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ROBERT B. KORY, ESQ. (BAR NO. 110750) MICHELLE L. RICE, ESQ. (BAR NO. 235189) LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT KORY 9300 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 200 Beverly Hills, California 90212 Telephone: (310) 285-1630 Email: rkory@rbklaw.com mrice@rbklaw.com Attorneys for Defendant SAMMY ORITI BRIAN G. WOLF, ESQ. (BAR NO. 135257) EVAN N. SPIEGEL, ESQ. (BAR NO. 198071) TODD S. EAGAN, ESQ. (BAR NO. 207426) LAVELY & SINGER A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, California 90067-2906 Telephone: (310) 556-3501 Email: bwolf@lavelysinger.com espiegel@lavelysinger.com teagan@lavelysinger.com Attorneys for Plaintiff OKSANA GRIGORIEVA
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION
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OKSANA GRIGORIEVA, an Individual, Plaintiff,
) ) ) ) v. ) ) SAMMY ORITI, an individual; ) and DOES 1 through 10, ) inclusive, ) Defendants. ) ) ________________________________ )
CASE NO. CV 09-03968 MMM (Ex)
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AND FOURTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)
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Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………...1 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R.CIV. P. 12(b)(1)…………………………….………...3 III.ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………..4 A. Plaintiff’s Copyright Infringement Claim is Precluded by 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) Because Plaintiff Has Not Obtained Valid Certificates of Registration For Any of the Allegedly Infringed Works……………..............................................4 B. Plaintiff’s Claim For a Declaration of Sole Ownership In Each of the Musical Compositions Does Not Arise Under The Federal Copyright Act and Therefore Does Not Vest The Court With Subject Matter Jurisdiction………….8 1. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Valid Claim For Infringement Because the Works Are Unregistered and Do Not Meet the Jurisdictional Prerequisite Under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)………………………....9 2. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Claim That Requires Construction of the Copyright Act…..……………………………………………………....10 C. If the Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Claims On Jurisdictional Grounds,The Court Has No Discretion to Hear The State Law Claims and Must Dismiss Them…………………………………......12 IV. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………..12
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I
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1 2
Table of Authorities Cases
3 4
Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15321 * 12, 2002 WL 1906620 * 4 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ............ 6
5 6
Franklin v. Cannon Films, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 133, 134-135 (C.D. Cal. 1987) ............................................................. 10
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Goodwin v. Best Plan Int’l, 2004 WL 1924147 *1 , 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17823 *3-4 (N.D. Cal. 2004) .......... 6 Hancock Park Homeowners Ass’n Est. 1948 v. Hancock Park Home Owners Ass’n, 2006 WL 4532986 (C.D. Cal. 2006) .......................................................................... 12 Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805-6 (9th Cir. 2001)........................................................................ 1, 12 Jefferson Airplane v. Berkeley Systems, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ...................................................................... 7 Joyce v. Renaissance Design, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17774 * 7, 2000 WL 34335721 * 2 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ........... 6 Just Water Heaters, Inc. v. Affordable Water Heaters and Plumbing, Inc., 2006 WL 449136 * 3, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15321 *10 (N.D. Cal. 2006) .............. 6 Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998) ............................................................................. 7 Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., 340 F. 3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................... 2, 11 Loree Rodkin v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. 2004) ................................................................... 2, 6, 7, 9 Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S. Ct. 162, 79 L. Ed. 338 (1934) .............................................. 3 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, II
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858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988) ....................................................................... 4, 10 Muchnick v. Thompson Corp., 509 F.3d 116, 123 (2nd Cir. 2007) ................................................................................ 8 Paramount Pictures Corp. v. REPLAYTV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924 (C.D. Cal. 2004).................................................................. 3 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 710, n. 1 (9th Cir. 2007) ......................................................................... 7 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 129 S. Ct. 1523, 77 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. Mar. 02, 2009)(NO. 08-103) .................... 8 Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................. 3 Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) ............................................................................. 4 Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) ............................................................................................. 3 Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................. 3 Scholastic Entertainment v. Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., 336 F. 3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................... 8, 9, 10 Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) ............................................................................. 3 T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F. 3d 823 (2nd Cir. 1964) ....................................................................................... 9 Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914) ............................................................................................ 2 Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 1983) ............................................................................... 10
28
III
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Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................... 4 United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................ 3 Vestron v. Home Box Office Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) ................................................................... 8, 9, 10 Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2001).............................................................. 3
10
