Navigating the New Washington | Diplomatic Courier | January 2017 Edition

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A Global Affairs Media Network JA NUA RY 2 0 , 2 0 1 7 I S PECIAL U.S. PRESIDEN TIAL IN AUGURAL EDITION

NAVIGATING THE NEW WASHINGTON

THE FIRST 100 DAYS OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ADMINISTRATION COVER STORY BY JONATHAN GREGORY GEOPOLITICS

GLOBALIZATION

SECURITY

ASIA, RUSSIA, POPULISM, AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

ECONOMIC POLICY, GLOBAL TRADE, AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

US BORDERS, ENERGY, NUCLEAR, AND CYBERSECURITY

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THE WORLD IN 2050 tm a forum about our future.

VISIT: COCREATE.WORLD TO LEARN MORE. THE WORLD IN 2050 is a series of Global Summits hosted by Diplomatic Courier, in collaboration with private and public sector partners. The series convenes five times a year to stimulate discussion and solutions for the future. How will major global forces such as demographic changes, resource stress, technology, and economic power shifts change our future? Join global publics and thought leaders from 180 countries on a journey of strategic forecasting.

D I P L O M AT I C O U R I E R .c o m

Welcome VO L UME 1 1 I S PE CIAL IN AUGURAL ISSUE I J AN UARY 2017

Ana C. Rold Publisher & CEO

The guard is changing in Washington and with the new guard comes a promise for a refresh of domestic and foreign policy. What to make of the coming change? Should we expect a dramatic reset of how Washington works? Not quite, explains Jonathan Gregory, a long-time Diplomatic Courier contributor and expert in Washington’s inside workings.

He explains: “The first 100 days agenda of a presidency is generally intended to set a tone, change direction, achieve immediate success and establish a basis for future governing. While President Franklin Roosevelt’s flurry of government action during the great depression established the 100 day measure, the FDR bar of success is almost impossible to match. Nonetheless, it is a time when much is possible and when much can be done.”

President Donald J. Trump’s election to the White House was undoubtedly historical and unprecedented. He takes office with no shortage of conflicts— internal and global. But the question remains: will his arrival at the White House dramatically change the course of major U.S. and regional alliances?

What will global trade and resource security look like in the coming months and years?

We partnered with Duco Experts to answer these questions through the prism of three key departments most likely to experience major shifts in the Trump administration—geopolitics, security, and globalization. In a town full of first class think tanks, you may ask, why Duco? At Diplomatic Courier, we pride on being constructive disruptors. Part think tank, part consulting firm, part speaker’s bureau, Duco is the innovative brainchild of the times we live in: it democratizes access to experts and thought leaders through technology. The platform boasts over 200 experts worldwide, providing skillful analysis once only privy to insiders. Using some of the same technology as Uber, Airbnb, and other sharing economy companies, the platform provides a secure and automated way to connect immediately and directly with experts around the world—no account manager or middle man to slow down the process.

We sail into 2017 with our first creative partnership with Duco and are excited for the crowd-sourced expertise we have gathered for our readers. From Russia to Asia and from energy security to cybersecurity, the most polemic issues of the day are distilled by the foremost experts in the world. As always, we hope you will send us your thoughts and questions through letters to the editors or feel free to connect with the authors directly through Duco’s online marketplace. ●

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Contents VO L UME 1 1 I S PE CIAL IN AUGURAL ISSUE I J AN UARY 2017

08 I COVER STORY A New Direction and Its Limits: Trump’s First 100 Days

By Jonathan Gregory

12 I BOOK REVIEW The Death of Expertise, by Tom Nichols

By Joshua Huminski

Geopolitics

Globalization

Security

14 I U.S.–Russia Relations

in 2017 and Beyond

26 I Trump’s Consequential

Economic Agenda

34 I Energy Security and Trump’s

Higher Oil Price Wager

By Steve Hall

18 I The Future of U.S. Turkey Relations

28 I A Trump Trade Agenda

By Marc L. Busch

30 I Transforming the World’s

Energy Future

By Jon Powers and Kevin Johnson

By Mike Fuchs

22 I The Future of Populism

in a Trump Era

By Avik S. A. Roy

By Amanda Sloat

20 I U.S.-Asia Relations

in a Trump Era

32 I Transatlantic Relations

in 2017

By Stanley R. Sloan

By Cathryn Cluver

By Andrew Bowen

36 I Trump: “Biggest Problem,

To Me, In the World, Is

Nuclear, And Proliferation”

