Tolle Lege 2022

tolle LEGE

Mount St. Mary’s University Emmitsburg, Maryland Volume XV 2022

Staff Editors-in-Chief Harry Scherer Lexi Zambito

Editorial Board Selia Bizzarro Elijah Disharoon Emily Jansen Savannah Laux Rachel Lyter Matthew Pugsley Glennamarie Rivers Heather Wade

Faculty Advisors Dr. Joshua Brown Dr. Thane Naberhaus

Table of Contents Editors’ Note .............................................................................................3 Contributors ...............................................................................................4 A Critical Analysis of Antiracism Olivia Prevost ..................................................................................................5 A Discussion of Grace in Caryll Houselander’s The Reed of God Conor Hardy ................................................................................................. 10 All in Order: Cicero’s Analysis of the Ordering of the Cardinal Virtues Harry Scherer ................................................................................................ 14 The Personal Lament of the Despairing Yet Obedient Prophet in Jeremiah 20:7–18 Lexi Zambito................................................................................................ 17 Whether Mando and Baby Yoda Have the Same Essence?

Olivia Prevost ................................................................................................ 27 Mutilate to Sanctify? An Analysis of Matthew 5:29–30 in Light of Augustine’s Treatment Harry Scherer ................................................................................................ 31

In vitro Fertilization

Carolyn Allen ............................................................................................... 36 The Phenomenological Ressourcement: An Exploration of the Philosophical Foundations and Consequences of the Nouvelle

Théologie

Leagon Carlin ............................................................................................... 48

Why “Tolle Lege ”?

The title of this journal is a reference to an extraordinary moment of conversion in the life of St. Augustine, the great philosopher and theologian of the early medieval period. The story begins with St. Augustine sitting beneath a fig tree, weeping in distress over his inability to leave behind his life of sin and follow God faithfully.

Amidst his tears he hears the distant voice of a child chanting the words “Tolle, lege!” or “Take up and read!” Aroused from his pitiable state and taking this as a sign from God, he goes to his house, picks up the first book he finds, and reads the first chapter. The book contained the letters of St. Paul, and the verse that Augustine read spoke to his heart with such force that he was convinced beyond any doubt of the truth of God; he was converted on the spot.

This journal of philosophy and theology is meant to embody a spirit of truth-seeking—on the part of both the contributors and you, the reader. Like St. Augustine, we are all faced with the choice between complacency and continual conversion toward truth. We hope that this journal will serve as an aid in the discovery of truth, and thus we exhort you in all earnestness to “Take up and read!”

2

TOLLE LEGE

Editors’ Note “Tolle, lege”—these words inspired St. Augustine to embark on a journey of faith in pursuit of truth. In 2007, these two words became the cornerstone of our journal. For fifteen years we have sought to inspire students through masterly essays in theology and philosophy written by their Mount peers. With this new issue we continue to offer you, our readers, an opportunity to take up your journey toward truth.

This year, our editorial board selected eight fantastic essays on a variety of topics. The prize essay, A Critical Analysis of Antiracism, written by Olivia Prevost, C’22, offers a detailed account of contemporary antiracism literature through the lens of Catholic philosophical anthropology. As in previous years, the editorial board selected essays as the result of a blind review. The essays that appear in the pages that follow stood out to our editors for their contemporary relevance and clarity of argument.

We would like to thank our editorial board for their genuine consideration of each of the submissions, and for their dedication in selecting the essays included in this volume. We will never cease to be amazed by the zealous pursuit of truth exhibited by our peers. May we follow St. Anselm, not understanding in order that we might believe, but believing in order that we might understand.

Publication of this volume would not have been possible without the support of many members of the Mount St. Mary’s community.

We would like to thank the provost, Dr. Boyd Creasman, and the dean of the College of Liberal Arts, Dr. Peter Dorsey, for their generous financial support. Furthermore, we owe special thanks to our faculty advisors, Drs. Joshua Brown and Thane Naberhaus, for their encouragement and guidance. Finally, we want to thank all those students whose submissions made this volume possible.

So tolle, lege—take up and read! We hope that through this journal, you will be inspired to participate in a community conversation directed toward the discovery of truth and its revelation to others.

Harry Scherer and Lexi Zambito Editors-in-Chief

VOLUME XV (2022)

3

Contributors Carolyn Allen graduated from Mount St. Mary’s University in the spring of 2021 with a degree in elementary education. She is currently a pre-kindergarten teacher in Pennsylvania and plans to seek out an elementary teaching position in the near future.

Rev. Mr. Leagon Carlin is a transitional deacon of the diocese of Ogdensburg, New York. He has a B.A. in philosophy and humanities from the Pontifical College Josephinum and is currently pursuing an M.Div. and an M.A. in systematic theology at Mount St. Mary’s Seminary. He hopes to be ordained a priest in May of 2022.

Conor Hardy is a seminarian for the archdiocese of Washington studying at Mount St. Mary’s Seminary. He is on pastoral year at Our Lady Star of the Sea parish in Solomons, Maryland, and is looking forward to returning to the Mount in the fall of 2022 for Third Theology.

Olivia Prevost is a senior pursuing a major in philosophy and a minor in theology. After graduation she plans to put her degree to good use in a missionary year dedicated to serving God and the homeless in Denver, Colorado.

Harry Scherer is a senior pursuing majors in philosophy, politics, and economics (PPE), history, and Latin. He proudly hails from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Lexi Zambito is a senior pursuing majors in theology, philosophy, and Latin.

4

TOLLE LEGE

*** PRIZE ESSAY ***

A Critical Analysis of Antiracism Olivia Prevost

T

o understand the cultural resonance and the true message of Ibram Kendi’s book How to Be an Antiracist, we must examine closely his use and definition of the concept of race. Kendi defines race in a very particular way. Race, for Kendi, is “a power construct of collected or merged differences that lives socially.”1 He sees race not as a shared scientific or biological fact, but as a purely constructed sociological phenomenon. Race is not a physical aspect of Kendi’s anthropology; rather, it is completely determined by cultural and historical forces. Biological diversity is anthropologically meaningless, so there cannot exist any natural racial hierarchy. All physical differences are rooted in a common humanity that subsists despite racial categorizing.

Race, as a sociological category, is created and preserved by power structures. Kendi traces the origins of the concept of race to the West African slave trade. Prince Henry the Navigator first began classifying the African people primarily in terms of race in order to demarcate them as a group worthy of enslavement. Race was then tied inextricably to racial hierarchy, with the people in power, the Spaniards, using the concept of race to dominate and dehumanize.

Racism, then, is not something inherent to human nature, but is instead a relative phenomenon to the group that possesses political power.

Kendi defines racism as “a marriage of racist policies and racist ideas that produces and normalizes racial inequalities.”2 Racism, for Kendi, is only possible when there is a power imbalance between two social groups. Members of any race can be racist against another race, or even members of their own race, as long as the discrimination affects the underprivileged race. Racism is not discriminating on the basis of race; it is discriminating against a weaker group of people on the basis of race. “The only remedy to racist discrimination is antiracist 1 2

Ibram X. Kendi, How to Be an Antiracist (New York: Penguin Random House, 2019), 38.

Ibid., 18.

discrimination,” Kendi writes. “The only remedy to past discrimination is present discrimination. The only remedy to present discrimination is future discrimination.”3 Kendi takes discrimination against oppressed people as a normative wrong: to be good is to be antiracist (supporting policies and ideas that better the oppressed racial groups, equalizing the condition of the races).

This definition of racism allows for any person, regardless of his or her race, to be racist. For example, a wealthy black American could be racist against a poor black American or even a poor white American. The context and consequences of the actions in relation to existing power structures are what constitute their moral rectitude.

Kendi restricts racism to policies and ideas, and the actions that propagate them. Racism is emphatically not, as some believe, interpersonal acts of discrimination based on race for better or worse.

It not something founded in ignorance and hate. On the contrary, racist acts are related only to the conditions present in society and how the consequences of the actions affect others in society broadly. The driving force behind racism is economic, political, and cultural selfinterest, not hatred. All policies are either racist or anti-racist in their results, and thus in their nature: no racially neutral policies can exist, as long as a racial power imbalance exists. Policy discrimination on basis of race is not racist if it results in the empowerment of the weaker group of people.

The solution to racism, then, is to struggle for anti-racist power.4 This first takes the form of intense self-examination, which involves analyzing one’s thoughts and ideas for traits that might result in the disenfranchising of an oppressed race. When one’s own racist tendencies and inclinations have been confronted and rejected, then one must move to seize positions of power in society to effect antiracist policies. By providing a definition of racism that allows for any person to “be a racist,” Kendi’s approach aims to bring nuance to a dichotomic racist/not racist understanding that prevents selfexamination and growth in personal virtue. However, Kendi operates from certain assumptions that hinder his theory’s usefulness from a Catholic anthropological perspective.

Kendi’s theory falls short because it struggles to provide a firm ground for normative claims and neglects the spiritual nature of man.

Kendi assigns blame for racial suffering to societal policies and 3 4

Ibid., 19.

Ibid., 226.

6

TOLLE LEGE

practices that cause or sustain racial inequalities. He does not see racism as a vice or quality inherent to human beings. Instead, he views racism as a completely social phenomenon. “This is the consistent function of racist ideas,” he writes, “and of any kind of bigotry more broadly: to manipulate us into seeing people as the problem, instead of the policies that ensnare them.”5 This definition of racism stands in the shadow of cultural relativism.

Cultural relativism is evident in his analysis of the assimilationist approach to racial injustice. For Kendi, any assimilationist approach is fundamentally racist. An assimilationist seeks to change one race to match the norms of another. For example, an assimilationist in the Jim Crow South would believe that African Americans were capable of becoming worthy citizens as completely as white Americans, but he would require that the African Americans change and educate themselves to meet the same standards as those applied to white Americans. Kendi objects to assimilationist ideas, claiming that they reduce non-whites to children who need instruction by whites in how to be adults. Kendi’s point is a good one; there is significant danger of a totalizing, colonizing mentality running amok that would demand black Americans become white Americans in order to become Americans. However, Kendi grounds his assertion that all assimilationist ideas are wrong in the claim that there is no objective norm of behavior or value that can be applied to all races.

He claims that the very idea that “racial groups are culturally or behaviorally inferior” is fundamentally detrimental to racial equity, and thus racist.6 He goes beyond saying that there is nothing anthropologically superior or inferior about a race as a race and claims that there cannot be anything better or worse about racialized behavior. Not only can a race not be better or worse intrinsically, but it cannot be better or worse behaviorally. No objective standard of morality can be applied to the actions of one race or another. And any ideology that tries to do so is problematic. “One either believes problems are rooted in groups of people, as a racist, or locates the roots of problems in power and policies, as an anti-racist.”7 This refusal to apply moral norms across racial divides prevents Kendi’s condemnation of racist action from striking to the heart of the matter: individual human hearts. His approach has the potential to Ibid., 8.

Ibid., 31.

7 Ibid., 9.

5 6

VOLUME XV (2022)

7

fall into the same trap as second wave feminism: the difficulty of assigning moral norms to a structurally relative system. As Fr. Francis Martin writes in his overview of feminist history, without the ability to appeal to moral (or anthropological) norms that apply to all people regardless of their political power, it is difficult to articulate why one form of social consciousness is better than the other. Either social theory is approached through rational discourse regarding the truths of human nature or it “runs the risk of being another instance of social engineering on the part of an enlightened elite who have access to the means of communication.”8 Why is it better to be an antiracist than a racist? The only normative answer Kendi can provide is the force of his own personal perspective and the power he wields in society.

As shown by Danielou, a Marxist anthropology views the human person as a puzzle piece in a grand temporal unfolding of an economic power struggle. To be human is to engage in the conflict between the exploiting class and the exploited class, and virtuous actions are those that allow the afflicted class to rise up and overthrow the oppressors.9 This materialistic humanism does not allow for a supernatural destiny for man, because man has no supernatural origin. Man creates humanity, transforming himself and others by improving or degrading the material conditions of human life. For Marxism, says Danielou, “[m]an is the supreme value for man.”10 This humanism is a foil to the Christian concept of human history, which sees human beings not as fundamentally locked in a power struggle with no way out but rather as engaged in a constant struggle against sin, from which humanity is delivered through the grace of God. While economic struggles are real and significant materially, the real captivity is not physical but spiritual.

This contrast and continuity between liberation from sin and liberation from oppression can be seen in Kendi’s description of his parents’ spiritual journey as African American civil rights activists.

Kendi contrasts his own secular journey for racial justice with his parents’ experience in the evangelical liberation theology movement.

His parents both converted from mainstream evangelical Christianity to the church of the Black Power movement. This theology saw Jesus as, in essence, the original, prototypical revolutionary. It emphasized Francis Martin, S.J., The Feminist Question: Feminist Theology in Light of the Christian Tradition (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2011), 158.

