
4 minute read
Port Sudan
SUDAN CROSSROADS
Port Sudan’s situation is symbolic of that of the country as a whole – in simple terms forward or reverse? The key is removing politics from the decision-making process
Port Sudan, Sudan’s main seaport, continues to ride the roller coaster presented by the country’s volatile politics with the road ahead to progress in need of focused and unifi ed leadership.
The beginning of November saw the lifting of a six-week blockade of Port Sudan implemented by the Beja tribal group. It did so with a political agenda and at the centre of this the goal of removing the transitional government.
The lifting of the blockade followed a military coup on 25 October which ended the power sharing arrangement between civilians and the military, which came into effect after the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir and was meant to steer the country towards democratic elections in 2023.
The military coup received massive international condemnation and sparked country wide protests resulting, in late November, in the release of Abdalla Hamdok, the detained civilian prime minister and other political prisoners. The release is based on a 14-point deal, and the set-up of a new largely technocratic cabinet, agreed between Hamdok and the coup leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. This agreement, however, is not liked by all civilian interest groups including The Forces for Freedom and Change, the group that effectively led the overthrow of Bashir. At the time of writing, there is no certainty that this latest agreement will lead to stability and a viable route out of the political turmoil.
For Port Sudan this scenario offers little comfort which, in turn, means a continuing limited contribution to economic recovery.
PORT ISSUES
Port Sudan has major potential. Its strategic location makes it well placed to serve not just as the major gateway port for Sudan’s maritime trade but also as a regional hub serving the landlocked countries which surround it. These include South Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad, Niger, the Central African Republic and Uganda. Further, the potential extends to serving areas of neighbouring countries distant from their own ports plus its Red Sea location offers the ability to engage in container transshipment activity. strength of central government to enforce its policies nationwide and to exert clear, unbiased leadership in pursuit of economic strategies of benefit to the country as a whole.
AT A CROSSROADS
In the years leading up to regime change in Sudan, the South Port Container Terminal (SPCT) in Port Sudan underwent what was widely recognised as an efficient and transparent concession process, overseen by Hamburg Port Consulting. This resulted in the award of the concession to International Container Terminal Services Inc. (ICTSI) of the Philippines. This was a much-needed step to bring Sudan’s main international container terminal up to modern and professional standards after decades of what is widely acknowledged to be mismanagement by the Sea Ports Corporation of Sudan.
However, after the revolution, vested interests opposing the privatisation process succeeded in using the revolution as an excuse to have the new regime terminate the contract awarded to ICTSI. As a result, the Sea Ports Corporation of Sudan remains in control and service levels remain sub-standard.
ICTSI, approached by PS for its view of the chain of events, responded with a simple statement:
“ICTSI is proud to have won a very competitive tender process and remains ready to implement the concession under the terms agreed.”
Today, Port Sudan stands at an interesting crossroads symbolic of the situation of the country as a whole. Effectively, it can continue to rub along under public ownership, in a functional way without a sound development strategy behind it, or the new government leadership can validate Hamdok’s emphasis on technocratic and expert management of the economy and implement much needed reforms at Port Sudan, in the process demonstrating that real progress can be achieved. A simple starting point is to go back and complete the privatisation process rather than letting various interest groups hold the whole country hostage to either a closed or backward port.
Within such a framework port Sudan has a realistic chance of enjoying the multiple benefits enjoyed by its regional peers who have already followed this rewarding path.
As recent events have demonstrated, however, the port remains hamstrung by the tide of political events. Essentially, the port has become politicised; negatively impacted by the shifts in power and underpinning this being used as a pawn in regional haggling. The port is seen as a revenue source by both special interest groups in the eastern region and in Khartoum where it is looked upon as an important generator of foreign exchange.
This negative culture has to be dropped by all parties in order for Port Sudan to progress and realise its huge potential. There has to be a widespread recognition that a unified approach to its development will facilitate efficient trade processes, generate major employment opportunities and provide it with a real chance of gaining regional hub status. Fundamentally, however, this boils down to the
8 South Port