Screenshot from Noaq Flood Protection AB, 2014)

In case the water level keeps increasing and the flood equipment is no longer keeping the water away, Evacuation needs to be implemented. As shown in figure 21, three different public buildings can be assigned as evatuation meeting points for the vulnerable area around the flood stream: Byåsen butikksenter for the upstream area near the dam, Åsveien school/Åsveihallen in the middle area, and Byåsen Disability Housing for the houses near Nidelva. These three meeting points can be temporary meeting places before families are evacuated out of Sverresborg.

Figure 20: Door barrier for preventing the water to enter the house (The Blue Pages, n.d.)

Figure 21: A map of evacuation meeting points and alternative route for the bus

Physical Implementation Infrastructure can alter and control the water flow behavior, building up the capacity of the area to respond to the dam failure, while still remaining in a functional state. Similar to the case of South East Queensland, Australia, a framework of physical interventions adapted to the varied landscapes is proposed. The integrated system is aiming to direct the water from the dam to Nidelva is organized in three steps, shown in figure 22.

Green streets are proposed for the adjacent roads, which combine small scale channels and stormwater planters. The road section is slightly sloped, so the water is directed to the edges, and then channeled towards Breidablikkveien.

At the same time, the planters collect and store the water, delaying the time it reaches the main street (American Society of Landscape Architects, n.d.).

Figure 22: Three Steps Strategy

1. Delay The initial aim is to decrease the velocity and volume of the water going from the dam towards the built-up area. In order to achieve this, a secondary reservoir will be built in proximity to Theisendammen, to create flood storage capacity. Some of the water will furthermore be held back and slowed down through buffers in the form of vegetated keylines.

To store higher amounts of water, retention areas are proposed along the streams, in the form of floodable parks or water squares for hard surfaces.

The most important characteristic of these interventions is their dual factor. They protect the area not only from a potential dam failure flooding, but also from general rainfall flooding. Furthermore, they improve the quality of the urban spaces while incorporating recreational functions (The Source, 2016).

2. Embrace The water will make its way through Sverresborg following three streams shown in figure 23, combining underground and surface level solutions.

The structures shown in figure 24 are able to adapt to the presence of water, absorb, store and direct it. Green stormwater infrastructure plays the key role in this. Breidablikkveien becomes one of the main streets channeling the water by turning into a stormwater greenway. Swales on both sides of the street will lead the water towards the river, and also filter, temporarily store and absorb a proportion of it (SuDS, 2020). Permeable pavement is used for the hard surfaces to direct the water away from them. Drainage capacity is increased through stormwater pipes, which further carry water underground (The Source, 2016).

Attention is paid to protection of private property as well. In this regard, vegetation of the property lines to slow water flow and usage of flood resilient materials for building facades are proposed.

3. Dispose Several areas in proximity to Nidelva are composed of quick clay. This has been taken into consideration, while deciding the streams’ location. They have been directed away from these regions to avoid triggering a landslide (Kansas Geological Survey, 1999). When not able to do so, piles and retaining walls are proposed to be designed as a solution (figure 24).

Floodable areas will be additionally constructed nearby the river, in order to spread the volume

Figure 23: The three streams

Figure 24: Retaining wall with tiebacks and buttress beams (adapted from Kansas Geological Survey, 1999)

Figure 25: Breidablikkveien interventions

of water disposed in Nidelva over time, because immense amounts of water can cause inundation further downstream. Experts will need to pay attention to the water quality drained in Nidelva. Infiltration system have proposed in order to avoid pollution of the river.

Operational support plan To carry out the contingency plan, different stakeholders need to cooperate. Figure 26, based on the Stakeholder Mapping, shows the most

important stakeholders involved in this contingency plan and the relationship between them.

The given scenario has a disaster management authority, which in this case would be the Disaster Management Authority of Trondheim municipality. One of their most important tasks is coordinating the different stakeholders (both within and outside of the municipality), and creating a communication and warning system, as well as distributing information together with the online newspaper, Adresseavisa. Urban planners and

landscape architects can develop and design the physical preventative measures together with water and wastewater engineers, as well as direct their implementation. Monitoring Theisendammen as a part of the preparedness plan is also one of the tasks of the municipality.

NVE is another major stakeholder in case of a flood. Their role is essential for the implementation plan, as they map vulnerable areas and contribute with physical preventative measures. Furthermore, the Meteorological Institute will be developing weather alerts, helping Trondheim municipality predict the severity of the flood, and prepare which actions and stakeholders need to be activated.

In case of evacuation, Åsveien school, Sverresborg church and Byåsen Disability Housing work as meeting points or provide close-by shelter.

Byåsen shopping center can provide food and supplies if needed. Volunteer groups, like Trondheim Red Cross and the Scout’s Emergency Response Group Trøndelag, will contribute with notifying the inhabitants about the possible scenarios before the flood event and

help them evacuate during the flood. As shown in figure 26, emergency services will also be able to help the residents in case of emergencies, and they will coordinate relief efforts. Depending on how severe the situation is, flood-fighter teams can be formed by the Norwegian Home Guard and the Civil Defense, to keep the inhabitants safe and help with evacuation. AtB can provide transportation of larger groups of people in case of evacuation.

Preparedness plan The following preparedness plan shown in table 3 is based on the implementation plan and therefore divided into Emergency Response and Long-Term Physical Interventions. The preparedness plan involves identifying organisational resources, determining roles and developing procedures and planning for quick and efficient respond for whenever a disaster should occur. These measures improve quality and effectiveness of a response to disaster (IFRC, 2000).

Figure 26: Operational support plan

Implementation Plan

Preparedness Plan Emergency Response • •

Monitoring system and alert system

• •

Updating and observing meteorological data Assigning the committee responsible for the dam functionality Improving the monitoring system with new updated technology Examining and improving the existing warning system

Flood fighter team

•

Establishing the flood fighter team by the Disaster Management Authority

Information sharin platform

•

Deciding on a platform for sharing information from the Disaster Management Authority to the inhabitants

•

Researching and consulting with engineers and flood experts Identifying the equipment to be used Identifying the stakeholders to distribute them to the flood fighter team and the residents

Flood control equipment (temporary flood wall and door barriers)

Evacuation plan

• •

• • • •

Updating the flood map to the latest condition by the Disaster Management Authority and NVE Consulting with water engineers Planning evacuation route and shelters Coordinating stakeholders responsible for the evacuation

Long Term Physical Interventions Building secondary reservoir

• • •

Building green stormwater infrastructure

• • • • • •

Construction of the floodable parks

• • • • •

Private property protection (floodproof materials and property line vegetation)

• • • • •

Designing and consulting with landscape architects/urban planners and water and civil engineers Selecting the construction company Initiating construction Road mapping Designing the interventions appropriate at different roads by the landscape architects and engineers Selecting the construction company Selecting the committee inspecting the process Mapping alternative routes for the construction process period Initiating construction

Locating possible areas Designing the interventions by the team of landscape architects and engineers Selecting the construction company Selecting the committee inspecting the process Initiating construction

Mapping to identify vulnerable areas and buildings Discussions with landscape architects and engineers to identify and design the necessary solutions Informing the inhabitants about possible measures and actions they can take for protection Discussions about subsidy provision for floodproof materials Distribution of plants for property line vegetation

Table 3: Preparedness plan

What

Physical Implementation

Emergency Response

Measure

Main Response

Price Range

· Flood proof materials

· Engineers

· Vegetation of property lines

· Urban planners

I

· Secondary reservoirs

· Engineers

III

· Floodable parks and water squares

· Urban planner/Engineer/ Landscape architects

II

· Green streets

· Landscape architects/ Urban planners

II

· Stormwater greenway

· Engineers

II

· Quick clay solutions

· Engineers

I

· Monitoring Theisendammen

· NVE

II

· Weather forecasts and alerts

· Meteorological institute

I

· Distributing information

· Local newspaper and other platforms

I

· Public alerts/notifications

· Trondheim municipality

I

· Assisting with evacuation

· Trondheim Red Cross and Scouts emergency group

I

· Shelters/meeting points

· Trondheim municipality (Åsveien school /

II

I

Åsveihallen and Byåsen Disablity Housing) and Sverresborg church center

Urban Drainage System

Transport/Mobility

· Flood control equipment

· Engineers

II

· Stormwater pipes

· Water and wastewater engineers

III

· Open stormwater channels and swales

· Water and wastewater engineers

II

· Infiltration systems

· Water and wastewater engineers

I

· Transporting inhabitants to shelter

· AtB

I

· Redirecting the traffic

· Police

I

Table 4: Budget

Budget The financial aspects are critical in managing disasters, as they create a solid foundation for fast recovery, resilience and mitigation for a potential disaster.

For the study of Sverresborg, spatial interventions will require a significant amount of monetary resources.

In the Norwegian State Budget for 2020, the government has granted a total of 1.135 billion NOK to NVE, where 337 million NOK of this is specifically assigned for flooding, landslides and similar disasters (Statsbudsjettet, 2020).

However, in this contingency plan it is chosen not to provide economical calculation in specific numbers. Instead, the measures in the budget will be divided into three price ranges, differentiating between the cheaper and the more expensive measures. The three price ranges are: Low cost (I), medium cost (II) and high cost (III).

Discussion and conclusion The given scenario about floods due to heavy rainfall, combined with substantial resources and a disaster management authority, is quite realistic for the city of Trondheim. This made finding data and background information and understanding the interrelation between the different stakeholders an easier process.

However, there are many assumptions that had to be done throughout the different parts of the contingency plan. After choosing an area, the given scenario was further developed and detailed, resulting in the dam failure hypothesis. The group wanted to look at a unique scenario despite the lack of tactile data and previous experience with dam mechanisms. This brought the challenge of drawing conclusions and making assumptions regarding several elements, such as the direction of the water exiting the dam reservoir, the spread of inundation in the area or the damages caused by the different levels of the scenario. The assumptions were based on previous flood events, case studies and Stenvikâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s GIS study, however there is room for inaccuracies.

