Messages in the Media, April 2015

Messages in the

Media A Review of EU Member State Relations as Depicted in National Media in 2015

The European Studies Students’ Association

Messages in the Media A Review of EU Member State Relations as Depicted in National Media in 2015

April 2016

Messages in the Media features twenty country-specific reports that examine the relationships that different European countries have with the EU. By analyzing the major themes discussed in the national media in 2015 in both EU and non-EU member states, these reports aim to provide valuable insights into the challenges facing each country today, and the way that these domestic perspectives inform dialogue at the supranational level.

1

Acknowledgements

The publication of this journal would not have been possible without the generous contribution and support from the Arts and Science Student Union (ASSU) and the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs. We are particularly grateful to Georgina SteinskySchwartz for her contribution not only this year, but in the past number of years as well. Furthermore, our gratitude goes out to our incredible team of analysts and editors. We thank you for your time, your hard work, and your dedication.

Lastly, thank you to Professor Robert Austin and Laurie Drake for your guidance.

- Sonia Liang, Emma de Leeuw, and Maria Alexiou Messages in the Media co-Editors-in-Chief

Please do not reproduce any parts of this book without permission from the respective authors.

Printed by Sunview Press Limited, Toronto, Canada Published in April 2016

2

Table of Contents Masthead 5 Letter from the Editors 6 Glossary 8 France 9 Mathieu Sitaya Belgium 20 HÊlène Emorine Germany 31 Alexander Meile Netherlands 45 Emma de Leeuw Italy 61 Tea Cimini United Kingdom 73 Friederike Wilke Ireland 81 Karen Power Greece 93 Athanasios Kipouros, Iason Rodopoulos, and Angelica Dimoulias 3

Table of Contents

Spain 109 Jorge Quesada Davies Portugal 122 Natasha Rodrigues Sweden 132 Sonia Liang Czech Republic 144 Taylor Forsyth Bulgaria 151 Tzvetozar Iolov Romania 161 Flavian Berneagă Croatia 175 Nicole Belošević Serbia 183 Luka Pavicic Albania 192 Christine Siomou Turkey 200 Mertol Özaltan Armenia 209 Mariam Baghdasaryan Russia 216 Anna Morosovska 4

Masthead Co-Editors-in-Chief

Analysts

Sonia Liang

Mariam Baghdasaryan

Emma de Leeuw

Nicole Belošević

Maria Alexiou

Flavian Berneaga Tea Cimini

Design Editor

Jorge Quesada Davies

Adriana Workewych

Angelica Dimoulias Hélène Emorine Taylor Forsyth

Copy Editors

Tzvetozar Iolov

Serena Coco

Athanasios Kipouros

Giancarlo Mignardi Massimo Tini

Emma de Leeuw

Elise Wagner

Sonia Liang Alexander Meile

Infographics

Anna Morosovska

Designed by Sonia Liang

Mertol Özaltan Luka Pavicic

Powered by

Karen Power

Cover Design

Iason Rodopoulos

Adriana Workewych

Natasha Rodrigues Christine Siomou

Advisory Board

Mathieu Sitaya

Robert Austin, PhD

Friederike Wilke

Lauri Drake, PhD student © The European Studies Students’ Association 5

Letter From the Editors This is the fourth year of publication for Messages in the Media, the European Studies Students’ Association (ESSA) Journal. Each year, the journal provides up-to-date and reliable reports on the way major political, economic and social events that affect relations with the European Union were portrayed in national media coverage. As the senior editors, we strove to make the journal as comprehensive as possible, tailoring reports to give a concise and accurate snapshot of the issues at hand, while preserving the intent of each author. As the reports aim to provide clear insights into the public and media’s perception of the EU within each country covered, a clear methodology guided their production.

Each analyst was required to select media sources that provide free access to all areas of their website; whose circulation numbers indicate that they are widelyread; and that report on issues affecting the EU. 2015 was a year of multiple crises for Europe. Major events reminded the EU of its vulnerability and raised concerns about the EU’s future. Primary among them was the refugee crisis, which was mentioned in nearly all reports and prompted discussions on the future of open borders. The journal provides a snapshot of the contrasting experiences that different member states had in welcoming refugees (or, in many cases, turning them back), the difficult balancing act between humanitarian concerns and economic and cultural concerns, and the impact the crisis has had on the viability of collective decisionmaking. In the journal, the crisis is referred to both as the refugee crisis and the migrant crisis, depending on which term is predominantly used in each country’s media sources.

Questions of national security were also at the forefront of the agenda in 2015. Russia’s aggressive actions on the EU’s eastern flanks — primarily in Ukraine, but also with regards to military exercises in the Arctic and Baltic, threats to energy security in Central and Eastern Europe, and pecuniary support for anti-establishment Eurosceptic parties — led to an increasingly adversarial relationship with the EU. Together with the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January and the attacks on the Stade de France and the Bataclan in Paris in November, these events have intensified discussions on national security, border control, and terrorism. Furthermore, with significant gains made by extreme right-wing and left-wing parties across the continent, largely as a reaction to the refugee crisis and economic turmoil, political discourse has in many countries become increasingly polarized and inflamed with ethno-nationalist rhetoric.

The EU faces many challenges today that have put considerable strain on relations between member states and the EU. While our analysis of 2015’s media coverage reveals growing disillusionment with the European project, both among the public and among political parties, it also stresses the importance of collective decision-making. Today’s challenges are not peculiar to Germany, or Sweden, or Great Britain, or Croatia alone, but impact every EU member and 6

Letter from the Editors thus demand a united European response. 2015 has tested the resilience of the EU as problems arose regarding the Union’s economic and political viability, its ability to control its borders, and the extent to which it is able to represent the diverse and often conflicting viewpoints of its 28 member states and 500 million inhabitants. Ultimately, we hope that this year’s Messages in the Media will provide an informative and thought-provoking look at key developments across Europe, and at how different events are understood by EU member states and its neighbours.

Sincerely, Sonia Liang, Emma De Leeuw and Maria Alexiou Messages in the Media Editors-in-Chief 2015

7

Glossary of Terms AA Association Agreement Benelux Economic Union of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands CAP Common Agriculture Policy CCCTB Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base CEE Central and Eastern Europe COP21 21st Conference of Parties EC European Commission ECB European Central Bank ECJ European Court of Justice EEU Eurasian Economic Union ELA Emergency Liquidity Assistance EMS European Monetary System EP European Parliament EU European Union EUR Euro Europol European Police Office Eurostat The statistical office of the EU Frontex European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the

External Borders of the Member States of the European Union FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia G7 Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA) GDP Gross domestic product IJC International Court of Justice ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria IMF International Monetary Fund MCV Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification MEP Member of the European Parliament MG Minsk Group NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OLAF European Anti-Fraud Office OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Pegida Patriotic Europeans against an Islamisation of the Occident PNR Passenger Name Record SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement SAC Stabilization and Association Council TAP Trans Adriatic Pipeline TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership UN United Nations UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNHCR United Nations Human Rights Council

8

FRANCE

By Mathieu Sitaya

Le Figaro: Founded in 1828. Owned by Dassault Group. Daily circulation of 336,939.

Le Monde: Founded in 1944. Owned by Pierre BergĂŠ, Xavier Niel, and Mathieu Pigasse. Daily circulation of 340,131.

Le Parisien: Founded in 1944. Owned by Amaury Group. Daily circulation of 222,415.

Figures are for 2014. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

9 4

Messages in the Media The 3 most heavily reported-on issues concerning France-EU relations in 2015 were: France’s response to the refugee and migrant crisis; France’s anti-terrorism efforts and support for increased EU security; and France’s role in European diplomatic efforts with Russia, concerning Ukraine.

France’s Response to the Refugee and Migrant Crisis

In 2015, France witnessed a series of dramatic social events. On January 7, terrorists attacked the office of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo. Two days later, there was a standoff between police and an armed gunman in a Paris supermarket. Just a few days before these unprecedented attacks, refugees were involved in large-scale clashes resulting in numerous injuries at a migrant camp in the northern city of Calais.1 Overall, not only did events such as these spur the growing debate surrounding the handling of asylum seekers in France, but they also had far-reaching security implications for the entire continent.

During this time, Le Figaro reported that, in 2014, 230 French human smuggling groups were discovered and dismantled.2 However, despite the apparent success these numbers indicate, France, along with many of its European neighbours, has continued to receive an ever increasing stream of asylum seekers arriving via its Mediterranean shores from Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, and Eritrea.3 According to Frontex, the European agency responsible for border services, a major launching point for migrant boats is the Libyan coast, as much of the migrant influx can be attributed to the failed Libyan state.4 As a result of growing pressure from Italy, Malta, and Greece, the European Commission proposed a quota system to distribute migrants across all 28 EU members.5,6 The French government pledged its support for distributing the migrant influx in such a manner.7 Indeed, this was the focal point of a May 19 meeting between French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin.8 Here, France insisted that any future system take into account the number of asylum seekers that have already been given refuge.9

In June, Le Parisien cited a report by the United Nations Refugee Agency that put the number of Syrians requesting asylum in Europe between 2011 and 2015 at 254,000.10 The countries who have accommodated the highest number of asylum seekers are Germany, with nearly 29 per cent, and Sweden, with 23 per cent, compared to France’s paltry 2.3 per cent.11 Generally speaking, France is not as attractive to asylum seekers for several reasons, including: a challenging application process, a relatively poor economic outlook, and a lack of local Syrian support networks.12 Nonetheless, Paris has maintained its support for accommodating more asylum seekers. For example, in September, Francois Hollande announced his country’s commitment to accept an additional 24,000 refugees over the next two years.13 Furthermore, on 7 September 2015, French Interior Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, announced that France would immediately accept 1,000 Syrian, Iraqi and Eritrean asylum seekers in order to relieve the burden Germany has faced with a sudden surge in asylum seekers there.14 However, France wants a system of waiting-zone facilities in Italy and Greece to distinguish refugees from irregular 10

France - Mathieu Sitaya migrants.15 Overall, EU Head of Foreign Affairs and Security, Federica Mogherini, applauded the French decision and called for other EU members to “react with the same courage” in the face of the migrant crisis.16 In September, Le Figaro reported that in the midst of an unprecedented number of asylum seekers, Germany and France have begun effectuating a common position which calls for the establishment of processing centres in migrant “hotspots” such as Italy and Greece.17 At the end of September, the Turkish government refused EU requests for migrant processing centres in Turkey.18 Turkey later declared that such facilities could be established in return for the relaxation of visa requirements for Turkish citizens entering the EU, to which Francois Hollande responded that the EU should tread cautiously and establish “clear rules” with Turkey regarding possible visa liberalization.19 Mounting domestic pressure has forced EU governments to react, yet, without a general European consensus on the migrant issue, a cohesive policy seems far off at this point. A consensus would not only improve the EU’s ability to instill a sense of security, but also help to reaffirm its future viability, even during times of crisis.

French Efforts Against Terrorism and Increased EU Security

As mentioned above, on January 7 and 9, Paris fell victim to horrific terrorist attacks committed by assailants loyal to ISIS and Al-Qaeda. In one of the incidents, two gunmen, brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, opened fire at the offices of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, killing twelve people.20 In another, Amedy Coulibaly took a kosher supermarket hostage and killed 4 people.21 Following the Paris attacks, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, informed Hollande that meetings scheduled for February 12 between EU heads of state would focus on the fight against terrorism.22 In January, Le Monde reported that Frontex’s new director from France, Fabrice Leggeri, was intent on bolstering Frontex’s patrolling abilities and would seek further logistical support from all 28 EU nations as part of his mandate.23 Frontex’s main objective is to monitor entrants into the EU as opposed to engaging in rescue operations at sea.24 The transparency of Frontex’s Mediterranean monitoring operations, however, has been called into question given the organization’s ability to enter into agreements with foreign governments without any domestic oversight.25 Furthermore, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees suggests that Frontex’s rigid treatment of migrant boats in the Mediterranean can do a lot to discourage would be migrants from seeking asylum in Europe, actions that are in violation of international law.26 In a meeting of EU foreign ministers on January 19, French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, called for the creation of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) initiative, granting EU members the ability to compile and share lists of airline passenger information in order to intercept passengers before they enter the EU.27 Fabius implored the EU Parliament to pass the bill immediately.28 In March, at the European Summit in Brussels, French Prime Minister Emanuel Valls called on his European counterparts to assume a greater role in ensuring 11

Messages in the Media the security of the EU in the face of terrorist threats.29 Valls also suggested that the responsibility of European security was unevenly distributed amongst EU members and that France would not continue to go at it alone.30 His comments came on the heels of statements by European Commission President, JeanClaude Juncker, who suggested the establishment of a common European army to tackle current and future threats.31 On November 13, Paris once again fell victim to coordinated terrorist attacks, executed simultaneously at several spots across Paris: at a football match between France and Germany at the Stade de France, inside the Bataclan live music club, and at several restaurants nearby.32 In a show of solidarity, EU representatives called for a moment of silence the following Monday at noon Paris local time.33 An unnamed EU official was quoted as saying that, “we Europeans will all remember November 13 as a European day of mourning… and that we stand united with the French people and the government of France.”34 On November 20, an emergency meeting of EU interior ministers decided to implement tighter border controls along the EU’s external borders.35 This announcement is seen as a victory for the French government, which has been the most active proponent of the measure.36 Furthermore, all 28 EU member states reiterated a commitment to accelerate the adoption of the PNR bill.37 For the last several years, the European Parliament has staunchly opposed the PNR bill citing concerns over potential rights and privacy violations.38 During a meeting in Brussels in December, EU interior ministers finalized the adoption of the PNR system.39 While the PNR system will provide state security apparatus with immediate benefits, the risk posed to citizen’s “sensitive personal data” remains a contentious issue. Personal information from credit card details, to special meal selections, to medical service requests will all be included, and making this type of private information available may violate European law.

France’s Role in European Diplomatic Efforts with Russia

At the beginning of January, President Hollande announced plans to hold meetings in Astana, Kazakhstan on January 15 with Chancellor Merkel, President Putin, and President Poroshenko, in an effort to diffuse tensions between Ukraine and Russia.40 Hollande also suggested that Russia was a potentially useful partner in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear infrastructure and in the fight against ISIS.41 The summit was cancelled days before it was scheduled to start due to disagreements over procedural details.42 According to a French diplomat, the most prominent sticking point was the demarcation of boundaries.43 On January 20, French Foreign Minister Fabius, and his German counterpart Steinmeier expressed resolve to organize a fresh round of talks with their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts before EU members voted in March on the extension of the first round of sanctions.44 A new set of talks was scheduled for January 21 in Berlin, purportedly in order to, “prevent further military confrontation and to de-escalate political tensions between Kiev and Moscow.”45

In early February, despite the outbreak of fresh hostilities in eastern 12

France - Mathieu Sitaya Ukraine, French Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian reiterated that France was seeking a political solution instead of providing weapons to the Ukrainian armed forces.46 Le Drian also said his country would pursue further sanctions if the situation worsened.47 During his 5th presidential press conference on February 5, Hollande reaffirmed his country’s commitment to a peaceful solution, and referred to his and Chancellor Merkel’s efforts during the past year.48 He also announced that he and Chancellor Merkel would visit Kiev and Moscow to propose a new plan of action designed to ensure Ukraine’s territorial integrity.49 According to Hollande, France was not at war in Ukraine, had no desire to become involved, and was not considering supplying arms.50 In an attempt to reassure Moscow, the French President also declared that Russia was a friend of France and that his country was against the idea of Ukraine’s NATO membership.51 On February 11, President Hollande, Chancellor Merkel, President Putin, and President Poroshenko met in Minsk, to sketch a solution to the Ukrainian crisis.52 The resulting agreement called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons.53 In October, French, German, Russian and Ukrainian leaders convened in Paris to discuss the consolidation of peace in Ukraine and the potential for removing sanctions against Russia.54 However, finalizing the peace process would not happen by December 31 — the date chosen in Minsk.55 In December, Merkel, Hollande, Putin and Poroshenko reaffirmed their commitment for a total ceasefire.56 Since the agreement, the level of conflict has been greatly reduced with only 5 deaths reported, however, there remains an obvious fragility to the Minsk peace process.57 2015 In Review

The year 2015 was and will remain infamous in French history and, as such, French news outlets were given plenty to report on throughout 2015. In a very ominous fashion, the year began with the shocking events of Charlie Hebdo and Hypermarche, which set the tone for what is to be considered one of the most tragic years in French headlines. Set against the backdrop of the ongoing migrant crisis and a precarious diplomatic dance involving Russia and Ukraine, France fell victim to not one, but two horrific attacks that significantly altered the French and European social and political landscapes.

The attacks of January and November in Paris not only raised serious questions concerning the threat of terrorism within France, but also called into question the country’s policies concerning asylum seekers. While in France and the rest of Europe, the migrant issue was already highly divisive, the attacks in Paris severely skewed the optics through which Europeans view the arrival of asylum seekers into their countries. As word spread that several of the attackers in the November attacks entered Europe only a few weeks prior using fraudulent Syrian passports, concerns regarding the ineffectiveness of the EU at properly filtering out terrorists began to spread from France outwards. This fear not only forced EU policymakers to question existing policies concerning the accommodation of asylum seekers, but also to examine their foreign policies in 13

Messages in the Media zones of conflict.

Perhaps the most pertinent fear that came from the attacks in Paris was that the whole of Europe is just as vulnerable to attacks as France. The newly minted landscape of fear and uncertainty has prompted EU policymakers into action, calling for an increase in resources devoted to patrolling Europe’s borders.

With France spearheading the proposed Passenger Name Record program, terrorist threats within Europe will undoubtedly accelerate the adoption of such measures, as the rest of Europe looks to avoid becoming the next victim of terrorism.

Regarding the Ukrainian crisis, throughout 2015 France—along with Germany—worked tirelessly at bringing a peaceful solution to the ongoing crisis. While the diplomatic efforts of both countries have not been without certain stumbling blocks, the process of peaceful negotiations has more or less maintained a positive course. Despite having placed sanctions on a number of Russian individuals and businesses, France has worked hard not to alienate Russia completely. It maintained a clear channel of dialogue and remained staunchly committed to finding a diplomatic solution to the Ukrainian impasse.

Although France and Germany successfully engineered a ceasefire that was officially negotiated in Minsk, both protagonists have struggled to uphold the agreement in its entirety.

It is safe to say that all three topics are either directly or indirectly connected and have therefore occupied vast portions of the French news media landscape. European security, both internally and abroad, is being called into question as has been demonstrated by the French push for the Passenger Name Record system. In the context of the refugee and migrant crisis, France is a useful example of the limits of the EU’s open-door approach. An open door policy without a supporting integration or assimilation policy, that would ensure the transition of newcomers into European society, is bound to fail and will only widen the gulf that already separates member states. After the attacks of 2015, the French government realized that its security apparatus had to adapt to an advancing enemy. However, what remains to be seen is whether or not states can do so in a transparent and legal manner. The Ukrainian situation remains fragile, and France, along with its European partners, must continue their tireless work towards achieving a lasting solution, or run the risk of watching Ukraine drift off into oblivion.

“Plusieurs blessés dans une rixe entre 200 migrants à Calais.” Le Monde, 03 Jan 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/03/ plusieurs-blesses-dans-une-rixe-entre-200-migrants-a-calais_4548845_3224. html?xtmc=migrants&xtcr=1931 2 Cornevin, Christophe. “Immigration clandestine: la France sous pression.”

Le Figaro, 02 Jan 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/ politique/2015/01/01/01002-20150101ARTFIG00 132-immigration-clandestine1

14

France - Mathieu Sitaya la-france-sous-pression.php 3 “Le nombre d’immigrés entrés clandestinement dans l’UE a presque triplé en un an.” Le Monde, 04 Mar 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/ societe/article/2015/03/04/le-nombre-d-immigres-entres-clandestinement-dansl-ue-a-presque-triple-en-un-an_4587296_3224.html?xtmc=migrants&xtcr=1842 4 Ibid.

5 Mevel, Jean-jacques. “Migrants : Juncker veut imposer des quotas.”

Le Figaro, 10 May 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/ international/2015/05/10/01003-20150510ARTFIG00017-migrants-junckerveut-imposer-des-quotas.php?redirect_premium 6 Ibid.

7 “UE/Migrants: la France soutient les quotas.” Le Figaro, 11 May 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/05/11/9700120150511FILWWW00057-uemigrants-la-france-soutient-les-quotas.php 8 Lemaître, Frédéric. “Hollande et Merkel divergent sur la répartition des réfugiés en Europe.” Le Monde, 19 May 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde. fr/europe/article/2015/05/19 /pour-francois-hollande-il-n-est-pas-question-quil-y-ait-des-quotas-de-refugies-en-europe_4636 365_3214.html?xtmc=ukraine_ france&xtcr=185 9 “Valls opposé aux quotas migratoires dans l’Union européenne.” Le Monde, 16 May 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/ article/2015/05/16/valls-s-oppose-a-l-instauration-de-quotas-migratoires-dans-lunion-europeenne_4634750_3214.html 10 Lombart, Gaël. “INTERACTIF. Syrie : 4 millions de réfugiés, 250 000 ont demandé l’asile en Europe.” Le Parisien, 15 June 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.leparisien.fr/international/ interactif-syrie-4-millions-de-refugies250-000-ont-demande-asile-en-europe-15-06-2015-486338 7.php 11 Ibid 12 Maligorne, Clémentine. “Pourquoi la France ne fait pas rêver les réfugiés.”

Le Figaro, 23 Sep 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualitefrance/2015/09/23/01016-20150923ART FIG00016-pourquoi-la-france-ne-faitpas-rever-les-refugies.php 13 Maligorne, Clémentine. “La France va accueillir 24.000 réfugiés en deux ans et un millier en urgence.” Le Figaro, 07 Sep 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www. lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/09/07/01016-20150907ARTFIG00287-accueildes-refugies-cazeneuve-nomme-un-coordinateur-national.php 14 Ibid.

15 Cornevin, Christophe. “Migrants : la France, solidaire de l’Allemagne, prête à partager l’effort mais sous conditions.” Le Figaro, 26 Aug 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/ international/2015/08/26/0100320150826ARTFIG00331-la-france-solidaire-de-l-allemagne-prete-a-partager-leffort-mais-sous-conditions.php 15

Messages in the Media “Réfugiés: Mogherini (UE) félicite la France.” Le Figaro, 07 Sep 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/09/07/9700120150907FILWWW00342-refugies-mogherini-ue-felicite-la-france.php 17 Leclerc, Jean-Marc. “Crise des migrants : la France attend des mesures concretes.” Le Figaro, 11 Sep 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/ actualite-france/2015/09/11/01016-20150911ARTFIG00270-crise-des-migrantsla-france-attend-des-mesures-concretes.php 18 “Réfugiés:la Turquie contre des centres d’accueil.” Le Figaro, 28 Sep 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/09/28/9700120150928FILWWW00124-refugiesla-turquie-contre-des-centres-d-accueil.php 19 “Migrants: Hollande veut «des règles claires».” Le Figaro, 15 Oct 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/10/15/9700120151015FILWWW00194-migrants-hollande-veut-des-regles-claires.php 20 “Comment s’est déroulée l’attaque contre « Charlie Hebdo ».” Le Monde, 07 Jan 2015, accessed 11 Jan 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/attaque-contre-charliehebdo/article/2015/01/07/comment-s-est-deroulee-l-attaque-contre-charliehebdo_4550930_4550668.html?xtmc=refugiee&xtcr=73 21 Johannès, Franck. “A 17 heures, vendredi, les trois preneurs d’otages sont tués.”

Le Monde, 10 Jan 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/policejustice/article/2015/01/10/a-17-heures-vendredi-les-trois-preneurs-d-otagessont-tues_4553226_1653578.html 22 “Prochain sommet européen consacré à la lutte anti-terroriste.” Le Figaro, 09 Jan 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flashactu/2015/01/09/97001-20150109FILWWW00049-prochain-sommet-europeenconsacre-a-la-lutte-anti-terroriste.php 23 Baumard, Maryline. “Surveiller les entrées ou sauver les migrants, le dilemme de Frontex.” Le Monde, 16 Jan 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde. fr/europe/article/2015/01/16 /surveiller-les-entrees-ou-sauver-les-migrants-ledilemme-de-frontex_4557896_3214.html?xtmc =migrants&xtcr=1905 24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 “Lutte contre le terrorisme : la coopération européenne en marche.”

Le Parisien, 19 Jan 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.leparisien.fr/ international/lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-la-cooperation-europeenne-enmarche-19-01-2015-4460087.php 28 Ibid.

29 Mevel, Jean-Jacques. “Valls : face au terrorisme, «l’armée européenne existe, c’est la France»,” Le Figaro, 19 Mar 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www. lefigaro.fr/international/2015/03/19/0 1003-20150319AR TFIG00113-valls-faceau-terrorisme-l-armee-europeenne-existe-c-est-la-france.php 30 Ibid.

16

16

France - Mathieu Sitaya Ibid.

“Au moins 35 morts dans les fusillades à Paris.” Le Figaro, 13 Nov 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/11/13/9700120151113FILWWW00420-au-moins-18-morts-dans-les-fusillades-a-paris.php 33 “Attaques à Paris : l’UE appelle à observer une minute de silence lundi.”

Le Parisien, 14 Nov 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.leparisien.fr/ faits-divers/attaques-a-paris-l-ue-appelle-a-observer-une-minute-de-silencelundi-14-11-2015-5277191.php 34 Ibid.

35 “L’UE renforce les contrôles aux frontières extérieures et révise Schengen.”

Le Parisien, 20 Nov 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.leparisien.fr/ international/l-union-europeenne-va-renforcer-les-controles-a-ses-frontieresexterieures-20-11-2015-5296371.php 36 Majerczak, Julie. “L’Europe ne veut plus être une passoire.” Le Parisien, 21 Nov 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://atelier.leparisien.fr/sites/attentats-novembre2015-paris/2015/11/21/leurope-ne-veut-plus-etre-une-passoire/ 37 “L’UE renforce les contrôles aux frontières extérieures et révise Schengen.”

Le Parisien, 20 Nov 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.leparisien.fr/ international/l-union-europeenne-va-renforcer-les-controles-a-ses-frontieresexterieures-20-11-2015-5296371.php 38 Pelloli, Matthieu. “Vers un fichier commun des passagers d’avion.” Le Parisien, 21 Nov 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://atelier.leparisien.fr/sites/attentatsnovembre-2015-paris/2015/11/21/vers-un-fichier-commun-des-passagersdavion/ 39 “Les pays de l’UE d’accord pour partager les dossiers des passagers aériens.” Le Parisien, 04 Dec 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.leparisien.fr/attentatsterroristes-paris/les-pays-de-l-ue-d-accord-pour-partager-les-dossiers-despassagers-aeriens-04-12-2015-5340115.php 40 “François Hollande : « Poutine ne veut pas annexer l’Est de l’Ukraine, il me l’a dit ».” Le Monde, 05 Jan 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www. lemonde.fr/international/article/2015 /01/05/ francois-hollande-poutinene-veut-pas-annexer-l-est-de-l-ukraine-il-me-l-a-dit_4549259_ 3210. html?xtmc=ukraine&xtcr=969 41 Ibid.

42 Vitkine, Benoît. “La diplomatie piétine dans le dossier ukrainien.”

Le Monde, 13 Jan 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde. fr/europe/article/2015/01/13/la-diplomatie-pietine-dans-le-dossierukrainien_4555112_3214.html?xtmc=sanctions&xtcr=1675 43 Ibid.

44 Stroobants, Jean-Pierre. “Les Vingt-Huit restent divisés sur la Russie.” Le Monde, 20 Jan 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/ article/2015/01/20/les-vingt-huit-restent-divises-sur-la-russie_4559647_3214.

31 32

17

Messages in the Media html?xtmc=ukraine&xtcr=937 45 “Ukraine : Allemands, Français, Russes et Ukrainiens se réunissent mercredi à Berlin.” Le Monde, 20 Jan 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/ europe/article/2015/01/20/ukraine-allemands-francais-russes-et-ukrainiens-sereunissent-mercredi-a-berlin_4559928_3214.html?xtmc=ukraine&xtcr=935 46 «La France ne livrera pas « d’armes létales » à l’Ukraine pour l’instant.” Le Monde, 04 Feb 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/ article/2015/02/04/la-france-ne-livrera-pas-d-armes-letales-a-l-ukraine-pour-linstant_4569675_3214.html?xtmc=ukraine_france&xtcr=348 47 Ibid.

48 “Terrorisme, laïcité, Ukraine : ce qu’il faut retenir de la conférence de Hollande.” Le Monde, 05 Feb 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/ politique/article/2015/02/05/hollande-annonce-une-initiative-franco-allemandesur-l-ukraine_4570054_ 823448.html?xtmc=ukraine_ france&xtcr=344 49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Riols, Yves-Michel, “Initiative franco-allemande de la dernière chance pour sortir du conflit en Ukraine.” Le Monde, 05 Feb 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article /2015/02/05/initiative-franco-allemandede-la-derniere-chance-pour-sortir-du-conflit-en-ukraine_4570845_3214. html?xtmc=ukraine_france&xtcr=343 52 “Ukraine : un nouveau sommet mercredi, pour tenter d’obtenir la paix.” Le Monde, 08 Feb 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/ article/2015/02/08/ukraine-un-sommet-quadripartite-prevu-mercredi-aminsk_4572181_3214.html?xtmc=ukraine_france&xtcr=302 53 “Un compromis qui marque le retour du couple franco-allemand.” Le Monde, 16 Feb 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/ article/2015/02/16/un-compromis-qui-marque-le-retour-du-couple-francoallemand_4577386_3232.html?xtmc=ukraine_france&xtcr=306 54 “Négociations de paix sur l’Ukraine à Paris.” Le Figaro, 02 Oct 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/10/02/9700120151002FILWWW00011-negociations-de-paix-sur-l-ukraine-a-paris.php 55 “Ukraine: processus de paix pas achevé avant 2016 (Hollande).” Le Figaro, 02 Oct 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flashactu/2015/10/02/97001-20151002FILWWW00342-ukraine-processus-de-paixpas-acheve-avant-2016-hollande.php 56 “Ukraine: Merkel, Hollande, Poutine et Porochenko se prononcent pour <<un cessez-le-feu>>.” Le Figaro, 30 Dec 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www. lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/12/30/97001-20151230FILWWW00090-ukrainemerkel-hollande-poutine-et-porochenko-se-prononcent-pour-un-cessez-le-feu. php 57 “Ukraine : nouvelle trêve avec les rebelles.” Le Figaro, 13 Jan 2016, 18

France - Mathieu Sitaya accessed 6 Mar 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/01/13/9700120160113FILWWW00294-ukraine-nouvelle-treve-avec-les-rebelles.php

19

BELGIUM

By Hélène Emorine

L’Avenir. Founded in 1918. Owned by Corelio. Daily circulation of 94,118.

Le Vif/L’Express. Founded in 1983. Owned by Roularta Media Group. Daily circulation of 95,000.

Le Soir. Founded in 1887. Owned by Rossel et Cie. Daily circulation of 115,853.

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

20 4

Belgium - Hélène Emorine From these findings, the following three major topics stand out as the leading issues related to Belgium-EU relations: right-wing reactions to the migrant crisis, the issue of radicalized youth, and the debate on the future of the EU. Right-Wing Reactions to the Migrant and Refugee Crisis Since the start of the migrant crisis, more than 30,000 migrants have travelled to Belgium fleeing war and persecution.1 This has led to a significant rise in the strength of radical right-wing parties.2 In the local elections of 2015, extreme right-wing parties received nine percent of the vote in Charleroi, the largest city in the Francophone region of Wallonia.3 Additionally, reactionary and inflammatory discourse has become more commonplace.4 Bart De Wever, the president of the federal New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) party, said that only one refugee out of ten has the skills necessary to contribute to the labour market.5 His pro-Flemish independence party is part of the federal coalition government. The N-VA has advocated for the elimination of family allowances for refugees, the return of refugees to their home country, the closure of Schengen Area borders, and most egregiously, to give migrants a ‘special status’ that would, among other things, force them to wear badges that identify them as migrants.6,7 In direct breach of the Geneva Conventions, these policies would also restrict migrants’ social rights and living options.8 With many parties arguing about the entrenched cultural differences between recently arrived migrants and the host society, Minister for Immigration Theo Francken has proposed to make ‘respect for women’ classes compulsory for all refugees and migrants.9 This proposal has been met with mixed reactions, with for example Parti Socialiste MP Isabelle Simonis denouncing the policy as “thinly veiled racism.”10 The Belgian government has also passed legislation limiting refugees’ right of residence from unlimited asylum to five years. Only after five years would the right of residence become unlimited, unless a refugee claimant committed a grave crime such as a war crime, crime against humanity, or was considered a threat to national security during the initial five years.

Furthermore, a refugee could be denied residence if they were no longer in danger of persecution in their home country or were given the right of residence on the basis of false declarations. To justify this law, Francken stated that many other European countries have implemented similar measures.11 Francken’s announcement of Operation Gaudi (a contraction of Gauwdief, which means ‘thief ’ in Dutch), an initiative targeting small crimes committed by illegal immigrants, was met with protests by organizations arguing that the operation could lead to the public equating migrants with thieves. Civil society groups stated that the measure was purely an effort to appeal to the members of Vlaams Belang, a right-wing populist and Flemish nationalist political party.12 In an attempt to further restrict immigration and refugee policy, in 2015 the Belgian government sent back thirty migrants by force to Hungary.

Many human rights associations have judged the process to be worrisome and even illegal, since many migrants are vulnerable to violence in Hungary.13 The 21

Messages in the Media Francophone opposition has qualified Francken’s policies as repressive and cynical, while the N-VA has argued that Francken’s policies are not radical and only serve to protect Belgian citizens.14 Francken himself has responded to allegations of radicalism by stating that the N-VA is not an extreme right-wing party, but simply a center right party concerned about migration and security.15 The Belgian Foreign Minister, Didier Reynders, has criticized the EU for lacking a coordinated approach to the migrant crisis.16 Francken emphasized the need for a common European policy to deal with the migrant crisis, including targeting ships transporting migrants illegally and establishing European-wide quotas in order to relieve some of the pressure on Belgium.17 In September, Belgium agreed to a quota of 3,812 refugees from Greece and Italy, letting in 5,814 in total over the course of the next two years.18 The EU promised the installation of hotspots on the borders of Greece and Italy to direct migrants to European countries during the summer of 2015. However, according to Francken, by December, only 1 of 5 the promised hotspots in Greece had been set up, and only 1 of the 6 scheduled hotspots in Italy were operational.

Additionally, the hotspots were not equipped to host migrants while they were waiting to be relocated elsewhere in Europe. Furthermore, without operational hotspots, migrants lack appropriate identification, making them more susceptible to illegal networks.

By December, only 0.1% of migrants of the migrants entering the EU had used the hotspots to be transferred to another European country.19 During a joint European-Turkish meeting in December 2015, German chancellor Angela Merkel proposed that the EU directly relocate migrants arriving in Turkey to different European countries. While this proposal was supported by the European Commission, Belgium opposed it arguing that it was too late to deal with the relocation of migrants from Turkey and should focus on relocating migrants from Greece and Italy, which has been extremely lengthy due to the slow installations of the hotspots.20 To combat the large numbers of arriving migrants, Belgium participated in the European operation against the smuggling of migrants in the Mediterranean.21 Radicalized Youth As a result of the discovery that three perpetrators of the November 13 Paris terrorist attacks were Belgian citizens and had travelled through Belgium to Paris, radicalisation became a major issue in Belgian media.22 Salah and Brahim Abdeslam, together with Abdelhamid Abaaoud — the alleged leader behind the Paris attacks — were all born and raised in Sint-Jans Molenbeek, a municipality situated close to the center of Brussels.23 Commonly known as Molenbeek, it has been home to mostly Moroccan immigrants since the 1960s. The area is characterized by high poverty, a 40 percent unemployment rate, rampant crime, and radicalisation.24 Much of the news coverage commented on how this process of radicalization, both for the three perpetrators and for other disillusioned second and third-generation migrants, has gone unnoticed. Furthermore, the 22

Belgium - Hélène Emorine terrorist attacks have fostered an increasing sense of hostility towards Islam and immigration in Belgium.25 Following the attacks, Belgium has been described as being at the crossroads of international terrorism.26 Some of the perpetrators of the Paris attacks, including Abaaoud, travelled freely multiple times between Europe and Syria, even while some of them were under surveillance. Considering the ability of Abaaoud and his co-conspirators to travel freely within the EU in the months preceding the attacks, the N-VA has increasingly voiced concern about the EU’s policy of open borders,27 going so far as to qualify it as a failure of the European project.28 Furthermore, the fact that two of the perpetrators were able to gain entry into Europe by posing as migrants on the Greek island of Leros has raised further concerns about Europe’s border security.29 With police officers in places like Leros overwhelmed and understaffed, and more than 540,000 migrants passing through Greece between January and October alone, it is unsurprising that many are not documented properly.30 Following the attacks, the president of the N-VA party stated, “the wave of uncontrolled immigration and terrorist threats are a dangerous cocktail. European leaders can no longer deny it”31.

Gilles de Kerchove, the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, described the link made by certain parties between refugees and terrorists as “toxic.”32 Shortly after the Paris attacks, the Belgian members of the European Parliament addressed a letter to the presidents of the European institutions asking for additional counter terrorism measures including the mandatory sharing of information between European intelligence services.33 Debate on the Future of the EU The EU faced several challenges this year with the Greek financial crisis, the migrant crisis, economic challenges, and the possibility of British exit from the Eurozone. A large part of Belgium’s media coverage centered on the future of the EU, with much of the media describing Europe as divided and powerless.34 The Schengen Agreement was the main source of debate within Belgium.35 While the federal government accepted its quota of migrants, there was significant debate on the Schengen policy of open borders between the N-VA party and the Reformist Movement (MR), a Francophone center-left party who is also a coalition member. The N-VA advocated for the return of border controls, while MR argued for the maintenance of Schengen.36 Minister Francken stated that the Schengen area has enormous faults and may last four months, maybe a year, but will eventually have to be eliminated.37 Reynders said that collective European solutions would resolve the problems of Schengen, like they solved the financial crisis.38 In September, Germany re-established border controls, which some within the Belgian media saw as a terrible threat to Schengen.39 In October, Austria erected a fence on its border with Slovenia. Foreign policy experts within the Belgian media described these measures as a threat to Schengen, one of the foundations of the European system.40 Furthermore, the response to the EU’s 23

Messages in the Media plan to relocate refugees was opposed by central European countries, while accepted by the majority of other EU members, including Belgium.41 Various experts in Belgium have described this divide between Eastern and Western Europe as a division of values, endangering the stability and power of the EU.42 Year In Review Much of Belgium’s media coverage in 2015 centered around the twin issues of terrorism and radicalisation, especially following the November terrorist attacks in Paris. Molenbeek, where three of the perpetrators of the Paris attacks originated from, was the center of various investigations and prosecutions.43 In December, Belgian secret services found evidence of a planned terrorist attack in Brussels.44 Brussels cancelled its annual New Year’s Eve celebration and fireworks, implementing many additional safety measures to protect the country.45 Consequently, counter terrorism and de-radicalisation policies were at the center of the news.

Domestically, the media also focused on Bart De Wever, the president of the N-VA, and his reactions to the migration crisis, the terrorist threat, and the issue of Flemish independence. His controversial statements, such as his calls to revise the Geneva Convention, are seen not only as ploys to win the loyalty of far-right voters to his party, but also as an enunciation of Belgian sentiments on topical issues.46 Internationally, most of Belgium’s media coverage commented on Belgium’s place in a Union mired by internal and external challenges; the possibility of Britain’s exit from the EU; and the migrant crisis.47 De Pape, Nicolas. «Migrants : Ne Pas Sous-estimer La Colère Qui Gronde.»

Le Vif/L’Express. September 18, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/ migrants-ne-pas-sous-estimer-la-colere-qui-gronde/article-opinion-419285. html.

2 Ibid.

3 Dumont, Martial. “«Le Terreau De L’extrême Droite Existe En Wallonie Aussi».” L’Avenir. December 7, 2015. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/ DMF20151207_00747074.

4 Mouton, Olivier. «Comment Le Discours Réac a Pris Le Pouvoir.» Le Vif/L’express. December 17, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/ comment-le-discours-reac-a-pris-le-pouvoir/article-normal-441769.html.

Lamquin, Véronique. «Bart De Wever.» Le Soir. December 30, 2015. http:// portfolio.lesoir.be/v/retrospectives/2015-12-18_Belges/83611_ Bart De Wever_. jpg.html.

Mouton, Olivier. «Les Migrants, La N-VA Et La Stratégie De La Tension.” Le Vif/L’Express. September 11, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/lesmigrants-la-n-va-et-la-strategie-de-la-tension/article-normal-417949.html.

«Marine Le Pen Mobilise à L’extrême.” L’Avenir. December 7, 2015. http://www.

1

24

Belgium - Hélène Emorine lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151206_00746616/marine-le-pen-mobilise-a-l-extreme.

Mandonnet, Eric. «La Marée FN.» Le Vif/L’Express. December 05, 2015. http:// www.levif.be/actualite/international/la-maree-fn/article-normal-438637.html.

5 Dumont, Martial. «Sarko Et Bart : Kif-kif Bourricot...» L’Avenir. January 8, 2016. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20160107_00760450/sarko-et-bart-kif-kifbourricot.

6 Mouton, Olivier. «Comment Le Discours Réac a Pris Le Pouvoir.» Le Vif/L’express. December 17, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/ comment-le-discours-reac-a-pris-le-pouvoir/article-normal-441769.html.

7 Mouton, Olivier. “Ça Va Recogner Au Parlement.» Le Vif/L’Express. October 13, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/ca-va-recogner-au-parlement/ article-normal-427547.html 8 Fiorilli, Thierry. «L’asile, Les Grèves Et Les Hussards.» Le Vif/L’Express.

October 28, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/l-asile-les-greves-et-leshussards/article-opinion-430573.html.

«Crise Des Migrants.» Le Soir. December 30, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/tag/ crise-des-migrants.

Mouton, Olivier. «Les Migrants, La N-VA Et La Stratégie De La Tension.» Le Vif/L’Express. September 11, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/lesmigrants-la-n-va-et-la-strategie-de-la-tension/article-normal-417949.html.

9 Mouton, Oliver. ”Théo Francken, Un Cynique à L’Asile.» Le Vif/L’Express. May 29, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/theo-francken-un-cynique-a-lasile/article-normal-397207.html.

10 «La Question Homme-femme Doit Faire Partie Du Parcours.» L’Avenir.

January 8, 2016. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/DMF20160107_00760449.

11 «L’asile, Ce Sera Pour 5 Ans.» L’Avenir. December 19, 2015. http://www.lavenir. net/cnt/dmf20151218_00753136.

Blogie, Elodie. „Séjour Limité Des Réfugiés, Regroupement Familial: Le Fédéral plus Sévère.» Le Soir. December 19, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/998144/ article/actualite/belgique/politique/2015-09-24/sejour-limite-des-refugiesregroupement-familial-federal-plus-severe.

12 Sandront, Anne. „Francken Veut Contrôler Les Illégaux, Le MRAX Dénonce.» L’Avenir. November 30, 2015. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/ dmf20151130_00743343/francken-veut-controler-les-illegaux-le-mrax-denonce.

Mouton, Oliver. ”Théo Francken, Un Cynique à L’Asile.» Le Vif/L’Express. May 29, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/theo-francken-un-cynique-a-lasile/article-normal-397207.html.

13 «La Belgique Continue à Renvoyer Des Migrants En Hongrie.» L’Avenir.

December 4, 2015. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151203_00745382.

14 Mouton, Oliver. ”Théo Francken, Un Cynique à L’Asile.» Le Vif/L’Express. May 29, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/theo-francken-un-cynique-a-lasile/article-normal-397207.html.

15 Mouton, Olivier. «Comment Le Discours Réac a Pris Le Pouvoir.» Le Vif/L’express. December 17, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/ comment-le-discours-reac-a-pris-le-pouvoir/article-normal-441769.html.

25

Messages in the Media Kuczkiewicz, Jurek. “Dombrovskis Sur L’avenir De La Zone Euro: «Trouver L’équilibre Entre Partage De Risque Et De Souveraineté».» Le Soir.

December 1, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1057593/article/actualite/unioneuropeenne/2015-12-01/dombrovskis-sur-l-avenir-zone-euro-trouver-lequilibre-entre-partage-risqu.

17 Mouton, Oliver. ”Théo Francken, Un Cynique à L’Asile.» Le Vif/L’Express. May 29, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/theo-francken-un-cynique-a-lasile/article-normal-397207.html.

18 «Migration: Le Désastre Des Bureaux D’enregistrement.» L’Avenir. December 19, 2015. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151218_00753137.

19 «Migration: Le Désastre Des Bureaux D’enregistrement.» L’Avenir. December 19, 2015. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151218_00753137.

20 Kuczkiewicz, Jurek. “Schengen Surveillance Renforcée.» Le Soir. December 5, 2015. http://pdf.lesoir.be/leSoirPlus/anonyme.php?backurl=http://plus.lesoir. be/16400/article/2015-12-04/schengen-sous-surveillance-renforcee.

Kuczkiewicz, Jurek. “Le Mini-sommet Qui Cache Les Nouvelles Divisions De L’Europe.” Le Soir. December 17, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1072260/article/ actualite/union-europeenne/2015-12-17/mini-sommet-qui-cache-nouvellesdivisions-l-europe.

21 Kuczkiewicz, Jurek. “Lutte Contre Daesh: Le Léopold I Va Escorter Le Porteavions Charles De Gaulle.» Le Soir. November 11, 2015. http://www.lesoir. be/1040345/article/actualite/belgique/2015-11-11/lutte-contre-daesh-leopold-iva-escorter-porte-avions-charles-gaulle.

22 “Rétro 2015 Sur RTL: Les Attentats, De Charlie Au Bataclan.» L’Avenir.

December 22, 2015. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151221_00754313.

«Des Interpellations Sans Suite.» L’Avenir. December 22, 2015. http://www. lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151221_00754455.

Mouton, Olivier. “Le Procureur Belge Antiterrorisme: “Nous Allons Tous Devoir Changer Nos Modes De Vie”” Le Vif/L’Express. December 21, 2015. Accessed January 23, 2016. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/le-procureur-belgeantiterrorisme-nous-allons-tous-devoir-changer-nos-modes-de-vie/articlenormal-453067.html.

Paquet, Catherine. “Les Amalgames Mènent Au Terrorisme, Il Est Grand Temps D’opter Pour L’intelligence.» Le Vif/L’Express. December 21, 2015. http://www. levif.be/actualite/belgique/les-amalgames-menent-au-terrorisme-il-est-grandtemps-d-opter-pour-l-intelligence/article-opinion-435285.html.

23 Thiolay, Boris. «Les Terroristes Du 13 Novembre, Djihadistes En Bandes Organisées.» Le Vif/L’Express. November 24, 2015. http://www.lexpress.fr/ actualite/societe/les-terroristes-du-13-novembre-djihadistes-en-bandesorganisees_1738925.html.

«Coup De Filet Dans Le Limbourg.» L’Avenir. December 18, 2015. http://www. lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151217_00752578.

Mertens, Peter. «Comment Molenbeek Est Devenue Ce Qu’elle Est.» Le Vif/ L’Express. November 16, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/commentmolenbeek-est-devenue-ce-qu-elle-est/article-normal-434001.html.

16

26

Belgium - Hélène Emorine “«Je N’ai Jamais Voulu Salir Molenbeek».» Le Soir. December 29, 2015. http:// pdf.lesoir.be/leSoirPlus/anonyme.php?backurl=http://plus.lesoir.be/19280/ article/2015-12-29/jan-jambon-je-nai-jamais-voulu-salir-molenbeek.

«La Belgique Débloque 400 Millions D’euros Contre Le Terrorisme.» L’Avenir.

November 19, 2015. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151119_00737740/labelgique-debloque-400-millions-d-euros-contre-le-terrorisme.

Martinet, Pascal. “L’islamophobie, Un Désert De Perspectives.» Le Soir.

December 18, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1072800/article/debats/editos/2015-1218/l-islamophobie-un-desert-perspectives.

25 Mouton, Olivier. «Comment Le Discours Réac a Pris Le Pouvoir.» Le Vif/L’express. December 17, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/ comment-le-discours-reac-a-pris-le-pouvoir/article-normal-441769.html.

«Le Parcours D’un Migrant N’est Pas Un Conte De Noël.” L’Avenir. December 28, 2015. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151227_00755955/le-parcours-d-unmigrant-n-est-pas-un-conte-de-noel.

«La Lutte Continue Pour Les Sans-papiers.» L’Avenir. December 10, 2015. http:// lavenir.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx.

“L’aménagement Est Loin D’être Terminé.” L’Avenir. December 8, 2015. http:// www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151207_00747497.

«L’islamophobie Devient plus Violente.» Le Soir. December 15, 2015. http://www. lesoir.be/1072749/article/actualite/belgique/2015-12-18/l-islamophobie-devientplus-violente.

Martinet, Pascal. “L’islamophobie, Un Désert De Perspectives.» Le Soir.

December 18, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1072800/article/debats/editos/2015-1218/l-islamophobie-un-desert-perspectives.

26 «L’échec De La Belgique. Mais Quel échec?» Le Soir. November 30, 2015. http:// pdf.lesoir.be/leSoirPlus/anonyme.php?backurl=http://plus.lesoir.be/15637/ article/2015-12-04/lechec-de-la-belgique-mais-quel-echec.

27 Ceaux, Pascal, Charles Haquet, Agnès Laurent, and Anne Vidalie. “Après Les Attentats, Ces Failles Qui Posent Questions.» Le Vif/L’Express. November 24, 2015. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/apres-les-attentats-ces-failles-quiposent-questions_1738888.html.

Ernens, Catherine. “«Le Terrorisme Est Une Guerre économique».” L’Avenir.

November 27, 2015. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151126_00741762/leterrorisme-est-une-guerre-economique.

28 Mouton, Olivier. «Comment Le Discours Réac a Pris Le Pouvoir.» Le Vif/L’express. December 17, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/ comment-le-discours-reac-a-pris-le-pouvoir/article-normal-441769.html.

29 Ceaux, Pascal, Charles Haquet, Agnès Laurent, and Anne Vidalie. “Après Les Attentats, Ces Failles Qui Posent Questions.» Le Vif/L’Express. November 24, 2015. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/apres-les-attentats-ces-failles-quiposent-questions_1738888.html.

30 Ceaux, Pascal, Charles Haquet, Agnès Laurent, and Anne Vidalie. “Après Les Attentats, Ces Failles Qui Posent Questions.» Le Vif/L’Express. November 24, 2015. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/apres-les-attentats-ces-failles-qui24

27

Messages in the Media posent-questions_1738888.html.

31 Mouton, Olivier. «Comment Le Discours Réac a Pris Le Pouvoir.» Le Vif/L’express. December 17, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/ comment-le-discours-reac-a-pris-le-pouvoir/article-normal-441769.html.

32 «Amener Des Hommes Et Du Matériel.” L’Avenir. December 2, 2015. http://m. lavenir.net/login-premium?goto=/cnt/DMF20151201_00744252?slugname=ame ner-des-homm-es-et-du-materiel.

33 «Attentats à Paris: Les Eurodéputés Belges Exigent Une Action Européenne Pour Lutter Contre Le Terrorisme.» Le Soir. November 26, 2015. http://www. lesoir.be/1054565/article/actualite/fil-info/fil-info-belgique/2015-11-26/attentatsparis-eurodeputes-belges-exigent-une-action-europeenne.

«Une CIA Européenne? Europol Existe Déjà.” L’Avenir. December 2, 2015. http:// www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151201_00744257.

«L’Europe Accélère Sa Réponse Au Terrorisme.» L’Avenir. December 2, 2015. http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151201_00744254.

34 «Une Europe Divisée Et Impuissante.» L’Avenir. September 7, 2015. http://www. lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20150906_00698502.

Kuczkiewicz, Jurek. “Juncker: «Trop Peu D’Europe, Et Trop Peu D’union Dans Cette Union».» Le Soir. September 15, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/985505/article/ actualite/union-europeenne/2015-09-09/juncker-trop-peu-d-europe-et-troppeu-d-union-dans-cette-union.

Labaki, Maroun. «Il Est Temps De Repenser L’Europe (et De Se Compter).»

Le Soir. October 15, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1017164/article/debats/ editos/2015-10-15/il-est-temps-repenser-l-europe-et-se-compter.

35 «Une Europe Divisée Et Impuissante.» L’Avenir. September 7, 2015. http://www. lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20150906_00698502.

36 Mouton, Olivier. «Les Migrants, La N-VA Et La Stratégie De La Tension.» Le Vif/L’Express. September 11, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/lesmigrants-la-n-va-et-la-strategie-de-la-tension/article-normal-417949.html.

37 Joie, Catherine. “Theo Francken Aux Patrons: «Donnez Une Chance Aux Réfugiés».» Le Soir. December 12, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1067841/article/ selection-abonnes/2015-12-11/theo-francken-aux-patrons-donnez-une-chanceaux-refugies.

38 Kuczkiewicz, Jurek. “Dombrovskis Sur L’avenir De La Zone Euro: «Trouver L’équilibre Entre Partage De Risque Et De Souveraineté».» Le Soir.

December 1, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1057593/article/actualite/unioneuropeenne/2015-12-01/dombrovskis-sur-l-avenir-zone-euro-trouver-lequilibre-entre-partage-risqu.

Dupièreux, Thierry. «Espoir Nécessaire.» L’Avenir. December 26, 2015. http:// www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151225_00755710/espoir-necessaire.

39 Kuczkiewicz, Jurek. “Rétablissement Des Frontières En Allemagne: Un Coup Terrible Pour L’Europe.» Le Soir. September 14, 2015. http://www.lesoir. be/988540/article/debats/editos/2015-09-14/retablissement-des-frontieres-enallemagne-un-coup-terrible-pour-l-europe.

«Le 11h02: «Les Fondements De L’Europe Mis à Mal Par La Crise Des 28

Belgium - Hélène Emorine Réfugiés».» Le Soir. September 15, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/988682/article/ debats/11h02/2015-09-14/11h02-fondements-l-europe-mis-mal-par-crise-desrefugies.

40 Kiesel, Véronique. ««Un Risque Réel Que Schengen Soit Démantelé».» Le Soir.

October 29, 2015. http://pdf.lesoir.be/leSoirPlus/anonyme.php?backurl=http:// plus.lesoir.be/archive/d-20151028-G40JAH. Martinet, Pascal. «L’Europe Ne Peut Brader Sa Liberté De Mouvement.» Le Soir.

October 29, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1029180/article/debats/editos/2015-1029/l-europe-ne-peut-brader-sa-liberte-mouvement.

Kuczkiewicz, Jurek. “Schengen Remis En Cause Par Ses Fondateurs.” Le Soir.

November 28, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1055577/article/actualite/unioneuropeenne/2015-11-27/schengen-remis-en-cause-par-ses-fondateurs.

41 «Pas D’accord Unanime Des Pays De L’UE Sur L’accueil Des Réfugiés.» Le Vif/ L’Express. September 15, 2015. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/ pas-d-accord-unanime-des-pays-de-l-ue-sur-l-accueil-des-refugies_1715749. html.

Kuczkiewicz, Jurek. “L’Europe Adopte Un Partage De Réfugiés Par Quotas, Qui N’ont De Volontaire Que Le Nom.» Le Soir. September 23, 2015. http://www. lesoir.be/996504/article/actualite/monde/2015-09-22/l-europe-adopte-unpartage-refugies-par-quotas-qui-n-ont-volontaire-que-nom.

42 Kuczkiewicz, Jurek. “Crise De L’asile: Réconcilier Responsabilité Et Solidarité En Europe.» Le Soir. September 15, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/998775/article/ debats/editos/2015-09-25/crise-l-asile-reconcilier-responsabilite-et-solidarite-eneurope.y Labaki, Maroun. «Il Est Temps De Repenser L’Europe (et De Se Compter).»

Le Soir. October 15, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1017164/article/debats/ editos/2015-10-15/il-est-temps-repenser-l-europe-et-se-compter Kiesel, Véronique. ««Un Risque Réel Que Schengen Soit Démantelé».» Le Soir.

October 29, 2015. http://pdf.lesoir.be/leSoirPlus/anonyme.php?backurl=http:// plus.lesoir.be/archive/d-20151028-G40JAH. 43 «Menace Terroriste: Ce Qu’il Faut Savoir Des Dernières Perquisitions à Molenbeek.” Le Soir. December 31, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1081926/article/ actualite/belgique/2015-12-30/menace-terroriste-ce-qu-il-faut-savoir-desdernieres-perquisitions-molenbeek.

44 «Une Menace «Du Même Style Que Les Attentats De Paris» Vise Bruxelles, Le Feu D’Artifice Du Nouvel An Annulé?” L’Avenir. December 29, 2015. http://www. lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20151229_00756554/une-menace-du-meme-style-que-lesattentats-de-paris-vise-bruxelles-le-feu-d-artifice-du-nouvel-an-annule.

45 Bordecq, Caroline. «Nouvel An à Bruxelles: Ce Qui Est Annulé Et Ce Qui Ne L’est Pas.» Le Soir. December 30, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1081896/article/ actualite/belgique/2015-12-30/nouvel-an-bruxelles-ce-qui-est-annule-et-ce-quine-l-est-pas.

46 Mouton, Olivier. «2015 En 15 Mots: N-VA (12/15).» Le Vif/L’Express.

December 25, 2015. http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/2015-en-15-mots-nva-12-15/article-normal-445749.html.

29

Messages in the Media Roche, Marc. „«Et Si Le Royaume-Uni Quitte L’UE, Où Va-t-on?».» Le Soir.

December 28, 2015. http://www.lesoir.be/1079391/article/actualite/unioneuropeenne/2015-12-28/et-si-royaume-uni-quitte-l-ue-ou-va-t-on.

47

30

GERMANY

By Alexander Meile

Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Founded in 1945. Owned by S端dwestdeutsche Medien Holding. Daily circulation: 455,000.

Die Welt. Founded in 1946. Owned by Axel Springer SE. Daily circulation: 247,000.

Der Spiegel. Founded in 1947. Owned by Spiegel-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH. Daily circulation of 1,021,000.

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

31

Messages in the Media

In 2015, the following three topics stood out as the leading issues related to German-EU relations: the Greek debt crisis, the refugee crisis and the rise of right-wing sentiment and violence.

The Impact of the Greek Debt Crisis (Eurokrise) on Germany During 2014, the radical left wing in Greece experienced a massive surge in support, ultimately resulting in the election of Syriza’s Alexis Tsipras as Prime Minister in January 2015. Throughout 2015, Greece, Germany and the EU battled for the financial salvation of the country, which had consistently been running current account deficits. Greece had previously benefited tremendously from the Rettungspolitik (German for the ‘Recovery Policy’ laid out for Greece

by Germany and the EU), yet in return has not kept its promises, which led to particularly harsh German criticism in the first two months of 2015.1 Germany, often seen as the the ‘model nation’ of the EU, was negatively perceived to be acting as a European hegemon by trying to force onto Greece a kind of ‘Euro logic’ that wasn’t suitable to address the problems associated with Greece’s economy and political situation.2 In February, German politicians declined to further extend the credit program, which was requested by Greece. Nevertheless, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and members of the German Bundestag continued to actively consider methods of aiding the Greeks, as they saw aid to Greece as a means of saving Germany itself—by preventing both further crises and a greater European collapse.3 In March, German and Greek finance ministers were negotiating Greek demands on overdue German WWII reparation payments to Greece, as well as the Greek failure to provide any clear financial reform plans, which the German Union parties (the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Socialist Union), along with Schäuble, strongly criticized.4,5 By acknowledging that such reparations contracts had in fact been made, Chancellor Angela Merkel calmed tensions by setting aside German leftist party’s claims surrounding the appropriateness of Greek demands. This move led to a rapprochement between Merkel and Tsipras in April 2015.6 Furthermore, in April Greece was given a new deadline of June 30 by which to lay out concrete reforms in order to receive a third bailout package.7 Germany demanded a clear plan, stating explicitly that they would only meet the terms of the third potential package if Greece was fully compliant.8 The Greeks subsequently planned a referendum on whether to accept the EU’s bailout conditions on July 5, right around the time during which Merkel was beginning to take up negotiations regarding Greece’s membership in the Eurozone. Merkel stressed the need to maintain a common European spirit and identity while ensuring that Greece abides by the EU’s rules and regulations.9 Thus, German politicians urged the Greeks to vote ‘Yes’ in the referendum and to adopt proper budgetary plans.10 The Eurozone countries sided with Germany, pushing for clear reforms and additional aid from the IMF, as they feared Greece’s inability to repay its outstanding debts. The President of the European 32

Germany - Alexander Meile Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, similarly stressed that a Grexit must not occur at any cost.11 On July 5, 62 per cent of the Greek population voted ‘No’ and rejected the bailout conditions negotiated with the Commission, the IMF, and the ECB. This forced Germany into a difficult political position, with the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Siegmar Gabriel, commenting that the last ‘bridges’ of negotiation were about to be broken as Germany pushed Athens for concrete reform plans.12 While it had recently been more supportive of a ‘Grexit’, Germany quickly became completely against such an outcome, and thus pushed to avoid it. Yet their actions prompted criticism from other EU nations, who deemed Germany’s demands to be harsh and feared their dominant attitude.13 Thus, the ‘friend and foe’ style of thinking returned to Europe by July—something that, according to Schäuble and the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, could be prevented by adhering to the terms of a common and efficient monetary, economic, political and fiscal union.14 The image of the ‘evil German’ had also returned in Greece.15 Thus, German politicians ran into conflict, wanting both a German-led Europe that would abide by strict guidelines, and one with a strong European spirit, where Greece would recover and become a fully participating member.16 Former German Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer has criticized the strict German bailout terms, seeing it as a dangerous policy, and urged Merkel and Schäuble to stop playing ‘policemen’ to the rest of the EU’s member states.17 Going forward, Germany can fix its image by accepting some responsibility in the crisis. They must also be careful to remain a part of the issue without antagonizing fellow EU members, with which relations have been recently strained.18 Merkel and ‘her’ Germany are the norm drivers in this issue and have the capabilities to draw conclusions on behalf of the entire EU.19 Throughout July, Merkel continued to appeal for financial support from the IMF, and for the signing of a third salvation package that she promised would result in tight controls and positive results.20 German media and society remained skeptical and enraged as no reforms were completed on Greece’s part by December 2015, even after receiving a third financial ‘aid kit.’21 This issue, which at first dominated media coverage in 2015, lost importance in the last quarter of the year as the severity of other political and humanitarian problems rose to the forefront in Germany.

The Refugee Crisis (Flüchtlingskrise) Throughout 2015, the refugee crisis became the most pressing issue on the German and European political scene, prompting new discussions about social conditions and political obligations throughout the Union, and seeing growing discord between the EU’s member states and their refugee policies.

Germany is the number one destination in Europe for refugees, with many of the individuals reaching Europe through Lampedusa, Italy, as well as the Greek islands, seeking to eventually make their way north to Germany. The 33

Messages in the Media record numbers of refugees that arrived in Europe in 2015 led to increased tensions in German society and among Germany’s political parties, with Merkel facing increasing criticism from both within and outside of her party for her open policies. In the first quarter of the year, Europe and the world witnessed humanitarian disasters in the Mediterranean, with over 7,000 refugees drowning before reaching European shores.22 The EU has been faced with increased criticism at its inability to effectively manage the crisis. Heribert Prantl’s commentary in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung argued that the EU, including Germany, deliberately keep ships at harbor and lets the refugees drown in order to ‘save their own skin’.23 Germany, as the main destination for incoming refugees, debated continually with the rest of the EU to identify how best to proceed with and manage this increasingly chaotic crisis. The turning point in Germany’s commitment to refugees came in June 2015, when Merkel announced that Germany and the EU were seeking collective long-term solutions to the crisis, which would include Germany initially taking up an additional 8,000 refugees, and ultimately agreeing on the equal division of the 40,000 remaining.24 Once again, like in the ongoing Greek financial crisis, Germany tried to take the lead in setting the norms and policies on the refugee crisis. Throughout the crisis, rather than acting in a common European spirit and acting collectively to solve the problem at hand, the policies of different EU member states have started to diverge. Germany was one of the only Europeans countries, alongside Sweden, Austria and Italy, who made a true effort in 2015 to provide solutions for this humanitarian fiasco.25 The crisis increased in size dramatically by the fall of 2015, at which point Germany and Merkel took a decisive, albeit somewhat different, stance on the issue. A majority — 61 per cent — of Germans indicated that they were against Merkel’s refugee policy and saw the political system to be failing to deal with the inflow of migrants. 37 per cent of Germans surveyed view the refugee crisis as the most important issue facing Germany at the time.26 Nevertheless, in a speech in September, Merkel praised the support the Germans had provided for refugees and stated that with her current policy, Germany would be able to support them despite figures estimating, at the time, that the refugees in Germany could cost the state an additional €3.3 billion per year.27 By the end of September, with strong backing from Merkel, the Cabinet passed a new asylum law which aimed to increase the processing speed of registering refugees, and created deportation requirements for ‘non-threatened’ asylum seekers, as well as a financial framework in which each refugee is to receive €670 per month.28 Despite this, opposition towards Merkel and the CDU was growing, particularly from the center-left and from within Merkel’s own coalition, with Horst Seehofer of the CSU and Siegmar Gabirel of the SPD both openly criticizing Merkel’s policies and demanding a rigid cap on the number of refugees to be let into Germany. Gabirel demanded that the gates should close once the ‘one million mark’ for refugees was reached, whereas Seehofer demanded an instant closure due to Bavaria’s particularly ‘critical condition’ 34

Germany - Alexander Meile and limited capacities in handling any more refugees.29 Public and political opposition to Merkel’s refugee policy continued to increase, however Merkel and her supporters stressed that fences and transit zones are not solutions and that Germany, its people, and the EU, must act as collectively to try to provide for those in need.30 Nevertheless, by mid-October many EU member states were closing their borders, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, and Germany found itself facing an ever-increasing number of refugees making its way to the country.31 German relations with the EU are thus being put to the test, as the German public criticizes the inability of the EU to deal effectively by the crisis, for example by failing to redistribute a large number of refugees through the quota system agreed upon in September.32 With growing divisions between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, it became increasingly unlikely that Germany’s generous stance towards refugees would continue.