9 Jean Danielou, S.J., “Marxist History and Sacred History,” Review of Politics 13 (1951): 503.

10 Ibid., 504.

8

8

TOLLE LEGE

Jesus’ role in societal reform and his wish for his disciples to “proclaim liberation to the captives.”11 A Christian, to Kendi’s parents, was someone who “is striving for liberation.”12 This theology provided a feeling of reconciliation between their racial identity and their Christian faith.

This theological emphasis on Jesus’ role as liberator is valuable and necessary to a complete Christology, as long as it includes the ever present anthropological fact of the relationship between sin and grace.

Jesus not only commanded his disciples to proclaim liberation to captives but he also commanded them to “teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.”13 Spiritual liberation both precedes and is the end goal of societal liberation, with the Sacrament of Baptism being the means through which Christ actively liberates his people from the bondage of sin, temporally. In restricting his diagnosis of the evil of racism to societal power structures and external systems of oppression, Kendi leaves out the essential element of personal sin and corruption.

Kendi’s definition falls short of providing a compelling anthropological approach to issues of race because it attributes all meaning and value to power structures within human society. He fails to address the deepest causes of human misery: sin and the effects of sin.

While structural societal injustices are a real and present concern, the origin of human suffering lies in the sin inherent in each postlapsarian heart. As John Paul II writes, “the ‘heart’ has become a battlefield between love and concupiscence.”14 A proper antidote to the evil of racism must provide a paradigm for addressing the individual sins of hatred and bigotry. Kendi’s analysis of the way that power structures support racist practices is insightful and important.

His critique would be enhanced, however, by a more substantial consideration of the role that personal virtue and vice play in the perpetuation of racial oppression.

Kendi, How to Be an Antiracist, 15.

Ibid., 17.

13 Danielou, “Marxist History,” 509.

14 Karol Wojtyla, Man and Woman He Created Them (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006), 258.

11 12

VOLUME XV (2022)

9

A Discussion of Grace in Caryll Houselander’s The Reed of God Conor Hardy

I

n The Reed of God, Caryll Houselander begins a reflection on grace by examining emptiness. Rooted in the paradox of having being and having emptiness, Houselander reveals deep insights into how grace works with our nature. It is the union of nature and grace that make us participants in the love of the Trinity. The insight that Houselander delves deeper into in her reflection is that we are nothing without God; we are empty vessels to be filled with grace. She uses three analogies to embody for us this insight: a reed made into a pipe for music, a hollow cup furbished into a chalice used for sacrifice, and a bird’s nest furnished to be a home for nurturing life.1 These metaphors serve as threads she weaves together to form for us a tapestry by which we can better understand and appreciate how we can be receptive of grace and be participants in God. Houselander notes one must first empty or let go of the rubble one possesses. A bird’s nest cannot be the home it was made to be if it is cluttered with trash and glass and harmful things.2 These things can be grasped onto out of fear of being empty, of the poverty of being alone, but they do not nourish us like soil does for a plant. Truly we experience a void, an emptiness, a longing unfulfilled, which we may loath and seek to avoid. This comes from the innate reality within us for which we were made: to be participants in God and be filled with love. A sense of lacking and the need to have something other than ourselves to fulfill us is intuited naturally. We do not naturally intuit the paradox Houselander examines here, which is that of the Gospels: “If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven” (Mt 19:21).

This participation in God is reflected in this having, giving away and then receiving again. We are given life freely, graciously, and it is 1 2

Caryll Houselander, The Reed of God (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 2020), 1.

Ibid., 2.

by giving of our life back to God in the same manner that we receive even more (Lk 6:38). An essential insight into our role as participants in the (created) natural order and the transition to the supernatural order of grace is discovered through this capacity of giving freely.

Edward Oakes, S.J., articulates this in his book A Theology of Grace in Six Controversies, where he says, “love is not love if it has been coerced out of the supposed lover . . . . Yet, in a sense, love is not due anyone.

What is the value of love if it is not freely given? Thus the paradox: we need love but cannot demand it.”3 With this capacity of freedom, we can choose to hoard or let go of things other than God. When we freely empty ourselves of our own desires or attachments, we can then be filled by God and made into the kind of being for which He intended us: a saint. Houselander relays that when we are emptied, God may use us as a reed He can play and “live lyrically through us,” or as a chalice “to be sacrificed in us,”4 or as a nest for Him to have “a warm, sweet abiding in a domestic life at home.”5 For there to be this free exchange of life in love it is necessary that the instrument of God be elevated by God in some capacity. The person cannot do this on his own but must cooperate with God to achieve such an end. When a person has the capacity to receive grace, God fills that person to the extent that the person is capable of receiving His grace. This is needed for the perfection of the person who is to be emptied of self. In doings so, the person still maintains his or her unique individuality but is filled with God. As Charles Journet explains in The Meaning of Grace, “God raises us up, rather as the artist uses an instrument to make it produce what by itself it would be incapable of—joy, sadness, prayer.”6 We are made for perfection, which is to be friends of God. Friendship entails a degree of equality, and thus God gives us His grace and we are changed by our openness to it.

As perfection is what we were made for, it is most natural for man to be opened and changed by His grace. In the Summa Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas explains, in his discussion of nature and grace in the New Law, that “a thing is not brought to perfection at once from the Edward T. Oakes, S.J., A Theology of Grace in Six Controversies (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2016), 3.

4 Houselander, Reed of God, 3.

5 Ibid., 4.

6 Charles Journet, The Meaning of Grace, trans. A. V. Littledale (Scepter Publishers, 2020), 20.

3

VOLUME XV (2022)

11

outset, but through an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a boy, and then a man.”7 So too is this seen with the processes by which a reed, a chalice, or a nest are made. God uses the natural means of time, nature, and one’s freedom of receptivity to strengthen and grow the individual into a perfected state by which one can participate in the love of the Trinity.

Houselander provides these different metaphors to show that the process of grace accomplishing perfection in a soul is varied, because each soul is unique. She says, “although we each have the same purpose of knowing and loving God, we do not all achieve that purpose in the same way or through the same experiences.”8 This is reflective of Revelation 2:17, in which God reveals a white stone to the man who has conquered with a new name written on it that only God and the man know. This stone reveals the identity of the man; it reveals to the man God’s thought of him, what he was created to be and who he is. It reveals his unique participation in God and an aspect of truth about God that he reveals in particular.

How can we empty ourselves of the rubble we have cluttered our souls with in an attempt to fill the gaping absence of the Divine?

Houselander explains that contemplation is the tool to furrow the soil of one’s soul to be receptive of God and His grace to take root within.

This mystery of grace acting in a soul is demonstrated in Mary of Nazareth, who contemplates the Divine Word (Luke 2:19). Through imitating Our Lady’s action of contemplation, Houselander says, we see that this emptying process is to occur again and again: “it is a thing which has to be done in contemplation as often as the earth has to be sifted and the field ploughed for seed.”9 Through this process, the Holy Spirit touches and interacts with our nature and makes a new creation (Rev 21:5). The Annunciation reveals this to us and the result is a “wedding of the Spirit of Wisdom and Love with the dust of the earth.”10 Finally, when this emptying occurs through free receptivity of grace, our attachment to the rubble wanes and our thirst for God and our need for faith grow. Houselander tells us that we begin to seek Him and see Him everywhere, in everything and in everyone. This is Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 106, a. 3.

Houselander, Reed of God, 5.

9 Ibid., 3.

10 Ibid., 9.

7 8

12

TOLLE LEGE

Mary’s commission at the Cross, to have the faith to see Him, her Son, in each individual.11 Jesus did not give the crowd to Mary to be her son; He gave her St. John. It is the universal call to each individual to become as Christ. So she looks at each individual and sees Christ in each one.

This is the truth Fr. Gerard Manley Hopkins glimpses in his poem As Kingfishers Catch Fire: I say more; the just man justices; Keeps grace, keeps all his goings graces Acts in God’s eye what in God’s eye he is Christ; for Christ plays in ten thousand places Lovely in limbs and lovely in eyes not His To the Father through the feature of men’s faces.12 Likewise, each of us grows to see the reality of Christ’s presence in others through the condition of emptying and losing ourselves in selfgift. In this self-emptying, one realizes that everyone is suffering. The suffering is the need for God because rubble does not quench or satisfy or fill; the sharp shards of glass in the nest only wound.

Standing there beneath her Son on the Cross, Mary reflects her Son’s suffering in emptying herself for the Father’s Will to be accomplished.

This was the condition to finding Him in St. John; in each individual; in you and in me.13

11 12

3.

13

Ibid., 93.

Gerard Manley Hopkins, As Kingfishers Catch Fire (London: Penguin Random House, 2015), Houselander, Reed of God, 3.

VOLUME XV (2022)

13

All in Order: Cicero’s Analysis of the Ordering of the Cardinal Virtues Harry Scherer

T

he moral philosophy of Cicero indicates an attention to order and devotion to logical soundness. For this reason, his words were referenced by the Angelic Doctor and the riches of his knowledge continue to be used today. One of the heights of his intellectual work was his organization of the four cardinal virtues. The hierarchy of these virtues is clearly laid out in De officiis, especially when he is introducing their four essences.

Cicero defines the first cardinal virtue, wisdom, in almost transcendent terms: “enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur” (“it is concerned with full perception and skillful mastery of the true”) (1.15).1 These characteristics set the practical standard for the rest of the virtues he is about to describe. The manner in which he analyzes this virtue suggests that a human person may develop this virtue but will never be able to fully achieve it. The use of the words perspicientia and sollertia indicate something stronger than mere reverence for or recognition of the truth. After he introduces the four cardinal virtues, Cicero is clear that he places wisdom first among them: “quae prima discripta est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus” (“that which was first assigned, in which we place wisdom and prudence”) (1.15). Later, he repeats, “primus ille, qui in veri cogitatione consistit ” (“that first one, which is reckoned in true reflection”) (1.18). It is clear, then, that Cicero considers wisdom to be the height and first of the cardinal virtues.

The second virtue that Cicero addresses is justice. He describes this virtue as being concerned with “hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide” (“preserving the society of men and rendering to each his due and with good faith of things contractually obligated”) (1.15). After describing the individual endeavor of developing wisdom, Cicero immediately directs his son to Marcus Tullius Cicero, De officiis, in Frederic M. Wheelock, Wheelock’s Latin Reader: Selections from Latin Literature, rev. Richard A. LaFleur, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).

Originally published 44 BC. All translations of this text are my own.

1

the hominum societatem. This outward-facing direction indicates that Cicero acknowledged the social nature of man and the tendency toward conflict that justice must correct. He later refers to the necessity of living out this social nature by referencing Plato: “tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem” (“now to bind society together by the abilities of humans between humans”) (1.22).

Cicero ultimately recognizes this binding together as the work of justice. Later, in his more detailed description of justice, he says, “inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continentur” (“a common bond of life is maintained between themselves”), going on to speak of “iustitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri boni nominantur” (“justice, in which the splendor of virtue is the greatest, in accordance with which men are called good”) (1.20). This common bond of life, Cicero suggests, is fortified and strengthened by an attention to justice.

Thirdly, Cicero explains the nature of spiritual courage, or fortitude: “in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore” (“in the greatness and strength of a noble and invincible spirit”) (1.15). Here a pattern slowly begins to develop in Cicero’s philosophy. Each of the cardinal virtues suggests a moral response to affronts against the previously described virtue. More than anything, this intentional ordering indicates Cicero’s practical experience and his ability to reconcile the failures of human incapacity with the ideals of a moral response. When one or one’s society is faced with the actions of an unwise man and neglects the value of a wise man, one’s first priority should be justice. When one is faced with injustice, one must find solace in one’s fortitude to identify and correct the injustice, depending on what one prudentially considers to be one’s responsibility. Again, because sapientiam et prudentiam survey all the other virtues, acting courageously must be done within the confines of prudential consideration.

Finally, Cicero informs his son of the proper response when one is faced with an action that falls outside of the mean, in Aristotle’s sense, of this spiritual courage. The fourth virtue that Cicero describes is temperance: “in omnium quae fiunt quaeque dicuntur ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperentia” (“in the orderliness and moderation of all things which are done and which are said, wherein moderation and self-control consist” (1.15). Cicero suggests that one must moderate even the good that one does. It is in this final virtue that Cicero confirms the fourfold distinction and interconnection between these virtues. He directs his son to observe self-control in his fortitude, to VOLUME XV (2022)

15

be courageous in his justice, and to be just in his wisdom. In the same way, one must be wise in one’s justice, just in one’s courage, and courageous in one’s self-control. While ensuring the necessity of recognizing the interconnection of the virtues, Cicero is clear to identify the distinctions among them through clear definitions and clarifications within the definitions. Cicero provides no escape for his son from the multi-layered moral portrait that he creates. This seems to be done intentionally so that one might see the inherent orderliness of these virtues; on the level of personal motivation, this order both impels a person to try more earnestly to develop these virtues and encourages buy-in, to use a corporate phrase, on the part of the moral agent to develop these abstract realities into practical ones.