By Philipp C. Bleek

38 I International Engagement is

Key to Securing U.S. Borders

By Matt Chandler

40 I Cybersecurity in the

Trump Administration

By Jamil N. Jaffer

Masthead Publishing house Medauras Global publisher & ceo Ana C. Rold Editorial Advisors Andrew M. Beato Sir Ian Forbes Lisa Gable Mary D. Kane Greg Lebedev Anita McBride Creative Director Christian Gilliham director of social media Alexcia Chambers un correspondent Akshan de Alwis

DC EDITORS Michael Kofman Paul Nash

Guest Editors Sidney Olinyk Alicia Sloan

senior photographers Michelle Guillermin Sebastian Rich

GUEST CONTRIBUTORS Philipp C. Bleek Andrew Bowen Marc L. Busch Matt Chandler Cathryn Cluver Mike Fuchs Jonathan Gregory Steve Hall Jamil N. Jaffer Kevin Johnson Jon Powers Avik S.A. Roy Stanley R. Sloan Amanda Sloat

CONTRIBUTORS Madeline Bielski David Clemens Charles Crawford Justin Goldman Joshua Huminski Sarah Jones Arun S. Nair Bailey Piazza Richard Rousseau Winona Roylance Mary Utermohlen

PUBLISHING. Diplomatic Courier magazine is produced by Medauras Global LLC, an independent private publishing firm. The magazine is printed six times a year and publishes a blog and online commentary weekly at www.diplomaticourier.com.

PRINT. Print issues of Diplomatic Courier average 100 pages in length. Individual and back issues cost $10.00 per issue (plus S&H). Student rates are available to both part-time and full-time students with proof of school enrollment. New print issues of Diplomatic Courier are published and mailed in January, March, May, July, September, and November. Subscriptions commence with the next issue.

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PERMISSIONS. Authors retain all copyrights to their articles. None of the articles can be reproduced without their permission and that of the publishers. For permissions please email info@medauras.com with your written request.

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ISSN. The Library of Congress has assigned: ISSN 2161-7260 (Print); ISSN 2161-7287 (Online).

ISBN: 978-1-942772-01-9 (Print); 978-1-942772-02 (Online).

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ART/PHOTOGRAPHY/ILLUSTRATIONS. In order of appearance in the publication: Cover, Bigstockphotos; page 4, by Joyce Boghosian; page 8, courtesy of Sidney Olinyk and Alicia Sloan; page 12, book cover image courtesy of Oxford University Press. All other images by Bigstockphotos.

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Welcome VO L UME 1 1 I S PE CIAL IN AUGURAL ISSUE I J AN UARY 2017

Sidney Olinyk | Alicia Sloan Guest Editors | Co-Founders, Duco

We approach 2017 with an unprecedented level of uncertainty about the future.

The ripples from seemingly intractable conflicts from Syria to Ukraine, the rise of populism and growing distrust of institutions from Jakarta to Rio, and the consequences of the U.S. presidential election and the Brexit vote are among the many things that have cast doubt on the future of the international order.

But despite the recent tumult, one thing remains clear: decades of globalization and economic integration ensure that international affairs and foreign policy will continue to have a profound impact on businesses—whether they are on Wall Street, High Street, or middle America’s Main Streets. A new trade policy can disrupt a global supply chain and spike prices overnight; a cyber-attack on an internet company can compromise your customers’ trust; a President-Elect’s tweet can send a shock through the stock market and pension funds; and a new sanctions approach can up-end (or jumpstart) your small business’s plans to export.