White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) ......................................................................... 3, 4
11
Statutes
12
17
17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. ................................................................................................... 1 17 U.S.C. § 408(f) ............................................................................................................ 4 17 U.S.C. § 411 ................................................................................................................ 7 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) ........................................................................................... 2, 4, 5, 8, 9 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) ........................................................................................................... 6 28 U.S.C. § 1331 .............................................................................................................. 1 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) ..................................................................................................... 1, 8 28 U.S.C. § 1367 .............................................................................................................. 1
18
Rules
13 14 15 16
19 20 21 22
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) ................................................................................................. 3 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) ................................................................................................... 3 Regulations 37 C.F.R. § 202.16 ........................................................................................................... 5
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IV
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I. INTRODUCTION In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges ten claims for relief against Defendant, most
4
of which are state law claims. Plaintiff alleges two causes of action, copyright
5
infringement and declaratory relief, which purportedly arise out of a single federal
6
statute, the Federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §101, et seq. Plaintiff contends that this
7
Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. §
8
1338(a). Complaint ¶ 5. Thus, the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction rests solely on
9
whether the Court has federal question jurisdiction as there is no diversity of
10 11
citizenship. Complaint ¶¶ 1, 2. Plaintiff had at the time of the commencement of her action in June and has at
12
the time of filing the instant motion pending applications for copyright registrations in
13
the United States Copyright Office for the four Musical Compositions Plaintiff alleges
14
that Defendant has infringed. Doc. 3. Plaintiff did not proffer with her complaint
15
Certificates of Registration for each of the four works, but merely averred that she had
16
filed applications in the United States Copyright Office prior to filing her complaint.
17
Complaint ¶¶ 8, 27.
18
The primary issue before the Court is whether pending applications for
19
registration at the time of filing of the action are sufficient to confer subject matter
20
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s infringement claim. If the Court finds that pending
21
applications for registration are insufficient, then the Court should then determine
22
whether Plaintiff’s request for a declaration of sole ownership in and to the Musical
23
Compositions independently vests the Court with subject matter jurisdiction under the
24
Federal Copyright Act. If the Court answers both questions in the negative and finds
25
that it does not have original jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s federal claims, then the
26
Court should also dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims because, absent original
27
jurisdiction, the Court would not have supplemental jurisdiction to hear the state law
28
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Herman Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 1
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1
802, 806 (9th Cir. 2001)(“if the court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it
2
has no discretion to hear and must dismiss all claims.”).
3
It is Defendant’s contention that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
4
hear Plaintiff’s federal claims for two reasons. First, Plaintiff has not made a prima
5
facie showing of copyright ownership by proffering Certificates of Registration from
6
the United States Copyright Office in the four Musical Compositions. Thus, the
7
jurisdictional bar of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), which has been interpreted in the Central
8
District as requiring completed examinations by the Copyright Office and Certificates
9
of Registration, precludes Plaintiff’s claim of infringement of each of the four
10
unregistered works. Loree Rodkin v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D.
11
2004).
12
Second, without a valid infringement claim, Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory
13
relief does not independently vest the Court with subject matter jurisdiction because
14
the relief sought does not “arise under” the Federal Copyright Act (the “Act”).
15
Through her claim for declaratory relief, Plaintiff seeks solely a determination of
16
ownership in the Musical Compositions which will not require a construction of the
17
Act. Complaint ¶ 37(a). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, jurisdiction “must be
18
determined from what necessarily appears in the Plaintiff’s statement of his own claim
19
in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of
20
defenses which it is thought defendant may interpose.” Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin.
21
Servs., 340 F. 3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74,
22
75-76 (1914)). Thus, Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim cannot vest the court with
23
federal question jurisdiction by anticipating Defendant’s potential defenses to
24
infringement. See Complaint ¶ 37 (b)-(c). Defendant’s claim of a co-ownership
25
interest in the Musical Compositions is based upon contract and equitable principles,
26
such as estoppel, which arise under state, not federal law. Oriti Decl. ¶¶ 3-10. As
27
such, the Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to Plaintiff’s claim for
28
declaratory relief under the Copyright Act. 2
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a party to move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject
4
matter jurisdiction. A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case
5
unless the contrary affirmatively appears. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of
6
Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).
7
Subject matter jurisdiction may be considered by the Court at any time. See
8
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3)(“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
9
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the
10
action.”); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. REPLAYTV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924 (C.D.