Moreover, the group was not able to find a lot of data and information on existing safeguards and security measures regarding the south-eastern part of Theisendammen. It was difficult understanding if preventative measures already have been done in Sverresborg, which could have affected the Implementation Plan. Regarding the Physical Interventions, collaboration with experts would be needed to understand possible side effects of the

proposals, and how they will be accomplished in practice. While taking inspiration from the Case Studies, it is considered that the same solutions might not work out in similar ways in a different context. Further expertise would have also been needed for the Budget, which was challenging to concretize with numbers. Therefore, the group chose to propose three categories of financial value for the different elements of the contingency plan, which can also be considered as a source of inaccuracy.

Due to COVID-19, the group project had to face additional challenges. Digital meetings resulted in less in-depth discussions and more individual work.

Furthermore, due to safety reasons, the group was not able to meet potential stakeholders, or conduct meetings with the inhabitants. Communicating with inhabitants through virtual means was considered.

Unfortunately, the group was not able to find an online platform, such as a Facebook group for the area of Sverresborg. Therefore, the group chose to focus on technocratic approaches and the infrastructure in Sverresborg.

Concluding, this work confirmed that a contingency plan is not easy to develop, and it requires much interdisciplinary knowledge regarding the different stages, strategies and implementations. Working on this project has given an insight on how complex such planning is. At the same time, acquiring more knowledge about this topic has highlighted the importance of a contingency plan as a preventative measure.

Figure 27: Aerial photos of Sverresborg

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Unless otherwise stated, the figures and tables are produced by the authors.

NYHAVNA CONTINGENCY PLAN Disaster preparedness for the resilience of Nyhavna in the face of future sea level rise and flooding Aleisha Martul Augustine Amankwaa Ida Ovidth Jørgen Strøm Iversen Michaela Schmidt

1. Introduction The existence of a high degree of uncertainty in climate variability appears to be a major cause of concern for many scientists, governments as well as institutions across the globe. Uncertainties in the rate and magnitude of sea-level rise complicate decision making on coastal adaptation (Haasnoot et. al, 2020). These uncertainties emanate from natural cause, such potential melting of the polar ice caps, and human induced changes including climate change and CO2 emissions (Hancock, 2020). An immediate implication of sea-level rise has been marine flooding of low-lying coastal areas (Nicholls and Cazenave, 2010).

Considering high population and urbanization characterized by many coastal cities, several studies have attempted to quantify future flood risks (Jonjegan and Masskant, 2015) and vulnerability (Mwale et al. 2015). These studies, among others have demonstrated the need to explore various impact and likelihood scenarios, and to anticipate future coastal flooding risks and vulnerabilities. In helping communities to prepare for, adapt to, and recover from flooding, many actors have resorted to contingency planning. According to Choularton (2007), contingency planning approach is a process undertaken in anticipation of potential crises, and it involves strategies, arrangements, and procedures to respond to crisis.

LOW LYING AREAS PRONE TO FLOODING AREAS PRONE TO SEALEVEL RISE

Figure 1: Map of flood prone areas in Trondheim

Like many cities worldwide, Trondheim, is prone to flooding due to its geographical location and landscape. Many of the densely populated areas of the city are low-lying and located along the coastline or along the banks of the Nidelva river which runs from the coastline south through the city. (Figure 1) This presents the possibility of unexpected flooding in communities along the coastline of Trondheim due to sea level rise, especially in Nyhavna. (Figure 2) Under the Trondheim Kommune plan, Nyhavna is set to be developed into a high-density mixed-use area over the next 10 years. The urban flooding due to sea level rise may put property and human lives at risk, the ability of critical infrastructure to function as intended may be limited as well.

With substantial resources, adopting “fail to safe” strategies to develop the area is paramount for building community resilience.

Figure 2: Nyhavna area. (Marinas, 2020)

Figure 3: Nyhavna area.

Problem Statement Although Norway is not considered vulnerable to accelerated sea level rise, due to the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s steep and resistant coastlines, future storm surges owing to climate change and rising sea levels are likely to cause flooding of low-lying coastal areas (Aunan and Romstad, 2008). Nyhavna, a habour area of Trondheim, is vulnerable to a 200-year storm surge prediction that will cause inundation of several portions of the neighbourhood (Trondheim Kommune, 2013). Proposals have been made to develop the area into a high-density neighbourhood (mixed-use) along the coast, with regulations to preserve the cultural heritage of the area. (Figures 3 and 4) Given the hypothetic dense population as well as instability and possible soil erosion owing to the presence of quick clay in the area, future flooding may adversely affect lives, livelihoods, and critical infrastructure. The situation is likely to worsen in the absence of disaster management authority coordinate to plans to prepare and cope with possible threats.

Research Question In the absence of a disaster management authority, how can a high density, substantially resourced coastal community prepare for and reduce the loss from future disasters resulting from the effects of climate change, in specific sea level rise?

Figure 4: Proposed development for Nyhavna by Agraff + Rallah. (Agraff + Rallar + FOM, 2019)

Structure of the Report This report identifies the issues relating to sea level rise in Trondheim, specifically focusing on the harbour area of Nyhavna, and produces a contingency plan for the future sustainable urban development of Nyhavna.

The structure of this report is divided into four main sections: methodology, findings, the contingency plan and the discussion and conclusion. Firstly, the methodology outlines the theoretical information behind the contingency plan. Secondly, the findings provide analysis of Nyhavna, its current conditions, and proposals for future development and planning regulations under the Trondheim Kommune plans.

Next the proposed contingency plan is outlined in depth, including the Scenario regarding the future development of Nyhavna, the Response Strategy, Implementation Plan, Operational Support Plan and the Preparedness Plan. Finally, the discussion and conclusion section summarise the report and indicates any difficulties or limitations encountered during the process of formulating the contingency plan.

2. Methodology Climate Change

High density

The world is facing global warming which will lead to a change in climate patterns on a long term.

The increase in temperatures lead to the rising sea levels which can create a future risk for coastal areas.

Density in housing refers to the number of people living in a certain area with set boundaries. In a high-density city or neighbourhood, the relation of residents to area is higher than the average which can be defined through national or international comparison with areas of similar inhabitation. A universal definition for high-density does not exist as there are too many varying aspects starting with the definition of household and household size (Lessons from Higher Density Development: Report to the GLA, 2006). High density leads to shorter ways and can make infrastructures like public transport, electricity and water more efficient and cost beneficial.

Sea level rise For coastal planning and adaptation, the relative sea-level, as the measure of the sea surface with respect to the seafloor and the shore, is of interest. With the increase of temperature, the global sea-level has risen due to thermal expansion of seawater and the melting of ice-sheets and glaciers. The sea-level rise varies by regions due to several different physical processes (Kartverket, 2020).

Storm surges Storm surges create an extreme sea-level rise caused by a combination of low pressure, wind and ocean tides. Storm surges can rise the sea-level up to several meters above the normal. Observation and analysis of tide gauges over the past decades allow estimations about high sea-level and their return periods. It is expected that return heights will be exceeded a lot more often in the future than they had been in the past (Kartverket, 2020).

Uncertainty in sea level rise measurements There are three different types of uncertainty in Climate Change and sea-level rise predictions which are emissions scenario uncertainty, natural variability and model uncertainty. The emissions scenario uncertainty is handled by calculating different possible outcomes for different concentration pathways.

Natural variability arises from the internal variability of the earth system, on different time scales. For climate models this variability can only be partly represented. The uncertainty can be minimized by using the observed natural variability for projections.

The model uncertainty is estimated by assessing the model ensemble spread but does not always represent the full range of uncertainties. The ensemble spread does not show structural errors, systematic errors, errors due to poorly represented or absent processes in the model setup (Simpson et al., 2015).

Substantial resources To prepare an area and its community for potential risks demands a lot of energy and effort. A big part of this are financial expenses, especially when it comes to implementing physical constructions.

A government that holds substantial resources to deal with the costs has better chances to mitigate disasters.

Disaster management authority Commonly, a National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is a central government body with overall responsibility for coordinating disaster management preparedness, relief and recovery.

Functions vary but tend to include administrative and procedural management, development of policy and legislation, and institutional support and resourcing (Featherstone, 2014).

With no disaster management authority, the community can be cast into chaos during a disaster if not properly prepared.

Mixed-use development A mixed-use development is characterized by good walkability and combination of residential, commercial, cultural, institutional, and/or industrial use. Besides that, it fosters integration, density and compatibility of land-uses (Complete Communities, 2020).

Safe to fail A safe-to-fail infrastructure can be defined as a built system that is allowed to lose function in a controlled way. A safe-to-fail system remains “adaptable to control the consequences at full failure by recovering lost function or transforming to serve new purposes” (Kim, 2018, p. 26).

Creating safe-to-fail infrastructure helps local governments to review their institutional capability and efficiency to manage unpredictable risks and develop more adaptive coping techniques (Kim, 2018).

Restemeyer, Woltjer and Van den Brink (2015) argue that a flood resilient city is “one which can withstand or adapt to a flood event without being harmed in its functionality” (Restemeyer, Woltjer and van den Brink, 2015, p. 1) The built environment is an important characteristic for how well a flood prone area can withstand flooding. Ensuring that buildings and infrastructure can withstand waveimpact and water intrusion will facilitate a faster recovery post-event and a return to “normalcy”.

While the notion of “strong protection schemes” or “failsafe” systems is an important element in planning and design, like building dikes to prevent flooding, the concept might create a false sense of security as it doesn’t necessarily take unplanned events into account. A place will always be in a state of change influenced by environmental, social, ecological and economical drivers and dynamics (Ahern, 2011). A flood resilient city is therefore also an adaptable city, aimed at preparedness and learning.