November and December saw a sharp reversal in Germany’s refugee policy. Merkel partly agreed to the CSU’s demands by drawing certain boundaries and instigating Transit Zones—for the processing of refugees at the borders—in cities such as Berlin. The sheer volume of refugees in Germany’s cities was, by the end of the year, massive, with experts predicting that over one million refugees had made it to Germany by the end of 2015.33 Despite a majority of Germans, by the end of the year, expressing disagreement with the government’s refugee policies, many associating the influx with increased security risks after the Paris attacks, the overall support for Merkel and her role as Chancellor remained strong as ever. As she outlined a clear plan for how Germany would deal with the refugees in 2016, she appealed to fellow EU member states not to revert back to nationalist isolationism in the face of the crisis, but instead acknowledge that a crisis of such scale and severity can only be dealt with if Europe acts together.34 By the end of the year, despite 1.1 million refugees arriving and forecasts predicting worse problems to come, the political tensions settled slightly in German Länder, including Bavaria, as they successfully enforced and came to terms on policies concerning the registration, integration, and deportation of refugees.35 Rise of Right-Wing Populism and Violence Over the last couple of years, Germany has been witnessing a slow revival of right-wing populism on the political and social scene. Starting with the refugee crisis in 2014, radical right-wing groups emerged in eastern Germany and consolidated their position within the political structure by the end of 2015. In January 2015, the recently emerged right-wing social movement Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against an Islamisation of the Occident) caused turmoil as it rallied thousands of supporters in anti-immigrant demonstrations in cities such as Dresden.

Throughout 2015, Pegida’s ideas were becoming increasingly popular not only within Germany but across the EU, supported by Neo-Nazi and rightwing groups with for example Monika Maron arguing for the right of protesters to 35

Messages in the Media spread their messages without freedom of speech being suppressed.36 Despite 74 per cent of Germans being opposed to Pegida, in late January, the movement and its supporters managed to rejuvenate the image of the ‘ugly German’ across Europe with their hate speech.37 Furthermore, the right wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) political party has been gaining support, with their Eurosceptic discourse shifting from a traditionally economic focus to one that all the more criticizes the EU for reasons of cultural threat. Emulating Pegida’s xenophobic discourse, they have become increasingly vocal in their Islamophobia and outspoken against the influx of refugees.38 The new-found success and momentum of right-wing parties and movements like Pegida and AfD reveal the latent potential for extremism to increase in Germany, revealing that there is considerable fear and distrust among German citizens of individuals of a different cultural background.39 There was a considerable shift in public opinion between April and August as the influx of refugees showed no signs of abating. Coupled with ongoing issues such as the Greek crisis, the mood in some parts of Germany shifted to a ‘not in my backyard’ mentality as more and more people became wary of rising numbers of refugees in their communities. This mentality emerged at the same time as recent growth in radical right-wing extremism, with 2015 seeing several acts of violence towards refugees and open criticism of Merkel’s policies.40 The mounting acts of violence, such as those in Heidenau, where right-wing extremists set fire to an asylum center, are nevertheless condemned by the public as well as top-tier German politicians like President Joachim Gauck and Chancellor Angela Merkel.41 In these times, Merkel took a clear stance in opposing the xenophobic rhetoric of right-wing forces by visiting the homes of refugees and planning to double the punishment for such violent criminal acts.42 Nevertheless, as Interior Minister Thomas De Maizère argued, in the long run, Germany will not be able to cope with the influx, as it is taking 40 per cent of the refugees presently in the EU.43 Groups like Pegida and AfD used these views to their advantage in promoting their own anti-asylum policies, which led to a revival in support for them after earlier ‘slumps’ as they began calling for political change in the autumn of 2015.44 The EU community is calling upon Germany to defend its democratic values and its colors—the ones of freedom—by preventing the right-wing’s fear rhetoric from proliferating.45 The German government has condemned the violent and provocative acts of both Pegida and AfD, with the situation escalating by the end of 2015 as the offices of several political parties were attacked, in the addition to attacks on refugee centers. Right-wing groups justified their actions by saying they were in the interests of all Germans.46 While little has yet been done to effectively stop this, it is widely believed that Merkel’s vision for Germany will triumph as she and the CDU still enjoy sound backing from society and parliament, on the whole, in this very difficult last quarter of 2015.47 Year in Review 2015 was a troublesome year for Germany. Major issues came in 36

Germany - Alexander Meile the form of the Greek crisis, the refugee crisis, and a growth in right-wing extremism. Despite this, 2015 allowed Germany to meet some of its vital desires and objectives, with particular regard to Germany’s ability to keep Greece in the Eurozone, its ability to provide thousands of refugees with support and aid, as well as Merkel’s ability to stand up against right-wing populists. Over the course of these events, the relationship between the EU and Germany was tested, with Germany taking the sometimes unpopular hard-line with the Greek government.

At the same time, Germany took the lead in the EU with regards to the refugee crisis, actively supporting its resolution through the accepting of refugees and release of humanitarian aid.48 Thus, despite contentions over Greece, EU-German relations did improve on account of Germany’s role in the refugee crisis. EU officials and politicians complimented Germany on its refugee policy and urged other EU states to follow suit.

The refugee crisis, however, was also the driving force behind growing right-wing support for political parties and social movements like AfD and Pegida, as they sought to overturn Germany’s generous refugee policies. This phenomenon acted as a wake-up call to fellow EU member states, including Austria and France, who fear similar movements within their borders. Overall, Germany and the EU demand that democratic values and the EU spirit of being a ‘Union’ must be upheld, and thus are in broad agreement that the growth of right wing-populist movements needs to be undercut in the coming year. EU relations by the end of 2015 with Germany were good. Nevertheless, in 2016, given increases in the difficulty arising from the refugee crisis and Greek question, the friendship and spirit of being a ‘Union’ may bring along new uncertainties.

Beise, Marc. “Europa muss den Griechen nicht entgegenkommen.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 5 Jan. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche. de/politik/2.220/angst-um-den-euro-europa-muss-den-griechen-nichtentgegenkommen-1.2290711

1

Kornelius, Stefan. “Des Strebers Einsamkeit.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 7 Jan. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/deutschlandund-griechenland-des-strebers-einsamkeit-1.2292138

2

“Deutschland lehnt Griechenlands Hilfsantrag ab.” Die Welt. 19 Feb. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article137617825/ Deutschland-lehnt-Griechenlands-Hilfsantrag-ab.html;

3

Denkler, Thorsten. “Mätzchen eines Machtlosen.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 27 Feb. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ schaeuble-und-die-griechenland-hilfe-maetzchen-eines-machtlosen-1.2370334 Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and Christian Social Union Bavaria (CSU)

4

Hulverscheidt, Claus & Schlötzer, Berlin und Christiane.“Riesenkrach zwischen Berlin und Athen.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 12 Mar. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015.

5

37

Messages in the Media http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/schuldenstreit-riesenkrach-zwischenberlin-und-athen-1.2390198 “Linke hält Athens Ansprüche für berechtigt” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 12 Mar. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/streitum-reparationen-linke-haelt-athens-ansprueche-fuer-berechtigt-1.2388224;

6

Gammelin, Cerstin. Braun, Stefan. Schlötzer, Christiane.“Warum Merkel mit Tsipras sprechen will.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 17 Mar. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/schuldenstreit-mitgriechenland-warum-merkel-mit-tsipras-reden-will-1.2397754; “SPD und Grüne fordern Entschädigung für Griechenland.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 17 Mar. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/2.220/streit-um-reparationen-spd-und-gruene-fordern-entschaedigungfuer-griechenland-1.; Dams, Jan. Greive, Martin. Tauber, André. “Die Kanzlerin macht Griecheland zur Chefsache.” Die Welt. 19 Mar. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2015. http://www.welt.de/ wirtschaft/article138550626/Die-Kanzlerin-macht-Griechenland-zur-Chefsache. html; Hulverscheidt, C. Braun, S.“Tsipras wirbt um Merkels Unterstützung.”

Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 24 Mar. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/antrittsbesuch-in-berlin-tsipras-wirbt-ummerkels-unterstuetzung-1.2406208 Kornelius, Stefan. “Auszeit für die Aufgeregten.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 22 Apr. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ griechenland-auszeit-fuer-die-aufgeregten-1.2447103

7

Gammelin, Cerstin. Mühlhauer, Alexander. “Noch eine Frist für Tsipras.”

Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 22 Jun. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/schuldenkrise-noch-eine-frist-fuertsipras-1.2532983

8

Fried, Nico. Roßmann, Robert. “Immer wieder Montags.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung.

29 Jun. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ die-kanzlerin-und-die-krise-immer-wieder-montags-1.2543170

9

Brunner, Katharina. “Deutsche Politiker werben in Griechenland um ein Ja.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 5 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/referendum-deutsche-politiker-werben-ingriechenland-fuer-ein-ja-1.2551857;

10

Kornelius, Stefan.“Griechenland braucht seine eigene Währung.”Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 26 Jun. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche. de/politik/2.220/schuldenkrise-griechenland-braucht-seine-eigenewaehrung-1.2538874; von Buillon, Constanze.“Hoffen auf ein klares Nein.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 29 Jun. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ linke-hoffen-auf-ein-klares-nein-1.2542728; 38

Germany - Alexander Meile Gammelin, Cerstin.“Merkels gebundene Hände.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 1 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ deutschland-merkels-gebundene-haende-1.2546390; Brössler, Daniel.“Es geht ums Ganze.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 5 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/europa-esgeht-ums-ganze-1.2549406 “Eurogruppe verstärkt Druck auf Griechenland.” Die Welt. 11 May. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article140808517/EuroGruppe-verstaerkt-Druck-auf-Griechenland.html;

11

Gammelin, C. Mühlauer, A. “Juncker: Griechenland muss bleiben.”Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 31 May. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/2.220/europaeische-union-juncker-griechenland-muss-bleiben-1.2501022 Schlötzer, Christiane.“Griechen lehnen Sparkurs ab.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung.

5 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ finanzkrise-referendum-spaltet-griechenland-1.2551598;

12

Clauß, Ulrich.“Griechenland zwingt Deutschland den Grexit auf.” Die Welt.

6 Jul. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/ article143647878/Griechenland-zwingt-Deutschland-den-Grexit-auf.html; “Letzte Chance.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 7 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/verhandlungen-in-bruessel-tsipraswill-grexit-abwenden-1.2554773 Brössler, D. Mühlauer, A.“Ende der Eintracht.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 11 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/eurokrise-ende-der-eintracht-1.2561938;

13

Brössler, D. Mühlauer, A. Kirchner, T.“Keine Einigung um jeden Preis.”

Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 12 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/griechenland-krise-keine-einigung-um-jedenpreis-1.2561928; Das Gupta, Oliver. “Der Grieche hat jetzt lang genug genervt.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 14 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/2.220/cdu-vize-thomas-strobl-aetzt-gegen-athen-der-grieche-hat-langgenug-genervt-1.2565942 Brössler, D. Kirchner, T. “Buhmann Deutschland.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 15 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/eurokrise-buhmann-deutschland-1.2567335;

14

Denkler, Thorsten.“Hört auf Europa kaputtzureden.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung.

15 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ griechenland-krise-hoert-auf-europa-kaputtzureden-1.2566774 Ulrich, Stefan. “Das Bild des hässlichen Deutschen ist wieder da.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 18 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/2.220/kritik-der-griechenland-politik-das-bild-des-haesslichen-

15

39

Messages in the Media deutschen-ist-wieder-da-1.2571446 Prantl, Heribert. “Deutsche Sphinx.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 18 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ finanzminister-schaeuble-deutsche-sphinx-1.2570742;

16

Kolb, Matthias.“Es gibt keine deutsche Dominanz.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 18 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ schaeuble-zu-griechenland-politik-es-gibt-keine-deutsche-dominanz-1.2572269 Kornelius, Stefan. “Europas zögerlicher Hegemon.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 26 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ deutschland-europas-zoegerlicher-hegemon-1.2580542;

17

Fischer, Joschka. “Fatale Entscheidung für ein deutsches Europa.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 26 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/2.220/griechenland-krise-es-droht-die-rueckkehr-des-haesslichendeutschen-1.2582530; “Schäuble warnt Griechenland vor Inkonsequenz.” Die Welt. 16 Aug. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article145266361/Schaeublewarnt-Griechenland-vor-Inkonsequenz.html Nock, Yannick.“Wie Deutschland sein Image verbessern kann.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 16 Jul. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche. de/politik/2.220/griechenland-wie-deutschland-sein-image-verbessernkann-1.2568431

18

Mühlauer, Alexander. “Merkel und die drei Buchstaben.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung.

10 Aug. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ griechenland-merkel-und-die-drei-buchstaben-1.2602056

19

“56 Unions-Abgeordnete kündigen Nein-Votum an.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 18 Aug. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ neues-griechenland-paket-unions-abgeordnete-kuendigen-nein-votuman-1.2612908

20

Seeling, Luisa. “Zäher Fortschritt.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 17 Nov. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/griechenlandzaeher-fortschritt-1.2741019;

21

Gammelin, C. Mühlauer, A.“Halbes Jahr vorbei, nichts passiert.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 7 Dec. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/2.220/griechenland-halbes-jahr-vorbei-nichts-passiert-1.2771672 Kornelius, Stefan. “Was die EU gegen das Massensterben im Mittelmeer tun muss.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 19 Apr. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/fluechtlingskatastrophe-was-die-eu-gegen-dasmassensterben-im-mittelmeer-tun-muss-1.2442744

22

Prantl, Heribert. “Wie die EU Flüchtlinge tötet.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 18 Apr. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ fluechtlingspolitik-du-sollst-nicht-toeten-1.2439653

23

40

Germany - Alexander Meile Brössler, Daniel.“Solidarität, aber freiwillig.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 25 Jun. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/eufluechtlingspolitik-solidaritaet-aber-freiwillig-1.2537539

24

25

Ibid.

“Mehrheit der Deutschen lehnt Zuwanderung aus Nicht-EU-Staaten ab.”

Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 19 Feb. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/umfrage-der-eu-kommissio...er-deutschen-lehntzuwanderung-aus-nicht-eu-staaten-ab-1.2358384

26

“Flüchtlinge kosten Deutschland zusätzlich 3,3 Milliarden Euro.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 1 Sep. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/2.220/ausgaben-fuer-integration-fluechtlige-kosten-deutschlandzusaetzlich-milliarden-euro-1.2629507;

27

Kolb, Matthias. “Merkel bleibt dabei: Wir schaffen das.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung.

15 Sep. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ treffen-mit-oesterreichs-kanzler-merkel-bleibt-dabei-wir-schaffen-das-1.2649030 “Kabinett beschließt neues Asylgesetz.” Der Spiegel. 29 Sep. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlingebundesregierung-beschliesst-neues-asylgesetz-a-1055193-druck.html

28

Knaup, Horand.“SPD streitet über Deutschlands Aufnahmekapazität.”

Der Spiegel. 3 Oct. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ deutschland/spd-streit-in-der-fluechtlings-diskussion-a-1056046-druck.html;

29

“CSU fordert Schließung der Grenze zu Österreich.”Der Spiegel. 3 Oct. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/csu-fordertschliessung-der-grenze-und-aufnahmestopp-a-1056049-druck.html “Alle gegen Merkel.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 4 Oct. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/debatte-ueber-fluechtlingskrise-allegegen-merkel-1.2675923;

30

Göring, Marlene.“Deutschlands Bürgermeister sind entspannt.” Der Spiegel. 20 Oct. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/ fluechtlinge-in-deutschland-umfrage-unter-buergermeistern-a-1058507-druck. html Müller, Peter. “Verteilung der Flüchtlinge droht zu scheitern.” Der Spiegel.

19 Oct. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ fluechtlingskrise-eu-verteilungssystem-koennte-scheitern-a-1058455-druck.html

31

Kirchner, Thomas. Braun, Stefan. “Berlin mahnt Juncker zur Eile.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 26 Oct. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/2.220/fluechtlinge-berlin-mahnt-juncker-zur-eile-1.2708609;

32

Fischer, Sebastian. Wittrock, Philipp. “Merkels gefährliche Freunde.” Der Spiegel.

27 Oct. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ fluechtlingskrise-merkels-gefaehrliche-freunde-in-cdu-und-csu-a-1059155druck.html 41

Messages in the Media Höll, Susanne. “Merkel zu Transitzonen: Wir müssen die SPD von vernünfitgen Dingen Überzeugen.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 3 Nov. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/fluechtlingspolitik-merkel-stellt-sichkritik-von-der-basis-1.2719943;

33

Bielicki, Jan. Seeling, Luisa.“Mehr als eine Million Flüchtlinge sollen bis Ende 2015 in Deutschland ankommen.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 26 Nov. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/deutschland-mehr-alseine-million-fluechtlinge-1.2755884; Reimann, Ana. “Hauptstadt des Versagens.” Der Spiegel. 3 Dec. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/berlin-in-derfluechtlingskrise-hauptstadt-des-versagens-a-1065828-druck.html “Mehrheit der Deutschen sieht innere Sicherheit bedroht.” Der Spiegel. 11 Dez. 2015, accessed 1 Jan 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ fluechtlinge-deutsche-sehen-hoeheres-risiko-von-terroranschlaegen-a-1067329druck.html;

34

“Merkel warnt Europa vor Rückfall in Nationalstaaterei.” Der Spiegel. 16 Dec. 2015, accessed 1 Jan 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ fluechtlingskrise-angela-merkel-draengt-europa-zu-mehr-solidaritaet-a1068093-druck.html “Länder schieben deutlich mehr Asylbewerber ab.” Der Spiegel. 21 Dec. 2015, accessed 1 Jan 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlingelaender-schieben-mehr-abgelehnte-asylbewerber-ab-a-1068854-druck.html;

35

“Bayern meldet 1,1 Millionen Flüchtlinge.” Der Spiegel. 30 Dec. 2015, accessed 1 Jan 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-in-deutschlandmillionen-marke-ueberschritten-a-1070050-druck.html; Diekmann, Florian. Klovert, Heike. Kwasniewski, Nicolai. Reimann, Anna. “So schafft Deutschland das.” Der Spiegel. 30 Dec. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http:// www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-in-deutschland-die-grosseaufgabe-der-integration-a-1069830-druck.html Maron, Monika. “Pegida ist keine Krankheit, Pegida ist das Symptom.”

Die Welt. 4 Jan. 2015, accessed 24 Dec. 2015. http://www.welt.de/debatte/ kommentare/article135973630/Pegida-ist-keine-Krankheit-Pegida-ist-dasSymptom.html;

36

Kahlweit, Cathrin. Theile, Charlotte. Bigalke, Silke. Urban, Thomas.

“Exportschlager Pegida.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 16 Jan. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/islamfeindliche-bewegungexportschlager-pegida-1.2305945; Beitzer, Hannah. “So viel Dresden steckt in Deutschland.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 17 Jan. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/2.220/pegida-so-viel-dresden-steckt-in-deutschland-1.2308951

37

Prantl, Heribert. “Ein völkischer Geist ist aus der Flasche gelassen.”

Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 18 Jan. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.

38

42

Germany - Alexander Meile sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/pegida-islam-und-gesellschaft-ein-voelkischergeist-ist-aus-der-flasche-gelassen-1.2306896; Beitzer, Hannah. “So viel Dresden steckt in Deutschland.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung.

17 Jan. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ pegida-so-viel-dresden-steckt-in-deutschland-1.2308951 Haimerl, Kathrin. “Was Populisten erfolgreich macht.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung.

13 Feb. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ rechte-parteien-in-europa-was-populisten-erfolgreich-macht-1.2345852

39

“Zahl der Gewalttaten von Rechtsextemen steigt.” Die Welt. 8 Apr. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article139271032/ Zahl-der-Gewalttaten-von-Rechtsextremen-steigt.html;

40

Woldin, Philipp. “Neuer Streit um Flüchtlingsheim in Nobelviertel.” Die Welt.

2 Jul. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.welt.de/regionales/hamburg/ article143469993/Neuer-Streit-um-Fluechtlingsheim-in-Nobelviertel.html?; Kelnberger, Josef. “Hilfe, Hoffnung, Hass.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 19 Jul. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/fluechtlingeund-fremdenfeindlichkeit-hilfe-hoffnung-hass-1.2572967; “Genscher erinnern Angriffe auf Flüchtlingsheime an NS-Zeit.” Der Spiegel.

5 Aug. 2015, accessed 2 Jan. 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ fluechtlinge-hans-dietrich-...er-fuehlt-sich-bei-angriffen-an-ns-zeit-erinnert-a1046808-druck.html von Buillon, Constanze. Kirchner, Thomas.“Gauck geißelt; wiederwärtige Angriffe.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 9 Jul. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http:// www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/fluechtlinge-gauck-geisselt-widerwaertigeangriffe-1.2559130;

41

Nimz, Urlike. “Brauner Schatten.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 23 Aug. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/heidenau-braunerschatten-1.2618491; Fried, Nico. Gammelin, Cerstin. “Merkel nennt die Gewalt in Heidenau ‘abstossend’.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 24 Aug. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http:// www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/fluechtlinge-merkel-nennt-gewalt-inheidenau-abstossend-1.2620268 “Merkel besucht Flüchtlingsunterkunft in Heidenau.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 25 Aug. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/2.220/nach-rechter-randale-merkel-besucht-fluechtlingsunterkunft-inheidenau-1.2620573;

42

Flade, Florian.“Anti-Asyl-Straftaten binnes eines Jahres verdoppelt.” Die Welt.

28 Aug. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/ article145748388/Anti-Asyl-Straftaten-binnen-eines-Jahres-verdoppelt.html Bielicki, Jan. Fried, Nico. Khalweit, Cathrin. “Auf Dauer auch für Deutschland zu viel.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 30 Aug. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://

43

43

Messages in the Media www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/fluechtlingspolitik-auf-dauer-auch-fuerdeutschland-zu-viel-1.2627308 “Mehr als 5000 Menschen auf Pegida Demo.” Die Welt. 15 Sep. 2015, accessed 24 Dec. 2015. http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article146413697/Mehrals-5000-Menschen-auf-Pegida-Demo.html;

44

Weiland, Severin.“Neue AfD punktet mit Anti-Asyl Kurs.” Der Spiegel. 30 Sep. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/afd-undfrauke-petry-punkten-mit-anti-asyl-kurs-a-1055308-druck.html; Sundermeyer, Olaf. “Die Allianz der Fremdenfeinde formiert sich.”Die Welt.

12 Oct. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/ article147459891/Die-Allianz-der-Fremdenfeinde-formiert-sich.html; “So steht es um die Pegida Bewegung.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 20 Oct. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/ein-jahr-nacherster-demo-so-steht-es-um-die-pegida-bewegung-1.2699844 “Pegida ist das hässliche Gesicht Deutschlands.” Die Welt. 19 Oct. 2015, accessed 24 Dec. 2015. http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article147762728/ Pegida-ist-das-haessliche-Gesicht-Deutschlands.html;

45

Fischer, Sebastian. “Finger weg von Schwarz-Rot-Gold.”Der Spiegel. 20 Oct. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ kommentar-deutschlandfahnen-bei-pegida-demonstration-a-1058669-druck. html; “EU-Parliamentspräsident warnt vor Deutschen Rechtsextremen.”Der Spiegel.

20 Oct. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ pegida-gabriel-maas-und-schulz-warnen-vor-rechtsradikalismus-a-1058609druck.html Interview of Popp, Maximilian. “Rassistische Gewalt ist Terror.” Der Spiegel. 26 Oct. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ angriffe-auf-fluechtlinge-rassistische-gewalt-ist-terror-a-1059598-druck.html;

46

“Linken Büro attackiert-mehrere Brände in Leipzig.” Der Spiegel. 12 Dec. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/leipzig-linkenbuero-angegriffen-mehrere-feuer-a-1067482-druck.html Roßmann, Robert.“Warum Merkel triumphiert.” Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 14 Dec. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/cduparteitag-merkel-streichelt-die-cdu-bis-sie-ihr-folgt-1.2781470

47

Diekmann, Florian. Klovert, Heike. Kwasniewski, Nicolai. Reimann, Anna. “So schafft Deutschland das.” Der Spiegel. 30 Dec. 2015, accessed 1 Jan. 2016. http:// www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-in-deutschland-die-grosseaufgabe-der-integration-a-1069830-druck.html

48

44

THE NETHERLANDS

By Emma de Leeuw

NRC Handelsblad. Founded in 1970. Owned by Egeria. Daily circulation of 218 000.

NOS Journaal. Founded in 1828. Owned by Nederlandse Omroep Stichting. Daily circulation of 2,00,000.

DeVolkskrant. Founded in 1919. Owned by De Persgroep. Daily circulation of 260 ,000.

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

45 4

Messages in the Media In researching the most prevalent new stories of 2015 in the Netherlands, the immigration and refugee crisis, concerns over border security and terrorism, and the state of the economy were the topics that featured most prominently.

The Immigration and Refugee Crisis

The migrant crisis was the topic mentioned the most by the three media sources over the course of 2015. In January 2015, the Dutch Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) reported a 75 percent increase in asylum seekers during 2014, and estimated that the Netherlands would take in six percent of the refugees entering Europe.1,2 On average, about 700 refugees enter the Netherlands every day, with a total of 47,764 having requested asylum as of December 2015.3,4 During September, there was a record number of asylum requests, with the majority from Syria and Eritrea.5,6 The agreement made by the European Commission in May proposed that the Netherlands take in 4.35 percent of the total amount of refugees that have already arrived in Italy and Greece.7,8 In addition to this estimate, the Netherlands was asked to accept additional refugees totaling 7,214 over the year.9 Although the increased security efforts were approved by the Dutch cabinet, there was hesitation about the compliance of other EU member states and unequal distribution of refugees.10,11 Compliance among all EU member countries was heavily emphasized by Prime Minister Mark Rutte, as was finding solutions to the underlying issues of conflict in Africa and the Middle East, to which €21 million was pledged.12,13 The Netherlands will contribute €117 million to the Turkish migrant deal negotiated in November and has increased its own budget for refugees by €750 million (€350 million in 2015, €400 million in 2016).14, 15 Within the Dutch government, there has been debate between the People’s Party for Freedom (VVD), the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), and the People’s Party for Freedom (PVV) who want to take stricter measures towards immigration policy, and the Labour Party (PvdA) and Democrats (D66) who are more liberal.16,17 The debate nearly toppled the coalition between VVD and the PvdA.18 Overall, the debate has increased right-wing tendencies in all political parties, and has fostered support for the right-wing PVV.19 One of the major issues was the process of returning refugees who were not granted asylum. There was increased demand to deport these individuals faster, instead of continuing the controversial ‘bed-bad-brood’ policy (a policy that provides rejected asylum seekers with food and shelter).20,21 Meanwhile, some groups of rejected asylum seekers live on the street or squat in abandoned buildings as a means of protesting.22,23 The main problem is the lack of long-term housing available for refugees, which would result in them continuing to live in temporary locations.24,25,26 The municipalities are often unwilling to accept refugee centres that house more than a few hundred individuals.27 These temporary locations are problematic and have been subject to complaints by the refugees.28 Asylum seekers live in temporary centers, 46

Emma de Leeuw - The Netherlands The Netherlands - Emma de Leeuw receive only three meals a day, and get no extra allowance.29 Within these centers, conflict has also broken out numerous times between the refugees and employees.30 The migrant crisis has exposed a divide between the Dutch population and the ruling coalition.31 It is the most important policy issue for Dutch citizens.

According to a survey, about 45 percent of Dutch citizens oppose an influx of refugees.32,33 Such opposition has been manifest in the aggressive protests against the size of new centers in places such as Geldermalsen, Steenbergen, Kaatsheuvel and Enschede.34,35,36,37,38 There were also anti-Islam Pegida demonstrations in Rotterdam and Utrecht.39 With that said, a survey found that public opinion toward asylum seekers becomes more positive once the centers are established.40 Various organizations have made efforts to help asylum seekers in the form of raising materials, money, and scholarships.41,42 There has also been a large public response, with around 47,000 people signing up to volunteer within refugee centres and among the refugees as well.43 Businesses are also optimistic about the potential employment prospects for refugees, especially in the trades and the construction industries.44,45 These positive views see the migrant crisis as an opportunity to benefit from the ‘brain drain’ and to improve population growth.46 The immigration ministry’s integration budget has been cut in half since 2013, yet integration efforts are necessary to successfully address the migrant crisis.47 This budget squeeze is apparent in the shortage of teachers at the migrant centers.48,49 In any case, other integration initiatives that have been established include providing an integration handbook and teaching refugees bicycle traffic rules.50 Going forward, the integration of refugees will be a long process towards re-establishing trust in themselves and in society.51 There have been mixed responses from refugees themselves. Some refugees warned others to avoid the Netherlands, while other refugees handed out flowers as a way of saying thanks.52,53 One thing that can be agreed upon is that, with the continuing conflicts, it is likely the stream of refugees will continue into 2016.

Borders, Security, Terrorism Although the majority of the Dutch people were open to accepting refugees, they were nevertheless concerned about the number of people that were not registering within the asylum system. The Netherlands contributed resources to initiatives meant to strengthen the EU’s external borders. Moreover, in April when EU leaders came together to triple the budget for rescue operations in the Mediterranean, the Netherlands contributed a patrol aircraft and a patrol boat.54 Within the Balkan region, the Netherlands also helped provide resources such as living materials and border guards to Slovenia.55However, the Netherlands concurrently delivered weapons and troops to conflict regions where the migrants come from such as Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.56,57 The Netherlands began to question its borders, even proposing a ‘Mini Schengen’ area comprised of the Benelux countries, plus Germany and 47

Messages in the Media Austria.58,59 People smugglers have been active in the Netherlands and were found in Hoek van Holland, Duiven, Eindhoven and Venlo.60,61 Many politicians became concerned about the strain of the refugees on the Dutch welfare system and are introducing mobile border controls to control the flow.62,63 With many neighboring countries increasing border controls, Dutch politicians are now considering the same, especially if no significant effort is made to protect the external borders.64,65 The Dutch public has also become worried about the threat of open borders and the migrant crisis.66,67 For example, there is fear of potential terrorists entering the Netherlands under the cover of seeking asylum.68 When an asylum seeker reaches Europe, they are questioned to determine whether or not they are a risk to European society.69 Police officers have also been placed within refugee communities in the Netherlands to monitor for radicalism.70 In November, it was announced that it was not possible for the government to register, identify, and screen all the refugees entering the Netherlands.71 However, even when an individual has been identified as having ties to terrorism, it is nevertheless difficult to remove them from the Netherlands.72,73 The lack of the Dutch governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to intervene and the potential dangers increase fear within the population, and connect refugees with terrorism further exaggerating the strains of the ongoing migrant crisis.

In response to the November terrorist attacks in Paris, the Dutch government emphasized both the need to remain calm but also to increase security efforts.74 Since the Netherlands is part of the coalition fighting ISIS, it is considered to be a potential target of terrorist attacks.75 As a result, the current threat level in the Netherlands is at the second-highest level (substantial).76 In an interview, police chief Gerard Bouman expressed that a future attack in the Netherlands was certain.77 Already, the Netherlands dealt with two serious terrorist threats in 2015: one at a German-Dutch football game in November 2015, and another on the train from Paris to Amsterdam in August.78,79 These threats prompted the creation of a number of policies, such as those to increase the number of registration centers and improve the screening process.80,,8182 As a result of the recent policy changes, it will also become easier to deport refugees involved in criminal activities.83 Moreover, an extra â&#x201A;Ź250 million has been allocated to the Department of Security and Justice to improve anti-terror initiatives and solve the ongoing labour disputes within the law enforcement sector.84 However, there has been criticism that these efforts potentially miss the root problem of radicalism. Moreover, the effect of the media exaggerating and scaring the general public was also mentioned.85 There was additional criticism about the re-integration of suspected radical individuals into society, and the failures of effective government programs.86

The Economy, Austerity Crisis Recovery The year started off with a positive outlook, with both investment 48

The Netherlands - Emma de Leeuw and exports performing better than in 2014. In April, the Dutch economy was predicted to grow by 1.7 to 2 percent by all three media sources.87,,8889 Although the growth rate was lower than past trends, it was still considered stable and appropriate for the global economic situation.90 These positive trends continued in September, when the Dutch Statistics Bureau announced all economic indicators were positive.91,92 In particular, the unemployment numbers improved since last year, with an additional 33,000 jobs created as of November.93 The economy is doing well relative to other European countries, and there has been increased optimism about the Dutch economy in 2015.94 So far, the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing measures have led to low inflation, but hopefully not deflation. Since November 2015, the Netherlands gained back its triple A status from Standard & Poor’s.95 Nonetheless, the head of the Dutch National Bank stated that the Dutch economy remains vulnerable to external shocks and changes.96,97 The Netherlands now imports more gas than it exports as a result of the reduction of natural gas extraction, which has cost around 0.2 percent of the GDP according the the Central Planning Bureau.98,99 Dutch businesses are also concerned about the slow-down in the Chinese market.100 Furthermore, there is uncertainty over economic ties with Russia, which have deteriorated since the Malaysian Airline MH17 crash, and because of concerns about Dutch tulips exported to Russia containing a certain pest.101 Although only 0.5 percent of Dutch exports go to Greece, Prime Minister Mark Rutte commented that Greece must stay in the Eurozone, but subject to tough regulations.102 The Netherlands contributed €4.5 billion to the total €16 billion on funding for Greece, mainly to pay off previous Dutch and European loans, but this was already taken into account by the Dutch government and doesn’t affect the budget deficit.103 In addition to the improving Dutch economy, the budget deficit also decreased this year, below the European target of three percent of GDP. The reduction in the Dutch budget deficit, measured at 1.8 percent of the GDP, can be traced back to the implementation of successful austerity measures.104 Due to these positive economic figures, the Dutch government had to pay an extra €446.2 million, which was already accounted for in the yearly budget.105,106 However, this extra payment to the EU has brought criticism from opposition members in the parliament, with the Netherlands already being a major funder, and about the lack of transparency and lack of effectiveness of initial Dutch calculations.107 In November, it was announced that the Netherlands would receive €1.8 billion from the EU due to overpayment in previous years.108 Furthermore, as part of an EU agriculture package, the Netherlands received €29.9 million to strengthen the dairy and pork industries.109 Furthermore, there have been a number of public and private scaledowns and bankruptcies that demonstrate the continued fragility of the economy. These include the Dutch Post service, the KLM, the pharmacy DA, the shoe store Scapino, and the department store V&D.110,111,112,113,114 The Dutch government also sold parts of the ABN AMRO Bank for €3.8 billion, as well as Propertize (part of SNS Reaal Bank).115 On the other hand, there was an 49

Messages in the Media increasing amount of investment in start up companies, which represents a trend away from traditionally structured businesses.116,117

2015 Year in Review The NRC Handelsblad did a survey of 380 people’s outlooks in 30 different neighbourhoods. The general sentiment was one of pessimism for the future, with most respondents foreseeing worsening conditions in the future.

This can be attributed to the past decade of financial crisis, austerity measures and now potential cultural erosion as a result of the migrant crisis.118 The majority of Dutch citizens are not opposed to welcoming refugees, but they are afraid of the large numbers of refugees settling in urban centres. In some cases, the positive response by the Dutch population in terms of volunteers and donations has overwhelmed refugee centers. There has also been a heavy emphasis on accommodating refugees in favourable living conditions.

Furthermore, the migrant crisis has also brought issues of border control and security to the forefront. All these extra costs as a result of the migrant crisis, created economic concerns of whether the Dutch economy can support such a large influx of people. Yet, although there are a number of articles that portray the benefits of the migrant crisis, the tone across all three media sources was negative. The three main topics are all related due to their impacts upon each other. All three topics influence and are also influenced by Dutch-EU relations.

Within the media, there was significant coverage of Dutch domestic efforts to house and register refugees coming into Europe. However, these efforts were heavily influenced by the European quota agreement. The Netherlands agreed to house the agreed upon percentage of refugees and additional refugees.

There is increasing impatience with other European countries that are not willing to agree. This has also resulted in opposition suggesting that the Netherlands had been assigned to too many refugees relative to its capabilities.

With the Netherlands participating in the Syrian air-strike campaign, there is increased threat of potential terrorist attacks. Without proper supervision by all countries, the resulting lack of human security causes governments to question the Schengen Agreement. This has led the Netherlands to look into a ‘mini-Schengen.’ The mini-Schengen proposes a border-less area only between the Benelux countries, Germany, and Austria, and would impose external borders. The Dutch government has also begun looking at temporary borders, with potential to fully implement them. This signifies a shift away from the Schengen foundation and a decreased willingness to cooperate. In any case, the mini-Schengen proposal suggests that the Dutch government is willing to cooperate, but only with nations that it can trust to uphold common agreements.

Economically, the Netherlands is beginning to show signs of stable recovery from the previous years’ crisis. The Dutch GDP growth has slowly increased, and the budget deficit is well below the European limit. Although these are positive conditions, the government remains alert for the next potential crisis. Especially as a result of the Greek debt crisis, there has been 50

The Netherlands - Emma de Leeuw a growth in Eurosceptic sentiment across the Netherlands. In addition to growing Euroscepticism, the new health care system, the Teeven drug deal and earthquakes as a result of the natural gas extraction have also caused a growing distrust of the government by the population. Although there is increased concern about the socio-economic conditions and uncertainty about the future, as head of the European Commission Timmermans has suggested, it is not the time to shy away, but instead, the time to get started.119 van der Veen, Casper. “Aantal asielaanvragen stijgt met 75 procent.”

NRC Handelsblad. 2 Feb. 2015, accessed 16 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/02/02/aantal-asielaanvragen-stijgt-met-75-procent 2 “Vluchtelingen blijven komen.” NCR Handelsblad, 2 Jan. 2015, accessed 16 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/01/02/vluchtelingen-blijvenkomen-1452926 3 “Asielaanvragen fors gedaald naar 2400.” NRC Handelsblad, 30 Sept. 2015, accessed 16 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/next/2015/09/30/vluchtelingenasielaanvragen-fors-gedaald-naar-24-1538979 4 “Cijfers.” Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. https:// www.coa.nl/nl/over-coa/cijfers 5 Redactie. “Aantal asielzoekers in Nederland daalt opnieuw.” Volkskrant, 26 Oct. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/aantalasielzoekers-in-nederland-daalt-opnieuw~a4171400/ 6 Posthumus, Niels. “Aantal asielzoekers in Nederland stijgt snel: 3100 in afgelopen week.” NRC Handelsblad, 13 Sept. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/09/13/aantal-asielzoekers-stijgt-snel-3100-inafgelopen-week 7 “EU wil dat Nederland 4,35 procent vluchtelingen neemt.” Volkskrant, 13 May 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/eu-wil-datnederland-4-35-procent-vluchtelingen-neemt~a4020048/ 8 “Brussel: Nederland moet ruim 4% vluchtelingen opvangen.” NOS Journaal, 13 May 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 18 2015. http://nos.nl/artikel/2035486-brusselnederland-moet-ruim-4-vluchtelingen-opvangen.html 9 Nederland krijgt 7214 extra asielzoekers.” NOS Journaal, 7 Sept. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://nos.nl/artikel/2056364-nederland-krijgt-7214-extraasielzoekers.html 10 van Loon, Wouter. “Als asielzoekers in de EU eerlijker worden verdeeld krijgt Nederland er minder.” NRC Handelsblad, 27 April 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/next/2015/04/27/als-asielzoekers-in-de-eu-eerlijker-wordenverdee-1490183 11 van den Dool, Pim. “Dijkhof wil compromis over EU-plan vluchtelingen, maar ook eerlijker verdeling.” NRC Handelsblad, 11 June 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/06/11/dijkhoff-over-eu-vluchtelingenplan1

51

Messages in the Media willen-compromis-maar-eerlijker-verdeling 12 “Nederland houdt ‘zoveel mogelijk’ vast aan vluchtelingenquota.” Volkskrant, 25 June 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/ nederland-houdt-zoveel-mogelijk-vast-aan vluchtelingenquota~a4088376/ 13 van der Veen, Casper. “Nederland zegt Syrische vluchtelingen 21 miljoen euro toe.” NRC Handelsblad, 29 Mar. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/03/29/nederland-zegt-syrische-vluchtelingen-in-midden-oosten21-miljoen-euro-toe 14 “Nederland moet 117 miljoen in Turks vluchtelingenfonds steken.” NOS Journaal. 12 Nov. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://nos.nl/artikel/2068657nederland-moet-117-miljoen-in-turks-vluchtelingenfonds-steken.html 15 de Vries, Joost. “Kabinet trekt 750 miljoen euro extra uit voor opvang.”

Volkskrant. 27 Nov. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.volkskrant.nl/ binnenland/kabinet-trekt-750-miljoen-euro-extra-uit-voor-opvang~a4196451/ 16 Pelgrim, Christiaan. “Coalitie na lang overleg een over EU-asielplan.” NRC Handelsblad. 8 Sept. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/09/08/coalitiena-lang-overleg-eens-over-eu-asielplan-1533081 17 “Meerderheid Kamer verwerpt ‘onrealistisch’ asielplan VVD.” NRC Handelsblad. 26 March 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/03/26/meerderheid-kamer-verwerpt-asielplan-vvd-gestolen-uitsnoepwinkel-pvv 18 “Geen enkele provincie wil megalocatie vluchtelingenopvang.” Volkskrant. 28 Oct. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/geenenkele-provincie-wil-megalocatie-vluchtelingenopvang~a4173036/ 19 de Vries, Joost. “Teruglezen: asielplan coalitie overleeft Kamerdebat.”

Volkskrant. 14 Oct. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.volkskrant.nl/ politiek/teruglezen-asielplan-coalitie-overleeft-kamerdebat~a4162936/ 20 “Bed-bad-broodruzie zet debat mensenrechten op scherp.” NRC Handelsblad. 16 April 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/ handelsblad/2015/04/16/bed-bad-broodruzie-zet-debat-mensenrechten-opsch-1484991 21 “Kabinet valt bijna over bed, bad en brood.” NOS Journaal. 17 Dec. 2015, accessed 20 Feb. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2075769-kabinet-valt-bijna-over-bedbad-en-brood.html 22 Willems, Marije. “Vluchtgarage even ontruimd na brand.” NRC Handelsblad.

28 March 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/03/28/ vluchtgarage-even-ontruimd-na-brand 23 “Uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers demonstreren bij azc Emmen.” NOS Journaal. 7 Oct. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://nos.nl/artikel/2061817uitgeprocedeerde-asielzoekers-demonstreren-bij-azc-emmen.html 24 Stoffelen, Anneke and van Walsum, Sander. “Langere wachttijd asielzoekers door logistieke problemen IND.” Volkskrant. 5 Dec. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015.

52

The Netherlands - Emma de Leeuw http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/langere-wachttijd-asielzoekers-doorlogistieke-problemen-ind~a4201963/ 25 Viesema, Ingmar. “Te weinig huizen vluchtelingen.” NRC Handelsblad. 25 Sept.

2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/09/25/teweinig-huizen-vluchtelingen-1541025 26 “Afspraken over woningen voor 10.000 vluchtelingen.” NOS Journaal. 9 Oct. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://nos.nl/artikel/2062102-afspraken-overwoningen-voor-10-000-vluchtelingen.html 27 “Geen enkele provincie wil megalocatie vluchtelingenopvang.” Volkskrant. 28 Oct. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/geenenkele-provincie-wil-megalocatie-vluchtelingenopvang~a4173036/ 28 Toonen, Annette. “Kamp van niks in beautiful country.” NRC Handelsblad. 17 Dec. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.nrc.nl/next/2015/12/17/kampvan-niks-in-beautiful-country-1567513 29 “Wat krijgt een vluchteling in Nederland eigenlijk?” NOS Journaal. 24 Nov. 2015, accessed Jan. 5 2016. http://nos.nl/op3/artikel/2071050-wat-krijgt-eenvluchteling-in-nederland-eigenlijk.html 30 “Vechtpartij bij noodopvang vluchtelingen Apeldoorn.” NOS Journaal. 4 Dec. 2015, accessed Jan. 5 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2073135-vechtpartij-bijnoodopvang-vluchtelingen-apeldoorn.html 31 de Pré. “Asielopvang trekt nieuwe breuklijn door het land en door coalitie.”

Volkskrant. 12 Oct. 2015, accessed Jan. 5 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/ binnenland/asielopvang-trekt-nieuwe-breuklijn-door-het-land-en-doorcoalitie~a4161108/ 32 “Grootste zorg Nederlander is instroom vluchtelingen.” Volkskrant. 30 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/-grootste-zorgnederlander-is-instroom-vluchtelingen~a4215931/ 33 “Nederlanders willen niet meer vluchtelingen toelaten.” NOS Journaal. 15 Aug. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2052105-nederlanders-willenniet-meer-vluchtelingen-toelaten.html 34 “14 aanhoudingen na rellen om komst azc Geldermalsen.” Volkskrant. 17 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/14aanhoudingen-na-rellen-om-komst-azc-geldermalsen~a4209171/ 35 Visser, Jeroen. “Geweld kan dus wel degelijk lonen.” Volkskrant. 24 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/geweld-kan-dus-weldegelijk-lonen~a4213591/ 36 “Betoging tegen komst azc in Enschede vroegtijdig beëidigd.” Volkskrant. 31 Oct. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/betogingtegen-komst-azc-in-enschede-vroegtijdig-beeindigd~a4175364/ 37 van der Veen, Casper. “Protest voor gemeentehuis Steenbergen tegen komst azc.” NRC Handelsblad. 9 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/11/09/protest-voor-gemeentehuis-steenbergen-tegen-komst-azc 53

Messages in the Media Sedee, Menno. “Protestgroep tegen komst 1200 asielzoekers in Kaatsheuvel.”

NRC Handelsblad. 24 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/12/24/protestgroep-tegen-komst-1200-asielzoekers-in-kaatsheuvel 39 Leijten, Jorg. “Politie verricht 24 arrestaties bij Pegida-demonstratie.”

NRC Handelsblad. 29 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/11/29/politie-verricht-24-arrestaties-bij-pegida-demonstratie 40 Bakker, Maartje. “Mensen met azc in de buurt ervaren veel minder overlast dan ze vreesden.” Volkskrant. 19 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www. volkskrant.nl/binnenland/mensen-met-azc-in-de-buurt-ervaren-veel-minderoverlast-dan-ze-vreesden~a4210686/ 41 “Nederland zamelt spullen in voor vluchtelingen.” NOS Journaal. 12 Sept.

2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/op3/artikel/2057294-nederland-zameltspullen-in-voor-vluchtelingen.html 42 “Cadeau Bussemaker: 40 extra vluchtelingen mogen studeren.” NOS Journaal.

5 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2067297-cadeaubussemaker-40-extra-vluchtelingen-mogen-studeren.html 43 van der Velden, Lisa. “Wie zijn al die nieuwe vrijwiligers voor vluchtelingen.”

Volkskrant. 1 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/ binnenland/wie-zijn-al-die-nieuwe-vrijwilligers-voor-vluchtelingen~a4199433/ 44 Gualthèrie Van Weezel, Tjerk. “Bouw rekent op miljardenomzet door komst asielzoekers.” Volkskrant. 20 Oct. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http:// www.volkskrant.nl/economie/bouw-rekent-op-miljardenomzet-door-komstasielzoekers~a4167457/ 45 van Leeuwen, Maike. “Hier kunnen vluchtelingen terecht op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt.” NRCQ. 14 Sept. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www. nrcq.nl/2015/09/14/hier-kunnen-vluchtelingen-terecht-op-de-nederlandsearbeidsmarkt 46 Rueb, Thomas. “Ja, juist méér vluchtelingen.” NRC Handelsblad. 15 Sept. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/09/15/ja-juist-meervluchtelingen-1536397 47 “Integratiebeleid niet klaar voor toename vluchtelingen.” NOS Journaal. 7 Sept. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2056462integratiebeleid-niet-klaar-voor-toename-vluchtelingen.html 48 Bakker, Maartje. “Tekort aan leerkrachten voor onderwijs vluchtelingen.”

Volkskrant. 30 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/ binnenland/tekort-aan-leerkrachten-voor-onderwijs-vluchtelingen~a4215891/ 49 “Hoezo, don’t learn Dutch?” NRC Handelsblad. 3 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/next/2015/12/03/hoezo-dont-learn-dutch-1565703 50 Onkenhout, Paul. “Doe-het-zelf handboek voor vluchtelingen.” Volkskrant. 26 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/media/doe-het-zelfhandboek-voor-vluchtelingen-ga-naar-de-kroeg~a4194937/ Fontein, Just. “Vluchtelingen in asielzoekerscentra krijgen verkeersles.”

38

54

The Netherlands - Emma de Leeuw Volkskrant. 30 Oct. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/ binnenland/vluchtelingen-in-asielzoekerscentra-krijgen-verkeersles~a4174403/ “Vluchteling in Limburg op verkeersles.” NOS Journaal. 29 Oct. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2065730-vluchteling-in-limburg-op-verkeersles. html Vriesema, Ingmar and Kamerman, Sheila. “Ze moeten ook gewoon Nederlandse pot leren eten.” NRC Handelsblad. 23 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http:// www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/11/23/ze-moeten-ook-gewoon-nederlandse-potleren-eten-1562181 51 Voorn, Christel. “Zorgen om integratie Eritrese vluchtelingen.” NOS Journaal.

20 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2076388zorgen-om-integratie-eritrese-vluchtelingen.html 52 “Syrische vluchtelingen waarschuwen elkaar: ga niet naar Nederland.” NOS Journaal. 22 Oct. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2064396syrische-vluchtelingen-waarschuwen-elkaar-ga-niet-naar-nederland.html 53 van Loosbroek, Sebastiaan. “Vluchtelingen delen rozen uit als dank, en om erger te voorkomen.” Volkskrant. 23 Oct. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www. volkskrant.nl/binnenland/vluchtelingen-delen-rozen-uit-als-dank-en-om-ergerte-voorkomen~a4169611/ 54 van der Hee, Sterre. “EU verdrievoudigt het budget voor reddingsoperaties Middellandse Zee.” NRC Handelsblad. 23 April 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http:// www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/04/23/europese-unie-verdrievoudigt-budget-voorreddingsoperaties-migranten 55 “Nederland wil Slovenië helpen bij opvang vluchtelingen.” NOS Journaal. 25 Oct. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2064972-nederland-wilslovenie-helpen-bij-opvang-vluchtelingen.html 56 “Nederland verlengt missie in Mali en Irak.” NRC Handelsblad. 20 June 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/next/2015/06/20/mali-nederlandverlengt-missie-in-mali-en-irak-1510272 57 “Nederland gaat nu ook vapens sturen naar de peshmerga’s voor hun strijd tegen IS.” NRC Handelsblad. 20 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www. nrc.nl/next/2015/11/20/koerden-nederland-gaat-nu-ook-wapens-sturennaar-d-1561973 58 van Staden, Alfred. “Mini-Schengen kan uitweg bieden.” Volkskrant. 3 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/opinie/mini-schengen-kanuitweg-bieden~a4200309/ 59 Kranenburg, Mark. “Plan ‘mini-Schengen’ zet druk op asielsysteem EU.” NRC Handelsblad. 19 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ handelsblad/2015/11/19/plan-mini-schengen-zet-druk-op-asielsysteemeu-1557481 60 “Twee mannen in Eindhoven opgepakt voor grootschalige mensensmokkel.”

NRC Handelsblad. 18 Sept. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016 http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/09/18/arrestaties-voor-smokkel-honderden-syriers 55

Messages in the Media “Weer mensensmokkelaar in trein Venlo opgepakt.” Volkskrant. 24 Sept.

2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/weermensensmokkelaar-in-trein-venlo-opgepakt~a4148984/ 62 “Rutte: desnoods Nederlandse grensbewaking.” NOS Journaal. 27 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016 http://nos.nl/artikel/2071748-rutte-desnoods-nederlandsegrensbewaking.html 63 “Marechaussee controleert grenzen extra vanwege vluchtelingen.” NOS Journaal. 17 Sept. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2058186marechaussee-controleert-grenzen-extra-vanwege-vluchtelingen.html 64 Bakker, Maartje. “Nederland scherpt grenscontroles aan.” Volkskrant. Sept.

14 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/nederlandscherpt-grenscontroles-aan~a4141947/ 65 van der Veen, Casper. “Kabinet steunt meer controles op vluchtelingen in vrachtauto’s.” NRC Handelsblad. 16 June 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www. nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/06/16/kabinet-steunt-meer-controles-op-vluchtelingen-invrachtautos 66 “De Nederlander is bang voor de grote boze wereld.” NRC Handelsblad. 30 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/12/30/denederlander-is-bang-voor-de-grote-boze-wereld-1575093 67 “Ruim kwart Nederlanders wil grenzen sluiten.” NOS Journaal. 15 Sept. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2057724-ruim-kwart-nederlanderswil-grenzen-sluiten.html 68 Noshad Sharifi, Maral. “Eén op de vijftig vluchtelingen is een radicaal van IS.” NRC Handelsblad. 21 Sept. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ next/2015/09/21/een-op-de-vijftig-vluchtelingen-is-een-radicaal-v-1536956 69 Kouwenhoven, Andreas. “Zijn dit terroristen of vluchtelingen?” NRC Handelsblad. 7 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ next/2015/11/07/zijn-dit-terroristen-of-vluchtelingen-1556792 70 Bakker, Maartje. “Wijkagent waakt voor extremisten onder vluchtelingen.”

Volkskrant. 17 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/ buitenland/wijkagent-waakt-voor-extremisten-onder-vluchtelingen~a4188055/ 71 Versteegh, Kees. “Veiligheidsdiensten weten niet wie Europa binnenkomt.”

NRC Handelsblad. 9 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/11/09/veiligheidsdiensten-weten-niet-wie-europa-binnenkomt 72 “Syrische asielzoeker (18) gearresteerd die beweerde lid te zijn van IS en AlQaeda.” NRC Handelsblad. 4 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ next/2015/12/04/terreurverdachte-syrische-asielzoeker-18-gearres-1566788 73 “Politie arresteert asiel zoeker verdacht van deelname IS.” Volkskrant. 3 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/politiearresteert-asielzoeker-verdacht-van-deelname-is~a4201063/ 74 van den Dool, Pim. “Rutte: kalmte bewaren en niet buigen voor terreur.”

NRC Handelsblad. 14 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ 61

56

The Netherlands - Emma de Leeuw nieuws/2015/11/14/rutte-kalmte-bewaren-en-niet-buigen-voor-terreur 75 Kreling, Tom and Modderkolk, Huib. “Kan het bloedbad in Parijs ook in Nederland gebeuren?” Volkskrant. 15 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http:// www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/kan-het-bloedbad-in-parijs-ook-in-nederlandgebeuren~a4186881/ 76 “Dreigingsniveau aanslag onveranderd substantieel.” NOS Journaal. 9 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2068080dreigingsniveau-aanslag-onveranderd-substantieel.html 77 “Korpschef Bouman: er komt zeker aanslag in Nederland.” Volkskrant. 23 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/korpschefbouman-er-komt-zeker-aanslag-in-nederland~a4213098/ 78 “Teruglezen: Duitsland-Nederland afgelast, geen explosieven gevonden.” NRC Handelsblad. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/11/17/live-voortvluchtige-daderparijs-bereidt-mogelijk-aanslag-belgie-voor 79 “Aanslag op Thalys maar net verijdeld.” NRC Handelsblad. 22 Aug. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/08/22/aanslag-opthalys-maar-net-verijdeld-1525455 80 Thijssen, Wil. “Politieteam registreert vluchtelingen in Nederland.” Volkskrant.

17 Sept. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/ politieteam-registreert-vluchtelingen-in-nederland~a4143738/ 81 “Marechaussee controleert extra op migranten.” Volkskrant. 16 June 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/marechausseecontroleert-extra-op-migranten~a4078378/ 82 Vis, Carlijn. “Politie gaat vluchtelingen registreren op vier plekken in Nederland.” NRC Handelsblad. 17 Sept. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www. nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/09/17/speciaal-team-van-politie-en-marechaussee-gaatvluchtelingen-registreren 83 Bolle, Joram. “Asielzoekers bij crimineel gedrag sneller uitzetten.” NRC Handelsblad. 25 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/11/25/asielzoekers-bij-crimineel-gedrag-sneller-uitzetten 84 van den Dool, Pim. “Kabinet trekt 250 miljoen euro extra uit voor justitie.”

NRC Handelsblad. 20 Nov. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/11/20/kabinet-eens-over-extra-geld-voor-justitie 85 Februari, Maxim. “Hoe fantoomterreur zelf ’t grootste reële gevaar wordt.”

NRC Handelsblad. 22 Jan. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ next/2015/01/22/hoe-fantoomterreur-zelf-t-grootste-reele-gevaar-w-1458825 86 Kamerman, Sheila. “Ex-terreurverdachten na vrijlating radicaal door slechte begeleiding.” NRC Handelsblad. 22 May 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www. nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/05/22/ex-terreurverdachten-blijven-na-vrijlating-radicaaldoor-slechte-begeleiding 87 “Economie groeit op alle fronten.” NOS Journaal. 23 April 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016 http://nos.nl/artikel/2031966-economie-groeit-op-alle-fronten.html 57

Messages in the Media “Herstel economie zet door.” NOS Journaal. Oct. 6 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016 .http://nos.nl/artikel/2040524-herstel-economie-zet-door.html 89 “Nederlandse economic groeit sneller.” NOS Journaal. June 3 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2039234-nederlandse-economie-groeit-sneller. html 90 Smal, Eva. “Nederlandse economie groeit opnieuw, maar wel minder hard.”

NRC Handelsblad. 13 May 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/05/13/nederlandse-economie-groeit-opnieuw 91 “CBS: alle seinen economic op groen.” NOS Journaal. 30 Sept. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2060400-cbs-alle-seinen-economie-op-groen. html 92 Schinkel, Maarten. “Stemming blijft goed voor de Nederlandse economie.”

NRC Handelsblad. 21 Oct. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ next/2015/10/21/stemming-blijft-goed-voor-de-nederlandse-economie-1550086 93 “CBS meldt meer banen en vacatures.” NOS Journaal. 13 Nov. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2068819-cbs-meldt-meer-banen-en-vacatures. html 94 “Meer optimisme over Nederlandse economie.” NOS Journaal. 5 Nov. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2067248-meer-optimisme-overnederlandse-economie.html 95 van der Veen, Casper. “S&P positiever over Nederlandse banken.”

NRC Handelsblad. 3 Dec. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/12/03/sp-positiever-over-nederlandse-banken 96 “DNB: Nederlandse economie moet weerbaarder worden.” NOS Journaal. Oct. 7 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2061741-dnb-nederlandseeconomie-moet-weerbaarder-worden.html 97 de Waard, Peter. “Vier bedreigingen voor de Nederlanse economie.” Volkskrant.

Oct. 6 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/economie/vierbedreigingen-voor-de-nederlandse-economie~a4156902/ 98 Beunderman, Mark. “CPB: groei lager door minder gaswinning.” NRC Handelsblad. 11 Dec. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016 http://www.nrc.nl/ handelsblad/2015/12/11/cpb-groei-lager-door-minder-gaswinning-1565872 99 “Nederland importeert voor het eerst meer gas dan het exporteert.” Volkskrant.

2 Dec. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/ nederland-importeert-voor-het-eerst-meer-gas-dan-het-exporteert~a4199910/ 100 Garschagen, Melle. “Hoe Nederlandse bedrijven de dupe zijn van de Chinese crisis.” NRCQ. Aug. 15 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrcq. nl/2015/08/15/hoe-nederlandse-bedrijven-de-dupe-zijn-van-de-chinese-crisis 101 de Voogt, Sam. “Rusland gaat alle Nederlandse bloemen streng controleren.”

NRC Handelsblad. 4 Aug. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/08/04/rusland-gaat-alle-nederlandse-bloemen-streng-controleren 102 “Rutte: gevolgen Griekse problemen voor Nederland beperkt.” NOS Journaal.

88

58

The Netherlands - Emma de Leeuw June 29 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2044204-ruttegevolgen-griekse-problemen-voor-nederland-beperkt.html 103 de Vries, Joost. “Waarom heeft Griekenland al die miljarden nodig?”

Volkskrant. 14 Aug. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/ economie/waarom-heeft-griekenland-al-die-miljarden-nodig~a4120932/ 104 Zandstra, Philippus. “CPB: herstel Nederlanse economie zet door begrotingstekort op 1,8 procent.” NRC Handelsblad. 5 March 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/03/05/cpb-nederlandse-economiegroeit-dit-jaar-met-procent-17-procent 105 “Nederland krijgt weer naheffing van de EU.” NOS Journaal. 20 Oct. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2064135-nederland-krijgt-weernaheffing-van-de-eu.html 106 “Nieuwe naheffing uit Brussel: Nederland moet 446 miljoen betalen.”

Volkskrant. 20 Oct. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant. nl/politiek/nieuwe-naheffing-uit-brussel-nederland-moet-446-miljoenbetalen~a4167330/ 107 “Veel vragen in Kamer over EU-naheffing.” NOS Journaal. 29 April 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2033026-veel-vragen-in-kamer-overeu-naheffing.html 108 Alonso, Stéphane. “Bijdrage voor EU wordt 1,8 mld lager.” NRC Handelsblad.

18 Nov. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/next/2015/11/18/ bijdrage-voor-eu-wordt-18-mld-lager-1561385 109 van Nierop, Leonie. “Bijna 30 miljoen extra voor Nederlandse boeren.”

NRC Handelsblad. 16 Sept. 2015, accessed 16 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc. nl/handelsblad/2015/09/16/bijna-30-miljoen-extra-voor-nederlandseboeren-1533917 110 “Krimpende postmarkt dwingt PostNL tot nieuwe bezuinigingen.” NOS Journaal. 3 Nov. 2015, accessed 16 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2066776krimpende-postmarkt-dwingt-postnl-tot-nieuwe-bezuinigingen.html 111 Nagtegaal, Bastiaan. “CEO Emirates: Nederlandse staat schaadt Schiphol.”

NRC Handelsblad. 19 Nov. 2015, accessed 16 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/11/19/topman-emirates-nederlandse-staat-schaadt-schiphol 112 “Ook schoenenwinkel Scapino failliet.” NOS Journaal. 8 Jan. 2015, accessed 16 Jan. 2016. http://nos.nl/artikel/2079322-ook-schoenenwinkel-scapino-failliet. html 113 “Failliete drogisterijketen DA overgenomen door Nederlandse Drogisterij Service.” NRC Handelsblad. 30 Dec. 2015, accessed 16 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc. nl/next/2015/12/30/detailhandel-failliete-drogisterijketen-da-overgen-1574628 114 Van der Ploeg, Jarl. “Ketens als V&D en DA gaan onderuit want...” Volkskrant.

23 Dec. 2015, accessed 16 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/economie/ketensals-vend-en-da-gaan-onderuit-want~a4213509/ 115 Giebels, Robert. “Dijsselbloem verkoopt vastgoedtak SNS Reaal.” Volkskrant.

59

Messages in the Media 16 Oct. 2015, accessed 16 Jan. 2016. http://www.volkskrant.nl/economie/ dijsselbloem-verkoopt-vastgoedtak-sns-reaal~a4164887/ 116 Vermeer, Oscar. “Nederlandse ondernemers geloven weer in de economie.”

NRC Handelsblad. 3 Feb. 2015, accessed 16 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrcq. nl/2015/02/03/nederlandse-ondernemers-geloven-weer-in-de-economie 117 de Voogt, Sam. “Steeds meer mensen doen online aankopen.” NRC Handelsblad. 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 16 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2015/12/22/steeds-meer-mensen-doen-online-aankopen 118 Blokker, Bas. “Nederland, een gelukkig land zonder vertrouwen in de toekomst.” NRC Handelsblad. 4 Dec. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.nrc. nl/nieuws/2015/12/04/nederland-een-gelukkig-land-zonder-vertrouwen-in-detoekomst 119 Alonso, Stéphane. “Timmermans” Wegduiken helpt niet. Aan de slag, zou ik zeggen.” NRC Handelsblad. 9 Dec. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www. nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/12/09/wegduiken-helpt-niet-aan-de-slag-zou-ikzeggen-1568521

60

ITALY

By Tea Cimini

La Stampa: Founded in 1867. Owned by Fiat SpA. Daily circulation: 270,353 (2015).

La Repubblica: Founded in 1976. Owned by Carlo De Benedetti, ”L’espresso Group”. Daily circulation: 412,957.