11
Cal. 2004)(citing Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583
12
(1999)(“Subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own
13
initiative even at the highest level.”). Federal courts have the duty to establish subject
14
matter jurisdiction whether or not the parties raise the issue. See United Investors Life
15
Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (“a district court's
16
duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’
17
arguments”, citing Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S. Ct. 162, 79 L. Ed. 338
18
(1934)). The plaintiff in the case bears the burden of establishing that the court has
19
jurisdiction. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).
20
A party challenging a court’s jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may do so by
21
either a facial attack or a factual attack. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.
22
2000). In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a
23
complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. Safe Air For
24
Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In evaluating a facial attack
25
to jurisdiction, the Court must accept the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint
26
as true. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal.
27
2001). In contrast when a movant raises a factual attack, the court may consider
28
extrinsic evidence presented on the jurisdictional issue. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 3
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1
F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, in evaluating a factual attack the court need
2
not assume the truthfulness of the allegations and may resolve factual disputes, if
3
necessary. See White, 227 F.3d at 1242.
4
Finally, federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist as of the time the action is
5
commenced. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858
6
F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988).
7 8
III.
ARGUMENT
9 10 11 12 13
A. Plaintiff’s Copyright Infringement Claim is Precluded by 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) Because Plaintiff Has Not Obtained Valid Certificates of Registration For Any of the Allegedly Infringed Works Plaintiff’s claim for copyright infringement involves the alleged infringement by
14
Defendant of four songs that Plaintiff claims she composed in June 2003 and in
15
January 2005 entitled: (1) “Remember Me”; (2) “Walking”; (3) “Doesn’t Matter” and
16
(4) “Heaven” (the “Demo Recordings” or “The Musical Compositions”). Complaint ¶
17
8. Plaintiff further alleges that “prior to filing this complaint, Grigorieva submitted
18
each of the Musical Compositions, including the recordings thereof to the United
19
States Copyright Office for registration in her name.” Complaint ¶¶ 8, 27. In the
20
Report on the Filing or Determination of an Action or Appeal Regarding a Copyright
21
filed with the Court on June 3, 2009, Plaintiff describes the status of the four
22
registrations for the works at issue as “pending.” Doc. 3.
23
To state a claim for copyright infringement requires proof of two elements: (1)
24
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of expression protected by that
25
copyright. Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th
26
Cir. 1995). Plaintiff does not state in the Complaint whether Plaintiff sought full
27
“registration” or “preregistration” under 17 U.S.C. § 408(f) of the Musical
28
Compositions with the United States Copyright Office. A search conducted by 4
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1
Defendant’s counsel of the Copyright Office’s public catalog of registrations and
2
preregistrations revealed no records for either registrations or preregistrations in
3
Plaintiff’s name for any of the allegedly infringed Musical Compositions. Rice Decl.
4
¶¶ 2-3; 37 C.F.R. § 202.16(12)(providing that the preregistration record will also be
5
available to the public on the Copyright Office website, http://www.copyright.gov.)
6
Thus, depending on Plaintiff’s type of application, at the time of filing of Plaintiff’s
7
complaint, her applications for full registration or “preregistration” were pending
8
because Plaintiff did not proffer either Certificates of Registrations or Certifications of
9
Preregistration. Further, Defendant has never sought to register the works in his name.
10
Oriti Decl. ¶ 6. Thus, the allegedly infringed works at the time of filing of the
11
complaint were and remain unregistered works.
12
The Copyright Act of 1976 requires certain conditions be fulfilled before an
13
infringement action, such as this one, may be brought. One such prerequisite is
14
copyright registration. Section 411(a) of the Act entitled “Registration and
15
Infringement Actions” states:
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
“no action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration1 or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)(emphasis supplied). 1
The Artists’ Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005 created a preregistration option by which certain classes of works that are susceptible to infringement prior to publication can be preregistered in anticipation of publication. The process of preregistration has its own procedure separate from the full registration process in the Copyright Office. 37 C.F.R. § 202.16. The preregistration is done online only and without deposit material. Preregistration is available for only a very limited class of unpublished works. 17 U.S.C. § 408(f); 37 C.F.R. § 202.16. Plaintiff has not averred that she has sought preregistration for the Musical Compositions under 17 U.S.C. § 408(f). Complaint ¶¶ 8, 27. The Copyright Office conducts a limited examination of applications for preregistration. 37 C.F.R. § 202.16(7). Upon completion of the preregistration process, the Copyright Office provides the claimant official notification by email of the preregistration. 37 C.F.R. § 202.16(10). The email contains information from the application and a preregistration number and date. See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE - PREREGISTRATION, available at http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-prereg.hmtl <last visited on July, 18, 2009>. In addition, once the preregistration process is completed, the preregistration record will also be available to the public on the Copyright Office website, http://www.copyright.gov. 37 C.F.R. § 202.16(12). Preregistration does not constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright or the facts stated in the application. 37 C.F.R. § 202.16(13). A search of the Copyright Office’s public catalog 5
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1
The Act’s standing provision at 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) also provides: “the legal or
2
beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the
3
requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any infringement...” (emphasis
4
supplied).