Uncertainty Creating and changing urban infrastructure is based on a mix of experience, knowledge, and assumptions of which some are more certain than others. John Abbott defines uncertainty as the following: “understanding what is known and unknown about the future; and the links between the past, the present, and the future; and how we act on this understanding are critical issues and challenges in planning” (Abbott, 2005, p.237). Dealing with climate change and other environmental changes in planning holds a lot of uncertainties.

Best practise case studies Best practise case studies provide practical examples and insights into how theoretical

knowledge or practical techniques can be applied in a real-life context. By studying these best practise cases, an understanding can be established of how this theoretical knowledge or practical techniques can be applied in another similar context, and the outcome that can be expected.

Risk and Vulnerability Assessment A risk and vulnerability assessment can be used to identify, qualify and prioritize recognized threats, risks and vulnerabilities in a system and predict the vulnerability that these factors may cause an exposure of loss in the system. Norway has a national Risk and Vulnerability Matrix and the Trondheim Kommune has established their own matrix based on this. The matrix indicates that sea level rise is a critical threat to Trondheim as it has a high likelihood of occurring and may result in a high damage impact on the community and its infrastructure. (Figure 5)

Figure 5: Risk and Vulnerability Matrix Trondheim Kommune (2012)

Stakeholder analysis Stakeholder analysis can be utilised to identify which individuals or groups are related to or can affect a certain scenario or context. Once their involvement has been identified, the stakeholders can be grouped together according to the role they can play, level of participation, interest and influence on the scenario or context. In the context of disaster response and relief operations, this analysis and mapping of stakeholder can be used to determine how best to coordinate the stakeholders and utilise their participation and intergroup relationships to achieve the best outcomes in a disaster response scenario.

3. Findings Climate Change Impacts

Nyhavna Site Analysis

The climate change impacts on Norway are expected to be less serious than in other regions such as southern Europe or sub-Saharan Africa (O’Brien, Naess, Eriksen and Sygna, 2006). Nevertheless, Norway must adapt to and prepare for the future changes in its climate.

Location The Nyhavna district is situated in the harbour area bordering Trondheimsfjorden in the northernmost part of Trondheim municipality in Norway.

The “Klima i Norge 2100” report outlines predicted changes in the Norwegian climate. It is estimated that the annual temperature will increase by ca. 4.5 ºC and annual precipitation will increase by ca. 18%. Furthermore, heavy rainfalls and flooding will be more intense and more frequently.

It is expected that the number of glaciers will be substantially reduced, and the mean sea level will rise by 15-55 cm (Hanssen-Bauer, Førland and Haddeland, 2017) According to The Norwegian Centre for Climate Services (NCCS) worst case scenario, the main sea level will rise 21 cm in the period 2041 – 2060 and 53 cm in the time period 2081 – 2100 compared to the main sea level in 1986 – 2005 (Kartverket, 2020). (Figure 6) 200-year storm surges cause the sea level to rise by 238 cm (Kartverket, 2020). Storm surges will happen more frequently in the future and cause flooding in certain parts of Nyhavna. Flooding can cause severe damage to infrastructure like electrical power, drinking water and sewage, to buildings and people. Damage to infrastructure like drinking water, sewage and electricity can make the area uninhabitable while repairs are done.

Nyhavna borders the fjord and Ladehammeren in the north, and a business district and the culturally distinct area Svartlamoen in the southeast. In the south the area is bordered by the railroad and in the west the area is bordered by the river Nidelva which has its outlet into Trondheimfjorden between Brattøra and Nyhavna. (Figure 8) History The earliest plans for Nyhavna date back to the early 1900-hundreds. Nyhavna was targeted for maritime purposes, as an extension of the harbour area on Brattøra in a plan from 1912. The plan was never implemented due to poor economic conditions in the 1930s.

Figure 7: View over Dora I into Nyhavna (Carstens, 2020).

The area was constructed as a submarine base during the German military occupation in 1940-45.

The transformation of the area was close to the original plan from 1912. Several facilities from the wartime era is still part of the site today, of which the most notable is the large concrete submarine bunkers Dora 1 and Dora 2. (Figure 7)

Figure 6: Expected sea level rise, based on worst case scenario, 2090: 53 cm and expected sea level rise during 200-year storm surge in 2090: 238 cm.

(Kartverket, 2020)

LADE

BRATTØRA LADEMOEN

ROSENDAL

SOLSIDEN SENTRUM

MØLLENBERG

Figure 8: Nyhavna and surrouding neighbourhoods.

In later years the area has experienced a new transformation process emphasising various cultural aspects on site. One of the reasons behind this process is that several small scale culturally based businesses have located themselves in Nyhavna and that the area has been used for different kinds of cultural activities, like art projects and outdoors theatre.

Site Conditions The risk of flooding in Nyhavna was briefly analysed in 2010/11 as part of the municipality’s strategy to transform the site into a high density mixed-use urban area (Nyhavna kommunedelplan analysehefte, 2011).

The area partly consists of land fillings approximately 3-5 meters above sea level. The red area, in the picture adjacent, is considered to be at risk for flooding due to rising sea levels and storm surges in the future. (Figure 9) The risk levels have since been adjusted. In the analysis of 2011, the sea level is predicted to rise 42 cm, while the current prediction by The Norwegian Centre for Climate Services (NCCS) states 53 cm (Simpson et al., 2015).

Rambøll conducted a geotechnical survey of the area in 2009. The following report disclosed that the Nyhavna area is unsuited for heavy constructions and buildings as it might cause instability and soil erosion. The report concludes that 6-7 story buildings in a lightweight construction without basements probably won’t alter soil conditions on site (Nyhavna kommunedelplan: analysehefte, 2011). Any heavier constructions require a more detailed geotechnical study.

Percieved Risks and Threats

Figure 9: Risk level for flooding (Nyhavna kommunedelplan analysehefte 2011).

Analyses carried out by Trondheim Kommune (2012) show that Trondheim is most likely to experience flooding from the sea during storm surges and spring tides in the Trondheim Fjord, with critical predictable consequences. These events are likely to increase the sea level up to 50 cm. Analysis using Geographical Information Systems (GIS) show that a 200-year storm surge will damage 458 buildings and 5,6 km stretch of roads (Kartverket.no). Nyhavna is one of the areas considered as high flood risks Zones in Trondheim, and the area is likely to face the 200-year scenario.

(Figure 10)

High density Nyhavna is regulated for “sentrumsformål”, which directly translated means that the area is regulated for “central city purposes”. In areas regulated for “sentrumsformål” the degree of density is decided in the municipal master plan for Trondheim. The minimum requirement is 10 residential units pr.

Acre (Trondheim Kommuneplanens arealdel 20122024: Retningslinjer og bestemmelser, 2013). As the Nyhavna area is approximately 350 acres, the minimum requirement is 3500 residential units.

The actual number of residential units will probably be higher.

Figure 10: Percieved risk areas in relation to sea level rise.

Future Development Trondheim Kommunedelplan, Nyhavna Kommunedelplan The city council approved the municipal master plan for Nyhavna in 2016. This is the first step in transforming the site from a harbour/dock area into a part of the city centre structure. The area is divided into 10 sections that require individual zoning plans, ensuring a step by step development of the area. (Figure 11) High density and mixed-use development are some of the prime measures for securing short distances to key destinations within the area, where the objective is an environmentally friendly urban district.

Figure 11: Municipal master plan for Nyhavna (Nyhavna kommunedelplan: Planbeskrivelse, 2016).

Mixed-use development The Trondheim Kommunedelplan has advised for the Nyhavna area to be developed into an urban mixeduse central district. Through the municipal master plan for Nyhavna the development is recommended to utilise a mixture of different urban structures and varied land use. This can include mixed-typology housing, commercial, retail and public facilities, green spaces, bicycle and pedestrian friendly street networks and environmentally friendly transport solutions (Nyhavna kommunedelplan, 2016). The exact distribution between businesses and residents within each of the 10 sections is not yet specified. Since the site will be developed over several years, it is believed that decisions about the exact distribution is better suited for the zoning plans instead as this will better accommodate the market.

Regulations Nyhavna is part of a zone requiring special consideration to sea level rise (§41.1 in the municipal master plan of Trondheim). Zoning plans and development plans in accordance with the Planning and Building act, within the special consideration zone, must be planned or designed to ensure adequate safety. This requires a risk and vulnerability assessment within each of the 10 sections and documented measures to achieve sufficient safety levels for wave impact and water intrusion (Trondheim Kommuneplanens arealdel 20122024: Retningslinjer og bestemmelser, 2013).

The Norwegian building code (TEK17) is very specific when it comes to requirements that must be met to achieve sufficient safety level, stating in § 7-2 that: (1) Structures that would suffer particularly severe consequences due to flooding shall not be sited in areas prone to flooding.

(2) The flood safety category of structures in areas prone to flooding shall be stipulated. Structures shall be sited, designed or protected against flooding such that the largest nominal annual probability (return period) in the table below is not exceeded. (Figure 12)

to storm surges at the river Elbe. Building dikes along the edges would have destroyed the sites charm, taken away a lot of space and held several economic disadvantages.

The two main interventions for Hafen-City were the elevation of buildings on plinth and the construction of roads and bridges above the flood line. The usage of plinth does not only protect the buildings from being flooded but creates underground parking spaces at the same time to reduce on-street parking in the area (HafenCity Hamburg, 2020). (Figure 13)

Figure 12: Flood sfatey catergory (Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection, 2017)

The flood safety categories are linked to the degree of impact flooding will have on societal functions.

If the development plan of the area includes residential buildings in the flood-zone with a return period of 200 years, as is the case on Nyhavna, measures must be taken to achieve sufficient safety before building permits are granted. These measures could include raising roadbeds, moving electrical installations above flood level and designing buildings that tolerate water intrusion (Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection, 2017).