It’s no surprise, then, that the most forward-leaning and successful organizations quickly adjust to global events, regularly engaging with experts to seize opportunities and capitalize on their competitive advantages.

John Chipman wrote about this in the Harvard Business Review last September, in a piece titled, Why Your Company Needs a Foreign Policy. He argues that the most successful companies “will be those that make expertise in international affairs central to their operations, adopting what can best be described as a corporate foreign policy.” In the article, he also cites a Bank of England survey on views of systemic risk where 57% of business executives said geopolitical risk is the greatest challenge facing their business—and this survey was conducted in June, well before the results of the U.S. presidential election.

So, for this 2017 Inaugural Edition, Duco and the Diplomatic Courier have partnered to shed light onto some big issues that will affect international business and beyond in 2017: geopolitics, globalization, and security. All the authors, each one a leading Duco Expert, are available for follow-up conversations at ducoexperts.com.

First, we take of a tour of the ins-and-outs and major storylines of geopolitics in 2017 with pieces by Amanda Sloat, Steve Hall, Catherine Cluver, and Mike Fucsh.

Then, Avik Roy, Stan Sloan, Marc Busch, and Jon Powers & Kevin Johnson write about various aspects of economic and cultural globalization—and what it might mean for business and governments around the world.

Finally, Jamil Jaffer, Andrew Bowen, Matt Chandler and Philip Bleek discuss what we should expect to see on the international security front in 2017—a year with the potential to fundamentally reshape global security for a generation to come. ●

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D I P L O M AT I C O U R I E R .c o m

cover story

A New Direction and Its Limits.

TRUMP’s First 100 days J A N U A RY 2 0 1 7 08

cRoEv Fe rU G s tEoErSy

The first 100 days of Trump’s presidency will likely provide some clues about the type of President he will be and how he will operate.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Jonathan Gregory is a government affairs consultant in Washington, DC.

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cover story

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HE HISTORIC ELECTION of Donald Trump as President of the United States represents a new direction in American politics. His surprise upset of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton showed the anti-Washington and anti-establishment mood of the country may have reached new heights as the electorate chose a candidate who is a political outsider with no government or military experience. Much of the country believes that Washington is not working or working for them, and that sentiment was reflected in voters expressing their frustration and desire for change. Trump’s election is part of a broader global trend for change in reaction to the inherently unsettling aspects of globalization.

President-elect Trump enters the White House with the potential to change the current framework of governing in Washington in ways few Presidents have had the chance to do. However, he is ultimately limited by the same factors that limit all Presidents. The first 100 days of Trump’s presidency will likely provide some clues about the type of President he will be and how he will operate.

Mr. Trump’s Contract with the American Voter is a mix of traditional and unconventional policy ideas and it will be interesting to follow.

However, what may be more useful is to consider broader questions: What will happen in a Trump Administration in the first 100 days, how will it happen and what does it predict about a Trump Presidency?

It is clear that Republican priorities will replace Democratic priorities, but one unknown question is how far President-Elect Trump will go, not only to change the policy direction of the United States, but to deliver the type of new and unconventional ideas he has promised to change the way Washington works.

THE TRUMP AGENDA AND THE FIRST 100 DAYS The first 100 days agenda of a presidency is generally intended to set a tone, change direction, achieve immediate success and establish a

basis for future governing. While President Franklin Roosevelt’s flurry of government action during the great depression established the 100 day measure, the FDR bar of success is almost impossible to match.

Nonetheless, it is a time when much is possible and when much can be done.

President elect-Trump’s 100 day agenda is ambitious and far-reaching with different degrees of potential success. Some items, like tax reform, the repeal and replacement of Obamacare, and an immigration overhaul, will take many months to accomplish because there is strong opposition and they are complicated issues. Simply advancing action on each would be a victory. Other issues, such as military spending, are either linked to the budget process or are dead on arrival in the Congress, as is the case with Washington anticorruption and term limit proposals.