Il Corriere della Sera: Founded in 1876. Owned by Rcs Quotidiani SpA. Daily circulation: 397,906 (2015) Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

61

Messages in the Media Throughout 2015, three major topics stood out in Italian media coverage: the role of Italy in the migrant crisis, the impact of EU sanctions and regulations, and the “Bad Bank” case.

The Role of Italy in the Migrant Crisis Throughout 2015, immigration remained a concern of primary importance for the Italian government. As the year began, the EU Commission announced that it would prioritize the implementation of common European policies to tackle the crisis.1 In Brussels, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi encouraged other European heads of state to comply to a common strategy, including reforms that would strengthen Frontex.2 After another shipwreck in the Mediterranean in March, the High Representative of the EU Commission for Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, pushed for the acceleration of the discussion on common measures to prevent more casualties, reiterating that Italy must not be left alone.3,4 Meanwhile, the perceived lack of support from the European community generated turmoil in Italy. This included both supporters of greater European intervention, such as the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Laura Boldrini, and also Eurosceptics, like Matteo Salvini, President of the Lega Nord party.5,6 In April, after a meeting of the European Commission, EC President Jean Claude Juncker admitted that the lack of general support for the Italian initiative ‘Mare Nostrum’ had been a mistake. He proposed new measures, including reforms on legal immigration and a quota system to distribute refugees.7,8 Renzi reiterated that these measures should include methods to prevent human traffickers from smuggling people from one side of the Mediterranean to the other.9,10 In May, the Commission approved a common agenda to tackle the refugee crisis. Among other measures, the plan included a quota system to redistribute the refugees among EU member states, with the exception of Italy and Greece, and military action to identify and destroy the facilities used by the smugglers.11 In June, France reintroduced mandatory controls on those coming in from the Italian border, generating great chaos among refugees in the Italian city of Ventimiglia.12 In response to French actions, Renzi strongly encouraged other EU countries not to withdraw their support, and to agree on a concrete quota number for the redistribution project.13 By the end of June, in a draft document that would regulate the redistribution of refugees among member states, the Commission agreed to take in 40,000 refugees who had landed on the Greek or Italian coasts.14,15 However, by this measure the Commission did not determine the number of refugees that each member state would have to take in, leaving the task of setting a specific number to the respective national governments.16 The internal divisions of EU countries have been heavily criticized by both Renzi and the President Emeritus of the Italian Republic, Giorigio Napolitano, who believe that the lack of a united front and the frequent quarrels in the European Parliament and Commission were hindering the effectiveness 62

Italy - Tea Cimini of EU-wide initiatives.17,18 In July, EU member states discussed the relocation of 28,000 refugees, as well as the creation ‘hotspots’, centers for the identification of incoming refugees that would help in redistribution efforts.19 However, many member states refused to sign up, thus hindering the process of relocation endorsed by the European Commission.20,21 Meanwhile, as the hotspots became increasingly crowded, Oxfam and other NGOs reported violations of the basic rights of refugees.22 In September, a summit was held to gauge the effectiveness of new measures that would help alleviate the difficult situation in Italy and in other southern European countries.23 Among the many measures considered, the most popular policy was to provide countries outside the EU, primarily Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, with financial support to take in more refugees.24 As of October, out of the 40,000 refugees who were supposed to be redistributed among EU member states, only 90 had actually been moved through the quota system.25 Many states like Hungary, Romania and the Czech Republic had voted against the redistribution plan, making its implementation that much more difficult.26 Prime Minister Renzi lamented the inefficacy of the quota system.

In December, the Commission came out with a plan for the expansion of Frontex to include responsibility over intervening during emergency situations, rather than only patrolling the EU borders, and the reintroduction of controls at the borders in the Schengen zone.27,28,29 Concurrently, the Commission criticized the Italian government for failing to follow up on the first stage of the relocation measures, including to acquire the fingerprints of all incoming migrants and to create five designated hotspot areas.30,31,32 In December, the UNHCR announced that approximately 972,000 migrants had travelled across the Mediterranean to seek refuge in a European country in the past three years. It also reported that 3,692 people died during the crossing. In total, 114,000 refugees, most of Libyan background, landed on Italian coasts.33

The Impact of EU Sanctions and Regulations Since 2003 up until November 2015, Italy has paid €183 million to the European Commission for infringing on regulations.34 Together with Greece, it was among the states that had the most ongoing legal procedures. In February, Italy received notification from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that it was in violation of the Quota Latte regulation, which limits the amount of milk and dairy products a member state may produce.35,36 The Quota Latte measure was supposed to be abolished by March 31.37,38 However, due to the missed payment of previously assigned sanctions, Italy received a total fine of € 30.5 million.39,40 The Quota Latte was poorly received by Italian farmers and dairy industry workers because of the resulting decline in total revenue and increase in total costs.41,42 Maurizio Martina, the Italian Minister of Agriculture, blamed Lega Nord for the excessive production of dairy products, claiming that party leader Matteo Salvini speculated on the amount of the fine during his various campaigns.43 The European Commission set November as the deadline for the 63

Messages in the Media payment of the fine.

Italy was also sentenced by the ECJ for not abiding by the European regulations for recycling waste materials.44 The lack of adequate recycling facilities especially affected Campania, a region in southern Italy that has been dealing with the problem for years, and has led to sanctions against Italy in the past.45 In addition, new research on the infamous Terra dei Fuochi area, in Campania, showed that the mismanagement of waste material is contaminating food, water and air.46 In July, Italy received a fine of €20 million plus a €120,000 late penalty per day due to the aforementioned unpaid fines.47,48 Vincenzo de Luca, President of the Campania region, initiated a plan to expedite the process of waste disposal with the support of Prime Minister Renzi.49 Renzi announced that the plan would save €1.8 billion in EU funding and alleviate the heavy financial burden that the country received earlier in the year.50,51 Renzi committed to invest more resources to ending the mismanagement of waste material in this area, and claimed that what has been done so far should demonstrate the Italian goodwill to the Commission.52 In March, Italy received notification from the ECJ that a lack of investment in water purification infrastructure could lead to financial penalties in 2016.53 In order to avoid fines, Italy pledged to commit €20 billion in investments over the next six years.54 In December, the Water Safety Plan became part of European legislation, providing a grace period of two years to each member state to adjust to the new regulations.55 In October, Juncker announced that the Commission would be more lenient in terms of financial penalties on countries like Italy, which at the moment have high financial expenditures due to the incoming flow of migrants.56 In November, the Campania region was threatened with a new fine for its failure to abide by the EU regulations on acoustic pollution in areas adjacent to hospitals, schools and parks.57

The “Bad Bank” Case During the first few weeks of the year, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to diminish the financial flow to many of the EU’s southern member states, Italy included, as a measure to prevent the larger EU community from being affected by the defaulting states.58 In September 2014, Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, initiated a project where the ECB would buy packages of private stocks, also called asset-backed securities.

In January, the Italian government proposed to sell some asset-backed securities to the ECB as a means to alleviate the debt suffered of many Italian banks, using the Italian treasury as a guarantee.59 By late January Pier Carlo Padoan, Minister of Economy and Finances, had begun to solidify the plan, claiming that the project would alleviate €181 billion of bank debt.60 In March, during a speech to the Italian chamber of Deputies, Draghi encouraged the Italian government to proceed with the “bad bank measures, as well as other structural reforms, projecting a potential GDP growth rate of two percent.”61,62 This idea was reiterated in May by Draghi, who urged the Italian government to 64

Italy - Tea Cimini agree on reforms that would improve the conditions of the public administration and financial institutions, once again citing the “bad bank” measure.63 In June, Padoan presented a more concrete plan that was received with some criticisms

by EU officers, as it did not involve a guarantee system reliable enough to be pursued by the ECB.64 In September, the Commission blocked the Italian solution, indicating that the “bad bank” program had to conform to the rules of market.65 Nonetheless, the Commission recognized that the Italian government was on the right path to heal the debt of the banks.66

Year in Review All in all, 2015 was a year full of challenges for the Italian government.

As the migrant crisis escalated in intensity, the EU community failed to agree on a common, cooperative solution. Among the measures suggested features the quota system, meant to alleviate the burden posed on the states that received the most incoming refugees, including Italy. However, the plan reached an impasse as many states blocked their borders and consequently threatened the survival of the Schengen area. Thus, due to discording ideas among the EU member states, a common agreement on how to tackle the refugee crisis was not reached. Should the European heads of state fail to agree on a common policy, the crisis may escalate and would jeopardize the stability and solidity of the Euro-zone.

On the economic side, Italy failed to comply with some European regulations, including the Quota Latte, hence incurring economic sanctions.

More financial penalties were imposed on the Italian government due to their failed compliance with European garbage disposal standards. On the other hand, the Italian government initiated some measures to alleviate the financial pressure from the banks. The Minister of Economy and Finances Padoan worked on a plan that would allow some of the high-risk stock held by banks to be sold to the ECB. The proposal has been favourably looked upon by the President of the ECB, Mario Draghi. However, the ECB and the European Commission encouraged the Italian government to continue their effort to find measures to lower the risks for both the ECB and the Italian government. Thus, throughout 2015, Italy has made some step forward towards to betterment of its economic situation. However, Padoan’s controversial proposal was met with discordant opinions from the various EU institutions.

In conclusion, the immigration crisis was by far one of the biggest challenges faced by Italy in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. As the Italian economy shows signs of improving, contrasting responses have been provided by the biggest actors and stakeholders in the EU. On the one hand, Italy hardly learned from its mistakes and accumulated, in the past few years, a number of sanctions and financial penalties that have further destabilized the precarious equilibrium of its economy. On the other hand, Padoan’s proposal seems to be be leading to progress compared to policies previously adopted.

Nonetheless, it did not generate full support among EU leaders due to its relatively high level of risk. The new year will surely bring new challenges to both 65

Messages in the Media Italy and the EU at large. However, steps have been taken to solve the issues that have been afflicting the stability of the Union in the past year.

“UE: La lotta al traffic di migrant sarà una priorità.” La Repubblica. 3 Jan. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/01/03/news/ ue_traffico_migranti-104212185/?ref=search 2 Martini, Fabio. “Rischio ISIS nella Libia dei migrant, L’allarme di Renzi al Consiglio UE.” La Stampa. 12 Feb. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www. lastampa.it/2015/02/13/italia/cronache/rischio-isis-nella-libia-dei-migranti-lallarme-di-renzi-al-consiglio-ue-u5CZS5KmfXBWfjsnrjLI1J/pagina.html 3 “Immigrazione, dieci morti nel Canale di Sicilia. L’EU accellera:”Ora basta con lo scaricabarile,” La Stampa. 4 Mar. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www. lastampa.it/2015/03/04/italia/cronache/immigrazione-morti-nel-canale-di-sicilia-CqiXEZcffTLsM63BOp7bDK/pagina.html 4 Nigro, Vincenzo.“Più soldi e mezzi per Triton l’Ue sta facendo troppo poco per salvare vite umane.” La Repubblica. 15 Feb. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/02/13/piu-soldi-e-mezzi-per-triton-lue-sta-facendo-troppo-poco-per-salvare-vite-umane10. html?ref=search 5 “Immigrazione, Salvini torna all’attacco: “Una class action contro Renzi e Alfano.” La Stampa. 14 Mar. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015 http://www.lastampa. it/2015/03/14/italia/politica/immigrazione-salvini-torna-allattacco-una-class-action-contro-renzi-e-alfano-nEu6MR8i5O3Ckp4qn3kLYI/pagina.html 6 “Strage migranti, Renzi: l’Europa non ci lasci soli.” La Stampa. 13Apr. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/04/19/italia/politica/ strage-di-migranti-renzi-come-restare-insensibili-e-salvini-lo-attacca-altre-morti-sulla-sua-coscienza-ru0W8tNR2YujHUdH5LKqfP/pagina.html 7 “Emergenza immigrazione, Juncker all’Europa: “Risposte insufficienti, l’Italia lasciata da sola.” La Stampa.

29 Apr. 2015, 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/04/29/esteri/emergenza-migranti-juncker-critica-leuropa-risposte-insufficienti-italia-lasciata-da-sola-jxFMrSIHYxqbOe7sVdgqsN/pagina.html 8 “Renzi sui migranti “L’Italia aveva ragione, la Ue no.” La Repubblica. 15 Oct. 2015, 19 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/10/15/renzi-sui-migranti-litalia-aveva-ragione-la-ue-no20.html?ref=search 9 Maesano, Francesco. “Le richieste di Renzi a Bruxelles: “Più fondi contro gli scafisti.” La Stampa. 23 Apr. 2015, 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa. it/2015/04/23/italia/cronache/c-un-limite-allo-sciacallaggio-renzi-attacca-ed-polemica-osZcldZLXAckf6xnQBy98O/pagina.html 10 Baldessarro, Giuseppe. “Profughi sulle navi cargo Ue: “Lotta ai nuovi trafficanti deve essere nostra priorità.” La Repubblica. 4 Jan. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/01/04/ 1

66

Italy - Tea Cimini profughi-sulle-navi-cargo-ue-lotta-ai-nuovi-trafficanti-deve-essere-nostra-priorita10.html?ref=search 11 “Strage migranti, Renzi: l’Europa non ci lasci soli.” La Stampa. 19Apr. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/04/19/italia/politica/ strage-di-migranti-renzi-come-restare-insensibili-e-salvini-lo-attacca-altre-morti-sulla-sua-coscienza-ru0W8tNR2YujHUdH5LKqfP/pagina.html 12 “La Francia: “L’Italia si faccia carico dei migranti”.Renzi in pressing. Pisapia: “Basta arrivi a Milano.”

La Stampa. 15 Jun. 2015, 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/06/15/ esteri/la-francia-replica-allitalia-non-abbiamo-bloccato-le-frontiere-jRPugXUml4W5yQeQHkYpMJ/pagina.html 13 “Emergenza migranti, la Francia: “Mai sospeso Schengen”, La Germania riapre le frontiere.” La Stampa.

14 Jun. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/06/14/italia/ cronache/renzi-sullemergenza-migranti-piano-b-se-lue-non-ci-ascolter-sRgkfGSGToz0yTToMhqRYO/pagina.html 14 Zatterin, Marco. “Ecco il compromesso dell’Europa sui migranti.” La Stampa. 22 June. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/06/22/ esteri/europa/ecco-il-compromesso-delleuropa-sui-migranti-nebJ8InfUVfatmdwgh7uzN/pagina.html 15 Francesca Basso, “Migranti, Accordo nella Notte.” Il Corriere della Sera. 26 Jun. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.corriere.it/esteri/15_giugno_26/migranti-accordo-notte-40000-ridistribuiti-2-anni-poi-altri-2000o-a0b9d20c-1bc411e5-a24d-298f280523ad.shtml 16 “L’Ue litiga ancora sulle quote migranti. Renzi: “Ci fate solo perdere tempo.” La Stampa. 25 Jun. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/06/25/esteri/migranti-tusk-non-c-consenso-tra-gli-stati-membri-sulle-quote-obbligatorie-836hNElqeKVpY2p8YQ4omL/ pagina.html 17 Napolitano, Giorgio. “Napolitano: “Europa, se non ora quando? Così batteremo i nazionalismi.” La Stampa. 28 Nov. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www. lastampa.it/2015/11/28/cultura/opinioni/napolitano-europa-se-non-ora-quando-cos-batteremo-i-nazionalismi-A4hBAW6yNhHRdZM4pDqHUK/pagina. html 18 “Migranti, il vertice dei leader Ue Renzi: non più solo nostro problema.” Il Corriere della Sera. 23 Sept. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.corriere. it/esteri/15_settembre_23/migranti-oggi-vertice-leader-ue-renzi-non-piu-solonostro-problema-237aaca0-6217-11e5-a22c-898dd609436f.shtml 19 “Accordo Ue, 32mila migranti distribuiti tra i Paesi europei.” Il Corriere della Sera. 20 Jul. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.corriere.it/esteri/15_luglio_20/accordo-ue-35-mila-migranti-saranno-distribuiti-paesi-europeic8b9602a-2efb-11e5-820a-d82a668b1363.shtml 20 “Migranti, il vertice Ue non trova l’accordo sul documento conclusivo.” Il Corriere della Sera. 14 Sept. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.corriere.it/ esteri/15_settembre_14/migranti-germania-sblocca-treni-85651efc-5aae-11e567

Messages in the Media 8668-49f4f9e155ef.shtml 21 “Juncker: «Manca l’unione nella nostra Ue, priorità accoglienza» Merkel: «Imparino in fretta tedesco».” Il Corriere della Sera. 9 Sept. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.corriere.it/esteri/15_settembre_09/juncker-l-europa-nonsta-bene-si-deve-cambiare-priorita-affrontare-l-emergenza-profughi-5778dfba56c1-11e5-a580-09e833a7bdab.shtml 22 Les, Dav. “Negli hotspot violazioni dei diritti dei migranti”. La denuncia di Manconi e delle associazioni.” La Stampa, 11 Dec. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/12/11/esteri/speciali/emergenza-migranti/ negli-hotspot-violazioni-dei-diritti-dei-migranti-la-denuncia-di-manconi-e-delle-associazioni-0rHKL6OD773MClOaCvEHFP/pagina.html 23 Zatterin, Marco “Quasi cinque miliardi dall’Ue per i migranti. Bruxelles incalza Roma: chiarezza sui flussi.” La Stampa. 23 Septmber. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/09/23/esteri/quasi-miliardi-dallue-per-i-migranti-e-bruxelles-richiama-roma-pi-chiarezza-sui-flussi-5dyMddeGWc03MS9uj28CgK/pagina.html 24 Zatterin, Marco “Quasi cinque miliardi dall’Ue per i migranti. Bruxelles incalza Roma: chiarezza sui flussi.”

25 Sarzanini, Fiorenza. “Profughi, la beffa delle quote Dall’Italia all’estero solo 90 migranti in un mese.” Il Corriere della Sera. 28 Oct. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.corriere.it/politic”a/15_ottobre_28/profughi-beffa-quote-dall-italiaall-estero-solo-90-migranti-un-mese-0ccc8b3e-7d3a-11e5-b7c2-dc3f32997c8b. shtml 26 “Sì al piano di redistribuzione dei profughi, ma l’Europa si spacca.” La Stampa.

22 Sept. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/09/22/esteri/ nuovi-scontri-tra-profughi-e-polizia-in-croazia-locse-pi-rifugiati-che-nella-seconda-guerra-mondiale-7yR1AtSOsl5dyM5x43TnYP/pagina.html 27 “L’Europa blinda Schengen e accusa l’Italia: troppo lenta.” La Stampa. 16 Dec. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/12/16/esteri/ leuropa-blinda-schengen-e-accusa-litalia-troppo-lenta-nDmuZ30PMjDpPNRCuHG1ZL/pagina.html 28 Bonanni, Andrea. “Rivoluzione ai confini guardie di frontiera Ue indipendenti dai paesi.” La Repubblica. 13 Dec. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca. repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/12/13/rivoluzione-ai-confini-guardie-di-frontiera-ue-indipendenti-dai-paesi18.html?ref=search 29 Bonanni, Andrea “Schengen sotto accusa “Alle frontiere esterne anche i cittadini europei saranno controllati.” La Repubblica. 20 Nov. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/11/20/ schengen-sotto-accusa-alle-frontiere-esterne-anche-i-controllati10.html?ref=search 30 “Migranti, procedura di infrazione Ue contro l’Italia su mancata registrazione.”

La Repubblica. 13 Dec. 2015, accessed 19 Dec 2015. http://www.repubblica.it/ cronaca/2015/12/10/news/migranti_eurostat_in_italia_91_prime_richieste_asilo-129161067/?ref=search 31 Bonanni, Andrea. “Migranti, l’Europa sanziona l’Italia Scontro con Bruxelles.”

68

Italy - Tea Cimini La Repubblica. 11 Dec. 2015, 19 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/12/11/migranti-leuropa-sanziona-litalia-scontro-con-bruxelles16.html?ref=search 32 Zatterin, Marco. “La Ue verso una procedura di infrazione contro l’Italia per non aver registrato i migranti.” La Stampa. 8 Dec. 2015, 19 Dec. 2015. http:// www.lastampa.it/2015/12/08/esteri/la-ue-verso-una-procedura-di-infrazione-contro-litalia-per-non-aver-registrato-i-migranti-ihRyeipKs2prgI140sX0YO/pagina.html 33 “Un milione di migranti entrati in Europa nel 2015.” La Stampa. 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan 2016. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/12/22/esteri/un-milione-di-migranti-entrati-in-europa-nelIuaJSsDm7yf5cFRIWSNjZN/pagina.html 34 Infrazioni europee: Italia in cima ha già pagato multe per 183 milioni di euro.”

La Repubblica. 2 Nov. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.repubblica.it/ economia/2015/11/02/news/infrazioni_europee_italia_multe-126060731/ 35 Balestreri, Giuseppe. “Quote latte, multa in arrivo per l’Italia. Martina: “Salvini chieda scusa.” La Repubblica. 26 Feb. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http:// www.repubblica.it/economia/2015/02/26/news/martina_quote_latte_multa_ ue-108213632/?ref=search 36 Rizzo, Sergio. “Quote latte, costo infinito: punita la «grazia» agli allevatori multati.” Il Corriere della Sera. 27 Feb. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www. corriere.it/cronache/15_febbraio_27/quote-latte-costo-infinito-punita-grazia-allevatori-multati-686d9928-be5a-11e4-abd1-822f1e0f1ed7.shtml 37 “Quote latte, l’ultima multa costa all’Italia 30 milioni di euro.” La Repubblica.

October 22. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2015/10/22/news/quote_latte-125645575/?ref=search 38 Spini, Francesco. “Quote latte, l’ultima mazzata Ue “Ancora da pagare 1,3 miliardi.” La Stampa. 27 Feb. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa. it/2015/02/27/economia/quote-latte-lultima-mazzata-ue-ancora-da-pagare-miliardi-rJXKG74bNdnXAZN01DPldL/pagina.html 39 Spini, Francesco. “Quote latte, l’ultima mazzata Ue “Ancora da pagare 1,3 miliardi.”

40 De Leo, Carlotta. “Quote latte addio, allevatori a Roma «Sopravvissuta 1 stalla su 5».” Il Corriere della Sera. 31 Mar. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://roma. corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/15_marzo_31/quote-latte-addio-allevatori-roma-sopravvissuta-1-stalla-5-dac694d6-d77b-11e4-82ff-02a5d56630ca.shtml 41 Poggio, Oldrado “Quote latte, multe e crisi hanno svuotato la stalla.” La Stampa. 2 Feb. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/02/09/ edizioni/asti/quote-latte-multe-e-crisi-hanno-svuotato-la-stalla-ThggsOG0ZkEE3DNCyxRgQP/pagina.html 42 “Quote latte, Italia deferita a Corte Ue Multe non pagate per 1,3 miliardi.” Il Corriere della Sera. 26 Feb. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.corriere.it/ economia/15_febbraio_26/quote-latte-italia-deferita-corte-ue-multe-non-pagate13-miliardi-fa0dc8da-bdce-11e4-8a38-1230a4c6f057.shtml 43 “Multa in arrivo per le quote latte Il ministro Martina “Ora la Lega chieda scusa.” La Repubblica. 26 Feb. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca.repubblica.

69

Messages in the Media it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/02/27/multa-in-arrivo-per-le-quote-latteil-ministro-martina-ora-la-lega-chieda-scusa38.html?ref=search 44 “Rifiuti Campania, l’Ue condanna l’Italia. Una multa da 20 milioni, più 120 mila euro per ogni giorno in cui la norma è stata violate.” La Repubblica. 16 Jul. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://napoli.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/07/16/ news/rifiuti_campania_corte_ue_condanna_italia_20_mln_piu_120mila_euro-119217183/?ref=search 45 “Rifiuti Campania, l’Ue condanna l’Italia. Una multa da 20 milioni, più 120 mila euro per ogni giorno in cui la norma è stata violate,” 46 Abate, Gianluca “«I veleni della Terra dei fuochi sono in aria e acqua, non nei cibi».” Il Corriere del Mezzogiorno. 14 Feb. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://corrieredelmezzogiorno.corriere.it/napoli/salute/15_febbraio_14/iveleni-terra-fuochi-sono-aria-acqua-non-cibi-e11daeba-b434-11e4bc47-b49536325042.shtml 47 Marconi, Luca. “Da Corte Ue maxi-multa all’Italia per i rifiuti della Campania Il ministro: «Ora pagherà la Regione».” Il Corriere del Mezzogiorno. 16 July. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://corrieredelmezzogiorno.corriere.it/napoli/cronaca/15_luglio_16/da-corte-ue-maxi-multa-all-italia-rifiuti-campania-6e42d53c2bc6-11e5-b7c2-086f3b1407a5.shtml 48 Salvaggiulo, Giuseppe. “Rifiuti, in Campania sprechi e salute a rischio: dall’Ue prima maximulta all’Italia.” La Stampa. 7 Oct. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2014/11/07/italia/cronache/rifiuti-in-campania-sprechi-e-salute-a-rischio-dallue-prima-maximulta-allitalia-QHCoyq4mhKfrc6QsbXd7gK/pagina.html 49 Fuccillo, Roberto. “Ecoballe e ciclo rifiuti multa Ue da 20 milioni “Gravi insufficienze.” La Repubblica. 17 Jul. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca. repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/07/17/ecoballe-e-ciclo-rifiuti-multa-ue-da-20-milioni-gravi-insufficienzeNapoli02.html?ref=search 50 “Ecoballe, interviene il governo «Operazione da 700 milioni».” Il Corriere del Mezzogiorno. 30 Jul. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://corrieredelmezzogiorno. corriere.it/napoli/cronaca/15_luglio_30/ecoballe-interviene-governo-operazione-700-milioni-e9bccab4-3680-11e5-8683-f133da2011c5.shtml 51 “Ecoballe e ciclo rifiuti multa Ue da 20 milioni “Gravi insufficienze.” La Repubblica. 17 Jul. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/ archivio/repubblica/2015/07/17/ecoballe-e-ciclo-rifiuti-multa-ue-da-20-milioni-gravi-insufficienzeNapoli02.html?ref=search 52 Ferrara, Antonio. “Renzi: “Governo amico del Sud risaneremo la Terra dei fuochi.” La Repubblica. 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca. repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/12/22/renzi-governo-amico-del-sud-risaneremo-la-terra-dei-fuochiNapoli04.html?ref=search 53 “Acqua, all’Italia servono 20 mld di investimenti per evitare le multe Ue.” La Repubblica. 24 Mar. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.repubblica.it/ economia/2015/03/24/news/acqua_all_italia_servono_20_mld_di_investimenti_per_evitare_le_multe_ue-110350331/?ref=search 54 “Acqua, all’Italia servono 20 mld di investimenti per evitare le multe Ue.” La 70

Italy - Tea Cimini Repubblica.

55 Corcella, Ruggiero. “Acqua del rubinetto, ci si può fidare L’«oro blu» sarà ancora più sicuro.” Il Corriere della Sera. 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http:// www.corriere.it/salute/nutrizione/15_dicembre_18/acqua-rubinetto-ci-si-puofidare-l-oro-blu-sara-ancora-piu-sicuro-f03285d6-a594-11e5-a238-fd021b6faac8. shtml 56 “Juncker: «Sì a bilanci più flessibili per i Paesi che aiutano i migranti».” Il Corriere della Sera. 27 Oct. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://www.corriere.it/ esteri/15_ottobre_27/migranti-juncker-avverte-niente-registrazione-niente-diritti-b77b81f2-7c95-11e5-8cf1-fb04904353d9.shtml 57 “Rumore record avvertimento Ue “Subito le mappe o multa all’Italia.” La Repubblica. 1 Nov. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/ repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/11/01/rumore-record-avvertimento-ue-subito-le-mappe-o-multa-allitaliaNapoli04.html?ref=search 58 Fubini, Federico. “Piano salva-banche: crediti a forte rischio venduti alla Bce con garanzia statale.” La Repubblica. 12 Jan. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http:// www.repubblica.it/economia/2015/01/12/news/piano_salva-banche_crediti_a_ forte_rischio_venduti_alla_bce_con_garanzia_statale-104761772/?ref=search 59 “L’idea bad bank come salvagente dei nostri istituti Ruolo di garante per il Tesoro.” La Repubblica. 18 Jan. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://ricerca. repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/01/18/lidea-bad-bank-comesalvagente-dei-nostri-istituti-ruolo-di-garante-per-il-tesoro28.html?ref=search 60 “Bad bank, il Tesoro sotto il 50% Tre fasce per i crediti a rischio.” Il Corriere della Sera. 28 Jan. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.corriere.it/economia/15_gennaio_28/bad-bank-stato-sotto-50percento-tre-fasce-crediti-rischiobe2c0cd6-a6d7-11e4-93fc-9b9679dd4aa0.shtml 61 “Bce, Draghi: «Con acquisti titoli spinta di un punto di Pil per l’Italia».” Il Corriere della Sera. 26 Mar. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.corriere.it/ economia/15_marzo_26/bce-draghi-ripresa-ora-piu-forte-l-euro-ha-ridottospread-3627cbde-d3c0-11e4-9231-aa2c4d8b5ec3.shtml 62 Barbera, Alessandro. “Draghi: “Col piano Bce l’Italia guadagnerà un punto di Pil nel 2016.” La Stampa. 27 Mar. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/03/27/economia/draghi-col-piano-bce-litalia-guadagner-un-puntodi-pil-nel-U5Oak0Hh7EgKug5p7urOCM/pagina.html 63 “Ue: l’Italia è sulla buona strada ma deve fare altri progressi.” La Repubblica. 11 May. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016 http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2015/05/11/ news/italia_commissione_ue-114131850/?ref=search 64 Paolucci, Gianluca. “Piano Padoan per rilanciare il credito.” La Stampa. 4 Jun. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://www.lastampa.it/2015/06/04/economia/piano-padoan-per-rilanciare-il-credito-Nkzu7g4kbarN5mhBcfDf9N/pagina.html 65 Zatterin, Marco. “L’Ue gela l’Italia sulla bad bank: “La soluzione è ancora lontana.” La Stampa. 9 Sept. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.lastampa. it/2015/09/09/economia/lue-gela-litalia-sulla-bad-bank-la-soluzione-ancora-lontana-cCzGOZv7SfmSwckfd2XXeL/pagina.html 66 “La Bce: “La bad bank è una delle soluzioni per le sofferenze.” La Repubblica. 29 71

Messages in the Media Sept. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/ repubblica/2015/09/29/la-bce-la-bad-bank-e-una-delle-soluzioni-per-le-sofferenze30.html?ref=search

72

UNITED KINGDOM

By Friederike Wilke

BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). Founded in 1922. Owned by the BBC Trust. Weekly Circulation: ca. 256,000,000 (web).

Daily Mail. Founded in 1896. Owned by DMGT (Daily Mail and General Trust). Weekly Circulation: 5,156,680 (web).

The Independent: Founded in 1986. Owned by Alexander Lebedev. Weekly Circulation: 2,780,560 (web).

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

73

Messages in the Media

The report’s findings show that the three most pertinent issues dominating British media in 2015 were: the Syrian refugee crisis, the Greek debt crisis, and the upcoming British referendum on European Union membership.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis The British response to the Syrian refugee crisis has been a mixed one.

On the one hand, Britain is an EU member state who has pledged to take in their fair share of Syrian migrants. On the other hand, they are wary of overwhelming and uncontrolled migration, and have been swift to close avenues of access through which asylum seekers might enter Britain illegally. On 30 July 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron warned of “a swarm of people coming across the Mediterranean… wanting to come to Britain.”1 In turn, he began setting up a number of domestic and international blockades to prevent such swarms from entering. One such measure came in the form of a partnership with France.

As the Calais migrant camp in France began to reach capacity, with over 4,000 inhabitants residing there at one time, asylum seekers began searching for transportation to Britain.2 While some illegally boarded the Eurostar train, others jumped onto the backs of trucks passing through the Channel Tunnel, which led to several short-term shutdowns of the roadway.3,4,5,6,7,8 The issue also spurred a mutually agreed-upon deal between France and Britain with each state promising both greater security efforts as well as joint humanitarian support. The agreement is expected to be signed soon.9,10,11,12 On the domestic front, Prime Minister Cameron signed into law a bill that would punish landlords who rent out their property to illegal immigrants.13,14 Wary of the economic motivations that drive British migrant flows, the government is also aware of the British public’s weariness surrounding the issue.15 In September, a British marketing firm, YouGov, found that almost half of Britons felt that the nation was taking in too many refugees.16 However, despite measures to control migrant flows, the British have also undertaken a number of efforts to help alleviate EU pressures surrounding the refugee crisis.

On 3 September 2015, Prime Minister Cameron announced that Britain would “fulfill its moral responsibilities,” and work to bring more stability into the region through comprehensive migration policies.17 On 7 September 2015, he announced that the United Kingdom would resettle up to 20,000 Syrian refugees over the next five years.18 This program would not include the resettlement of those who had already arrived on European shores, as the United Kingdom also chose to opt out of any future EU initiatives to relocate already settled migrants, which make up an estimated 160,000 individuals according to Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission.19,20,21,22 However, Britain did pledge £150 million in support to the EU’s resettlement program, a decision that did not sit well with a significant portion of the British public.23

Overall, the handling of the Syrian refugee crisis by the British government has led to friction both within the UK and among the UK and its EU allies. However, there have also been points of cooperation between all actors, 74

United Kingdom - Friederike Wilke with a number of effective reforms passed.

The Greek Debt Crisis Greece’s flailing economy has been a primary concern across the EU, as well as within Britain itself. Upon the January 2015 election of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, leader of Syriza, a leftist Greek political party bent on renegotiating Greece’s bailout package, Prime Minister David Cameron declared the results to be a dangerous sign.24 In exchange for repealing key anti-austerity measures, Greece was granted a four-month extension of EU funding, while renegotiation efforts took place. In June, however, the ECN stopped releasing funds, and in July, negotiation terms were rejected by the EU. At this time, the UK had already provided Greece with £1.72 billion in assistance, a section of the total £37.8 billion Greece had been granted through the IMF.25 As such, with the failing of negotiations, British chancellor Osborne refused to continue contributing British funds to the Greek bailout.26 This term was agreed upon by the EU, who promised to protect British funds from being mixed in with Greek aid.27 Instead of using the money from the European Financial Stability Mechanism, a fund contributed to by all EU members, to fund the Greek bailout, the European Commission agreed to have costs fall back on members of the EMU, which Britain is not a part of.28,29 In August, Greece and its creditors negotiated a third bailout, thereby avoiding both bankruptcy and having to leave the Eurozone. The deal included a bridge loan of €7 billion, by which Greece could repay its debts to the ECB and IMF, in addition to a total €86 billion loan over a three year period.30,31 Avoiding the possibility of a “Grexit” protected fellow EMU countries, but also members of the EU, including Britain. While the potential impact on British finances would be lessened due to the fact that they have their own currency, the use of British money to continue funding what might have become a bankrupt nation troubled the United Kingdom. It also increased tensions between the UK and fellow EU members seeking to strike a deal with Greece.

The British Referendum on European Union Membership On 27 May, the European Union Referendum Bill, a piece of legislation required for the referendum on Britain’s potential exit from the EU to take place, was unveiled in the Queen’s Speech and is now law.32 Simultaneously, Prime Minister Cameron was in talks to renegotiate the terms of Britain’s EU membership. Points of contention between the two parties included a potential ban on EU migrants to Britain, and granting Britain veto power on laws passed in Brussels.33 In December, at the EU Summit in Iceland, these requests were discussed for the first time among EU leaders, of which German Chancellor Angela Merkel was the biggest opponent.34 Although willing to negotiate new policies in order to guarantee that Britain remains within the EU, the two nations did not see eye to eye on a number of issues, making talks more contentious.35,36 75

Messages in the Media In November, an opinion poll conducted by The Independent showed that more than half the British public wants to leave the EU.37 Members of other EU member states clearly indicated that they want Britain to remain within the Union, and are willing to give in to some British demands. Other, however, see the nation as an obstacle to consensus and perceive them as hindering effective decision-making on the EU level.38,39,40

2015 in Review The year 2015 was a difficult one for EU-UK relationships, the turbulence of which is likely to have an impact on the upcoming 2016 referendum. The referendum will be a major and, many would agree, unpredictable event, with lasting consequences for all involved. Britain would be the first nation to leave the EU, and as there is no current precedent for such a move, an exit strategy would have to be devised. Both the Greek debt crisis and the Syrian refugee crisis have caused the British public to lose faith in the process of the EU, with many believing their crisis management strategies to be slow and unsuccessful. The UK is also wary of having policies which they disagree with enforced on them by the EU. Expedited by the May re-election of David Cameron and the Conservative Party, “Brexit” is sure to continue to captivate British media, with the fallout being of high consequence, regardless of the results.

The Syrian refugee crisis, a key point of strain in EU-UK relationships, also continues to rage on. With the number of asylum seekers within Europe having topped one million, several issues have arisen.41 Fellow EU members, Britain included, are less than pleased with the German “open door” policy, as they fear that it may contribute to increased illegal migration within their own borders. Additionally, the British were disappointed at the lack of a cohesive strategy employed throughout the crisis and are thus wary of pouring more money into it through the EU, a debate which further intensified negotiation efforts over their EU membership. As the referendum approaches, however, and such issues continue to challenge the United Kingdom, officials are struggling to stabilize relations. Questions remain about how a Brexit might affect Scotland, who was unsuccessful in its attempt at independence in 2014, as they want to remain within the EU.42,43,44 There are also fears that a Brexit may reignite tensions in Northern Ireland.45 Overall, while they were able to opt out of the EU bailout of Greece, both the details surrounding the Greek debt crisis as well as the Syrian refugee crisis have strained the UK-EU relationship, with distrust brewing on both sides.

Thus, the events of 2016 will have a deciding impact on future relations.

Fry, Luke. “Refugee crisis timeline: How the crisis has grown.” The Independent.

15 Sept. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ europe/refugee-crisis-timeline-how-the-crisis-has-grown-10502690.html 1

76

United Kingdom - Friederike Wilke Akbar, Jay. “It’s an even bigger jungle out there.” Dailymail. 1 Oct. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3256653/It-s-biggerjungle-Aerial-photographs-Calais-migrant-camp-rapidly-increased-size-justthree-months-number-people-living-hits-4-000.html 3 Robinson, Martin. “Clinging on for dear life.” Dailymail. 31. Jul 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3180929/Another-night-chaos-Calais-Migrants-cling-roof-lorry-arrives-Kent-children-pulled-barbed-wirefences-surrounding-Channel-Tunnel-French-struggle-cope.html 4 Drury, Ian; Witherow, Tom and Tozer, James. “Fear of truckers at Calais running the gauntlet of migrant mob.” Dailymail 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3371193/Fear-truckers-Calais-runninggauntlet-migrant-mob-Hauliers-say-driver-die-face-daily-attacks-hammersbaseball-bats-guns.html 5 Dearden, Lizzie. “Refugee crisis: Hundreds of migrants storm Calais motorway attempting to board lorries heading to the UK.” The Independent. 16 Dec. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 6 Sims, Alexandra. “Channel Tunnel service resumes after mass break-in.” The Independent. 2 Oct. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/europe/channel-tunnel-suspensed-after-100-migrants-invadetrack-a6677981.html 7 Allen, Peter and Tomlinson, Simon. “Two-thousand migrants storm the Channel Tunnel in one night as riot police battle for six hours in a desperate attempt to keep them out.” Dailymail. 28 Jul. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016 http:// www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3176965/Holidaymakers-face-travel-misery-latest-wave-migrant-chaos-sparks-hour-long-delays-Eurotunnel-Operation-Stack-causes-gridlock-Kent.html 8 Sheffield, Hazel. “Eurotunnel freight trains down by a third because of refugee crisis at Channel Tunnel.” The Independent. 22 Oct. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/eurotunnel-freight-trainsdown-by-a-third-because-of-refugee-crisis-at-channel-tunnel-a6703896.html 9 “Calais migrant crisis: UK and France to sign deal.” BBC. 18 Aug. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33982018 McTague, Tom; Slack, James and Allien, Peter. “Britain and France ‘to sign a deal’ in Calais on Thursday in a bid to end the migrant crisis.” Dailymail. 18 Aug. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3202503/ Britain-France-sign-deal-Calais-Thursday-bid-end-migrant-crisis.html 10 “Calais migrant crisis: Theresa May signs deal with France.” BBC. 20 Aug. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33992952 11 McTague, Tom; Slack, James and Allien, Peter. “Britain and France ‘to sign a deal’ in Calais on Thursday in a bid to end the migrant crisis.” Dailymail. 18 Aug. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3202503/ Britain-France-sign-deal-Calais-Thursday-bid-end-migrant-crisis.html 12 Chorley, Matt. “Landlords threatened with jail if they rent to illegal immigrants but tenants won’t automatically be kicked out oft he UK.” Dailymail. 2 Aug. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3183347/Land2

77

Messages in the Media lords-fail-check-renting-illegal-immigrants-face-five-years-prison.html 13 Chorley, Matt. “Cameron’s flagship crackdown on illegal migrants renting homes caught just seven landlords and fined them £800 each.” Dailymail. 6 Aug. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3187149/ Cameron-s-flagship-crackdown-illegal-migrants-renting-homes-caught-justSEVEN-landlords-fined-800-each.html 14 Carlin, Brendan. “Migrants can’t break into Britain, says Cameron: PM’s defiant vow sparks new fury over calling refugees a ‘swarm’.” Dailymail. 15 Aug. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3199510/We-t-letmigrants-break-Britain-says-Cameron-denies-wrong-talk-swarms-refugees.html 15 Doyle, Jack. “Nearly half of Britons thing we’re taking too many Syrian refugees: Poll exposes gulf between opposition parties and public opinion.” Dailymail. 8 Sep. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-3227059/Nearly-half-Britons-think-taking-Syrian-refugees-Poll-exposes-gulf-opposition-parties-public-opinion.html 16 “Migrant crisis: PM says UK will fulfill moral responsibilities.” BBC. 3 Sep. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34135870 17 “First of 20,000 Syrian refugees arrive in UK.” BBC. 22 Sep. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34329459 18 Chorley, Matt and McTague, Tom. “Britain to open the doors to 20,00 Syrians – but spread out over five years and only from refugee camps in the Middle East.”

Dailymail. 7 Sep. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3224902/Syrian-orphans-offered-help-Cameron-promises-Britain-safe-haven-thousands-refugee-camps.html 19 “First Syrian refugees flight due to land in UK next week.” BBC. 10 Nov. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34779524 20 Cendrowicz, Leo. “Refugee crisis: EU to vote through quota plan despite opposition from Eastern Europe.” The Independent. 8 Sep. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-eu-to-votethrough-quota-plan-despite-opposition-from-eastern-europe-10492190.html 21 “Syrian refugees flight lands in UK.” BBC. 17 Nov. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34839477 22 “First Syrian refugees flight due to land in UK next week.” BBC. 10 Nov. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34779524 23 Stevens, John and Tonkin, Sam. “We have lost control of our borders, says EU chief.” Dailymail. 23 Sep. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ news/article-3246937/Millions-refugees-flood-Europe-lost-control-borderswarns-EU-chief-ahead-summit-tackle-crisis.html 24 “Cameron on Greece election: ‘There are some danger signs’.” BBC. 26 Jan. 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016) http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30984232 25 Broad, Mark. “What impact would Grexit have on the UK?” BBC. 6 Jul. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/business-33165580 26 “Greece debt crisis: No UK cash for bailout, Osborne says.” BBC. 14 Jul. 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33517457 27 “UK ‚strikes deal’ over Greek bailout.” BBC. 16 Jul. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 78

United Kingdom - Friederike Wilke http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-33556085; “Greek bailout: PM says UK won’t provide interim funding.” BBC. 15 Jul. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http:// www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-33532485 28 “Greek bailout: UK ‘could be overruled’ on bridging loans.” BBC. 14 Jul. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-33528894 29 Austin, Henry. “Greek debt crisis: No British money will be used for bailout, says George Osborne.” The Independent. 13 Jul. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/greek-debt-crisis-george-osborne-wants-no-british-money-used-for-bailout-10386644.html 30 “Greece debt crisis: Eurozone backs €7bn bridging loan.” BBC. 16 Jul. 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33546352 31 “Greece debt crisis: Eurozone summit strikes deal.” BBC. 13 Jul. 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33503955; “Greece debt crisis: Eurozone deal laws backed by MPs.“ BBC. 16 Jul. 2015, accessed 11 Jan. 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33535205 32 Peev, Gerri and Groves, Jason. “PM putsEuro referendum Bill at top of Queen’s speech: Cameron signals intention to fast-track negotiations so poll could be held in 2016.” Dailymail. 18 May 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail. co.uk/news/article-3086982/PM-puts-Euro-referendum-Bill-Queen-s-speechCameron-signals-intention-fast-track-negotiations-poll-held-2016.html 33 Chorley, Matt. “Cameron’s EU wishlist dismissed by Tory MPs as ‘thin gruel’ as he retreats on banning benefits for migrants four years.” Dailymail. 10 Nov. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3311261/ My-EU-mission-possible-vows-Cameron-four-page-negotiating-letter-lambasted-short-detail.html 34 Robinson, Martin. “Cameron says ‘the pace will quicken’ in his battle to get a better deal for Britain from the EU as he insists talks are ‚going well’.” Dailymail.

29 Oct. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3294698/Tell-want-EU-leaders-reveal-David-Cameron-not-shared-concreteplans-reform-Britain-s-relationship-Europe.html 35 Groves, James. “PM set to clash with Merkel over EU reform: He’ll demand right to restrict migrants’ benefits at summit.” Dailymail. 21 May 2015, accesssed 10 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3091967/PM-set-clashMerkel-EU-reform-ll-demand-right-restrict-migrants-benefits-summit.html 36 Chorley, Matt. “Merkel tells Cameron she ‘very much likes’ having Britain in EU as she backs benefit curbs to end ‘abuse’ of migration rules.” Dailymail. 7 Jan. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2900454/ Cameron-hail-Merkel-key-ally-battle-claw-powers-Brussels-Germany-backsbenefits-clampdown.html 37 Grice, Andrew. “EU referendum: Majority of UK public wants ‘Brexit’, poll reveals.” The Independent. 23 Nov. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-majority-of-public-now-wantsa-brexit-poll-reveals-a6745561.html 38 Chorley, Matt. “British public could think ‘Oh Christ, push Europe away’, Cameron warns as Poland rejects demand to curb migrant benefits.” Dailymail.

79

Messages in the Media 10 Dec. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article3354001/I-m-British-voter-Cameron-warns-migrant-crisis-push-UK-leave-European-Union.html 39 Groves, Jason and Peev, Gerri. “Poland may block PM’s bid to curb migrant benefits: Cameron faces crunch talks with country’s new leader as he battles to save his EU reform package.” Dailymail. 10 Dec. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3353708/Poland-block-PM-s-bid-curbmigrant-benefits.html 40 “Poland, UK still have no agreement on Cameron EU reforms.” Dailymail.

10 Dec. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3354035/Poland-UK-no-agreement-Cameron-EU-reforms.html 41 Withnall, Adam. “Refugee crisis: Number of people reaching Europe in 2015 passes 1 million.” The Independent. 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http:// www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-number-reaching-europe-2015-passes-1-million-syria-afghanistan-turkey-greece-a6782611. html 42 “EU exit could lead to break up of UK, says Lord Hague.” BBC. 23 Dec. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35165720 43 “Nicola Sturgeon warns of EU exit ‘backlash’.” BBC. 2 Jun. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-32961729 44 “Sturgeon warning on EU exit ‘anger’.” Dailymail. 2 Jun. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/pa/article-3106883/Sturgeon-seeks-sensible-EU-reform.html 45 Chorley, Matt. “Brexit could restart Northern Ireland Troubles, warns Irish PM as Durch claim UK will be drifting in ‘the middle of the Atlantic’.” Dailymail. 9 Nov. 2015, accessed 15 Jan. 2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3310338/Brexit-restart-Northern-Ireland-Troubles-warns-Irish-PM-Dutchclaim-UK-drifting-middle-Atlantic.html

80

IRELAND

By Karen Power

The Independent: Founded in 1986. Owned by The Independent Print Ltd. Daily circulation of 280,000.

Irish Examiner: Founded in 1841. Owned by Landmark Media Investments. Daily circulation of 35,000.

Irish Times: Founded in 1859. Owned by Irish Times Trust. Daily circulation of 80,000.

Figures are for 2015. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

81 4

Messages in the Media Throughout 2015, three major topics stood out in Irish media coverage: the negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the proposed Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), and the United Kingdom’s possible exit from the EU. The Impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on Irish Trade, Agriculture and Public Health The TTIP was conceived and launched in 2013 during the Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union.1 The EU is negotiating a trade and investment deal with the United States known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). If achieved, the TTIP would create the largest free trade zone in the world. The objective of the TTIP is to help EU countries and businesses by establishing easier access to the American market, reducing or eliminating red tape for exporting purposes, and establishing rules to allow for easier and fairer terms for exporting, importing, and investing in the United States.2 For Ireland specifically, the TTIP is projected to boost GDP by as much as two percent.3 The EU Ambassador to the US, Irish diplomat David O’Sullivan, sees the TTIP as having a huge potential boost for Ireland’s economy.

Specifically, the TTIP could help Ireland to diversify and rebuild its economy in a more sustainable way. O’Sullivan went so far as to say that TTIP will “disproportionately benefit Ireland.” As one of the EU countries with the highest levels of trade with the US, Ireland stands to gain the most from more open trade. For instance, with Ireland exporting 80 percent of what it produces, 20 percent of that went to the United States in 2013. This trade amounted to over €500 million in the food and drink industry alone.4 From an agricultural perspective, there is concern amongst Irish farmers that American imports will not be subjected to the “hefty standards” that Irish farmers face.5 Media coverage reminded Irish readers that American farming practices are not subject to the same regulations as the EU. For example, this is true with regards to the practice of adding hormones to animal feed in America; practices that are the antithesis to Irish methods.6 Moreover, the European Agriculture Commissioner, Irishman Phil Hogan, has been quoted saying the TTIP “won’t be done at any price.”7 Some other concerns involve ones relating to healthcare, including regulations on tobacco companies, and the provision of medical care to the elderly. In May 2015, Ireland introduced plain packaging for cigarettes. One of the proposed provisions of the TTIP is that a company can appeal to a transnational arbitration system to circumvent national governments if the company feels that a particular law discriminates against their business activity.8 The concern was that tobacco companies could appeal to an arbitrator, rather than pursue the matter through Irish courts. The Irish Medical Organisation passed a motion to lobby the Irish Government to ensure that any EU-level 82

Ireland - Karen Power legislation “cannot weaken existing or future regulations and policies that protect public health.”9 The healthcare debate continued with elder-care. Under TTIP, the media claimed that private American healthcare companies could encroach on what is currently a government-funded social service in Ireland. One American elder-care company in particular, Home Instead, has a number of Europeanbased offices and has lobbied the European Commission to change the labour rules concerning minimum wage and overtime pay. This has led to fears of substandard elder-care in the event of privatization of this sector.10 However, the Commission has dismissed any public fears of privatization, as the current plan does not call on governments to privatize social services or healthcare. In fact, those sectors are excluded from negotiations.11 In July, some of Ireland’s largest teachers’ unions signed a petition urging MEPs to oppose the TTIP as the partnership is considered a “threat to basic European principles”. This viewpoint is largely based on the hotly debated arbitration dispute mechanism.12 Irish Corporate Tax Policies and the EU’s Proposed Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) Initially launched in 2001, the CCCTB initiative aims to introduce common accounting standards across all EU member states. These common standards would include the tax rate a company pays, and would also enable companies to submit one standardized tax return. The plan is meant to thwart companies who avoid paying corporate taxes under the current system: at the moment, companies operating within the EU can choose the EU country through which they wish to submit their taxes. This inevitably results in companies submitting their taxes in the country with the lowest corporate tax rate. The initiative has been tabled multiple times since its inception, and 2015 saw more delays due in large part to the onerous task of the initiative.13 The latest push for common EU tax policies is primarily being led

by France and Germany.14 In Ireland, the consequences are that the proposed changes to the CCCTB may result in Irish-based companies facing higher tax rates. At the moment, Ireland’s corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent is the lowest in the EU. There are two main challenges: not only does the EU want to implement a standardized corporate tax rate (which will be higher than the existing rate in Ireland), but also, the UK has announced that they are considering imposing tax rates on profits from sales made in the UK.15,16 From a national perspective, some EU member states view the CCCTB as an opportunity to reduce national debt since collected taxes would be apportioned across EU countries in a standardized manner.17,18 Brexit: The Possible Exit of The UK From The EU With the UK Conservative Party winning a majority government in 83

Messages in the Media the May 2015 elections, one of the key items on the new government’s agenda is planning a referendum on whether the UK should remain within the EU, and under what conditions. Ireland’s economy and national security are inextricably linked to Britain, and they would be under severe pressure should Britain leave the EU. Britain is Ireland’s largest trading partner, and a positive relationship between Dublin and London ensures that Ireland has a stable relationship with Northern Ireland. Insofar as it relates to Brussels, Ireland and Britain hold similar positions on various EU-related issues, and should Ireland have to go-it-alone without Britain, then it is felt by some that Ireland would not win when differing opinions prevail in Brussels.19,20,21 If the British exit — Brexit — from the EU were to occur, the impact on the Irish economy is projected to be harsh.22,23 If Ireland does not attain a specific trade agreement with Britain in the event of exit, initial estimates are that three percent of Irish GDP (equivalent to €5.5 billion) would be lost. Even with a trade agreement, it is still expected that the Irish economy would lose about two billion euros in trade in the event of a Brexit. These figures exclude the additional costs incurred for transporting goods to what is Ireland’s biggest European trading partner.24,25 After the Conservatives won a majority election in Britain, the projections of lost goods and services revenue varied between three billion euros to a potential high of eight billion euros.26,27,28 Those projected losses would be in addition to the ramifications felt in the existing bilateral trade between Ireland and Britain, which is currently pegged at one billion euros per week in goods and services.29,30 However, uncertainty on the actual impact on the economy continued at the end of 2015 since Britain’s role and final terms in the event of a “Brexit” remained unknown.31,32,33 Ireland: A Year in Review 2015 Currently, there is a lot of concern in Ireland regarding the changing conditions in the future. The potential TTIP, CCCTB and the British exit from the EU would all significantly change the economic and social conditions in Ireland. While there is uncertainty as to how Irish-EU relations would be affected in the event of either of the three events, there is still significant overall support for the EU within Ireland. With the American presidential election looming in 2017, The Irish government saw 2015 as a key year to finalize the TTIP negotiations before President Obama leaves office.34,35 When negotiations began in 2013, the aim was to finalize the partnership before the end of 2016.36 However, as 2015 progressed with various delays and hurdles in the negotiations, that deadline looked less likely.37 Indeed, as 2015 came to close there was no definite end in sight for negotiations.38 Brussels is keen to offset the growing negative perceptions around the TTIP, with many member states voicing concerns about the lack of transparency and the actual aims and objectives of the agreement.39,40 Irish diplomat and EU Ambassador to the US, David O’Sullivan, attempted to counter any concerns by 84

Ireland - Karen Power stating that the negotiations were “utterly boring” and that some people clearly think more is going on behind the scenes and therefore assume the government is hiding information.41 Mr O’Sullivan went on to further accuse opponents of “scaremongering” and to reassure the public that existing Irish and EU standards regarding consumer, health, labour, or environmental protection would be maintained.42 Advocates for the TTIP claim that it will create more jobs and will allow European businesses to compete against the current strength of Russian and Chinese imports. Conversely, opponents of TTIP (including Irish Republican party Sinn Féin) argue that it will lead to higher unemployment in Ireland.43 Opponents also included many European citizens (including the Irish) who had expressed concerns that the initial American proposal for arbitration practices would undermine existing binding EU laws and standards and that the agreement will allow American multinationals to “bully European governments”.44,45,46 By this, they are referring to the proposal to allow companies that invest in a particular country a means to challenge the host government through a proposed arbitration mechanism, known as the investor state dispute settlement system (ISDS).47 Opponents are concerned that the TTIP would empower corporations with respect to potentially overruling national sovereignty, and as favouring the rights of foreign investors over those of national investors and residents.48,49 Richard Bruton, the Irish Minister for Enterprise, told fellow government ministers that any dispute mechanism within TTIP was “unlikely” to supersede existing Irish courts and legal system.50 The European Parliament ultimately agreed to a compromise arbitration solution that would establish a new European court as the dispute mechanism that would comprise of a 15-judge (publicly appointed) court system.The United States has yet to approve this, as they have always insisted on ISDS.51

When it comes to the implementation of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, several concerns were raised in the main news sources.

Presently, multinational companies based in Ireland account for 25 percent of GDP and 11 percent of all public sector jobs, employing approximately 174,500 people.52 Non-Irish firms account for 90 percent of exports.53 Any changes to Ireland’s corporate tax rate could thus have huge implications for business. At the moment, EU member states retain the right to set their own corporate tax rates,54 and in the past Ireland has voted against implementing a CCCTB.55 Many politicians, civil society members, corporations and members of the public see the determination of tax rates to be a sovereign, national-level issue, not one to be decided by the EU.56,57,58,59,60,61 These concerns about transferring power to the supranational level are one of the main reasons Ireland has voted against the CCCTB in the past, together with concerns about lost tax revenue and job losses.

The European Commission was adamant that it would develop a proposal that would be mandatory for all multinationals operating within the Eurozone.62,63 As of the year’s end, an agreement had still not been met.

With regards to issues arising from the potential Brexit, some of the 85

Messages in the Media media coverage positioned such an event as an opportunity for Ireland to attract investment from emerging markets, particularly in Asia. Some speculate that if this were to occur, some multinational companies would move their European offices in Ireland, which would be the only English-speaking country remaining within the Eurozone.64,65

The Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) has established a working group to assess how Ireland could attract companies with European operations to relocate to Ireland.66,67 As well, the Bank of Ireland has conducted risk assessments and contingency planning to help identify economic and political impacts on Ireland should Britain leave the EU.68

By the end of 2015, Ireland had increased its lobbying efforts within the EU to back David Cameron in reforming the EU.69,70 The Irish Foreign Affairs Minister, Charlie Flanagan, acknowledged that if Britain were to exit the EU, there would be the risk of tremendous harm to the Irish economy.71,72 Prime Minister Enda Kenny supported his Minister’s position and said that Ireland would help to support any “reasonable” demands that Britain puts forward.73,74,75,76,77

Public opinion polls showed that approximately 77 percent of the Irish population would want to remain as part of the EU, even if Britain were to exit.78 Lynch, Suzanne. “European Parliament postpones transatlantic trade vote” The Irish Times. 9 June 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/european-parliament-postponestransatlantic-trade-vote-1.2243114 2 European Commission Trade. What is TTIP about? http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/ 3 Edwards, Patrick. “US trade deal to boost GDP by 2pc” The Irish Independent.

27 May 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/ustrade-deal-to-boost-gdp-by-2pc-31256464.html 4 O’Regan, Mark. “‘Our hearts must rule our heads’ as Europe faces crisis – diplomat” The Irish Independent. 8 Sept. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www. independent.ie/irish-news/politics/our-hearts-must-rule-our-heads-as-europefaces-crisis-diplomat-31509333.html 5 Downing, John. “The Big Interview: Phil Hogan - Brussels Philosophy” The Irish Independent. 7 Jan. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/farming/the-big-interview-phil-hogan-brussels-philosophy-30884065. html 6 Lavin, Rachel. “Darina Allen warns of trade deal threat to Irish food market “ The Irish Independent. 1 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www. independent.ie/irish-news/news/darina-allen-warns-of-trade-deal-threat-toirish-food-market-34158881.html 7 Cogley, Michael. “TTIP trade deal won’t be ‘done at any price’ says Hogan” The Irish Independent. 28 Oct. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.

1

86

Ireland - Karen Power ie/business/farming/ttip-trade-deal-wont-be-done-at-any-price-sayshogan-34143022.html 8 O’Meara Kathleen. “Trade deal could put Big Tobacco’s interests before public health” The Irish Independent. 20 Aug. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/opinion/comment/trade-deal-could-put-bigtobaccos-interests-before-public-health-31464272.html 9 O’Donoghue, Paul. “‘Trade deal could help Big Tobacco in legal battles’: IMO” The Irish Independent. 17 Apr. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www. independent.ie/irish-news/trade-deal-could-help-big-tobacco-in-legal-battlesimo-31149537.html 10 Cahill, Ann. “EU deal will put elderly care at risk” The Irish Examiner. 13 Oct. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/eu-deal-willput-elderly-care-at-risk-358950.html 11 Lynch, Suzanne. “Warning EU-US trade deal could undermine public services” The Irish Times. 13 Oct. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/warning-eu-us-trade-deal-couldundermine-public-services-1.2389223 12 O’Donoghue, Paul. “Teachers unions oppose TTIP ahead of vote” The Irish Independent. 9 July 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/teachers-unions-oppose-ttip-ahead-of-vote-31360021.html 13 http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_ base/index_en.htm 14 Cahill, Ann. “Ireland finds support for corporate tax policies” The Irish Examiner. 27 Apr. 2015, accessed 14 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/ business/ireland-finds-support-for-corporate-tax-policies-327194.html 15 Morgan, Gareth and Kelpie, Colm. “EU and UK reforms pose challenge to our corporate tax regime” The Irish Independent. 19 Mar. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/eu-and-uk-reforms-posechallenge-to-our-corporate-tax-regime-31078920.html 16 Kelpie, Colm. “Mandatory corporate tax rules to be launched within 18 months “ The Irish Independent. 18 June 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www. independent.ie/business/irish/mandatory-corporate-tax-rules-to-be-launchedwithin-18-months-31310249.html 17 Independent.ie Newsdesk. “Newsmaker: Pierre Moscovici “ The Irish Independent. 1 June 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/irish/newsmaker-pierre-moscovici-31268020.html 18 Cahill, Ann. “EU seeks to force firms pay tax where profits earned “ The Irish Examiner. 19 Feb. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/ business/eu-seeks-to-force-firms-pay-tax-where-profits-earned-313448.html 19 O’Brien, Dan. “Keeping Britain in the EU is best for Ireland - so we need Conservatives to lose” The Irish Independent. 3 Apr. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/opinion/columnists/dan-obrien/keeping-britain-inthe-eu-is-best-for-ireland-so-we-need-conservatives-to-lose-31115517.html 87

Messages in the Media O’Brien, Dan. “Could a Brexit be Ireland’s opportunity?” The Irish Independent.

15 May 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/opinion/ columnists/dan-obrien/could-a-brexit-be-irelands-opportunity-31220876.html 21 Downing, John. “John Downing: Risk of ‘Grexit’ and ‘Brexit’ compound Kenny’s woes” The Irish Independent. 15 June 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http:// www.independent.ie/opinion/columnists/john-downing/john-downing-risk-ofgrexit-and-brexit-compound-kennys-woes-31302047.html 22 Hand, Lisa and O’Connor, Niall. “‘Brexit’ will pose risk to Irish economy, warns Kenny “ The Irish Independent. 10 Nov. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www. independent.ie/irish-news/politics/brexit-will-pose-risk-to-irish-economywarns-kenny-34185087.html 23 Kelpie, Colm.” ‘Brexit’ would cut Irish-UK trade by a fifth: ESRI” The Irish Independent. 5 Nov. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/irish/brexit-would-cut-irishuk-trade-by-a-fifth-esri-34170917.html 24 Curran, Richard. “Brexit will be the new Y2K bonanza for consultants”.

The Irish Independent. 10 May 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www. independent.ie/business/world/brexit-will-be-the-new-y2k-bonanza-forconsultants-31209610.html 25 Cahill, Ann. “Ireland most to fear in ‘Brexit’” The Irish Examiner. 29 Apr. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/ireland-most-tofear-in-brexit-327583.html 26 Unknown. “Brexit could cost Ireland €3bn a year: ESRI” The Irish Examiner. 5 Nov. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ ireland/brexit-could-cost-ireland-3bn-a-year-esri-704060.html#!