The description and order of these virtues was so well done that St. Thomas Aquinas, in the Summa, refers to Cicero’s De officiis in three articles of his sixty-first question, on the nature of the cardinal virtues.

In his reply to the first objection on the question of whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another, Aquinas says, “again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance . . . for as Cicero says (De officiis i), ‘it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity, or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered by toil (1.68).’”2 Aquinas recognized and appreciated the interconnection that Cicero developed in his analysis. As this analysis suggests, Cicero’s moral philosophy can rightly be used even today to clarify fundamental questions about the essence and order of the virtues and as the foundation for an internal impulse to foster these virtues in one’s life.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981), I-II, q. 61, a. 4.

2

16

TOLLE LEGE

The Personal Lament of the Despairing Yet Obedient Prophet in Jeremiah 20:7–18 Lexi Zambito

T

he prophet Jeremiah lived in a time of great turmoil in Judah: the Northern Kingdom had just fallen, and Jerusalem was on the brink of destruction. God sends Jeremiah as a prophet to foretell the impending destruction at the hands of the Babylonians and call the people to turn away from their sins of idolatry and child sacrifice. The people reject Jeremiah, calling him a false prophet and refusing to listen to his predictions. Thus, Jeremiah laments his fate as a rejected prophet in 20:7–18. With provocative imagery of having been seduced by God, Jeremiah describes how he has no choice but to obey God and proclaim His word, even though this makes him the object of scorn and derision from his friends. According to the Deuteronomistic Historian, if you obeyed God, you were blessed, and if you disobeyed God, you were cursed (Deut 6:1–2). Jeremiah feels abandoned by God because, though he obeys God, he is cursed, while his fellow citizens disobey God and live lives of prosperity. This leads Jeremiah to curse the very day on which he was born in a rejection of the call to be a prophet received in the womb. It is obeying God that brings Jeremiah so much anguish, but he has no other choice. Jeremiah feels no remorse for the city of Jerusalem, but laments that he is the one that has to be an object of derision. Jeremiah’s lament in 20:7–18 expresses his despair about his fate as a prophet, worsened by the contradiction between his compulsion to speak the word of God, which brings him suffering, and the pressure to remain silent from his friends, who prosper.

Jeremiah is a commoner from a minor priestly family who served at a shrine outside of Jerusalem. The Book of Jeremiah emphasizes that he is destined from the womb to be a prophet, and Jeremiah himself has no say in the matter. There are parallels between Jeremiah and Moses, as Jeremiah initially objects to God’s call due to his lack of

speaking ability (Jer 1:6).1 Among Jeremiah’s original audience, this would have evoked thoughts of Moses’s initial rejection of God’s call for him to lead the Israelites out of Egypt, as Moses also objects on the grounds that he is not a good speaker (Exod 4:10). Moses has Aaron to speak for him and thus answers God’s call, but Jeremiah answers God’s call because he has no choice. He is born to be God’s prophet, despite his personal reluctance. In answer to his divine call, Jeremiah begins to prophesy during Josiah’s reign from 639 to 609 B.C., before the fall of Jerusalem to the Babylonians, and he continues until the dreaded fall actually occurs in 587.2 Jeremiah is thus an eyewitness to the destructive events he predicts.

Because the temple had been saved from destruction at the hands of the Assyrians in 722 B.C., there was a common presumption among the people that the temple would never be destroyed. God promised David that his dynasty would last forever (2 Sam 7:8–16), and therefore the people believed that the temple, built by David’s son Solomon, would also last forever. Jeremiah did not share in this presumption, because while Yahweh was always faithful to His promises, the people were not always so faithful. The covenant depended on their moral uprightness.3 Jeremiah thus warned the people about the imminent danger and advised that they submit to Babylon. Although Jeremiah disliked Babylon, he labeled Judah as the primary cause of the nation’s coming destruction. In the prophet’s view, Jerusalem’s destruction would be a just punishment for the people’s sins. During a time when everyone projected blame onto Babylon for Judah’s fate, Jeremiah blamed Judah itself and called for personal accountability. The Judahites denounced Jeremiah as a false prophet because he contradicted all the other prophets. Nothing about which he had prophesied had happened yet, and therefore the people had no reason to trust in his harsh prophesying. Because the people rejected him, Jeremiah bemoaned his sufferings in many of his oracles (e.g., 11:1–12:6, 14:1–15:9). It was his inescapable fate, destined for him while he was still in the womb.

Despite their belief that no one could destroy the temple, the people of Jerusalem were nonetheless desperate, as the Babylonians William Holladay, “The Background of Jeremiah’s Self-Understanding: Moses, Samuel, and Psalm 22,” Journal of Biblical Literature 83, no. 2 (1964): 154.

2 Corrine Carvalho, Reading Jeremiah: A Literary and Theological Commentary (Macon: Smyth & Helwys Publishing, 2016), 2.

3 Ibid., 49.

1

18

TOLLE LEGE

had surrounded the city in a siege for a decade, beginning in 597 B.C. They anticipated another awful siege like the one they had experienced at the hands of the Assyrians. Because of their growing sense of desperation, many people resorted to child sacrifice as a way to appease the gods (e.g., Jer 19:4–5). Jeremiah had specifically prophesied against the temptation to offer child sacrifice and emphasized how angry such an injustice would make God (Jer 19:6– 13).4 He already viewed Jerusalem’s coming fate as punishment for its sins, so by committing the great sin of child sacrifice, the city’s people only compounded the judgment already hanging over them.

Jeremiah 20:7–18 falls in the middle of the book, right as Nebuchadnezzar’s forces surround the city. Immediately before these verses, God instructs Jeremiah to get a potter’s earthenware flask and bring it to the entrance of the Potsherd Gate (19:1–2). The Lord then informs Jeremiah that He will cause great evil to befall that place because of Judah’s numerous and glaring sins against His commandments, namely, idolatry and child sacrifices to Baal (19:3–5).

The practice of child sacrifice utterly abhors God, and thus He will make Judah and Jerusalem fall to their enemies (19:7). The Jews who die will be left unburied, and animals and humans alike will eat their corpses, desperate for food while under siege (19:7,9). God tells Jeremiah to smash the potter’s flask in front of the people (19:10).

This irreparable damage to the flask is the same damage that will be inflicted upon the city and its people because of their unfaithfulness (19:11). Jeremiah then goes to the court of the temple to relay this message to the people, and the priest Pashhur puts Jeremiah in the stocks for his prophecy (20:1–2). When Jeremiah is released the next morning, he renames Pashhur “Terror on every side” and tells him that Jerusalem will be handed over to the Babylonians (20:3). They will slaughter the people and take the rest captive, including Pashhur himself, who will live and die in Babylon (20:3–6). Jeremiah implies that Pashhur, because he refuses to listen to Jeremiah’s prophecies, is personally responsible for the coming destruction.5 Jeremiah’s conversation with Pashhur is the first time in the book that Babylon is mentioned by name, concretizing the impending destruction, as well as elucidating that Nebuchadnezzar is being specifically used by God to enact judgment on His people (20:4).6 Ibid., 63.

Leslie C. Allen, Jeremiah: A Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 228.

6 Ibid.

4 5

VOLUME XV (2022)

19

The political situation of Judah, Jeremiah’s personal history, and the account of God’s wrath due to child sacrifice contextualize Jeremiah’s lament in 20:7–18. In his lament, Jeremiah mourns his fate as a prophet, because the people, who do not realize that their own sinfulness will cause the ruin of Judah, reject him. Jeremiah 20:7–18 is a self-contained lament in which he complains not about the impending destruction of the city, but about his own fate as a rejected prophet. Rather than expressing a compassionate cry for help on behalf of his city, Jeremiah begs God to take vengeance on his fellow citizens and bring them to justice.7 Jeremiah’s imprisonment by Pashhur in the preceding verses illuminates the immediate events that prompt the emotional and desolate lament.

In 20:7–18, Jeremiah laments his fate as a prophet, because God has seduced him, which invites on Jeremiah the scorn of his people.

There is an accusatory tone as Jeremiah shakes his fists at God for having overcome him, saying, “[Y]ou seduced me, Lord” (v. 7a). This image of seduction is reminiscent of how a lover is overcome by the beloved. Jeremiah accuses God of seducing him, but Jeremiah himself says that he allowed it to happen and he seems to suggest that part of him wanted it to happen, saying, “I let myself be seduced” (v. 7a).

Jeremiah willingly participates, as being close to God is “attractive,” but he only later realizes the full implications of what this closeness to God means for his life.8 Jeremiah cannot fight against God’s seductive power anymore, admitting that God is “too strong” for him and has “prevailed” over him (v. 7b). Because God “prevailed,” Jeremiah is “an object of laughter” and all the people “mock him” for his adherence to proclaiming God’s messages (v. 7c). The people do not share Jeremiah’s concerns that the temple may be destroyed, and they do not realize that their sinfulness will cause their devastation. This impending destruction results in Jeremiah lamenting, “Whenever I speak, I must cry out, violence and outrage I proclaim” (v. 8a). God compels Jeremiah to “cry out” against Judah’s current state of affairs with oracles of destruction to rouse the people from their willful ignorance. Jeremiah, however, is caught between God, who demands that he prophesy, and his enemies, who would have him remain silent.9 He proclaims, “the word of the Lord has brought [Jeremiah] reproach Carvalho, Reading Jeremiah, 65.

Ibid.

9 Jonathan Magonet, “Jeremiah’s Last Confession (Jeremiah 20:7–18),” European Judaism: A Journal for the New Europe 32, no. 1 (1999): 51.

7 8

20

TOLLE LEGE

and derision all day long,” and this from his friends, who believe him to be a false prophet, as the destruction of which he warns them has not yet happened (v. 8b). Whenever Jeremiah grows weary of being an object of derision, he resolves to “not mention [God]” and to “no longer speak in his name” (v. 9a). When Jeremiah vows to no longer speak for God, however, “it is as if fire is burning in [his] heart, imprisoned in [his] bones” (v. 9b). This fire, which usually indicates a fever in the psalms of lament, refers here in v. 9 to an unbearable mental burden.10 Jeremiah “grow[s] weary holding back” and simply “cannot” refuse God (v. 9c). The prophet is incapable of refusing God, as to do so induces an intolerable physical and mental burden.

God’s messages are simply too urgent to be contained within the prophet.

Jeremiah hears “the whisperings of many” who say, “Terror on every side! Denounce! Let us denounce him!” (v. 10a). Jeremiah’s friends, although they condemn him as a false prophet, are nonetheless frightened by his oracles of destruction. In v. 10, Jeremiah calls the reader back to 20:3, in which, just after he is released from the stocks, he renames the priest Pashhur “terror on every side” because of his refusal to listen to Jeremiah’s prophecies. Pashhur and the rest of Jeremiah’s friends “are on the watch for any misstep of [his]” to serve as a confirmation that Jeremiah is a false prophet (v.

10b). Jeremiah’s enemies think, “Perhaps he can be tricked; then we will prevail and take our revenge on him” (v. 10c). They want to trick Jeremiah so that his blunder can be used as evidence against his veracity as a prophet. They desire to take their “revenge on him,” because Jeremiah warns them that the destruction of the city will be a direct result of their sinfulness. Jeremiah compounds the ridicule by the fact that the destruction of Jerusalem does not happen until at least ten years after he starts prophesying.11 Although Jeremiah is mocked, “the Lord is with [him], like a mighty champion” (v. 11a). God is like a warrior in battle who defends Jeremiah against his enemies, and as a result, “[his] persecutors will stumble, they will not prevail” (v. 11a). The repetition of the word “prevail” here reminds the reader of how God “prevailed” over Jeremiah in v. 7. In this case, however, Jeremiah’s enemies will not prevail over him, because he has already succumbed to God. Jeremiah 10 11

Allen, Jeremiah, 231.

Elizabeth Achtemeier, Jeremiah (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1987), 63.

VOLUME XV (2022)

21

is free from enslavement to the world and to himself, and “he has his life totally from the hand of God,” who is “faithful and good and is working out a purpose of salvation.”12 References to honor and shame are interlaced throughout the passage. Jeremiah experiences shame because he does not have a family, as God commands him in 16:2, “Do not take a wife and do not have sons and daughters in this place” because they will die of disease and famine. Jeremiah’s not taking a wife or having children serves as a warning to the Judahites of the impending destruction, and it also results in a lower social status for Jeremiah. In the “failure” of Jeremiah’s enemies to trick him, “they will be put to utter shame, to lasting, unforgettable confusion” (v. 11b). Although Jeremiah experiences shame now, his enemies will experience shame at the destruction of their households and the decimation of their city at the hands of foreign invaders, the very events about which Jeremiah attempts to warn them with his prophecies and the example of his life.13 Jeremiah praises God’s just judgment, saying, “Lord of hosts, you test the just, you see mind and heart” (v. 12a). Jeremiah knows that God will reward him for his faithfulness, and asks God to avenge him, requesting, “Let me see the vengeance you take on them” (v.