However, there is a set of issues, including infrastructure investment, school choice, childcare and eldercare, and community safety, that could serve as low-hanging fruit, particularly as there may be some Democratic support to advance these issues.

For the most part, the 100 day agenda relates to Congress and does not include unilateral executive actions, which Presidents can take immediately. President elect-Trump will have more sweeping power to enact executive, regulatory, treaty and military changes as long as they don’t require congressional approval, conflict with existing law or cost additional money. And even if his actions do violate these principles, he may be able to pursue them anyway, as President Obama has, in the absence of congressional or judicial resistance.

REAL CHANGE AND REAL POWER President-elect Trump’s electoral power will be magnified by several things. The first is the enhanced executive authority of the President, ironically expanded under President Obama and first accelerated by President George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

The imperial Presidency is alive and J A N U A RY 2 0 1 7 10

well with the courts and Congress acting as seemingly periodic checks on power. A second factor is that oversight by a Congress of the same party as the President is almost always less robust. A third factor is Trump’s profile – a unique political independence and lack of adherence to party ideology or Washington tradition.

President–elect Trump is different from most Presidents in that he enjoys a political power base independent of the Republican and Democratic parties, which could give him a flexibility and leverage rarely seen in a modern Presidency. In addition to this base of power, he has the support of the Republican establishment and many independents, coherent congressional majorities in both chambers of Congress, a neutral Supreme Court, and a Republican majority of governors and state legislatures. It is a level of Republican Presidential power not seen since 1980, aided by a bold, charismatic leader with a defined agenda and license for change.

President-elect Trump won the 2016 election in many ways because he was in touch with a part of the electorate and national sentiment that few other candidates understood, could articulate or could mobilize. If he is able to maintain this connection during his Presidency, it could be a powerful weapon in using the “bully pulpit” to enact policies and promote change in Washington.

The Democratic Party’s unexpected defeat, not only in the Presidential elections, but also in falling far short of its expected wins in Congress, puts the party in a temporary state of disarray, as is the case with losing parties in most elections. It is a party with an aging leadership that lacks a singular leader at the top, and thus, President-elect Trump will have the upper hand in partisan and bipartisan agreements for some time.

REAL CONSTRAINTS President-elect Trump faces some very real constraints that may undermine his ability to govern and to advance his 100 day agenda.

There are natural political and

cRoEv Fe rU G s tEoErSy

institutional conflicts between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government which could flare up at any time and constrain Trump’s ability to act.

Legal, budgetary and political constraints haven’t changed with Trump’s election. The federal budget, infrastructure, tax reform and immigration are all issues where such constraints play a role.

Article II of the U.S. Constitution gives the President relatively few formal powers in comparison to Congress, and unlike the election process, there are many more checks and balances in the process, particularly if you include the independence of the courts, states and the media. Similarly, bipartisan opposition is not unique to Presidents Obama or Bush and could potentially affect the ability of a President Trump to act as may be the case emerging with cyber security and Russia. CEOs aren’t often contradicted, resisted or overruled by their own company, but the U.S. government is designed to operate on that basis.

From the perspective of public opinion and informal powers, the lack of a popular vote majority and relatively narrow electoral victory will be a constraining factor in governing.

Trump’s election win is closer than it may appear as he won four key states (Florida, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan) by less than 1.5% each.

Combined with a popular vote deficit of nearly 3 million votes and one of the most narrow electoral victories in the modern era, this suggests is that a lot of people didn’t like or agree with Trump.

It is too early to tell if Presidentelect Trump’s status as a newcomer to Washington will impact his ability to effectively fill the 4,000-6,000 federal positions typically required of a new Administration, 1,000 of which are essential. This hiring process is a challenge for any Administration and often can slow policy change or executive action as offices are understaffed or lacking direction, as career bureaucrats manage the day-to-day operations of government.

The White House staff is another area where governing can be undermined

if roles aren’t filled or clarified and processes aren’t in place, as some have suggested is the case with President-elect Trump’s team.