27 Kelpie, Colm. “Brexit: Ireland-UK trade could fall by a fifth, exporters warned” The Irish Independent. 24 June 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http:// www.independent.ie/business/irish/brexit-irelanduk-trade-could-fall-by-a-fifthexporters-warned-31325443.html 28 O’Dwyer, Peter. “Brexit ‘would cost us €4bn’ “ The Irish Examiner. 25 Mar. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/brexitwould-cost-us-4bn-320327.html 29 McCabe, Sarah. “Exporters warn we must plan for ‘Brexit’ “ The Irish Independent. 18 May 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/world/exporters-warn-we-must-plan-for-brexit-31230035.html 30 Unknown. “Lunch at No. 10 - and a full British Brexit is on the menu” The Irish Independent. 19 June 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ opinion/columnists/lise-hand/lunch-at-no-10-and-a-full-british-brexit-is-onthe-menu-31313762.html 31 Mangan, Oliver. “ESRI report shows effect of ‘Brexit’ on the euro and Irish economy “ The Irish Examiner. 10 Nov. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www. irishexaminer.com/business/features/esri-report-shows-effect-of-brexit-on-theeuro-and-irish-economy-364044.html 32 Hogan, Louise. “‘Brexit’ fears are overstated says Teagasc expert” The Irish 20

88

Ireland - Karen Power Independent. 9 Dec. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/farming/brexit-fears-are-overstated-says-teagasc-expert-34266376.html 33 Online Editors. “NTMA chief economist says impact of Brexit on Ireland “impossible” to quantify” The Irish Independent. 19 Nov. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/business/ntma-chief-economist-says-impactof-brexit-on-ireland-impossible-to-quantify-34216051.html 34 Copley, Caroline. “Talks on EU-US trade deal to stretch to 2016” The Irish Independent. 29 Apr. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/world/talks-on-euus-trade-deal-to-stretch-to-2016-31180072.html 35 O’Donoghue, Paul. “Kenny wants controversial EU-US trade deal wrapped up ‘by end of this year’” The Irish Independent. 24 Apr. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/kenny-wants-controversial-euustrade-deal-wrapped-up-by-end-of-this-year-31166907.html 36 Lewis, Barbara. “EU aims to finalise ‘TTIP’ trade deal next year “ The Irish Independent. 5 Aug. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/world/eu-aims-to-finalise-ttip-trade-deal-next-year-31427570.html 37 Lynch, Suzanne. “Warning EU-US trade deal could undermine public services” The Irish Times. 13 Oct. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/warning-eu-us-trade-deal-couldundermine-public-services-1.2389223 38 Matthews, Alan. “No definite deadline in sight for a TTIP deal” The Irish Independent. 25 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/farming/no-definite-deadline-in-sight-for-a-ttip-deal-34227105.html 39 Emmott, Robin. “EU breaks its silence on trade talks with US” The Irish Examiner. 8 Jan. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/ business/eu-breaks-its-silence-on-trade-talks-with-us-305818.html 40 Unknown. “Europe: EU releases trade deal papers with US” The Irish Independent. 8 Jan. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/world/europe-eu-releases-trade-deal-papers-with-us-30890344.html 41 Unknown. “Trade negotiations ‘utterly boring’, says EU diplomat” The Irish Times. 7 Sept. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishtimes.com/business/trade-negotiations-utterly-boring-says-eudiplomat-1.2343495 42 Edwards, Elaine. “Proposed US-EU trade deal will uphold standards, says EU” The Irish Times. 7 Sept. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishtimes.com/business/proposed-us-eu-trade-deal-will-upholdstandards-says-eu-1.2343491 43 Unknown. “So much at risk, so little information - Talks on transatlantic trade deal” The Irish Examiner. 12 Oct. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www. irishexaminer.com/viewpoints/ourview/so-much-at-risk-so-little-information-talks-on-transatlantic-trade-deal-358745.html 44 Unknown. “European Parliament postpones debate on TTIP EU-US trade deal” The Irish Independent. 10 June 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.

89

Messages in the Media independent.ie/business/european-parliament-postpones-debate-on-ttip-euustrade-deal-31291867.html 45 Unknown. “European Parliament backs compromise in TTIP deal” The Irish Independent. 9 July 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/european-parliament-backs-compromise-in-ttip-deal-31363668.html 46 Unknown. “Europe: EU releases trade deal papers with US” The Irish Independent. 8 Jan. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/world/europe-eu-releases-trade-deal-papers-with-us-30890344.html 47 O’Brien, Dan. “Cross-Atlantic trade agreement will benefit Ireland - let’s do the deal” The Irish Independent. 10 Sept. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/opinion/columnists/dan-obrien/crossatlantic-tradeagreement-will-benefit-ireland-lets-do-the-deal-31515710.html 48 O’Dwyer, Peter. “What lies behind the new trade agreement” The Irish Examiner. 3 Jan. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/ business/what-lies-behind-the-new-trade-agreement-304987.html 49 O’Dwyer, Peter. “Call to rethink disputes system” The Irish Examiner. 14 July 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/call-torethink-disputes-system-342407.html 50 O’Halloran, Barry. “Richard Bruton says TTIP deal has safeguards for investors” The Irish Times. 24 June 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www. irishtimes.com/business/economy/richard-bruton-says-ttip-deal-has-safeguardsfor-investors-1.2260689 51 Lynch, Suzanne. “European Commission to establish trade disputes court” The Irish Times. 16 Sept. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishtimes. com/business/economy/european-commission-to-establish-trade-disputescourt-1.2354061 52 Quinn, Eamon. “FDI flows driving recovery ‘can’t be taken for granted’” The Irish Examiner. 16 June 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer. com/business/fdi-flows-driving-recovery-cant-be-taken-for-granted-337181. html 53 O’Brien, Dan. “We should welcome EU’s tax proposals - not fear them” The Irish Independent. 20 Mar. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent. ie/opinion/columnists/dan-obrien/we-should-welcome-eus-tax-proposals-notfear-them-31081021.html 54 Keenan, Brendan. “EU’s corporation tax plans may repeat euro mistake” The Irish Independent. 26 June 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www. independent.ie/business/world/eus-corporation-tax-plans-may-repeat-euromistake-31327497.html 55 Kelpie, Colm. “Report that Europe is considering a minimum corporate tax rate across Europe incorrect – EC” The Irish Independent. 26 May 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/business/world/report-thateurope-is-considering-a-minimum-corporate-tax-rate-across-europe-incorrectec-31255390.html 90

Ireland - Karen Power Unknown. “Ireland in focus as EU proposes common tax base for multinationals – again” The Irish Independent. 17 June 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/business/world/ireland-in-focus-as-euproposes-common-tax-base-for-multinationals-again-31309770.html 57 Cahill, Ann. “European Commission insists Europe tax plan is fair “ The Irish Examiner. 18 June 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/ business/european-commission-insists-europe-tax-plan-is-fair-337663.html 58 Kelpie, Colm and Collins, Sarah. “New OECD global tax proposals target corporation tax avoidance” The Irish Independent. 5 Oct. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/business/world/new-oecd-global-taxproposals-target-corporation-tax-avoidance-31583371.html 59 Unknown. : Michael Noonan willing to level the playing field for corporate tax” The Irish Examiner. 5 Oct. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer. com/breakingnews/ireland/michael-noonan-willing-to-level-the-playing-fieldfor-corporate-tax-699269.html#!

60 Hume Jr, John. “Coalition can find a tasty replacement for the Double Irish” The Irish Examiner. 1 July 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer. com/business/coalition-can-find-a-tasty-replacement-for-the-doubleirish-340088.html 61 O’Donoghue, Paul. “Chairman of Brussels tax committee says Ireland should keep 12.5pc rate” The Irish Independent. 21 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/chairman-of-brussels-tax-committeesays-ireland-should-keep-125pc-rate-34220942.html 62 Cahill, Ann. “MEPs urge tougher stand on corporation tax” The Irish Examiner. 30 July 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/ business/meps-urge-tougher-stand-on-corporation-tax-345382.html 63 Cahill, Ann. “OECD to unveil global tax plans “ The Irish Examiner. 3 Oct. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/oecd-tounveil-global-tax-plans-357326.html 64 O’Brien, Dan. “Asian firms would love a safe European home - let’s give them one” The Irish Independent. 29 Mar. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www. independent.ie/opinion/columnists/dan-obrien/asian-firms-would-love-a-safeeuropean-home-lets-give-them-one-31102266.html 65 O’Donohue, Paul. “Ireland could gain from ‘mess’ of Brexit vote - EU think tank” The Irish Independent. 21 May 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www. independent.ie/business/irish/ireland-could-gain-from-mess-of-brexit-vote-euthink-tank-31239488.html 66 Reynolds, John. “McMurtry eyes Irish move if ‘Brexit’ looms” The Irish Independent. 7 June 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/ business/irish/mcmurtry-eyes-irish-move-if-brexit-looms-31283346.html 67 Howlin, Gerard. “GERARD HOWLIN: If Britain leaves the EU, then Ireland will be left in a difficult position” The Irish Examiner. 24 June 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/viewpoints/columnists/gerard-howlin/ if-britain-leaves-the-eu-then-ireland-will-be-left-in-a-difficult-position-338644.

56

91

Messages in the Media html 68 Webb, Nick. “Bank of Ireland’s risk gurus prepare contingency plan for possible ‘Brexit’” The Irish Independent. 14 June 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www. independent.ie/business/irish/bank-of-irelands-risk-gurus-prepare-contingencyplan-for-possible-brexit-31300589.html 69 Cahill, Ann. “Could Ireland decide whether Britain remains in the EU?” The Irish Examiner. 20 May 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer. com/ireland/could-ireland-decide-whether-britain-remains-in-the-eu-331714. html 70 Cahill, Ann. “Brexit: Battle lines drawn for keeping Britain within EU” The Irish Examiner. 18 Dec. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer. com/ireland/brexit-battle-lines-drawn-for-keeping-britain-within-eu-372166. html 71 Quinn, Eamon. “Charlie Flanagan warns about British EU exit uncertainty” The Irish Examiner. 27 Nov. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www. irishexaminer.com/business/charlie-flanagan-warns-about-british-eu-exituncertainty-367396.html 72 McEnroe, Juno. “Charlie Flanagan: Determined to leave a legacy of his own” The Irish Examiner. 3 Aug. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www. irishexaminer.com/viewpoints/analysis/charlie-flanagan-determined-to-leave-alegacy-of-his-own-345921.html 73 Unknown. “Enda Kenny says Ireland will back ‘reasonable’ EU reform demands by UK” The Irish Examiner. 9 Nov. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http:// www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/enda-kenny-says-ireland-willback-reasonable-eu-reform-demands-by-uk-704718.html#!

74 McConnell, Daniel and Tapsfield, James. “Enda Kenny: No deal yet on avoiding ‘Brexit’ “ The Irish Examiner. 17 Dec. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www. irishexaminer.com/world/enda-kenny-no-deal-yet-on-avoiding-brexit-371995. html 75 Ryan, Philip. “Kenny to meet Cameron on Brexit” The Irish Independent. 17 Dec. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/ kenny-to-meet-cameron-on-brexit-34294544.html 76 Hand, Lise. “Enda Kenny: Ireland does not want to see a Brexit materialise “ The Irish Independent. 9 Nov. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www. independent.ie/business/world/enda-kenny-ireland-does-not-want-to-see-abrexit-materialise-34182488.html 77 Press Association. “Enda Kenny says Ireland will back ‘reasonable’ EU reform demands by UK” The Irish Independent. 9 Nov. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.independent.ie/breaking-news/irish-news/enda-kenny-says-irelandwill-back-reasonable-eu-reform-demands-by-uk-34182433.html 78 Unknown. “77% of Irish want to stay in EU even if UK leaves” The Irish Examiner. 29 May 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.irishexaminer.com/ breakingnews/ireland/77-of-irish-want-to-stay-in-eu-even-if-uk-leaves-679342. html#!

92

GREECE

By Athanasios Kipouros, Iason Rodopoulos, and Angelica Dimoulias

Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ (I Kathimerini). Founded in 1919. Owned by Aristides Alafouzos. Daily circulation: 26,000.

In.gr. Founded in 1999. Owned by Lambrakis Press Group. Daily circulation: 3,860.

Ta Nea. Founded in 1931. Owned by Lambrakis Press Group. Daily circulation of 284,000.

Official website of the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction. http://www.ypes.gr/el/.

Figures are for 2014.All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

93

Messages in the Media

In 2015, the media coverage in Greece revealed that the three issues most discussed concerning EU-Greek relations were: the January and September parliamentary elections, the imposition of capital controls and the July referendum on bailout payments, and the refugee crisis.

The January and September Parliamentary Elections

By Athanasios Kipouros

2015 was a tumultuous year for Greek politics, much like the one before it. The excitement and hope which lingered from the victory of the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in the May 2014 European Parliament elections turned into uncertainty with the onset of the presidential elections in December 2014.1 SYRIZA’s leader, Alexis Tsipras, refused to submit a presidential candidate, and the subsequent failure of Greece’s government to elect a new president forced Prime Minister Antonis Samaras to call for national elections.2 While all three media sources had speculated that national elections were inevitable, there was still a degree of surprise regarding Samaras’ decision to call the elections early — for January 25, 2015.3 Following the announcement, SYRIZA MP Panagiotis Lafazanis boldly stated that “the Memorandum of today has become a thing of the past. We will cancel the Memorandum in an institutional way.”4 Samaras refuted this statement on January 2, 2015 claiming that a SYRIZA victory would lead to economic and political instability, as well as risk reversing the progress the Greek people had made under austerity measures, which required great sacrifice.

On January 3, Alexis Tsipras vowed to restructure Greece’s debt and went so far as to state, “that which was done for Germany in 1953, should be done for Greece in 2015.”5 This rhetoric further heightened the tensions between the two countries, and revived fears of a Greek exit — Grexit — from the Eurozone. On January 7, Kathimerini reported that Greek ten-year government bond yields were back above 10 per cent, indicating that the upcoming elections were creating fear within the markets.6 As tensions continued to flare between SYRIZA and Greece’s ‘troika’ of lenders — the ECB, the IMF, and the Commission — Kathimerini reported ECB Executive Board member Benoit Coeure’s on-air statement that Greek debt held by the ECB could not be restructured.7 Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s Finance Minister, attempted to sway the election away from SYRIZA by stating, “the elections will not change the previous deal.”8 This indicated that, if elected, SYRIZA would almost certainly be set on a collision course with the EU powers.

Leading up to the elections, Kathimerini and in.gr both predicted a SYRIZA victory of between 32 and 33 per cent.9,10 On January 25, SYRIZA swept to power with a shocking 36.4 per cent of the vote.11 Tsipras secured a plurality of the vote, yet he failed to obtain an absolute majority of the seats, which forced him to form a coalition government. While the most likely coalition partner may have been the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), they had denounced working with SYRIZA in any way. However, they did state, “if SYRIZA brings forth any 94

Greece - Athanasios Kipouros, Iason Rodopoulos, Angelica Dimoulias measures which are good for the people (φιλολαϊκά μέτρα), KKE will vote for them.”12 There were no other leftist anti-austerity parties with enough seats to form a coalition, and so Tsipras formed a government with Panos Kammenos and his party, the Independent Greeks (ANEL). Far-right ANEL is ideologically opposite to SYRIZA on most issues, and were chosen as a coalition partner of last resort.

However, what they do have in common is their anti-austerity stance, and ANEL’s support was hoped to strengthen Greece’s position in the bailout negotiations.13 After forming government and successfully electing a president with a recordbreaking vote, Kathimerini reported that Alexis Tsipras and his SYRIZA-ANEL coalition were headed for a full-speed collision with the ‘troika’ — a sentiment echoed both by the Greek people and European officials.14,15 Following months of negotiations, Greece came to the brink of political and economic collapse when Tsipras announced that a referendum on the troika’s proposed bailout package would be held on July 5.16 In the referendum, an overwhelming majority of 61.3 per cent of Greeks voted against the terms of the bailout.17 Yet, even so, Tsipras was forced to comply with even harsher terms and accept a third bailout to avoid Greece’s economic collapse. His capitulation resulted in further political turmoil as seventeen hard-line SYRIZA MPs broke off to form their own party, Popular Unity.18 The defection left the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition unable to govern, and forced Tsipras to call elections for September 20.19 This was disappointing for the leader of the newly formed Popular Unity, Panagiotis Lafazanis, who had requested that the elections be held on September 27.20 In the run-up to the September election, both Kathimerini and Ta Nea reported a close race in the polls.21,22 It was clear that the optimism and hope that SYRIZA had brought to Greek politics had faded since the referendum and their subsequent capitulation to strict bailout terms. The interim leader of right-wing New Democracy (ND), Vangelis Meimarakis, who had been leading the party ever since Samaras’ resignation in response to the referendum’s ‘no’ result, was chosen to lead the party in the election.23,24 Unlike the January elections, leaders outside of Europe largely kept quiet, having recognized that either a SYRIZA or an ND victory would lead to compliance with austerity demands.

On September 21, SYRIZA once again won the national election, however, with a smaller share of the vote at 35.54 per cent.25 In his victory speech, Tsipras stated, “we received a four-year mandate, SYRIZA has proven very difficult to die.”26 This was in sharp contrast with his January victory speech where he stated, “the people have demanded the final step in the return of hope,”27 suggesting a change in the party’s strength and goals between the two elections. Indicative of the country’s general election fatigue was Kathimerini’s prediction of a historically high voter abstention rate of up to 40 per cent.28 Following SYRIZA’s election victory and a new mandate to implement the very policies they had promised to abolish, EU-Greek negotiations were somewhat “normalized” and both sides expressed hope for less animosity between them.29

95

Messages in the Media

Capital Controls on Greek Banks and the Bailout Referendum

By Iason Rodopoulos

It is important to analyze capital controls imposed on Greek banks during the summer of 2015 and the referendum that followed, because they strained the relationship between Greece and the ‘troika’ — the ECB, the IMF and the European Commission. Up for negotiation was the possibility and nature of a new austerity package in exchange for a new loan. Four months had passed since the Greek government and the troika agreed in February 2015 to extend until June 30 the Second Memorandum of Understanding (MοU), which promised agreement upon a Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece.30 The two sides were unable to agree on a new package; the Greek government, led by the SYRIZAANEL coalition, had promised to end the previous regime of austerity, and were unwilling to agree to the troika’s demands for continued austerity.31 The inability of the Greek government to put forward constructive counter-proposals during the consecutive Eurogroup meetings resulted in a four-month long period of tension between the Greek government and the rest of the EU governments.32 Tensions during the negotiations were especially high as the Greek government maintained the possibility of exiting the Eurozone, with significant elements within Greece advocating for contentious anti-European measures.

In May 2015, a meeting took place between Deputy Prime Minister Giannis Dragasakis and other members of the government, where a proposal considering a complete rupture with the EU as a “Plan B” to bring Greece out of the Euro was created.33 Part of this plan had been prepared by Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis and his team. They had been working on their own idea for a “parallel system” which would promote the use of Euros along with national state bonds.34 Meanwhile, a rumour had spread that Panagiotis Lafazanis’ “Left Platform,” the opposition faction of SYRIZA that demanded exit from the Eurozone, had a secret plan to invade the Greek Banknote Printing Foundation to secure the necessary funds for a potential “Grexit.”35 Furthermore, Tsipras was reported to have initiated talks with Russia, China, Venezuela and Iran to solicit alternative sources of financial help.36 While talks with these countries ultimately didn’t result in a financial agreement, they put a further strain on EU-Greek relations, especially since relations with Russia are at an all-time low.37 On June 16, Tsipras announced that the Greek government would not pay their scheduled installment to the IMF, unless an agreement was reached for debt relief without austerity.38 However, the situation for the Greek banks had been problematic since April, as Greek citizens had withdrawn 29.4 billion euros from their bank accounts between December 2014 and April 2015, due to the unstable economic conditions.39 On June 21, a proposal offered to the EU by the Greek government which included some austerity was rejected.40 On June 25, the Eurogroup issued an ultimatum to the Greek government to “take or leave” their own proposed agreement by midnight.41 In the early morning hours of June 27, in a broadcast to the Greek people, Alexis Tsipras announced that a referendum 96

Greece - Athanasios Kipouros, Iason Rodopoulos, Angelica Dimoulias would be held on July 5, so people could vote for or against the proposed package.

He encouraged voters to vote “no.”42 On the same day, the Eurogroup rejected the Greek government’s request for an extension of the program.43 On June 28, it was announced that all Greek banks would close the following day, in order to prevent a massive capital flight, and that capital controls would be imposed the next day. This restricted the ability of people to move money abroad, and limited ATM withdrawals to sixty euros per day.44 On June 29, the Athens Stock Exchange closed along with the Greek banks.45 Over the next few days, thousands of people waited for hours to use ATMs, and others waited outside gas stations to buy gas and basic goods in case Greece declared bankruptcy.46 On June 30, the ECB stopped Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to Greek banks.47 On July 1, the Second Economic Adjustment Programme officially ended, and Greece became the first developed country that ever failed to pay an instalment — of 1.6 billion euros — to the IMF.48 During the referendum on July 5, voters rejected the EU agreement with 61.31 per cent voting against.49 On July 7, Minister of Finance Yanis Varoufakis resigned, despite the victory of the “no” vote in the referendum, and was replaced by Euclid Tsakalotos.50 The ambiguity of Greece’s position made the negotiations difficult. In an interview that Varoufakis gave to journalist Paul Mason on June 21, for the documentary #thisisacoup, he mentioned, “our partners in the Eurogroup have made up their minds that they will give us an offer which we can’t possibly sign up to, and, as a result, there are going to be bank closures on Tuesday, following the Euro Summit Meeting.” When asked if the Greek government would be ready for bank closures, Varoufakis responded, “of course not.”51 On June 27 Tsipras stated, “Europe’s refusal to grant a new extension to Greece forces the Bank of Greece to impose bank closure and withdrawal controls.”52 Tsipras blamed the EU in general and the ECB specifically for capital controls, viewing them as fully responsible for the liquidity crisis despite warning from Varoufakis on June 21 about the potential bank closure. However Nikos Voutsis, the Minister of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction, viewed the capital controls more as a bargaining strategy than an action forced upon Greece by the EU. On July 31 he stated, “the imposition of capital controls was a marginal, extreme form of strong negotiation [with the Europeans].”53 The different positions within the Greek government concerning the capital controls caused confusion during the negotiations and resulted in considerable uncertainty concerning the government’s direction.54 In the European Council meeting that followed, on July 7, the Greek government failed once more to submit realistic proposals, and the EU gave Greece a term limit until July 12 to do so.55 On July 10, Greece submitted a new proposal that outlined taxation increases and pension reforms.56 On July 13, the EU approved the proposal and required that the Greek government pass the measures by July 15.57 The new package passed on July 16 with a large parliamentary majority.58 It was supported by most of the government MPs, New Democracy, social-democratic PASOK, and social-liberal party The River. It was rejected by the Communist Party, the ultra-right Golden Dawn, and thirtynine SYRIZA MPs, who were mostly part of the “Left Platform”.59 On July 20 the 97

Messages in the Media banks reopened, but capital controls remained into 2016.60 On July 22, the ECB increased the ELA (Emergency Liquidity Assistance) for Greek banks by nine hundred million euros.61 On August 3, the Athens Stock Exchange also reopened, but when it closed for the day, the General Price Index had fallen by 16.23 per cent.62 This was a record drop, not seen since December 1987.63 On August 14, the Greek Parliament approved the Third Memorandum of Understanding with 222 votes in favour, 64 votes against, and 11 abstentions.64 The Eurogroup approved the Programme on the same day.65 On August 20, the German Bundestag also approved the new Programme for Greece.66 On August 21, the SYRIZA-ANEL government resigned and elections were set for September 20.67 Alexis Tsipras was temporarily replaced by the head of the Supreme Court of Greece, Ms.Vassiliki Thanou-Christofilou, the first female Prime Minister in Greek history.68

The Impact of the Refugee Crisis on Greece Angelica Dimoulias

Greece, as a bridge connecting East and West, is a significant point of transit for refugees making their way to Europe from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Many refugees pass through the islands of Lesvos, Kos, Samothrace, and Leros, and then proceed through the mainland to Europe.69 The migrant crisis escalated in Greece throughout 2015. All three of the sources reported that, in the first quarter of 2015, the number of refugee arrivals by sea were over three times larger than the number of refugee arrivals in the first quarter of 2014. The number of refugees entering Greece in the first quarter of 2015 was reckoned at 10,445 individuals, whereas the number for 2014 was 2,863.70 According to the UN Refugee Agency, that number multiplied dramatically over the course of the year. All three media sources reported that the total arrivals in Greece from the beginning of the year until November were 660,000, compared to approximately 50,000 for the entirety of 2014.71 This increase in arrivals led Greece to request extensive help from Europe during the year.

In January 2015, Panos Kammenos, the country’s defence minister, in an interview with Italian newspaper La Stampa, stated that although Greece would respect Europe’s policies regarding the refugees, Europe should recognize Greece’s need to reach an agreement with Turkey on migration of benefit to both countries. The minister also stressed that, if the Dublin agreement, which is the basis for the ‘first point of entry’ principle, is to be upheld, then Greece should also be able to “return and repel illegal migrants” to their home countries.72 Τhis statement sparked disputes between SYRIZA, ANEL and European officials.

Yiannis Panousis, Greece’s Public Order Deputy Minister, stated that the fence surrounding the river Evros, should remain in order to prevent more refugees from entering the country. Many Greek MPs opposed this, arguing that his stance reinforces xenophobia and racism towards refugees.73 The Defence Minister provoked European officials when he stated that, if Europe continued bullying Greece in regards to the economy, Greece would “flood Europe with refugees and jihadists.”74 Since then, Hungary closed its border to 98

Greece - Athanasios Kipouros, Iason Rodopoulos, Angelica Dimoulias Serbia and announced that a fence would be build to prevent refugees from passing through to the rest of Europe, Austria, Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia expressed their desire to build fences to prevent refugees from coming through from Greece and entering their country.75 All three sources reported that European countries expressed their disapproval of Greece’s handling of the situation. The Croatian Minister of the Interior stated that Greece had created a big problem for Europe by closing its refugee camps, allowing refugees to enter Serbia and FYROM, and continue to Europe.76 Αn overwhelming number of articles from all three sources between March and May focused on the terrible conditions on the Greek islands of Kos and Lesvos, where the bulk of refugees were arriving. The Daily Mail reported that the situation in Kos was deteriorating, as the island was taking in more refugees than it could help.77 In December 2015, the Greek Prime Minister considered using Kos as a “hot spot” for refugee arrivals. The mayor of the island and the local authorities opposed the proposal, as they believed that it would attract an even larger number of refugees. Primary among their concerns was the impact of the refugee influx on Kos’ tourism industry.78 In a letter to the Prime Minister, the mayor of Kos requested immediate help from the Greek government and from the EU to help prevent Kos from becoming a camp for ‘illegal’ refugees.79 Despite his protests, however, the government decided that Kos would be the site of a reception and identification hotspot. Months later, on December 15, the European Council for Refugees and Exiles addressed the situation in Kos. They called for immediate attention from the EU, since the island had been neglected by previous meetings.80 Lesvos had the first reception and identification hotspots that opened in Greece in October 2015. The UNHCR reported that 57 per cent of arrivals by sea in 2015 were through Lesvos. In the second half of 2015, the daily refugee arrivals were close to 5,000. As a ‘hotspot’, reception centers on Lesvos rigorously screens and fingerprints newly-arrived refugees, with the goal being to help distinguish refugees from economic migrants.81 Martin Schulz, the president of the European Parliament, alongside Greek officials and Jean Asselborn, the President of the EU’s General Affairs Council, visited the reception centres to assess the facilities and the aid being provided.82 Almost a month later, on November 5, the lack of improvement in living conditions, and the serious protests by locals and activists led the Greek PM to accompany Martin Schultz to the hotspot to inspect it further.

During their visit, protesters gathered outside the Mytilene Municipality Hall and protested the EU policy on refugees, and the negligence that has cost hundreds of lives so far.83 The three media sources reported that, in order for Europe to provide further assistance to Greece for the migrant crisis, Greece had to open the necessary reception hot spots. This agreement was reached by Jean Asselborn and the Greek commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos during a meeting in Athens on Saturday October 10.84 The following day, Antonio Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, called for immediate EU attention to Greece.

He stated that aid had to be provided in order for the Greek government to build the hotspots. He also called on the EU to reach an agreement with Turkey at the 99

Messages in the Media upcoming summit in Brussels.85 The European Commission asked for a new, bigger hot spot to open in Athens for as many as 50,000 refugees under the supervision of Frontex and the UN.86 The Greek government expressed concerns. Although the Athens hotspot had not been created, the European Commission released funds of 62 million euros to Greece for the support of the refugees.87 With the three sources all reporting on the Summit meeting in Malta concerning the migrant crisis, Greece’s most important goal was for Europe and Turkey to find common ground and to create a policy to stop smuggling.88 In a speech to the Bundestag, Chancellor Merkel recognized that Turkey plays a key role in the crisis, and said that without Turkey’s cooperation, little could be done to alleviate the situation.89 All three sources reported PM Alexis Tsipras’ statements in December that Greece had fulfilled its duties regarding refugees, despite its suffering economy. Tsipras criticized the EU, stating that they had redistributed only 100 of the 66,000 refugees they had promised to move to other member states through the quota system.90 Tsipras asked Europe to fulfill its promise, and reiterated that the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean must stop being the tomb of so many souls.91

Year in Review For Greece, 2015 kicked off with a bang and ended with a dull fizzle. The January elections which brought the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition to power not only destabilized Greece’s relationship with its creditors, but also brought with it a wave of hope that there may be an end to the country’s economic woes.92 However, the multiple crises that plagued Greece during the summer and brought Greece to the brink of economic and political collapse brought an end to this optimism. The events of the summer also saw SYRIZA toning down the combative nationalist rhetoric it employed during its initial election campaign, and was replaced with a more cooperative stance.93 This cooperation can be seen in the agreement between the Greek government and the Troika to extend the Second Memorandum of Understanding for Greece’s Economic Adjustment Programme, until June 30.94 Yet, the Greek government, which wanted less austerity, failed to bring satisfying alternative proposals to the European Union Summits and Eurogroup meetings. This prevented agreement on a new plan prior to the programme’s expiry date.95 Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras called a referendum, in which Greek citizens expressed their opinion on the agreement proposed by the Troika.96 On July 5, the “no” vote won with 61.31 per cent.97 According to Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, the victory of the “no” voice in the referendum could possibly mean a rejection of the European Union and the Eurozone by Greece.

If this happened, Greece would become the first country to leave the Eurozone and the Union.98 Meanwhile, capital controls were imposed on the Greek banks in order to prevent massive capital flight, and Greece failed to pay the 1.6 billion euro installment to the International Monetary Fund before the programme expired.99,100 This was the first time that a developed country ever failed to pay 100

Greece - Athanasios Kipouros, Iason Rodopoulos, Angelica Dimoulias an installment to the IMF.101 The capital controls and the referendum, combined with disagreements within the government itself, caused confusion for the general public and worsened EU-Greek relations.102 Due to extensive negotiations regarding the country’s economy, the migrant crisis was in the background until mid-2015, by which time the crisis had reached an unprecedented severity. Greek and European officials realized that an effective plan needed to be established to protect the refugees, but also to ensure that their arrival in Europe would not cause domestic problems.103 Since the start of 2015, Greek officials were occupied with reaching a new agreement with the country’s lenders, but in interviews they highlighted the importance of establishing a plan to regulate refugee arrivals. Due to Greece’s strained economic relations with the EU, Europe was at first very critical of the efforts taken by the Greek government to respond to the refugees.104 Europe criticized the living conditions on the refugees in the islands of Kos and Lesvos, and in camps close to Greece’s borders with other Balkan countries. Yet, as the year progressed, and the Greek Prime Minister pushed for greater EU assistance, relations between the two ameliorated as European officials recognized Greece’s contributions. Some of them even visited reception hot spots and helped to improve their conditions.105

“Democratic Left mulls strategy as SYRIZA eyes cooperation.” Kathimerini. 30 May 2014, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.ekathimerini.com/160387/article/ ekathimerini/news/democratic-left-mulls-strategy-as-syriza-eyes-cooperation 2 ΓΑΛΙΑΤΣΑΤΟΣ, ΠΑΝΑΓΗΣ “Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ δεν θα προτείνει Πρόεδρο.” Η Καθημερινή. 20 Aug. 2014, accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini. gr/780356/article/epikairothta/politikh/o-syriza-den-8a-proteinei-proedro 3 ΜΠΙΣΤΙΚΑ, ΕΛΕΝΗ “Oι ημερομηνίες 17, 23, 29 τρέχουν, Σταύρος Δήμας ο υποψήφιος για την Προεδρία...” Η Καθημερινή. 10 Dec. 2014, accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/795300/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/oihmeromhnies-17-23-29-trexoyn-stayros-dhmas-o-ypoyhfios-gia-thn-proedria 4 “Στις 25 Ιανουαρίου εθνικές εκλογές - Δεν επιστρέφει η Τρόικα.” Η Καθημερινή.

29 Dec. 2014, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/797557/article/ epikairothta/politikh/stis-25-ianoyarioy-e8nikes-ekloges---den-epistrefei-htroika 5 Mangasarian, Leon. “Greek parties embark on election amid debate on euro.” Kathimerini. 5 Jan. 2015, accessed 4 Jan. 2016. http://www.ekathimerini. com/166015/article/ekathimerini/news/greek-parties-embark-on-election-amiddebate-on-euro 6 Goodman, David. “Greek 10-year bond yields exceed 10 pct for first time since 2013.” Kathimerini. 7 Jan. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.ekathimerini. com/166071/article/ekathimerini/business/greek-10-year-bond-yields-exceed10-pct-for-first-time-since-2013 7 “Greek debt held by ECB cannot be restructured, says Coeure.” Kathimerini. 7 Jan. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.ekathimerini.com/166133/article/ 1

101

Messages in the Media ekathimerini/business/greek-debt-held-by-ecb-cannot-be-restructured-sayscoeure 8 “Οι εκλογές δεν θα αλλάξουν τη συμφωνία, διαμηνύει ο Σόιμπλε.” Η Καθημερινή. 30 Dec. 2014, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini. gr/797398/article/epikairothta/politikh/oi-ekloges-den-8a-alla3oyn-thsymfwnia-diamhnyei-o-soimple 9 “Με προβάδισμα ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ στην τελική ευθεία προς τις εκλογές.” Η Καθημερινη. 20 Jan. 2015, accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini. gr/800128/article/epikairothta/politikh/me-provadisma-o-syriza-sthn-telikhey8eia-pros-tis-ekloges 10 “Τι δείχνουν οι τελευταίες δημοσκοπήσεις” In.gr. 22 Jan. 2015, accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1231379619 11 “Εκλογές 2015: Τα τελικά αποτελέσματα στο 100% της Επικράτειας.” Τα Νέα. 26 Feb. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/ article/5202441/h-eikona-twn-apotelesmatwn-sto-50-43-ths-epikrateias/ 12 “Μεγάλη νίκη του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ που σχηματίζει κυβέρνηση με τους ΑΝΕΛ.” Τα Νέα. 25 Jan. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/ article/5202322/megalh-nikh-toy-syriza-dinoyn-ta-exit-polls/ 13 ΑΝΤΩΝΙΟΥ, ΔΩΡΑ. “Στο Μέγαρο Μαξίμου ο Αλέξης Τσίπρας.” Η Καθημερινή. 26 Jan. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini. gr/800974/article/epikairothta/politikh/sto-megaro-ma3imoy-o-ale3hs-tsipras 14 ΜΠΟΥΡΔΑΡΑΣ, ΓΙΩΡΓΟΣ Σ. “Ρεκόρ ψήφων και αντιδράσεων για την κ. Κωνσταντοπούλου.” Η Καθημερινή. 7 Feb. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http:// www.kathimerini.gr/802545/article/epikairothta/politikh/rekor-yhfwn-kaiantidrasewn-gia-thn-k-kwnstantopoyloy 15 ΠΑΠΑΔΙΟΧΟΣ, ΚΩΣΤΗΣ Π. “Σε τροχιά σύγκρουσης με την Ευρωζώνη.” Η Καθημερινή. 2 Feb. 2015, accessed Jan. 9 2016. http://www.kathimerini. gr/801773/article/epikairothta/politikh/se-troxia-sygkroyshs-me-thn-evrwzwnh 16 “Δημοψήφισμα στις 5 Ιουλίου υπέρ ή κατά της πρότασης των δανειστών.” in.gr. 27 Jun. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500008049717074 17 “Σαρωτική επικράτηση του ΟΧΙ με 61,31%.” Η Καθημερινή. 5 Jul. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/822291/gallery/epikairothta/ politikh/sarwtikh-epikrathsh-toy-oxi-me-6131 18 “Tsipras admits reservations about deal but urges support.” Kathimerini. 14 Jul. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.ekathimerini.com/199536/article/ ekathimerini/news/tsipras-admits-reservations-about-deal-but-urges-support 19 “Γεροβασίλη: Εκλογές στις 20 Σεπτεμβρίου για να επανέλθει η σταθερότητα.” in.gr. 22 Aug. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500020063 20 “Εκλογές στις 27 Σεπτεμβρίου ζητεί ο Λαφαζάνης.” Η Καθημερινή. 25 Aug. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/828253/article/ epikairothta/politikh/ekloges-stis-27-septemvrioy-zhtei-o-lafazanhs 21 “Προς εκλογική αναμέτρηση «θρίλερ».” Η Καθημερινή. 5 Sept. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/829641/article/epikairothta/politikh/pros102

Greece - Athanasios Kipouros, Iason Rodopoulos, Angelica Dimoulias eklogikh-anametrhsh-8riler 22 “Απόλυτο θρίλερ στις εκλογές δείχνουν και νέες δημοσκοπήσεις” Τα Νέα. 5 Sep. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/ article/5271891/kalph-thriler-promhnyei-kai-nea-dhmoskophsh/ 23 “Παραιτήθηκε ο Αντώνης Σαμαράς από την ηγεσία της Νέας Δημοκρατίας.” in.gr. 5 Jul. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500010257 24 ΤΕΡΖΗΣ, ΓΙΩΡΓΟΣ Π. “ Χωρίς εκπλήξεις τα ψηφοδέλτια Ν.Δ.” Η Καθημερινή.

10 Sep. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/830205/article/ epikairothta/politikh/xwris-ekplh3eis-ta-yhfodeltia-nd 25 “Νέα συγκυβέρνηση ΣΥΡΙΖΑ με ΑΝΕΛ.” Η Καθημερινή. 21 Sep. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/831591/article/epikairothta/politikh/neasygkyvernhsh-syriza-me-anel 26 “Τσίπρας: Λάβαμε εντολή τετραετίας, ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ απέδειξε ότι είναι πολύ σκληρός για να πεθάνει.” Η Καθημερινή. 21 Sept. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/831576/article/epikairothta/politikh/tsipras-lavameentolh-tetraetias-o-syriza-apedei3e-oti-einai-poly-sklhros-gia-na-pe8anei-live 27 “Τσίπρας: «Ο λαός καλείται να ολοκληρώσει το βήμα για την επιστροφή της ελπίδας».” Τα Νέα. 25 Jan. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/ news/politics/article/5202267/tsipras-o-laos-kaleitai-na-oloklhrwsei-to-bhmagia-thn-epistrofh-ths-elpidas/ 28 Chrysoloras, Nikos, Paul Tugwell, and Antonis Galoanopoulos. “Greek election stalemate beckons as campaign enters final week” Kathimerini. 13 Sept.

2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.ekathimerini.com/201475/article/ ekathimerini/news/greek-election-stalemate-beckons-as-campaign-enters-finalweek 29 “Η τελική φάση είναι πάντα δύσκολη.” Η Καθημερινή. 17 Nov. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/838920/article/oikonomia/epixeirhseis/ h-telikh-fash-einai-panta-dyskolh 30 “Συμφωνία για τετράμηνη παράταση στο Eurogroup.” in.gr. 20 Feb. 2015, accessed 20 Oct. 2015. http://news.in.gr/economy/article/?aid=1231387401 31 “Ψήφο εμπιστοσύνης με 162 “ναι” πήρε η κυβέρνηση.” Τα Νέα. 10 Feb. 2015, accessed 20 Oct. 2015. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/article/5207952/ synexizetai-h-syzhthsh-sth-boylh-ta-mesanyxta-h-pshfos-empistosynhs/ 32 “Τσίπρας στον Πολ Μέισον: Αν έλεγα “όχι”, θα γινόμουν ήρωας για μια βραδιά.” in.gr. 15 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500046173 33 Αντωνίου, Δώρα. “Η μυστική σύσκεψη τον Μάιο για το plan B.” Η Καθημερινη.

11 Oct. 2015, accessed 21 Dec. 2015. http://www.kathimerini.gr/834417/article/ epikairothta/politikh/h-mystikh-syskeyh-ton-maio-gia-to-plan-v 34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ντόκος, Θάνος Π. “Η επόμενη μέρα στις σχέσεις Ευρώπης-Ρωσίας”. Η Καθημερινη. 10 Apr. 2014, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.

103

Messages in the Media gr/762025/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/h-epomenh-mera-stis-sxeseis-eyrwphs-rwsias 38 Κρουστάλλη, Δήμητρα. “Τσίπρας: Δεν πληρώνω το ΔΝΤ χωρίς έντιμη συμφωνία και αναδιάρθρωση χρέους.” in.gr. 16 Jun. 2015, accessed 21 Oct. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500005218 39 “ΤτΕ: Εκροές καταθέσεων 29,4 δισ. Ευρώ μεραξύ Δεκεμβρίου 2014 – Απριλίου 2015.” in.gr. 17 Jun. 2015, accessed 25 Oct. 2015. http://news.in.gr/economy/ article/?aid=1500005625 40 “Τα μέτρα που προβλέπει το ελληνικό σχέδιο συμφωνίας.” in.gr. 22 Jun. 2015, accessed 25 Oct. 2015. http://news.in.gr/economy/article/?aid=1500006810 41 “Τελεσίγραφο προς την Ελλάδα εάν δεν υπάρξει συμφωνία.” in.gr. 25 Jun. 2015, accessed 1 Nov. 2015. http://news.in.gr/economy/article/?aid=1500007503 42 Κοσβανής, Χρήστος. “Δημοψήφισμα στις 5 Ιουλίου υπέρ ή κατά της πρότασης των δανειστών.” in.gr. 27 Jun. 2015, accessed 1 Nov. 2015. http://news.in.gr/ greece/article/?aid=1500008049 43 “Τσίπρας: Ζήτησα ξανά παράταση από τους ηγέτες της Ευρωζώνης.” Τα Νέα. 28 Jun. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/ article/5253192/diaggelma-anamenetai-na-kanei-se-ligo-o-alekshs-tsipras/ 44 “Κλειστές οι Τράπεζες – Περιορισμός στα ΑΤΜ από την Τρίτη.” in.gr. 28 Jun. 2015, accessed 1 Nov. 2015. http://news.in.gr/economy/article/?aid=1500008362 45 “Κλειστό το Χρηματιστήριο Αθηνών έως και τις 15 Ιουλίου.” in.gr. 14 Jul. 2015, accessed 1 Nov. 2015. http://news.in.gr/economy/article/?aid=1500012302 46 “Τεράστιες ουρές σε ΑΤΜ και βενζινάδικα.” in.gr. 28 Jun. 2015, accessed 1 Nov. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500008399 47 “Eurogroup: Διακόπτεται η χρηματοδότηση – Θωρακίζεται η Ευρωζώνη.” in.gr. 27 Jun. 2015, accessed 10 Nov. 2015. http://news.in.gr/economy/ article/?aid=1500008206 48 “Ραγδαίες Εξελίξεις: Έληξε το πρόγραμμα, δεν πληρώθηκε το ΔΝΤ.” in.gr. 1 Jul. 2015, accessed 10 Nov. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500009064 49 “Referendum July 2015.” Greek Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction. 5 Jul. 2015, accessed 20 Nov.2015. http://ekloges-prev. singularlogic.eu/r2015/e/public/index.html#{“cls”:”main”,”params”:{}} 50 “Παραίτηση Βαρουφάκη με αιχμές.” Η Καθημερινη. 7 Jul. 2015, accessed 1 Dec. 2015. http://www.kathimerini.gr/822369/article/epikairothta/politikh/paraithsh-varoyfakh-me-aixmes 51 “Μητσοτάκης: Εγγυώμαι ότι ο Βαρουφάκης θα πάει σε εξεταστική.” in.gr. 25 Dec. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500048158 52 “Τσίπρας: Ζήτησα ξανά παράταση από τους ηγέτες της Ευρωζώνης.” Τα Νέα. 28 Jun. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/ article/5253192/diaggelma-anamenetai-na-kanei-se-ligo-o-alekshs-tsipras/ 53 Μανδραβέλης, Πάσχος. “Έτσι, χωρίς σχέδιο...” Η Καθημερινη. 12 Sep. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/830637/opinion/epikairothta/ politikh/etsi-xwris-sxedio 54 Μανδραβέλης, Πάσχος. “Έτσι, χωρίς σχέδιο...” Η Καθημερινη. 12 Sep. 2015, 104

Greece - Athanasios Kipouros, Iason Rodopoulos, Angelica Dimoulias accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/830637/opinion/epikairothta/ politikh/etsi-xwris-sxedio 55 “Όλα κρίνονται την Κυριακή – Γιούνκερ, Τουσκ: Δεν αποκλείουμε το ‘μαύρο’ σενάριο για την Ελλάδα (LIVE).” Η Καθημερινη. 7 Jul. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.kathimerini.gr/822550/gallery/epikairothta/politikh/olakrinontai-thn-kyriakh---gioynker-toysk-den-apokleioyme-to-mayro-senariogia-thn-ellada-live 56 “Η ελληνική πρόταση προς τους θεσμούς – όλα τα μέτρα που περιλαμβάνει – εξουσιοδότηση από τη Βουλή ζητά η Κυβέρνηση.” Τα Νέα. 10 Jul. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/article/5256891/h-ellhnikhprotash-pros-toys-thesmoys-ola-ta-metra-poy-perilambanei/ 57 “Μέρκελ: Πρώτα η ψήφιση στην ελληνική Βουλή και μετά τα υπόλοιπα Κοινοβούλια.” in.gr. 13 Jul. 2015, accessed 22 Dec. 2015. http://news.in.gr/world/ article/?aid=1500012010 58 “Με 229 “ναι” πέρασαν τα μέτρα, 39 διαφοροποιήσεις από το ΣΥΡΙΖΑ.” in.gr. 16 Jul. 2015, accessed 22 Dec. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500012830 59 “Με 229 “ναι” πέρασαν τα μέτρα, 39 διαφοροποιήσεις από το ΣΥΡΙΖΑ.” in.gr. 16 Jul. 2015, accessed 22 Dec. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500012830 60 “Άνοιξαν οι τράπεζες – τι προβλέπει η νέα ΠΝΠ.” Η Καθημερινη. 20 Jul. 2015, accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.kathimerini.gr/824320/article/oikonomia/ ellhnikh-oikonomia/anoi3an-oi-trapezes---ti-provlepei-h-nea-pnp 61 Παπαδόγιαννης, Γιάννης. “Σε αύξηση του ELA κατά 900 εκατ. ευρώ προχώρησε η ΕΚΤ.” Η Καθημερινη. 23 Jul. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http:// www.kathimerini.gr/824626/article/oikonomia/ellhnikh-oikonomia/se-ay3hshtoy-ela-kata-900-ekat-eyrw-proxwrhse-h-ekt 62 “Μαύρη Δευτέρα” στο Χρηματιστήριο με πτώση 16,23%.” Τα Νέα. 3 Aug. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.tanea.gr/news/economy/article/5263273/ anoigei-shmera-meta-apo-25-meres-argias-to-xrhmatisthrio-athhnwn/ 63 “Me 222 “ναι” ψηφίστηκε το τρίτο μνημόνιο, 44 απώλειες για τον ΣΥΡΙΖΑ.” in.gr. 14 Aug. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500018638 64 Βαρβιτσιώτη, Ελένη. “Συμφωνία για τριετές πρόγραμμα – 26 δισ. σε δόσεις η πρώτη εκταμίευση.” Η Καθημερινη. 14 Aug. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http:// www.kathimerini.gr/827380/article/epikairothta/politikh/symfwnia-gia-trietesprogramma---26-dis-se-doseis-h-prwth-ektamieysh 65 Κουναλάκη, Ξένια. “Γερμανικό “ναι” στη συμφωνία με 66 αντάρτες.” Η Καθημερινη. 20 Aug. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.kathimerini. gr/827654/article/epikairothta/politikh/germaniko-nai-sth-symfwnia-me-66antartes 66 “Στα χέρια του Προέδρου της Δημοκρατίας η παραίτηση της κυβέρνησης.” in.gr. 20 Aug. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500019805 67 “Η Βασιλική Θάνου πρώτη γυναίκα πρωθυπουργός της Ελλάδας.”

105

Messages in the Media in.gr. 27 Aug. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500021289 68 Gaunt, Jeremy and Michelle Kambas. “Tsipras to demand EU action on refugees.” Κathimerini. 21 Sep. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www. ekathimerini.com/201759/article/ekathimerini/news/tsipras-to-demand-euaction-on-refugees 69 Newsroom ΔΟΛ “Υπερτριπλάσιοι οι μετανάστες που μπήκαν στην Ελλάδα διά θαλάσσης το 2015.” Ιn.gr. 9 Apr. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://news.in.gr/ greece/article/?aid=1231399145 70 Newsroom ΔΟΛ “Διεθνής αμνηστεία: H Ελλάδα αδυνατεί να διαχειριστεί τις αφίξεις μεταναστών.” Ta Nea. 24 Aug. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www. tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5268118/diethnhs-amnhstia-h-ellada-adynatei-nadiaxeiristei-tis-afikseis-metanastwn/ 71 ΑΠΕ-ΜΠΕ “Π. Καμμένος: «Η Ευρώπη πρέπει να βοηθήσει την Ελλάδα στο μεταναστευτικό».” Η Κathimerini. 28 Jan. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http:// www.kathimerini.gr/801264/article/epikairothta/politikh/p-kammenos-heyrwph-prepei-na-voh8hsei-thn-ellada-sto-metanasteytiko 72 Editors’ team, H Kathimerini. “Nέες αναφορές Καμμένου σε είσοδο Τζιχαντιστών.” Η Κathimerini. 8 Apr. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www. kathimerini.gr/810572/article/epikairothta/politikh/nees-anafores-kammenoyse-eisodo-tzixantistwn-sthn-eyrwph 73 Τζίμας, Σταύρος. “Τέστ και για τον φράχτη του Έβρου.” H Kathimerini. 10 Oct. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.kathimerini.gr/836246/article/ epikairothta/ellada/test-kai-gia-ton-fraxth-toy-evroy 74 A.P., AΠΕ “Ουγγαρία: δήμαρχος ζητεί φράχτη.” Η Κathimerini. 6 Feb. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.kathimerini.gr/802498/article/epikairothta/ kosmos/oyggaria-dhmarxos-zhtei-fraxth 75 Reuters, ΑΠΕ. “Κροατία:Η Eλλάδα να σταματήσει τη προώθηση μεταναστών στην Ευρώπη.” Η Kathimerini. 21 Sep. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http:// www.kathimerini.gr/831720/article/epikairothta/kosmos/kroatia-h-ellada-nastamathsei-th-prow8hsh-metanastwn-sthn-eyrwph 76 Dailymail. “Οι μετανάστες συνθέτουν σκηνικό κόλασης στην Κώ.¨ Η Kathimerini. 28 May 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.kathimerini. gr/817166/article/epikairothta/ellada/dailymail-oi-metanastes-syn8etoynskhniko-kolashs-sthn-kw 77 Editors’ Team, Τa Nea. “Συμβούλιο της Ευρώπης: « Η κατάσταση στην Κώ προκαλεί ντροπή!».” Τa Nea. 14 Dec. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www. tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5318861/symboylio-ths-eyrwphs-h-katastash-sthnkw-prokalei-ntroph/ 78 Newsroom ΔΟΛ. “Διαμαρτυρία Δήμου Κώ για το ενδεχόμενο δημιουργίας μονίμου κέντρο υποδοχής μεταναστών.” Τa Nea. 19 Aug. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5266934/diamartyria-dhmoy-kwgia-to-endexomeno-dhmioyrgias-monimoy-kentroy-ypodoxhs-metanastwn/ 79 Σκούρης, Δημήτρης “Άποψη: H Eυρωπαική ‘Ενωση ως κοινότητα δικαίου και σύστημα αξιών.” Η Kathimerini. 25 Dec. 2015, accessed 29 Jan. 2016. http://www.

106

Greece - Athanasios Kipouros, Iason Rodopoulos, Angelica Dimoulias kathimerini.gr/843685/article/epikairothta/kosmos/apoyh-h-eyrwpaikh-enwshws-koinothta-dikaioy-kai-systhma-a3iwn 80 Τζίμας, Σταύρος. “Φιλοξενία προσφύγων σε επτά στρατόπεδα.” H Kathimerini.

8 Dec. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.kathimerini.gr/841326/article/ epikairothta/ellada/filo3enia-prosfygwn-se-epta-stratopeda 81 AFP, AΠΕ-ΜΠΕ. “ΟΗΕ: Περισσότεροι από 800.000 οι μετανάστες που έφτασαν στην Ευρώπη το 2015.” H Κathimerini. 11 Nov. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.kathimerini.gr/838529/article/epikairothta/kosmos/oheperissoteroi-apo-800000-oi-metanastes-poy-eftasan-sthn-eyrwph-to-2015 82 Newsroom ΔΟΛ. “Το πρώτο hotspot για πρόσφυγες στη Λέσβο επισκέπτεται ο Μάρτιν Σούλτς.” In.gr. 16 Oct. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://news.in.gr/ greece/article/?aid=1500033039 83 Newsroom ΔΟΛ. “Greek reporter: Greek PM Tsipras and EU Parliament Chief Schulz Visit Lesvos Amid Protests.” Ιn.gr. 5 Nov. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500037231 84 Newsroom ΔΟΛ. “Προχωρήστε γρήγορα τα χοτ σποτ, το μήνυμα της ΕΕ στην Αθήνα. “ In.gr. 10 Oct. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500031812 85 Newsroom ΔΟΛ. “Γκουτερές: Δεν μπορεί να αφήσουμε την Ελλάδα μόνη τηs.” In.gr. 11 Oct. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500032082 86 Spiegel. “H Κομισιόν ζητά hotspot περίπου 50.000 προσφύγων στην Αθήνα” In.gr. 24 Oct. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500034756 87 Newsroom ΔΟΛ. “Koμισιόν: Βοήθεια 62 εκατ. ευρώ για τη στήριξη Σύριων προσφύγων.” Ta Nea. 3 Nov. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2015. http://www.tanea.gr/ news/politics/article/5307831/komision-bohtheia-ypsoys-62-ekat-eyrw-gia-thsthriksh-syrwn-prosfygwn/ 88 Newsroom ΔΟΛ. “Οι στόχοι της Ελλάδας για το προσφυγικό στη Σύνοδο της Μάλτας.” Ιn.gr. 10 Nov. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500038575 89 Newroom ΔΟΛ. “Ανταποκρινόμαστε στις υποχρεώσεις μας παρα την οικονομική συγκυρία-Σειρά της ΕΕ να υλοποιήσει τις δεσμεύσεις της.” Ta Nea. 15 Dec. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/ article/5320208/tsipras-ikanopoihsh-gia-ta-symperasmata-ths-synodoy-koryfhs/ 90 Spiegel. “Μέρκελ: Η Τουρκία, χώρα κλειδί στο προσφυγικό.” H Kathimerini.

26 Nov. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2015. http://www.kathimerini.gr/839969/article/ epikairothta/kosmos/merkel-h-toyrkia-xwra-kleidi-gia-to-prosfygiko 91 Newsroom DOL. “Αλέξης Τσίπρας: Να σταματήσει το Αιγαίο να ξεβράζει σορούς και τον ευρωπαικό πολιτισμό.” Τa Nea. 4 Nov. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2015. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/article/5307964/tsipras-na-stamathsei-hanthrwpothysia-sto-aigaio/ 92 ΠΑΠΑΔΙΟΧΟΣ, ΚΩΣΤΗΣ Π. “Σε τροχιά σύγκρουσης με την Ευρωζώνη.” Η Καθημερινή. 2 Feb. 2015, accessed 9 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini. gr/801773/article/epikairothta/politikh/se-troxia-sygkroyshs-me-thn-evrwzwnh 107

Messages in the Media “Tsipras admits reservations about deal but urges support.” Kathimerini. 14 Jul. 2015, accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.ekathimerini.com/199536/article/ ekathimerini/news/tsipras-admits-reservations-about-deal-but-urges-support 94 “Συμφωνία για τετράμηνη παράταση στο Eurogroup.”in.gr. 20 Feb. 2015, accessed 20 Oct. 2015. http://news.in.gr/economy/article/?aid=1231387401 95 Κρουστάλλη, Δήμητρα. “Τσίπρας: Δεν πληρώνω το ΔΝΤ χωρίς έντιμη συμφωνία και αναδιάρθρωση χρέους.” in.gr. 16 Jun. 2015, accessed 21 Oct. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500005218 96 Κοσβανής, Χρήστος. “Δημοψήφισμα στις 5 Ιουλίου υπέρ ή κατά της πρότασης των δανειστών.” in.gr. 27 Jun. 2015, accessed 1 Nov. 2015. http://news.in.gr/ greece/article/?aid=1500008049 97 “Referendum July 2015.” Greek Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction. 5 Jul. 2015, accessed 20 Nov. 2015. http://ekloges-prev. singularlogic.eu/r2015/e/public/index.html#{“cls”:”main”,”params”:{}} 98 “Γιούνκερ: Το “όχι” σημαίνει ότι η Ελλάδα λέει “όχι” στην Ευρώπη.” Τα Νέα. 29 Jun. 2015, accessed 21 Dec. 2015. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/ article/5253408/h-eyrwpaikh-epitroph-den-tha-paroysiasei-nees-protaseis-giathn-ellhnikh-krish/ 99 “Κλειστές οι Τράπεζες – Περιορισμός στα ΑΤΜ από την Τρίτη.” in.gr. 28 Jun. 2015, accessed 1 Nov. 2015. http://news.in.gr/economy/article/?aid=1500008362 100 “Ραγδαίες Εξελίξεις: Έληξε το πρόγραμμα, δεν πληρώθηκε το ΔΝΤ.” in.gr. 1 Jul. 2015, accessed 10 Nov. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500009064 101 “Ραγδαίες Εξελίξεις: Έληξε το πρόγραμμα, δεν πληρώθηκε το ΔΝΤ.” in.gr. 1 Jul. 2015, accessed 10 Nov. 2015. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500009064 102 Μανδραβέλης, Πάσχος. “Έτσι, χωρίς σχέδιο...” Η Καθημερινή. 12 Sep. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/830637/opinion/epikairothta/ politikh/etsi-xwris-sxedio 103 Κουλουμπής, Θόδωρος. “Προσφυγικό και μεταναστευτικό: Απειλή ή ευκαιρία;” Η Καθημερινή. 1 Nov. 2015, accessed 29 Jan. 2016. http://www. kathimerini.gr/837041/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/prosfygiko-kaimetanasteytiko-apeilh-h-eykairia 104 Σουλιώτης, Γιάννης. “Eκρηκτική η κατάσταση στο Αιγαίο.” Η Καθημερινή.

10 Apr. 2014, accessed 29 Jan. 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/810965/article/ epikairothta/ellada/ekrhktikh-h-katastash-sto-aigaio 105 Newsroom ΔΟΛ. “Ικανοποιητική η λειτουργία του πρώτου hot spot στη Λέσβο, διαπίστωσαν Αβραμόπουλος-Μουζάλας.” Τα Νέα. 16 Oct. 2015, accessed 19 Jan. 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/world/article/5302919/to-prwto-hotspot-gia-prosfyges-sth-lesbo-episkeptetai-o-martin-soylts/ 93

108

SPAIN

By Jorge Quesada Davies

Jutarnji List: Founded in 1998. Owned by EPH. Daily circulation of 110,000.

Dnevnik.hr: Founded in 1990. Owned by CME Media Enterprise BV. Vecernji List: Founded in 1950. Owned by Styria AG. Daily circulation of 100,000.

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

109

Messages in the Media From these findings, the following three major topics stand out as the leading issues related to Spain-EU relations reported on in 2015: economic recovery after the financial crisis, the implications of the general election results in December, and the issue of Catalan independence.

Economic Recovery After the Financial Crisis One of the most outstanding developments in 2015 to emerge from Spain, the fourth-largest economy in the Eurozone, was the country’s return to growth after the worst recession in a generation. GDP growth was forecasted to hit 3.5 per cent in 2015 and continue above 3 per cent in 2016, driven in part by domestic demand, and, as competitiveness returned, by the depreciation of the euro and the fall in the price of oil. The Spanish turnaround was in contrast to continued weakness in France and Italy, the second and third largest Eurozone economies. However, analysts point to gathering clouds under the surface of a much-heralded recovery. Even as exports have soared, outpacing those in France, Germany and Italy, the level of imports has fallen, as Spaniards, especially young people stricken by stubbornly high unemployment, continue to hold back on spending. Although economic conditions have been improving, the country maintains a high debt burden with the debt-to-GDP ratio standing at close to 95 per cent. This is higher than it was in 2008 at the onset of the crisis, and, as of November 2015, higher than that of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

From the perspective of the EU, any growth in the Spanish economy is an encouraging prospect, with the very survival of the Union threatened by the ongoing volatility in the continent’s southern fringe, with the EU brought close to breaking point by Greece’s financial turmoil throughout 2015. Growth in 2015 brought hopes of a strong recovery, but warning signs remain: the country’s economy is still 4 per cent smaller than it was before the global financial crisis, when it contracted by 8 per cent between 2008 and the lowest point in 2013.

Spain’s recovery is well below the Eurozone average, where GDP is roughly 1 per cent below the pre-crisis peak. Although the EU has cautiously welcomed the Spanish economy’s return to health, the European Commission has demanded continued cuts and higher tax revenues to keep the country within the confines of its deficit rules. The economic recovery is still on shaky ground; political risk, arising with the end of two-party rule nationally and the ongoing spectre of a secessionist Cataluña, could jeopardize growth, exposing the considerable weaknesses that lie below the surface.

The End of Two-Party Rule: The 2015 General Elections The year 2015 marked the advent of multiparty politics in Spain. The country’s voters, fed up with six years of European-imposed austerity, internal devaluation, political corruption, and drastically low employment levels, ended a 33-year duopoly between the right-of-centre Partido Popular (PP) party, and 110

Spain - Jorge Quesada Davies the left-wing Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) in the December 20th elections. The ongoing rise of the new party Podemos, since it exploded onto the scene in 2014, has been defined by its far-left platform of Euroscepticism and anti-austerity. The party’s leader, Pablo Iglesias, gave up his seat in the European Parliament earlier this year both to focus on the general election, and to express his dissatisfaction with EU’s lack of progress in expanding the European welfare state. Likewise, Cuidadanos, the new centre-right party from Spain’s largest autonomous region, Cataluña, has also played a central role in dismantling the deep-seated two-party system in Spain. Both new parties are opposed to Catalan independence, although the Madrid-based Podemos would put the decision to a regional referendum. Podemos placed third in the December elections, winning 20.6 per cent of the vote, while Cuidadanos finished fourth, winning 13.6 per cent. This meant that neither the PP, which placed first with 28 per cent of the vote, nor the PSOE, with 22 per cent, were able to form a majority government without a coalition partner.

As such, the year ended in political gridlock, with no single party able to form a cohesive majority government. PP’s most logical coalition partner, if they wanted to stay in power, would be the centre-right, anti-independence Cuidadanos party, which nevertheless did not win enough votes to give it a majority. A grand coalition between PP and PSOE would likely be the most stable government, but would undermine the latter’s political credibility as a socialist party, and has in any case been ruled out by the party’s leader, Pedro Sánchez. Instead, Sánchez has discussed his desire for a broader coalition between Spain’s leftist parties, in which PSOE, Podemos, IU-UP (Unidad Popular), ERC (Republic Left of Cataluña) and EAJ-PNV (Basque National Party) would form a majority government, thus ousting the incumbent PP Party from office. Sánchez’ ambition reflects what occurred in November in neighbouring Portugal, when a bloc of left-wing parties joined forces to eject the recently sworn-in centre-right government from office. This development is a daunting prospect for the EU: should a broad left-wing coalition form a majority in Spain, especially one that includes staunchly anti-austerity parties like Podemos, much of Spain’s economic growth achieved this year through adopting EU-imposed structural reforms could be swept away. As one of Europe’s “big five” economies and the second-fastest growing in 2015 after Ireland, Spain is central to the EU’s efforts to keep Southern Europe afloat and, ultimately, to hold the Eurozone project together.

The Issue of Catalan Independence The elections held in September in the autonomous community of Cataluña in Spain’s wealthy northeast were one of the defining events of the year, and one that is expected to have ongoing repercussion into 2016 and beyond. The elections were a triumph for the pro-independence bloc, which won a majority of seats in the Generalitat, the Catalan parliament, but fell just short of an absolute majority. The Junts pel Si (Together for Yes) party, led by incumbent president 111

Messages in the Media Artur Mas, won 62 of the 135 seats in the legislature, but failed to secure the support of smaller pro-secessionist parties to form a government, leading to a deadlock that was still unresolved at the year’s end. In a prelude to the general Spanish elections held in December, the strengthening of political plurality contributed to the impasse: Ciudadanos, the new anti-independence party, won 25 seats to become the second-largest party in the assembly with 18 per cent of the vote. Its rival on the national stage however, the anti-austerity Podemos party, failed to make a similar impact after throwing its lot in with other leftwing parties to form Cataluña Si Que Es Pot (‘Cataluña Yes it is Possible’), which disappointed voters at the end of the day, with just 9 percent of the vote and 11 seats.

Cataluña is an economic powerhouse, accounting for about one-fifth of Spain’s GDP. It is a highly populated and industrialized region, and a net contributor to the central government’s coffers. The secession movement had been observed keenly and with trepidation by the EU over the course of 2015.

Jean-Claude Junker, the European Commission President, revealed recently that he had been following the “difficult situation in Cataluña minute by minute.”