12b). He desires to see his enemies shamed as they have shamed him, and Jeremiah justifies this request by saying, “for to you [God] I have entrusted my cause” (v. 12). Although Jeremiah speaks of his vindication by God while his enemies are put to shame in vv. 11 and 12, the surrounding text contradicts this. Jeremiah’s enemies have not been put to shame, and God has not saved Jeremiah from ridicule or punishment.14 There is a contrast here between what Jeremiah knows to be true about God and his actual lived experience of serving Him. Jeremiah, however, has placed all of his trust in the Lord and will therefore be saved from the same lasting confusion to which his friends will be subjected. Jeremiah praises God for his salvation: “Sing to the Lord, praise the Lord, for he has rescued the life of the poor from the power of the evildoers!” (v. 13).

After thanking God for the vindication that will one day be his, Jeremiah reverts to lamenting his fate as a prophet, as his vindication has not yet come. Verses 14–18 communicate a tone of despair that, Ibid., 64.

Carvalho, Reading Jeremiah, 65.

14 Magonet, “Jeremiah’s Last Confession,” 49.

12 13

22

TOLLE LEGE

despite Jeremiah’s unwavering faith in Yahweh, is directed at God.15 Jeremiah laments, “Cursed be the day on which I was born! May the day my mother gave me birth never be blessed!” (v. 14). This is no small curse for Jeremiah’s original audience, because to curse something in ancient Israel meant to wish that it had never existed at all.16 Jeremiah wishes that he had never existed, as he was born solely to be God’s prophet, the very role that makes him an object of scorn and derision.17 Jeremiah curses not only the day of his birth but “the one who brought the news to [his] father, ‘A child, a son, has been born to you!’ filling him with great joy” (v. 15). He wishes that this messenger of the good news of his birth were wiped from existence and wishes a terrifying life upon him: “Let that man be like the cities which the Lord relentlessly overthrew; let him hear war cries in the morning, battle alarms at noonday” (v. 16). Jeremiah wants the messenger to be constantly on guard against his enemies with the threat of destruction ever hanging over his head, just as Jeremiah has to be constantly vigilant against his supposed friends who seek to harm him. Jeremiah curses the messenger “because he did not kill [Jeremiah] in the womb!” (v. 17a). Jeremiah’s fate as a prophet is so unbearable that he wishes that the messenger had committed the vile act of killing a child in its mother’s womb. This act of evil that Jeremiah wishes had happened is ironically similar to the sin of child sacrifice for which he condemns Judah in chapter 19. Despite cursing the day of his birth and the messenger, Jeremiah is careful not to curse his mother or father, as that would have been a terrible sin in Israel, nor does he curse God, as that would have been blasphemy.18 In concluding his lament, Jeremiah contrasts vv. 17–18 with the beginning verses of the passage. In vv. 7–9, Jeremiah possesses the word of God like a pregnant woman whose baby is due imminently and who cannot keep from going into labor, but in vv. 14–18 Jeremiah wants to remain in the womb forever.19 If the messenger had killed him in the womb, “then [his] mother would have been [his] grave, her womb confining [him] forever” (v. 17b). The image of a child dead inside its mother’s womb is unnatural and reviling, as the womb Jack Lundbom, “The Double Curse in Jeremiah 20:14–18,” Journal of Biblical Literature 104, no. 4 (1985): 589.

16 Achtemeier, Jeremiah, 65.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Magonet, “Jeremiah’s Last Confession,” 54.

15

VOLUME XV (2022)

23

usually symbolizes “fertility, prosperity, and virility.”20 Jeremiah’s current fate as a prophet is so dreadful that he wishes he had died in his mother’s womb, which is usually a secure place of life and growth, but which Jeremiah desires to distort into a place of death. Jeremiah questions, “Why did I come forth from the womb, to see sorrow and pain, to end my days in shame?” (v. 18). The word “shame” reminds the reader of v. 11, in which God shames Jeremiah’s enemies. Once again, Jeremiah contrasts God’s promises of vindication with his lived reality as a scorned prophet. He wonders what the point of his life is.

Most scholars believe that this question in v. 18, rather than being addressed to his parents or to the messenger, is really directed at Yahweh.21 The material that comes after 20:7–18 is ironic, because Nebuchadnezzar surrounds and attacks the city, which is precisely what Jeremiah prophesies and against which he urges the people to defend themselves by living justly. Now that the events of his prophecies are coming true, Jeremiah’s enemies beg him to ask God for help. King Zedekiah sends Pashhur and Zephaniah to Jeremiah to have him communicate with the Lord and ask whether or not God will free them from Nebuchadnezzar (21:1–2). They ask whether God will perform “wonderful works” for them as He has done before, but they seem to forget that, because of their unfaithfulness, they do not merit such mercy from God (21:2). Instead of receiving the answer they hope for, Jeremiah says that God Himself will turn against Jerusalem and cause a great pestilence to afflict the city (21:6). The king and the rest of the survivors will be turned over to the Babylonians to be killed (21:7). Here, God gives the people an option: stay in Jerusalem and die, or leave and surrender to the Babylonians and live (21:8–9). Nebuchadnezzar will set the city on fire, utterly destroying it (21:10). This chapter following Jeremiah’s lament ends with a call to the Davidic line for justice on behalf of the oppressed (21:11–14). If they do not enact justice for the poor and the oppressed, God will destroy them in His fury. It is too late for Jerusalem, however, as they already had a chance to be helped by God through faithfulness to Him. They cannot expect God, after having done nothing for Him, to save them in a time of distress. They must be faithful to God always, and not only when it is expedient for them.

20 21

Carvalho, Reading Jeremiah, 65.

Lundbom, “Double Curse,” 591.

24

TOLLE LEGE

Jeremiah’s prophecies are so urgent because the Northern Kingdom of Israel has already fallen, and the Southern Kingdom is at risk of experiencing the same fate. The people do not believe that their city will be destroyed as punishment for their sins; rather, they believe that as long they have the temple, they will be free from the same decimation experienced by Israel. The people have done nothing to honor God’s presence but have instead turned to idolatry and child sacrifice. The question is not so much a matter of how much God is with His people, but about how much the people are with their God. This is why Jeremiah urgently calls the people to conversion and laments the scorn he must suffer due to his divinely appointed role as a prophet and his compulsion to prophesy. He is caught between doing God’s will and sounding blasphemous or keeping silent about his prophecies for the sake of his countrymen and disobeying God. Jeremiah wishes he had never been born because of the utter mockery and derision to which he is subjected. Jeremiah is caught in a tough relationship with God. Although he never doubts in his prophecies or that he is doing the will of God, it often seems that Jeremiah suffers for doing God’s will while his friends are living in prosperity even though they have turned away from God. Jeremiah does not understand why he is suffering even though he is doing everything right, and this is such a relatable experience for modern readers.

In life it can feel like we are doing our very best in serving God, our families, and our communities, but we do not experience peace or joy. Serving God is often very difficult, and this comes as no surprise when we reflect on our Lord on the cross. We can be tempted towards despair, as Jeremiah is, when the good works we perform seemingly produce no fruit. The despair and anguish of Jeremiah is especially relatable for those undergoing sickness, family strife, or trauma.

Things happen to us that are painfully out of our control, and the best we can do is move forward slowly by doing what God asks of us in each individual moment. Here, a modern audience can learn from Jeremiah in that despite his despair, embarrassment, anguish, and desperation, he never once stops doing the will of God. He does not understand why he is an object of mockery, why people who are supposed to be his friends do not listen to him, or why God permits him to undergo such painful experiences. Jeremiah even curses the day he was born and wishes it had never happened. Jeremiah wrestles with God and contends with his fate, but nevertheless, he knows that he was born for a purpose—to be God’s prophet—and thus keeps doing VOLUME XV (2022)

25

the work the Lord requires of him. He does not perform this work without complaint, but rather with vulnerable prayer that expresses just how deeply he is wounded by his role in life. With Jeremiah and Christ, who was wounded in His Passion for the saving work He was sent to accomplish, we are often wounded by what God calls us to do.

Despite his anguish and woundedness, Jeremiah never forgets that God fashioned him in the womb for a specific purpose, and this serves as a great reminder to those who feel as though their lives are hopeless that they, too, have been created for a purpose. Although serving God is often burdensome and painful, He will never abandon those who are faithful to Him, even in their distress.

26

TOLLE LEGE

Whether Mando and Baby Yoda Have the Same Essence?

Olivia Prevost

O

bjection 1: Baby Yoda and the Mando do not have the same essence because they differ in form and designated matter. According to Thomas Aquinas, the essence of rational yet material beings consists of form and undesignated matter. Baby Yoda’s alien form is of a different kind than the Mando’s human form. Baby Yoda is short with stubby legs and only three fingers, while the Mando is tall and muscular and possesses the average human’s number of fingers. Likewise, Baby Yoda’s green flesh differs materially from the Mando’s human flesh. Because they share neither form nor matter, Baby Yoda and the Mando have different essences.

Objection 2: Moreover, Baby Yoda and the Mando do not have the same essence because they have different powers. Baby Yoda can use the Force to affect the world around him telekinetically, while the Mando cannot. Baby Yoda can also digest a wide variety of things that the Mando would find inedible, like space spiders and frogs as large as Baby Yoda’s head. As St. Thomas writes, “Every substance exists for the sake of its operation.”1 This can be taken to refer to a substance’s powers. Since the operations of Baby Yoda differ from the operations of the Mando, Baby Yoda and the Mando cannot have the same substance. Essence is the way that the substance exists, so without the same substance, Baby Yoda cannot have the same essence as the Mandalorian.

On the contrary: St. Thomas Aquinas says, “the word essence in the case of complex substances signifies what is composed of matter and form.”2 W. Norris Clarke, S.J., Person and Being (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1993), 8.

Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings, ed. R. McInerny (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 33.

1 2

I answer that: According to Thomas Aquinas, there are three types of rational beings: God, angels, and rational animals. God’s very essence is existence, since he is an absolutely simple substance and receives his existence from nothing else. The essence of spiritual yet created intelligences, the angels, is separate from existence and receives its existence from God. These rational beings do not have matter as part of their form since they do not exist in the material world. Their essence includes only form and existence. The third type of intelligences, human beings, have an essence that includes matter, since their form cannot exist without some kind of matter.

As Aquinas writes, the material intellectual substance exists “close to material things that they might be drawn to participate in its existence.”3 To be a human being is to be embodied, and as such a human being’s form cannot exist without matter. Aquinas calls this matter undesignated matter, that is, matter that does not individuate a particular person but rather is intrinsic to the form: “Non-designated matter is included in the definition of man, for it is not this man and this flesh that are put into the definition of man, but bone and flesh as such, which are the non-designated matter of man.”4 Thus, Thomas includes undesignated matter and form as the essential aspects of the third type of rational being: the rational animal. Baby Yoda falls into this third category of rational being as a rational animal.

Baby Yoda, while having an alien body, is an intellectual being.

This can clearly be seen in the actions of fully developed members of his species, like Grandmaster Yoda. Jedi Grandmaster Yoda can think rationally and communicate. As a young member of Yoda’s alien species, Baby Yoda also possesses these powers of reason.5 Under his mask, the Mando is a human being, that is, a being with the same powers of reason and communication. Clearly, Baby Yoda is a material being, since he operates within the confines of space and time. Like a human being, Baby Yoda is a rational yet material being.

As a material intellectual substance, Baby Yoda’s essence is like that of a human: it includes both matter and form. The presence of undesignated matter in his form makes him a rational being closer in nature to the Mando than to an immaterial rational being. Both Baby Ibid., 43.

Ibid., 34.

5 “Grogu,” Fandom, https://starwars.fandom.com/wiki/Grogu.

3 4

28

TOLLE LEGE

Yoda and the Mando are complex substances since they possess both form and matter. Thus, they share the essence of rational animal. However, it is important to note that although Baby Yoda and the Mando have the same essence as rational animals, it does not follow that they have the same nature. Baby Yoda can share an essence with a human being while not sharing in human nature.

In understanding the nature of Baby Yoda’s essence in relation to other rational animals, a distinction must be made between nature and essence. Both human nature and Baby-Yoda-species-nature (for lack of a better name) are subspecies of the genre of rational animal.

As Thomas Aquinas writes, “Human nature itself exists in the intellect as abstracted from all individuating characteristics, because it is equally the similitude of all and conducive to the knowledge of each insofar as they are men.”6 Human nature exists in relation to essence as the abstraction of everything that is common in individual humans. Baby Yoda does not share the qualities necessary to be included in his abstraction. However, he is an individuated member of his own alien species, which is a subspecies of rational animal.

Despite having different natures on the level of species, Baby Yoda and the Mando have the same essence insofar as they are rational animals, because they are both intellectual substances with undesignated matter as part of their essence.