Others have said Mr. Trump could be his own worst enemy as his personal and public attacks via traditional and social media, inconsistent policy positions, lack of adherence to facts or tendency to get involved or sidetracked in individual issues could limit his effectiveness. He must be careful not to inadvertently overreach and overplay his hand with the American public or accidentally provoke his own party by exposing divisions over issues like trade.

Discipline, consistency and time management are key characteristics of all successful Presidents and a lack of any can quickly cause a President to lose public support and focus and get bogged down. President Bill Clinton’s first 100 days included several bad episodes such as his efforts to promote an economic stimulus bill and advance his gays in the military policy. The particular risk for President Trump is that he could shorten his Presidential honeymoon period if a policy fails, he fails to read the mood of the country or Washington becomes gridlocked over an issue, as it may constrain his ability to act in Congress.

THE ROAD AHEAD In the end, the question remains: What will Trump do in the First 100 days and who will he be? Will he be a visionary who changes Washington and has a lasting legacy like Franklin Roosevelt or Ronald Reagan? Will he start strong and weaken like George H.W. Bush or will he start slowly and finish strong like Bill Clinton? Or will he succumb to circumstances like Jimmy Carter?

The key variable in the first 100 days of a Donald Trump presidency will be to watch what he does, not what he says. He has already shown that he will offer contradictory statements or take multiple positions only to settle on a final solution which is different, but in line with his goals. One thing to watch is if he measures success beyond the results of public opinion and personal ego and can objectively measure success in other ways. We

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will get a sense in the first 100 days of how Mr. Trump learns on the job and faces presidential adversity. Every new President also faces a crisis moment when organization, experience and leadership are on display (or not on display) and this may or may not happen in the first 100 days. The FDR’s great depression agenda is the positive example and President John F. Kennedy’s aborted Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba is the negative.

We will also get an early sense if he will make any inroads into changing the way Washington operates to a more business oriented framework devoid of the gridlocked, special interest dominated, wasteful, corrupt and ineffective practices he portrays.

How adept he, his team and his cabinet leaders are in fully understanding Washington and assuming the reins of power during the first 100 days will determine how effective he will be in the longer term.

It will be instructive to see if Mr. Trump pursues a third way in his first 100 days, either by putting together bipartisan coalitions around common issues or shedding Republican ideologies to cut deals with Democrats. This return to Presidential leadership based on coalitions and common interest would be a fundamental change to the partisan and almost parliamentary style of single party support in Congress.

Donald Trump is a disruptive figure in a time of disruption as the world is unsettled and changing. He seeks to challenge the governing system and change political assumptions, thinking and people. How much he succeeds in doing these things to improve the lives and opportunities of Americans will be the measure of his success.

President Obama, like every President, brought change, but it is fair to say he was not transformative in changing how Washington works or dramatically changing the direction of the country. Whether Donald Trump will be a truly transformational figure is to be determined, but if he does, it will be despite a number of factors stacked against him.

The first 100 days agenda will offer some early clues. ●

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itting down to review Tom Nichols’ “The Death of Expertise” proved to be more difficult than I initially expected.

Not due to any fault of the book or Nichols’ thesis, but from attempting to find a starting point—a hook if you will from which to begin—because there are simply too many from which to choose. Subtitled “The Campaign Against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters,” Nichols’ book could hardly be more timely.

It seems that America is in the midst of fundamental rejection of facts. In December, the PresidentElect Donald Trump claimed during an interview that “nobody really knows” if climate change is real. An astounding statement by any elected official, but it is simply staggering coming from the person who will next occupy the Oval Office. This is despite the fact that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded that human activity is “extremely likely” to be responsible for driving the changes in our environment.

This is despite the fact that among peer reviewed scientific papers more than 97% endorsed the principles of anthropogenic global warming (AGW).

Turning away from the hotly contested climate change issue, look to anti-genetically modified organism (GMO) campaigns.

According to Pew Research “millennials” are more likely to believe that GMOs are bad for one’s health and that “organic” foods are better for you. This is despite the fact that 88% of the members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) conclude that GMOs are safe to eat.