Spain is the fourth largest economy in the eurozone, and Spaniards have long been among the most fervent supporters of political and economic union with the rest of Europe. Catalan independence threatens to undermine Madrid’s strong ties to Brussels by creating not just a legal limbo and raising the spectre of separation, but also an economic and political puzzle: Mas insists that Cataluña would remain within the EU, while legal experts claim that secession would necessitate the region’s “automatic” and “immediate” exit from the Union and the Eurozone, as well as from the ECB, the Eurogroup, NATO, the UN, the IMF, and the G30. The negative impact on Spain’s burgeoning economic recovery, with GDP growth topping 3 percent in 2015, would be inevitable. In political terms, a move to create national institutions such as a foreign ministry and a tax authority, a tenet of Mas’ program in the lead-up to eventual secession, could conceivably provide inspiration to other would-be EU separatists, such as the Scottish Nationalist Party, still reeling from the resounding “no” vote in the 2014 independence referendum, and Belgium, fractured along cultural and linguistic lines, and whom recently went for 20 consecutive months, between 2010 and 2011, without a central government after divisive elections.

Year in Review Spain’s return to growth in 2015 is an encouraging prospect to its European creditors and the European Union at large, who have become hopeful that Spain will keep an otherwise economically struggling Southern border afloat. The Spanish economy saw a drastic spur in its GDP growth this year, rising to 3.5 per cent at its peak, and was forecast to settle at around 3 per cent in 2016. Mariano Rajoy, Spain’s incumbent President, was perhaps too ambitious in stating that the years of struggle in Spain would soon end, since these strides were made at the expense of a suffering populace who have grown tired of six 112

Spain - Jorge Quesada Davies years of imposed austerity measures in the form of structural reforms, taxes, and social spending cuts. While economic growth in Spain has been impressive insofar as it has risen to be the second-fastest growing economy in the EU, its growth is volatile for a number of reasons. Unemployment, particularly among young people of the Spanish electorate is still excessively high, which in turn has lent itself to public disillusionment and support for divergent, anti-austerity parties like Podemos. Moreover, while GDP growth has risen, the Spanish economy is still very much in a process of recovery after the 8 per cent decrease in GDP during the worst years of recession. Ongoing political instability after an inconclusive general election in December has left Spain’s future economic growth up in the air.

2015 marked the advent of multiparty politics in Spain, after Spanish voters changed Spain’s bipartisan political culture, ousting the country’s main parties, the incumbent PP and PSOE, after their 33 year duopoly. New-comers to the Spanish political spectrum, namely the far-left, anti-austerity party Podemos, an outgrowth of the Indignados 15-M movement of 2011, placed third in the tables, winning nearly 21 per cent of the votes, while the centre-right, Cataluñan-based party Cuidadanos, placed fourth with nearly 14 per cent of the votes. While the results of the 2015 election have provided powerful evidence for Spaniards’ desire for change towards deeper democracy and self-determination, Spain’s current fractious political situation could hinder efficacy in governance, and could adversely affect both growth and business confidence, much to the EU’s dismay. The ongoing disagreements between the parties has underscored the problem at hand; that Spanish opinion is starkly split between accepting further structural reforms and public spending cuts, which in turn could lead to further growth, or to adopt anti-austerity policies, with a view to counteract both poverty and corruption at the social and political level. A majority government had not yet been formed leading into 2016, and parties seeking office had seemingly confronted an impasse; either they recede from some of their platform promises and coalesce with an unfavourable counterpart, or they accept defeat.

Talks on the left alluded to a ‘grand leftist’ coalition, under which leftist parties would group together to form a majority government, but the likelihood of this happening remained inconclusive leading into 2016.

Discussion about Catalan independence was a development that came to the forefront in 2015 when municipal elections took place in September, with pro-independence parties such as ‘Junts pel Si’ lead by Arturo Mas falling just short of an absolute majority in municipal government. That Cataluña, Spain’s wealthiest and most economically productive autonomous community, might choose or, at least, would like to be able to choose to separate from Spain, is an extremely daunting prospect both to the central Spanish government, and the European Union at large. In large part, it is Catalan industry and taxes that keep the Spanish economy afloat - it accounts for one-fifth of Spanish GDP, and, were Spain to lose its most prosperous region, its timely economic recovery would likely be doomed. But such a separation would be politically unprecedented within the context of the EU. Despite Mas’ assurances that Cataluña would 113

Messages in the Media remain in the EU, European analysts and experts indicate otherwise. Instead, should Cataluña wish to separate, what’s likely is the region’s complete separation from the EU and the Eurozone, as well as the ECB, the Eurogroup, NATO, the UN, the IMF and the G30.

Fonte, Eva., La ONU revisa al alza sus previsiones de crecimiento para la Unión Europea para 2015 y 2016., El Mundo., May 19, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015.,http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2015/05/19/555ba28546163fc45b8b4580.html

1

Bolaños, Alejandro., El FMI sitúa a España a la cabeza del crecimiento en los países avanzados., El Pais., July 9, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015.,http:// economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/07/09/actualidad/1436434891_459136. html Pardo, Pablo., España es la economía que más va a crecer en 2015, según el FMI., El Mundo., July 9, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/economia/ No author., Cambiar el patrón., El Pais., August 15, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/08/14/opinion/1439580175_117110.html De Quere, Alberto F., La UE mejora más de medio punto su previsión para España., El Mundo., February 5, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015.,

2

No author., La economía española se recupera y la construcción sigue en auge., La Vanguardia., September 14, 2015., accessed December 29, 2015., http://www. lavanguardia.com/economia/20150914/54436496581/la-economia-espanola-serecupera-y-la-construccion-sigue-en-auge.html Pieró, Francesc., El FMI confirma que la economía española crecerá menos en 2016 pero por encima de la eurozona., La Vanguardia., October 6, 2015., accessed November 20., 2015., Sandri, Piergiorgio., Los indicadores empresariales respaldan la recuperación económica., La Vanguardia., August 8, 2015., accessed November 20, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia.com/pr/economia/20150806/54435658398/indicadores-empresariales-respaldan-recuperacion-economica.html 3 “De Guindos atribuye recuperación al liderazgo de Rajoy, ayuda UE y reformas.,” La Vanguardia., October 22, 2015., accessed November 20, 2015., http:// www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20151022/54437383077/de-guindos-atribuyerecuperacion-al-liderazgo-de-rajoy-ayuda-ue-y-reformas.html

Pérez, Claudi., Alemania y España aceleran el ritmo de recuperación de la zona euro., El Pais., February 13, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/02/13/actualidad/1423813753_577758.html Viaña, Daniel., Urrutia, César., España mantiene su crecimiento mientras la economía mundial se frena., El Mundo., November 11, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http:/www.elmundo.es/economia/2015/11/11/564255e1268e3efd6 114

Spain - Jorge Quesada Davies 48b4619.html López, Celeste., La generación de la crisis ya no cree en España., La Vanguardia., April 16, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015.,

4

“España tiene el noveno salario mínimo más alto de la Unión Europea.” El Mundo., December 29, 2015., accessed January 10, 2016., http://www.elmundo.es/ economia/2015/12/29/5682cf6bca4741b10f8b465d.html No author., Pedro Sánchez admite la recuperación económica pero censura la “euforia” de Rajoy., La Vanguardia., February 3, 2015., accessed November 20, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20150203/54425786250/pedro-sanchez-admite-recuperacion-economica-censura-euforia-rajoy.html

5

Pardo, Pablo., El FMI mejora en medio punto la previsión de crecimiento de España para este año y la sitúa en el 2,5%., El Mundo., March 14, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2015/04/14/552d11d2ca47412f0b8b4575.html Bolaños, Alejandro., Diagnóstico de una recuperación., El Pais., April 19, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/04/17/ actualidad/1429291973_681479.html Pérez, Claudi., Bruselas eleva al 2,8% su previsión de crecimiento para España en 2015., El Pais., May 5, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://economia. elpais.com/economia/2015/05/05/actualidad/1430814645_238655.html No author., España, con tres millones de pobres, es el cuarto país más desigual de la Unión Europea., El Mundo., September 9, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/solidaridad/2015/09/09/55ef630022601d8753 8b4574.html Otero, Lara., España empieza a pagar en Bruselas., El Pais., January 25, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/01/25/ actualidad/1422218545_130001.html

6

No author., La clave es Alemania., El Pais., May 17, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/05/16/opinion/1431800296_372707.html Gómez, M. V., España, tercer país de la UE con más ayudas a la banca en la crisis., El Pais., June 4, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://economia.elpais. com/economia/2015/06/04/actualidad/1433442026_379365.html El “milagro económico español”, desmontado en un estudio., La Vanguardia., October 22, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia.com/ economia/20151022/54437366826/milagro-economico-espana-desmontado.html Bolaños, Alejandro., España es el quinto país de la zona euro que menos crece desde 2011., El Pais., November 8, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http:// economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/11/07/actualidad/1446927733_716615. html No author., La OCDE eleva la previsión de crecimiento de España en 2015 pero 115

Messages in the Media reduce la del 2016., La Vanguardia., November 9, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20151109/54438731306/ocde-espana-crecimiento-2015.html Pérez, Claudi., Bruselas eleva al 2,8% su previsión de crecimiento para España en 2015., El Pais., May 5, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://economia. elpais.com/economia/2015/05/05/actualidad/1430814645_238655.html

7

Suanzes, Pablo R., La UE pide más reformas estructurales a España para cumplir el déficit., El Mundo., May 13, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http:// www.elmundo.es/economia/2015/05/13/55534eac22601d91388b456c.html Rodríguez-Rata, Alexis., Santiago Niño Becerra: “Faltan al menos seis, siete, ocho años de crisis”., La Vanguardia., June 14, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20150614/54432254625/santiago-nino-becerra-anos-crisis.html Pérez, Claudi., Cebrián, Belén Domínguez., Bruselas ve riesgo de que España incumpla el déficit en 2015 y 2016., El Pais., October 6, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/10/05/actualidad/1444052565_017576.html Suanzes, Pablo., La Comisión Europea empeora aún más las previsiones económicas sobre España., El Mundo., November 5, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2015/11/05/563b2b3d268e3eef138b458d.html No author., Rajoy cifra en el 3,2% el crecimiento de España durante 2015., El Mundo., December 29, 2015., accessed January 10, 2016., http://www.elmundo. es/economia/2015/12/29/5682835a46163f452f8b45fc.html Suanzes, R, Pablo., Las elecciones españolas desconciertan a la UE., El Mundo., May 27, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2015/05/27/5564e8a5e2704e4b0c8b4596.html 8

No author., Montoro asegura que la independencia “sería terrible para España”., La Vanguardia., September 7, 2015., accessed November 20, 2015., http://www. lavanguardia.com/politica/20150907/54435144707/montoro-independencia-terrible-espana.html Segovia, Carlos., Montoro pagará a la Generalitat como la UE a Grecia para tutelar su gasto., El Mundo., November 25, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/11/25/5654d3cbe2704e7e788b45b1.html Inglesias, Pablo., Pablo Inglesias: ‘Un rico es el que usa ingeniería fiscal para no pagar impuestos’., El Mundo., February 24, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/02/23/54eb9e45268e3e48448b4597. html

9

Del Palacio, Guillermo., Hay amores que matan: los apoyos ‘envenenados’ de Podemos., El Mundo., February 27, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http:// www.elmundo.es/enredados/2015/02/27/54ecb37322601d87738b4577.html 116

Spain - Jorge Quesada Davies García, Juan Manuel., Empate entre Ciudadanos y PSEO a un mes de las elecciones., La Vanguardia., November 18, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015.,http://www.lavanguardia.com/vangdata/20151118/30237566084/ciudadanos-psoe-20d-elecciones-generales.html Juliana, Enric., Gana la España plural., La Vanguardia., December 18, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20151221/30945430550/gana-la-espana-plural.html Carlin, John., La vieja contra la nueva España., El Pais., December 19, 2015., accessed January 5, 2016., http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/12/18/actualidad/1450468411_326406.html Gil Calvo, Enrique., Gran Transacción., El Pais., December 26, 2015., accesos January 5, 2016., http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/12/26/actualidad/1451153808_844775.html Segurola, Maria., Vera, Joaquin., Podemos Saca El Pecho., El Mundo., January 31, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/ espana/2015/01/31/54ccae0822601dc9388b4570.html

10

Dolz, Patricia., Las cinco marchas de Podemos., El Pais., February 1, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2015/01/31/madrid/1422728582_907781.html No author., Podemos mestra a los empresarios su programa económico., Europa Press., El Mundo., February 25, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www. elmundo.es/economia/2015/02/25/54edf01722601d521c8b456c.html Manetto, Francesco., Podemos leader says farewell to EU Parliament with harsh attack., El Pais., October 28, 2014., accessed November 29, 2015., http://elpais. com/elpais/2015/10/28/inenglish/1446019833_914590.html Cotarelo, Ramón., Timermas, Asís., La Marcha de Podemos, a debate., El Mundo., January 31, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/ el-mundo-tv/2015/01/31/54cd1076e2704e13288b4587.html

11

Díez, Anabel., Sánchez asumirá su candidatura con un plan de cambio profundo., El Pais., June 17, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://politica.elpais. com/politica/2015/06/17/actualidad/1434571652_316678.html Garcia Campos, Juan M., Ciudadanos ya supera a Podemos en intención de voto para las Generales., La Vanguardia., November 7, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia.com/vangdata/20151007/54437942747/ciudadanos-supera-podemos-intencion-voto-generales.html Garcia Campos, Juan M., Ciudadanos ya pisa los talones al PSEO en intención de voto para el 20D., La Vanguardia., November 28, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia.com/vangdata/20151028/54438434368/ciudadanos-ya-pisa-los-talones-al-psoe-en-intencion-de-voto-para-el-20d.html 12

Garcia, Luis B., España, abocada a los pactos., La Vanguardia., December 19, 117

Messages in the Media 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/elecciones/20151220/30935557531/resultados-elecciones-generales.html García, Luis B.,, Los sondeos señalan una gobernabilidad incierta: PP y Cuidadanos no suman y PSEO y Podemos tampoco., La Vanguardia, December 20, 2015., accessed December 29, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/ elecciones/20151220/30935558486/sondeos-elecciones-generales.html Quitian, Sergi., Elecciones Generales, última hora en directo., La Vanguardia., December 21, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http://www.lavanguardia.com/ politica/elecciones/20151221/30954833322/20d-elecciones-generales-en-directo. html Lago, Jorge., Moruno, Jorge., Cambia, todo cambia., El Pais., December 23, 2015., accessed January 5, 2016., http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/12/23/opinion/1450866949_426908.html García De Blas, Elsa., Izquierda Unida, al filo de quedarse sin grupo en el Congreso., El Pais., July 7, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://politica.elpais. com/politica/2015/05/07/actualidad/1431011036_982937.html

13

Sierra, Enric., Sin gran coalición, catalanes y vascos mandan., La Vanguardia., December 21, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http://www.lavanguardia.com/ opinion/20151221/30945662537/gran-coalicion-catalanes-vascos-mandan.html Mucientes, Esther., Todos los pactos posibles para formar gobierno., El Mundo., December 22, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2 015/12/20/5676056eca47415d758b45c7.html De Carreras, Francesc., Podemos como tentación., El Pais, December 23, 2015., accessed January 5, 2016., http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/12/22/opinion/1450801296_731088.html Galindo, Jorge., La estrategia de los extremos., El Pais., December 28,, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/12/27/opinion/1451229679_451939.html Prieto, Joaquín., El PSOE versus Podemos., El Pais., December 29, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/12/28/actualidad/1451331673_536673.html Suanzes, R, Pablo., Las elecciones españolas desconciertan a la UE., El Mundo., May 27, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2015/05/27/5564e8a5e2704e4b0c8b4596.html

14

Manetoo. Fran., Iglesias propone como alternativa a Sánchez una ‘figura independiente’., El Pais., December 23, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016.,http://politica. elpais.com/politica/2015/12/23/actualidad/1450863367_752292.html Medina, Pablo., Sondeos de voto para las elecciones del 20-D., El Mundo., December 14, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http://www.elmundo.es/grafico/ espana/2015/10/15/561fe19422601dd7728b45ef.html

15

118

Spain - Jorge Quesada Davies Cruz, Marisa., El PP se mantiene, Podemos crece y Ciudadanos se estanca., El Mundo., December 14, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http://www.elmundo.es/ espana/2015/12/14/566d968122601d3e588b4585.html No author., Las últimas encuestas dibujan una España difícil de gobernar tras el 20D., La Vanguardia., December 14, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http:// www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20151214/30789613341/ultimas-encuestas-20d. html Carvajal, Álvaro., Podemos pide ‘paso al cambio’ lanzado desde Cataluña y Valencia., El Mundo., December 18, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016,, http://www. elmundo.es/espana/2015/12/18/56748a7de2704e22218b45dd.html Calvet, Josep., ¿Qué combinaciones permitirán gobernar tras las elecciones del 20D?., La Vanguardia., December 20, 2015., accessed January 2, 2015., http:// www.lavanguardia.com/politica/elecciones/20151221/30942682460/combinaciones-gobernar-espana-elecciones-20d.html Pi, Jaume., Victoria histórica de En Comú Podem en Catalunya., La Vanguardia., December 21, 2015., accessed January 2, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia. com/politica/elecciones/20151220/30935782580/resultados-elecciones-generales-catalunya.html Cruz, Marisa., Podemos igualará al PP en subvenciones del Congreso., El Mundo., December 27, 2015., accessed January 10, 2016., http://www.elmundo.es/ espana/2015/12/27/5679a7ec268e3ebd468b45a2.html No author., Elecciones municipales: CiU se mantiene como primera fuerza municipal en Catalunya pero pierde la capital., La Vanguardia., May 5, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20150524/54431816635/resultados-elecciones-catalunya.html

16

No author., Participación récord en las elecciones catalanas., La Vanguardia., September 27, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia. com/politica/20150927/54437677493/resultados-elecciones-catalanas.html

17

Doncel, Luis., Alemania pide a Cataluña que respete la legislación española y europea., El Pais., September 28, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/09/28/actualidad/1443436069_323133.html Verdú, Daniel., La independencia de Cataluña, ¿Una cuestión demográfica?., El Pais., December 6, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http://ccaa.elpais.com/ ccaa/2015/12/05/catalunya/1449336570_447004.html Fernandéz, Laura., Antonio Baños: ‘No es un enfrentamiento Cataluña-España, es un enfrentamiento de los catalanes contra el Estado español’., El Mundo., September 25, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2015/09/25/5605975eca474156188b45a7.html

18

Culla, Joan B., Bandazos a ciegas., El Pais., November 6, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2015/11/05/catalun119

Messages in the Media ya/1446750566_839898.html No author., El bipartidismo se resiente y España vira a la izquierda., La Vanguardia., May 24, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia. com/politica/20150524/54431421081/resultados-elecciones-municipales.html

19

Casquiero, Javier., Rajoy: “No va a haber independencia de Cataluña”., El Pais., July 17, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015.,http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/07/16/actualidad/1437051588_307689.html Castro, Carles., El 27S proyecta la quiebra del bipartidismo en España., La Vanguardia., October 12, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www. lavanguardia.com/politica/20151012/54437177064/27s-proyecta-quiebra-bipartidismo-espana.html Viaña, Daniel., Sólo Grecia paga más que Cataluña por su deuda., El Mundo., September 16, 2015., accessed November 29., 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/ economia/2015/09/16/55f8788746163fd9598b45a7.html 20

López, María-Paz., Alemania emplaza a los independentistas de Catalunya a respetar la Constitución y la ley europea., La Vanguardia., September 28, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/elecciones-catalanas/20150928/54437706442/alemania-independentistas-catalunya-constitucion.html Martínez, Víctor., Delgado, Juan T., Villar Mir: ‘Si crece el riesgo de independencia en Cataluña, muchos empresarios nos iremos’., El Mundo., October 5, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2015/10/05/560ec1c846163fef308b45cd.html No author., S&P rebaja la calificación de Catalunya a ‘BB-’ por las “tensiones políticas” con el Gobierno., La Vanguardia., October 9, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.lavanguardia.com/local/barcelona/20151009/54437142564/s-p-rebaja-la-calificacion-de-catalunya-a-bb-porlas-tensiones-politicas-con-el-gobierno.html Navarro, Beatriz., Juncker pide “un gobierno lo más estable posible” para España., La Vanguardia., January 7, 2016., accessed January 10, 2016., http://www. lavanguardia.com/politica/20160107/301248467517/juncker-gobierno-estable. html No author., La CUP apuesta por una declaración unilateral de independencia sin negociar con España., El Mundo., September 5, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2015/09/05/55eb2b2aca474159508b4582. html

21

Casquiero, Javier., Rajoy y Albiol se lanzan a por los votantes socialistas catalanes ., El Pais., September 5, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/09/05/actualidad/1441445219_681713.html No author., El Parlamento sueco acoge un debate sobre el proceso independentista catalán., La Vanguardia., September 17, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., 120

Spain - Jorge Quesada Davies http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20150917/54435322499/parlamento-sueco-debate-proceso-independentista-catalan.html Moreno, Antonio., ¿Perderían los catalanes la nacionalidad española si se independizaran?., El Mundo., September 25, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/09/23/560297eb268e3e882b8b4584.html No author., Pronovias se ‘posiciona’ y advierte de que dejaría Cataluña en caso de secesión., El Mundo., September 21, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2015/09/21/56001463ca4741471d8b45c7.html

22

No author., Alierta advierte de los efectos negativos de la secesión de Cataluña., El Pais., September 21, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://politica.elpais. com/politica/2015/09/21/actualidad/1442840312_222628.html Sanz, Luis Ángel., Pedro Sánchez insta a Junts pel Sí a ‘abandonar el independentismo’ y a no echarse ‘en brazos de los antisistema’., El Mundo., September 28, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/09/28/ 5609339de2704e4b108b4591.html Bou, Agustín., Pérdida de confianza., El Pais., December 9, 2015., accessed December 20, 2015., http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2015/12/08/catalunya/1449606004_878988.html No author., Cataluña -20D - Rajoy hará campaña este jueves en Barcelona e insistirá en su mensaje de defensa de la unidad de España., La Vanguardia., December 17, 2015., accessed January 5, 2016., http://www.lavanguardia.com/ vida/20151217/30863356109/catalunya-20d-rajoy-hara-campana-este-jueves-enbarcelona-e-insistira-en-su-mensaje-de-defensa-de-la-unidad-de-espana.html Gorospe, Pedro., Méndez de Vigo: “Si Euskadi sale de España quedará fuera de la UE”., El Pais., January 28, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://ccaa. elpais.com/ccaa/2015/01/28/paisvasco/1422452873_977045.html

23

No author., La viabilidad económica de un Estado catalán polariza el debate electoral en TVE., El Mundo., September 10, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2015/09/10/55f0c39d22601d975a8b45ac.html Manso, Joaquín., Cruz, Marisa., Núñez, Francisco., Sánchez, Rosalía., ¿Cuáles serían las consecuencias de una Cataluña independiente?., El Mundo., September 27, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://www.elmundo.es/ espana/2015/09/26/5605b06446163ff3208b45a3.html Cruz, Juan., “El franquismo marca como una sombra el diálogo español”., El Pais., November 27, 2015., accessed November 29, 2015., http://cultura.elpais. com/cultura/2015/11/26/actualidad/1448564760_164278.html No author., Duran acusa a Junts pel Sí de “hipotecar el futuro” de Catalunya en manos de la CUP., La Vanguardia., December 8, 2015., accessed January 2, 2016., http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/elecciones/20151208/30667938322/duran-lleida-junts-pel-si-cup.html 121

PORTUGAL

By Natasha Rodrigues

Correio de Manhā. Founded in 1979. Owned by the Cofina Group. Daily circulation of 108, 625.

Jornal de Notícias. Founded in 1888. Owned by Global Media Group. Daily circulation of 57, 059.

Público. Founded in 1990. Owned by Sonae. Daily circulation of 31, 580.

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

122

Portugal - Natasha Rodrigues In researching the most prevalent new stories of 2015 in Portugal, the issues which garnered the most interest and attention are: the Syrian refugee crisis, national unemployment rates, and the 2015 national election.

The Refugee Crisis and Portugalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role In 2015, the refugee crisis dominated Portuguese media, with many media sources focused both on the impact it would have on Portugal, as well as the European continent as a whole. Stemming largely from civil strife in Syria that began in March of 2011 and overall violence in the region, it is estimated that in 2015 alone, nearly 1.5 million migrants arrived in the EU.1 Of these migrants, approximately 49 percent are refugees from Syria, 21 percent are from Afghanistan, 8 percent are from Iraq, and the remaining constitute African migrants from Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Gambia and Mali.2 The processing of migrants has been a particularly prolonged process, due to the difficulty associated with separating eligible refugees from economic migrants.3 Interestingly however, polls taken by Eurobarometer demonstrate that, when asked about the two most important issues facing Portugal, only 3 percent chose migration, compared to the European average of 23 percent.4 Portuguese media outlets have not only focused on those arriving on Greek and Italian islands, but also on the roughly 3,700 people who have lost their lives en route to Europe as well as those being mistreated upon arrival.5 Countless reports feature haunting images of sinking boats and stories that detail instances when refugees were transported in refrigerated trucks and were subjected to gruesome conditions.6 Portuguese newspapers also highlighted instances in other EU states, including the Czech Republic, where refugees went on hunger strikes and made claims of mistreatment towards the government in their search for asylum.7 As the most geographically westward European nation, Portugal has not faced so large an onslaught of migration as its EU counterparts. However, it has been enlisted in aiding the resettlement.8 In agreement with the EU Refugee Resettlement Program, Portugal has pledged to take in 4,500 refugees over a two-year period.9 Despite the fact that the majority of refugees prefer northern Europe because of the ample job opportunities they believe are available there, the policies regulating asylum seekers prevent them from always going to their preferred destination.10,11 The first round of Portuguese resettlement was small, approximately 25 people, and took place on 17 December 2015.12 Two of the three media sources consulted (Correio de ManhĂŁ and PĂşblico) identify the asylum seekers as mostly Eritrean women with children, and included that they are of Christian faith.13,14 Government officials have stressed the importance of employing these individuals either in the agricultural sector or within small businesses. They have also emphasized the importance of having all migrants learn the Portuguese language.15 Despite a relatively weak but recovering economy, Portugal has been cooperative with the resettlement goals of the European Union and has 123

Messages in the Media also contributed around €340,000 towards combatting the crisis.16 After a political impasse that replaced the former right-wing political party with a leftist coalition, the political climate has become increasingly favorable to the issue of refugee resettlement, with even greater cooperation expected in the future.17

Portugal’s Persisting Unemployment While Portugal’s economic performance has been, on the whole, slowly improving, their unemployment rates remain less than satisfactory, with many believing that the official rate does not capture the reality of the Portuguese economy.18 Largely, these numbers have been attributed to the austerity measures put into place in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, the enactment of which is believed to have stunted the Portuguese labour market and resulted in both structural and youth unemployment.19 More specifically, the International Labour Organization (ILO) suggests that Portugal’s increased use of temporary and part-time employment, in conjunction with the austerity measures put in place, are the driving forces behind the consistently high levels of youth unemployment.20 Although the two numbers have slowly begun to converge, Portugal’s unemployment rate, which stood in September at an estimated 12.4 percent, continues to stand above the average EU unemployment rate of 9.5 percent.21 In fact, while the EU average for youth unemployment is only 16.6 percent, in Portugal rates as high as 34.8 percent have been reported.22 Left-leaning papers, including the consulted Público, have also suggested that the official unemployment rates do not accurately reflect the reality in Portugal.23 According to the Observatory on Crisis and Alternatives, the true unemployment rate is actually around 29 percent, the discrepancy being in that the official statistics do not count every Portuguese currently out of a job.24 This is a sentiment backed by the Leftist Bloc Party, which believes individuals taking part in unpaid internships, completing job training, have given up looking for work or who have migrated in search of economic opportunity should also be included in the official unemployment statistics.25 Furthermore, when comparing unemployment rates on a region-by-region basis, it is evident that discrepancies exist. While the rates in the Madeira and Azores Islands have slightly increased, by 1.1 and 0.8 percent respectively, as well as in the north of the country by 0.2 percent, and the metropolitan area of Lisbon by 0.1 percent, rates have decreased in the Alentejo by 0.8 percent, Algarve by 0.6 percent, and in the central regions by 0.3 percent.26 The majority of reports reviewed focus on both youth and structural unemployment, with some sources pointing to in-course internships, which are estimated to drive down unemployment among newly graduating students by as much as 15 percent, as a possible solution.27 All in all, the issue of unemployment has been at the forefront of not just Portuguese but also EU politics, with fellow member states also struggling to improve flailing rates. While Greece’s unemployment rate stands at 25.4 percent, Spain comes in at 22.7 percent, Croatia at 17.5 percent, and Cyprus at 15.6 percent.28 These numbers have all warranted further economic 124

Portugal - Natasha Rodrigues intervention by the EU into the finances of member states, typically in the form of austerity measures. With regards to Portugal, the European Commission has actively advised on various long-term policies that could work to lower existing unemployment rates.29 These include the proper registration of long-term unemployment, the individual monitoring of claimants, which is specifically designed to target structural unemployment, and offers of integration contracts.30,31 Despite these proposals however, including a new venture by Brussels to combat youth unemployment through individual payment plans to member states in order to aid the facilitation of financial assistance programs, significant progress has yet to be made.32 Currently, the Portuguese government is attempting to solve the problem through domestic measures, with their recent plans to increase the Portuguese minimum wage.33 While the direct economic impacts of this action remain unknown, many, including the former Prime Minister, under whose term the EU austerity measures were implemented, believe it will hamper future growth.34

The 2015 Election and Political Impasse In October, Portugal faced a legislative election in which the centerright Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho sought re-election and leftist parties wanted to “save Portugal” from austerity plans.35 The Prime Minister ran under a coalition comprised of his Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the People’s Party (CDS-PP).36 The results were largely mixed; the PSD and CDS-PP coalition won a minority government with 38.55 percent of the vote, while the Socialist Party (PS) won 32.38 percent.37 Other parties include the Left Bloc which acquired 10.22 percent, and the Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU), comprised of a coalition between the Communist Party (PCP) and the Green Party (PEV), which won 8.27 percent of the vote.38 While minority governments are common in many European nations, leaders of the newly elected opposition, the Socialist and the Left Bloc parties in particular, refused to accept defeat and continued to fight for a “break with austerity.”39 The leader of the PS, António Costa, was particularly vocal about his disappointment with the results, but claimed that he and his party would not give up, stressing that the majority of voters voted for a change in politics.40 Despite President Aníbal Cavaco Silva’s statement that the minority government won constitutionally and fairly, and that political stability is necessary for economic growth, the leftist parties continued to resist.41,42 As a result, discussions between the newly elected Passos Coelho and PS leader Costa failed.43 As the political impasse continued, the opposition began meeting to establish an agreement that would allow them to gain control together.44 The Left Bloc, the Socialist Party (PS) and the Portuguese Communist Party underwent complex negotiations and eventually arrived at an agreement.45 On the tenth of November 2015, 123 members of Parliament voted in favor of a motion to reject the program set forth by the new government, while only 107 voted in favor of its 125

Messages in the Media implementation, causing a government collapse.46 Although the events of the leftist takeover are recent and their longterm impacts are unknown, the reaction of the European Commission upon the initial win of Passos Coelho and his coalition are telling. Shortly after the PSDCDS-PP victory, the European Commission claimed that their win confirmed the desire of the Portuguese people to continue with the positive economic reforms started under Passos Coelho.47 These reforms include austerity measures that were critical in Portugal’s recovery from the financial and economic crisis.48 In addition, in President Cavaco Silva’s defense of the elected minority government, he included that the Portuguese government had never up until that point depended upon Eurosceptic politicians, alluding to the PCP and the BE.49 As the political impasse occurred near the very end of 2015, its impacts regarding relations with the EU remain uncertain.50 However, with plans to increase the minimum wage, it is likely that the nation will face another budget deficit and thereby challenging the austerity measures imposed by the previous government.51 The events surrounding the most recent Portuguese election may also affect other elections in Europe – namely the Spanish elections in December 2015.52 Watching the events in Portugal very closely, the leader of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) has already agreed to potentially lead leftist government negotiations, if they are unsuccessful in their elections.53 Some have even gone so far as to claim that the events in Portugal represent the end of bipartisanship in Europe.54

2015 in Review In light of the Economic Adjustment Program applied to Portugal by the EU between 2011 and 2014, Portugal has shown some signs of economic improvement, as seen in their external balances and national debt levels.

However, the issue of unemployment remains a national concern, with figures far from the European average.55 Despite having made some headway with unemployment, the bulk of the problem persists, leading politicians in Brussels and Lisbon to conclude that Portugal’s economic problems may be rooted deeper than expected, and be of a structural nature.56 The effects of the recent increase in the minimum wage are unknown in Portugal, but some argue that it will exacerbate the unemployment issue, and derail efforts of debt repayment.57 In regards to the continuous European migration patterns, Portugal has experienced mixed reactions. Under the former Prime Minister Passos Coelho, immigration policy did not take precedence, with the majority of the attention focused towards economic recovery and job creation.58 Maintaining the opinion that collective EU action was necessary in solving the migrant crisis, the Prime Minister stood firm in the opinion that migration policies had to take into consideration the economic status of each EU state.59 As the months have passed, migration policies have become the focus of greater political attention, with the new administration willing to take in greater numbers of refugees.60 Overall, the Portuguese have been compliant with EU demands regarding refugee and border 126

Portugal - Natasha Rodrigues guidelines, despite initial reluctance.

Finally, the latest and most impactful event of 2015 was the national Portuguese election and the political deadlock it resulted in. While the results of the political impasse suggest a future weakening of the Portugal-EU relationship, particularly regarding economic recovery, relations regarding the resettling of refugees may improve as the new government shifts priorities. However, despite current fears surrounding the policy impacts of the Eurosceptic coalition, their actions, especially in relation to austerity measures, will be better understood over the course of 2016.

“A crise de refugiados na Europa “é uma crise de solidariedade.”” Público, December 16, 2015. Accessed December 18, 2015. http://www.publico.pt/portugal/noticia/a-crise-de-refugiados-na-europa-e-uma-crise-de-solidariedade1717662?page=-1.

2 “Migrações: Mais de um milhão chegou à Europa por mar.” Correio de Manhã, December 30, 2015. Accessed December 30, 2015. http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/ cm_ao_minuto/detalhe/migracoes_mais_de_um_milhao_chegou_a_europa_ por_mar_em_2015____onu.html.

3 “Portugal acolherá investigadores entre os refugiados sírios.” Jornal de Notícias, December 11, 2015. Accessed December 17, 2015. http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4924607&page=-1 4 “Standard EB 83,” Eurobarometer (European Commission). Accessed December 20, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_fact_pt_ en.pdf 5 Félix Ribeiro. “Europa atinge o milhão de refugiados e migrantes, sem compromissos ou garantias.” Público, December 22, 2015. Accessed December 23, 2015. http://www.publico.pt/mundo/noticia/ja-mais-de-um-milhao-de-refugiados-emigrantes-chegaram-este-ano-a-europa-1718159?page=-1 6 “Encontrados 31 refugiados dentro de camião frigorífico.” Jornal de Notícias, October 2, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015. http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/ Mundo/interior.aspx?content_id=4812579&page=-1 7 “Refugiados fazem greve de fome em centro de detenção na República Checa.”

Público, November 11, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015. http://www.publico. pt/mundo/noticia/refugiados-fazem-greve-de-fome-em-centro-de-detencao-narepublica-checa-1714128 8 “Formação e qualificação dos refugiados vão ser reconhecidas.” Público, November 9, 2015. Accessd November 14, 2015. http://www.publico.pt/sociedade/noticia/formacao-e-qualificacao-dos-refugiados-vao-ser-reconhecidas-1713873 9 “Primeiro grupo de refugiados chega a Portugal na quinta-feira.” Jornal de Notícias, December 14, 2015. Accessed December 17, 2015. http://www.jn.pt/ PaginaInicial/Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4929480 10 “Refugiados não querem viajar para Portugal.” Jornal de Notícias, November 27, 2015. Accessed December 8, 2015. http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Nacional/ interior.aspx?content_id=4905032&page=-1 1

127

Messages in the Media “Refugiados que recusem recolocação serão excluídos.” Jornal de Notícias, November 27, 2015. Accessed December 8, 2015. http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/ Mundo/interior.aspx?content_id=4905535 12 “Refugiados encontram esperança em Portugal.” Correio de Manhã, December 18, 2015. Accessed December 23, 2015.http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/nacional/sociedade/detalhe/25_refugiados_ja_estao_em_portugal.html 13 “Refugiados encontram esperança em Portugal.” Correio de Manhã, December 18, 2015. Accessed December 23, 2015.http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/nacional/sociedade/detalhe/25_refugiados_ja_estao_em_portugal.html 14 Viana, Clara, and Ana Dias Cordeiro. ““Jovens, mulheres, cristãos: eis os primeiros refugiados oficiais que chegaram a Portugal.”” Público, December 17, 2015. Accessed December 23, 2015. http://www.publico.pt/sociedade/noticia/jovens-mulheres-cristaos-eis-os-primeiros-refugiados-oficiais-que-chegaram-a-portugal-1717753?page=-1 15 Ibid.

16 “Portugal contribuiu até agora com 340 mil euros para os refugiado.” Jornal de Notícias, October 30, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015. http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4862824 17 “Sampaio da Nóvoa diz ter “grande abertura” aos refugiados.” Correio de Manhã, January 3, 2016. Accessed January 3, 2015. http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/ nacional/politica/detalhe/presidenciais_novoa_diz_ter_grande_abertura_aos_refugiados_e_pede_que_se_conheca_esta_realidade.html 18 “Taxa de desemprego esconde número real de desempregados.” Público, March, 27, 2015. Accessed December 13, 2015.http://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/ taxa-de-desemprego-esconde-numero-real-de-desempregado-1690510 19 “Portugal continua entre os países com maior taxa de desemprego jovem.”

Público, August 8, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.publico.pt/ economia/noticia/portugal-continua-entre-os-paises-com-maior-taxa-de-desemprego-jovem-1710585 20 “Portugal continua entre os países com maior taxa de desemprego jovem.”

Público, August 8, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.publico.pt/ economia/noticia/portugal-continua-entre-os-paises-com-maior-taxa-de-desemprego-jovem-1710585 21 Martins, Raquel. “Taxa de desemprego da Zona Euro estabiliza em 11%.” Público, September 30, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015. http://www.publico.pt/ economia/noticia/taxa-de-desemprego-da-zona-euro-estabiliza-em-11-1709583 22 Ibid.

23 “Taxa de desemprego esconde número real de desempregados.” Público, March 27, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/ taxa-de-desemprego-esconde-numero-real-de-desempregado-1690510 24 “Taxa de desemprego esconde número real de desempregados.” Público, March 27, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/ taxa-de-desemprego-esconde-numero-real-de-desempregado-1690510 25 “Bloco diz que taxa de desemprego não traduz “toda a realidade.” Jornal de Notícias, July 30, 2015. Accessed November 17, 2015. http://www.jn.pt/PaginaIni11

128

Portugal - Natasha Rodrigues cial/Economia/interior.aspx?content_id=4707560&page=-1 26 “Desempregados sobem na Madeira, Açores, Norte e Lisboa.” Jornal de Notícias, November 4, 2015. Accessed November 17, 2015.http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Economia/interior.aspx?content_id=4869407 27 Viana, Clara. “Licenciaturas com estágios têm taxas de desemprego mais baixas.” Público, May 5, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015. http://www.publico.pt/sociedade/noticia/licenciaturas-com-estagios-tem-taxas-de-desemprego-mais-baixas-1694639 28 “Taxa de desemprego da zona euro desce ligeiramente para 11,1% em abril.”

Jornal de Notícias, June 3, 2015. Accessed November 17, 2015. http://www.jn.pt/ PaginaInicial/Economia/interior.aspx?content_id=4604140 29 “Bruxelas avisa Portugal para níveis de desemprego.” Correio de Manhã, November 26, 2016. Accessed December 5, 2015. http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/nacional/sociedade/detalhe/portugal_deve_reforcar_acompanhamento_a_desempregados_de_longa_duracao___bruxelas.html 30 “Bruxelas avisa Portugal para níveis de desemprego.” Correio de Manhã, November 26, 2016. Accessed December 5, 2015. http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/nacional/sociedade/detalhe/portugal_deve_reforcar_acompanhamento_a_desempregados_de_longa_duracao___bruxelas.html 31 “Bruxelas quer que desempregados há mais de 1 ano tenham acompanhamento individualizado.” Correio de Manhã, September 17, 2015. Accessed November 5, 2015. http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/cm_ao_minuto/detalhe/bruxelas_quer_que_desempregados_ha_mais_de_1_ano_tenham_acompanhamento_individualizado. html 32 “UE aumenta verbas para combate ao desemprego jovem.” Correio de Manhã, May 19, 2015. Accessed November 5, 2015. http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/nacional/economia/detalhe/verbas_para_combate_ao_desemprego_jovem_na_ue_ sobem_para_quase_1000_me_em_2015.html 33 “Subida do salário mínimo beneficia mais de 650 mil pessoas.” Correio de Manhã, December 23, 2015. Accessed December 27, 2015. http://www.cmjornal. xl.pt/nacional/economia/detalhe/subida_do_salario_minimo_beneficia_mais_ de_650_mil_pessoas.html 34 “Subida do salário mínimo beneficia mais de 650 mil pessoas.” Correio de Manhã, December 23, 2015. Accessed December 27, 2015. http://www.cmjornal. xl.pt/nacional/economia/detalhe/subida_do_salario_minimo_beneficia_mais_ de_650_mil_pessoas.html 35 “BE reitera disponibilidade para solução de Governo.” Jornal de Notícias, October 5, 2015. Accessed on November 5, 2015.http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/ Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4818138 36 “Acordo de Governo PSD/CDS-PP assinado na quarta-feira.” Jornal de Notícias, October 6, 2015. Accessed on November 5, 2015. http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/ Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4819872&page=-1 37 “PSD diz que resultados responsabilizam maiores partidos.” Jornal de Notícias, October 5, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015. http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/ Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4818163 129

Messages in the Media “Cavaco recebe Passos na terça-feira.” Jornal de Notícias, October 5, 2015.

Accessed November 5, 2015.http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Nacional/interior. aspx?content_id=4817710&page=-1 39 “BE volta a desafiar PS para um Governo que “rompa com austeridade.” Jornal de Notícias, October 7, 2015. Accessed November 5, 2015. http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4820236 40 Barbosa, Rafael. “Governo à Direita num Parlamento à Esquerda.” Jornal de Notícias, October 5, 2015. Accessed November 5, 2015.http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4816389&page=-1 41 Rodrigues, Sofia. “Chegou ao fim o Governo que durou 27 dias.” Público, November 26, 2015. Accessed December 5, 2015.http://www.publico.pt/politica/ noticia/chegou-ao-fim-o-governo-que-durou-27-dias-1715660 42 “Cavaco força Passos no Governo.” Correio de Manhã, October 23, 2015. Accessed November 5, 2015.http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/nacional/politica/detalhe/ cavaco_escolhe_passos.html 43 Lourenço, Nuno Sá and Sofia Rodrigues. “Costa e Passos com “poucochinho” para apresentar a Cavaco.” Público, October 20, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.publico.pt/politica/noticia/costa-e-passos-com-poucochinho-para-apresentar-a-cavaco-1711721 44 “Catarina Martins diz que caminho “é difícil” mas tem de ser feito.” Jornal de Notícias, October 16, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4839279 45 “Catarina Martins diz que caminho “é difícil” mas tem de ser feito.” Jornal de Notícias, October 16, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4839279 46 Pena, Paulo. “O dia em que os derrotados aplaudiram e os vencedores hesitaram.” Público, Novemver 10, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www. publico.pt/politica/noticia/o-dia-em-que-os-derrotados-aplaudiram-e-os-vencedores-hesitaram-1714031 47 “Eleições: Portugueses confirmaram vontade de prosseguir reformas Comissão Europeia.” Correio de Manhã, October 5, 2015. Accessed November 5, 2015.http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/cm_ao_minuto/detalhe/eleicoes_portugueses_ confirmaram_vontade_de_prosseguir_reformas___comissao_europeia.html 48 “Eleições: Portugueses confirmaram vontade de prosseguir reformas Comissão Europeia.” Correio de Manhã, October 5, 2015. Accessed November 5, 2015.http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/cm_ao_minuto/detalhe/eleicoes_portugueses_ confirmaram_vontade_de_prosseguir_reformas___comissao_europeia.html 49 “Cavaco força Passos no Governo.” Correio de Manhã, October 23, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/nacional/politica/detalhe/ cavaco_escolhe_passos.html 50 Aníbal, Sérgio. “Impasse político reforça incerteza orçamental.” Público, October 27, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.publico.pt/economia/ noticia/impasse-politico-reforca-incerteza-orcamental-1712437?page=-1 51 Aníbal, Sérgio. “Impasse político reforça incerteza orçamental.” Público, October 27, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.publico.pt/economia/ 38

130

Portugal - Natasha Rodrigues noticia/impasse-politico-reforca-incerteza-orcamental-1712437?page=-1 52 “Líder socialista espanhol admite liderar Governo de esquerda.” Correio de Manhã, November 27, 2015. Accessed December 7, 2015. http://www.cmjornal. xl.pt/mundo/detalhe/lider_socialista_espanhol_admite_liderar_governo_de_esquerda.html 53 “Líder socialista espanhol admite liderar Governo de esquerda.” Correio de Manhã, November 27, 2015. Accessed December 7, 2015. http://www.cmjornal. xl.pt/mundo/detalhe/lider_socialista_espanhol_admite_liderar_governo_de_esquerda.html 54 “Número dois do Podemos diz que acabou o “bipartidarismo.”” Correio de Manhã, December 20, 2015.http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/mundo/detalhe/numero_dois_do_podemos_diz_que_acabou_o_bipartidarismo.html 55 European Commission. “Country Report Portugal 2015.” Accessed December 23, 2015, 1. http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2015/cr2015_portugal_en.pdf 56 Ibid.

57 “Subida do salário mínimo beneficia mais de 650 mil pessoas.” Correio de Manhã, December 23, 2015. Accessed December 27, 2015. http://www.cmjornal. xl.pt/nacional/economia/detalhe/subida_do_salario_minimo_beneficia_mais_ de_650_mil_pessoas.html 58 “Passos diz que acolhimento de refugiados tem de ter em conta o desemprego.”

Jornal de Notícias, May 29, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.jn.pt/ PaginaInicial/Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4596291&page=-1 59 “Passos diz que acolhimento de refugiados tem de ter em conta o desemprego.”

Jornal de Notícias, May 29, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2015.http://www.jn.pt/ PaginaInicial/Nacional/interior.aspx?content_id=4596291&page=-1 60 “Sampaio da Nóvoa diz ter “grande abertura” aos refugiados.” Correio de Manhã, January 3, 2016. Accessed January 3, 2016.http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/ nacional/politica/detalhe/presidenciais_novoa_diz_ter_grande_abertura_aos_refugiados_e_pede_que_se_conheca_esta_realidade.html

131

SWEDEN

By Sonia Liang

Dagens Nyheter. founded in 1864. Owned by The Bonnier Group. Daily circulation of 282,800.

Svenska Dagbladet. founded in 1884. Owned by Schibsted Media Group. Daily circulation of 143,400.

Gรถteborgs Posten. founded in 1850. Owned by Stampen. Daily circulation of 173,700.

Figures are for 2014. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa. eu).

132

Sweden - Sonia Liang

Throughout 2015, three major topics have dominated Swedish media coverage: the refugee crisis, Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, and global climate change.

The Refugee Crisis: A Challenge for an Increasingly Divided Europe

In 2014, half of all Syrian refugees who sought asylum within European Union member states travelled either to Germany or Sweden.1While Germany accepted the greatest absolute number of asylum seekers, Sweden accepted the greatest number of asylum seekers per capita. Characterized by an open and welcoming attitude towards incoming migrants, Sweden under Stefan Löfven’s Social Democratic government was unique in the EU for offering granting permanent resident status to all Syrian refugees who arrived within its borders.

However, the positive outlook at the start of the year sombered as Swedish refugee policy became increasingly restrictive. Departing from its narrative of solidarity, leadership, and optimism, Swedish society struggled to adapt to the influx of refugees and revised many of its generous policies, including that of granting permanent residency.2,3

The top three newspapers all reported on the increased strain placed on schools, social services, and the national health care system as a result of increased migration.4 In October, the Swedish migration agency Migrationsverket announced that it could no longer guarantee housing to newly arrived asylum seekers.5,6 This change in sentiment was mirrored at the political level: while the populist, right-wing, Sweden Democrats were the only party with an antiimmigration platform before the crisis, by the end of the year many mainstream parties, including the ruling Social Democrats and the bourgeois opposition bloc, Alliansen (of which the biggest member is the Moderate Party), had departed from the pro-immigration consensus and were calling for more restrictive migration policies.7,8 In September, Dagens Nyheter documented the criticism received by the Green Party who, contrary to its campaign promises to keep doors open, supported the Social Democrats’s suggestions for a more restrictive policy.9 Tensions also rose within the Social Democratic Party as some members disapproved of Löfven’s attempts to reduce refugee flows.10 Dominating both the Swedish and the European agenda in 2015, the Syrian refugee crisis has resulted in both internal divisions and tensions between neighbours.11With some EU states insisting on closing their borders to future asylum seekers, and others maintaining more generous policies, there has been a growing debate about the extent to which questions of immigration should be decided by EU institutions or by national governments.12,13

Throughout the crisis, Sweden has advocated for closer cooperation on the EU level and for a common European migration policy.14,15 In March, Sweden called for refugees to be more evenly distributed, chastising Nordic and Baltic countries like Denmark, Finland and Estonia for not taking on their fair share of individuals.16 Stressing the need for a European solution to what is, after all, an EU-wide problem, Sweden also denounced the obstructionist policies of 133

Messages in the Media Hungary’s Victor Orban.17,18 Sweden continues to be frustrated at the mounting discord among EU states on an issue that, as they view it, can only be solved through collective action.19,20 This was reflected in an article in Svenska Dagbladet titled, “The EU’s Migration Strategy Seems to be Failing,” which chronicled the European Commission’s failed attempt to redistribute refugees more evenly within the EU as it faced opposition from France, Spain, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.21,22

Instead, as reported by the Göteborgs-Posten in September, the EU agreed on a German and Swedish brokered quota system at an emergency summit, despite the opposition of four members (Hungary included).23,24 However, the plan has largely been deemed a failure, as almost no refugees have been redistributed through the system and many member states are hostile to the idea of the EU mandating their migration policies.25 Consequently, Löfven released a statement in October maintaining that Sweden “…will not continue to take on its part any longer as long as other countries don’t take on theirs.”26 The declaration foreshadowed the Social Democrat’s November policy reversal on migration, when temporary border controls were imposed and Swedish asylum rules tightened so that new refugees were granted only temporary protection.27,28,29 At the same time, Sweden requested the EU’s help in redistributing already settled refugees among other member states, despite considerable reluctance from other EU member states.30,31,32 By the end of the year, the Commission decided to allocate 324 million kronor (about 35 million euros) in emergency aid to Migrationsverket to manage the refugee situation.33 The Impact of Russian Aggression on Swedish Security Policy Since the Euromaidan protests and the Russian annexation of Crimea in early 2014, Sweden, like the rest of the EU, has been all the more concerned with the security risks posed by an increasingly truculent and provocative Russia.34 Due partly to its close relationship with Finland and its own complicated history with its Eastern neighbor, Sweden’s relationship with Russia is one of pragmatism.35 Despite attempts to keep dialogue open and constructive, Sweden continues to condemn Russian violations of international law and territorial sovereignty, with Margot Wallström, Sweden’s Foreign Minister, taking an increasingly harder line towards Russia, making a statement that it is Russia’s behaviour that has resulted in cooler relations between the two.36,37,38 At the same time, Wallström maintains that “…critical dialogue is necessary between neighbours.”39 In the midst of a full-scale war in Ukraine, large Russian military exercises in the Baltic and Arctic, including a practice military takeover of the Swedish island of Gotland, as well as an ongoing sanctions war between Russia and the EU, Sweden is attempting to maintain a fragile balance in an ever uncertain political climate.40,41,42,43,44 Similar to fellow EU members, Sweden is also putting the question of security and defense back into the spotlight, as they continue to determine whether they should depart from their long-standing 134

Sweden - Sonia Liang position of neutrality and apply for NATO membership. Many, however, think that Russia would interpret the move as a deliberate provocation, and thus prefer to act through regional and European structures to strengthen security in the region.45,46,47,48 As such, public opinion remains in favor of neutrality, and both the public and most political parties stand by their commitment that Sweden will only join together with Finland. However, full membership within the alliance is still seriously being considered.49,50 A statement by the Swedish, Finnish, Danish, and Icelandic defense ministers, published in Dagens Nyheter in April, called for increased cooperation among the EU on security and defense.51 It also maintained that Russia’s aggressive revisionism is “the biggest challenge to the European security order.”52 The issue, which affects not only Sweden, but the rest of the Nordic and Baltic states as well as Central and Eastern Europe, is one that many believe can only be solved through a unified EU response.53 Wallström, who has repeatedly stated that Sweden will act through the EU to normalize relations with Russia, continues to call on Sweden to be a strong voice within the Union. The economic sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 stand as a key example of the types of coordinated policy measures EU members can take in response to Russian aggression. Originally linked to the implementation of the Minsk agreements, the sanctions have been extended twice already, once in June and again in December, on account of Russian noncompliance.54,55,56,57 In response, retaliatory Russian sanctions were placed on food imports from EU states, and in August a controversial law was passed authorizing the destruction of hundreds of tons of food smuggled in from Europe.58,59 The Commission has also put forth ambitious plans for an Energy Union, which would, by linking together the energy policy of EU member states, make the EU less dependent on Russian oil and gas.60 Simultaneously, it would signal a shift towards a greener use of energy and a renewed commitment to deeper integration.61 With many member states, including Sweden, stating that Russia has deliberately attempted to cause instability within the EU (through military action, threats to energy supply, and pecuniary support to extreme left and right wing anti-establishment parties), it is all the more important that the EU acts collectively to stabilize the geopolitical situation.62,63 A Global Problem with a European Solution: Sweden and Environmental Policy

Long perceived as a global leader on climate change and the environment, Sweden is increasingly concerned with the environmental impact of different industries and on the way environmental policy is developing in the EU.64 This year, the Volkswagen emissions scandal prompted new discussions on emission rules for EU-made cars, while the debates concerning food production, and the tradeoffs between economic efficiency and higher environmental standards, intensified.65,66

In Sweden, the Green Party received significant criticism for falling short 135

Messages in the Media of its campaign promises with regards to environmental protection.67 Particularly contentious was the selling of Vattenfall’s brown coal business, as the Green Party had campaigned on having the coal stay in the ground.68 In fact, Jasenko Selimovic, an MEP from Folkpartiet, maintained that greenhouse gas emissions have only increased since the Green Party’s environmental policies were put in place.69 Food production is another challenging industry, especially where dairy is concerned.70,71,72 The Swedish system for producing milk has relatively high environmental and animal protection costs, which, in an increasingly competitive global economy, has resulted in lost market shares to competitors with less stringent environmental regulations. An article in Svenska Dagbladet in October highlighted the importance of restoring competitiveness without lowering environmental standards.73 Moving forward, it is crucial that both Sweden and the EU maintain and restore economic competitiveness while continuing to promote a green and sustainable model for growth.74,75,76

The issue of climate change became a focus topic during the Paris Climate Change Conference in November, where leaders from all over the world sat down to sign the first truly global climate change agreement. Leading up to COP21, Sweden emphasized the importance of setting ambitious emission targets, and of the EU presenting a united front during the negotiations. On the whole, Sweden hailed the Paris Agreement as a success.77,78 Not only was an ambitious 1.5 degree target set, but a clear signal was also sent to the private sector that it is becoming increasingly unviable for companies to ignore their environmental responsibilities. The EU also called for greenhouse gas emissions to be reduced by 40 percent by 2030, and 50 percent by 2050.79 However, many in Sweden hoped that more would have been accomplished, including the setting of specific emission reduction targets.

The fact that the new government is divided on key issues and has a weak mandate means that, while Sweden has been one of the EU’s leading voices on environmental issues, it is now criticized by many as being ineffective.80,81 With political deadlock crippling the decision-making process, opposition parties fear that Sweden’s strong voice in the EU is being reduced.82 In March, Moderate Party MEP Christofer Fjellner criticized the government for voting against various EU environmental recommendations, including their vote against the EU’s policy on GMO seeds.83 The Center Party, too, is critical of the gap between the Green Party’s ambitious campaign goals and their track record. In September, Svenska Dagbladet published an article describing the Center Party’s frustration with the government for not pushing hard enough for strict EU-wide environmental standards on biofuels.84,85

Ultimately, the message in all three newspapers is that to solve environmental problems, Sweden needs to act through the EU and through international institutions.86 The problems associated with climate change are not ones that European states can tackle alone, but ones that require ambitious changes on a global scale. Thus, it is imperative for current government of Social Democrats and Green Party members to find its voice, and maintain Sweden’s status as a leader in shaping the EU’s environmental policy.87 136

Sweden - Sonia Liang Year in Review

In 2015, Swedish media coverage stressed the importance of collaboration between Sweden and fellow EU members in solving the biggest issues of today — including the refugee crisis, security policy in the context of Russian aggression, and environmental change.

In order to promote significant, meaningful change, Sweden must work both domestically and through the institutions of the EU as these challenges are not theirs alone, but impact every EU member. In addition to action at the national level, it is increasingly through the framework of the EU that Sweden is able to shape policy and exert its influence on the world stage. Today’s challenges are not peculiar to Sweden, but affect every single EU member state, and thus require collective decision-making to solve.

While Sweden has traditionally been one of the EU’s more Eurosceptic members, with criticism typically coming from the political left who see the Union as bringing in neo-liberal tendencies and not prioritizing social and environmental issues, Eurobarometer polls reveal that for the first time, in 2014 and 2015, Swedes had a more positive image of the EU than the average EU citizen. More and more, members of the public, of civil society, and of political parties (both those ruling and in opposition) are calling for problems to be solved through the EU and not simply on a national level.88

In 2015, the Swedish government has advocated for a more ambitious environmental target in the EU, for a more generous refugee policy and a more equitable spread of refugees across the EU, and for a clear position on Russia.89 It is a fragile time in the Union’s history. Rife with economic and political challenges, low economic growth, growing political extremism, and a heightened sense of insecurity due to terrorist attacks and threats on member states’ borders, the internal cohesion of the Union is under siege.90 However, despite these challenges, the attitudes in Sweden, as reflected by 2015’s media coverage, signal that Sweden is staunch in its belief in a European solution to the problems of today.91 While there is a small minority in Sweden that thinks Sweden would be better off without the EU, the majority advocate for closer regional cooperation.92 Ruist, Joakim. “Därför flyr syrier just till Sverige.” Svenska Dagbladet. 27 Mar 2015, accessed 29 Nov. 2015. http://www.svd.se/darfor-flyr-syrier-just-till-sverige 2 Akerman, Mikaela. “Inte konstigt att Sverige ses som ett paradis.” Svenska Dagbladet. 20 Aug. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/inte-konstigt-attsverige-ses-som-ett-paradis/om/flyktingkrisen-i-europa 3 Dahlberg, Joel. “Finns risk för ‘enorma ekonomiska påfrestningar.’” Svens1

137

Messages in the Media ka Dagbladet. 1 Oct. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/ finns-risk-for-enorma-ekonomiska-pafrestningar/om/flyktingkrisen-i-europa 4 Bolling, Anders. “Kraftigt höjd flyktingsprognos.” Dagens Nyheter. 22 Oct. 2015, accessed 22 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/kraftigt-hojd-flyktingprognos/ 5 Ahola, Teresa. “Asylplatser klart färre än beräknat.” Svenska Dagbladet. 29 Oct. 2015, Accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/asylplatser-klart-farre-an-beraknat/om/flyktingkrisen-i-europa 6 “Flyktingboenden kan inte garanteras.” Göteborgs-Posten. 5 Nov. 2015, accessed 2 Jan. 2016. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/1.2887414-flyktingboenden-kan-inte-garanteras 7 Eriksson, Karin. “Åkesson: Tyvärr, ni kommer inte in, det är fullt.” Dagens Nyheter. 17 Oct. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/ akesson-tyvarr-ni-kommer-inte-in-det-ar-fullt/ 8 Pehrson, Josephine and Bjorn Dickson. “Åkesson kräver totalt stopp för asylinvandring.” Svenska Dagbladet. 17 Oct. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www. svd.se/akesson-kraver-totalt-stopp-for-asylinvandring/om/flyktingkrisen-i-europa 9 “Strid med Miljöpartiet väntar om flyktingkrisen.” Dagens Nyheter. 16 Sept.

2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/arkiv/dn-nyheter/strid-med-miljopartiet-vantar-om-flyktingkrisen 10 “Flyktingkris kan hota regeringen” Göteborgs-Posten. 26 Nov. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015.http://www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/1.2909068-flyktingkris-kan-hota-regeringen 11 “Löfven: Fler länder måste ta ansvar.” Göteborgs-Posten. 21 April 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015 http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2691962-lofven-fler-landermaste-ta-ansvar 12 Akesson, Hanna. “Grannländerna skärper sin asylpolitik.” Svenska Dagbladet.

13 Nov. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015.http://www.svd.se/grannlanderna-skarper-sin-asylpolitik/om/flyktingkrisen-i-europa 13 “Oenigt EU om asyl och migration.” Göteborgs-Posten. 15 Apr. 2015, accessed 2 Jan. 2016.http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2686755-oenigt-eu-om-asyl-ochmigration 14 Olsson, Hans. “Kinberg Batra: Flyktingkrisen ett hot mot hela Europasamarbetet.” Dagens Nyheter. 12 Nov. 2015, accessed 21 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/ nyheter/sverige/kinberg-batra-flyktingkrisen-ett-hot-mot-hela-europasamarbetet/ 15 “EU-gemensam gränsstyrka på förslag.” Svenska Dagbladet. 11 Dec 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.svd.se/eu-gemensam-gransstyrka-pa-forslag/om/flyktingkrisen-i-europa 16 “Sverige hoppas på jämnare asyl i EU.” Svenska Dagbladet. 12 Mar. 2015, accessed 20 Nov. 2015http://www.svd.se/sverige-hoppas-pa-jamnare-asyl-i-eu 17 Olsson, Hans. “Kinberg Batra: Flyktingkrisen ett hot mot hela Europasamarbetet.” Dagens Nyheter. 12 Nov. 2015, accessed 21 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/ nyheter/sverige/kinberg-batra-flyktingkrisen-ett-hot-mot-hela-europasamar138

Sweden - Sonia Liang betet/ 18 “EU-gemensam gränsstyrka på förslag.” Svenska Dagbladet. 11 Dec 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.svd.se/eu-gemensam-gransstyrka-pa-forslag/om/flyktingkrisen-i-europa 19 “Inte aktuellt med gränskontroll.” Göteborgs-Posten. 14 September 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016.http://www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/1.2832742-inte-aktuellt-med-granskontroll 20 Jonsson, Gunnar. “Gränslös rädsla för samarbete.” Dagens Nyheter. 16 Dec. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/ledare/signerat/gunnar-jonsson-granslos-radsla-for-samarbete/ 21 “EU:s migrationsstrategi ser ut att misslyckas.” Svenska Dagbladet. 16 June 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/eus-migrationsstrategi-ser-ut-att-misslyckas/om/flyktingkrisen-i-europa 22 “Löfven vill ha tvingande EU-system.” Svenska Dagbladet. 18 Sept 2015, accessed 25 Nov. 2015. http://www.svd.se/lofven-vill-ha-tvingande-eu-system/om/ flyktingkrisen-i-europa 23 Ibid.

24 “Merkel och Löfven sätter press på EU-länder att ta emot flyktingar.” Dagens Nyheter. 8 Sept. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/ merkel-och-lofven-satter-press-pa-eu-lander-att-ta-emot-flyktingar/ 25 “Sverige lovas asylbesked av EU.” Göteborgs-Posten. 18 Dec. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2015.http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2931943-sverige-lovas-asylbeskedav-eu 26 translation by author. Haglund, Frederik. “Löfven hotar med flyktingstopp.”

Europaportalen. 15 Oct. 2015, accessed 1 Nov. 2015. http://www.europaportalen. se/2015/10/lofven-hotar-med-flyktingstopp 27 “Tufft för Sverige när andra skärper.” Göteborgs-Posten. 10 Nov. 2015, accessed 15 Nov. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/1.2891589-tufft-for-sverige-narandra-skarper 28 “Skärpta kontroller i Schengen.” Göteborgs-Posten. 20 Nov. 2015, accessed 1 Dec. 2015.http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2902617-skarpta-kontroller-i-schengen 29 “Regeringens förslag till skärpta asylregler.” Dagens Nyheter. 24 Nov. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/regeringens-forslag-till-skarpta-asylregler/ 30 “Sverige begär flyktinghjälp av EU.” Dagens Nyheter. 4 Nov. 2015, accessed 10 Dec. 2015.http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/sverige-begar-flyktinghjalp-av-eu/ 31 “Löfven strider för asylomfördelning.” Göteborgs-Posten. 16 Dec. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2930066-lofven-strider-for-asylomfordelning 32 Sundberg, Marit. “EU-länder säger nej till flyktingar från Sverige.” Dagens Nyheter. 12 Dec. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/ eu-lander-sager-nej-till-flyktingar-fran-sverige/ 33 “Sverige får hundratals miljoner i nödbidrag.” Dagens Nyheter. 23 Dec. 2015, accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/sverige-far-hundratals139

Messages in the Media miljoner-i-nodbidrag/ 34 “Regeringen attackerar Ryssland.” Göteborgs-Posten. 21 Feb 2015, accessed 15 Nov. 2015.http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2636791-regeringen-attackerar-ryssland 35 Nerbrand, Sofia. “Sverige borde komma ut ur garderoben.” Svenska Dagbladet. 21 Dec. 2015, accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/sofia-nerbrand-sverige-borde-komma-ut-ur-garderoben 36 “Wallström vill vara rak mot Ryssland.” Göteborgs-Posten. 11 Jan. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/1.2598381-wallstrom-villvara-rak-mot-ryssland 37 “Rysk-svensk ordkrig på hög nivå.” Svenska Dagbladet. 18 June 2015, accessed 28 Nov. 2015.http://www.svd.se/rysk-svenskt-ordkrig-pa-hog-niva 38 Ibid.