Baby Yoda and the Mando have a strong bond in The Mandalorian. The Mando even adopts Baby Yoda into his warrior culture, and they become a family of two. It is possible for Baby Yoda to be a part of the Mando’s family as a foundling, despite Baby Yoda’s alien nature, because Baby Yoda shares in the Mando’s essence as a rational animal. They are both complex substances, having a form that includes undesignated matter. They share a spot in Aquinas’ hierarchy of being as the lowest of intellectual substances, and while their particular form and designated matter differ on the level of species, this difference is not great enough to prevent them from relating to one another as one material intellectual substance to another, that is, through a relationship of mutual love.

Reply to Objection 1: It is wrong to say that the Mando and Baby Yoda have different essences because they have differing form and 6

Aquinas, Selected Writings, 39.

VOLUME XV (2022)

29

undesignated matter. Thomas Aquinas had no knowledge of a rational creature like Baby Yoda when he described the three types of rational beings in On Being and Essence. The essential feature of the embodied rational creature is its combination of form and matter. As Aquinas writes, referring to the Commentator, “the nature had by the species of generable things is something in between, that is, composed of matter and form.”7 Both Baby Yoda and the Mandalorian are composed of matter and form. Thus, they share the same essence as rational yet material beings.

Reply to Objection 2: Even though Baby Yoda has different powers from the Mando, they still share the same essence as rational animals. The powers Baby Yoda possesses, like telekinesis and his remarkable powers of digestion, come from Baby Yoda’s material nature as a member of his alien species, not from a difference in his intellectual substance. Thus, these powers do not indicate a difference in essence on the level of rational being. Furthermore, the Mando and Baby Yoda are different substances by the very fact that they exist as individual entities. However, this does not mean that they have different essences. Thomas Aquinas writes that “substantial form does not have absolute existence in itself apart from the thing that it informs, nor does the matter to which it advenes.”8 The substance of the Mando and Baby Yoda differ in so far as they are individuated. This does not preclude their having the same essence, since the matter and form which make up the substance can be the same in different substances of the same species, as in human men and women. Baby Yoda and the Mando are different substances with the same essence as rational and material beings.

7 8

Ibid., 33.

Ibid., 47.

30

TOLLE LEGE

Mutilate to Sanctify? An Analysis of Matthew 5:29–30 in Light of Augustine’s Treatment Harry Scherer

If your right eye causes you to sin, pluck it out and throw it away; it is better that you lose one of your members than that your whole body be thrown into hell. And if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it away; it is better that you lose one of your members than that your whole body go into hell.

—Matthew 5:29–30

E

ven for the trained Scriptural exegete, it is understandable that these two verses from Matthew could cause difficulty for readers. These confusions are to be expected, and our Lord’s demand to instruct the ignorant (Matt 28:19–20) requires those who know to teach and clarify the true meaning of even the most difficult passages of Scripture. For this reason, the anticipated confusions will be outlined and provided a charitable interpretation so as to engage with these difficulties and in this way provide a clearer path to understanding. Then, it will be beneficial to briefly survey both early and modern exegetes so as to better understand the depth of this teaching; the exegesis of Augustine will be paid particular attention.

Finally, the force of Augustine’s interpretation will be evaluated and the contemporary pastoral relevance of properly understanding this passage will be confirmed and detailed.

The first clear source of confusion for this passage is the possibility that our Lord is encouraging self-mutilation as a means of avoiding or curtailing vicious behavior. A literal interpretation of the Scripture immediately suggests that Christ would encourage his disciples to pluck out their eye or cut off their hand if one of those members “causes [them] to sin.” Although it is ultimately erroneous to interpret the Scripture in such a way, this interpretation should not be dismissed without consideration. After all, taken literally, this demand of our Lord could serve as a sign that a member of the Church

cares more of his soul than his body, and that he is even willing to harm his body, which is fleeting, for the benefit of his soul, which is eternal. Yet a subscription to this interpretation implicitly denies the Incarnation; it is impossible for the incarnated second Person of the Trinity to suggest the commission of an evil act. Non-life-sustaining self-mutilation is an evil act. Therefore, the incarnated second Person of the Trinity would not encourage the commission of such an act. In addition, because the material manifestation of an act is not required for culpability, one without an eye to see could be culpable for lust and one without a hand to grasp could be culpable for theft as long as he consents to either act.

Another understandable misinterpretation of this text concerns the reading of the nouns “eye” and “hand” as actual eyes and hands.

Augustine provides nuanced commentary that allows for a deeper figurative interpretation. He considers the eyes to be “such a thing as is ardently loved” and the hands to be a “beloved helper and assistant in divine works.”1 Augustine expands the understanding of the eye from the merely anatomical level to the spiritual level; in the same way, the interpretation of the hand extends from the anatomical to the relational. Augustine’s interpretation of Christ’s words in this regard seems to be wholly consistent with the perennial teaching of the Church.

A deepening of the soul’s relationship with Christ necessitates a fundamental redirection of focus from that which he currently loves and desires to Christ. Because Christ simultaneously understands the condition of man and detests sin, this plucking out of the eye can be understood as a sure rebuke against all sin or occasion thereof: “Whatever is an immediate occasion of sin, however near or dear it may be, must be abandoned (Menochius), though it prove as dear to us, or as necessary as a hand, or an eye, and without delay or demur.”2 Augustine’s interpretation confirms Fr. Haydock’s commentary in their mutual insistence that the redirection of the soul must be total and lasting. One of the Church’s most revered mystical teachers, St. John of the Cross, confirms this total abandonment of earthly things, even good things, in search of Christ: “the more the desire for that thing fills the soul,” i.e., that thing that is not God, “the less capacity St. Augustine, On the Sermon on the Mount (Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1888), bk. 1, aa. 37–38.

George Leo Haydock, “Commentary on Matthew 5:29,” in George Haydock’s Catholic Bible Commentary, 1859.

1 2

32

TOLLE LEGE

has the soul for God.”3 In other words, greater intimacy of the soul with God is dependent on the desires that the soul encourages. Christ says the same thing, in more extreme figurative terms, so as to emphasize the spiritual, emotional and at times physical pain that can accompany this redirection of the soul.

Augustine’s understanding of the act of cutting off one’s hand if it causes one to sin is distinct from that of his contemporaries; more on this distinction will follow. He understands the right hand to be one who advises in divine matters. This interpretation suggests that these advisors can be either good or bad. The bad one, Augustine says, can be easily identified “if he endeavors to lead one into any dangerous heresy under the guise of religion and doctrine.”4 The bishop’s experience with Manicheism before his total embrace of the faith confirms that these leaders should be avoided. The heretical teachings of these sects will certainly lead the soul away from the Truth and will damage one’s soul if it chooses to consent to their more externally attractive alternatives to the Christian life. Augustine almost certainly would have thought of his teacher Ambrose as a good teacher and “right hand” leading him on the path of virtue. The fulfillment of Augustine’s long conversion was dependent on the virtuous or vicious guidance of those around him; the deceptions of Mani and his disciples allowed him to continue his life of promiscuity and intellectual pride in the profession of rhetoric while the counsel of Ambrose initiated Augustine’s centered focus on the things of heaven.

For all these reasons, Augustine’s insistence on the importance of external guides on this earth should come as no surprise. This is not to say that his interpretation is solely based on his personal experience.

Instead, he was able to inform the interpretation in light of his particular experience, recognizing that the invitation to which he provided an extraordinary response is still common across times and cultures.

The commentary that Augustine provides for this passage suggests that Christ is not recommending deformation, but reformation. In order for the soul to recognize whether or not something must be plucked out or cut off, he must thoroughly inspect his thoughts, words and actions. The soul must be “aware that what is St. John of the Cross, Ascent of Mount Carmel, trans. E. Allison Peers (Mineola: Dover, 2008), 34.

4 St. Augustine, Sermon on the Mount, 38.

3

VOLUME XV (2022)

33

best in us may soon devolve into vice.”5 Jerome, along with Augustine, recognizes that man is only consistent in his inconsistency and that sin and occasions of sin must be plucked out and cut off at the root. While refraining from scrupulosity, the soul must be ever mindful, cognizant of weakness, to reject any entertainment of temptation. The harsh words of our Lord seem to make more sense when the condition of sin and man’s interaction with that condition are clarified by the Church Fathers. Augustine does not consider this metaphor of plucking out the eye to be a gross violation against the dignity of the human body as a temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 6:19). On the contrary, he maintains the necessary message of Christ’s words but reformulates the presentation to become somewhat more palatable with his figurative interpretation.

Augustine’s commentary is helpful in understanding this difficult teaching of Christ. The precision of his words is necessary, especially for these two verses of the Gospel that are open to confused and even damaging interpretations when not read with the Church and through the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Augustine seems to be unique, though, in his interpretation of the hand mentioned by Christ as a guide or counselor. Where Augustine thinks of a friend, Jerome thinks of “the beginnings of the will and of feeling, so that what we conceive with the mind, we would fulfill in deed.”6 Jerome considers Christ’s reference to a hand in this case to be the will to act in a certain manner after the eye senses a certain thing. The most similar interpretation to Augustine’s is that of St. John Chrysostom. When asking himself why Christ included hand in addition to the eye, he says, To show you that not of limbs is He speaking, but of them who are near unto us. Thus, “If,” saith He, “you so love any one, as though he were instead of a right eye; if you think him so profitable to you as to esteem him in the place of a hand, and he hurts your soul; even these do you cut off.”7 Chrysostom’s focus is similar to that of Augustine, but the former does not specify the “hand” as one who counsels or guides; instead, he suggests that a person cut off any other person around him who harms his soul, to the extent that this cutting off is practical. Both St. Jerome, The Fathers of the Church: St. Jerome Commentary on Matthew, trans. Thomas P. Scheck (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 82.

6 Ibid.

7 St. John Chrysostom, A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Volume X; St. Chrysostom: Homilies on the Gospel of St. Matthew (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1978), 115.

5

34

TOLLE LEGE

Chrysostom and Augustine, while they predate St. John of the Cross, seem to anticipate and imitate the placement of God above all else, that primary emphasis of the Spanish mystic, even if one perceives that his other desires are good in nature.

Augustine’s specificity and nuance with his commentary on these two verses is particularly refreshing. In addition, placing his thought in dialogue with his contemporaries has proven to be helpful in clarifying his own thought. Deeper study of his thought is beneficial in both the academic and pastoral realms. The pastoral relevance for this particular passage manifests itself in two ways. First, an understanding of these rather difficult sayings of our Lord aids in helping the flock discern the true meaning of Christ’s words in the midst of a culture that tends to prooftext passages of Scripture with the intention of rejecting the legitimacy of the inspired words. If secular forces, for example, refute the Gospel because of a literal interpretation of its content, the pastor should be prepared to provide a thorough presentation of the Church’s understanding of these passages. Second, an enthusiastic presentation of Augustine’s interpretation, in conjunction with that of Fr. George Haydock and Ss. John Chrysostom and Jerome, further illustrates and confirms the demands that are required of a person seeking to live out the Christian life to the fullest. A repudiation of even the good things of this world does not appear prima facie to be a typical way to live life. This proper ordering of goods flies in the face of common experience for those who do not place God at the center of their lives. Because the Christian life is definitionally atypical, an enthusiastic portrayal of the method and fruits of this life would strengthen the flock to live out that life until they meet their reward, by the grace and mercy of God, in holy beatitude.

VOLUME XV (2022)

35

In vitro Fertilization Carolyn Allen

T

he birth of a child is arguably one of the most amazing things one can experience. As human beings, we have a biological desire to have children and thus preserve our genes and family names. However, some people cannot have children. What are they to do? In the field of medicine, scientists and doctors have made some astounding scientific discoveries that have changed the world forever. Some of these discoveries have been positive, others negative.

IVF, or in vitro fertilization, is one of these discoveries. Nonetheless, there is some debate on whether IVF is ethical, with several arguments supporting each side. As expressed in the following sections, this paper will argue that IVF is unethical because it contradicts the innate sanctity of life and the natural conjugal act of procreation.

Description of the Practice In vitro fertilization (IVF) is “a complex series of procedures used to help with fertility or prevent genetic problems and assist with the conception of a child.”1 It is the most common and effective form of assistive reproductive technology (ART). The term “in vitro” is a Latin derivative that means “in glass.”2 This means that the term “in vitro fertilization” translates to “fertilization in glass,” or in-glass fertilization. The concept of IVF dates back to 1878, but the first successful human attempt of IVF wasn’t until 1978 with the birth of Louise Brown.3 IVF can be a very intricate and intensive process. The chances of success of IVF depend on several factors, including the reason for infertility, age, weight, and other health factors. IVF can also be timeMayo Clinic Staff, “In Vitro Fertilization (IVF),” Mayo Clinic (2019). https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac-20384716.

2 Tian Zhu, “In Vitro Fertilization,” The Embryo Project Encyclopedia (2009). https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/vitro-fertilization.

3 Ibid.

1

consuming, expensive, and invasive.4 According to a study done by the CDC in 2015, a total of 182,111 ART procedures were performed across the United States. These procedures resulted in 59,334 livebirth deliveries and 71,152 infants born.5 These numbers indicate that ART is 39% effective based on the most up-to-date CDC data.