From where does this fundamental rejection of facts and expertise spring? This is the question that Nichol attempts to answer. In attempting to do this he is successful on some accounts and less so on others.

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THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE: The Campaign Against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters

Author Tom Nichols Oxford University Press, 2017

Book review by Joshua Huminski

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Nichols sees the genesis of this rejection of expertise and facts stemming from public discourse, higher education, the Google effect, journalism, and from experts themselves.

In the first instance conversation and disagreements now seem to go beyond basic disputes to outright hostility—it is no longer a matter of people disagreeing, now the opponent is stupid or wrong for having that opinion. It’s no longer an argument over principles, it’s an argument over the level of intelligence of the debater.

Taken together with the great equalizer of social media—disputes quickly spiral out of control, particularly when no social filter is applied online. While social media connects people in ways never before possible, it also equalizes the playing field in the worst of ways—a layperson now enjoys the same platform as an accomplished statesperson, scientific expert, or thought leader.

The proliferation of higher education too is both a great equalizer, but also creates a false sense of knowledge. Nichols takes the higher education system to task for creating environments that are cushy to the point of luxury for students, detracting from the focus on education. He laments the creation of environments where the students run the campus, complaining about issues that make them uncomfortable, demanding “safe spaces.” Universities in many instances according to Nichols are nothing more than degree factories that confer a false sense of accomplishment and knowledge upon the graduating students.

Now laypeople have the world’s knowledge at their fingertips—again, a blessing and a curse. With the few taps of the finger or a request to Siri, any question is answerable, but often people only peruse the surface, scanning a page or a document, and certainly not looking at the sources. “I Googled it” is a common

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refrain when asked about the source of knowledge. Many consume their news and information from Facebook alone—an issue Nichols should have explored more.

Make no mistake about it, Facebook is a media company. Despite protestations to the contrary, the social media platform now competes alongside the likes of Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC in the provision of news, breaking or otherwise. With its algorithms, it customizes content it believes a viewer would like to see or agree with leading to greater segregation of news sources and input. Added to the fact that fake news proliferated across Facebook and most people lack the ability to differentiate fake from real news, the implications of the social media giant’s dominance is truly concerning.

Turning deftly to journalism, Nichols highlights some concerning trends that have been apparent, if underappreciated. The pursuit of revenue dollars upended the model of journalism. Now it is all about “clicks”—what will get users to view content. It is no longer about high quality in-depth research stories, it is about “listicles” from BuzzFeed or short, punchy stories with attractive graphics. Traditional media outlets can’t compete without adapting to this new model. Journalists no longer have the opportunity to become experts, to become enmeshed in their subject area, and to learn the questions to ask. They are, above all, now content generators—it is about articles or content per day, not the piece that requires lengthy research efforts and in-depth analysis.

Experts too are to blame for the erosion of their prominence. Yes, experts do get things wrong, sometimes spectacularly so.

Unfortunately, the mistakes get more attention than the accuracies or when the process corrects itself. When an untruth is released into the wild, it propagates like wildfire before it is

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Journalists no longer have the opportunity to become experts, to become enmeshed in their subject area, and to learn the questions to ask. They are, above all, now content generators – it is about articles or content per day, not the piece that requires lengthy research efforts and in-depth analysis. captured and put down, if ever. With the permanence of the world-wide web, sometimes things like vaccinelinked autism never go away.

Nichols clearly identifies multiple sources of the erosion of the belief in experts and their prominence in today’s society. Where he falls short is on the assessment of the rejection of knowledge and facts. It seems to be more in vogue than ever to be uninformed, to be unengaged, to care about the world. It is a lament heard often that social media is turning the populace into vapid narcissist with at best a shallow knowledge of the world around them. Look at the number of “memes” on the Internet that circulate like wildfire with half-truths, complete inaccuracies, or outright lies, but look to at the extent at which they are shared, consumed, and promoted.