39 “Wallström skarp mot Ryssland.” Göteborgs-Posten. 8 June 2015, accessed 3 Dec. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/1.2740523-wallstrom-skarp-motryssland 40 Nygards, Olle. “Sverige följer ryska övningarna minutiöst.” Svenska Dagbladet. 28 Aug. 2015, accessed 10 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/sverige-foljer-ryska-ovningarna-minutiost 41 Holmström, Mikael. “Hultqvist: Rysk oberäknelighet kräver stärkt försvar.”

Dagens Nyheter. 16 Mar. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/ varlden/hultqvist-rysk-oberaknelighet-kraver-starkt-forsvar/ 42 Triches Robert. “Löfven om ryska Gotlands-övningen: ‘Är inte okej.’” Svenska Dagbladet. 25 June 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2015. http://www.svd.se/lofven-om-ryska-gotlands-ovningen-ar-inte-okej 43 “Inga vinnare i sanktionskamp med öst.” Göteborgs-Posten. 15 Sept. 2015, 22 Dec. 2015.http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2833405-inga-vinnare-i-sanktionskamp-med-ost 44 Hökmark, Gunnar. “EU kommer att hålla ihop.” Göteborgs-Posten. 22 Nov 2015, accessed 10 Dec. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/debatt/1.2902919-eukommer-att-halla-ihop 45 Hedlund, Stefan. “Står vi pall om Ryssland sätter hårt mot hårt?” Svenska Dagbladet. 15 Sept 2015, accessed 15. Dec 2015. http://www.svd.se/star-vi-pall-omryssland-satter-hart-mot-hart 46 Arpi, Ivar. “Putin vill destabilisera Nato.” Svenska Dagbladet. 26 Nov. 2015, accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/putin-vill-destabilisera-nato 47 “Forskare: Natomedlemskap kan öka rysk aggression.” Dagens Nyheter. 9 June 2015, accessed 10 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/forskarenatomedlemskap-kan-oka-rysk-aggression/ 48 “Jonas Gummesson: Hinner Sverige ta steget som aldrig togs?” Svenska Dagbladet. 13 Nov. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/hinner-sverige-tasteget-som-aldrig-togs 49 “Clarence von Ahn: Norden måste ta ökat eget ansvar för säkerheten.” Svenska Dagbladet. 10 Dec. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2015. http://www.svd.se/clarence-vonahn-norden-maste-ta-okat-eget-ansvar-for-sakerheten 140

Sweden - Sonia Liang Bertelman, Tomas. “Nato-medlemsskap minskar osäkerheten.” Dagens Nyheter. 9 Oct. 2015, accessed 28 Nov. 2015. http://www.dn.se/debatt/repliker/nato-medlemsskap-minskar-osakerheten/ 51 Wammen, Nicolai, Carl Haglund, Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson, Ine Eriksen Søreide, and Peter Hultqvist. “Vi fördjupar det nordiska försvarssamarbetet.” 10 Apr. 2015, accessed 29 Nov. 2015. http://www.dn.se/debatt/vi-fordjupar-det-nordiska-forsvarssamarbetet/ 52 Ibid.

53 “Baltikums sak är vår.” Göteborgs-Posten. 11 Mars 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/ledare/1.2652927-ledare-baltikums-sak-ar-var 54 Nummelin, Wiktor and Maria Davidsson. “Löfven för sanktionspress på Ryssland.” Göteborgs-Posten. 18 Mar. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.gp.se/ nyheter/varlden/1.2660503-lofven-for-sanktionspress-pa-ryssland 55 “Biden: fortsatt tryck på Ryssland.” Göteborgs-Posten. 8 Dec. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016.http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2921822-biden-fortsatt-tryck-paryssland 56 “EU förlänger ryska sanktioner.” Göteborgs-Posten. 17 June 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2750406-eu-forlanger-ryska-sanktioner 57 “EU förlänger ryska sanktioner.” Svenska Dagbladet. 18 Dec. 2015, accessed 23 Dec. 2015.http://www.svd.se/eu-forlanger-ryska-sanktioner-7ecn 58 “Putin kritiseras för förstörd mat.” Göteborgs-Posten. 6 Aug. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015.http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2795103-putin-kritiseras-for-forstord-mat 59 “Ryssland förstör hundratals ton mat.” Svenska Dagbladet. 26 Aug. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.svd.se/ryssland-forstor-hundratals-ton-mat 60 Küchler, Teresa. “Energiunion ska lösa EU ur ryska band.” Svenska Dagbladet.

25 Feb. 2015, accessed 28 Nov. 2015. http://www.svd.se/energiunion-ska-losa-euur-ryska-band 61 “Energin ska förena i EU.” Göteborgs-Posten. 25 Feb. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2640251-energin-ska-forena-i-eu 62 Bengtsson, Tomas. “Regeringen attackerar Ryssland.” Dagens Nyheter. 21 Feb. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/regeringen-attackerar-ryssland/ 63 “Ryska vänner i EU:s ytterspår.” Dagens Nyheter. 9 Feb. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2624867-ryska-vanner-i-eu-s-ytterspar 64 Axelsson, Svante. ”Det är för billigt att köra bil – CO2-skatten måste höjas.”

Dagens Nyheter. 17 Feb. 2015, accessed 17 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/debatt/ det-ar-for-billigt-att-kora-bil-co2-skatten-maste-hojas/ 65 Johansson, Sandra. “EU-utskott sågar nya utsläppsregler för bilar.” Svenska Dagbladet. 15 Dec. 2015, accessed 22 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/eu-utskott-sagarnya-utslappsregler-for-bilar 66 Jonsson, Helena and Sofia Karlsson. “Värna både djurskyddet och konkurrenskraften.” Göteborgs-Posten. 30 June 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www. gp.se/nyheter/debatt/1.2762992-varna-bade-djurskyddet-och-konkurrenskraften 50

141

Messages in the Media Axelsson, Svante and Johanna Sandahl. “Dags att leva upp till vallöftena, Miljöpartiet.” 13 June 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/debatt/1.2745118-dags-att-leva-upp-till-valloftena-miljopartiet 68 Ådahl, Martin and Kristina Yngwe. “Varför händer inget inom miljöpolitiken, MP?” Svenska Dagbladet. 2 July 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/ varfor-hander-inget-inom-miljopolitiken-mp 69 Selimovic, Jasenko. “Mer koldioxidutsläpp med miljöpartiets politik.” Göteborgs-Posten. 28 Sept. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/ debatt/1.2844746-mer-koldioxidutslapp-med-miljopartiets-politik 70 Jonsson, Helena and Sofia Karlsson. “Jordbruket är lösningen inte boven.”

Göteborgs-Posten. 14 Dec. 2015, accessed 8 Dec. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/ debatt/1.2925285-jordbruket-ar-losningen-inte-boven 71 Jewert, Jenny. “Mjölken måste få bli lönsam.” Dagens Nyheter. 10 Mar. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.dn.se/ledare/kolumner/jenny-jewert-mjolkenmaste-fa-bli-lonsam/ 72 Nohrstedt, Hans-Örjan. “Svensk mjölk är inte mest klimatsmart.” Svenska Dagbladet. 6 Nov. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/svensk-mjolkar-inte-mest-klimatsmart 73 Vernersson, Lars. “Sluta utreda – rädda svenskt jordbruk.” Svenska Dagbladet.

19 Oct. 2015, accessed 18 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/lagpristrend-blir-jordbrukets-dod 74 “Näringslivet måste med nu.” Göteborgs-Posten. 1 Dec. 2015, accessed 20 Dec. 2015.http://www.gp.se/nyheter/debatt/1.2913185-naringslivet-maste-med-nu 75 Forsberg, Birgitta. “Miljöbovar förstör för seriösa företag.” Dagens Nyheter.

28 Sept. 2015, accessed 10 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/ekonomi/birgitta-forsberg-miljobovar-forstor-for-seriosa-foretag-1/ 76 Alestig, Peter. “Företagen måste inse allvaret i klimatarbetet.” Svenska Dagbladet. 14 Dec. 2015, accessed 22 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/nu-maste-foretagen-lyssna-pa-politikerna 77 “Jubel över nytt globalt klimatavtal.” Göteborgs-Posten. 12 Dec. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015.http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2926427-jubel-over-nyttglobalt-klimatavtal 78 Stiernstedt, Jenny and Peter Alestig. “Romson: ‘Glad och stolt över avtalet.’”

Svenska Dagbladet. 12 Dec. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/ romson-glad-och-stolt-over-avtalet 79 “EU-länder enade om klimatlinje.” Göteborgs-Posten. 18 Sept. 2015, accessed 20 Nov. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2837344-eu-lander-enade-omklimatlinje 80 Fjellner, Christofer. “Miljö- och klimatpolitiken måste bli mindre byråkratisk.”

Dagens Nyheter. 27 Nov. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/debatt/ repliker/miljo-och-klimatpolitiken-maste-bli-mindre-byrakratisk/ 81 Barth, Johan, Per Jonasson, Styrbjörn Drugge, and Kjell Ekermo. ”Geoenergi är en viktig del i att uppfylla klimatmålen.” Dagens Nyheter. 2 Mar. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/debatt/repliker/geoenergi-ar-en-viktig-del-i-att-uppfylla-klimatmalen/ 67

142

Sweden - Sonia Liang Fjellner, Christofer and Johan Hultberg. “Sveriges röst i EU tystnar när regeringen är splittrad.” Göteborgs-Posten. 9 Mar. 2015, accessed 22 Dec. 2015. http:// www.gp.se/nyheter/debatt/1.2649286-sveriges-rost-i-eu-tystnar-nar-regeringenar-splittrad 83 “Feghet är inte försiktighet.” Dagens Nyheter. 26 April 2015, accessed 28 Nov. 2015. http://www.dn.se/ledare/huvudledare/feghet-ar-inte-forsiktighet/ 84 Alestig, Peter. “C: ‘Regeringen lägger sig platt för EU.’” Svenska Dagbladet. 21 Sept. 2015, accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/c-regeringen-lagger-sigplatt-for-eu 85 “Svår balans om biobränslen i EU.” Göteborgs-Posten. 25 Feb. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2640233-svar-balans-om-biobranslen-i-eu 86 Domeij, Åsa, Annica Hansson-Borg, Louise König, Kerstin Lindvall and Katarina Rosenqvist. “EU-förslag stoppar ekomaten.” Svenska Dagbladet. 14 May 2015, accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.svd.se/eu-forslag-stoppar-ekomaten 87 Delling, Hans. ”Sverige en nyckelspelare i arbetet för klimatet.” Svenska Dagbladet. 29 Aug. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.svd.se/sverige-en-nyckelspelare-i-arbetet-for-klimatet 88 Hökmark, Gunnar. “Vår kraft för fred större än Rysslands kraft för krig.” Göteborgs-Posten. 9 May 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/debatt/1.2709078-var-kraft-for-fred-storre-an-rysslands-kraft-for-krig 89 “Putin söker efter sprickor i EU:s politik.” Dagens Nyheter. 10 June 2015, accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/putin-soker-efter-sprickor-i-eus-politik/ 90 “Oenigheten om ryska sanktioner ökar i EU.” Dagens Nyheter. 17 Mar. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/oenigheten-om-ryskasanktioner-okar-i-eu/ 91 “Rysk nöt svårknäckt i EU.” Göteborgs-Posten. 19 Jan. 2015, accessed 15 Oct 2015. http://www.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2605246-rysk-not-svarknackt-i-eu 92 Eriksson, Karin. “Åkesson: Tyvärr, ni kommer inte in, det är fullt” 17 Oct. 2015, accessed 19 Dec. 2015. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/akesson-tyvarr-nikommer-inte-in-det-ar-fullt/ 82

143

CZECH REPUBLIC

By Taylor Forsyth

Mladá Fronta DNES: founded in 1945. Owned by MAFRA, A.S. Daily circulation of 221,000.

Lidové Noviny: founded in 1893. Owned by MAFRA, A.S. Daily circulation of 40,000. České Noviny: founded in 1988. Owned by Petrak. Daily circulation of 118,000.

Figures are for 2014. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

144

Czech Republic - Taylor Forsyth From the analysis of these media sources, three issues stood out. First, the reactions to increasing number of asylum seekers in Europe and the response by the Czech government. Second, the effect of Czech social commitments on the country’s relationship with the EU. Finally, the improvement of relations between China and the Czech Republic, much to the chagrin of the EU.

The Effect of the Refugee Crisis in the Czech Republic As the conflict in Syria persists, refugees continue to flee the country looking for the opportunity to rebuild their lives. The Czech Republic has not been exempt from this crisis and how it is being dealt with has quickly become a controversial issue in the country. So far, the government has remained indecisive, which has drawn widespread criticism from many other countries in the EU.1,2 The issue has also created significant tension domestically. Riots occurred throughout the latter half of 2015 in the cities of Prague, Brno, Ostrava, and Liberec between pro-migrant and anti-Islam groups, with the government’ indecision causing further issues.3 Czech ambassadors from the countries most affected by the crisis met in Prague on November 11, 2015 in an attempt to create some form of a solution with the government. Unfortunately, these efforts were to no avail.4 Some Czech officials, including Interior Minister Milan Chovanec, have even stated that the Czech Republic may be unable to assist in the crisis at all in 2015.5,6 One of the most significant issues for the Czech government is the EU’s proposed refugee quotas. Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka has been the most outspoken against the suggestion of quotas, going as far as to call it “merely a comforter.”7,8,9As a result of Czech resistance to accepting refugees, relations with the EU have suffered. Many other nations in the EU have come out to criticize the response of the Czech Republic, even going so far as to call it a disgrace.10,11 Some Czech officials have responded to this with their own criticism of the EU. Hynek Kmoníček, the director of the International Department at Prague Castle, has criticized the EU of being unprepared and ill-equipped to deal with the refugee crisis.12,13 Criticism has also come from European media, with international news agency Reuters accusing the Czech Republic of treating refugees “harshly.”14 Overall, the refugee crisis resulting from the Syrian Civil War has become a significant source of stress on EU-Czech relations, as it has on several other member states.

The Czech Government’s Lack of Commitment on Resolving Social Issues The social conditions in the Czech Republic have been a long-standing point of interest and have played an important role in the country’s relations with the EU. In 2015, the Czech media focused their criticism on issues such as sanitation and minimum wage. Furthermore, concern was expressed about 145

Messages in the Media whether or not the country’s continued membership in the EU is as important as some Czech politicians have stated. Of particular concern was the fact that the Czech Republic has failed to fulfill obligations regarding the collection and treatment of wastewater, despite a directive coming from the EU.15 The Supreme Audit Office has revealed that nearly one-fifth of the Czech population still do not have access to proper sanitation.16 The country was expected to meet EU standards by 2010, but has now stated that these will not be reached until 2021.17 In addition, the Czech government has also received criticism for having the fourth lowest minimum wage in Europe in 2014.18,19 Deteriorating social conditions in the Czech Republic have put a stain on its relationship with the EU. This has been received with a level of disdain within the Czech public. The EU has become significantly more impatient with the Czech Republic and its lack of progress towards the conditions that would see the country adopt the Euro and fully integrate into the EU.20,21 This frustration is mutual. Contempt for the EU from the Czech public is at an all-time high. In a recent survey, one in five Czechs stated that they would not be sorry if the EU collapsed.22,23 In addition, 22 percent of respondents said they would be relieved, and another six percent would welcome the abolition of the EU.24 The regressing social conditions in the Czech Republic, combined with pressure from the EU, has created a significant sense of animosity within the country.

The Czech Republic’s Evolving Relations with China and its Effect on Relations with the European Union The year 2015 saw the Czech Republic focusing on improving relations with China. With Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka’s visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in November 2013, the intent of the government is clear: to create a strong relationship with China and give them a “foothold in the EU.”25,26,27 Through this strategic partnership with China, the Czech Republic hopes to see an increase in investment from China. In return, China will further expand into the diverse European market.28 Czech president Miloš Zeman believes the first wave of Chinese investment in the Czech Republic will come in at around €10 billion.29 Attempts to encourage Chinese investment in the country have become a priority for the Czech government. These efforts have piqued both Czech and international media attention.

The Czech Republic’s new interest in cultivating close relations with China has raised several issues within the EU, and has impacted their overall relationship. Czech president Miloš Zeman received a significant amount of criticism from the Czech media after he made statements regarding Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights. Zeman stated that the Czech Republic would respect the integrity of China’s territorial claims in Taiwan and Tibet, and that he was in China to focus on business, not human rights.30,31 With other difficulties in the Czech-EU relationship already threatening their future together, this new-found relationship with China and the controversial remarks made by government officials have caused Czech-EU relations to reach a new low in 2015.

146

Czech Republic - Taylor Forsyth

Year in Review The year 2015 proved to be a turbulent and difficult year for the Czech Republic. The media focused on several issues that, for the most part, did not show the Czech government in the brightest of lights. The Czech-EU relationship, which had been showing signs of improvement in 2013 and 2014, unfortunately deteriorated after a number of significant issues that resulted in other member states questioning the Czech commitment to basic EU principles.

Principal among these issues was the refugee crisis, and the subsequent influx of asylum seekers to Europe. The Czech Republic’s indecisive stance frustrated many officials within the EU and the situation has been handled poorly on the part of the Czech government.32 Its refusal to agree to any kind of EU-wide quota system made the country appear to be unwilling to do its part in handling the crisis, instead putting the burden of the work on its neighbours.33 This stance significantly damaged relations between the Czech Republic, the EU, and its member states.

The media also paid close attention to the slow progress on improving social conditions, an issue that has persisted in the Czech Republic for several years. The media was extremely critical of the issue, as it had a negative effect on the country’s relations with the EU. Poor sanitation and the inability to meet the EU’s minimum requirements were a more specific focus of the Czech media.34 This has had an effect on Czech public opinion about the EU, with the public feeling now more than ever, disenchanted with EU membership. There is a popular belief that it may even be better for the country to leave the Union.35 While most in the media have tried to downplay this, there is also some support coming from news sources such as Mladá fronta DNES.36 What started with worsening social conditions at the start of 2015 quickly turned into contempt on both sides of the Czech-EU relationship.

A strong effort was also made in 2015 to strengthen economic ties with China. In an attempt to allow China a foothold in the Czech Republic, President Sobotka visited Beijing and met with several Chinese government officials, much to the chagrin of the EU and to mixed opinions on the part of the Czech media and public.37 While billions in investment from China will surely help spur the Czech economy, its collaboration with a nation known to have a questionable human rights record has further impacted the EU-Czech relationship.38 Unfortunately, 2015 became somewhat of a year to forget for the Czech Republic. The influx of refugees from the Middle East into Europe, deteriorating social conditions, and a new interest in relations with China, all played a role in further damaging the country’s relationship with the European Union.

Furthermore, the country’s inaction on climate change and the continued failure to meet the economic conditions that would grant it entry into the European Monetary Union also placed strain on this important relationship. All in all, after some gains in 2014, the Czech-EU relationship hit a bumpy patch in the road in 2015.

147

Messages in the Media 1 “Miliony uprchlíků zlepší ekonomiku a trh práce EU, tvrdí komise.” Mladá fronta DNES. 5 Nov. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://ekonomika.idnes.cz/miliony-uprchliku-zlepsi-ekonomiku-a-trh-prace-eu-tvrdi-komise-pvu-/ekonomika. aspx?c=A151105_193913_ekonomika_rts 2 “Po ČR se demonstrovalo proti migraci, názorové tábory dělili těžkooděnci.” Mladá fronta DNES. 28 Oct. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://zpravy. idnes.cz/po-cesku-demonstruji-odpurci-migrantu-dyp-/domaci.aspx?c=A151028_144245_domaci_fer 3 Ibid.

4 “Navrhnou premiérovi, jak dál s migrací.” Mladá fronta DNES. 10 Nov. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://zpravy.idnes.cz/porada-velvyslancu-k-migracni-krizi-d7g-/domaci.aspx?c=A151110_063934_domaci_neh 5 “ČR neplánuje dobrovolně vzít další uprchlíky, tvrdí Chovanec.” Lidové noviny.

9 Sept. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/cr-neplanuje-dobrovolne-vzit-dalsi-uprchliky-tvrdi-chovanec/1256325 6 “ČR a Slovensko letos nepočítají s přebíráním migrantů z EU.” Lidové noviny. 9 Nov. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/cr-a-slovensko-letos-nepocitaji-s-prebiranim-migrantu-z-eu/1279420 7 “Uprchlické kvóty? Jen šidítko pro veřejnost, kritizuje Sobotka bruselský verdict.” Lidové noviny. 22 Sept. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.lidovky. cz/ministri-vnitra-rozhodli-spatne-kvoty-krizi-neresi-mini-sobotka-py4-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A150922_203049_ln_domov_ELE 8 “ČR odmítá kvóty na uprchlíky, Klaus považuje plán EK za tragický omyl.” České Noviny. 13 May 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny. cz/zpravy/cr-odmita-kvoty-na-uprchliky-klaus-povazuje-plan-ek-za-tragickyomyl/1215651 9 “ČR a Slovensko letos nechtějí přijmoutžádného migranta v rámci kvót EU Zdroj.” Lidové noviny. 9 Nov. 2015, accessed 16 Dec. 2015. http://www.lidovky. cz/cr-a-slovensko-letos-nechteji-prijmout-zadneho-migranta-v-ramci-kvot-eu1no-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A151109_184716_ln_domov_sij 10 “Rakouský kancléř kritizuje ČR za odmítání kvót na uprchlíky.” České Noviny.

25 Aug. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/rakousky-kancler-kritizuje-cr-za-odmitani-kvot-na-uprchliky/1250940 11 “Vzkaz pro Česko z Evropy: Měli bystepřijmout 525 uprchlíků z třetího světa Zdroj.” Lidové noviny. 13 May 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.lidovky. cz/chladny-egoismus-zemi-eu-na-pranyri-kvuli-uprchlikum-a-kvotam-p64-/ zpravy-svet.aspx?c=A150513_123846_ln_zahranici_msl 12 “Kmoníček: EU uprchlickou krizi nezvládá, hrozí volání po silném vůdci.”

Mladá fronta DNES. 5 Nov. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://zpravy.idnes.cz/ silny-vudce-v-evrope-po-tom-budou-obcane-volat-reseni-migracni-krize-nutna-zmena-gf2-/domaci.aspx?c=A151105_203635_domaci_rych 13 “Zaorálek: Evropa je přetížená, integraci další vlny uprchlíků nezvládne.”

Mladá fronta DNES. 9 Nov. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://zpravy.idnes.cz/ zaoralek-evropa-je-preplnena-integraci-dalsi-vlny-uprchliku-nezvladne-1mr-/ domaci.aspx?c=A151109_134359_domaci_kop

148

Czech Republic - Taylor Forsyth “Reuters: Česká republika zachází s uprchlíky drsně.” České Noviny. 18 Oct. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/reuters-ceska-republika-zachazi-s-uprchliky-drsne/1271029 15 “NKÚ: Pětina lidí nemá odpovídající kanalizaci. I přes miliardové dotace.”

Mladá fronta DNES. 12 Oct. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://zpravy.idnes.cz/ odpovidajici-kanalizaci-nema-vice-jak-petina-obyvatel-tvrdi-nku-pw1-/domaci. aspx?c=A151012_082110_domaci_ale 16 “Skoro pětina Čechů stále nemá kanalizaci podle podmínek EU.” Lidové noviny.

12 Oct. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.lidovky.cz/nku-skoro-petina-cechu-stale-nema-kanalizaci-podle-podminek-eu-p66-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A151012_084039_ln_domov_ELE 17 “Skoro pětina Čechů stále nemá kanalizaci podle podmínek EU.” Lidové noviny.

12 Oct. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.lidovky.cz/nku-skoro-petina-cechu-stale-nema-kanalizaci-podle-podminek-eu-p66-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A151012_084039_ln_domov_ELE 18 “Česko má čtvrtou nejnižšíminimální mzdu v Evropské unii.” Lidové noviny. 1 Jan. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://byznys.lidovky.cz/cr-ma-ctvrtou-nejnizsi-minimalni-mzdu-v-eu-fjk-/statni-pokladna.aspx?c=A150101_112319_statni-pokladna_ele 19 “EU nekývla na zavedení kvót pro ženy ve vedení firem, proti bylo i Česko.”

Mladá fronta DNES. 11 Dec. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://ekonomika. idnes.cz/eu-proti-kvotam-pro-zeny-ve-vedeni-firem-fdk-/eko_euro.aspx?c=A151211_203524_eko_euro_cen 20 “ČR má podle Evropské komise nedostatky v přejímaní pravidel EU.” České Noviny. 22 Oct. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/ cr-ma-podle-evropske-komise-nedostatky-v-prejimani-pravidel-eu/1272621.

21 “Zpožděný protikuřácký zákon: nepřijme-li jej Česko do května, hrozí sankce z EU.” Lidové noviny. 29 Oct. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.lidovky. cz/zpozdeny-protikuracky-zakon-neprijme-li-jej-cesko-do-kvetna-hrozi-musankce-od-eu-ggr-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A151028_151435_ln_domov_ele 22 “Rozpadu Evropské unie by litovala méně než pětina Čechů.” České Noviny.

17 Dec. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/rozpadu-evropske-unie-by-litovala-mene-nez-petina-cechu/1294206 23 “Ze zemí EU mimo eurozónu jsou občané ČR k euru nejskeptičtější.” České Noviny. 8 May 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.financninoviny.cz/zpravy/ze-zemi-eu-mimo-eurozonu-jsou-obcane-cr-k-euru-nejskeptictejsi/1213889 24 “Ze zemí EU mimo eurozónu jsou občané ČR k euru nejskeptičtější.” České Noviny. 8 May 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.financninoviny.cz/zpravy/ze-zemi-eu-mimo-eurozonu-jsou-obcane-cr-k-euru-nejskeptictejsi/1213889 25 “Česko bude vstupní branou Číny do EU, nabídl premiér Sobotka.” Mladá fronta DNES. 10 Nov. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://ekonomika.idnes.cz/cinskeho-investicniho-fora-se-ucastni-svoky-podnikatelu-a-politiku-z-ciny-a-evropy-gev-/ekonomika.aspx?c=A151110_145239_ekonomika_rts 26 “Sobotka lobboval v Číně: ČR má být jejím opěrným bodem v Evropě.” České Noviny. 26 Nov. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/ 14

149

Messages in the Media sobotka-lobboval-v-cine-cr-ma-byt-jejim-opernym-bodem-v-evrope/1285953 27 “Sobotka dorazil do Číny. Bude jednat o nové letecké lince Praha-Šanghaj.”

Lidové noviny. 22 Nov. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://byznys.lidovky.cz/ sobotka-dorazil-do-ciny-bude-jednat-o-nove-letecke-lince-praha-sanghaj-12f-/ firmy-trhy.aspx?c=A151122_175005_firmy-trhy_ELE 28 “Praha by mohla být centrem čínského finančnictví, řekl Sobotka.” České Noviny. 13 Oct. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/ praha-by-mohla-byt-centrem-cinskeho-financnictvi-rekl-sobotka/1269286 29 “Zeman odhadl první vlnu čínskýchinvestic na deset milliard.” Lidové noviny.

6 Sept. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://byznys.lidovky.cz/zeman-odhadlprvni-vlnu-cinskych-investic-v-cr-na-10-miliard-kc-pti-/statni-pokladna.aspx?c=A150906_092120_statni-pokladna_ELE. 30 “Nezávislost Tibetu a Tchaj-wanuneuznáváme, řekl Zeman v Číně.” Lidové noviny. 27 Oct. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.lidovky.cz/nezavislosttibetu-a-tchaj-wanu-neuznavame-rekl-zeman-v-cine-pr7-/zpravy-svet.aspx?c=A141027_194934_ln_zahranici_ele 31 “Česko uznává celistvost Číny, řekl Zeman.” Mladá fronta DNES. 27 Oct. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://zpravy.idnes.cz/cesko-uznava-celistvost-ciny-tibetzeman-f1k-/zahranicni.aspx?c=A141027_129943_zahranicni_bse.

32 “Miliony uprchlíků zlepší ekonomiku a trh práce EU, tvrdí komise.” Mladá fronta DNES. 5 Nov. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://ekonomika.idnes.cz/ miliony-uprchliku-zlepsi-ekonomiku-a-trh-prace-eu-tvrdi-komise-pvu-/ekonomika.aspx?c=A151105_193913_ekonomika_rts.

33 “ČR neplánuje dobrovolně vzít další uprchlíky, tvrdí Chovanec.” Lidové noviny.

9 Sept. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/cr-neplanuje-dobrovolne-vzit-dalsi-uprchliky-tvrdi-chovanec/1256325 34 “NKÚ: Pětina lidí nemá odpovídající kanalizaci. I přes miliardové dotace.”

Mladá fronta DNES. 12 Oct. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://zpravy.idnes.cz/ odpovidajici-kanalizaci-nema-vice-jak-petina-obyvatel-tvrdi-nku-pw1-/domaci. aspx?c=A151012_082110_domaci_ale 35 “ČR má podle Evropské komise nedostatky v přejímaní pravidel EU.” České Noviny. 22 Oct. 2015, accessed 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/ cr-ma-podle-evropske-komise-nedostatky-v-prejimani-pravidel-eu/1272621 36 “EU nekývla na zavedení kvót pro ženy ve vedení firem, proti bylo i Česko.”

Mladá fronta DNES. 11 Dec. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://ekonomika. idnes.cz/eu-proti-kvotam-pro-zeny-ve-vedeni-firem-fdk-/eko_euro.aspx?c=A151211_203524_eko_euro_cen 37 “Zeman odhadl první vlnu čínskýchinvestic na deset milliard.” Lidové noviny.

6 Sept. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://byznys.lidovky.cz/zeman-odhadlprvni-vlnu-cinskych-investic-v-cr-na-10-miliard-kc-pti-/statni-pokladna.aspx?c=A150906_092120_statni-pokladna_ELE 38 “Praha by mohla být centrem čínského finančnictví, řekl Sobotka.” České Noviny. 13 Oct. 2015, accessed 15 Dec. 2015. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/ praha-by-mohla-byt-centrem-cinskeho-financnictvi-rekl-sobotka/1269286 150

BULGARIA

By Tzvetozar Iolov

Trud: founded in 1936. Owned by the WAZ Group. Daily circulation of 100,000.

Dnevnik: founded in 1999. Owned by Economedia. Daily circulation of 30,000.

Standart: founded in 1992. Owned by the Standart News Agency. Daily circulation of 100,000.

Figures are for 2014. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

151

Messages in the Media Analysis of the media sources revealed that the three main issues which dominated public discouse in the Bulgarian press for the year 2015 were:

• Bulgaria’s efforts to gain entry into the Schengen zone.

• Strengthening border control and preventing human trafficking in the

context of the migrant crisis affecting Europe.

• Attempts by the government to reform the judicial system and pass anti-

corruption legislation in order to satisfy the guidelines set by the EU

Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification (MCV).

Efforts of the Bulgarian government to secure admission to the Schengen zone Despite having met all functional and technical requirements since 2011, and receiving the approval of the European Commission, Bulgaria (together with Romania) has been consistently denied membership to the Schengen area by the Council of the European Union.1,2,3 In March 2015, Bulgarian media reported widely on the renewed strategy and priority by the center-right government’s Minister of Interior, Rumyana Bachvarova, and Minister of EU Policies, Meglena Kuneva, to secure admission to the Schengen zone.4 That strategy involved lobbying and getting personal endorsements from top European politicians. In April, it was reported that Sergey Stanishev, exleader of Bulgaria’s opposition party and current leader of the Party of European Socialists (PES) group in the European Parliament, organized a campaign with the goal of convincing EU decision-makers to accept Bulgaria in Schengen by the end of June.5 As the migrant crisis intensified in the summer, however, the Bulgarian campaigners were forced to change their tone and adapt their strategy.6 A new target deadline was set for October 8, when the Council of EU Ministers was scheduled to meet and discuss the issue, along with the migrant crisis.

Additionally, the government revived an old proposal to integrate Bulgaria into the Schengen zone in two stages.7 This proposes to first remove the internal “blue borders” (air and sea), followed by the “green borders” (land).8,9 On September 17, The Daily Express was quoted in the media suggesting that Bulgaria and Romania had jointly decided to use the refugee crisis as a political tool to help them gain entry in Schengen. The argument used by the two countries was that, since the Balkan states are already protecting the external borders of the Union, it would be in the common security interest of all Europeans if Romania and Bulgaria became members of the border-free Schengen agreement.10 Closer scrutiny, however, indicates that this position was not shared by Ministers Kuneva and Bachvarova. Instead, Minister Kuneva emphasized questions of security and solidarity, while Minister Bachvarova insisted that admission to Schengen should be based on principle and not tied up to the issue of relocation quotas.11 At the end, the topic of Schengen expansion did not find place on the agenda of the Council of Ministers meeting in October, as it was overshadowed by the pressing issue of trying to adequately manage the 152

Bulgaria - Tzvetozar Iolov refugee stream. The general atmosphere of uncertainty about the border-free agreement in its current state also made it unsurprising that Bulgaria’s Schengen status was not resolved in October.12 A decision was yet again postponed for a future date, and Minister Kuneva somberly commented in the press that admission to Schengen will not come easily to Bulgaria in the current political climate. Nevertheless, the struggle should continue until admission is achieved.13 Meanwhile, Minister Bachvarova commented that this has now become an issue of security for the continent.14 Similarly, Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta’s tone seemed pessimistic about the prospect of his country becoming a Schengen member, even in 2016.15 Voices such as that of French ex-President Sarkozy calling for the reformation of the border-free agreement and doubting its usefulness in its current state, may become more influential in the coming year and complicate the relationship between the EU and its Balkan members.16

Strengthening border control and preventing human trafficking in the context of the migrant crisis As a country located on the external border of the EU, Bulgaria felt the intense pressure of incoming human migration earlier than the West Balkan countries. Already in 2013, the government began constructing a fence along the border with Turkey.17 In August, The Daily Mail described the fence and drew parallels between the challenges faced by the Bulgarian border police and the police in Calais.18 That article was also one of the first to shed light on the rising issue of organized human trafficking affecting Europe. On September 26, in light of the shocking news of the 71 refugees found suffocated in a truck on a Hungarian highway, AFP did an exposé describing how Bulgarian organized crime groups have found a profitable new venue in migrant smuggling.19 They use the same channels which allow them to smuggle contraband and sex workers.20 The following month, another tragic event further tarnished Bulgaria’s image after an Afghan migrant was accidentally shot dead by a border patrol agent.21 The article concluded that Bulgaria’s image among refugees and migrants is poor because of associations with police brutality, long administrative procedures, and risky smuggling journeys.22 In November, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that 96 percent of the 28,000 migrants who had entered the country since the beginning of the year had left the country via the Serbian border towards Western Europe.23 This includes refugees who had applied for asylum and received refugee status.

Interior Minister Bachvarova theorized that the reason for the decreasing migrant flow was due to the increased police presence at the Turko-Bulgarian border, while national media argued that it was due to redirection of the traffic through the Western Balkans, and the increased involvement of organized smugglers in Sofia.24 Concurrently with these developments, Prime Minister Boyko Borissov was extolling the effectiveness of Bulgarian border control to the media, citing the praise of European officials for its effectiveness.25 However, 153

Messages in the Media at the same time, the EU border agency Frontex was commissioned to send additional personnel to strengthen all external borders, including the Bulgarian border.26 In December, British Prime Minister David Cameron was taken on a personal tour of the border fence by his Bulgarian colleagues, where he stated that the rest of Europe should look up to Bulgaria as a role model in border protection.27 Media reports illustrated the anxiety the Bulgarian government felt in the last four months of 2015 over the EU’s failure to establish a common migration and refugee policy. In September, Borissov was reportedly confused about the exact definition of the “hotspot” centres proposed by Angela Merkel.28 The following month, he told EU Council President Donald Tusk that Bulgaria would not build additional refugee camps, and would also expect the same support from the EU that was offered to Greece and Croatia.29 He added that refugee quotas are not a long-term solution.30,31 In that context, Borissov, together with the leaders of Serbia and Romania, agreed on a unified position to close their borders if Western European countries do not keep theirs open, in order to prevent the Balkans from becoming a massive refugee buffer zone.32 The Prime Minister also made a statement that Bulgaria is a transit country, and that the government cannot force refugees to stay there if they do not want to stay. Foreign Minister Daniel Mitov even called on the EU to start deporting economic migrants and to place the question of refugee quotas as a lower priority, while affirming that Bulgaria has been meeting its responsibility on the issue better than most other EU members.33,34,35

Judicial Reform in Accordance with the EU Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification (MCV) guidelines In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania were admitted to the EU, despite their judicial systems not being up to European standards. For this reason, a monitoring Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification (MCV) was established as a tool for the European Commission to guide and encourage judicial reform, which each year produces an annual report.36 The report for 2015, published in January, stated that “progress has been slow in Bulgaria in terms of addressing judicial reform and making concrete advances on corruption and organised crime.”37 Bulgarian Minister of Justice, Hristo Ivanov, decided to concentrate on the few positive aspects of the report by emphasizing that the Commission approved of and trusted his judicial reform strategy.38 However, there were many concerns: Budget Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva pointed out the way corruption adversely affects public project tenders, and Law Commissioner Frans Timmermans insisted on more concrete action being taken on judicial reform — not just ‘empty promises’— before the next report comes out.39,40 German MP Gunther Krichbaum also clarified in an interview for Dnevnik the importance of a reliable judicial system as a guarantor to foreign investors’ confidence in Bulgaria.41 In an informal mid-year report, the Commission positively commented 154

Bulgaria - Tzvetozar Iolov on the proposed constitutional amendments by Minister Ivanov to split the Supreme Court Council in two parts in order to provide checks and balances, and expressed hope that the legislation would be passed by the Parliament.42 The first setback, however, happened in September when the legislature voted against the anti-corruption law proposed by Minister Kuneva. This resulted in 16 EU ambassadors in Bulgaria, as well as Minister Kuneva herself, issuing statements of concern.43,44 The following month, the Director-General of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), Giovanni Kessler, showed his support for Minister Kuneva with a visit, reaffirming that corruption must be fought with strong reforms in investigation and sentencing guidelines.45 Minister Kuneva was quoted by Standart saying, “the rejection of the proposed law sends a bad signal that Bulgarian politicians do not recognise the severity of the corruption problem.”46 A few weeks later, the judicial reform efforts by Minister Ivanov also suffered a setback after his constitutional amendment proposal was passed by Parliament, but in a severely truncated form in order to gain the support of some of the opposition parties. Minister Ivanov resigned immediately after, declaring that the reforms in their current state would not result in any profound change in the judicial status quo.47 Minister Ivanov invited Romanian ex-Justice Minister Monica Macovei to a debate forum in order to publicize her country’s success as a role model for the Bulgarian initiative. Macovei argued that while reforms are necessary, it is more imperative to find a politically neutral prosecutor who will have the willpower to go after the wrongdoers in high positions.48 She also expressed doubts as to whether Prime Minister Borissov was genuinely committed to fighting corruption, which led to statements of indignation from his party GERB.49 After the resignation of Hristo Ivanov, Borissov, in a surprising move, asked Brussels to help the Bulgarian justice reform by sending experts to act as observers.50

2015 in Review During the first half of the year, there was a decidedly optimistic undertone to the media coverage, as media sources followed the moves of the newly sworn-in center-right coalition government, who enthusiastically took on the task of judicial reform and implementation of the Schengen admission requirements. Despite the government’s attempts to conceptualize these as two clearly separate issues, they eventually came to the realization that in Brussels, many actors saw them as inextricably interlinked. Some EU member states, such as Finland, were of the opinion that Bulgarian criminal structures would pose a risk in the border-free area if the local justice system could not be yet trusted to effectively prosecute criminal groups on a national level.

While there are several opponents to Bulgaria’s accession to Schengen within the EU, the failure of the anti-corruption campaign showed that there was also no shortage of opponents at home. In the face of an entrenched political class and oligarchy who wield tremendous power within the current political 155

Messages in the Media and judicial arrangements, reform is difficult.51 Optimism eventually turned to general pessimism as the debate in the national media turned into whether failure to reform was a symptom of unwillingness or inability. The ability of politicians to implement deeper institutional re-organization, instead of cosmetic piecemeal reforms, was called into doubt. Prime Minister Borissov’s appeal to the EU to provide the country with experts was seen as a pre-emptive disarming move ahead of the next MCV report. The new, expectedly critical report was released on January 28, 2016. A detailed analysis in Trud explains that there is a sense of fatigue felt by EC officials, who, after 15 similar reports, are coming to the realization that the MCV is proving to be an ineffective instrument in producing the desired results.52 Although the MCV report showed that attitudes among the Bulgarian population remain staunchly pro-European and supportive of the EU, the fact that the Union was overwhelmed by the Greek debt crisis and the migrant crisis this year meant insufficient attention was given to the issues of some member states, such as Bulgaria’s judicial reform. Rather than focusing on the improvements that will, step by step, lead to Bulgaria fulfilling the Schengen entry requirements, the discussion has turned to existential doubts about the future of the Schengen zone and the EU altogether. There is a general feeling that the campaigns throughout the year might have ultimately been conducted in vain. A sense of uncertainty about the future role that Bulgaria will play in the constantly evolving geopolitical game between the EU, Russia, and Turkey also prominently featured in the local media as the year came to a close.

Bilyana Vesselinova, “Сергей иска “зелена светлина” за Шенген,” Standart, April 20, 2015, accessed November 8, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/ svyat-europe/sergey_iska_zelena_svetlina_za_shengen-281258.html 2 “В ЕС има нагласа “да се даде хоризонт” на България и Румъния за влизане в Шенген” Dnevnik, April 4 2015, accessed November 8 2015. http:// www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2015/04/04/2506337_v_es_ima_naglasa_da_se_dade_ horizont_na_bulgariia_i/ 3 “ЕК: България и Румъния изпълняват условията за Шенген,” Standart, September 10, 2015, accessed November 8, 2015. http://www.standartnews. com/svyat-europe/ek_balgariya_i_rumaniya_izpalnyavat_usloviyata_za_shengen_-300145.html 4 Bilyana Vesselinova, Mariya Chipileva, “Бъчварова и Кунева с мисия “Шенген”,“ Standart, March 10, 2015, accessed November 8, 2015. http://www. standartnews.com/balgariyapolitika/bachvarova_i_kuneva_s_misiya_shengen-276224.html 5 Bilyana Vesselinova, “Сергей иска “зелена светлина” за Шенген,” Standart, April 20, 2015, accessed November 8, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/ svyat-europe/sergey_iska_zelena_svetlina_za_shengen-281258.html 6 “Кунева: Влизането в Шенген решава част от бежанския проблем,” Trud, September 10, 2015, accessed November 9, 2015. http://www.trud.bg/Article.

1

156

Bulgaria - Tzvetozar Iolov asp?ArticleId=4973780 7 Vasil Shushkov, “Кунева чака “да” за Шенген през юни, ” Standart, April 23, 2015, accessed November 9, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/balgariya-politika/kuneva_chaka_da_za_shengen_prez_yuni-281867.html 8 Diyan Nikolov, “Кунева иска първо само с един крак в Шенген,” Trud, July 13, 2015, accessed November 9, 2015. http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=4869086 9 “Цитат на деня: Влизането ни в Шенген се превръща в движеща се мишена,” Dnevnik, April 30, 2015, accessed November 9, 2015. http://www. dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/citat_na_deniia/2015/04/30/2523416_citat_na_denia_vlizaneto_ni_v_shengen_se_prevrushta_v/ 10 “The Daily Express: Румъния и България ще използват имиграционната криза,” Trud, September 17, 2015, accessed November 9, 2015. http://www.trud. bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=4988541 11 “Вицепремиерски разнобой за Шенген и бежанците: Кунева говори за обвързване на двете теми, Бъчварова – обратното,” Trud, September 10, 2015, accessed November 9, 2015. http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=4975808 12 Kalina Alexandrova, “Отлагат влизането на България в Шенген, ” Standart, October 6, 2015, accessed November 9, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/balgariya-politika/otlagat_vlizaneto_na_balgariya_v_shengen-303606.html 13 Tzvetan Krastev, “Кунева: Никой няма да ни поднесе Шенген на тепсия, ” Standart, October 18, 2015, accessed November 9, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/balgariyapolitika/kuneva_nikoy_nyama_da_ni_podnese_shengen_ na_tepsiya-305689.html 14 “Бъчварова: Присъединяването към Шенген е въпрос на сигурност,” Trud, October 8, 2015, accessed November 9, 2015. http://www.trud.bg/Article. asp?ArticleId=5032950 15 Kalina Alexandrova, “Отлагат влизането на България в Шенген, ” Standart, October 6, 2015, accessed November 9, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/balgariya-politika/otlagat_vlizaneto_na_balgariya_v_shengen-303606.html 16 Bilyana Veselinova, Mariya Chipileva, “Бъчварова и Кунева с мисия “Шенген”,“ Standart, March 10, 2015, accessed November 8, 2015. http://www. standartnews.com/balgariyapolitika/bachvarova_i_kuneva_s_misiya_shengen-276224.html 17 Rick Lyman, “Bulgaria Puts Up a New Wall, but This One Keeps People Out,” New York Times, April 5, 2015, accessed February 14, 2016. http://www.nytimes. com/2015/04/06/world/europe/bulgaria-puts-up-a-new-wall-but-this-onekeeps-people-out.html?_r=0 18 Kalina Alexandrova, “Daily Mail: България спира мигранти с 4-метрова ограда,” Standart, August 3, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http:// www.standartnews.com/balgariya-politika/daily_mail_balgariya_spira_migranti_s_4metrova_ograda_-295139.html 19 “АФП: Българските трафиканти процъфтяват в кризата с мигранти,” Trud, September 26, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.trud.bg/Article.

157

Messages in the Media asp?ArticleId=5006491 20 Ibid.

21 Ruslan Yordanov, “Бягащите афганци станаха повече от сирийците,” Standart, October 18, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/balgariya-obshtestvo/byagashtite_afgantsi_stanaha_poveche_ot_siriytsite-305763.html 22 Ibid.

23 “Полска медия: 27 хил. бежанци са се “изпарили” от България, никой не знае как и кога,” Trud, November 18, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http:// www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=5121613 24 Rossana Maneva, “Намалял е броят на нелегалните мигранти в хостелите в София,” Standart, November 27, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http://www. standartnews.com/balgariya-obshtestvo/namalyal_e_broyat_na_nelegalnite_migranti_v_hostelite_v_sofiya-311937.html 25 Petya Gaydarova, “Бойко Борисов: Отзвукът в Европа е, че тук е най-добре пазената граница,” Trud, October 17, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http:// www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=5053314 26 “Фронтекс ни помага за охраната на турската граница,” Standart, October 26, 2015, accessed February 14, 2016. http://www.standartnews.com/svyat-europe/fronteks_ni_pomaga_za_ohranata_na_turskata_granitsa-307218.html 27 Ivaylo Nedkov, “Камерън на браздата: Учете се от България, ” Standart, December 4, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/ svyat-europe/kameran_na_brazdata_uchete_se_ot_balgariya_video-312958.html 28 “Залутани в интерпретацията: Искала ли е България “гореща точка” за бежанци (обобщение),” Dnevnik, September 25, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2015/09/24/2615606_zalutani_v_interpretaciiata_iskala_li_e_bulgariia/ 29 “България без нови лагери за бежанци (ОБЗОР),” Standart, October 9, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/balgariya-politika/balgariya_bez_novi_lageri_za_bezhantsi_obzor-304309.html 35 Ibid.

30 “Борисов: Бежанските квоти не са решение, само подхранват националистите,” Dnevnik, October 15, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.dnevnik.bg/evropa/2015/10/15/2629627_borisov_bejanskite_kvoti_ne_sa_reshenie_samo/ 31 Iveta Stratieva, Tsvetelina Katanska, “Затваряме границите за бежанци заедно с Европа (обзор),” Trud, October 24, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=5070333 32 “Борисов: Нямаме намерение да строим затвори за бежанците, за да ги държим насила в България,” Dnevnik, November 16, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.dnevnik.bg/evropa/novini_ot_es/2015/11/16/2650427_borisov_niamame_namerenie_da_stroim_zatvori_za/ 33 Georgi Angelov, “Връщаме мигранти, ЕС да плаща,” Trud, December 5, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=5157339 158

Bulgaria - Tzvetozar Iolov “Даниел Митов: България е много напред в ЕС по прием на бежанци,” Dnevnik, November 22, 2015, accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.dnevnik. bg/bulgaria/2015/11/22/2654417_daniel_mitov_bulgariia_e_mnogo_napred_v_ es_po_priem_na/ 36 “Assessing Ongoing Progress by Bulgaria and Romania,” European Commission, accessed February 14, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/index_en.htm 37 “Report on Progress under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism in Bulgaria,” European Commission, January 28, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-3825_en.htm 38 “Еврокомисията към България: Сега е времето да се действа (обобщение),” Dnevnik, January 29, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http:// www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2015/01/28/2461655_evrokomisiiata_kum_bulgariia_sega_e_vremeto_da_se/ 39 Stela Stoyanova, “ Кристалина: Корупцията в обществените поръчки е голяма,” Standart, March 17, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://www. standartnews.com/balgariya-politika/kristalina_koruptsiyata_v_obshtestvenite_ porachki_e_golyama-277096.html 40 Teodora Angelova, “Тимерманс: Върховенството на закона е като орхидея, трябва да се грижите за него,” Dnevnik, June 4, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2015/06/04/2547246_timermans_vurhovenstvoto_na_zakona_e_kato_orhideia/ 41 Petya Vladimirova, “Гунтер Крихбаум: Очакваме всички партии да разпознаят съдебната реформа като проект за бъдещето на държавата,” Dnevnik, July 6, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://www.dnevnik.bg/ intervju/2015/07/06/2566769_gunter_krihbaum_ochakvame_vsichki_partii_da/ 42 “Еврокомисията одобрила усилията за съдебна реформа,” Trud, July 15, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=4873236 43 “Посланици на 16 държави обявиха отхвърлянето на антикорупционния закон за лош сигнал,” Dnevnik, September 7, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2015/09/07/2605112_poslanici_na_16_ durjavi_obiaviha_othvurlianeto_na/ 44 “ЕС се интересува от борбата с корупцията, а не от митниците, заяви Меглена Кунева,” Dnevnik, September 8, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2015/09/08/2605695_es_ se_interesuva_ot_borbata_s_korupciiata_a_ne_ot/ 45 “Неспособността на съдиите да наказват е голям проблем в България, заяви шефът на ОЛАФ,” Dnevnik, October 19, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2015/10/19/2631728_nesposobnostta_na_sudiite_da_nakazvat_e_goliam_problem/ 46 Rumen Penchev, “Кунева: Забавянето на антикорупционния закон изпрати лош сигнал,” Standart, October 19, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/balgariya-politika/kuneva_zabavyaneto_na_ antikoruptsionniya_zakon_izprati_losh_signal-305822.html 47 “Еврокомисията отказа да коментира оставката на Христо Иванов,” 34

159

Messages in the Media Dnevnik, December 10, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://www.dnevnik. bg/bulgaria/2015/12/10/2667178_evrokomisiiata_otkaza_da_komentira_ ostavkata_na_hristo/ 48 “Моника Маковей: Промените в Конституцията са прахосване на време, само ще забавят борбата с корупцията,” Trud, May 25, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=4784803 49 “ГЕРБ скочи на Маковей, нарушила добрия тон,” Standart, May 25, 2015, December 22, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/balgariya-politika/gerb_ skochi_na_makovey_narushila_dobriya_ton-286323.html 50 “Бойко иска: Евронаблюдатели за Темида (ОБЗОР),” Standart, December 17, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://www.standartnews.com/balgariya-politika/boyko_iska_evronablyudateli_za_temida_obzor-314861.html 51 “Българският съд е похитен от олигархията и започна да ‘и служи,” Trud, January 17, 2016, accessed February 14, 2016. http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=5239480 52 Anna Zarkova, “Евродокладът и след това (обзор),” Trud, January 29, 2016, accessed February 14, 2016. http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=5266275

160

ROMANIA

By Flavian Berneaga

Adevarul. Founded in 1871. Owned by Adevarul Holding. Daily circulation of 51,000 to 33,000.

Romania Libera. Founded in 1943. Owned by Medien Holding. Daily circulation of 48,754.

Gandul: Founded in 2005. Owned by PubliMedia International. Daily circulation of 52,000.

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

161 4

Messages in the Media

In 2015, the issues covered most heavily by Romanian media pertaining to Romanian-EU relations were: the 2014 presidential election, RomanianMoldovan reunification, and state corruption.

The Presidential Election Of Late 2014 On November 17, 2014, Klaus Iohannis, leader of the Christian Liberal Alliance, defeated Victor Ponta of the Socialist-Democrats in the race for the Romanian presidency. Decided in the second round of voting, with Iohannis taking 54.5 percent of the vote, the 2014 election boasted the highest voter turnout rate in fourteen years, with 62.04 percent of eligible voters having cast a ballot.1,2 Iohannis’ victory came on the heels of a political campaign which centered on his Saxon ancestry and promises of national order and stability.

Relying on his achievements as the Mayor of Sibiu, as well as the prevailing stereotype that Saxons are a hardworking, punctual, and disciplined people, Iohannis was able to mobilize voters against Victor Ponta.3,4 His campaign depicted Ponta as an incompetent politician - one who would not be able to lift Romania out of economic destitution or halt its rampant corruption. Hence, the results are best observed as a vote of non-confidence against Victor Ponta, rather than a vote for Klaus Iohannis.5,6 In the aftermath of his defeat, Ponta acknowledged the results by claiming that the “people are always right,” but insisted that he would not step down as Prime Minister of Romania.7 Meanwhile, in claiming his victory, Iohannis reiterated the need for change based on the realignment of Romanian laws with German and European standards.8 Appealing to stereotypes of German efficiency, which were indirectly linked to his Saxon background, Iohannis promised to push for a strong and meaningful relationship between Romania, Germany, and the European Union. A goal in line with the Merkel-EU agenda, which seeks to use Romania as a regional example in order to promote Europeanization – specifically to neighboring nations such as Moldova.9

Significant throughout the election was the presence of social media.

Both mainstream media outlets and social media platforms played a historic role in promoting higher voter turnout rates. However, while platforms such as Facebook were seen as ideal for spirited debate, mainstream media outlets, specifically popular television channels, started to be seen as biased and corrupt.10 Therefore, Iohannis, who made a point of using Facebook when addressing young voters, was credited for doing so, while Ponta, who shied away from the Internet altogether, was criticized and purported to be corrupt.11

Iohannis’ victory, however, was not simply on account of the youth he courted through social media, but rather on account of his winning 89.73 percent of the diaspora vote.12 The votes cast by the diaspora community, which took place across multiple nations and were controlled by individual governments, were ridden in controversy. Ethnic Romanians casting ballots in other European states had to endure much longer wait times than faced in Romania, with many stranded 162

Romania - Flavian Berneaga in the cold for hours on end. Live updates from London, Paris, Frankfurt, etc., were broadcasted both online and on television, with videos showing kilometre after kilometre of Romanians lined up to vote.13 Dubbed lines of “humiliation and determination,”14 nationals likened the queues to those of Communist times. In Moldova, tensions ran so high that masses of voters began breaking fences and engaging in violence against the police.15 However, when an individual was denied a vote in the West, their family back in Romania was that much more galvanized to go out and cast their own ballots.16 The brunt of the blame for such conditions ultimately fell on Victor Ponta, who many believed had sought to make it that much more difficult for the diaspora community to vote.17 In response, President-Elect Klaus Iohannis declared his revolt for those who had organized the elections, and asked that all ambassadors and consuls from countries where the elections were made difficult be called back.18,19 In addition, the Co-President of ACL, Vasile Blaga,and the Mayor of Cluj (also ex-Prime Minister of Romania) demanded that Prime Minister Ponta resign.20,21 Meanwhile, Mina Andreeva, spokesperson for The European Commission’s President, Jean-Claude Junker, declared that the Commission was eager to observe how Romanian authorities would work to solve such issues in the future.22 Reunification With Moldova

Until 1991, when it became an independent state, the Republic of Moldova had always been under either Soviet or Romanian jurisdiction. With 2018 approaching, and Romanians preparing to celebrate the centenary of the Greater Romania, a state which, in its origins, included Moldova, the controversy surrounding Moldovan independence is once again at the forefront of public discussion. In the past 25 years, Moldovan unionists have grown in membership, surpassing even pro-Russian minded citizens, and have been continuing to push for a reunification with Romania. Not only is such a proposal considered both historically and culturally “correct” among unionists, it is also viewed as the best means by which Moldova can distance itself from Russian influence and begin to Europeanize.23 With social justice, economic prosperity, and strong political leadership perceived to be lacking in Moldova, many have come to agree with the call for reunification. It is a proposal considered both economically and culturally appealing for Moldovans.24 However, disagreement persists. As such, many have come to believe that a solution can only be reached by referendum, a notion that grew in popularity after the development of Bucharest and the breakdown of Kishinev.25 In order to successfully plan and carry out a referendum, however, several steps have to be taken. One such step is the beginning of a dialogue with the larger players involved; namely, Russia and Germany. In conferencing with Russia, Moldova would have to discuss the Transnistria, which is a disputed region between Eastern Ukraine and Moldova; renouncing it may offer Moldova the leniency necessary to proceed with the reunification process.26 163

Messages in the Media Among the supporters for Moldovan-Romanian reunification, a nongovernmental organization called Actiunea 2012 remains one of the largest. Born out of the dissolution of the Kishinev government, and the protests that followed, Actiunea 2012 seeks to promote the ideals of reunification.27 Also seeking to promote the idea of reunification is former Romanian President Traian Basescu, as well as Romanian Senator Titus Corlatean, who maintains that Moldova’s place is within the European Union.28,29 In Moldova, the feeling is mutual, with Mihai Ghimpu, a Moldovan politician maintaining that reunification with Romania is Moldova’s most viable option, should it remain unable to regulate its failing economy.30 The project has also garnered international attention, with Petras Austrevicius, a Lithuanian MEP, commenting that both nations must make a decision, and must do so quickly, if they wish to repair Stalin’s mistake.31 However, while many politicians see Moldova as a failed state project, and in desperate need of reunification, there remains great resistance from the political left.32 In a display of his discontent for reunification, Socialist parliamentarian Vlad Batrancea proceeded to rip apart a map of the Greater Romania of 1918, which an NGO had begun distributing around schools, during a parliamentary meeting. Meanwhile, his colleague, Igor Dodon, asked that the constitution be changed so that the distribution of such maps would become illegal.33 In response, the former Moldovan President, Mihai Ghimpu, threatened that reunification would occur despite their protests, and that such pro-Russian politicians should go to Novosibirsk to die.34 The Ministry of Education later insisted that the map of Greater Romania is a part of Moldovan history and cannot be taken out of curriculums.35 As demonstrated, Russia’s heavy influence within Moldova acts as a great hurdle to reunification. On one front, Russian Deputy Konstantin Kosachev argued that reunification would be impossible without first resolving the conflict in Transnistria.36 Moreover, Moldovan unionists are vilified in the Russian media, and depicted to be mercenaries who are paid for their support by Romanian lobbyists.37 Last year, the leader of the Social Democrats maintained that Moldova must be an economic player that should stand in between the EU and Eurasia.38 All the while, Moldova remains a big importer of Russian gas, a partnership pegged to last until 2017.39 With the election of Klaus Iohannis in Romania, however, dynamics have changed. Pragmatic in nature, Iohannis seeks to institute domestic political reforms before steering Romania down a path of Europeanization.40 His approach with reunification is similarly cautious. During his campaign, Iohannis stated that Moldovan-Romanian reunification could only be proposed by Bucharest and accepted by Kishinev. He then went on to call for national consensus in both nations regarding reunification by way of Moldova’s integration within Europe.41As he settled into the presidency, however, his tone became colder and more distant.42 In accordance with his Prime Minister, Dacian Ciolos, Iohannis suspended aid to Moldova. Contrary to the position of the former Prime Minister, Victor Ponta, who sought to send Moldova 150 million Euros in aid, the President insisted that such sums would only be sent after Moldova had taken meaningful reforms to 164

Romania - Flavian Berneaga Europeanize.43, 44 Taken surprisingly well by the Moldovan public, Iohannis’ steps are expected to aid in the detachment of Moldova from Russian influence.45,46 In the end, however, Iohannis and the newly appointed Prime Minister of Moldova, Pavel Filip, did reach a consensus on the matter of economic aid, with Romania agreeing to dispatch 250 million Euros once Moldova has entered into an agreement with the IMF.47 Fight Against Corruption

Dedicated to prosecuting politicians and public figures accused of corruption, the National Anticorruption Directorate (“DNA” in Romanian) is led by Laura Codruta Kovesi. In 2015, DNA was credited for handling 10,200 files with only 90 prosecutors.48 Consequently, Kovesi’s reputation echoed all the way to England, where The Guardian published an article regarding her ruthless pursuit of 24 mayors, five deputies, two ex-ministers, a Prime Minister, and 1,000 other people, including both judges and prosecutors, all of whom were sent to trial. Kovesi is also responsible for the seizure of illegal bribes and gifts, amounting to a stunning 100 million euros in value.49 At the time, she was investigating then-Prime Minister Victor Ponta, who was accused of money laundering and fiscal evasion.50 Kovesi’s work was applauded both internally, by Valeriu Zgonea, President of the Chambers of Deputies, who deemed Romania, on account of Kovesi’s work, a model state in the fight against corruption, and externally by Hans Klemm, the American Ambassador to Romania.51,52 The magazine Politico.

Eu went on to include Kovesi as one of the twenty-eight most influential people within the European Union.53 However, despite her success, Kovesi remains steadfast in the opinion that meaningful legislative reform is necessary in preventing corruption – opening up criminal files is simply not enough.54 Just as eager to eliminate corruption within Romania is President Iohannis, whose victory was credited in part to his campaign promises surrounding the issue.55 Of the reforms imposed, the most comprehensive came after October 30, 2015, when a fire erupted at the Colectiv nightclub, leaving 63 dead and 180 wounded.56 Three days of national mourning were declared. The nightclub was persecuted for its lack of official paperwork – running both without a proper safety license and without having conducted regular safety checks. 57 Almost immediately following, nightclubs operating under similar circumstances began shutting down for fear of investigation. 58 Depicted as the first time in post-Communist Romania when corruption was directly responsible for the taking of so many lives, the event acted as a rallying cry for anti-corruption protests.59 Most of the anger released was directed against then-Prime Minister Victor Ponta.

In Bucharest alone, there were some 25,000 people protesting; around the country, thousands of others also took to the streets (3,000 people in Galati; 3,000 in Iasi; 2,000 in Cluj; 1,000 in Sibiu; 1,500 in Targu Mures).606162 In response, Victor Ponta resigned, stating that he did not want to fight the people, nor did he wish to exploit the suffering of victims’ relatives.63, 64 Appointed as his replacement 165

Messages in the Media was Dacian Ciolos, an ex-European Commissioner of Agriculture, alongside a technocratic, party-less government.65 The resignation was welcomed by the mainstream media, who viewed the act as representative of a civilized EU member state.66 One week after the fire, the Mayor of Bucharest’s Fourth Sector, Cristian Piedone, also offered his resignation after he was arrested for carelessness and indifference leading to the loss of human lives.67 In his statement, he acknowledged the part he played in the tragedy, while also drawing on his experiences as a father and a husband, and how he would have felt had such tragedy struck his own family.68,69,70 Year in Review

As Romania continues towards a path of Europeanization, its relations with the EU have magnified in both scope and meaning. While Romanians still lack a sense of shared identity with the EU, the push for further integration with the West continues, and has begun to spread to its Eastern neighbors. Beginning with the election of President Klaus Iohannis, Romania’s growing relationship with the EU is viewed as his campaign promises are coming to life. Among Iohannis’ many resolutions were vows to fight domestic corruption, at all levels of government, and to bring discipline to a highly tangled and bureaucratic political system. A member of the Saxon minority within Romania, Iohannis has also been able to build a meaningful relationship with Germany’s Angela Merkel, with the two collaborating to raise Romania out of its economic disparity as well as assisting neighboring Moldova with its own economic and political upheavals.

With the Romanian centenary approaching, large populations of both Moldovans and Romanians hope to see a reunified state by the 2018 deadline.