Best Practise Case Studies Hafen-City in Hamburg Hafen-City is a high-density neighborhood with businesses, apartments, bars and restaurants, public institutions as well as parks and open spaces along the waterfront. It is prone to flooding due Figure 13: Intervention for Hafen-City (HafenCity Hamburg, 2020).

Figure 14: Flood gates on ground level of building (HafenCity Hamburg, 2020).

In addition to these constructional interventions, buildings that are in higher risk areas are equipped with flood gates to seal entrances and windows on the ground floor, which are for commercial use only. Apartment blocks have different access levels to cope with varying flood levels and escape routes are on different heights to allow safe evacuation if needed (Voorendt, 2020). (Figure 14)

The Disaster Management is duty of the Hamburg Port Authority which, in cooperation with WADI (Storm surge warning service), gives information and warnings to the public more than nine hours in advance of an expected high water. It also coordinates the closure and evacuation of roads and districts that might be affected (Hamburg Port Authority, 2020). In addition to the flood management authorities, building owners of the Hafen-City are required to engage into a partnership for flood protection for each residential building (called Flutschutzgemeinschaft – FSG).

Those FSG must “document, maintain, exercise and execute flood protection at their respective buildings” (Seebauer et al., 2018, p. 6). The members of each FSG also have to nominate a person as speaker and overseer. “FSGs have to take self reliant action when a flood strikes and cannot rely on any governmental backup apart from emergency rescue services” (Seebauer et al., 2018, p. 6).

Copenhagen Copenhagen has been plagued by unprecedented periods of flooding over the past 10 years due to cloudbursts. The City Council acknowledged the future risks of increased stormwater volumes due to these events, especially in the neighborhood of Østrebro, and set about creating adaptive and resilient green infrastructure to combat the issue (Cities100, 2015).

Through this they created the Østrebro climate quarter, which houses an integrated system of green streets and pocket parks which serve as retention areas and water basins alongside in-built hills which act as a funnel to channel water into the designated retention areas (Cities100, 2015).

(Figure 17)

Figure 15: Raised pathways and water retention areas within a public square (Cities100, 2015).

Figure 16: Rain gardens and permable surfaces absorb water during periods of heavy rainfall (Cities100, 2015).

Public squares are also designed to collect rainwater and distribute this within a new local pipe system.

These systems are expected to manage about 30% of the local rainwater instead of delivering it into the city sewage system, reducing the load in times of heavy rainfall (Cities100, 2015). (Figures 15 and 16) Figure 17: Section of Østrebro neighborhood (Cities100, 2015).

The neighborhood is being praised as the first climate-resilient district through its innovative green infrastructure design, which not only serves to address the issue of flooding but also provides an enjoyable and livable green space in the neighborhood.

Community-based disaster management Laos and Thailand (Talab Kao Community) Both Laos and Thailand are countries with a lower disaster risk management authority than Norway, and communities at risk where resources are much scarcer. The projects for communitybased approaches to flood management in Laos and Thailand aided the communities in the development of self-help capabilities in flood-prone communities (Tripathi, 2018). These projects were carried out between 2013 - 2016 in conjunction with WMO/Global Water Partnership initiative, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre and a range of local partners. The projects utilized participatory approaches in the flood-prone communities to implement community-centered flood risk assessments and preparedness measures to reduce the negative impacts of riverine and flash flooding (Tripathi, 2018). (Figure 18)

Figure 18: Project leaders carrying out participatory planning activities with community members (Tripathi, 2018).

The projects aimed to empower the local communities to assist and manage their own disaster preparedness and relief response strategies so increase their resilience in the face of future flooding events. This cumulated in the formation of a community-based flood management committee, a village disaster prevention and control committee, and new communication and warning systems which marked vulnerable households, established an early warning public announcement system and line messenger group through coordination and collaboration among hydrometeorological departments and local communities (Tripathi, 2018). (Figure 19)

Figure 19: Students take part in practical flood skill activites for fllood preparedness measures (Perwaiz, Sinsupan and Murphy, 2015).

Proposed Future Development for Scenario As a future development plan has not yet been finalised for Nyhavna, for the purpose of this report a proposed future development plan has been constructed for the scenario. This plan is based on the planning and development requirements set out for Nyhavna by Trondheim Kommune as well as information gathered from literature and best practise case studies. This proposed future development will be the basis for the upcoming Stakeholder Analysis, the Risk and Vulnerability Assessment and the Contingency Plan.

The proposed future development is designed to be a mixed-use, integrative, sustainable urban development that is expected to provide high quality infrastructure to the urban centre of Trondheim and complement the existing urban infrastructure surrounding it. With the future risk of flooding due to sea level rise and other climate change effects, a safe to fail approach is suggested to be applied to the design of infrastructure within the development.

Safe to fail By adopting a safe-to-fail strategy as opposed to a failsafe strategy the concept of disturbance and change is integrated in the planning process.

By anticipating failure and designing systems strategically, failure can be contained and minimized (Ahern, 2011) Measures like â&#x20AC;&#x153;making room for the waterâ&#x20AC;?, creating backup functions, raising roads

Power vs Interest Diagram High

Municipality

Residential Community Future businesses in Nyhavna Insurance Companies Hospital (St. Olavs)

DBS

INTEREST

NTNU Red Cross

Residents of Trondheim

KEY

NGU Fire and rescue services

Residents of neighbourhoods surrounding Nyhavna

NVE

TIH

Amnesty International

Community Norwegian National Government

Non-governmental organizations

Trondelag County Government

NVE (Norges vassdrags og

Salvation Army

energidirektorat)

DBS (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap)

Caritas Telecommunication Companies

Governmental institutions

NGU (Norges Geologiske Undersøkelse) TIH (Trondheims interkommunale havn) NGI (Norges Geotekniske Institutt)

Military/Defence Forces

NGI

Low

POWER Figure 20: Power vs Interest diagram for stakeholders.

and houses above flood level and similar measures minimize failure and facilitates faster recovery post-event. This also adds a social dimension to flood risk management. People in flood prone areas must know what to do during a flood event and be able to ensure their own safety and the safety of their belongings. It also implies a shift in people’s perception of flooding, from “fighting the water” to “living with the water”. This requires a certain level of transformability; a capacity to change based on new insights, and a willingness to find the best way to deal with flood risk (Restemeyer, Woltjer and van den Brink, 2015).

Mixed Use As regulated by the Trondheim Kommune in the Nyhavna Area Plan, the development with utilised a mixed-use typology, integrating residential, commercial, retail and public facilities into the development. This will be tied together with a comprehensive transport network facilitating walking, cycling, public transport, and limited private transport within the development and to neighbouring areas.

High

Stakeholder Analysis An analysis of stakeholders involved in the present and future development of Nyhavna can be separated into 3-4 different categories based on the societal level within which they operate.

The categories of stakeholders identified in conjunction with Nyhavna are non-governmental organizations (NGO`s), governmental institutions and community organizations. (Figure 20) Community TIH (Trondheims interkommunale havn): There is around 150 companies residing on Nyhavna today, most of which rent the land from TIH. Warehouse and wholesale dominate the activities in the area in addition to construction businesses, mechanic, and maritime industry. Depending on the future development, some of these businesses may remain in their existing facilities or be integrated into new facilities so they can be considered stakeholders.

The other obvious stakeholder on the community level is the residents of the area. They could suffer both damage and potential loss of property.

Governmental institutions Firstly, Trondheim municipality has responsibility in the planning and land-use within its borders.

In addition to general help before and after a catastrophic event the municipality could help through building regulations as they are responsible for the land-use. The municipality cannot take a leading role in managing disaster-risk and mitigations as there is no disaster management authority, but the municipality can have a general informative role.

NVE (Norges vassdrags og energidirektorat) has a central role in flood risk management. They are the Norwegian water and energy resource directorate, and it is their responsibility to manage water and energy resources. NVE continuously gives updates on potentially hazardous situations involving flood, clay slides and other hazards that may affect the community.

Another important stakeholder on the national level is DSB (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap), which is the directory for civil protection and readiness. The role of DSB is to map areas for potential natural hazards and to create a preparedness plan.

NVE and DSB have a responsibility regarding scenarios such as the one described in this report as it is their area of expertise, but other governmental institutions like the commune itself (Trondheim commune) will also play a role.

Non-governmental organizations This is a very heterogenous group of stakeholders.

Some of these organizations have extensive experience with disastrous scenarios and their knowledge/resources should not be overlooked. In this category there are organizations like red cross and the salvation army. The NGO`s are different from the other levels of stakeholders as they can operate outside and independent of the Norwegian context. These organizations are more important in catastrophic scenarios where more lives and livelihoods are at stake, but they could still be considered a stakeholder in this scenario. There are many more NGO`s in Trondheim but red cross and the salvation army are the most likely to be involved when a crisis happens.

Risk and Vulnerability Assesment The adapted risk and vulnerability matrix for Trondheim, from the Trondheim Kommune, indicates the Municipality’s high risk of experiencing sea level rising, quick clay erosion and flooding. These, in the absence of disaster management authority (given scenario), could negatively affect lives as well as critical infrastructure present in Nyhavna, with its associated consequences, as presented in figure 21. Nevertheless, with sufficient contingency planning, considering substantial resources, could cushion vulnerability of critical infrastructure.

Figure 21: Flood Risk and Vulnerability for Nyhavna.

Contingency Plan Future Development at Nyhavna, Trondheim Disaster preparedness for the resilience of Nyhavna in the face of future sea level rise and flooding

Outline

Scenario

The Contingency Plan is split into 5 sections: The Scenario, Response Strategy, Implementation Plan, Operational Support Plan and the Preparedness Plan. The latter four sections address the scenario in two different ways: the first through physical intervention and the second through social responses. Physical interventions include aspects such as infrastructure and maintenance plans while social responses include community response teams and evacuation aids.