5
The Central District of California has recognized that a completed registration is
6
a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit for copyright infringement. Loree Rodkin v. Ross-
7
Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056 (C.D. 2004)(finding that “a federal district
8
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a copyright claim if the certificate of
9
registration is yet to be issued.”); See also Joyce v. Renaissance Design, Inc., 2000
10
U.S. Dist LEXIS 17774 * 7, 2000 WL 34335721 * 2 (C.D. Cal. 2000)(dismissing
11
plaintiff’s claim of copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. 411 §(a) because plaintiff’s
12
works were unregistered).
13
Other California District Courts have also held that the jurisdictional
14
prerequisite under Section 411 requires a completed certificate of registration to bring
15
an infringement action. See, e.g., Just Water Heaters, Inc. v. Affordable Water Heaters
16
and Plumbing, Inc., 2006 WL 449136 * 3, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15321 *10 (N.D.
17
Cal. 2006)(granting defendant’s 12(b)(1) motion and finding that “the Act supports the
18
position that registration occurs when the Copyright Office issues a certificate of
19
registration…the Court cannot accept the idea that an applicant can confer a copyright
20
on his work – and thereby invoke the weighty protections of federal law – merely by
21
depositing materials and a fee with the Copyright Office.”); Goodwin v. Best Plan
22
Int’l, 2004 WL 1924147 *1 , 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17823 *3-4 (N.D. Cal.
23
2004)(granting defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
24
because plaintiff did not allege registration of copyrights claimed.); Brush Creek
25
Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15321 * 12, 2002 WL 1906620 * 4
26
(N.D. Cal. 2002)(remanding case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
27 28
revealed no completed preregistrations in any of the Musical Compositions in Plaintiff’s name. Rice Decl. ¶¶2-3.
6
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1
and finding that the “plain language of the statute forecloses copyright suits while a
2
copyright application is pending and before a certificate of registration issues (or is
3
denied.)”); Jefferson Airplane v. Berkeley Systems, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D.
4
Cal. 1994)(finding that “such registration is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit for
5
infringement.”).
6
As the Loree Rodkin court observed, the Ninth Circuit has yet to issue a clear
7
rule on whether the registration requirement of Section 411(a) requires a Certificate of
8
Registration before initiating an infringement suit. Loree Rodkin, 315 F. Supp. at
9
1057. In a case decided in 1998, Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
10
stated: “copyright registration is not a prerequisite to a valid copyright, but it is a
11
prerequisite to a suit based on a copyright.” Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d
12
1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998). In Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., decided in 2007, the
13
court in response to Google’s argument that the court lacked jurisdiction over a
14
preliminary injunction to the extent it enforced unregistered copyrights, the court
15
observed in a footnote that:
16 17 18 19 20 21
Registration is generally a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit for copyright infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 411…Once a court has jurisdiction over an action for copyright infringement under section 411, the court may grant injunctive relief to restrain infringement of any copyright, whether registered or unregistered…Because at least some of the Perfect 10 images at issue were registered, the district court did not err in determining that it could issue an order that covers unregistered works. Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 710, n. 1 (9th Cir. 2007)(emphases supplied).
22
The implication of the Perfect 10 footnote is that a court must first consider whether it
23
has jurisdiction under § 411 for any of the allegedly infringed works by determining
24
whether at least one of the allegedly infringed works is registered. Here, unlike the
25
situation presented in Perfect 10, none of the works allegedly infringed are registered
26
works.