The push for reunification, however, has been slowed on account of Moldovan political instability and the fight put up by lobbyist Vlad Plahotniuc, who has employed significant sums of money in his fight against pro-European governments. Further tensions have risen on account of the dispersing of school maps of the Greater Romania, which depict Romania and Moldova as one province. While NGOs view the move as politically savvy, the pro-Russian Socialists and Communists believe it to be against state interests. While both states sought guidance in the election of Klaus Iohannis, who they believed would have sped up the process, each was disappointed when the President took a fairly distant approach to the issue. Originally refusing to continue the transfer of monetary aid into Moldova, the President insisted that such aid would only be given after meaningful anti-corruption measures had been taken and negotiations had begun with the IMF. EU politicians eagerly await the Moldovan reforms promised and remain open-minded about their possible entry into the Union.

In instituting its own anti-corruption reforms, procedures were expedited in the wake of the Colectiv fire. The fire, which was blamed on poor safety regulations, shed light on the direct and tragic consequences of running corrupt businesses – the nightclub had bribed politicians in seeking 166

Romania - Flavian Berneaga its operation license, without ever taking care to meet regulation standards.

Absolutely livid with the state of their politics, and devastated by the tragedy, the Romanian people took to the streets and demanded the resignation of those responsible. Both Prime Minister Victor Ponta and the Mayor of the Fourth Sector of Bucharest, resigned. In the former Prime Minister’s stead came Dacian Ciolos, the former Commissioner of Agriculture. Establishing a technocratic government, Ciolos vowed to work with President Iohannis in order to speed up Romanian Europeanization, and work to eliminate corruption.

‘Rezultate alegeri prezidentiale 2014 turul doi : situatia pe judete’ Adevarul. November 17th, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/rezultatealegeri-prezidentiale-2014-turul-doi-situatia-judete-iohannis-ponta1_546976eb0d133766a8f2f3ec/index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 2 Alegeriprezidentiale 2014. Prezenta la vot de duminica, comparabila cu anii ’90. Adavarul. November 17th, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/ alegeri-prezidentiale-2014--prezenta-vot-duminicacomparabila-anii-901_5469facf0d133766a8f71a67/index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 3 ‘”Pas cu pas”. Profesiunea de credinta a lui Klaus Iohannis. Adevarul. November 25th, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/pas-pas-profesiunea-decredintaklaus-iohannis-1_5474ab79a0eb96501e13c824/index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 4 ‘Decembrie. Poveste de iubire.’ Adevarul. December 14th,2015. http://adevarul. ro/news/eveniment/decembrie-poveste-iubire-1_548d7960448e03c0fdbd17a0/ index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 5 ‘”Financial Times”: Furia romanilor fata de coruptie adus la victoria lui Iohannis’. Adevarul. November 18th, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/ financial-times-furia-romanilor-fata-coruptie-condus-victoria-iohannis1_546b1f640d133766a8ffa203/index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 6 ‘C. T. Popescu: PSD-ul a facut o greseala “macro”. Daca va fi infrant, Ponta va fi infrant de un vot moral’. Gandul. November 16th, 2014. http://www.gandul.info/ stiri/c-t-popescu-psd-ul-a-facut-o-greseala-macro-daca-va-fi-infrant-ponta-vafi-infrant-de-un-vot-moral-13572277 (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 7 ‘Ponta isi recunoaste infrangerea: “L-am sunat pe domnul Iohannis si l-am felicitat pentru victorie” UPDATE: Nu deminsionez de la guvern´. Gandul.

November 17th 2014. http://www.gandul.info/politica/ponta-isi-recunoasteinfrangerea-l-am-sunat-pe-domnul-iohannis-si-l-am-felicitat-pentru-victorieupdate-nu-demisionez-de-la-guvern-13572709 (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 8 ‘Klaus Iohannis: Am fost convins ca voi castiga alegerile. Este nevoie de un system de invatamant dual, similar cu ceea ce exista in Germania’. Romania Libera. December 5th, 2014. http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/politicaalegeri-prezidentiale/klaus-iohannis--am-fost-convins-ca-voi-castigaalegerile-360092 (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 1

167

Messages in the Media ‘S-ar putea construe o axa Bucuresti-Berlin-Washington?’. Romania Libera.

November 25th, 2014. http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/politica-alegeriprezidentiale/s-ar-putea-construi-o-axa-bucuresti-berlin-washington--358831 (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 10 ‘Online-ul a luat act in offline. Datoria lui Iohannis’. Adevarul. November 18th, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/news/societate/online-ula-luat-act-offline-datoriaiohannis-1_546a6fae0d133766a8fae771/index.html . (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 11 ‘STUDIU IRES: Klaus Iohannis a castigat alegerile datorita Generatiei Facebook,televiziunii si internatului pe telefoanele mobile’. Romania Libera. http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/politica-alegeri-prezidentiale/studiu-ires--klaus-iohannis-a-castigat-alegerile-datorita-generatiei-facebook--televiziuniisi-internetului-pe-telefoanele-mobile-359061 . (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 12 ‘Alegeri prezidentiale 2014. Iohannis a obtinut 90% din voturile romanilor din diaspora. Unde a castigat Ponta’. Adevarul. November 20th, 2014. http://adevarul. ro/news/politica/alegeri-prezidentiale-2014-iohannis-castigat-90-voturileromanilor-diaspora-castigat-ponta-1_546db3410d133766a8117ccf/index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 13 ‘10 ore si 30 de minute’. Adevarul. November 21st, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/ news/eveniment/10-ore-30-minute-1_546efd210d133766a81b0391/index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 14 ‘ALEGERI PREZIDENTIALE 2014. O tanara epuizata dupa zece ore de stat in picioare la Paris, simbolul rezistentei romanilor in fata batjocurilor Guvernului.

Gandul. November 16th, 2014. http://www.gandul.info/stiri/alegeri-prezidentiale2014-o-tanara-epuizata-dupa-zece-ore-de-stat-in-picioare-la-paris-simbolulrezistentei-romanilor-in-fata-batjocurii-guvernului-13570741 (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 15 ‘VOT MOLDOVA ALEGERI PREZIDENTIALE 2014. La Chisinau oamenii forteaza gardul de protectie. Se scandeaza « Vrem sa votam » si « Rusine »’.

Gandul. November 16th, 2014. http://www.gandul.info/stiri/vot-moldovaalegeri-prezidentiale-2014-la-chisinau-oamenii-forteaza-gardul-de-protectie-sescandeaza-vrem-sa-votam-si-rusine-13568278 (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 16 ‘VIDEO Parintii din tara au votat pentru a-si razbuna copiii din strainatate : Un vot impiedicat dincolo a adus sase in Romania’. Adevarul. November 20th, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/locale/buzau/video-parintii-tara-votat-asi-razbuna-copiii-strainatate-vot-impiedicat-dincolo-adus-sase-romania1_546dd94a0d133766a812a099/index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 17 ‘Ponta sustine ca a platit politics rusinea votului din diaspora’. Adevarul.

November 25th, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/ponta-sustine-platitpolitic-rusinea-votului-diaspora-1_5474b82da0eb96501e141f9c/index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015 9

168

Romania - Flavian Berneaga ‘Iohannis: Sunt revoltat că cei ce au împiedicat a exercita un drept fundamental sunt încă în funcţii’ Adevarul. November 29th, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/news/ politica/iohannis-revoltat-cei-impiedicat-exercita-fundamental-inca-functii1_5479da3ea0eb96501e332443/index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 19 ‘Mesajul lui Iohannis catre Basescu: retrageti ambasadorii si consulii din tarile unde romanii au fost umiliti’. Gandul. November 17th, 2014. http://www. gandul.info/politica/mesajul-lui-iohannis-catre-basescu-retrageti-ambasadoriisi-consulii-din-tarile-unde-romanii-au-fost-umiliti-13577140 (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 20 ‘Blaga: Ii cer demisia lui Ponta pentru modul execrabil in care a organizat alegerile’. Adevarul. November 17th, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/news/ politica/blaga-Ii-cer-demisia-ponta-modul-execrabil-organizat-alegerile1_5469ab5e0d133766a8f45b88/index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 21 ‘Primarul Clujului, Emil Boc, cere demisia lui Victor Ponta. “In conditiile in care poporul ti-a spus un Nu atat de categoric”’. Adevarul. November 17th, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/locale/cluj-napoca/alegeri-prezidentiale-2014-primarulclujului-emil-boc-cere-demisia-victor-ponta-In-conditiile-poporul-ti-a-zisnu-atat-categoric-1_5469a5b70d133766a8f426eb/index.html (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 22 ‘Mesajul Comisiei Europene pentru Guvernul Ponta, dupa scandalul votului din strainatate : Vom urmari cu atentie cum vor clarifica autoritatile romane situatia’. Gandul. November 17th, 2014. http://www.gandul.info/international/ mesajul-comisiei-europene-pentru-guvernul-ponta-dupa-scandalul-votuluidin-strainatate-vom-urmari-cu-atentie-cum-vor-clarifica-autoritatile-romane-situatia-13580050 (Date Accessed: December 27th, 2015) 23 ‘Reunificarea cultural: o prioritate?’ . Adevarul. December 28th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/social/reunificarea-culturala-prioritatee1_56810a2f37115986c6e48705/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 5th, 2016) 24 ‘VIDEO Interesul national: reunificarea tarii’ . Adevarul. December 29th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/video-interesul-national-reunificarea-tarii1_568223c837115986c6eb6805/index.html (Date Accessed: January 5th, 2016) 25 ‘2018 – Anul UNIRII Republicii Moldova cu Romania. Argumente si Solutii.’ Adevarul. December 27th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/cultura/ istorie/2018-anul-unirii-republicii-moldova-romania-argumente-solutii1_5680442437115986c6dfbdbc/index.html (Date Accessed: January 5th, 2016) 26 ‘2018, anul reunirii. E nevoie de dialog Romania - Federatia Rusa?’ . Adevarul.

January 3rd, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/international/rusia/2018-anul-reunirii-enevoie-dialog-romania-federatia-rusa-1_56895a4c37115986c618809d/index. html (Date Accessed: January 5th, 2016) 27 ‘”Vrem govern comun”: Miting spontan la Chisinau, in favoarea unirii Republicii Moldova cu Romania’. Adevarul. November 5th, 2015. http://adevarul. ro/international/europa/vrem-guvern-comun-miting-spontan-chisinau18

169

Messages in the Media favoarea-unirii-republicii-moldova-romania-1_563b91e0f5eaafab2c551af7/ index.html . (Date Accessed: January 5th, 2016)s 28 ‘Basescu, indemn la unirea Romaniei cu Republica Moldova : « Cereti, fratilor, unirea, si o veti avea »’. Gandul. August 12th, 2015. http://www.gandul.info/ politica/basescu-indemn-la-unirea-romaniei-cu-republica-moldova-ceretifratilor-unirea-si-o-veti-avea-11247040 . (Date Accessed: January 5th, 2016) 29 ‘Senatorul roman Titus Corlatean: Locul Republicii Moldova este in Uniunea Europeana’. Adevarul. December 2nd, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/ actualitate/senatorul-roman-titus-corlatean-locul-republicii-moldova-uniuneaeuropeana-1_565e96337d919ed50ecf0d65/index.html (Date Accessed: January 6th, 2016) 30 ‘Mihai Ghimpu spune ca in lipsa unui Guvern, Moldova este jefuita. “A mai ramas de furat asfaltul sovietic”’. Adevarul. December 15th, 2015. http://adevarul. ro/moldova/politica/mihai-ghimpu-spune-lipsa-unui-guvern-moldova-jefuitaa-mai-ramas-furat-asfaltul-sovietic-1_566fa8747d919ed50e3d540e/index.html (Date Accessed: January 6th, 2016) 31 ‘Oficial al UE: “Moldova si Romania trebuie sa decida in privinta unirii.

Stalin a separat Basarabia de restul Romaniei’. Adevarul. October 30th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/oficial-ue-moldovasi-romaniatrebuie-decida-privinta-unirii-stalin-separat-basarabia-derestul-romaniei1_563333c3f5eaafab2c285817/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 6th, 2016) 32 ‘Vlad Filat a vorbit despre esecul Republicii Moldova ca proiect statal’.

Adevarul. October 21st, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/ vlad-filat-vorbitdespre-esecul-republicii-moldova-proiect-statal1_56277d0bf5eaafab2ce380b6/index.html (Date Accessed: January 6th, 2016) 33 ‘Igor Dodon vrea sa modifice Constitutia de teama reunirii Republicii Moldova cu Romania’. Adevarul. December 17th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/ actualitate/igor-dodon-vrea-modifice-constitutia-teama-reunirii-republiciimoldova-romania-1_56727d547d919ed50e507e1e/index.html (Date Accessed: January 6th, 2016) 34 ‘FOTO Deputatii socialisti au rupt in doua harta Romaniei Mari. Unionistii protesteaza, PNL cere interzicerea PSRM’. Adevarul. December 10th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/foto-deputatii-socialisti-rupt-douahartaromaniei-mari-unionistii-protesteaza-pnl-cere-interzicerea-psrm1_5669679b7d919ed50e153707/index.html (Date Accessed: January 6th, 2016) 35 ‘Ministerul Educatiei spune ca harta Romaniei Mari este binevenita in scoli, la fel ca alte harti’. Adevarul. December 11th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/ politica/ministeruleducatiei-spune-harta-romaniei-mari-binevenita-scoli-felalteharti-1_566ab64f7d919ed50e1da1f3/index.html (Date Accessed: January 6th, 2016) 36 ‘Mesaj de la Kremlin: “Reunirea Moldovei cu Romania ingroapa orice sansa privind solutionarea conlfictului transnistrean”’. Adevarul. October 28th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/mesaj-kremlin-reunirea-moldoveiromania-ingropa-oricesansa-privind-solutionarea-conflictului-transnistrean170

Romania - Flavian Berneaga 1_563077c2f5eaafab2c1a4d8c/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 6th, 2016) 37 ‘Unionismul in presa rusa: studentii sunt adusi cu forta la marsuri, politicieni cu doua cetatenii fac lobby pentru Bucuresti’. Adevarul. November 21st, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/actualitate/unionismul-presa-rusastudentii-adusi-forta-marsuri-politicienii-doua-cetatenii-fac-lobby-bucuresti1_564f28c57d919ed50e683588/index.html (Date Accessed: January 6th, 2016) 38 ‘Selin vrea unirea fortelor protestatare. « Moldova sa fie Zona Economica Libera intre UE si Uniunea Eurasiatica’. Adevarul. September 25th, 2015. http:// adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/Selin-vrea-unirea-fortelor-protestatare-moldovazona-economica-libera-ue-uniunea-eurasiatica-1_56053751f5eaafab2cfd4d84/ index.html . (Date Accessed: January 6th, 2016) 39 ‘Rusia va continua sa aprovizioneze cu gaze Republic Moldova’. Romania Libera. December 31st, 2015. http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/ international/rusia-va-continua-sa-aprovizioneze-cu-gaze-republicamoldova--403387 . (Date Accessed: January 6th, 2016) 40 ‘Cum a evoluat relatia dintre Romania si Moldova in era Iohannis: mai putin sentiment, mai mult pragmatism. Ce spun specialistii’. Adevarul. January 4th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/cum-evoluat-relatia-romaniamoldova-era-iohannis-mai-putin-sentiment-mai-pragmatism-spun-specialistii1_568abb1e37115986c621bc99/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 9th, 2016) 41 ‘Klaus Iohannis : « Sa organizam un consens national pentru a sustine integrarea Moldovei in Uniunea Europeana’. Adevarul. December 21st, 2014. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/actualitate/klaus-iohannis-sa-organizamconsens-national-sustine-integrarea-republicii-moldova-uniunea-europeana1_5496acbf448e03c0fdeeca59/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 9th, 2016) 42 ‘Iohannis, sindromul Coca-Cola si de ce doarme Romania’. January 6th, 2016. http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/editorial/iohannis--sindromul-coca-cola-side-ce-doarme-romania-403830 . (Date Accessed: January 9th, 2016) 43 ‘Romania nu mai trimite la CHisinau cele 150 milioane de euro promise din cauza suspendarii parcursului european’. Adevarul. November 9th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/actualitate/romania-nu-mai-trimite-chisinaucele-150-milioane-euro-promise-cauza-suspendarii-parcursului-european1_5640a001f5eaafab2c702b92/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 9th, 2016) 44 ‘Republica Moldova in deriva. Poate face Ciolos ceva?’. Adevarul. November 21st, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/republica-moldova-derivaciolos-cevae-1_5650ac237d919ed50e7047bf/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 9th, 2016) 45 ‘Ciolos, moldovenii si imprumutul’. Adevarul. November 13th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/iohannis-moldovenii-imprumutul1_5645b8707d919ed50e2c0a64/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 9th, 2016) 46 ‘Analist german: Klaus Iohannis va imbunatati dialogul cu Germania pe tema Reunirii’. Adevarul. November 26th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/ analist-german-klaus-johannis-imbunatati-dialogul-germania-tema-reunirii1_54759307a0eb96501e18bb92/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 9th, 2016) 171

Messages in the Media ‘Republica Moldova intra sub guvernanta romaneasca. Cati bani trimite Guvernul Ciolos peste Prut’. Adevarul. January 26th, 2016. http://m.adevarul. ro/news/politica/republica-moldova-intra-guvernanta-romaneasca1_56a7b5f637115986c6ec31f3/index.html (Date Accessed: January 26th, 2016) 48 ‘Laura Codruta Kovesi: In acest an, DNA a trebuit sa gestioneze peste 10.200 de dosare penale cu un numar de numai 90 de procurori. Adevarul. December 11th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/laura-codruta-kovesi-In-andna-trebuit-gestioneze-10200-dosare-penale-numar-numai-90-procurori1_566a93e97d919ed50e1c96e0/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 49 ‘Codruta Kovesi: “Anul acesta, valoarea mitelor, a foloaselor oferite si primite , este in jur de 100 de milioane de euro’. Adevarul. November 25th, 2015. http:// adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/codruta-kovesi--anul-acesta-valoarea-mitelorfoloaselor-oferite-primite-jur-100-milioane-euro-1_565597aa7d919ed50e91a80f/ index.html (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 50 ‘The Guardian: Laura Codruta Kovesi castiga trofeu dupa trofeuin lupta anticoruptie’. Adevarul. November 4th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/ the-guardian-laura-codruta-kovesi-castiga-trofeu-trofeu-lupta-anti-coruptie1_563a35c3f5eaafab2c4d448c/index.html (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 51 ‘Zgonea o lauda pe Laura Codruta Kovesi: Suntem un model in regiune pentru combaterea coruptiei’. Adevarul. November 26th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/ news/politica/zgonea-lauda-laura-codruta-kovesi-model-regiune-combatereacoruptiei-1_565726457d919ed50e9cd52e/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 52 ‘Ambasadorul Statelor Unite ale Americii la Bucuresti: “Sustin in totalitate munca doamnei Kovesi”’. Adevarul. October 20th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/news/ eveniment/ambasadorul-statelor-unite-americii-bucuresti-sustin-totalitatemunca-doamnei-kovesi-1_56260d1ef5eaafab2cd83146/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 53 ‘Laura Codruta Kovesi, in clasamentul celor mai influente personalitati din UE ‘. Adevarul. December 2nd, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/ laura-codruta-kovesi-clasamentul-celor-mai-influente-personalitati-ue1_565ecf8f7d919ed50ed14315/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 54 ‘Laura Codruta Kovesi, la Europa FM : Coruptia nu se rezolva doar cu dosare penale. Trebuie modificata legislatia’. Adevarul. December 1st, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/laura-codruta-kovesi-europafm-coruptia-nu-rezolva-doar-dosare-penaletrebuie-modificata-legislatia1_565d81c07d919ed50ec70c2e/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 55 ‘Iohannis, pentru presa franceza: Lupta anticoruptie a fost una dintre temele campaniei prezidentiale pentru ca esxita coruptie in Romania’. Adevarul.

February 7th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/iohannis-luptaanticoruptie-fost-temele-campaniei-prezidentiale-exista-coruptie-romania1_54d5df83448e03c0fd5c60cc/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 56 ‘Marturia cutremuratoare a unei asistente, despre incendiul din Colectiv : Tinerii desfigurati urlau sa ii ia’. Romania Libera. October 31st, 2015. http:// 47

172

Romania - Flavian Berneaga www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/marturia-cutremuratoare-a-uneiasistente--despre-incendiul-din-colectiv--urlau-sa-ii-iau-398169 (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 57 ‘Clubul Colectiv functiona pe baza unei delcaratii de proprie raspundere a proprietarului. Ce precizari a facut Primaria Sectorului 4’. Romania Libera. http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/clubul-colectiv-functionape-baza-unei-declaratii-pe-propria-raspundere-a-proprietarului--ce-precizari-afacut-primaria-sectorului-4-398244 . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 58 ‘O luna, 60 de morti, un effect Colectiv : Tragedia care a schimbat afaceri si a clatinat un sistem cladit pe spaga’. Adevarul. December 1st, 2015. http://adevarul. ro/economie/afaceri/o-luna-60-morti-efect-colectiv-tragedia-schimbat-afacericlatinat-sistem-cladit-spaga-1_565d7c547d919ed50ec6eb17/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 59 ‘ANALIZA Ce s-a schimbat in Romania in doua luni de la incendiul din Colectiv, cea mai mare tragedie din ultimii 25 de ani’. Adevarul. December 30th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/analizA-s-a-schimbatromania-doua-luni-tragedia-colectiv-cea-mai-mare-tragedie-ultimii-25-ani1_5683c76637115986c6f7a8b2/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 60 ‘UPDATE Galatenii au protests si sambata seara impotriva clasei politice : « E pacat ca suntem tot mai putini »’. Adevarul. November 7th, 2015. http://adevarul. ro/locale/galati/galatenii-anunta-vor-protesta-sambata-seara-clasei-politicemobilizarea-facebook-1_563ddf6cf5eaafab2c61d5e5/index.html (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 61 ‘Romania in strada pentru a patra zi la rand. Peste 3000 de oameni au iesit sa protesteza la Iasi si Galati.’. Adevarul. November 6th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/ news/eveniment/live-text-romania-strada-patra-zi-rand-protestele-organizatefacebook-28-orase-tarii-1_563c9106f5eaafab2c5af725/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 62 ‘Proteste antisistem: ziua a cincea, Targu-Mures.’. Adevarul. Novemner 9th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/locale/targu-mures/proteste-antisistem-ziua-cinceatargu-mures-1_563f2b19f5eaafab2c689f95/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 63 ‘Premierul Victor Ponta a demisionat. Primele reactii si propuneri’.

Romania Libera. http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/ponta-sper-ca-depunerea-mandatului-meu-sa-satisfaca-asteptarile-celor-care-auprotestat-398514 . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 64 ‘Mesajul lui Victor Ponta pe Facebok, la cateva ore dupa demisie’. Romania Libera. http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/mesajul-lui-victorponta-pe-facebook--la-cateva-ore-dupa-demisie-398613 . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 65 ‘Basescu: Iohannis vrea sa-l desemneze pe Ciolos premier, consultarile sunt pentru imagine’. Adevarul. November 7th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/ basescu-iohannis-vrea-sa-l-desemneze-ciolos-premier-consultarile-imagine1_563db3fef5eaafab2c60f089/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 173

Messages in the Media ‘Reactie la cald: De ce va disparea Oprea definitiv si cine castiga din demisia lui Ponta’. Romania libera. November 4th, 2015. http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/ editorial/reactie-la-cald--de-ce-va-disparea-oprea-definitiv-si-cine-castiga-dindemisia-lui-ponta-398521 . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 67 ‘Judecatorii au motivate arestarea lui Piedone:”Nepasarea si indiferenta au costat zeci de vieti omenesti. Avocati : are probleme cardiace.’ Adevarul.

November 9th, 2015. http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/judecatorii-motivatarestarea-piedone-nepasarea-indiferenta-costat-zeci-vieti-omenesti-avocatiprobleme-cardiace-1_5640b359f5eaafab2c70b02e/index.html . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 68 ‘Cristian Popescu Piedone, primele declaratii dupa demisie’. Romania Libera.

November 4th, 2015. http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/cristianpopescu-piedone--primele-declaratii-dupa-demisie-398535 . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 69 ‘Primarul PIEDONE DEMISIONEAZA si el: Imi asum aceasta vina morala.

Am demisionat. Onoarea trebuia sa fie in prima zi.’ Gandul. November 4th, 2015. http://www.gandul.info/tragedia-din-clubul-colectiv/primarul-piedonedemisioneaza-si-el-imi-asum-aceasta-vina-morala-am-demisionat-onoareatrebuia-sa-fie-in-prima-zi-14873460 . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 70 ‘Piedone: Este o greseala ca nu mi-am dat demisia in prima zi de la tragedia de la Colecti’. Gandul. November 4th, 2015. http://www.gandul.info/stiri/piedoneeste-o-greseala-ca-nu-mi-am-dat-demisia-in-prima-zi-de-la-tragedia-dincolectiv-14873695 . (Date Accessed: January 11th, 2016) 66

174

CROATIA

By Nicole Belošević

Jutarnji List: Founded in 1998. Owned by EPH. Daily circulation of 110,000.

Dnevnik.hr: Founded in 2006. Owned by CME Media Enterprise BV. Vecernji List: Founded in 1950. Owned by Styria AG. Daily circulation of 100,000.

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

175

Messages in the Media The three major issues covered by Croatian media in 2015 regarding Croatia-EU relations were: the 2015 parliamentary election, the shift in domestic demographics on account of economic strain, and the Syrian migrant crisis.

The 2015 Croatian Parliamentary Elections The 2015 parliamentary elections marked the first national election held within the state since Croatia’s entry into the European Union in 2013. With no party having won a clear majority, talks ensued between parties about a possible coalition government.1 The incumbent, center-left Social Democratic Party (SDP) and its allies, under the leadership of Zoran Milanovic, sought a coalition with the Most Party, which became the third strongest parliamentary group holding a total of 19 seats.2 However, while a majority of Croatians supported the idea, the Most Party, under the leadership of Bozo Petrov, chose to align themselves with Tomislav Karamarko’s right-wing Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).3 Having won a total of 56 seats, the HDZ party was able to use their diaspora votes to edge out the SDP with 59 seats. Despite the coalition formation, no bloc managed to obtain the number of seats necessary to declare a clear parliamentary majority.4 Prior to deciding their position, the Most Party, who at the time were in a ‘kingmaker’ position, engaged in talks with both the SDP-led coalition Hrvatska Raste (Croatia Is Growing) and the HDZ-led Domoljubna Koalicija (Patriotic Coalition).5 The party sought to discover which group would be most effective in forming a stable, quality government that could contribute effectively to repairing Croatia’s fragile economy.6 The Most Party, who campaigned on a neoliberal program to reduce state economic regulations and implement EU targets aimed at reducing the national deficit, had two main requests: the regulatory reformation of the energy and agriculture sectors, and the introduction of more effective environmental protection laws.7 Economically, the Most Party sought to downsize and simplify local governments by insisting on the amalgamation of smaller local communities, and those unable to financially support themselves, into bigger regional units and calling on the election of fewer local officials.8 This restructuring is scheduled to be completed within 2016.9 On the environmental front, they requested a moratorium on all explorative and extractive activities surrounding the natural resources within the Adriatic Sea until substantive scientific research is conducted on their environmental impact.10 The Most Party is also seeking gradual systematic changes in how Croatia monitors its pollution levels – requesting that the EU provide increased funds for the purpose of modernizing domestic pollution monitoring technologies.11 The lack of a cohesive government majority, however, has led to an ongoing political stalemate. As it stands, President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic is the only Croatian official whose role is deemed stable and functioning, and thus the only individual who can be expected to hand out decisive orders.12 With legislation becoming that much more difficult to draft, amend, and approve, 176

Croatia - Nicole Belošević the nation remains unable to effectively govern itself, especially where Syrian refugees are concerned. Used as a stepping stone into Western Europe, Croatia has experienced a large number of incoming refugees, some of whom have been unable to pass into the now heavily monitored Schengen Zone, and have instead chosen to simply resettle in Croatia.13 As such, they are in desperate need of comprehensive legislation designed to address the problem, which has begun to take its toll on the nation’s finances.14 The Shift in National Demographics on Account of Economic Uncertainty Croatia’s debt levels are astronomically high, placing the nation among the top twenty most indebted countries worldwide.15 While this is troubling, Croatia’s ranking is unlikely to change anytime soon, as it continues to borrow money in order to pay off existing debt.16 Exacerbated by ongoing political deadlock, Croatia’s failing economy has prompted mass emigration among the nation’s youth.17 Over the past five years, more individuals have left the state than have entered.18 Coupled with declining birth rates, the data proves unsettling – if rates remain the same, the Croatian population is expected to drop by an overwhelming 30 percent over the next thirty-five years.19 Of those leaving the nation, most are heading for cities in the center of Western Europe, where they seek better education and employment opportunities.20 In response, many EU states have welcomed the incoming flow of Croatian migrants by reducing travel barriers. As of July 2015, 22 EU states eliminated the employment visa requirement for incoming Croatians.21 Of those immigrating, a significant portion are young professionals, specifically doctors and specialists – individuals who are able to earn up to 10 times the salary they receive in Croatia, with many facing either equal or lower living costs than before.22 With 26,000 Croatian immigrants settled just last year, Germany remains the most popular destination.23 In response, some Croatian companies have begun offering young professionals fast-track mentorship programs with guaranteed job placements.24 However, despite these efforts, the European Commission predicts that, within seven years, approximately 166,000 to 217,000 Croatian workers will have left the country.25 Similarly, the Central Bureau of Statistics reports that, by 2051, Croatia’s population could very well fall to just over three million.26 The Impact of the Syrian Migrant Crisis on Croatia On September 16, 600 Syrian refugees boarded a train to Zagreb, bringing the total number of Croatian-bound migrants to 1,300.27 Interior Minister Ranko Ostojic declared Croatia was only equipped to handle an additional 1,800 refugees, but with the closing of the Serbian-Hungarian border, Croatia became the only unabridged path out of the region and into Western Europe.28 As such, in the day following the closure, several buses carrying 177

Messages in the Media incoming refugees were redirected from the Serbian town of Sid to the Croatian region of Tovarnik.29 Within a week, over 60,000 refugees had crossed into Croatia.

Unequipped to deal with the rising number of migrants, Zagreb and Belgrade began engaging in a ‘tug of war’ of sorts, with each believing that the other was not taking in their fair share of migrants. The Croatian Prime Minister, Zoran Milanovic, believed that Serbia was not working to effectively handle its refugee flows, and thus redirecting all of its migrants to Croatia.30 In response, Croatia proceeded to block the flow of migrants entering through the SerbianCroatian border, and put a halt to the transport of all Serbian cargo carriers.31 In response, the Serbian Foreign Minister, Ivica Dacic, assured Croatia that Serbia was doing all it could to remedy the situation and called for EU assistance in the matter.32 Regionally, however, the blame was being placed on Croatia – with both Slovenia and Bosnia declaring that the state had not done enough to stabilize the situation within and around its borders.33 The sentiment was echoed by Hungary, which, on October 16, stopped accepting Croatian trains and began building a wire fence around its borders.34 Hungary’s decision led to further complications, as Croatia had counted on them to accept a portion of the migrant flows that had come from Serbia.35 In response, Slovenia also put up a fence around its Croatian border – a move that both threatens the tourism industry and jeopardizes years of EU investment in cross-border cooperation.36 Year in Review The results of the 2015 parliamentary elections had far-reaching consequences for Croatian society, with the resulting coalitions formed unable to break the political deadlock that has since ensued. Having aligned themselves with the HDZ party and, historically, ending the four-year rule of the SDP led coalition, the Most Party was able to push through a distinct and comprehensive set of reforms.37 Both Bozo Petrov, the leader of the Most Party, and Tomislav Karamarko, the leader of the HDZ, will serve as Croatian deputy Prime Ministers.38 Both also agreed that Croatia’s next Prime Minister must be nonpartisan, if they are to be considered legitimate and be able to call for national cooperation.39 However, the Patriotic Coalition and the Most Party have stressed that they are only in cooperation with one another, and have not entered into an official coalition. Intent on rejuvenating Croatia’s political landscape, the two appointed Tihomir Oreskovic as the new Prime Minister.40 After five rounds of consultations, Oreskovic gained the full confidence of President Kolinda GrabarKitarovic and was allowed to establish a government – one which is tasked with tackling Croatia’s high levels of debt, their increasing deficits, and a struggling economy.41 In response to their economy’s stagnation, many Croatians have chosen to leave the state and move to Western Europe, a decision made easier when several EU states removed work-visa restrictions on Croatia. Cities in Germany, 178

Croatia - Nicole Belošević Austria, and Ireland will continue to experience the biggest influx of Croatian migrant workers who are looking for better opportunities. Current predictions are that more and more people are going to keep leaving the country if the Croatian economy continues to struggle. This ‘brain drain’ effect will leave Croatian companies with an ever-smaller pool of young and educated workers, who are sorely needed to boost productivity and institute modernizing reforms.

However, the current unstable and unpredictable political situation makes this unlikely to happen soon.

Between September 16 and the end of December, more than 157,000 migrants entered Croatia in hopes of reaching their desired destinations in Western Europe, which has become more difficult in the winter months.42 Winter reception centers, that were organized across railway stations so that refugees do not have to spend time outdoors, were well coordinated and many migrants applied for asylum in Slovenia.43 The number of migrants that entered Croatia to cross into Slovenia increased sharply with the closure of the Hungarian border with Serbia and Croatia, yet the reception and transit of migrants had not increased as Croatian and Slovenian authorities adjusted the speed of registrations with the influx of refugees.44 Humanitarian agencies are concerned about the possibility of a halt in the flow of refugees in Southeastern Europe due to larger waves of refugees and traffic at the border however, provided that Austria and Germany keep their doors open and do not restrict the flow of refugees, there should be limited pressures from migrants when being processed at the border.45 Although Croatia is not the main migration route to Western Europe, Croatia has had to accommodate more migrants than initially proposed under a EU plan that aimed to establish a level of cooperation and a sense of shared responsibility among all countries.46 These were kind words heard by interior ministers at a conference in Brussels on October 8; however, the declaration they plan to adopt turned a blind eye to the fact that Hungary worsened the chaos on the migrant route with the construction of a wall on the borders with Serbia and Croatia.47 Challenges will continue in the foreseeable future that at times may be more critical and financially demanding than certain domestic affairs in Croatia, which will put pressures on the government to turn to the EU in order to obtain more funds to help the country overcome the migrant crisis and other economic shortcomings.

Puljic-Sego, Iva, Marko Spoljar, Slavica Vukovic, and Velinka Buljan. “Kljuceve drzi MOST, SDP void.” Vecernji List. Nov. 16, 2015, accessed Dec. 9, 2015. http:// www.vecernji.hr/izbori2015/kljuceve-drzi-most-sdp-vodi-1037714.

2 Erdelja, Ana, Bojan Arezina, Davor Ivanov, Hina, Ivica Kristovic, Jana Persic, and Vanja Dezelic. “Rezultati DIP-a: HDZ-ova koalicija 59, SDP-ova koalicija 56, MOST 19 mandata.” Vecernji List. Nov. 8, 2015, accessed Dec. 9, 2015. http:// www.vecernji.hr/izbori2015/u-7-sati-otvorena-biralista-u-hrvatskoj-1036030/ live.

1

179

Messages in the Media Vecernji.hr. “Evo sto gradani misle tko ce biti novi premijer I kome bi zeljeli da se MOST prikolni.” Vecernji List. Nov. 12, 2015, accessed Dec. 9, 2015. http:// www.vecernji.hr/izbori2015/istrazivanje-255-gradana-misli-da-ce-premijer-bitimilanovic-a-njih-18-da-ce-to-biti-karamarko-1037211.

4 Erdelja, Ana, Bojan Arezina, Davor Ivanov, Hina, Ivica Kristovic, Jana Persic, and Vanja Dezelic. “Rezultati DIP-a: HDZ-ova koalicija 59, SDP-ova koalicija 56, MOST 19 mandata.” Vecernji List. Nov. 8, 2015, accessed Dec. 9, 2015. http:// www.vecernji.hr/izbori2015/u-7-sati-otvorena-biralista-u-hrvatskoj-1036030/ live.

5 Ibid.

6 Puljic Sego, Iva, Marko Spoljar, and Petar Maretic Zonja. “Koalicija Hrvatska raste prihvatljiv gospodarski pojas, smanjenje PDV-a, manji brpj opcina I gradova.” Vecernji List. Nov. 29, 2015, accessed Dec. 5, 2015. http://www.vecernji. hr/izbori2015/koaliciji-hrvatska-raste-prihvatljiv-gospodarski-pojas-smanjenje-stope-pdv-a-te-manji-broj-opcina-i-gradova-1041062.

7 Matljevic, Bozena, Diana Jurasic, Honey Gataric, Marko Spoljar, Peter Maretic Zonja. “Strucnjaci: Za drzavu bolji novi izbori nego nestabilna vlada.” Vecernji List. Dec. 2, 2015, accessed Dec. 29, 2015. http://www.vecernji.hr/izbori2015/ strucnjaci-za-drzavu-bolji-novi-izbori-nego-nestabilna-vlada-1041619.

8 Hina. “Procitajte reformske zahtjeve Mosta za poljoprivredu, zastitu okolista I energetiku.” Vecernji List. Nov. 20, 2015, accessed Dec. 9, 2015. http://www. vecernji.hr/izbori2015/most-predstavio-reformske-zahtjeve-za-poljoprivredu-zastitu-okolisa-i-energetiku-1038905.

9 Hina. “Most objavio reformske zahtjeve za lokalnu I javnu upravu.”

Vecernji List. Nov. 19, 2015, accessed Dec. 9, 2015. http://www.vecernji.hr/ izbori2015/most-objavio-reformske-zahtjeve-za-podrucje-lokalne-i-regionalne-samouprave-te-javne-uprave-1038625.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Kristovic, Ivica. “Petrov je postao sasvim druga osoba poslije sastanka s predsjednicom.” Vecernji List. Nov. 29, 2015, accessed Dec. 5, 2015. http://www. vecernji.hr/izbori2015/stipe-petrina-petrov-je-postao-sasvim-druga-osoba-poslije-sastanka-s-predsjednicom-1041036.

13 Ivkovic, Zarko. “HDZ, SDP I Most vise zanimaju fotelje nego migrantska kriza.”

Vecernji List. Nov. 14, 2015, accessed Dec. 9, 2015. http://www.vecernji.hr/izbori2015/hdz-sdp-i-most-vise-zanimaju-fotelje-nego-migrantska-kriza-1037429.

14 Ibid.

15 Kuljis, Denis. “Trebamo sjekiru, blage reforme nisu dovoljne. Povecati produktivnost I place. I hitno prodati sva javna poduzeca.” Jutarnji List. Dec. 27, 2015, accessed Dec. 29, 2015. http://www.jutarnji.hr/trebamo-sjekiru--blage-reforme-nisu-dovoljne/1486574/.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 HPB. “Mladi odlaze zbog hrvatskog pesimizma.” Vecernji List. Jul. 2, 2015, accessed Nov. 29, 2015. http://www.vecernji.hr/hpb-mojefinancije/mla3

180

Croatia - Nicole Belošević di-odlaze-zbog-hrvatskog-pesimizma-1012730.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Krajinovic, Jospia. “Prijeti jos veci odlazak mladih iz Hrvatske.” Dnevnik.hr. Jul. 2, 2015, accessed Nov. 29, 2015. http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/od-danas-se-hrvati-bez-ogranicenja-zaposljavaju-u-22-zemlje-eu---391344.html.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 PR article. “Mladi I obrazovani imaju sansu I u Hrvatskoj.” Vecernji.hr. Jun. 29, 2015, accessed Nov. 29, 2015. http://www.vecernji.hr/gospodarstvo/mladi-i-obrazovani-imaju-sansu-i-u-hrvatskoj-1012240.

25 Ibid.

26 HPB. “Mladi odlaze zbog hrvatskog pesimizma.” Vecernji List. Jul. 2, 2015, accessed Nov. 29, 2015. http://www.vecernji.hr/hpb-mojefinancije/mladi-odlaze-zbog-hrvatskog-pesimizma-1012730.

27 Dnevnik.hr. “Ostojic: Imamo potpunu kontrolu.” Dnevnik.hr. Sep. 16, 2015, accessed Dec. 29, 2015. http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/vozacima-receno-da-se-ne-zaustavljaju-autobusi-s-izbjeglicama-preusmjereni-prema-hrvatskoj---408737.html.

28 Bradaric, Branimir, Davor Ivanov, Ivica Kristovic, Marina Borovac, Suzana Lepan Stefancic, and Tea Romic. “U Hrvatsku uslo vise od tisucu izbjeglica. Vlak iz Tovarnika sprema se za Zagreb.” Vecernji List. Sep. 16, 2015, accessed Dec. 29, 2015. http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/izbjeglice-pred-hrvatskom-prvi-autobus-stigao-u-sid-1025015.

29 Transylvania, Ana, Ivica Kristovic, and Mia Buva. “Svjetski mediji I mediji iz regije hvale postupanje Hrvatske prema izbjeglicama.” Vecernji List. Sep. 16, 2015, accessed Dec. 29, 2015. http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/strani-mediji-o-izbjeglicama-prve-grupe-stigle-u-hrvatsku-1025030.

30 Ibid.

31 Hina. “Globalni odjeci Hrvatsko-Srpskih Napetosti.” Jutarnji List. Sep. 24, 2015, accessed Dec. 29, 2015. http://www.jutarnji.hr/globalni-odjeci-hrvatsko-srpskih-napetosti-svi-strani-mediji-pisu-o-narusenim-odnosima---ovako-nije-bilo-od-milosevica-/1424856/.

32 Hina. “Bijes u Sloveniji I BiH zbog zatvorene granice sa Srbijom.” Jutarnji List.

Sep. 24, 2015, accessed Dec. 29, 2015. http://www.jutarnji.hr/slovenija-i-bih-javno-kritiziraju-hrvatsku-vladu-i-premijera--sto-je-sljedeci-potez--da-stavi-vojsku-na-granicu-i-proglasi-mobilizaciju--/1424975/.

33 Ibid.

34 Š.D., and BV. “Madarska zatvorila granicu- U posljednjem vlaku velik broj iscrpljene I bolesne djece.” Dnevnik.hr. Oct. 17, 2015, accessed Dec. 29, 2015. http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/izbjeglicka-kriza-madjarska-zatvorila-granicu-s-hrvatskom-propustene-zadnje-izbjeglice---412688.html.

35 Ibid.

36 Vlainic, Vibor and Barbara Strbac. “Nimalo lijep prizor uz tablu dobrodoslice na brojnim jezicima doceka ih zilet zica.” Dnevnik.hr. Dec. 13, 2015, accessed 181

Messages in the Media Dec. 29, 2015. http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/slovenija-hrvatskoj-dijeli-zilet-zicu-uzduz-granice-u-istri---419685.html.

37 Hina, Ivica Kristovic, Tea Romic. “Petrov: Vrata za Domoljubnu koaliciju su zatvorena. Milanovic: Ja sigurno necu biti premijer.” Vecernji List. Dec. 19, 2015, accessed Dec. 29, 2015. http://www.vecernji.hr/izbori2015/u-1430-novi-sastanak-mosta-s-hdz-om-i-sdp-om-1046150.

38 Ivankovic, Davor and Hina. “Karamarko: Jos uvijek moguc dogovor Mosta i HDZ-ove koalicije.” Vecernji List. Dec. 22, 2015, accessed Jan. 5, 2016. http:// www.vecernji.hr/izbori2015/karamarko-sve-je-na-predsjednici-no-nismo-protiv-bipartitne-vlade-s-mostom-1046838.

39 Hina, Vanja Nezirovic, and Tomislav Kukec. “Prvi govor mandantara Tihomira Oreskovica.” Jutarnji List. Dec. 23, 2015, accessed Jan. 5, 2016. http://www.jutarnji.hr/predsjednica--gospodin-oreskovic-me-uvjerio-da-ima-potporu-78-zastupnika--povjeravam-mu-mandat--oreskovic--ovdje-smo-svi-da-sluzimo-gradanima-/1484960/.

40 B.V/M.G. “Zavrsen sastanak u MOST-u: Odlucili se za nestranackog mandatara.” Dnevnik.hr. Dec. 23, 2015, accessed Jan. 5, 2016. http://dnevnik.hr/ vijesti/hrvatska/ispred-sredisnjice-mosta-jutros-osvanuli-lampioni-i-stolica---420760.html?icn=site-navigation&ici=articles.

41 Hina, Vanja Nezirovic, and Tomislav Kukec. “Prvi govor mandantara Tihomira Oreskovica.” Jutarnji List. Dec. 23, 2015, accessed Jan. 5, 2016. http://www.jutarnji.hr/predsjednica--gospodin-oreskovic-me-uvjerio-da-ima-potporu-78-zastupnika--povjeravam-mu-mandat--oreskovic--ovdje-smo-svi-da-sluzimo-gradanima-/1484960/.

42 B.V. “Izbjeglice u Hrvatskoj: Priprema se zimski tranzitni centar u Slavonskom Brodu.” Dnevnik.hr. Dec. 10, 2015, Accessed Jan. 9, 2016. http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/izbjeglice-u-hrvatskoj-opatovac-i-dalje-na-dan-pristize-cetiri-pet-tisuca-novih-izbjeglica---412087.html.

43 D.D.M and M.B.D. “U Slavonski Brod Stizu Migrantima.” Dnevnik.hr. Nov. 11, 2015, accessed Dec. 23, 2015. http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/izbjeglice-u-hrvatskoj-u-slavonski-brod-stigao-prvi-vlak-s-migrantima---414889.html.

44 D.S. “Austrija Dnevno Prima 1.500 a Hrvatska Zeli Slati 5.000Izbjeglica.”

Dnevnik.hr. October 18, 2015, accessed Oct. 26, 2015. http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/ hrvatska/izbjeglice-cekaju-u-autobusima-ulazak-iz-srbije-u-hrvatsku---412797. html.

45 Ibid.

46 Krasnec, Tomislav. “Bruxelles ce opomenuti Hrvatsku jer krsi obveze I ne registrira izbjeglice.” Vecernji List. Oct. 6, 2015, accessed Oct. 26, 2015. http://www. vecernji.hr/hrvatska/bruxelles-ce-opomenuti-hrvatsku-jer-krsi-obveze-i-ne-registrira-izbjeglice-1028985.

47 Ibid.

182

SERBIA

By Luka Pavicic

Politika: founded in 1904. Owned by Politika and East Media Group. Daily circulation of 125,000.

Vreme: founded in 1990. Owned by NP Vreme. Daily circulation of 6,000.

Blic: founded in 1996. Owned by Ringer Axel Springer Media AG. Daily circulation of 150,000.

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

183

Messages in the Media Throughout 2015, the three topics most covered by Serbian media sources were: the Syrian refugee crisis, Serbian-Russian relations, and SerbiaKosovo relations.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis Being a West Balkan state, Serbia is seen by many European migrants as a prime passage into Western Europe.1 As such, flows of migrants have been sweeping into the nation through the Serbian-Hungarian border. In June 2013, as many as 130 people were making the crossing per day.2 In June 2015, Serbia received 9,000 asylum applications from landed refugees, adding to the 31,500 individuals that had already arrived over the past year, as reported by Politika.3 However, of those applications, the Ministry of the Interior only accepted 362.4 With the number of migrants rising, Hungarian officials plan to build a 174 kilometer-long wall between themselves and their Serbian neighbors, an obstacle which incoming refugees are rushing to avoid.5 However, despite both the increasing number of passing migrants, and Serbia’s infrastructure plans, Serbian officials, such as the Director of the Asylum Protection Centre in Serbia, Radoš Đurović, believe that “Serbian citizens offer warmer relations [to migrants] compared to the citizens of the EU.”6 The Director also noted that such hospitable behaviour should and will continue, so long as the government continues to control the flow of individuals entering, and the media does not sensationalize the issue. All in all, Serbia is proud of its management of the situation, as highlighted by the Minister of Labour, Employment, Housing and Social Issues, Mr. Aleksandar Vulin’s praise of the government’s “exceptional” humane treatment of incoming migrants, despite a lack of outside assistance and the slow reaction of international organizations.7 In line with Serbia’s commitment to accept and settle in as many refugees as feasibly possible, Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić announced the opening of two new refugee centers this past September. The centers are meant to help accommodate incoming refugees and to provide them with care throughout the winter.8 Vučić said that Serbia wants to be part of a “European solution” and is ready to take responsibility, despite not being a member of the EU.9 Response efforts have varied greatly thus far, not only between the EU and Serbia, but also among the EU member states themselves. Without a comprehensive European migrant policy in place, tensions between EU states have been rising.

In August, Croatia closed the commonly used migration routes from Serbia to Croatia which harmed Serbian-Croatian relations and led to a suspension in overland trade between the two states.10,11 Critical of the Serbian government’s openness towards the passage of migrants to Europe, Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanović stated that “Serbia should operate like a sovereign state” and not allow the free passage of migrants though its borders.12 Furthermore, in response to Serbia’s anger over the closure of Serbian-Croatian travel routes, the Croatian Prime Minister noted that Serbia could not retaliate, even if it wanted to, as Croatia is an EU member and any action against them 184

Serbia - Luka Pavicic would cause backlash from the EU.13 This sentiment was consistent with a statement made by a European Commission spokesman, who said, “it’s the right of every EU country to decide how it will manage its borders” with non-EU neighbors.14 In response, Prime Minister Vučić maintained that Serbia’s actions remain in the best interest of both Serbia and its migrants, and that Serbia will continue to uphold international commitments and act in accordance with European values. The Prime Minister deemed Serbia the first country through which migrants passed where they were treated in a “serious, responsible, proper and humane manner,” and he also referred to the closure of the Serbian-Croatian border to Serbian commercial vehicles as a “brutal attack” and a “forceful attempt to ruin the Serbian economy.”15,16 Despite his dismay, the Serbian Prime Minister reiterated in his September statements in Blik, a Swiss journal, that the Syrian refugee crisis is a European problem requiring a single and comprehensive policy solution.17 He said that the crisis should be approached “seriously and humanely,” adding that ‘Serbia will never raise barbed wire or walls.”18 He also maintained that while Serbia and Hungary had implemented different strategies, the two states still enjoyed good relations.19 After an Amnesty International report highlighted that Serbia had become a destination for refugees who had been rejected by the EU, however, Prime Minister Vučić insisted at a meeting of European leaders, that his state would not become a dumping ground for rejected asylum seekers.20,21 At the end of the year, a Vreme report on the refugee crisis concluded that 2015 was Serbia’s “first big year of migrants.”22 The crisis, they claimed, could only be solved through a coordinated response employed by the United Nations in accordance with the international community.

The Evolving Relationship Between Serbia and Russia In March, MEP Tanja Fajon criticized Serbia’s unwillingness to follow the EU’s lead and impose economic sanctions on Russia.23 The United Nations, Fajon maintained, understands the “traditional ties and strong relationship Serbia has with Russia,” however she stated that as a candidate state, Serbia is still expected to harmonize its foreign policy with that of the EU.24 The EU was particularly critical of Serbia’s decision to continue to transport Russian gas through its borders. The Serbian Vice President, Ivica Dačić, however called the EU’s stance hypocritical, as he accused the EU of attempting to negotiate its own pipeline proposal with Russia. Dačić claimed that a Russian official had notified Serbia that EU leaders had secretly proposed that Russia transport their gas through pipelines in Hungary and Romania, instead of through Serbia, to create a so-called “Eastern Ring.”25 “Generally,” the Vice President continued, “when Russian gas is supposed to flow through Serbia, it is a political problem, but when it’s supposed to go to Western and Northern Europe, then it is economics and apparently has nothing to do with politics.”26 The Vice President concluded by stating that if the claims about the proposal were discovered to be true, then 185

Messages in the Media serious discussions would need to be had with the “European Commission [regarding] its relationship with Serbia.”27 In July, Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution submitted by the British government that would classify the crime committed at Srebrenica as a genocide.28 The veto was described as a “diplomatic victory” for Serbia and understood as a Russian “favour” to the state.29 However, former Serbian President Boris Tadić stated that “Serbia should not demand such actions from Russia,” as doing so only politicizes Serbia and the tragedy of Srebrenica.30,31 Later, in October, the Serbian Prime Minister visited Moscow in order to negotiate a potential arms deal with Russia. The Croatian Minister of Defence Ante Kotromanović commented that “Serbia would be unable to afford an arms deal with Russia,” and added that Serbia should decide whether it wants to be “part of Europe or [part of] the Russian Federation.”32 Serbia cannot become a member of the EU in this way, they must defend common European and EU interests, and choose which seat they wish to hold.33 Vučić said the equipment Serbia wished to purchase from Russia would be for “the defence of Serbia and will not be of an offensive type.”34 He admitted that it was “not realistic for Serbia to purchase a large amount, but that they would negotiate some purchase.”35 Vučić directed a comment at Croatia, a NATO member, when he said that no one should be raising concerns as it is “Serbia that is surrounded by NATO countries” and that Serbia has “stayed silent as neighboring countries have received everything from attack helicopters and armored vehicles to Howitzers.”36 In June, two reports examining Serbia’s relationship with the EU were released. In one of the two, an EU Commissioner declared that neglecting Serbian ascension into the EU was a mistake, as doing so leaves its interests vulnerable, and creates a void which Russia and China are all too willing to fill.37 While Russian-Serbian ties were strengthened by their 2009 “Strategic Partnership” agreement, China continues to entertain strategic aspirations in the Balkans, which threatens the EU’s influence in the region.38 The report concluded however, that the EU is Serbia’s largest investor, and so while Serbia may be seeking partners in the east, they know that their future is with the EU.39 Yet, in the second report from Stratfor, Politika maintained that Serbia would remain at a crossroads, strengthening its ties with Russia and China while at the same time pursuing EU membership.40 Serbia and Kosovo: A Stalemate During a meeting between Belgrade and Pristina in March 2015, Kosovo’s Minister of Dialogue and Deputy Prime Minister, Edita Tahiri, commented that “Serbia is aware that it will have to recognize [Kosovo’s independence] prior to entry into the EU.”41 Domestically, she continued, the Serbian government may choose to disregard the Brussels Treaty, however they must recognize that it is their international duty, and an EU policy, that they respect it.42 Yet, despite the Minister’s demands for recognition, Serbia’s position on Kosovo remains controversial, as the Serbian government insists that it will 186

Serbia - Luka Pavicic never recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state. In fact, Serbia maintains that if giving such recognition is necessary for them to become an EU member, then they no longer wish to join, as “no nation would accept such terms.”43 Tensions between the two countries were especially high when Kosovo made a bid for UNESCO membership, as Serbia felt that it deserved protection and preservation for Kosovo sites that are of historical, cultural, and/or religious significance to Kosovo Serbs.44 In support of their claim, they cited past attacks on specific cities by Kosovars, and accused the Pristina government of being unwilling to preserve such sites.45 A year-end Vreme report, however, showed that progress had been made in Serbian-Kosovar relations. Throughout the past year, the two governments negotiated agreements pertaining to the governance of Serbian-dominated Kosovar municipalities, set up electricity providers, and began negotiations to end legal barriers for vehicle insurance and to add Kosovo Serbs to government police forces.46 Kosovo is a point of divergence between the Serbian government and the EU. In October, Doris Pack, a German politician and a former member of the European Parliament, said that Serbia is a valued member of the European community and should join the EU, but that to do that, it must have good relations with its neighbors, including Kosovo.47 The fostering of such relations, and the fight between either a de-facto Serbian recognition of Kosovo or their simply satisfying the EU’s Chapter 35 demands within the Serbian-EU ascension agreement, took precedence among Serbian officials after a multilateral meeting between themselves, the EU, and the Pristina government.48 Serbia’s Director of the Chancellery for Kosovo stated that amendments brought forward by Germany and supported by the UK and Croatia put pressure on Serbia to directly or indirectly recognize Kosovo’s independence.49 Even the greatest advocate of EU integration, Prime Minister Vučić, said “Serbia wishes to be in the EU, but will never recognize the independence of Kosovo.”50 Serbian President, Tomislav Nikolić commented on Chapter 35 stating that “the EU’s position on Kosovo and Serbia’s ascension to the union is comparable to Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum in 1914.”51 Ivica Dačić even accused the EU of holding double standards when the European External Action spokeswoman Maja Kocijančić stated that it must improve its treatment of its Albanian minority, while the EU called an infringement of Serbian language rights an internal matter.52 Despite some of the commentary, Serbia’s sustained commitment towards Europeanization and normalization of relations with Kosovo in 2015 suggests progress for the year to come.

Year in Review 2015 was a challenging year for Serbian-EU relations, as portrayed in their disputes over Kosovo’s independence, Serbia’s ties to Russia, and the response to the Syrian refugee crisis. However, while both parties have a long way to go on these issues, progress was made between Kosovo and Serbia in 2015.

Despite attempts to counter Kosovan diplomacy abroad, at a meeting in Brussels 187

Messages in the Media this past year, Serbia did agree to the establishment of Chapter 35 as a necessary requirement of Serbian-EU ascension. The Serbian Minister of Relations with the EU, Jadranka Joksimović, consequently stated that “the opening of Chapter 35 is an important political signal that the EU has recognized Serbia as a stable partner.”53 Thus, Serbia’s desire to normalize relations with the Pristina government, a desire that materialized in 2015, is poised to continue in 2016.

This past year, Serbian relations with Russia also shifted, as the nation attempted to balance their desire to maintain Russia as an ally with their desire to please EU officials. While Russia has been a key asset in Serbia’s diplomatic relations, Serbian officials were focused on their goal of entering the EU. The balancing of interests, however, while a defining characteristic of 2015, may become that much more difficult in 2016, as Serbia’s geological position shifts to reflect the non-aligned politics of the former Yugoslav Federation.54 However, while Kosovo’s potential ascension into the EU and Serbia’s close relationship with Russia were bound to create friction in Serbian-EU relations, the Syrian refugee crisis was an unexpected burden that only deepened the Serbia-EU divide. For Serbia, the solution to the refugee crisis must be a comprehensive, EU-wide policy. Therefore, while Serbian officials feel confident and satisfied with their domestic agenda regarding incoming refugees, they continue to advocate for international cooperation on the issue. Yet, despite the challenges faced, Serbia remains steadfast in their desire to join the EU, as expressed by Prime Minister Vučić who seeks to finish the necessary “heavy reforms [required by the EU] before the end of 2019.”55 “udavilo se na stotine izbjeblice.” Vreme. 19 Apr. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1290493 2 Ibid.

3 “Судбина миграната – задња пошта Србија.” Politika. 25 Jun. 2015, accessed 26 Dec. 2015. http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/331378/Sudbina-migranata-zadnja-posta-Srbija 4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Đorđević, Katarina. “Srbija na testu gostoprimstva.” Politika. 10 Aug. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/335265/Tema-nedelje/ Velika-seoba-migranata-kroz-Balkan/Srbija-na-testu-gostoprimstva 7 Ibid.

8 Tanjug. “Vučić: Dva nova prihvatna centra za izbeglice u Srbiji.” Blic. 5 Sept.

2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/vucic-dva-nova-prihvatna-centra-za-izbeglice-u-srbiji/1p4zznh 9 Ibid.

10 Tanjug. “Na polju kukuruza: Hrvatska policija zaustavila izbeglice iz Srbije.”

Blic. 18 Oct. 2015, accessed 26 Dec. 2015. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/ na-polju-kukuruza-hrvatska-policija-zaustavila-izbeglice-iz-srbije/qrkeblm 11 Ibid.

12 “Blokada Tovarnika.” Vreme. 23 Sept. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://www.

1

188

Serbia - Luka Pavicic vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1329575 13 Ibid.

14 Turudić, Momir. “Brisel suzama ne veruje.” Vreme. 24 Sept. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1329643 15 “Blokada Tovarnika.” Vreme. 23 Sept. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://www. vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1329575 16 Turudić, Momir. “Brisel suzama ne veruje.” Vreme. 24 Sept. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1329643 17 Tanjug. “Vučić: Dva nova prihvatna centra za izbeglice u Srbiji.” Blic. 5 Sept.

2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/vucic-dva-nova-prihvatna-centra-za-izbeglice-u-srbiji/1p4zznh 18 Tanjug. “Vučić: Dva nova prihvatna centra za izbeglice u Srbiji.” Blic. 5 Sept.

2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/vucic-dva-nova-prihvatna-centra-za-izbeglice-u-srbiji/1p4zznh 19 Ibid.

20 Beta. “Amnesti: Srbija i Makedonija ponor za izbeglice koje Evropska unija neće.” Blic. 7 Jul. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/amnesti-srbija-i-makedonija-ponor-za-izbeglice-koje-evropska-unija-nece/etxjl43 21 Tanjug. “Vučić: Srbija neće biti tampon zona za izbeglice.” Blic. 25 Nov. 2015, accessed 4 Jan. 2016. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/vucic-srbija-nece-biti-tampon-zona-za-izbeglice/6dchvz3 22 Stupar, Ivan. “Godina izbeglica za nama i ispred nas.” Vreme. 24 Dec. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1352704 23 Politika. “Fajon: EU očekuje da Srbija postepeno uvodi sankcije Rusiji.” Blic. 24 Mar. 2015, accessed 4 Jan. 2016. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/fajon-eu-ocekuje-da-srbija-postepeno-uvodi-sankcije-rusiji/399fbr5 24 Politika. “Fajon: EU očekuje da Srbija postepeno uvodi sankcije Rusiji.” Blic. 24 Mar. 2015, accessed 4 Jan. 2016. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/fajon-eu-ocekuje-da-srbija-postepeno-uvodi-sankcije-rusiji/399fbr5 25 “Дачић: ЕУ нудила Русији да гасоводом заобиђе Србију.” Politika. 18 Jun. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/330852/DacicEU-nudila-Rusiji-da-gasovodom-zaobide-Srbiju 26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Črajak, B. “Ruski veto zaustavio britansku rezoluciju.” Politka. 8 Jul. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/332589/Ruski-veto-zaustavio-britansku-rezoluciju 29 Ibid.

30 Šoljić, Sanja. “Srebrenica, dvadeset godina kasnije.” Vreme. 11 Jul. 2015, accessed 26 Dec. 2015. http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1312945 31 Ibid.

32 Beta. “Kotromanović: Kupovina oružja od Rusije za Srbiju je nemoguća misija.”

Blic. 30 Oct. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/kotromanovic-kupovina-oruzja-od-rusije-za-srbiju-je-nemoguca-misija/w1s22z9 33 Ibid.

189

Messages in the Media Tanjug. “Vučić u Moskvi: Oružje nabavljamo da bismo zaštitili Srbiju.”

Blic. 28 Oct. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/ vucic-u-moskvi-oruzje-nabavljamo-da-bismo-zastitili-srbiju/3yrc2pt 35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 “ЕУ Обзервер: Не препуштајте Србију Русији и Кини.” Politika. 29 Mar. 2015, accessed 26 Dec. 2015. http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/323180/EU-Obzerver-Ne-prepustajte-Srbiju-Rusiji-i-Kini 38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 “Стратфор: Запад спречава руски гас и преоријентише Србију.” Politika.

2 Jun. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/329355/ Stratfor-Zapad-sprecava-ruski-gas-i-preorijentise-Srbiju 41 Beta. “Tahiri: Srbija mora da prizna Kosovo pre ulaska u EU.” Blic. 9 Mar. 2015, accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/tahiri-srbija-mora-da-prizna-kosovo-pre-ulaska-u-eu/dzh2gyd 42 Ibid.

43 Tanjug. “Nikolić: Srbija neće priznati nezavisnost Kosova zbog EU.” Blic. 8 May. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/nikolic-srbija-nece-priznati-nezavisnost-kosova-zbog-eu/p67e2zk 44 “Србија је за ЕУ празан лист папира.” Politika. 19 Oct. 2015, accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/341306/Srbija-je-za-EU-prazan-list-papira 45 Ibid.

46 “Srbija otvorila prva poglavlja.” Vreme. 15 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1350655 47 “Kosovo, najskuplje evropsko poglavlje.” Politika. 15 Oct. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/341055/Kosovo-najskuplje-evropsko-poglavlje 48 “Kriza Briselskih pregovora.” Vreme. 14 Oct. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1334692 49 Ibid.

50 “Kosovo, najskuplje evropsko poglavlje.” Politika. 15 Oct. 2015, accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/341055/Kosovo-najskuplje-evropsko-poglavlje 51 Ibid.

52 “Дачић: ЕУ опет показала двоструке стандарде.” Politika. 16 Sept. 2015, accessed 26 Dec. 2015. http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/338460/Dacic-EU-opet-pokazala-dvostruke-standarde 53 Beta. “Joksimović: Srbija ulazi u novu fazu pregovora sa EU.” Blic. 14 Dec. 2015, accessed 4 Jan. 2016. http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/joksimovic-srbija-ulazi-unovu-fazu-pregovora-sa-eu/zv7pzmr 54 Србија спремна за унапређење сарадње са Русијом.” Serbia.gov. 28 Dec. 2015, accessed 10 Jan. 2016. http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=255436 55 Bukvić, Dimitrije. “Вучић: Србија жели да заврши реформе за четири 34

190

Serbia - Luka Pavicic године.” Politika. 10 Dec. 2015, accessed 5 Jan. 2016. http://www.politika.rs/scc/ clanak/345141/Politika/Vucic-Srbija-zeli-da-zavrsi-reforme-za-cetiri-godine

191

ALBANIA

By Christine Siomou

Gazeta Shqip. Founded in 2005. Owned by Top Channel, Top Media Group, Daily circulation: 1,000.