A scenario is a story about how the future might develop. In the context of risk management, the scenarios can be used to inform decision making about response strategies, preparedness, and management of risks (Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies and Lighthill Risk Network, 2020).

Physical Interventions

Social Responses

The scenario is based on the current projections of climate change in Norway, the municipality plan for Nyhavna and the constrictions of the assignment.

The goal is to ascertain how flooding due to climate change can impact Nyhavna in relation to plausible future mixed-use development of the Nyhavna area.

The framework of the scenario states that Nyhavna is a very high-density area, that is prone to flooding due to sea-level rise. The Trondheim municipality has substantial resources but no Disaster Management Authority. The absence of a disaster management authority requires a communitybased equivalent to prevent chaos in case of a flood event. Substantial resources are necessary to create preventive interventions before an event and to handle the financial burden of damage and losses after an event.

Scenario

High Density

No Disaster Management Authority

The most plausible building typology for high density development is several story apartment buildings.

Businesses and services will likely be located on the first floor in the apartment buildings, but can also reside in the stories above, depending on type of business or service. Residents on the first floor are most at risk from flooding.

With no disaster management authority, the community can be cast into chaos during flooding if not properly prepared. Many residents will probably try to leave at the same time causing congestion on the roads, and elderly citizens and others that can’t use the stairs might be isolated at home.

Climate Change Impact

Substantial Resources

According to The Norwegian Centre for Climate Services (NCCS) worst case scenario, the main sea level will rise 21 cm in the period 2041 – 2060 and 53 cm in the time period 2081 – 2100 compared to the main sea level in 1986 – 2005.

The financial damage to infrastructure and buildings might be substantial as a result of flooding. Wave impact and debris might cause both material damage, injuries and soil erosion that might further damage buildings and infrastructure. In the aftermath of the disaster many people might need to make costly repairs on their respective homes and businesses which might cause financial problems for the residents and business owners. The continuous risk of flooding might discourage financial incentives and business owners might chose to relocate their business elsewhere. Empty premises can make the area less attractive, causing housing prices to drop and high-income households to move.

200-year storm surges cause the sea level to rise by 238 cm. Storm surges will happen more frequently in the future and cause flooding in certain parts of Nyhavna.

Flooding can cause severe damage to infrastructure like electrical power, drinking water and sewage, to buildings and people.

Damage to infrastructure like drinking water, sewage and electricity can make the area uninhabitable while repairs are done.

Response Stratergy The response strategy indicates specific physical and social interventions that can be implemented to aid in the resilience of the community. It outlines the specific objective and targets of these interventions.

Making Room for the water

Establish rain gardens to infiltrate and contain excess water on strategic places to avoid stress on buildings and infrastructure

Buildings

Construct buildings with storm gates on the first floor to prevent water intrusion and damage due to debris Establish green roofs to contain excess water Raise buildings on plinth with capacity for flood storage and water movement underneath

Infrastructure

Create back-up functions for drinking water and sewage Place electrical components above flood level or underground and use non-metallic conduits Increase dimensions on underground canalisation and drainage for storm water

Evacuation

Elevate roads and pathways above flood level with permeable material Install an early warning system Durable structure to accommodate heavy vehicles for contingency and emergency service situations Establish a safety building fully stocked with food, water and other necessities. Works as a rendezvous point where the community can organise themselves

Community-based flood management committee

Establish a flood management committee comprised of representatives of various stakeholders in Nyhavna

Community based insurance program

Mandatory membership in insurance program for stakeholders in Nyhavna will facilitate faster recovery post-event. The community flood management committee can be responsible for negotiating the insurance premium on behalf of the community

Maintenance

Develop a maintenance plan for physical structures like rain gardens which are privately owned by the community

Implementation Plan The objectives and targets outlined in the response strategy will be implemented through both physical and social interventions.

Building codes and regulations

Codes and regulations to ensure the implementation of safe-to-fail infrastructure

Making room for the water

From the initial design phase ensure the proposal is based around the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;safe to failâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; flood infrastructure narrative Incorporate rain gardens and other water infiltration and collection measures into initial design development

Buildings

Building features such as storm gates and green roofs can be integrated into the development from the initial design phase to ensure development if built around these features

Community-based flood management committee

Consult with relevant stakeholders to establish a flood management committee comprised of representatives of various stakeholders in Nyhavna Assign specific roles to individuals within the flood management committee Once community is established, consult with them on the establishment, structure and operation of the flood management committee so they understand the committeesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; role and responsibilities

Community based insurance program

Infrastructure

Facilitate relevant flood management committee members to establish an insurance premium with related insurance company and the Trondheim Kommune

Ensure placement of electrical components is integrated into development from the initial design phase

Maintenence

Backup functions for water and sewage can be implemented in development from the initial design phase

Ensure changes to established infrastructure, such as stormwater piping, are completed before irreversible development construction is begun Include relevant stakeholders through participatory methods for the design and incorporation of infrastructure components in the development, especially telecommunications

Evacuation

From the initial design phase include the safety house and the elevated road and accessible walkway layouts Include relevant stakeholders in the design, implementation and testing of the warming system

Inform relevant stakeholder, community members and maintenance personal of the maintenance plan for physical structures and how it will operate Establish the timeframe for maintenance of specific physical structures and who is responsible for such maintenance Implement maintenance plan and ensure required maintenance is carried out at required timeframe

Operational Support Plan The operational support plan assesses the available resources and the administrative, logistical, and support requirements of a response. The available resources are all the different actors that could play a role in the response strategy like human resources, information and communications technology, administration, security etc.â&#x20AC;Żâ&#x20AC;Ż

Technological Resources

Implementing a flood warning system

Communication tools (radio, mobile etc.) to allow easy communication between stakeholders and/or residents

Operational headquarter (saftey building)

Safety building that functions as operational headquarter for the community-based disaster management easy to reach for everyone and save from flooding due to its location on site used for trainings and information centre

First aid equipment

Stored at the safety building

Community disaster management team Stakeholders united in a Disaster Management Team Prepares community and other stakeholders for crisis-events and undertake trainings and drills Communicates and coordinates with first responders (Fire Bigrade, Red Cross, etc.) and other departments

Community engagement

Active engagement of residents in trainings, seminars on safety and relief operations

Preparedness Plan The preparedness plan outlines how to make the development, community and other stakeholders prepared for the risk.

Maintenence and functional test

Capacity building workshops

Evacuation routes are to be clearly signed, lit and illuminated

Identified emergency response team and voluntary organisations

Evacuation routes are to be maintained and cleared

emergency response workers know local flood evacuation plan regarding their respective roles, procedures, routes and exits points

Schedule for regular clearing and maintenance of important infrastructures e.g. drainage Test alarm systems and other automated safety infrastructure

Train community on operation of infrastructure

e.g. closing of flood gates / physical protection to buildings How to raise alarm and use escape routes

Education on how to evacuate vulnerable groups First Aid education

Insurance

Educate insurance companies on the safe-tofail infrastructure Mandatory for businesses to have a certain level of insurance Allocate budget to help pay for shortfall in insurance Educate homeowners on insurance

Budget The Budget considers different positions necessary to implement and work according to the contingency plan. The costs are estimated and staggered from low (+) to middle (++) to high (+++)

5. Discussion and Conclusion The report brings together site analysis, a literature review and case studies analysis to create a comprehensive Contingency Plan for a hypothetical scenario affecting the Nyhavna community in Trondheim. The information throughout the report and the Contingency Plan act to answer the initial research question: In the absence of a disaster management authority, how can a high density, substantially resourced coastal community prepare for and reduce the loss from future disasters resulting from the effects of climate change, in specific sea level rise?

The Contingency Plan has provided a comprehensive potential Response Strategy, Implementation Plan, Operational Support Plan and a Preparedness Plan in relation to the hypothetical scenario imposed in Nyhavna. This has been attempted through suggesting flexible tools, strategies and frameworks that are designed to deal with unexpected and unprecedented uncertainties that can occur in future disaster events. The Contingency Plan has been created based off information gathered through literature reviews, site analysis and best practise case studies, to ensure it relevant to the context of the Nyhavna area and fit for purpose for the future community which will be occupying the development.

The scenario for the Contingency Plan is based on a future mixed-use, high density urban development occupying the current site at Nyhavna. As the Trondheim Kommune has already outlined regulations for the development of this area, we thought it fitting to use this site within the context of the given scenario for the project. We saw our method of proposing a Contingency Plan for a future development as a forward-thinking approach in comparison to retrofitting or designing a plan to fit an existing area which already has various levels of insufficient infrastructure in place. By creating the plan before the development is constructed, the response strategies can be more openly explored during the design phase and implemented in the construction phase potentially leading to more successful results in the face of the effects from climate change and sea level rise.

Furthermore, by organising and establishing a community disaster management team and a community response team alongside the establishment of the developments, allows community members to be involved and informed from day one. Although this method will not ensure the development is fully prepared for future uncertainties that may occur in disaster events, it can reduce the uncertainty around how the buildings and infrastructure will perform in such an event as well as how the community can be supported by outside groups and response teams.

Making sense of the context of the future development and the resulting contingency plan was difficult throughout this process, due to the nature of designing around hypothetical scenario.

This meant we had to make a lot of assumptions surrounding the buildings, infrastructure, and community that would be occupying the development and effected by the contingency plan. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the created Contingency Plan is a valuable contribution towards creating more resilient neighbourhoods and, furthermore, can easily be adapted by other development projects with similar preconditions.