The process of in vitro fertilization begins with various screenings and tests to determine eligibility and likelihood that IVF will work.

This is unique to each couple or situation, so these results vary. Some screenings or tests include ovarian reserve testing, semen analysis, infection disease screening, practice (mock) embryo transfer, and uterine exam. These tests are not required in all cases but are commonly used for couples trying to conceive through IVF.6 The second step of the IVF process is ovulation induction.

Ovulation induction mimics the natural process of ovulation, but with more intense stimulation. During natural ovulation, the woman’s ovary will produce a single healthy egg over the course of each menstrual cycle. For IVF, the woman will produce several eggs through the help of medication. This is done to increase the chances of a successful fertilization.

There are several medications that could potentially be used during this step of the process. The doctor will determine which medications are necessary and/or will be helpful in making the induction successful. Some common medications include a series of gonadotropins and doxycycline. Gonadotropins “are injectable hormones used to increase development of a woman’s eggs, follicles (the sac-like structures where eggs mature), and estrogen levels prior to ovulation.7 There are three common gonadotropins used, including human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG), follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH), and gonadotropin releasing hormone (GnRH) analogs. HCG is used during IVF to trigger release of the mature egg(s) after a woman’s follicles have developed. HCG is a naturally occurring chemical produced during pregnancy. Common hCG drugs include Pregnyl, Profasi, A.P.L., Novarel and Ovidrel. Side effects may include bloating, fatigue, mood swings or breast tenderness. FSH initiates the Mayo Clinic, “In Vitro Fertilization.”

Saswati Sunderam, Dmitry M Kissin, et al., “Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance—United States, 2015” in Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report Surveillance Summary 67, no. 3 (2018): 1–28.

6 Mayo Clinic “In Vitro Fertilization.”

7 Women and Infants Fertility Center, “In Vitro Fertilization: Fertility Drugs” (2020), https://fertility.womenandinfants.org/treatment/ivf.

4 5

VOLUME XV (2022)

37

development and growth of eggs in a woman’s ovaries. Common FSH drugs include Bravelle, Gonal-F and Follistim. GnRH analogs help prevent premature ovulation. By delaying ovulation, GnRH analogs increase the chance of a woman producing fertile eggs and prevent the release of eggs before an egg retrieval occurs. These drugs include Ganirelix Acetate, Antagon (ganirelix), Lupron Depot (leuprolide acetate) and Lupron. Side effects may include hot flashes, headaches, trouble sleeping, mood swings and vaginal dryness. Women will typically take gonadotropins for seven to twelve days, but some drugs may be taken longer. A physician will closely monitor follicle size and estrogen levels to decide if the dosing is adequate or if a woman needs to continue injections.8 Doxycycline is an oral antibiotic that decreases the chance of a bacterial infection to both partners involved in IVF treatment.

Patients take one doxycycline pill twice a day after they begin hCG injections until their prescription is complete. Doxycycline increases sensitivity to sunlight, and anyone taking it should avoid long exposure to the sun for up to two weeks after taking it. Other side effects include diarrhea, sore mouth, and genital itching.9 Although each drug has risks and side effects of its own, ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS) is the most serious risk associated with IVF medication. This condition causes over stimulation of the ovaries, which then causes overproduction of hormones. Though most cases are mild when they occur, some people may experience a severe reaction and suffer side effects that may include severe pelvic pain, swelling of the hands or legs, stomach pain and swelling, shortness of breath, weight gain, diarrhea, nausea or vomiting, and urinating less than normal.10 If all goes well with the medication, the ovulation induction process lasts for one to two weeks, or until the doctor determines it is time to retrieve the eggs. Some problems that could interfere or even cancel the process are an inadequate number of or too many follicles developing, premature ovulation, and other medical issues. If the IVF cycle is cancelled, the doctor may recommend changing medications or dosage, or advise the patient to use an egg donor.11

Ibid.

Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Mayo Clinic, “In Vitro Fertilization.”

8 9

38

TOLLE LEGE

The third step of the IVF process is egg retrieval. The doctor will determine if the eggs are ready for retrieval through either a vaginal ultrasound or a series of blood tests. Egg retrievals are typically done in the doctor’s office 34–36 hours after the final dose of medication and before ovulation. The egg retrieval process begins with the doctor sedating the patient and administering pain medication. Then, a transvaginal ultrasound aspiration is used along with an ultrasound probe to identify follicles. Once the follicles have been identified, a thin needle is inserted through an ultrasound guide to go through the follicles and retrieve the eggs. Several eggs can be removed in approximately 20 minutes. Mature eggs are then placed in a nutritive liquid and incubated. The patient may experience cramping and feelings of fullness or pressure after the procedure.12 The fourth step of the IVF process is sperm retrieval. The male will provide a semen sample the morning of egg retrieval, usually through masturbation. If a semen sample is unable to be provided, the doctor can also retrieve sperm directly from the testicle through testicular aspiration. The procedure involves the doctor using a needle to extract sperm directly from the testicle. Donor sperm can also be used. Sperm are separated from the semen fluid in the lab.13 The fifth step of the IVF process is fertilization. There are two popular methods of fertilization: conventional insemination or intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI). Conventional insemination involves mixing the retrieved mature eggs and sperm and allowing them to incubate overnight. ICSI is performed by injecting a single healthy sperm into each mature egg. This is often used if the sperm is faulty or if previous IVF attempts have failed. After fertilization, the doctor may recommend other procedures before embryo transfer, such as assisted hatching or preimplantation genetic testing.14 The final step of the IVF process is embryo transfer. This is usually done at the doctor’s office two to five days after egg retrieval.

To begin, the doctor may give the patient a mild sedative to reduce potential cramping. Next, the doctor inserts a catheter into the vagina and through the cervix to reach the uterus. Finally, the doctor attaches a syringe containing one or more embryos to the end of the catheter and places the embryos into the uterus. If the procedure is successful, an embryo will implant in the lining of the uterus six to ten days after Ibid.

Ibid.

14 Ibid.

12 13

VOLUME XV (2022)

39

egg retrieval. After the procedure, the patient may resume normal activities. Some side effects may include passing a small amount of clear or bloody fluid shortly after the procedure, breast tenderness, mild cramping or bloating, and constipation.15 Two weeks after egg retrieval, the doctor will test the patient’s blood to determine if the woman is pregnant. If she is pregnant, the doctor will refer her to an obstetrician. If she is not, she will stop all medication and will likely get her period within a week. If she would like to try IVF again, the doctor may suggest measures to take to improve chances of a successful IVF cycle the next time.16 Rationale for the Practice In our modern society, with all the advances in technology and medicine, it is unsurprising that IVF is becoming a common alternative to traditional reproductive means. More and more people are turning to IVF to have their families. On average, 1–2% of American babies are born through IVF each year.17 As described previously, IVF is a medical procedure that helps women who suffer with fertility issues. It can also help prevent genetic problems in offspring before birth. These rationales are very generalized, as there is a plethora of reasons why one might consider IVF. Although infertility is the most common reason why people use IVF, there are several other reasons why people choose IVF to build their families. These include fallopian tube damage or blockage, ovulation disorders, endometriosis, uterine fibroids, previous fallopian tubal sterilization or removal, impaired sperm production or function, unexplained infertility, a genetic disorder, fertility preservation for cancer or other health conditions, older age, and same-sex family planning.18 Although each person’s reasoning for using IVF is unique, many of these reasons often contribute to or are the sole cause of infertility.

The main purpose of IVF is to assist in the production of a child.

Since some people are unable to do this naturally on their own, they turn to external means such as IVF. It is in our nature to desire to procreate and pass our genes to the next generation. If there is a reason Ibid.

Ibid.

17 “IVF by the Numbers,” Penn Medicine: Fertility Blog. Published March 14, 2018. Accessed March 13, 2022, https://www.pennmedicine.org/updates/blogs/fertilityblog/2018/march/ivf-by-the-numbers.

18 Mayo Clinic, “In Vitro Fertilization.”

15 16

40

TOLLE LEGE

why one is unable to do this, our inclination is to figure out why this is and how we can fix it. This is where medicine and technology come into play. Medicine is how we as human beings deal with natural evils.

If something is not functioning properly, medicine tries to fix it. In the case of infertility and most of the other issues mentioned previously, something is not functioning properly or is not present at all. Medicine in this case attempts to fix problems with a woman’s (or sometimes man’s) physical ailment or inability to create a child naturally. To put it plainly, IVF is a means to fulfill that desire to procreate if one is unable to do so autonomously.

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, IVF is an intervention for an inability to reproduce naturally. By that logic, IVF is an unnatural phenomenon. This says something about the relationship between medicine and humanity. With medicine, we have the ability and technology to create and destroy naturally occurring things artificially. In the case of IVF, natural human materials are used (eggs, sperm) but medicine artificially brings them together because the body cannot do so on its own. In other words, medicine does not “fix” infertility. Medicine acts as a mediator between the body and science to bypass the body’s incapability. In doing things such as this, we have found a way to manipulate the human body to do what we want it to do. We have taken its incapability or deficiency and made it capable and efficient through medicine.

IVF is becoming more and more widely accepted in our society.

According to a PMC research study on beliefs, attitudes, and funding for ART, more than half of the respondents surveyed (54%), had considered or would consider having IVF treatments. Additionally, 93% of respondents answered that at least one IVF cycle should be publicly funded.19 This data suggests that ART procedures are common, and because of this, more people are willing to get them and fund them. Although IVF is expensive and invasive, many people still rely on it to have a family. Culturally, IVF has become very common, with many viewing it as a helping hand in the path to pregnancy and building a biological family. IVF has made the impossible possible for thousands of people, and that number only seems to be increasing.

Bart Fauser, et al., “Beliefs, Attitudes and Funding of Assisted Reproductive Technology: Public Perception of over 6,000 Respondents from 6 European Countries,” Public Library of Science, PloS One 14, no. 1 (January 25, 2019).

19

VOLUME XV (2022)

41

Moral Assessment A. Ethical Claim about the Practice In vitro fertilization is an unethical practice and should not be performed by anyone under any circumstance because it contradicts the innate sanctity of life and the natural conjugal act of procreation.

B. Arguments IVF aims to replace the act of sexual intercourse to produce a child. As defined by Merriam-Webster, sexual intercourse is “heterosexual intercourse involving penetration of the vagina by the penis.” Further, to produce children, the male partner must orgasm and ejaculate semen into the woman’s vagina. Catholic tradition teaches that this act must be done within the context of marriage.

Additionally, sex is unitive and must be open to children for it to be morally correct. By having sexual intercourse with someone, one is bonded to the other physically, emotionally, and spiritually. This is true no matter the context it is performed in. However, if sex is performed outside of marriage and is not open to children, it is morally incorrect and unethical.

Argument 1: Babies and the process of creating them are not items to be bought and sold.

Babies are living human beings. Generally, our society considers the buying and selling of human beings to be morally wrong. For example, slavery was the buying and selling of human beings for the purpose of utilizing them for unpaid labor. Slavery was abolished because society deemed it unethical. Similarly, IVF is a transactional process of buying and selling. It is the buying and selling of a procedure for the purpose of artificially creating a child. People go to a doctor so the doctor can sell a service that they can buy. The service is the medical procedure of IVF. IVF costs thousands of dollars per cycle and can be purchased by anyone who has the means to do so.

Since the result of the purchase of the procedure is the possible creation of the child, IVF is essentially the buying and selling of human beings. By using the logic of the buying and selling aspect of the slave trade, IVF is morally wrong and violates the sanctity of human life.

Some may argue that if someone has the financial resources to do IVF, there is no law that says they can’t do so. However, babies are not merely products of their parents and cannot ethically be purchased as they are through IVF. Genetically, they are a matching of their parent’s chromosomes—one set from their mother and one from 42 TOLLE LEGE

their father. This means that the child is of their parents, not from them. Therefore, the child cannot be ethically purchased as they are through IVF because they are their own being in their own right. In other words, they are not the property of their parents, and therefore their parents do not have the right to buy them.

Argument 2: Childbearing is not a right.

By design, our bodies are biologically capable of bearing children.

However, just because something has the capability to do something, that doesn’t mean it should or will do it. For example, everyone has talents unique to them. Some people are gifted in the performing arts and others are not. Although both parties have the capacity to perform, some people are born with a capacity to perform well and act on their talent. Similarly, although our bodies were made with the possibility to bear children, not everyone will be able to. Additionally, believing that it is a right to bear children violates the sanctity of human life because we cannot create life ourselves. We can mediate the production of life by bringing together the natural material of sperm and egg, but we cannot create the sperm and egg necessary to form a human life. Human life is determined by the creator of the sperm and egg, which is God. Therefore, it is not a right to bear children.