Panorama. Founded in 1996, Ownership: Panorama Group, Irfan Hysenbelliu, Daily circulation: 2,000.

Shekulli. Founded in 1997. Owned by Koço Kokëdhima. Daily circulation: 2,167 (2012).

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

192

Albania - Christine Siomou The following three topics stood out in the media concerning AlbanianEU relations in 2015: legal reform as a prerequisite for Albanian EU membership; the construction of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP); and the refugee crisis in Europe.

Legal Reform as a prerequisite for Albanian EU membership With the fall of the Communist regime in 1991, a drastic change in Albania’s legal system took place, particularly in 1993 and 1994.2,3 A new constitution was adopted through a popular referendum on November 28, 1998.

As an EU candidate country, Albania is collaborating closely with EU member states and institutions to ensure a smooth transition to full membership.4 The European Commission’s main goal in regards to legal reform in Albania is to help create a new legislative system for the country and to ensure healthy collaboration between the older members of the EU and the candidate country.

Two conditions for Albania’s entrance to the EU are to effectively implement a series of legal reforms with the goal of decreasing both criminality and political corruption.5 Other subsidiary conditions for Albania to fulfill include: property restitution, progress on the protection of minorities, and economic and social reforms. As such, the 2013 parliamentary elections were seen as a “test of maturity” for the country, because of the election of a party that would have more favourable views toward Albania entering the European Union.6 Many changes have been made since the country received candidate status in June 2014. Firstly, Albanians have been using biometric passports since December 2010, and they can now also travel visa-free to Schengen zone countries.7 The EU and Albania concluded a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in June 2006, which was the first step towards membership.

The negotiations took three and a half years, which was fairly long compared to similar negotiations between the EU and other countries such as Croatia and Macedonia.8 Another major issue that the country is facing is the restoration of property to their original owners. The problem originates from the country’s Communist era, when all private lands became state-owned. The land was never fully and correctly returned after 1991.9 Twenty experts on the matter sat down on October 31, 2015 to discuss the legislative changes with the leader of the Special Committee on Justice Reform, Fatmir Xhafaj. He believes the opposition will be useful in this situation and added that if any further requests for changes are presented, the Commission is more than happy to accommodate them, showing good spirit for future collaboration between the opposing parties.10 The group includes members of the Prosecutor General, the School of Magistrates, the Supreme Court, the National Bar Association, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Justice as well as legislation experts from the University of Tirana. Therefore, as of 2015, there have been at least three draft laws negotiated between the Democratic Party of Albania, who are the official opposition, and the governing Socialist Party of 193

Messages in the Media Albania.11 The relationship Albania has with the other EU member states will be based on three policy instruments: the Stabilization and Association Process, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Common Security and Defense Policy.12,13,14 In light of its EU ambitions, Albania’s relationship with Greece is one where some issues still lie unresolved. The 1944 “Çam issue,” when the population in the Albanian Çameria region were subject to ethnic cleansing at the hands of the Greek army, still affects bilateral relations between the two states. To this day, no solution has been reached about the Albanian Çam populations who were deported.15 Further EU-Albania political dialogue will have to take place in order for the Çam issue to be resolved, and for closer ties between Albania and other EU members, especially Greece, to be established.

These discussions will take place within the structure of the Stabilization and Association Council (SAC), which was formalized in the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). The SAC meets once a year for an overall assessment of the SAA’s implementation, and also deals with further issues that may arise within the framework of the implementation.16

Construction of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) One of the main issues concerning Albania at the moment is the construction of a 217 kilometer-long pipeline that will begin in the summer of 2016.17 It would not only transport natural gas across Europe, benefiting the environment, but is also expected to stimulate the Albanian economy by creating new jobs and increasing foreign direct investment into the country.18 It is one of the biggest energy projects in the country and would have three gas connection points that would require approximately 2,000 workers. An estimated €500 million will enter the Albanian economy as a result of its construction.20 Mr. Bejtja has said that the decision to pursue the project is based on consensus between all political parties, even though the previous government of Sali Berisha as a leader of the Democratic Party (PD- Partia Demokratike) was responsible for its establishment.21 New energy laws were implemented in Albania after 2013 after a massive loss of $217 million US in the energy sector of the country, but in 2014 the losses were reduced by $180 million, reducing the total debt to $45 million.22 The Albanian government achieved this through a financing in the state budget of about $130 million, creating hope for Albania to reduce its debt completely and become a net energy contributor.23 The government introduced a new law about hydrocarbons and building efficiency as part of the Third Energy Package in 2014.24 The creation of such legislation can be seen a direct connection to the building of the pipeline, as the country is opening to opportunities that will help Albania progress within the social and legal boundaries of the EU. The Albanian National Territory Council (KKT) approved the first phase of TAP (CDC- Phase 1) on April 9, 2014, which is an important step in granting permission to the TAP officials to build in the country as early as 2014.24 194

Albania - Christine Siomou In order to understand the importance of this project, it is crucial to explain what the TAP is. The project is the construction of a natural gas pipeline that will transport gas from the Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan, via Greece and Albania, and then across the Adriatic Sea to reach southern Italy, and then Western Europe. It is designed to expand the transportation capacity of gas from 10 to 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, and to allow for physical reverse flow of up to 80 per cent. This will open a new Southern Gas Corridor to Europe and open up a new market of natural gas from the Caspian Sea. This movement requires the cooperation of all the countries through which the pipeline would potentially pass.25 The TAP aims to transport at least 350 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas per year.26 The country from where the natural gas project initiated, Azerbaijan, has signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ with Albania concerning the TAP’s development. The head of SOCAR (the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan), Rovnag Abdullayev, signed the MOU during the Azerbaijani delegation’s visit to Albania in December 2014, together with Albanian Minister of Energy Natig Aliyev and Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalfov. This action demonstrated the good relations between the two countries with regards to the common goal of providing Europe with natural gas.27 The construction of the pipeline will last approximately 3.5 years and will be completed by 2018.28

The refugee crisis in Europe

The current refugee crisis in Europe is a major issue for the whole continent, and for the rest of the world. Albanians understand the pain of the refugees very well, since many fled their country in 1991 to neighbouring Greece and Italy when the Communist regime fell. During that time of crisis about twenty years ago, several vessels carried about 15,000 Albanian migrants who eventually entered the port of Bari, Italy.29 The Syrian, Iranian, Iraqi, and Turkish refugees passing through Albania to reach other countries such as Germany, Sweden, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK, and Luxembourg, are doing so in search of safer living conditions for them and their families. The number reached 7,945 refugees during the summer of 2015.30 This is an extremely high number, keeping in mind Albania’s small population and relatively high poverty levels.31 The “sympathetic” reception of those who fled the war, as seen by a public poll conducted in 2014 in the UK in a sample of 1,000 people over the age of 18, approaches 45 per cent, while those with a “very sympathetic” reception is around 18 per cent.32 This demonstrates the willingness of European countries to collaborate together in order to aid those fleeing from war.33 The major issue with the refugee crisis, especially in Albania, is that most of the asylum-seekers enter the country illegally. This adds further suspicion as to how the borders are controlled by the Albanian police. Lack of border security is one of the reasons for asylum denial in Germany for applicants coming from Albania.34 According to Eurostat statistics, people with Albanian 195

Messages in the Media citizenship make up the third largest group of people who apply for asylum in Europe, after Syrians and Afghans. The number of people recorded to have applied for asylum during the second quarter of 2015 is 17,665, which is about eight percent of the total first-time asylum applicants applied in 2013.35 The number of applicants in 2015 reached over 210,000 people.36 In this difficult situation in which Europe finds itself, some countries that are already members of the EU refuse to open their borders to Syrian refugees, creating great discord among members. For example, in the summer of 2015, Hungary and Austria officially closed their borders and adopted strict policies towards refugees who used their countries as pathways to reach Germany. Jean Asselborn, Luxembourg’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, has condemned such actions as they go against the laws of the EU that bind those countries.37 Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, more than 4 million Syrians have fled their country to find shelter in neighboring countries.

Another 7.6 million still remain in Syria, but have been displaced internally from their homes.38 This crisis creates huge strain in Balkan countries, through which many refugees pass on their way to reach more developed countries such as Germany and the UK. Even though living conditions in Albania are difficult and the economic situation is tough, the country continues to welcome refugees to help them reach their final destination.

A new proposal to deal with the refugee crisis was ratified on September 14 during a meeting of the 28 EU member states’ interior ministers. It aims to move 60 percent of the refugees in Italy, Greece, and Hungary, to Germany, France, and Spain.39 Although France committed to take 24,000 migrants in two years and Spain to take another 15,000, the plan has not been welcomed by all member states.40 Poland and Romania oppose the idea, and the Czech Prime Minister does not see the plan as a good solution.41 In addition, Slovakia, who restricted their refugee acceptance to 61 Syrians in 2015, has announced that it would only admit those who are Christian. The nationalist Hungarian Prime Minister, Victor Orban, has called for the construction of a barbed wire fence along Hungary’s Serbian border to stop the influx of incoming refugees.42

2015 IN REVIEW 2015 was an eventful year for Albania-EU relations. While Albania is not yet a member state, since 2009, there have nonetheless been numerous negotiations, meetings, discussions, and legal changes that have set Albania firmly on course to enter the Union. In 2014, Albania became an official candidate for accession. The most recent changes have been in the area of legal and judicial reform, calling for a reduction in corruption and in organized crime in the country. These preparations are said to bring the country to the final stages of entrance into the EU. However, despite the high hopes of Prime Minister Edi Rama and other Albanian politicians, the country’s legal system still has a long way to go until it is able to fulfill and uphold the values laid out in the EU’s acquis 196

Albania - Christine Siomou communautaire.

The construction of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) has also been a major milestone in the evolution of the relationship Albania has with the EU. The TAP will transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Greece, which will then go through Albania, pass by southern Italy, and end up in Western Europe. As above-mentioned, this project will not only increase employment opportunities in Albania, it will also provide Albania with much-needed alternative energy sources: at the moment, the main energy sources in Albania are coal and hydropower, relying on the latter for 90 percent of its electricity.

It neither imports nor exports natural gas, so the TAP would fundamentally alter the energy market.43 A project of this scale required close cooperation with other members of the EU, such as Greece and Italy in order to approve the construction of the pipeline, and agreements were made with the head of SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan) sealing the cooperation between the Azerbaijan and Albania.44 Lastly, the concerning issue of Syrian refugees fleeing to Europe has dominated news coverage across the continent. Since many migrants and refugees pass through the Balkan countries to get further west in Europe, it has caused fear and pain both for EU member states like Greece, and candidates like Albania. The influx of asylum-seekers has led powerful countries, such as Germany, to increase their quota for accepting refugees and investing more than €60 million in the construction of shelters and medical help. Although many refugees are unsuccessful in their asylum applications, Albania generally did not hesitate to welcome those in need and aid them in completing their journey.

The Gazeta Shqip, Panorama, and Shekulli articles consulted provided similar opinions on the three matters, while external sources such as Eurostat reinforced the findings and provided trustworthy information about the current political, social, and economic crisis in Europe. Of the three topics discussed in this paper, I consider the issue of legal reform to be the most important for Albania’s eventual membership in the EU. Having said that, the Syrian refugee crisis was undoubtedly also a vital, Europe-wide issue, at both the national and European level. Overall, the media coverage analyzed in this paper reinforces the idea that Albania, although not yet an EU member state, has great potential and motivation to become a valuable part of the EU community while strictly abiding by the values and laws of the Union.

CIA World Factbook, Albania. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/al.html 2 Binder, David. “Thousands of Albanians Flee Aboard Ships to Italy.” The New York Times. March 6, 1991. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://www.nytimes. com/1991/03/07/world/thousands-of-albanians-flee-aboard-ships-to-italy.html 3 “ALBANIA.” HSW. Accessed January 2, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/HSW-01.htm 4 “Stay Connected.” European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotia1

197

Messages in the Media tions. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm.

5 “Albania: Yes to EU Candidate Status but under Certain Conditions.” European Parliament. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/ news-room/20121207IPR04413/Albania-yes-to-EU-candidate-status-but-under-certain-conditions.

6 Ibid.

7 “EU Enlargement: The next Seven - BBC News.” BBC News. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11283616.

8 Ibid.

9 “Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).” Council of Europe. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/.

10 “Reforma në drejtësi, miratohen 20 ekspertët”- Shekulli Online.” Reforma Në Drejtësi, Miratohen 20 Ekspertët. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://www.shekulli. com.al/p.php?id=207563.

11 “Council of Europe.” Venice Commission: Accessed January 5, 2016. http:// www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2015)038-e.

12 “EU Relations with the Western Balkans.” European External Action Service.

Accessed January 5, 2016. http://eeas.europa.eu/western_balkans/index_en.htm.

13 “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union.” European External Action Service. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://eeas.europa.eu/ cfsp/index_en.htm.

14 “Security and Defence - CSDP.” European External Action Service. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/index_en.htm.

15 “Greece Slams the EU Door to Albania in Maritime Dispute.” United Europe.

Accessed January 5, 2016. http://www.united-europe.eu/news-and-topics/european-topics/greece-slams-the-eu-door-to-albania-in-maritime-dispute/.

16 “Relations between Albania and the EU.” Relations between Albania and the EU. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en/mission/ eu-integration/relations-between-albania-and-the-eu.

17 “Albanian Economy to Flourish with TAP, Officials Say.” Trans Adriatic Pipeline a Good Investment for Albania. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://www. naturalgaseurope.com/ilir-bejtja-albanian-economy-and-tap-59467.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 “Albania Approves First Phase of TAP.” Albania Clears Way for Start of TAP Construction. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/albania-approves-first-phase-tap-construction.

26 “TAP Gets Nod From Albania.” Another Step Forward for TAP as Albania Signs off on Implementation Terms. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://www.natu198

Albania - Christine Siomou ralgaseurope.com/tap-gets-nod-from-albania.

27 “Azerbaijan to Increase Cooperation with Albania.” Albania and Azerbaijan Plan Gas Supply Co-operation. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/azerbaijan-albania-gas-cooperation.

28 “Vija E Gazsjellësit, 38 Komunat Ku Do Të Kalojë TAP-i - Shekulli Online.”

Vija E Gazsjellësit, 38 Komunat Ku Do Të Kalojë TAP-i. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://www.shekulli.com.al/p.php?id=19065.

29 “Wave of Misconstrued Migration.” Snopes. Accessed January 6, 2016. http:// www.snopes.com/tramp-steamer-italy-libya/.

30 “6 Infographics That Lay Bare The Brutal Reality Of Europe’s Refugee Crisis.” The Huffington Post UK. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/10/27/europe-refugee-crisis-graphics-latest-developments_n_8398868.html.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 “Migrant Crisis: Explaining the Exodus from the Balkans - BBC News.”

BBC News. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34173252.

34 “How Many Migrants to Europe Are Refugees?” The Economist. September 7, 2015. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/09/economist-explains-4.

35 “Over 210 000 First Time Asylum Seekers in the EU in the Second Quarter of 2015.” Eurostat: News Release. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/documents/2995521/6996925/3-18092015-BP-EN.pdf/b0377f79-f06d4263-aa5b-cc9b4f6a838f.

36 “Dështon Takimi I Ministrave Të Brendshëm Të BE-së Për Refugjatët - Shekulli Online.” Dështon Takimi I Ministrave Të Brendshëm Të BE-së Për Refugjatët. July 21, 2015. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://www.shekulli.com.al/p. php?id=288310.

37 “The 5 Big Questions About Europe’s Migrant Crisis.” Time. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://time.com/4026380/europe-migrant-crisis-questions-refugees/.

38 “Takimi Urgjent I Këshillit Të Evropës Për Refugjatët.” Takimi Urgjent I Këshillit Të Evropës Për Refugjatët. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://albanian.irib.ir/ lajme/bota/item/185902-takimi-urgjent-i-këshillit-të-evropës-për-refugjatët.

39 “The 5 Big Questions About Europe’s Migrant Crisis.” Time. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://time.com/4026380/europe-migrant-crisis-questions-refugees/.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 CIA World Factbook, Energy, Albania.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/al.html 44 “Azerbaijan to Increase Cooperation with Albania.” Albania and Azerbaijan Plan Gas Supply Co-operation. Accessed January 6, 2016. http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/azerbaijan-albania-gas-cooperation.

199

TURKEY

By Mertol Özaltan

Hürriyet: Founded in 1948. Owned by Doğan Media Group. Daily Circulation of 356,772.

Zaman: Founded in 1986, Owned by Feza Publications. Daily Circulation of 667,369.

Sözcü: Founded in 2007. Owned by Estetik Publishing Ltd. Daily Circulation of 282,532.

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

200

Turkey - Mertol Özaltan From these findings, the following three major topics stood out in the media concerning Turkey-EU relations in 2015: the migrant and refugee crisis, ongoing issues related to national and regional instability, and concerns over totalitarianism and corruption.

The Migrant/Refugee Crisis

Turkey has hosted millions of refugees fleeing the Syrian Civil War, and many have filled state-sponsored refugee camps along the country’s southern border. Many have also found themselves impoverished, desperate, and homeless in Turkey’s larger cities, often leading to tensions with the local community.1 The migrant crisis became a focal point for the European Union in 2015, especially during the latter half of the year. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants, mostly Syrians, poured into Europe from Turkey’s Western borders and coasts in their effort to find a better life. Events stemming from the crisis shocked the world in September 2015 in particular, when the photograph of the lifeless Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi lying dead on a Turkish beach after having drowned in the Aegean, made worldwide headlines.2,3 Turkey unfortunately continued to be a haven for human traffickers throughout 2015, profiting from the migrant crisis, as state and legal efforts have been ineffective.4,5 Sözcü referenced an Amnesty International report calling Turkey Europe’s “place of detainment” for migrants in December.6 The start of the year saw little interaction between the EU and Turkey on the issue. In February, Hürriyet reported that German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose country consistently maintained robust and generous refugee policies in the EU throughout 2015, had praised the efforts of Turkey in taking in Syrian refugees.7 Hundreds of other refugees continued to drown off of Turkish coasts throughout the year. However, the sinking of boats during the early part of 2015, with many incidents occurring in March and April,8 did not receive much attention from the EU. With that said, this may be due to their preoccupation with other events in the Mediterranean, with over a thousand people trying to reach Italy within the span of a single week in April.

The Turkish media has covered the migrant crisis extensively, often with very strong opinions. While some outlets strongly criticize the Turkish government, those same outlets also often point to a lack of responsibility on the part of the European Union. A piece in Zaman during the height of the crisis in August 2015 called the failure of the EU specifically and Europe in general to deal with the crisis as a “great shame,” due to scale of death and misery of migrants trying to reach its shores and borders.9 Overall, the migrant crisis has had major implications for EU-Turkish relations, especially during its more severe period – the latter half of 2015 – when the flow of migrants into Europe suddenly saw an exponential increase. In August, the German foreign minister, speaking on behalf of the EU, suggested that relief camps be built in Turkey as part of an effort to decrease the inflow of migrants into Europe.10 In late November, there were ongoing discussions between the EU and Turkey about how to tackle the 201

Messages in the Media crisis. On 25 November, Sözcü reported that a payment of €3 billion would be made from the EU to Turkey in an effort for the EU to help Turkey control a chaotic and growing flow of migrants and refugees into Europe.11 On the whole, the Turkish media was widely critical about the implications this payment has for EU-Turkey relations. For instance, in a December 1st opinion piece, one of Turkey’s leading liberal media figures, Ahmet Hakan, accusing the EU of bribing Turkey and burdening them with migrants that they themselves did not want.

He also commented negatively on the Turkish state for its weakness to resist.12 Yilmaz Özdil, also writing for Sözcü, in a satirical and mocking tone, described Turkey as being naive in its relationship with the EU when it comes to the migrant negotiations, and predicted that its efforts to bend to the EU’s demands will get it nowhere in its road towards EU membership.13 Overall, although the year saw plenty of interaction and agreement between Turkey and the EU on the migrant crisis, the media often remained skeptical about their ability to effectively deal with a crisis that appears to be spiralling out of control.

Ongoing National and Regional Instability

As the gateway from Europe into Asia and the Middle East, Turkey has often been a hotbed for instability, especially given its ethnic divides. This instability was manifest again in 2015. The year saw a re-flaring of the 30-yearold conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish-separatist terror group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Fueling the conflict were three terrorist attacks, all suspected to be linked to various ISIS-linked groups, which continued to fight against the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. The first attack, in June, targeted an election rally of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (the HDP), killing four. The second, in July, targeted a rally in Suruç, in support of the Kurdish-Syrian town of Kobane, which was resisting an ISIS advance, killing 32.14 The largest, in October, targeted a so-called peace rally of leftist, student, and Kurdish groups, killing over 100 people in the Turkish capital of Ankara.15 Meanwhile, accusations and revelations that the Turkish government was aiding Islamist rebels in Syria, or perhaps even ISIS, were in full swing. A particularly significant case arose in May 2015, when an opposition newspaper, Cumhuriyet, leaked a video showing the Turkish intelligence services (MIT) sending trucks of ammunition across the Syrian border disguised as humanitarian aid. Media outlets reported on this video, leading to a political fallout.16 Moreover, in November Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet, leading to tensions coming to a boil between Russia and Turkey, both on opposite sides of the raging Syrian Civil War. The latter half of the year saw a full-on military operation targeting the PKK, and by December, urban operations in many Kurdish-dominated southeastern cities.17 For a country trying to enter the EU, the events of 2015 were quite troubling.

The EU was quick to condemn the attack against the HDP rally and the Suruç attacks in June and July.18 As the PKK conflict re-flared, the EU became more concerned in August 2015 with the level of force being employed by the 202

Turkey - Mertol Özaltan Turkish army, police, and gendarmerie forces in their operations. Hürriyet reported that European Commissioner Johannes Hahn, after meeting with the head of the HDP, stated that Turkey should limit themselves to using only ‘proportional force’ against terrorists.19 In September, the European Parliament continued to urge Turkey to seek peace in the conflict.20 In October, President Erdoğan met with European Commission President Donald Tusk for a meeting on regional security issues. Erdoğan stressed that not only ISIS a terror group, but so are the PKK and PYD; that is, the autonomous, Kurdish-rule based group operating in northern Syria.21 Meanwhile, as Erdoğan refused to apologize for the shoot-down of a Russian jet in November and relations with Russia deteriorated, Donald Tusk urged for calm amidst the tensions.22,23 Media reports constantly suggested that, in its relationship with an ever more unstable Turkey, the EU has been taking a passive stance. Naturally, as a buffer zone between Europe and a war-torn Middle East, Turkey’s security is vitally important for the EU. However, 2015 has seen the interaction between the two having little effect on the issue of Turkish security and stability. Perhaps the EU is not enough of a ‘hard power’ to be influential in this issue, lacking for example NATO’s military capabilities. However, the EU continues to be critical of Turkey’s military operations against the Kurds, and has issued several appeals demanding ‘proportional force.’ What seems like an apocalyptic threat for Turks, the PKK, is perhaps considered less of an immediate threat for the EU.

Concerns over Authoritarianism and Corruption Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), who have now been in power for 13 years, have been seen as increasingly authoritarian, promoting a conservative Islamist agenda, and intolerant of anyone opposing or questioning their rule. The year saw a widespread crackdown on the judiciary, with the prosecutors dealing with the case of weapons being smuggled into Syria disguised as humanitarian aid (The MIT weapons scandal) arrested in May 2015.24 Also notable was the arrest of prosecutors in August, who were accused of leading a case against the government in a ‘coup’. The arrests happened following revelations in December 2013 of massive networks of state corruption.25 Later in November, Can Dündar and Erdem Gül, two notable journalists from Cumhuriyet, the same newspaper which exposed the MIT weapons scandal, were arrested on terror and spying charges.26 November 2015 saw the absurd story of a Turkish doctor, fired from his job and put on trial for comparing Erdoğan to Gollum from Lord of the Rings, which Erdoğan saw as insulting.27 Overall, the government pointed to parallel forces undermining their rule, in an effort to justify their crackdowns. In late October, Sözcü aired a 21-page EU report, referring to it “as a poison” for the Turkish government.

The report observed a major decline in press freedom and freedom of speech and thought, and the ever increasing politicization of the main state broadcaster, TRT.28 The EU continued to monitor the Turkish government’s seeming abuse of power throughout 2015.

203

Messages in the Media A January report by the European Commission cited that the crackdown on freedom of expression and the press in Turkey had intensified since the Gezi Park protests of 2013.29 In February, the European Parliament’s Turkey Rapporteur, Kati Piri, mentioned that Turkey’s judiciary is under “great pressure” and that the EU would soon have to come to a final decision on Turkey’s EU membership bid.30 Notably, there were forces in the EU that were deeply skeptical of eventual Turkish membership throughout 2015. Also in February, Turkey’s Minister of EU Affairs, Volkan Bozkır, claimed that the government’s crackdown on journalists linked to the Gülen movement would “have zero costs for EU ascension.”31 Zaman, due to its association with the Gülen movement, is often accused by the government of being a part of the “parallel state.” On 4 March, Zaman reported on European Parliament Vice President Alexander Lambsdorff, who dismissed the “parallel state” thesis as a conspiracy theory.32 In response to the arrests of both the MIT and corruption prosecutors, the EU once again expressed its nervousness with the levels of freedom in Turkey while stressing that the “independence of the judiciary and the rule of law is vital to democracy.”33,34 Interestingly, Zaman, once again, led the way in these reports. After coalition talks failed during the summer, when the ruling AKP lost their parliamentary majority in June elections, they soon regained their majority in a second November election, in the light of recent terror attacks and the re-intensified PKK conflict. The 1 November election, was, like those preceding it, filled with fraud accusations.35 The EU reaction was vague, not necessarily congratulating the AKP, in contrast to previous election reactions, but simply stating that it was “ready to work with the new government.”36 Throughout its rule, the AKP regime has claimed that it was paving the way for greater democratization in Turkey, but these stories consistently suggest otherwise. Overall, the persisting issues related to authoritarianism and corruption in Turkey has solidified opposition within the EU to Turkish membership, and has even caused some to doubt whether the country will be a viable partner in tackling future regional issues.

2015 in Review In brief, the events of 2015 showed signs that the relationship between the EU and Turkey, an aspiring member, continued to be on the decline.

Membership seems less and less likely, especially in an environment where the EU is concurrently facing its own crises and internal rifts. In January, President Erdoğan, speaking from Djibouti, stated that Turkey was “testing Europe,” but that Turkey was also not a “begging country,” and would be ready to pave its own way with or without EU membership.37 Although the EU and Turkey often cooperated financially and logistically on issues such as the migrant crisis, stances like Erdoğan’s paint a more skeptical and uncertain future of their relationship. Despite their cooperation on the migrant crisis, the EU’s concern over the human rights situation in Turkey, led Erdoğan to mock the EU during an October rally of Turkish diaspora supporters in Strasbourg. Citing the 204

Turkey - Mertol Özaltan mistreatment of many migrants on their journey into Europe, he asked Europe and the EU “if they had ever read the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”38 Clearly, Erdoğan showed, throughout the year, that he can be quite hostile to the EU and Europe as a whole. Other destabilizing factors are also in the works.

For instance, as the EU continues to face economic uncertainty, so does Turkey, despite its perceived growth.39,40 Indeed, throughout 2015 there was a major collapse in the value of the Turkish lira.41,42 Given this, would the EU be ready to accept another country whose economic future seems bleak while facing its own economic challenges? Furthermore, social issues also play a role, as the EU and Turkey continue to clash with each other in their stances on the Armenian Genocide.43 In April, European Commissioner Johannes Hahn stated that “Turkey’s continuing denial of the events will make EU accession much more difficult.”44 Returning to the three main issues of this year’s media analysis – the migrant crisis, national and regional instability, and Turkish authoritarianism and political corruption – all of them have contributed to Turkey’s relationship with the EU remaining tense and uncertain. In November, EU Commissioner Johannes Hahn stated that the Commission would like to re-start its relations with Turkey “from ground zero.”45 This suggests a redefining of the EU-Turkey relationship. It could mean switching from a focus on potential Turkish accession, to instead moving toward a relationship of cooperation for the EU’s own interests. Interestingly, a week after this announcement from Hahn came the EU plan to pay Turkey €3 billion to tackle the migrant crisis. This led to an outcry from the Turkish media which suggested that the EU is merely using Turkey for its own advantage. However, the year has seen a greater level of emphasis from the EU regarding Turkey’s poor human rights record, which could suggest an increasing cynicism for the future of their relations. Meanwhile, the Turkish government seems increasingly indifferent to the EU, with ministers like Bozkır dismissing potential consequences for EU relations and President Erdoğan’s brazenly taunting the EU and its member states with comments about its own disfunctionalities.

Perhaps the best outlet to describe EU-Turkey relations was Sözcü in 2015. In his lengthy December piece, Yilmaz Özdil retold the never-ending Turkish story of expectance to join the EU. He poked fun at former President Abdullah Gül constantly hinting at imminent Turkish ascension during his office, even cutting into a celebratory cake after “constructive” negotiations, as far back as 2004.46 To cap off the year, Sözcü’s 29 December article cynically described the current 2015 state of affairs, many years into the relationship. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu had excitedly rushed to a December meeting in Brussels, with speculation that he was to be welcomed to a summit of EU members. However, to his “shock,” as the newspaper writes, the meeting he was welcomed to, was only about tackling the migrant crisis.47 1

“Suriyeli çocuğa esnaftan dayak.” Hürriyet, 21 July 2015. Accessed 2 Jan. 2016.

205

Messages in the Media http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/suriyeli-cocuga-esnaftan-dayak-29603820.

2 “Işte vicdanı yerden kaldıran adam.” Hürriyet, 3 Sept. 2015. Accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/iste-vicdani-yerden-kaldiran-adam-29978196.

3 “Dünyayı sarsan fotoğrafı çeken DHA muhabiri Nilüfer Demir: O an kanım dondu.” Hürriyet, 3 Sept. 2015. Accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com. tr/dunyayi-sarsan-fotografi-ceken-dha-muhabiri-nilufer-demir-o-an-kanimdondu-29978898.

4 “Kuşadası’nda insan kaçakçılığına 3 gözaltı.” Hürriyet, 7 Oct. 2015. Accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kusadasinda-insan-kacakciligina-3gozalti-30255095.

5 “Çanakkale’de insan kaçakçılığı operasyonu.” Hürriyet, 21 Oct. 2015. Accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/canakkalede-insan-kacakciligioperasyonu-40004221.

6 “Türkiye, mülteciler için bir tutuklama merkezi.“ Sözcü, 16 Dec. 2015. Accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/uluslararasi-af-orgutundenturkiyeye-agir-suclama-1010270/.

7 “Türkiye’nin yaptıkları takdire şayan.” Hürriyet, 9 Feb. 2015. Accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkiyenin-yaptiklari-takdire-sayan-28149086.

8 “Mülteci teknesi battı: 5 ölu, 3 kayıp.” Zaman, 18 Mar. 2015. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.zaman.com.tr/_multeci-teknesi-batti-5-olu-3-kayip_2283986. html.

9 Emre Demir. “Avrupa’nın mülteci utancı.” Zaman, 20 Aug. 2015. Accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.zaman.com.tr/_avrupanin-multeci-utanci_2311624.html.

10 “Almanya’dan ‘Türkiye’ye mülteci kampı kurulsun’ önerisi” Sözcü, 28 Aug. 2015. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/almanyadanturkiyeye-multeci-kampi-kurulsun-onerisi-922230.

11 “Mülteciler için Türkiye’ye 3 milyar euro,” Sözcü, 25 Nov. 2015. Accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/multeciler-icin-turkiyeye-3milyar-euro-995078/.

12 Ahmet Hakan. “Avrupa Birliği’ne kızmamın 7 sebebi.” Hürriyet, 1 Dec. 2015.

Accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://sosyal.hurriyet.com.tr/yazar/ahmet-hakan_131/ avrupa-birligine-kizmamin-7-sebebi_40021156.

13 Yilmaz Özdil. Avrupa’da Avrupa Birliği’ne en çok giren ülke Türkiye. Sözcü, 8 Dec. 2015. Accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/yazarlar/ yilmaz-ozdil/avrupada-avrupa-birligine-en-cok-giren-ulke-turkiye-1003748/ 14 “Canlı bombada yeni iddia: Ikisi de Dokumacılar üyesi mi?” Hürriyet, 22 July 2015. Accessed 2 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/canli-bombada-yeniiddia-ikisi-de-dokumacilar-uyesi-mi-29613124.

15 “Ankara saldırısında hayatını kaybedenlerin sayısı 102 oldu.” Hürriyet, 16 Oct. 2015. Accessed 2 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ankara-saldirisindahayatini-kaybedenlerin-sayisi-102-oldu-30330346.

16 “Hükümet istifa etmeli.” Sözcü, 29 May 2015. Accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www. sozcu.com.tr/2015/gundem/hukumet-istifa-etmeli-845164/?utm_source=sm_ fb&utm_medium=free&utm_term=haber&utm_content=hukumet-istifa-etmeli845164&utm_campaign=gundem.

206

Turkey - Mertol Özaltan “SAS’lar Cizre’de.” Hürriyet, 29 Dec. 2015. Accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www. hurriyet.com.tr/saslar-cizrede-40033607.

18 “Dünya Suruç saldırısını lanetledi.” Sözcü, 21 July 2015. Accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/dunya-suruc-saldirisini-lanetledi-889161/.

19 “Terörle mücadelede ‘orantılı’ olun.” Hürriyet, 5 Aug. 2015. Accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/terorle-mucadelede-orantili-olun-29728961 20 “AP’den Türkiye: şidette son verin.” Sözcü, 15 Sept. 2015. Accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/apden-turkiye-siddete-sonverin-936237/.

21 “DAEŞ de PKK da PYD de terör örgütüdür.” Sözcü, 5 Oct. 2015. Accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/bu-endise-verici-birdurum-951535/.

22 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Rusya’dan özür dilenmeyecek. Hürriyet, 26 Nov.2015. Accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/cumhurbaskanierdogan-rusyadan-ozur-dilenmeyecek-40019306.

23 “Düşürülen Rus uçağıyla ilgili NATO’dan açıklama.” Hürriyet, 26 Nov. 2015.

Accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/natodan-dusurulen-rusucagiyla-ilgili-aciklama-40018080.

24 “MIT TIR’ları soruşturmasi: 4 savcı ve bir albay cezaevinde.” Hürriyet, 8 May 2015. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/mit-tirlari-sorusturmasi4-savci-ve-bir-albay-cezaevinde-28947305.

25 “Zekeriya Öz, Celal Kara, Mehmet Yüzgeç hakkında yakalama talebi.” Zaman, 10 Aug. 2015. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_zekeriyaoz-celal-kara-mehmet-yuzgec-hakkinda-yakalama-talebi_2310001.html.

26 “Can Dündar ve Erdem Gül tutuklandı.” Sözcü, 26 Nov. 2015. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/gundem/can-dundara-tutuklamatalebi-995825/.

27 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan‘ı Gollum’a benzeten doctor işten atıldı!” Sözcü, 17 Dec. 2015. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/gundem/ cumhurbaskani-erdogani-golluma-benzeten-doktor-isten-atildi-1011405/.

28 “Bild, AB’nin Zehir gibi Türkiye Raporunu yayınladı.” Sözcü, 31 Oct. 2015.

Accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/bild-abnin-zehirgibi-turkiye-raporunu-yayinladi-973704/.

29 “AP’den sert basın özgürlüğü uyarısı.” Hürriyet, 15 Jan. 2015. Accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ap-den-sert-basin-ozgurluguuyarisi-27970480.

30 “AP Türkiye Raportörü’nden iç güvenlik yasasına tepki: Hukuk devleti baskı altında.” Zaman, 3 Mar. 2015. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.zaman.com. tr/_ap-turkiye-raportorunden-ic-guvenlik-yasasina-tepki-hukuk-devleti-baskialtinda_2281197.html.

31 “Volkan Bozkır: Gülen operasyonlarının AB sürecine maliyeti sıfır.” Hürriyet, 6 Feb. 2015. Accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/volkan-bozkirgulen-operayonlarinin-ab-surecine-maliyeti-sifir-28134214.

32 “AP Başkan Yardımcısı: Paralel tez, komplo teorisi.” Zaman, 4 Mar. 2015.

Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.zaman.com.tr/_ap-baskan-yardimcisi-paralel17

207

Messages in the Media tez-komplo-teorisi_2281296.html.

33 “AB’den savcıların tutuklanmasına tepki: Endişeliyiz.” Zaman, 8 May 2015. Accessed 23 Jan. 2016. http://www.zaman.com.tr/_abden-savcilarintutuklanmasina-tepki-endiseliyiz_2293298.html.

34 “AB’den savcıları yakalama kararına tepki: Yargı bağımsızlığı esastır.” Zaman, 12 Aug. 2015. Accessed 27 Dec. 2015. http://www.zaman.com.tr/_abden-savcilariyakalama-kararina-tepki-yargi-bagimsizligi-esastir_2310250.html.

35 “AKP’li belediye başkanı mühürlenmiş oy pusulasının fotoğrafını paylaştı.”

Zaman, 1 Nov. 2015. Accessed 8 Dec. 2016. http://www.zaman.com.tr/ gundem_akpli-belediye-baskani-muhurlenmis-oy-pusulasinin-fotografinipaylasti_2325156.html.

36 “AB’den 1 Kasım seçimlerine ilişkin ilk açiklama.” Sözcü, 2 Nov. 2015. Accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/abden-1-kasim-secimlerineiliskin-ilk-aciklama-975314/.

37 “Erdoğan, Cibuti’den AB’ye seslendi: Türkiye kapınızda dilenecek ülke değil.”

Zaman, 24 Jan. 2015. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.zaman.com.tr/_erdogancibutiden-abye-seslendi-turkiye-kapinizda-dilenecek-ulke-degil_2273287.html.

38 “AB komisyonu: Türkiye’nin büyüme tahminini yükselti.” Hürriyet, 5 Feb. 2015.

Accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ab-komisyonu-turkiyeninbuyume-tahminini-yukseltti-28128783.

39 “Türkiye ikinci çeyrekte beklentilerin üzerinde büyüdü.” Hürriyet, 10 Sept.

2015. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkiye-ikinci-ceyrektebeklentilerin-uzerinde-buyudu-30033889.

40 “Dolar-Euro ne kadar oldu?” Hürriyet, 26 Aug. 2015. Accessed 2 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/asya-kara-pazartesi-sonrasi-yine-cakildi-cindenhamle-geldi-dolar-euro-ne-kadar-oldu-29897049.

41 “Dolar yeniden 3 lira sınırında.” Hürriyet, 14 Dec. 2015. Accessed 2 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dolar-yeniden-3-lira-sinirinda-40026892.

42 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Askeri arşivlerimizi de açmaya hazırız.” Zaman, 23 Apr. 2015. Accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.zaman.com.tr/_cumhurbaskanierdogan-askeri-arsivlerimizi-de-acmaya-haziriz_2290700.html.

43 “Türkiye’nin tepkisi AB üyelik sürecini zorlaştırır.” Hürriyet, 30 Apr. 2015.

Accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkiyenin-tepkisi-ab-uyeliksurecini-zorlastirir-28879347.

44 “Strasbourg, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan‘ı bekliyor.” Hürriyet, 3 Oct. 2015.

Accessed 8 Jan. 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/strasbourg-cumhurbaskanierdogani-bekliyor-30226856.

45 “AB, Türkiye ile ilişkilerini ‘sıfırlatmak’ istiyor” Sözcü, 18 Nov. 2015. Accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/ab-turkiye-ile-iliskilerisifirlamak-istiyor-989367/.

46 Yilmaz Özdil. Avrupa’da Avrupa Birliği’ne en çok giren ülke Türkiye. Sözcü, 8 Dec. 2015. Accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/yazarlar/ yilmaz-ozdil/avrupada-avrupa-birligine-en-cok-giren-ulke-turkiye-1003748/.

47 “Davutoğlu’na AB şoku!” Sözcü, 18 Dec. 2015. Accessed 23 Dec. 2015. http:// www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/gundem/davutogluna-ab-soku-1011797/.

208

ARMENIA

By Mariam Baghdasaryan

Armenpress. Founded in 1918. Owned by Armenpress News Agency.

Azatutyun (Armenian Liberty). Founded in 1954. Owned by RFL/EUROPE. 250,000 listeners daily.

Public Radio of Armenia: Founded in 1926. Owned by Public Radio of Armenia.

Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by Eurostat and the official European Union website (www.europa.eu).

209

Messages in the Media

In 2015, three major events that marked Armenia-EU relations were: the failure of the Association Agreement with the EU, the EU’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide, and resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Failure of the EU Association Agreement and the Negotiation of a New Armenia-EU Comprehensive Agreement

After several years of talks with the EU, on September 3, 2013, Armenia suddenly announced that it would not sign the Association Agreement negotiated between the two, instead choosing to join the Russian-led Customs Union.1 On January 2, 2015 Armenia officially became a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). It was widely believed that Armenia’s decision to join the EEU would weaken its relations with the EU, and that no offers similar to the Association Agreement would be made again. The Riga Summit that took place on May 22, 2015, however, hinted that the EU was willing to continue the process of Armenian-EU integration.2 Currently, Armenia is negotiating a new legallybinding comprehensive agreement with the EU, with official negotiations having begun in December. The latter is expected to be very similar to the Association Agreement, especially in regards to foreign policy, domestic policy, home and justice affairs, and economic/sectorial cooperation.3 There would, however, be changes regarding trade and investment regulations, in order to accommodate for Armenia’s joining the EEU.4 The new talks were widely welcomed by many EU and Armenian authorities, including President Serzh Sarkisian.5 Recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the EU and its Member States 2015 marked the centennial of the Armenian Genocide, and stood as one of the most important events of that year. The commemorations were widely covered, both domestically and internationally. Numerous events, marches, and liturgy services were organised around the world, including in most European countries, where individuals paid tribute to the memory of the victims. On April 24, representatives of at least 50 states joined Armenia’s leaders in Yerevan to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the genocide.6 This included French President François Hollande and the President of Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades, as well as the leaders of Serbia and the Russian Federation.

Amongst the commemorations, one of the most significant was the resolution passed by the European Parliament which paid tribute to victims and called on EU member states to, through the adoption of relevant domestic resolutions, both recognize and condemn the tragedy.7 It also urged Turkey to “start a genuinely transparent public debate with a view to recognising the genocide and [normalising] relations with Armenia.”8 While Turkey did not react positively, numerous European countries including Belgium, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and others did, and have since recognised or adopted such resolutions.9,10,11,12 210

Armenia - Mariam Baghdasaryan Resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Violence in the historically disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region was ongoing in 2015, but decreased slightly from 2014 levels. Despite this, challenges to the peaceful resolution of the conflict continued to arise. Various meetings took place throughout the region, as well as in several European and American cities such as Bern, Belgrade, Berlin, Washington, and New York.

The meetings, which centered on the maintenance of the cease-fire and thus the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, were held between OSCE Co-Chairs, EU representatives, and Armenian politicians. Very recently, in December, meeting were help with both the President of Armenia and the President of Azerbaijan attending, in Bern, Switzerland.

With the main negotiator involved in resolving the conflict being the OSCE Minsk Group (MG), Europe’s involvement in the matter has been and continues to be crucial. The EU has, once again, reiterated its support for the efforts of the Minsk Group and its Co-Chairs to move beyond the status quo and bring about comprehensive peace negotiations.13 This effort was also supported by the French Ambassador to Armenia, Jean-François Charpentier, who stated that the Minsk Group is an invaluable mediator in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.14 Although Germany is not among the three CoChair nations, it has always supported the group and has expressed willingness to take on a mediating role. It is expected that Germany will have a more pivotal role in the group in 2016, as it will assume the OSCE MG Presidency. As the German Federal Foreign Office Special Representative for Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia, Ambassador Andreas Peschke said, “Germany will make efforts for the conflict settlement.”15 Year in Review

2015 was an important and memorable year for Armenia. The abandonment of the EU Association Agreement (AA) did not end negotiations between the EU and Armenia; moreover, further commitments were assured in May during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga, Latvia. The European Union’s Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn stated that the EU is ready to start negotiations for a new legal framework with Armenia. This agreement will make sure to take into consideration Armenia’s other international commitments, namely its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).16 According to Sergey Minasyan, an Armenian political scientist, the legal framework is almost entirely similar to the AA; however, it will be different in that it will mention that Armenia is a member of the EEU.17 There have still not been any specific dates set for the start and completion of the talks, but the visit of Donald Tusk, European Council President, to the South Caucasus confirmed the EU’s commitment to reaching an agreement. According to Tusk, the first stage of the discussions on the new comprehensive agreement has been completed.18 211

Messages in the Media

The centennial of the Armenian genocide was widely commemorated both inside and outside Armenia. Europe has always played an important role both in condemning the atrocities and urging other states, especially Turkey, to recognize it. On April 24, delegations from around 60 countries attended centennial events, including the presidents of Cyprus, France, Serbia and Russia.19 Commemoration ceremonies were held in numerous European countries, including the Vatican, which organised a mass dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the genocide.20 Another important event was the adoption of the Armenian Genocide Resolution by the European Parliament. It called on its member states to adopt similar resolutions and recognise and condemn the phenomenon.21 The aforementioned events had positive outcomes, and several European countries and heads of state quickly followed suit. Some others, including Austria, Luxembourg, and Bulgaria officially recognised the genocide.22

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution is one of the most important aspects of Armenian-EU relations. Represented by France in the OSCE Minsk Group, the EU has a direct interest in peacefully resolving the conflict, as security and stability along its borders are one of its key aims. The ongoing situation also hampers diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, who is also a candidate for EU accession. Turkey supports Azerbaijan on the Karabakh issue and refuses to open its borders with Armenia.23 As one of the Co-chairs of the group, France has continually shown concern over the violence. It has called on the conflicting parties to refrain from any military escalations and maintain the ceasefire.24 Other European authorities, such as Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, have stated that there is no alternative other than the peaceful resolution of the conflict.25 Throughout the year, there were numerous meetings regarding the conflict between the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and other authorities, as well as the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The violence lessened in 2015; however, there were instances of escalating tensions on the border between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan. These incidents, which resulted in several casualties and during which heavy weapons were used, were discussed during the most recent Sarkisian-Aliyev meeting in Bern, Switzerland.26 The negotiations also touched upon the easing of tensions in the conflict zone and working towards conflict resolution.

With many important developments happening in 2015, we can expect to see EU-Armenian relations to continue to develop in 2016. While a new Comprehensive Agreement is in the process of development, there is much to hope for. As stated, there have already been guarantees of closer cooperation between the EU and Armenia. There have also been talks about moving the Eastern Partnership program forward.27 Besides negotiating the Comprehensive Agreement, it is expected that the EU will continue to have an influential role in Armenia, particularly on its economy. Currently, the EU is Armeniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s largest trading partner and it is anticipated that this will also be the case in 2016.28 The EU has also confirmed that it will allocate 30 million euros in fresh assistance to Armenia. This will help to initiate some crucial reforms, including improving 212

Armenia - Mariam Baghdasaryan Armeniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s labour marketâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s efficiency and the employability of its workforce, with a particular emphasis on employment within the agricultural sector.29 Last but not least, the EU will also have an important role in fostering a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and in improving Armenia-Turkey relations.

213

Messages in the Media

214

Armenia - Mariam Baghdasaryan

215

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

By Anna Morosovska

RosBusinessConsulting. Founded in 1993. Owned by RBC Information Systems. Daily circulation of 85,000.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. Founded in 1990. Owned by the Government of Russia. Daily circulation of 171,000.

Kommersant: Founded in 1909. Owned by The Berezovski Group. Daily circulation of 131,000 Figures are for 2014 unless otherwise stated. All statistics provided by The CIA World Factbook.

216

Russian Federation - Anna Morosovska Throughout 2015, three major topics that stood out in Russian media coverage in regards to Russia-EU relations were: Russia’s involvement in the Syrian War, the proposal of Nord Stream 2, and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

Russia’s Involvement in the Syrian War Russia began a military operation on September 30 that included bombing against groups opposing the incumbent Syrian government.1 These Russian actions were condemned by the West, including by the EU, who considered additional sanctions against Russia, which were never implemented.2 Russian media accused the West of incorrectly portraying Russia’s behaviour in its anti-terrorist efforts, and throughout October underlined Russia as taking the better route in the fight against ISIS.3 Despite disagreement between Russia and the United States over the Syrian government, an approach was agreed upon with the establishment of nine points by the end of a meeting in Vienna on October 30.4 After the Paris attacks on November 13, the Russian news was filled with articles exclaiming that the Western powers, particularly France, wanted to establish a coalition against terrorism.5 By November 17, Vladimir Putin agreed to work together with France in Syria.6 The plan to cooperate with the EU threatened to fall apart when a Russian Su-24 jet was shot down by the Turkish Air Force on November 24.7 As a reaction to this event, the Russian government decided to impose sanctions, similar to its pre-existing food embargos, on the EU, the US and Turkey by the end of November.8 The EU’s refusal to lift sanctions on Russia at a time when Russia was offering its assistance in the Syrian War increased tensions on both sides.9 As such, an attempted rapprochement between Russia and the EU failed due to the combination of continued sanctions and the downing of the Russian Su24 jet. The Russian media was also of the opinion that the EU was too heavily influenced by US policy, and not focused enough on its own strategic interests.10 Throughout the year, there were many conferences held between Russia and the EU for potential military cooperation in the Middle East. Russian newspapers primarily emphasized Russia’s intent on finding an end to the conflict in Syria and the supposed need for the West to ally with Russia for this to occur.11 Overall, despite the hope for a potential rapprochement between Russia and the EU in November, relations between the two worsened dramatically after the downing of the Russian jet and onwards.

The Proposal of Nord Stream-2 Over the past few months, the Russian government has tried to construct an extension to its northern pipeline, Nord Stream, which runs through the Baltic Sea towards Germany.12 This project, called Nord Stream-2, followed the failure of another Russian pipeline project, the South Stream, earlier in 2015.13 At the beginning of September, Gazprom, one of Russia’s 217

Messages in the Media biggest energy companies, signed an agreement with Western European energy companies in favour of the creation of Nord Stream-2.14 This pipeline would bypass Ukrainian transit routes, removing those transit fees and making Germany a major distributor of Russian gas.15 Due to the poor relations between the two countries over the Ukraine crisis, Russia has been seeking ways to entirely avoid transporting its gas through Ukraine.16 Meanwhile, the EU has been trying to support Ukraine’s status as a transit country for Russian gas.

Certain Eastern European nations such as Slovakia were worried about a certain level of uncertainty by the EU in regards to Nord Stream-2.17 Overall, the push to get the EU to approve Nord Stream-2 was highly prevalent in the Russian media.

In October, Gazprom decided to cut half the carrying capacity of their southern pipeline project, the Turkish Stream, in preparation for Nord Stream-2.18 Meanwhile, Russian newspapers disapproved of the EU’s quick approval of three other infrastructure projects,similar to the South Stream, project that had been denied in November.19 They also connected the EU’s efforts to limit their dependence on Russian gas with the lack of approval for the Nord Stream-2 project.20 December brought further negotiation and debate; Germany appeared to be somewhat interested in a potential energy deal between Russia and the EU, but the EU’s Central and Eastern European members protested against it.21 Russia emphasized that their intent to supply gas is purely economic, and would not be used as a political tool, which was a major concern for the EU.22 Certain articles condemned the EU’s behaviour as uncooperative and against the economic interests of its members.23 In mid-December, the EU announced that new infrastructure projects would have to comply with the Third Energy Package, other EU legislation, and the EU’s energy objectives.24 This further increased concerns about the legality of the Nord Stream-2 project.25 As such, the Nord Stream-2 project’s approval by the EU remained a subject of contention within Russian media during the last months of 2015.

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement Ukraine and the EU have been in the process of implementing the Association Agreement since it was signed by the two countries in 2014.26 The agreement made Russia feel threatened economically because it included a deepening of political and economic association between Ukraine and the EU.27 On September 12, 2014, a tripartite agreement between Russia, Ukraine, and the EU had postponed the implementation of the Free Trade Area section of the Association Agreement.28 The Association Agreement has been frequently mentioned in the last few months, as the negotiations over the Free Trade Zone between Ukraine and the EU were coming to a close. Russian media has expressed significant concern about a free trade zone between the two powers, particularly due to the potential for European goods to arrive in Russia through Ukraine, and the potential cost to Russian businesses.29 In November, as a reaction to the upcoming implementation of the 218

Russian Federation - Anna Morosovska economic section of the Association Agreement, Russia threatened to impose a food embargo on Ukraine that would be implemented on January 1, 2016. As the EU did not make any immediate concession to this threat, the food embargo was signed into being on December 21.30 The EU subsequently demanded that Russia not impose the embargo on Ukraine — but they hardly believed that Russia would go through with it anyway.31 Russian media announced that Ukraine would lose an estimated $600 million due to the food embargo, but suggested that prices in Russia would be very minimally affected by this action.32 Additionally, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree suspending Russia’s free trade zone with Ukraine in mid-December — to be enacted on January 1, 2016 — as a reaction to the Association Agreement.33 This decree was adopted as a law on December 22, following negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, and the EU on December 21.34 The issue of the pending Free Trade Zone between Ukraine and the EU was highly worrisome for Russian authorities, as it threatens trade relations between Russia and Ukraine, and would cause Russia to lose business.35 These negotiations undoubtedly worsened relations between Russia and the EU. As January 1 approached with no solution in sight, the Russian media became increasingly opposed to the EU’s stance and repeatedly accused the EU of being inflexible and uncooperative.36 Year in Review The main issue underlying EU-Russian relations in 2015 was the ongoing sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU over Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine. All three of the major topics discussed above were worsened by the fact that the EU reduced its sanctions against Russia only slightly, while it sided with Ukraine on most diplomatic issues.37 For example, the EU defended Ukraine in tripartite talks on September 25, which discussed whether or not Ukraine would acquire Russian gas throughout the 2015-2016 winter.38 Moreover, the EU refused to lessen their sanctions against Russia, despite Russia’s efforts to support Western operations in Syria.39 The Russian news repeatedly made reference to the December EU talks regarding the potential to extend sanctions on Russia into 2016.40 If the requirements of the Minsk Protocol were not met by December 31, the sanctions would be extended for another six months until July 2016.41 As a result of a variety of things, involving elections being held on different dates by the Donetsk and Luhansk, self-acclaimed republics from the Ukrainian parliamentary elections and the ongoing disagreement concerning prisoner exchanges, all EU member states agreed to extend the sanctions.42 Additionally, the Russian Foreign Ministry felt that the EU was not realistically looking to create a compromise with Russia in the Association Agreement negotiations, and accused the EU of not taking responsibility for the damages they would be inflicting on Russia in the event of a newly created free trade zone.43 Russian media also emphasized to its readers how much they believed 219

Messages in the Media the EU needs to better its ties with Russia to improve trade relations, and to more effectively fight against the Islamic State.44 Furthermore, the European Union was portrayed as incredibly inflexible and unwise in its decision to keep its sanctions against Russia active. Undergoing a difficult time financially, Russia has been trying to reconnect with the European Union economically through the Nord Stream-2 and politically in terms of Syria. Unfortunately, these attempts were largely unsuccessful and, ultimately, the European Union and Russia remained on bad terms at the end of 2015.

“Russia intends to strengthen strikes against Islamic State militants in Syria,” Kommersant.ru. 3 Oct. 2015, accessed 30 Dec. 2015. http://www.kommersant.ru/ doc/2824864

1

“Prime Minister of Luxembourg ruled out new sanctions against Russia over Syria,” RosBusinessConsulting, 6 Oct. 2016, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc. ru/rbcfreenews/56138f569a7947bad5f25e6a

2

Shestakov, Yevgeny. “Europeans better understand Russians,” RosBusinessConsulting. 6 Oct. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.rg.ru/2015/10/06/smi-site. html

3

Rahr, Alexander. “The West should not be avoided in Moscow,” RosBusinessConsulting, 7 Oct. 2015, 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.rg.ru/2015/10/08/rar.html Antonov, Elizabeth and Kirill Bulanov. “A nine-point communiqué reached at Vienna talks on Syria,” RusBusinessConsulting, 30 Oct. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/30/10/2015/5633a7539a794784d7ef7c00

4

Artemyev, Alexander. “In response to the terrorist attacks, France will form a coalition with the participation of Russia,” RosBusinessConsulting. 16 Nov. 2015, accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/16/11/2015/5649bbb19a7947538f59e456

5

Likhomanov, Peter. “Juncker: Security in Europe is impossible without cooperation with Russia,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 18 Nov. 2015, accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http:// www.rg.ru/2015/11/18/yunker-site-anons.html Marenko, Georgiy. “Hit on Freedom: what consequences await the Western media after the attack on Paris,” RosBusinessConsulting. 14 Nov. 2015, accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/society/14/11/2015/564712199a79476505e760bb, Gordeev, Vladislav. “Hollande will ask Obama to reconsider the tactics of combat with ISIS,” RosBusinessConsulting, 19 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http:// www.rbc.ru/politics/19/11/2015/564d70ea9a7947a17b80dde3

6

Artemyev, Alexander, George Makarenko, Alexander Ratnikov, and Mary Makutina, “A new enemy: what to expect from the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Ankara,” RosBusinessConsulting. 24 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/24/11/2015/56545df29a7947d7239bc411

7

220

Russian Federation - Anna Morosovska Barsukov, Yuri, Anatoly Dzhumaylo, Olga Mordyushenko, Andrew Paradise, Ivan Safronov, and Anastasia Formicheva, “Settling of accounts,” Kommersant.ru.

25 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2861774.

Sapozhnikov, Oleg, Tatiana Edovina, and Dmitry Butrin. “Sanctions without fanaticism,” Kommersant.ru. 30 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www. kommersant.ru/doc/2865706

8

Focht, Elizabeth. “The EU refused to soften sanctions against Russia in exchange for help in Syria,” RosBusinessConsulting. 19 November 2015, 13 Jan. 2016. http:// www.rbc.ru/politics/19/11/2015/564ceb8f9a794765ea0e9b4f

9

“Pushkov: Statement by EU leaders talk about the precariousness of the anti-Russian position,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 12 Oct. 2015, 4 Jan. 2016. http://www. rg.ru/2015/10/12/pushkov-anons.html

10

Likhomanov, Peter. “Juncker: Security in Europe is impossible without cooperation with Russia,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 18 Nov. 2015, accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http:// www.rg.ru/2015/11/18/yunker-site-anons.html

11

Kuznetsov, Andrey. “The media explained Italy’s blocking the extension of sanctions against Russia,” RosBusinessConsulting. 15 Dec. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/15/12/2015/56703e5d9a7947fc8e470b53

12

Barsukov, Yuri. “Russian gas goes to Ukraine by sea,” Kommersant.ru. 7 Sep. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2804725

13

Peremitin, Georgiy. “’Gazprom’ talks about expanding ‘Nord Stream’,” RosBusinessConsulting. 4 Sep. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/business/04/09/2015/55e91e999a79472165131a02

14

Barsukov, Yuri. “Russian gas goes to Ukraine by sea,” Kommersant.ru. 7 Sep. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2804725

15

Galaktionova, Alexander and Lyudmila Podobedova. “’Gazprom’ has decided to halve the power “of the Turkish Stream,” RosBusinessConsulting. 6 Oct. 2015, accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/business/06/10/2015/56138e8e9a7947b942d88d49

16

Barsukov, Yuri. “Russian gas has gone by the wayside,” Kommersant.ru. 19 Nov. 2015, accessed 03 Jan. 2016. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2857229

17

Galaktionova, Alexander and Lyudmila Podobedova. “’Gazprom’ has decided to halve the power “of the Turkish Stream,” RosBusinessConsulting. 6 Oct. 2015, accessed 6 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/business/06/10/2015/56138e8e9a7947b942d88d46

18

Barsukov, Yuri. “Russian gas has gone by the wayside,” Kommersant.ru 19 Nov. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2857229

19

20

Ibid.

Zubkov, Igot. “Gas is with them,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 3 Dec. 2015, accessed 03 Jan. 2016. http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/04/energetika.html

21

221

Messages in the Media 22

Ibid.

Shestakov, Yevgeny. “Stone instead of diamond,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/22/skandal-site.html

23

“Ulyukayev said the possible failure of the EU Nord Stream 2 “shot up”,” RosBusinessConsulting. 21 Dec. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/ rbcfreenews/56782b4d9a7947429c956947

24

Kuznetsov, Andrey. “Reuters acquainted with the draft decision of the European Union on the “Nord Stream”,” RosBusinessConsulting. 17 Dec. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/17/12/2015/5672e23e9a7947841be6d7d3

25

Bondarenko, Maria. “Dutch collected signatures for a referendum on association between Ukraine and EU,” RosBusinessConsulting. 27 Sep. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/27/09/2015/560851589a794710ba2bb2f0

26

“Medvedev promised to deprive Kiev preferences in the “activation” of the agreement with the EU,” RosBusinessConsulting. 29 Sep. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/560ab7559a794708d7895787

27

28

Ibid.

Zubkov, Igot. “Gas is with them,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 3 Dec. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/04/energetika.html

29

“Damage from the association of the EU and Ukraine to Russia could be $3.5 billion without measures added to the FTA,” Kommersant.ru. 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 28 Dec. 2015. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2883245 Bondarenko, Maria and Jan Milyukova. “The government allowed the rejection of the food embargo onto Ukraine,” RosBusinessConsulting. 18 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/18/11/2015/564c7cee9a79474a281aa8a3

30

“Ukraine is punishing itself,” Kommersant.ru. 21 Dec. 2015, accessed 14 Jan. 2016. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2882720 Bondarenko, Maria and Jan Milyukova. “The government allowed the rejection of the food embargo onto Ukraine,” RosBusinessConsulting. 18 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/18/11/2015/564c7cee9a79474a281aa8a3

31

“Kiev estimated at $600 million in losses from the Russian food embargo in 2016,” RosBusinessConsulting. 18 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www. rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/564c831f9a79475e0699f179

32

Zubkov, Igot. “Gas is with them,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 3 Dec. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/04/energetika.html “Vladimir Putin will suspend the agreement on an FTA with Ukraine on January 1,” Kommersant.ru. 16 Dec. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2878685

33

222

Russian Federation - Anna Morosovska “The State Duma adopted the law on suspension of the agreement on an FTA with Ukraine,” Kommersant.ru. 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. .2016. http://www. kommersant.ru/doc/2883424

34

Shestakov, Yevgeny. “Stone instead of diamond,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/22/skandal-site.html

35

Likhomanov, Peter. “Chizhov: the Russian Federation has shown the utmost flexibility in the talks on Ukraine,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/22/chizhov-site-anons.html

36

“The parliamentarians called on NATO countries to maintain sanctions against Russia,” RosBusinessConsulting. 11 Oct. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www. rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/561a829b9a794754403e16c8

37

“Russia will not change the contract on gas because of sanctions from Kiev,” RosBusinessConsulting. 26 Sep. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/ rbcfreenews/560662bc9a7947342e1bdeca

38

Petrov, Vitalij. “Matvienko told about improving relations with the European deputies,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 23 Oct. 2015, accessed 3 Jan. 2016. http://www. rg.ru/2015/10/23/matvienko-site.html

39

“The head of EU diplomacy has not question the extension of sanctions against Russia,” RosBusinessConsulting. 15 Dec. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www. rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/566f393f9a794784f5f08352

40

Nadykto, Olga. “The heads of government of the EU decided to extend sanctions against Russia,” RosBusinessConsulting. 9 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/09/11/2015/56404dcf9a7947e35996e833 Barabanov, Ilya. “Minsk will stay for a second year,” Kommersant.ru. 25 Dec. 2015, accessed 2 Jan. 2016. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2883418

41

Kuznetsov, Andrey. “Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains Italy’s decision to continue sanctions against Russia,” RosBusinessConsulting. 15 Dec. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/15/12/2015/56703e5d9a7947fc8e470b53 “The media found out about the unwillingness of the EU to truly discuss the sanctions against Russia,” RosBusinessConsulting. 12 Dec. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/566bdd649a79471672f27f1c

42

Zabrodina, Catherine. “Russian Foreign Ministry: EU and Kiev brought the negotiations to a standstill on the implications of the association,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 22 Dec. 2015, accessed 12 Jan. 2016. http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/22/associacia-site.html

43

Peremitin, George. “The European Commission has proposed to Putin to develop trade between Russia and Europe,” RosBusinessConsulting. 19 Nov. 2015, accessed 13 Jan. 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/economics/19/11/2015/564deacd9a794730e1c9ecae

44

223

Authors Mariam Baghdasaryan Nicole Belošević Flavian Berneaga Tea Cimini Jorge Quesada Davies Angelica Dimoulias Hélène Emorine Taylor Forsyth Tzvetozar Iolov Athanasios Kipouros Emma

de

Leeuw

Sonia Liang Alexander Meile Anna Morosovska Mertol Özaltan Luka Pavicic Karen Power Iason Rodopoulos Natasha Rodrigues Christine Siomou Mathieu Sitaya Friederike Wilke

Messages

in the

Media