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Flood Contingency Planning For Ila Group 6 Alvira Shrestha Einar Olav Jensen Sanaz Akbari Koli Nick A. Kiahtipes Vibeke Fardal

Introduction

Location

The purpose of this assignment is to prepare a contingency plan for a possible flood event in Trondheim due to heavy rainfall. Trondheim is a very high-density city prone to floods due to heavy rainfall. The municipality does not have a disaster management authority and limited financial resources. This gives more responsibility to local organizations and important stakeholders in the chosen area. To prevent human injuries and material damages on housings and infrastructure due to flooding, it is important to give the community the resources they need to be prepared when a flood occurs.

The area of Ila is located in the western part of the city centre of Trondheim. It is surrounded by the Trondheimsfjord in the North and is divided by the river Ilelva running through the area. In the North-West part of the site area, an area called Ilviksøra is located. Ilviksøra is known for their residential treehouse buildings which were built in the 18th century. In the South, the river of Nidelva is surrounding the area of Øya. By following the Trondheimsfjord in the direction of the city centre, the area of Solsiden is located in the East. From Ila there are direct sightlines to Munkholmen, an Island located 2 km North of the city centre in Trondheim.

Figure A: Conditions

Figure B: Site Location

Scenarios Ila is a dense, largely residential area that accommodates schools, daycares, and corner markets. The municipal government does an adequate job maintaining the current infrastructure. However, the area is experiencing increasingly intense rainfall. The residents are used to minor flood waters coming off the southern mountains. The community even has a canal to direct the water through the neighborhood and into the ocean. However, the previous few springs nearly overflowed the canal and all other grey infrastructure.

Norway’s scientists predict that with worsening climate change there will be increased precipitation.

During the winter this means greater snowpack on the hills and mountains. As for the spring, this means more intense rainfall. The hazard develops when those first spring rainstorms melt the snowpack. When this happens, months of stored precipitation comes running off the hill.

Figure C: Scenarios

Trondheim’s Planning and Public Works departments know about the potential hazard.

Yet their overstretched employees are not able to allocate extra time to one neighborhood’s potential issue. With virtually zero action from the public agencies, the residents have lobbied the municipal government of Trondheim to address the issue.

The local politicians promise a solution but projects around the city are being denied funding due to the municipality’s dwindling budget. The community of Ila knows they need a disaster management authority to address their situation but they also know with economic prosperity of Trondheim, this is not a route for them.

In the midst of this uncertainty, an NTNU professor that lives in the area warns of a worst-case scenario. Much of the development from a few decades back was built on what is locally known as slip clay. The professor explains that if this clay becomes too saturated, it becomes viscous and unstable. Therefore, any weight bearing property of the soil is reduced and the atop buildings no longer have a solid foundation.

The residents of Ila are desperate to keep the springtime storms from bringing floodwaters through their streets and homes, and in the worstcase scenario, keep the soil below their feet solid.

Methodology and Analysis Introduction While residents do not have a disaster management authority to handle the situation for them, they know they must face the disaster in whatever why they can. To do so, they need to further understand the disaster. By looking at prominent disaster risk reduction literature, reviewing the history of the site, conducting a site analysis, and analyzing

recent case studies, this document will develop a contingency plan which the residents are able to push forward.

The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) states that disasters are the “result of the impact of a natural hazard on a socioeconomic system with a given level of vulnerability, which prevents the affected society from coping adequately with this impact” (Countering Disasters, 2001). This definition reveals that there is more to disaster than simply the floodwaters that Ila faces.

It is about vulnerability and ability to cope. To extrapolate this concept further, the International Federation of Red Cross and Crescent Society (IFRC) created the equation in Figure D. (What is a disaster?, 2020)

Figure D: IFRC Disaster Equation

The IFRC states that natural environmental hazards are “naturally occurring physical phenomena caused either by rapid or slow onset events which can be geophysical, hydrological, climatological, meteorological, or biological” (Types of Disasters, 2020). The UNDRR defines vulnerability as the “conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards” (Countering Disasters, 2001, p. 1). As for capacity, Wisner et al. state that capacities “refer to the resources and assets that people possess to resist, cope with and recover from disaster shocks they experience” (2012, p. 28) Moving forward, each three if these areas will be addressed to ensure the residents of Ila properly understand the potential disaster and that a contingency plan may be implemented to change the disaster equation to favor a better outcome for Ila.

Figure X: Flood History

Culture and History

History of Flood and Water

Historically, the residents of Ilsvikøra have been craftsmen, fishermen and industrial workers. And in spite of being some distance from the rest of Trondheim city center, in 1874 400 people lived here in 30 houses. The oldest (and largest) house that still stands here is from the 1780s, but most of the buildings date from around 1860-1875.

These are all wooden houses, and their placement according to each other together with the contrast to the modern buildings around make it look like a small village. And it is precisely this cohesion, not only the buildings themselves, but also among the residents, which has led Ilsvikøra to become the special place it is today. Local patriotism has always been great, and it helped to determine the fate of this place during the heated preservation debates in the 1960s and 1970s (Håpnes, 2007). Today Ilsvikøra is considered to be a tourist destination in Trondheim.

In Ilabekken there has been floods almost annually due to rain and snow melt. Partly because of this, three dams have been constructed along the course of the stream. Several of the floods haves caused damage to buildings and infrastructure, but the flood of 1791 was something else (Bratberg, 2008). 1791 was the year of the biggest and most damaging flood Trondheim had ever experienced.

This was also Norway’s largest dam accident (Strømø, 2020). Five days of heavy snowmelt and continuous rainfall caused the dams at both the Kobberdammen and Theisendammen to burst.

This led to a big flood that took with it mills, 6 houses and 22 deaths as a result (Bratberg, 2008).

Figure E: Cultural History Figure F: Flood Timeline

Since the early 1900s the lower part of the stream was put in pipes, but in 2008 it was dug up and turned into a park (Bratberg, 2008). This park work like a kind of flood park, and after it was constructed the number of floods has dropped significantly. This park is dimensioned for a 1000year flood, but it has only experienced a 100-year flood, so just how well it will work remains an uncertainty (Dalen, 2016).

However, this protection is limited because it only protects the area from water flowing in the stream. It is unknown what will happen if a blockage occurs somewhere along the stream or if frozen ground causes problems with water absorption.

Future flood zones Figure G maps out the Information from NVE (The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate) regarding estimated flood zones.

It indicates, after Nidelva river with the highest water level rise during flood (Max 8 m), Ileva river comes the second with maximum of 4-5 meters.

The highlighted boundary shows the situation of Ilsvikøra ( the study location) in future flood danger zones.

Figure G: Flood Zones Figure H: Water and Vegetation Timeline

Water and Vegetation Figure H illustrates changes in the freshwater resources and the vegetation patterns connected to Ilsvikøra and its neighborhood. Ileva river as the main water body of this area has been branched off from Teisendammen dam since the available historical maps show. Today this water body ends up at Iladalen water park which is canalled to the fjord. The map from 1937 shows the presence of a smaller water reservoir called Reservedammen.

This dam was located in between Teisendammen and Ileva river but it has been dropped since 1953.

The aerial view from 1957 shows the vegetation growth taking over the area of the dried water pond. The timeline shows a significant increase in the vegetation growth along the water body all the way down to Ilsvikøra. These riparian plants have an important role in reducing the downstream flood. The Iladalen wetland and water body has the potential of following the riparian vegetation patterns to stabilize the land for the future floods.

Stakeholder Mapping Human resources are extremely vital elements of any kind of planning. Without them, none of the other resources can be mobilized. Hence in this section, we take on the task of stakeholder mapping, to assess the various actors in our case, covering 4 hierarchies- National, Regional, Local and Communal. We do so using the Power vs Interest Matrix which maps out the â&#x20AC;&#x153;stakeholders in relation to the power that they hold and how likely they are to show interestâ&#x20AC;? (UKEssays, 2018) in the overall goal of flood management.

Figure I: Stakeholder Overview

After this basic overview of the stakeholders, let us shift our focus to the color-coded matrix (Figure J) Evidently, local and communal actors have prominent interest in bettering the site and can play vital roles in the overall disaster resilience. But their options are bound to be limited, due to the lack of resources. Despite this, they can still excel in communal resilience. On the other hand, we see the National and Regional actors have the highest power over important matters, yet their interest in Ila specifically is not as encouraging. In an ideal situation, a Disaster Management authority should have been present in the list, fulfilling high ranks in both interest and power. But the sheer lack of it in our case, creates a void. This needs to be filled through integration of the various existing stakeholders which shall be further explored in our contingency plan.

Figure J: Interest and Power

Case Studies International: Thailand The stakeholder mapping conducted in the earlier section highlighted the position of the community, as a vital actor in disaster management. Hence seeing them as possible front runners, we now investigate the International case example of Thailand showcasing community driven approaches Flooding in Thailand is an annual event, unfortunately re-occurring every monsoon. One of the worst floods to hit Thailand was in 2011, affecting some 97000 buildings and 13 million citizens, and submerging settlements for months (Carbonari,2014). While there are many bigbudgeted physical recommendations that can be made to break the vicious cycle of the disaster, many local communities cannot adhere to those financial demands. This gap was realized by organizations like World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Global Water Partnership, Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) and USAID. Hence from 2013 to 2016, they executed a joint project – “Community-Based Approaches To Flood Management” to “develop self-help capabilities in flood-prone communities” (Tripathi,2018). It was aimed at 4 pilot communities to basically foster resilience through the sense of ownership. Some of the best features of the programs were: 1. Emphasis on use of participatory methods to generate awareness of local risks factors.

Once community members were given such platforms, they engaged in many personal reflections, and were able to indulge into potential solutions. These methods were applauded more due to its inclusive nature.

All strata of the community were involved- the elderly, women, children, and differently abled people likewise.

2. Local leaders were identified to form the Disaster Management Committee. This new establishment empowered the community to voice their opinions more often. Furthermore, the committee could be trained and allotted specialized tasks for “early warning, search and rescue, evacuation, security, health and relief” (Tripathi,2018).