Some may argue that if a couple really wants a child but can’t have one, it is within their right to do everything they can to fulfill their desire. On the contrary, there is no law that says someone deserves to have a child, no matter how badly they may want one. Additionally, even if there was a law that said someone deserves a child, that would not make it right because there are unjust laws (e.g., slavery was legal, but that doesn’t make it right). Although many people may want a child and have good intentions, it is not an innate right that their desire to have a child be fulfilled. Additionally, many want children because they believe it will bring them happiness and fulfillment. However, childbearing is designed to be a selfless act and should not be done with selfish intentions. According to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops: Love is “total,” a “very special form of personal friendship in which husband and wife generously share everything . . . not thinking solely of their own convenience.” This marital friendship means that spouses love each other not because they will get something from each other, but just because of VOLUME XV (2022)

43

who they are. This kind of generous, selfless love “leads the spouses to a free and mutual gift of themselves” to each other.20 Similarly, children are not a means to an end. Many people want children because they have an innate desire to have them and believe it will bring them happiness and a sense of fulfillment. However, having a child is a serious commitment and is not something one should do to fulfill selfish desires.

Argument 3: IVF denies the nature and necessity of sexual difference in relation to unity in marriage and procreation.

Human beings were created as man and woman, sexually differentiated, by God: “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them” (Genesis 1:27). This was not an accident, and it had, and has, a purpose. For a child to be made, a sperm from a man and an egg from a woman must join. A child cannot be created from one or two sperm or one or two eggs. Although there are many other reasons for sexual difference, this is the only pertinent information in relation to this argument. Although IVF requires sperm and an egg, it doesn’t require that they originate from a heterosexual married couple. A single mother could use a sperm donor and IVF to have a child. Similarly, a homosexual couple could use IVF and a surrogate to produce a child.

Both scenarios are a direct violation of the unity of the sexually differentiated man and woman and deny the sanctity of the sexual act.

In the case of the single mother, she is completely foregoing both marriage and the conjugal act and is surpassing the need for that union.

In the case of the homosexual couple, there are several violations. For one, they are not sexually differentiated and therefore cannot create a child naturally in any case, so IVF is necessary regardless. Secondly, like the case of the single mother, there is no need for the bonding act of sexual intercourse. In both cases, the use of surrogate donors or carriers also ignores the need for the conjugal act. Therefore, IVF is morally incorrect.

Some may argue that it is not morally correct that only heterosexual married couples be allowed to have children. Single mothers and homosexual couples should be able to have children because it doesn’t matter if the child has one parent or two same-sex USCCB, “Responsible Parenthood,” https://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/marriageand-family/natural-family-planning/what-is-nfp/responsible-parenthood.

20

44

TOLLE LEGE

parents. On the contrary, research has shown that children who grow up with married heterosexual parents fare better than those without a mother or father. A study conducted in 2015 indicates that children who grow up in non-traditional family structures do worse in school and struggle socially and emotionally in contrast to their peers.21 This is just one example of research. This research addresses the outcome of IVF (a child) and that the family structure as well as the relationship between the parents makes a difference in the child’s development.

Argument 4: IVF denies the natural intimate bonding act of sexual intercourse.

As stated earlier, IVF aims to mimic and replace the natural act and process of sex. However, the bonding element of intercourse is completely denied. For one, sexual intercourse is meant to take place between a married man and woman. As Christ affirms in Mark 10: 6– 8, “But at the beginning of creation God ‘made them male and female.’

‘For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.’ So they are no longer two, but one flesh.” This also raises the issue of the role of a third party, the doctor, in the picture. Because sexual intercourse is an intimate act that bonds a married man and woman together, the presence of a third human being violates the sacred nature of sex and the chaste love of spouses.

Some may argue that it’s not important or relevant that conception be done naturally because we have the medical technology to do it without the need for sex and the barriers that may come with it (such as infertility and medical problems). On the contrary, the pure and ethical sexual act creates a bond between two people. This is done through the chemical release of oxytocin, which promotes trust in the other person and psychological stability.22 This is just one benefit of the natural and conjugal sexual act. These results of the release of oxytocin connect to the bonds of marriage and the traditional family structure. Although it is possible that children be born naturally outside of marriage, the parents will not have the bond and commitment of marriage, which may result in separation of the parents. In other words, the oxytocin bond manifests and is meant to affirm the metaphysical bond of marriage. Additionally, it is well Richard P. Fitzgibbons, “Growing Up with Gay Parents: What Is the Big Deal?” The Linacre Quarterly 83, no. 2 (May 2016): 332–36.

22 Markus MacGill, “Oxytocin: The Love Hormone?” Medical News Today, ed. Michael Weber, (Sept 4, 2017), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/275795.

21

VOLUME XV (2022)

45

known that children who are born into loving households with a married mother and father have numerous advantages over those who don’t. For these reasons, it is important that children be conceived naturally and born into traditional nuclear family environments.

Argument 5: Human lives are inevitably lost through the IVF process.

The fifth and final steps of the IVF process involve fertilization and embryo transfer. To reiterate, an embryo is the name that a person is called at fertilization, or conception. During the fertilization stage, depending on which method is used, the sperm and retrieved eggs join to create several embryos. Then, the doctor manually inserts the embryos into the woman’s uterus. At this stage, the woman waits to see if the embryo has attached to the uterine wall and she becomes pregnant. However, procedures such as IVF have an efficacy rate of only 39%, so many, if not all, the embryos die in utero. In other words, many of the embryos fail to attach to the uterine wall, so they essentially die because they haven’t attached to initiate the next steps of pregnancy. This equates to the loss of several human lives.

Additionally, many women elect to undergo multiple IVF cycles until a viable pregnancy occurs, thus resulting in the loss of even more lives.

Therefore, IVF is unethical due to the inevitable loss of human life during the fertilization and embryo transfer stages of the process.

Some may argue that embryos aren’t human beings, and therefore it is morally acceptable if they don’t make it. On the contrary, research shows that the joining of a sperm and egg creates a new genetically distinct being. The only things that separate the embryo from the human being living outside the womb are environment and allowance for development. It has nothing to do with the form of the being.23 Additionally, the Catholic Church teaches that life begins at conception. Therefore, the fifth and final steps of IVF violate the sanctity of human life, and therefore IVF does. People choose to do IVF fully aware that the chances of success are slim. As a result, they consciously risk the nearly inevitable loss of human life. Because human life begins at conception, the loss of embryos in the final step of IVF results in the loss of human life and therefore makes IVF unethical.

Fred De Miranda and Patricia Lee June, “When Human Life Begins,” American College of Pediatricians (March 2017): acpeds.org/position-statements/when-human-life-begins.

23

46

TOLLE LEGE

Conclusion In conclusion, although millions of people have used IVF and millions of babies have been born as a result, IVF is unethical at its core. In summation, IVF dehumanizes the procreative process and molds it into a cold and unintimate transaction that can be bought by anyone. Procreation is supposed to be a natural act and was designed for a married man and woman who have solidified their bond of love and who have been blessed by God to share in that love. Not everyone is meant to have children, and no one deserves to have them. It is not our duty as human beings to manipulate the gifts God has or has not given us to fit our idea of happiness. On the contrary, it is our duty to be gracious for what has been given to us and to seek our God-given purpose.

VOLUME XV (2022)

47

The Phenomenological Ressourcement: An Exploration of the Philosophical Foundations and Consequences of the

Nouvelle Théologie Leagon Carlin

T

he movement of the Nouvelle Théologie, emerging developmentally in the mid 1930s, was one of a return to sources. This orientation toward a return to origins and beginnings gave rise to the name that is widely given to the operating principle of the movement: ressourcement. This French term, literally meaning “a return to sources,” encompasses the goal of the theological movement that would come to define the thinking of the Second Vatican Council, and the Church thereafter. The thinkers who defined this movement, specifically those in France, were profoundly influenced philosophically by the thought of phenomenologists like Maurice Blondel, whose application of the phenomenological method to the Christian life in the Church served as a foundation for the worldview and method of thought found in the ressourcement movement. Further, the phenomenological character of the Nouvelle Théologie is made evident in the thought of the later philosophers on whom this ressourcement was influential. In a special way, the philosophical personalism of Fr. Karol Wojtyla, later Pope John Paul II, is a closely related descendent in the same philosophical lineage stemming from the Nouvelle Théologie.

The Effects, before the Cause The document which could, perhaps arguably, be called the “culmination” of the worldview of the ressourcement movement is the final and summary document of the Second Vatican Council. Gaudium et Spes, generally titled in English as “The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” put forward the framework for the Church’s interaction with the world, Her animating principles when doing the work of Salvation. This document, though the subject of

some criticism from certain voices in the Church from the very beginning, if read with a hermeneutic of continuity, is an extremely moving and faithful treatise on ecclesiology, and one which seems to encapsulate the methods and intentions of the nouvelle théologiens in their treatment of history and tradition, as well as in their central focus on the person in community. The opening paragraph of Gaudium et Spes speaks profoundly and clearly of these themes: The joys and the hopes, the griefs, and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ. Indeed, nothing genuinely human fails to raise an echo in their hearts. For theirs is a community composed of men. United in Christ, they are led by the Holy Spirit in their journey to the Kingdom of their Father, and they have welcomed the news of salvation, which is meant for every man. That is why this community realizes that it is truly linked with mankind and its history by the deepest of bonds.1 Those things which are human, both the good and the bad, are in the ambit of the Church. The centrality here is not simply on “the person,” in some kind of individualistic, relativistic, or autonomous sense, but rather on the person in community. The community of the Church is linked profoundly to the community of the world at large, not merely now, but throughout the whole of history.

Though not established with certainty, the widely accepted understanding is that much of this document was authored by one Karol Wojtyla, a Bishop at the Council, later to become, of course, Pope Saint John Paul II. Whether it can be established that he actually penned the lines above, or any other part of the document, is actually inessential, because from his other work it can be directly established that he would have been of much the same understanding as the sentiments expressed in Gaudium et Spes. By beginning with these points, we are able now to reach back into history even further, back before the Council and its documents, back to the philosophical and theological foundations that lie beneath them. We will be able now to see, in the thinkers who had influence on the Council Fathers, including Karol Wojtyla, a quite clear line of succession in concepts.

To accomplish this, we must return to the France of the mid-twentieth century.

1

Gaudium et Spes, §1.

VOLUME XV (2022)

49

Phenomenological Foundations Maurice Blondel, born in 1861, was a French philosopher and devout Catholic whose major work was in the area of a philosophy of action. Blondel was particularly focused on the intersection of the truth of the faith in human experience, specifically the human person in act, and this naturally led him to an application of the phenomenological method to the Christian life. Though his works were heavily criticized at the time of their publication, and though for many decades he was unfairly labelled as a “Modernist,” Blondel has largely been vindicated, and his thought provides an excellent window into much of the work of the ressourcement thinkers.

Blondel placed a particular focus on an understanding of history and tradition, which could both acknowledge the essential place that the Church must occupy in the interpretation of history, due to God’s salvific plan and revelations thereof, while also understanding history in its experiential reality as it is presented to us. His work dealt with what were effectively the two extremes of his time, extrinsicism and historicism, and endeavored to find the unity of the good within both.

Extrincisicm “conceived of the Christian revelation as a totality of doctrine given once and for all in its entirety at a given point in history to a Church divinely established as the sole authority responsible for the custody and teaching of this revelation.”2 In this way, extricisicists protected the Church’s role as arbiter of history and the sacrament of salvation, but to the detriment of the good of reality itself. On the other hand, historicism can be defined as seeing history “as the only truth.” All truth, including that of the Christian faith, “must submit to the judgment of history.” Can the truth claims of Christianity be proven in the real order of history? Historicists claimed the right “to treat the content of Christianity as a pure matter of history.”3 In this way, we see that the historicists sacrificed the right of the Church to self-definition, and to the proper framing of salvation history within the context of Christian revelation, in order to protect the reality of history as it exists in time.

The unifying principle which Blondel established between these two extremes was that of tradition. A proper understanding of tradition serves as a via media of a sort, which can preserve the truth in both William A. Scott, “The Notion of Tradition in Maruice Blondel,” Theological Studies 27, no. 3 (1966): 384.

3 Ibid., 385.

2

50

TOLLE LEGE

extremes while actually presenting a greater fullness than could be found in either position alone: the bond that he chose was that of tradition, the voice of the Church across the centuries, understood in all its fulness of meaning. He saw in tradition the means of reconciling the extremes by showing that both of them had very definite values but that these values had to be expressed in the service of the tradition of the Church. It was in this service that their solidarity was assured without the sacrifice of their relative independence.4 In Blondel’s definition of tradition, the Church remains the arbiter and interpreter of salvation history, and of history in full, but this protection of truth as revealed doesn’t have to be at odds with reality, with human reason, or with human progress and flourishing.

Establishing first what he does not mean by tradition, Blondel lays out two antitheses. First, “Tradition is not simply a process of recall.

It is . . . that but not only that.”5 In this, he points out that it is not enough to look to the past and preserve it simply because it is “what has always been done.” The practices and understandings of the past are not necessarily to be valued as superior solely because they are “old.” Second, “the elements which contribute to the formation of tradition are not totally in the order of the rational, nor is it only truth in the intellectual order which is expressed by it.”6 It is not merely empirical knowledge which can be gained from history; the time and place of events, and the effects born of them, are not the only truths that can be gained by an analysis of tradition. Looking to tradition in history can also tell us about, to paraphrase Gaudium et Spes, the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of ages past.