27 28
More recently, the Second Circuit, in Muchnick v. Thompson, Corp., questioned and declined to follow the Perfect 10 reasoning to the extent that it suggested that 7
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1
jurisdiction vested over any infringement claim so long as there was at least one
2
registered work at issue. Muchnick v. Thompson Corp., 509 F.3d 116, 123 (2nd Cir.
3
2007)(vacating class certification and settlement after holding that the district court
4
lacked jurisdiction over copyright infringement claims in unregistered copyrights),
5
cert. granted in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 129 S. Ct. 1523, 77 U.S.L.W.
6
3059 (U.S. Mar. 02, 2009)(NO. 08-103)(limiting petition granted “to the following
7
question: Does 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
8
courts over copyright infringement actions?”).
9
Because none of the four Musical Compositions at issue in this case are
10
registered works, the Court should find that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking and
11
dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Claim for Relief for copyright infringement pursuant to Rule
12
12(b)(1) and 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
13 14 15 16 17
B. Plaintiff’s Claim For a Declaration of Sole Ownership In Each of the Musical Compositions Does Not Arise Under The Federal Copyright Act and Therefore Does Not Vest The Court With Subject Matter Jurisdiction In her Fourth Claim for Relief, Plaintiff moves for declaratory relief under the
18
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that
19
she is a sole owner of “all right, title, and interest in and to” each of the Musical
20
Compositions. Complaint ¶ 37 (a). Plaintiff contends that this Court has subject
21
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and §1338(a), which give a federal court
22
original jurisdiction over any civil action arising under federal copyright law.
23
Complaint ¶ 5. The Ninth Circuit has held that “it is well established that just because
24
a case involves a copyright does not mean that federal subject matter jurisdiction
25
exists.” Scholastic Entertainment v. Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., 336 F. 3d 982, 986
26
(9th Cir. 2003)(citing to Vestron v. Home Box Office Inc.,839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir.
27
1988)).
28 8
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1
Without a valid infringement claim, the Court must determine if Plaintiff’s
2
declaratory relief claim “arises under” the federal Copyright Act. To determine if a
3
claim arises under the federal Copyright Act, the Ninth Circuit has adopted the
4
majority rule set out in T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F. 3d 823 (2nd Cir. 1964).
5
Scholastic, 336 F. 3d at 986.
6
The Harms test states that an action arises under the copyright laws
7
(1) If and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, e.g., a
8 9
suit for infringement or for statutory royalties for record reproduction… or (2) asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act as in DeSylva, or,
10
(3) at the very least and perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive
11
policy of the Act requires that federal principles should control the disposition of
12
the claim.
13
T.B. Harms, F. 3d at 828.
14
If any of these three grounds is satisfied, the federal courts have jurisdiction. Vestron,
15
839 F.2d at 1381.
16
The Harms test is “essentially a reiteration of the ‘well-pleaded complaint’ rule
17
that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of
18
a properly pleaded complaint.” Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 986.
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1. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Valid Claim For Infringement Because the Works Are Unregistered and Do Not Meet the Jurisdictional Prerequisite Under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) At the time of the commencement of Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff did not
24
possess Certificates of Registration for each of the allegedly infringed works and filed
25
the infringement claim based on “pending” copyright applications. Doc. 3. Thus,
26
Plaintiff cannot meet the first part of the Harms test because the works were
27
unregistered at the commencement of the action and therefore the court lacks subject
28
matter jurisdiction to hear her infringement claim under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). Loree 9
Case 2:09-cv-03968-MMM-E Document 8 Filed 07/20/09 Page 15 of 17 Page ID #:62
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Rodkin, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1056; Morongo, 858 F.2d at 1380 (“jurisdiction must exist
2
as of the time the action is commenced”).
3
The Ninth Circuit stated in Vestron:
4 5 6 7 8 9
Where there is a fatal flaw on the face of a complaint that purports to assert an infringement action, the suit should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction....If an action survives this scrutiny and affidavits or other materials reveal the infringement claim to be spurious, then the proper avenue is dismissal for failure to state a claim under federal copyright law. Vestron, 839 F.2d at 1382 (emphasis supplied). Thus, the lack of Certificates of Registration is a “fatal flaw” on the face of
10
Plaintiff’s complaint and Plaintiff’s Third Claim for Relief should be dismissed for
11
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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2. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Claim That Requires Construction of the Act In her Fourth Claim for Relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that “Grigorieva is
15
the sole owner of all right, title, and interest in and to [the, sic] Musical Compositions,
16
including the copyrights and all ancillary rights thereto.” Complaint ¶ 37(a). Further,
17
Plaintiff also seeks a declaration that there was no “written transfer of ownership of
18
copyrights in and to the Musical Compositions” and that “any contribution made by
19
Defendant to the Musical Compositions was de minimus.” Complaint ¶ 37(b)-(c).