3. Typically, people look for physical designs to provide solutions. But this project gave light to the value of non-physical interventions. In the case of a hazard, these physical solutions may also fail, whereas knowledge will assist them in various other ways. Useful information regarding risks, vulnerability, solutions, evacuations, and relief processes, can prepare them mentally, such that they act sensibly in the hour of need. This was seen effective in pilot simulations drills done in 2015 of the project.

At the end, they were able to achieve some quality communal resilience. For example, • They made use of existing local organizations, and connected them with community leaders, to create an efficient communication network.

Hence a system was created so that important information reached everyone.

• Secondly, they created early warning systems.

For this they put local market operators in charge of dissipating quick warning to masses.

• Thirdly, they set out to identify the most vulnerable buildings, zones, and marked them with red ribbons. This way in the case of a flood, the response team would know what to prioritize.

These were all very simple yet effective steps that did not demand much financially. Instead they fully utilized their existing communal assets.

Now looking back to our own case, we do not have access to adequate resources, and disaster response authority either. Hence, we can learn from the above case, and adopt a bottom-up response to the flooding scenario in Ila as well.

Local: Norway Compared to other countries flooding has not been a major problem in Norway, due to the country’s topography. But in the later years, temperature rise, heavy rainfall and the ice melting have made the danger of larger and more frequent floods to increase. In some areas in Norway the rain intensity is 100-200 mm/per day during a flood event, and snow melting usually gives 10-25 mm/per day.

There have been several large floods in Norway since the beginning of the 18th century, but with many years in between. The last big flood event occurred in June 1995 on the eastern part of Norway and was named “Vesleofsen”. Large amount of rainfall over a short period of time combined with snow melting caused a 200-300-year flood with a water flow on 4000 m3 per second (SNL, 2020). Several farms and agricultural land were completely damaged and one human life was lost.

The flood resulted in damages for about NOK 1,8 billion (YR, 2008).

In the later years, extreme weather has led to floods all over the country and made the municipalities strengthen their preparedness before a flood.

In 2015 the extreme weather named “Synne” resulted in large floods due to about 200 mm/per day in the southern part of Norway (YR, 2017). The

different municipalities were quick to initiate their contingency plan with evacuation and flood warning plans. The community was helpful in initiating responses such as building flood embankments and placing sandbags along the coastline to keep the water away. The floods caused major material damages on both infrastructure and housings, but no human lives were injured.

In Norway the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (later referred to as NVE) ensure public flood warnings. NVE also is responsible for preventing flood damages and are providing guidance regarding mapping of flood zones, spatial planning and other important preparedness actions before and during the flood.

Before the flood “Vesleofsen” occurred in 1995, NVE made sure to give public warnings for a possible flood, due to delayed snow melting weeks before the event. Together with the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, NVE is an important organization that provides safety for both the community and municipality during a flood event (NVE, 2015). The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency require each Norwegian municipality to write a contingency plan. The plan should contain an overview over the municipality’s crisis management and evacuation plans and identify human resources that are needed in a crisis (Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency, 2018).

Contingency Plan

Implementation Plan

1) Social Networking

When adverse events occur, it is tough to keep account of everyone and everything. Hence as a step ahead, a system shall be devised to make sure the whole of the community can be reached at all times. This shall be translated through the “phone tree” initiative - a system for contacting a sizable number of people quickly in which each person calls the next designated group of people (Holden, 2020). The top of the “tree” shall have community leaders with access to reliable information sources.

This scheme gives power to individuals to contribute and be responsible for their fellow community members. With phone trees in effect, important information regarding alertness, rescue, relief, or even general mental support can be relayed timely.

This way any missing link (individual/family) can also be identified swiftly and checked upon.

In the wake of a calamity, who acts as the first respondent? While there may be various formal agencies that dispense out aid, your neighbors are usually your first hope in those crucial early moments. Especially in our case we can expect huge reliance on nearer community members.

Hence this highlights “the need to identify and support the skills and capacities of local people and organizations in disaster response and recovery (for reasons of proximity, speed, efficiency, accountability)” (Twigg and Mosel, 2017).

Response Strategy Social networking can be generally understood as expanding one’s social contacts. Our first response strategy is to enable social networking of the entire neighborhood of Ila. The main idea is to build effective trust and communication among all societal members , so that they can rely on each other in times of need. This relation can be further utilized in all stages of disaster management.

Figure K: Networking Process

Preparedness Plan Awareness is the first and foremost step to achieving solutions. Thus few local stakeholders shall be integrated into organizing campaigns, workshops to showcase possible risks, vulnerabilities and hazards to the community. Once they grasp proper

understanding of the context, these events shall be stepped up to include the conversation of communal resilience. As seen in the case study of Thailand, such events give way to empowering people, and pave way towards finding plausible solutions.

for our site, Ila. Hence it only makes sense to try and incorporate natural vegetation in our tactic to prevent/control/mitigate flooding events.

Response Strategy

2) Natural Vegetation

Ila has a levelled terrain, meaning the hills to the south are not the only slopes to be considered.

These slopes, big or small, add to the intensity of water flow. Moreover, another hazard - quick clay landslides can amplify the damages, if not given thought. Our short term approach will be to strategically plant vegetations on such slopes and on the Iladalen wetland, in an effort to strengthen the ground, as well as control the speed of water in case of flooding. Another natural medium to be embraced would be rain gardens. Widely known to manage runoff, they can be constructed at both individual and communal levels.

In a natural environment, heavy rainfall is simply a natural phenomenon. The rainwater quietly finds its way seeping into the ground recharge or flowing into nearby water sources. What transforms rainfall into a hazard is the present day unnatural impervious built environment, forcing water to accumulate on the surface itself. The same goes

Figure M on the next spread shows the selected area for the long term plan which could be implemented on other vulnerable areas of Ilsvikøra. In this proposal the street between the new and old residentials will be transformed to a pedestrian sidewalk with green and blue elements.

This happens by suggested alternatives for the

Next in procedure would be the logistics to implement the phone tree- forming a dependable database containing vital contact details, and blood group of each household/establishment. This can be done conveniently through voluntary sharing and mapping on social media. With all data in place, community and household leaders shall be identified and incorporated into hierarchical phone trees and put in touch with authentic sources to get information from.

Figure L: Natural Vegetation Process

car access, shown with arrows. This project aims to integrate individual gardenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s of each house to the central green area and wetland in order to create a stable network. It is designed to collect the surface water during heavy rainfall as well as improving the aesthetic aspects of Ilsvikøra both for tourists and locals. Figures N-Q on the next spread illustrate some frames of this project from the existing situation to the future perspective.

Implementation Plan Since these are physical interventions, they shall require some amount of financial, human, and physical capital. These need not be lofty investments, instead small contributions will be collected from all stakeholders, that can add up to go a long way. The plan shall be administered in phases, to avoid strain on limited resources.

Volunteers and experts of all stakeholder strata shall be divided into teams to carry out plantation/ construction activities. Having an inclusive range of participants (youths, kids, elderly/ residents,

students, employees, etc.) shall enable them to enhance their communal link while sharing the ownership of the project. Hence it shall motivate actors to willingly maintain and continue the efforts.

Preparedness Plan Norway, as a country is already exemplary in terms of eco-friendly, sustainable living. Hence the concept of disaster resilience through natural solutions, should not be extremely hard to get across in Ila. What might still be lacking though,

is substantial collaboration of the community into the actual implementation. Hence information campaigns are still significant steps towards attracting participation to materialize the plan.

Various logistics are to be figured and laid out for everyone to access such as- Identification of plantation/construction sites, measurements and layers in rain garden designs, regulations to be followed, resources needed (physical, human, financial) , to name a few.

Figure M: Intervention Locations

Figure N

Current Situation

Current Situation With Flood

Figure O

Figure P

Post Implementation With Rain

Post Implementation With Sun

Figure Q

3) Evacuation To prevent human injuries and material damages there needs to be an evacuation plan put in place before the flood occurs. The plan should include specific evacuation procedures with transport routes and exits. There will need to be cooperation with emergency functions, volunteers, and important stakeholders to make sure the evacuated get the help they need in a crisis. It is also necessary to make sure the inhabitants are aware of the plan and that they know what to do if the flood should occur and affect their home.

Response Strategy When a flood occurs and the water level keeps rising rapidly, the evacuation process needs to happen quickly. Volunteers and emergency functions will need to go door to door to make sure everyone is being evacuated. To make this evacuation process more efficient, awareness and knowledge about the existing evacuation plan is important. This way, the inhabitants are aware of the evacuation routes and where to meet their assigned rescue and relief teams. To make this easier there could be signages leading evacuation routes and efficient use of evacuation gears.

Implementation Plan To create an efficient evacuation plan there needs to be created voluntary rescue teams consisting of people with different backgrounds. Ila voluntary center could be a useful resource, as well as Ilsvika medical care center and the schools in the area.

To involve all stakeholders, simulations and rescue drills could help to create awareness among the stakeholders of all levels and ages. To access more financial and human resources, the community should try to attract bigger humanitarian organizations such as the red cross. This way, it is possible to prepare for a worst-case scenario where there could be need of bigger evacuation gears such as helicopters, ambulances, and fire trucks. This could also be arranged by collecting funds from the community or other stakeholders.

Figure R: Evacuation Plan

Preparedness Plan To be able to create an efficient evacuation process there needs to be identified which areas should be evacuated if a flood occurs. By mapping and spatial planning of the area, the most vulnerable areas need to be marked. This could include houses right in front of slopes, older buildings or residentials along the coast. The safest escape paths need to be identified, as well as evacuation centres and shelters. This will need to be planned for both a best and worst-case scenario. If the infrastructure such as tunnels and bridges should be blocked or damaged the evacuation would be more complicated and time-consuming. If this happens there should be a plan for this worstcase scenario such as using the higher buildings as a temporary safe ground. Besides planning for evacuation paths, the required capacities for relief and rescue teams needs to be identified. There could also be given evacuation courses for both important stakeholders as well as the inhabitants living in the high-risk area.