Having established what is not meant by tradition, Blondel establishes what he means by it positively. “It is a preserving power [which is] at the same time conquering; it discovers and formulates truths which the past lived, without being able to articulate them or define them explicitly; it enriches the intellectual patrimony by minting little by little the total deposit and by making it fructify.”7 So, for Blondel, tradition preserves the past, while at the same time not being Scott, “Tradition in Maurice Blondel,” 385–86.

Ibid., 386–87.

6 Ibid., 387.

7 Maurice Blondel, Les Premiers Écrits de Maurice Blondel (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1956), 204.

4 5

VOLUME XV (2022)

51

controlled by it. The elements of tradition, the sources from which we gather the constituent parts to form the whole, do not define or limit its scope, but rather are united in a greater synthetic reality, which is more than the sum of its parts. Blondel further explains that tradition “knows how to guard from the past not so much the intellectual aspect as the vital reality . . . . Without doubt she bases herself on texts but she also bases herself at the same time and first of all on something other than them, on an experience always in act.”8 This vital reality is the true reality preserved in tradition, and that vitality is founded in the acting person. Here we begin to see the personalistic bent within Blondel’s phenomenology, specifically the focus on the acting experience of the person in community. This is seen even more clearly in the second quality that Blondel attributes to tradition, namely that of conquering. Tradition, as he says in explaining his understanding of the purpose of its preserving power, is not merely a disparate and pragmatic collection of texts and accounts, but a living and vital synthesis: “tradition is not dominated by the elements from which it fashions itself—facts from the past, Scripture, theological speculation, contemporary needs, the life of the members of the Church as expressed in their actions—but rather makes use of them all as they serve her purpose, which is to produce a living synthesis of them always applicable to the present.”9 This vital synthesis will always be applicable to the present, because, again, tradition is not simply a recollection of past events, a cataloging of practical facts, but a living reality of persons in act, of experiences that still live in the memory of culture and society. In addition, the synthesis that is tradition can be applicable to the present because, in its vital reality, it anticipates the future. As Blondel explains: “As paradoxical as such an affirmation may seem, one can maintain that tradition anticipates the future and disposes herself to illumine it by the same effort that she makes to live in a way that is faithful to the past.”10 It is precisely in this collection of dual definitions of tradition—as both preserving and conquering; as made up of of elements, while also being a living synthesis which is the arbiter of its parts; as the reality of the past, and the anticipation of the future—it is in this understanding of tradition that we can find the greatest evidence of the influence that Blondel had on the thinkers of the ressourcement.

Ibid.

Scott, “Tradition in Maurice Blondel,” 387.

10 Blondel, Premiers Écrits, 205.

8 9

52

TOLLE LEGE

The Foundations Are Built Upon This notion of tradition and history, enumerated by Blondel, can be found reflected in distinct ways through the thought of many who became influential in the ressourcement movement. This reflection is especially evident in the work of Yves Congar, O.P. For this reason, and in an effort to maintain a feasible scope for this treatment, we will limit our comparison to the work of Congar. In three specific ways, the understanding of tradition which is posited by Blondel is reflected in Congar’s work. The first way concerns the understanding of tradition as a living synthesis of sources, not merely a collection of texts and customs, but a unified and living whole. The second way lies in the understanding of tradition as based on an “experience always in act,” specifically with a view toward the acting person in community.

Finally, Blondel’s thought reflected in Congar’s work in their emphasis on the tradition’s anticipation of the future, and applicability to the present.

In Blondel’s work History and Dogma, he speaks to these realities in a way that seems tailor-made for the ressourcement: Turned lovingly towards the past where its treasure lies, it moves towards the future, where it conquers and illuminates.

It has a humble sense of faithfully recovering even what it thus discovers. It does not have to innovate because it possesses its God and its all; but it has always to teach something new because it transforms what is implicit and “enjoyed” into something explicit and known.11 Here we see clearly the affection that we are to have for the past, which is not at odds with progress, properly understood. Innovation is unnecessary, though change is not forbidden. Progress and applicability to the present can be achieved without adding anything new, because tradition is a living and synthetic reality, which anticipates the future.

Looking to Congar, we can see the similarities in his own articulation of tradition. The first theme which is recognizable is that of the synthesis of tradition’s sources to a unified whole which is still living and real today. For Congar, the whole purpose of a return to the sources, a ressourcement, is precisely this vital synthesis. In discussing reform in the Church, Congar says: “To return to principles, to ‘go Maurice Blondel, The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma, trans. Alexander Dru and Illtyd Trethowan (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1994), 267–68.

11

VOLUME XV (2022)

53

back to the sources,’ as we say now, means to rethink the situation in which we find ourselves in the light and the spirit of everything that the integrity of tradition teaches us about the meaning of the church.”12 Congar is referring to a rethinking of the situation in which we find ourselves, the present as it is, through the lens of tradition.

Here we see both the concept of tradition as an integral whole and tradition as anticipatory and applicable to the future. At the same time, Congar is clear that tradition is not merely a recollection, as Blondel, too, was intent on pointing out, and not simply a designation of superiority in relation to anything that happened in the past: “A ‘return to tradition’ does not necessarily mean binding today’s Catholic to the literal acceptance of a contingent expression of Christian thought or life from some moment in the past.”13 Congar maintains that tradition supersedes its parts, and is in fact a living and not constituent or disparate reality.

In his ecclesiology, Congar makes evident the similar focus on the person acting in community, which is present throughout history. He uses the term solidarity to mean this communal inter-responsibility of each person, in this context discussing the failures, historical and contemporary, of members of the Body of Christ, writing: Solidarity plays out in a way that is both truly collective but also truly personal in this area of historical faults and group behavior. Each person affects all others . . . and contributes to constituting, maintaining, or transforming a situation where human weaknesses affect all the members of the group.”14 Here we can see the centrality of focus on the person in community, on persons with mutual responsibility for others in the community who still remaining distinct in themselves.

Congar acknowledged the influence of Blondel on his own concept of tradition when writing about the subject himself in his work The Meaning of Tradition. By way of praise for Blondel’s concept of tradition, Congar begins by saying: “Maurice Blondel, a lay philosopher whose charity made him particularly attuned to the Catholic spirit, entered the discussion [on the subject of tradition] by writing a series of three articles, the third of which remains one of the Yves Congar, True and False Reform in the Church (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2011), 295.

Ibid., 294.

14 Ibid., 113.

12 13

54

TOLLE LEGE

finest descriptions of tradition that exist.”15 It is in this third article, “History and Dogma,” that Blondel lays out the framework of tradition as a via media between the extremes of Extrinsicism and Historicism, with which we began this exploration. Congar goes on to say of Blondel that he showed that, while it depends on the historical attestation, the Christian faith is not bound by it. Christianity has another source at its disposal, that of the ever-present experience of reality . . . . This experience itself is not shared by a few isolated individuals, but by a whole people, that is, the Church; and taken as a coherent whole, it is an authentic means of reference.16 As previously discussed, Blondel’s understanding of tradition preserves the essential self-determination and freedom from constraint of the Church, while allowing for the importance of the attestation of historical fact. This “ever-present experience of reality” is the same concept of the person in act as the first basis for tradition, and the fact that this experience of reality is not limited to the experience of individuals, but to a whole people is the step that establishes the acting person in community. This reality, Congar concludes, “is actually effected by a living synthesis in which all the forces of the Christian spirit play their part: speculation, ethics, history—and this is tradition.”17 The Effects, Revisited Blondel tells us that “whoever lives and thinks as a Christian really works for this [synthesis of tradition], whether it be the saint who perpetuates Jesus among us, the scholar who goes back to the pure sources of Revelation, or the philosopher who strives to open the way to the future, and to prepare for the unending birth of the Spirit in newness.”18 The participants in this work of synthesis, described here

by Blondel, were all present in different capacities for the work of the Second Vatican Council. There were saints, scholars, and philosophers, all gathered together to call on the help of the Holy Spirit in establishing the way forward for the Church in the age to Yves Congar, “The Meaning of Tradition,” in The Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1964), 26.

16 Ibid., 27.

17 Ibid.

18 Blondel, Letter on Apologetics, 268.

15

VOLUME XV (2022)

55

come. In their work, these men drew from many fonts, and they returned to the sources. Congar once remarked that “if it were necessary for us to characterize in one word the theological approach of the Council, we would evoke the ideal of knowledge proposed by Maurice Blondel, which protested against what he rather enigmatically called ‘monophorism,’ that is to say a reified (chosiste) conception of knowledge.”19 Blondel’s understanding of the phenomenon of tradition as being based on experience in act found its way, through Congar and others, into the discussion, and consequently the documents of the Council.

While it would be absurd to imply that the philosophical and theological work of Karol Wojtyla was a result of the Council, especially considering the fact that he was one of the Council Fathers and contributed greatly to the work of the Council, it remains true that he was influenced by the same sources as the theologians of the ressourcement, and though he, as an academic philosopher and not a theologian, was not in earnest a member of the movement, he nonetheless can be said to have been affected by the thought of these men. It is also clear that he was instrumental in bringing these ideas to fruition in the documents of the Council, the most notable being Gaudium et Spes, as discussed above.

Wojtyla’s own opinion of Blondel is summed up in a statement he made in the year 2000, addressed to those gathered for a symposium on the work of this French philosopher: “At the root of Maurice Blondel’s philosophy is a keen perception of the drama of the separation of faith and reason and an intrepid desire to overcome this separation, which is contrary to the nature of things. The philosopher of Aix is thus an eminent representative of Christian philosophy, understood as rational speculation, in vital union with faith, in a twofold fidelity to the demands of intellectual research and to the Magisterium.”20 This twofold fidelity is the animating principle underlying the whole of Blondel’s understanding of tradition: to be faithful both to the demands of right religion, the truth as put forth by Michael A. Conway, “Maurice Blondel and Ressourcement,” in Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, ed. Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 14.

20 John Paul II, “To the International Conference on Blondel between L’Action and the Trilogy” (November 18, 2000). www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2000/octdec/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20001118_blondel.html.

19

56

TOLLE LEGE

Magisterial authority, as well as to the rigor and reason of historical pursuit.

In his phenomenology, we again see the comparison of Blondel to Wojtyla. Blondel, in October of 1886, at the age of 25, wrote: “I propose to study action, because it seems to me that the Gospel attributes to action alone the power to manifest love and to attain God! Action is the abundance of the heart.”21 One can almost imagine a young Karol Wojtyla expressing the same sentiment as he decided to move from the study of the Polish language to the study of philosophy, motivated by the same fascination with human experience and the acting person. Blondel’s first major work was entitled l’Action, and Wojtyla’s seminal work of philosophy was entitled The Acting Person or Person and Act (depending on the translation). This mutual concern with action is seen in the method with which both thinkers approach the world and the Christian life, and it is a fitting companion to the theological method of the nouvelle théologiens.

Phenomenological Ressourcement “And so the various members contribute to the health of the body under the direction of the head,” Blondel writes, “which alone concerts and stimulates progress, in the unity of a consciousness which is divinely assisted.”22 The “twofold fidelity” of Maurice Blondel shows us that it is indeed possible to unite faith and reason, as would later be affirmed in encyclical form by Pope Saint John Paul II in Fides et Ratio. In his study of action, and his definition of tradition as a living synthesis, Blondel has reaffirmed the role that each member of the Body of Christ plays in this process of synthesis. The acting person in community, which is at the heart of Blondel’s philosophical method, and that of like-minded phenomenologists, is the first principle of tradition so defined. The influence of this understanding of tradition, as we have established, can be seen distinctly present in the work of the theologians of the ressourcement, and by their influence, in the documents of the Second Vatican Council. There is no progress without tradition—a living synthetic reality, lovingly sourced from the knowledge and practice of history, and not bound or controlled by the contingent expression of a particular time but rather preserving and conquering its parts to become a unified whole. In this time of tumult and transition, as the Church still reels from the sexual abuse scandal 21 22

Blondel, Letter on Apologetics, 33.

Ibid., 268.

VOLUME XV (2022)

57

of recent memory and with a financial scandal blowing in on the wind, the words of Maurice Blondel—written at a different time of confusion within the Church but with the power to inspire the great thinkers of the Nouvelle Théologie to return to the sources and in them discover what was already known—still resonate: I want to speak of the contemporary state of mind. A great renewal is taking place at the present time: it will be apparent that it is a question of adopting a whole moral attitude, that it is not only in the domain of thought that our salvation is decided, but above all in the secret recesses of the heart, that the time of heresies and even schisms is over, that not to be entirely for the Church is to be against it. . . . Truth is no longer adequatio rei et intellectus and no one lives on clear ideas any longer. But there remains the truth, and the truth which remains is living and active; it is adequatio mentis et vitae.23

23

Ibid., 33.

58

TOLLE LEGE