20
Plaintiff cannot establish jurisdiction under the second prong of the Harms test
21
because “when…ownership is the sole question for consideration…federal courts [are]
22
without jurisdiction.” Vestron, 839 F.2d at 1382 (citing Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d
23
991, 994 (9th Cir. 1983) ); See also Franklin v. Cannon Films, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 133,
24
134-135 (C.D. Cal. 1987)(dismissing the copyright claim for lack of jurisdiction as not
25
arising under the copyright laws and finding that where “the claim is essentially for a
26
naked declaration of ownership or contractual rights, jurisdiction is most often
27
declined.”); Scholastic, supra, 336 F.3d at 983 (dismissing copyright infringement
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1
claim after finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction because “questions regarding the
2
ownership of copyright are governed by state law.”).
3
Further, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, Plaintiff’s anticipation of
4
Defendant’s defenses to infringement cannot create federal jurisdiction. See
5
Complaint ¶ 37(b)-(c); Lippitt, 340 F.3d at 1040.
6
In his Declaration, Defendant proffers evidence that demonstrates that there was
7
an agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding shared ownership of the
8
Musical Compositions. Oriti Decl. ¶¶ 3-10, Exh.1-2. In January 2009, when
9
Defendant wrote Plaintiff to advise that she could not unilaterally exploit the Musical
10
Compositions without his permission, Plaintiff did not repudiate his claim of rights in
11
the Musical Compositions. Oriti Decl. ¶ 10, Exh. 2. To the contrary, Plaintiff
12
reconfirmed in writing their shared ownership of the Musical Compositions by
13
asserting her reciprocal right to request that he seek her permission for any exploitation
14
of the Musical Compositions. Id. In November 2006, Plaintiff agreed and approved of
15
the preparation of a label to place on a CD entitled “Oksana” containing recordings of
16
the Musical Compositions. Oriti Decl. ¶ 6; Studer Decl. ¶ 4. This label was used on
17
demo CDs subsequently distributed by both Plaintiff and Defendant. Oriti Decl. ¶ 6.
18
The CD label lists the four Musical Compositions and plainly states: “All songs written
19
by Oksana and Sammy Oriti” and “Produced by Sammy Oriti.” Oriti Decl., Exh. 1;
20
Studer Decl., Exh. 1.
21
Review of Plaintiff’s Complaint and Defendant’s Declaration reveals that there
22
is a genuine dispute regarding ownership of the Musical Compositions. Defendant
23
respectfully submits that resolution of the ownership issue will not require construction
24
of the Act, but rather application of state law principles of contract and equitable
25
principles such as estoppel.
26 27
Because the Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief does not “arise under” the Act, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
28 11
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1
C.
2 3
If The Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Claims on Jurisdictional Grounds, The Court Has No Discretion to Hear The State Law Claims
If the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claims on jurisdictional grounds, the
4 5
only claims remaining are Plaintiff’s state law claims for breach of contract,
6
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, common law misappropriation of the right of
7
publicity, violation of right of privacy, constructive trust, an accounting and injunctive
8
relief.
9
The Ninth Circuit has held that if a court dismisses for lack of subject matter
10
jurisdiction, it has no discretion to hear and must dismiss all claims. Herman Family
11
Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805-6 (9th Cir. 2001)(declaring that
12
“supplemental jurisdiction cannot exist without original jurisdiction.”) Dismissal on
13
jurisdictional grounds means that the court was without original jurisdiction and had
14
no authority other than to determine its jurisdiction. Id. See also Hancock Park
15
Homeowners Ass’n Est. 1948 v. Hancock Park Home Owners Ass’n, 2006 WL
16
4532986 (C.D. Cal. 2006)(dismissing plaintiff’s state law claims upon determining that
17
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s federal claim under the
18
Lanham Act.).
19 20 21
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant prays that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
22 23
DATED July 20, 2009
Respectfully submitted,
24
By: /s/ Michelle L. Rice
25
MICHELLE L. RICE ROBERT B. KORY LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT B. KORY Attorneys for Defendant SAMMY ORITI
26 27 28
12