4) Local Markets Relief centers are not a common phenomenon in Norway, but it can prove to be useful if the worst-case scenario should occur. In this way, the evacuated inhabitants have a safe place to go and get the help they need. If their house is completely damaged, a relief center could be a safe haven to stay until they get a new place to stay.

Response strategy If a flood should occur, the community should be aware of the location of the relief center and the possible transport paths. At the center they should be provided with relief packages or other things in need. The relief center could be a place to collect elements that could be useful to keep water away from their own basement/houses, such as concrete blocks or sandbags. Information and guidelines will be provided by emergency functions and volunteers at the relief center to create awareness over the situation and what is ahead.

Implementation plan To create an efficient relief center it is necessary to create voluntary relief teams consisting of people with different backgrounds and ages. The community could also try to collect funds from human resources or important stakeholders. This way, the community would be able to access more human and financial resources so that the relief teams can provide people with relief packages and other important gears.

Preparedness plan The first step is to identify possible areas to have a relief centre. The area needs to be large enough and be placed somewhere without any risk of flooding or other hazards. A local market could work as a relief centre, as long as itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s not placed in a high-risk area. To make sure the relief centre is providing the help people need, important resources, stakeholders and a relief team needs to be identified. Especially stakeholders or volunteers with health backgrounds, such as nurses or medical students will come of good use. Evacuation paths

need to be identified in line with the evacuation plan to create a safe transport to the relief centre.

5) Promoting Ila as a Cultural and Tourist Hotspot â&#x20AC;&#x153;Cultural heritage is the common property of all human beings and can never be recovered after destruction; thus, cultural heritage requires designated preventive conservation.â&#x20AC;?

(Jiuh Wang, 2014, p3) Cultural heritage values and the natural elements including the fjord, the pocket beaches and the hiking trails into the forest are the touristic hotspots of Ila. The long term goal is to establish future policies to protect these areas against natural hazards. In order to achieve this goal in this case study with limited resources, it is required to gain the interest of regional, national level stakeholders as well and generate more fundsphysical interventions to protect important areas and buildings.

Response strategy The most essential response to save cultural heritage is disaster prevention. This can include actions such as building flood embankments, dams or use other elements to keep water away from housings and important cultural heritage. In case of flood, it is important to investigate the damage to cultural heritage in a timely manner soon after the flood. To prevent damages to cultural heritage after the flood, recovery and reconstruction is important.

Implementation plan To prevent major damages to cultural heritage it is important to analyze the effect of flood on buildingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s materials. Maintenance or renovation of existing buildings should be done if needed. Flood zone maps can help to investigate the effect of flood on cultural heritage sites. By reviewing present and past situations, it is easier to understand future threats to historical areas. Physical and structural interventions can strengthen the older buildings and assist the flood as well as avoid it reaching

the vulnerable areas, the road, and other critical infrastructures. This includes interventions such as transforming surfaces by creating vegetative wetlands or porous surfaces.

Preparedness plan The first step to protect culture heritage values in the area is to identify them. There are several Norwegian organizations, such as Norwegian Culture Heritage, who would be helpful in this process. The Cultural Heritage Fond is another Norwegian organization where you, as a private, can apply for the means to protect cultural heritage values. Once a flood occurs, cultural heritage sites cannot be protected without preparations to protect the site and reduce damages. To be able to protect the cultural heritage with limited financial resources, it is important to raise public awareness before a flood occurs. This can be done by education and promotion. Emergency teams who are dealing with flood on preservation sites should include cultural heritage specialists to their team.

Operational Support Plan and Budget Due to not having a disaster management authority and a lack of available funds at a local level, the prior mentioned five focus area plans steered away from a central office implementing projects that would cost millions of kroners. Instead, the plans focused on individual aspects that are tangible. However, the residents of Ila are not alone. The following are several public and private stakeholders, institutions, and organizations which play a role in operationalizing the plans. A note for the residents, the following list is not exhaustive, as these are only the main players. The community should push past this list to find more organizations who are able to provide additional resources in terms of knowledge, capacity, and financial.

Main Actors • The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency • Norwegian Directorate for Cultural Heritage • The Norwegian Public Roads Administration • Corner markets • Ila Voluntary Center While the residents do not have a disaster management authority, they do have resources at the national level. With the goal to protect Norway and its citizens from accidents, disasters, and other incidents, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency will be a key player in addressing all the focus areas, especially number three. The Directorate specializes in crisis management, studies and analysis, and civil/military cooperation.

While the Directorate may not manage every aspect of the disasters facing Ila, it is able to help with the preparation of an evacuation plan, likely with military assistance.

The Norwegian Directorate for Cultural Heritage is the nation’s lead organization which is responsible for the management of cultural heritage in Norway. As Ila is promoted as a cultural and tourist hotspot, the Directorate is able to bring important knowledge around how other communities have protected historical building from natural hazards.

Through them, Ila may start networking with other communities who have faced similar challenges and learn of applicable regulations and grant money.

The Norwegian Public Roads Administration and the

subordinate road agencies at lower government levels will play a role when it comes to manipulating the community’s streets to support additional vegetation or evacuation plans. Since roads serve many purposes and are often contested spaces within the public realm, the Administration must serve as a guiding force as to what alterations are possible.

The last two listed entities, markets and Ila Voluntary Center, serve at the community level. As social networking gets started, when the evacuation plan is implemented, and when street improvements are drafted markets serve as a hub to get information out to the community. Additionally, the Center may serve as a community information outlet at the onset of the efforts. Both these institutions have the capacity to play an active role once plans are formulated and implements. For example, markets become gathering places and the Center’s volunteers build capacity for execution.

Due to the decentralized approaches, many of the costs typically incurred when one agency must plan and execute are minimized and dispersed throughout different agencies. Here is a list of the action areas and associated projects.

Action Area 1 Depending on the form of networking, this project will incur little to no cost. The initial footwork may be conducted through volunteering by the Ila Voluntary Center or concerned residents.

Depending on what form the phone tree takes shape, there may be costs in developing and maintaining it. Subscription services cost around 70-15 NOK per month. However, a manual phone tree of community and household leaders would be virtually no additional cost to residents.

Action Area 2 As more natural vegetation is placed throughout the community, there are possible high, up-front costs. However, since this action is taking place at a local level, often labor costs are supplemented by volunteering and material costs are offset by donations. If done correctly and along a timeline, these projects should not cost the municipal departments more money. If costs are incurred for project implementation, residents may pursue grant money from The Norwegian Climate and Forest Funding to Civil Society and similar organizations.

Action Area 3 and 4 These plans have the potential to occur the highest costs. The initial evacuation plan will be developed through the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency allocated budget, therefore, no foreseen cost will be incurred by the public. However, in the case of evacuation, there will be costs to provide nourishment to displaced people. Additionally, it is unknown if a municipality must compensate the central government for services rendered, such as military support. In these scenarios, the locals will be dependent on national and international aid if the disasters were to be catastrophic. While it is outside the scope of this article to develop a detailed cost analysis of internal displacement,

it is recommended that residents personally save money within financial institutions that can be accessed elsewhere and buy relevant insurance for property, vehicle, life, etc.

Action Area 5 This is the plan with the widest range of potential costs. Ideally, the costs incurred to protect cultural sites and buildings will be supplemented by national and institutional grants. Alternatively, the additional monies generated through sales tax, hotel tax, etc from increased tourism may justify a new, moderate tax to provide funding for these projects.

Discussion and Reflection As mentioned earlier, the community is used to minor floods in the site area, due to heavy rainfall.

The canal that carries the water through the area and into the ocean has worked well with previous floods, but in a worst-case-scenario the canal will not be able to keep all water away. It is clear that the area needs some new design interventions to prevent further damages to the housings, cultural heritage and infrastructure. As a worst-casescenario, the soil consisting of slip clay can be a major problem due to large amounts of flood water in the streets. This is not likely to happen today, but it is still important to plan for all future outcomes, if the soil should become viscous and unstable due to large amounts of floodwater in the area.

This report comes up with short and long term ideas generated based on the site analysis including the history of Ilviksøra. The historical analysis of the site focused on the flood related elements such as water, terrain variation and vegetation. This information helped to build informative knowledge about the site characteristics in order to cope with future floods. The short term plan is to highlight evacuation related information in the form of an infographic map which could raise awareness for the locals. Whereas the long term plan is to use physical interventions to control future floods which should be done in different phases due to limited resources in this case study. The long term interventions use the knowledge, gained through historical analysis to create wetlands and increase riparian vegetations in order to stabilize

the vulnerable areas. The proposal aims to not only solve one issue while adding benefits to other parts such as awareness, aesthetic aspects of the green and blue elements and the natural aspects related to biodiversity.

With limited financial resources, no disaster management authority and a dense settlement, the proposed contingency plan meets some challenges.

The contingency plan is depending on a high degree of collaboration between different stakeholders in the area, but also human resources as the red cross. Without any financial resources and no disaster management plan, the community needs to rely on the stakeholders and other resources in the area to be able to get the supply and the training they need. This will give the residents a bigger responsibility when it comes to protecting and preparing themselves for flooding in the future.

Due to the covid-19 situation, our methodology was limited. The original idea was a storytelling approach, but this became difficult to go through with when residents were recommended to stay at home. The alternative was an online questionnaire with questions regarding experience with previous floods in the area. This was feasible but when our original approach changed, the questionnaire lost its original meaning, and we chose a different approach. The Covid-19 situation has turned the group assignments into a digital collaboration with group members sitting across not only cities, but across continents. This has led to some challenges, but the group have managed to overcome this and create a positive experience of this unusual situation.

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