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For every “Cosmos” by Neil Degrasse Tyson there are a dozen or more “Real Housewives” programs.

“Duck Dynasty” and its ilk dominates television while informative programming like NOVA languishes on public television. Of course, this criticism is found during every period.

Undoubtedly Roman elites complained about the stupidity of popular plays and comedies. But the Romans never had the interconnectivity society enjoys today.

So, why does it all matter? At its core an educated citizenry is necessary for democracy to survive and flourish. If individual citizens cannot make informed decisions or trust that those they elect are advised by educated and informed experts, then what is the point of a democracy? ●

D I P L O M AT I C O U R I E R .c o m GEOPOLITICS

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U.S.–Russia Relations in 2017 and Beyond

he direction of U.S.Russian relations during the early part of the Trump administration will depend on how (and if) the new President is willing to moderate the positions he laid out during the campaign. If past is prelude, it is likely President Trump’s Russia policies will become somewhat more moderate (meaning less favorable to Russia) than his stump rhetoric. This is not unique to Donald Trump; most candidates are pushed (or are sometimes willing to move themselves) more towards the political center after inauguration.

What wins elections is not always what makes for good policy, foreign or domestic, and Trump has already changed several key positions he espoused when he ran.

If we imagine a sliding scale where Trump’s campaign statements favorable to Russia are maxed out at a 10, and more hawkish, Russiaskeptical policies are a 1 or 0, how much will he moderate? Will he move from a 10 (very positive for Russia) to a 7 (slightly less positive to Russia)? Or to a 3? Or not at all?

Recalling Trump’s campaign positions on Russia, and then imagining what a more moderate version of those positions would be, should provide at least left and right channel markers for a future Trump administration’s policy towards Russia.

The direction of U.S.-Russian relations during the early part of the Trump administration will depend on how (and if) the new President is willing to moderate the positions he laid out during the campaign.

By Steve Hall

UKRAINE, CRIMEA, & SANCTIONS During the campaign, Trump departed significantly from the West’s current policy on Russia and Ukraine.

European and NATO capitals noted that for the first time since the end of World War II, a land border in Europe had been changed by force when Russia annexed Crimea. Further, the U.S. under President Obama and its allies condemned Russia for providing military and other support to separatists in eastern Ukraine— separatists who subsequently downed a civilian airliner using Russianprovided weapons. As a result, the United States and the West imposed economic sanctions on Russia. For his part, Candidate Trump stated the ➣

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➣ people of Crimea wanted to become part of Russia, and instead of condemning the annexation, said, “I’m going to look at it.” On eastern Ukraine, Trump initially and infamously said Russia was not there. He later backtracked, but seemingly pushed the issue into Europe’s lap. “You look at Germany, you look at other countries, and they don’t seem very much involved.” With regard to Russian sanctions, Trump stated he “would be looking” at the possibility of lifting them.

What will President Trump’s position be on these issues? The new White House may shift to a somewhat more critical position of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and in fact, Trump began to moderate in the later stages of the campaign. But it is unclear how far he will go. Trump’s vague, “I’m all for Ukraine” statement, coupled with his belief that Europe needs to be less reliant on the U.S. and assert itself more on Ukraine, seems to indicate that the new President might give only lip service to the idea that Russia needs to withdraw from eastern Ukraine (and perhaps Crimea), but that he would leave it to Europe to figure it all out. Looking at the body of Trump’s statements, one gets the impression that he would not allow Ukraine or Crimea to interfere with his stated desire of working more closely with Russia. Sanctions against Russia may also be at risk down the road, especially given the nomination of Rex Tillerman—an oil businessman with past Russian business deals amounting to billions of dollars—as Secretary of State. While the U.S. might not lead the charge to lift sanctions, President Trump might not stand in the way if key European allies decided Moscow had suffered

enough for its incursions in Ukraine.

Moderation factor: from a 10 to a 9.

Moderation factor: from a 10 to a 5 (possibly lower).

NATO Undermining the NATO alliance is a key element of Putin’s foreign and defense policy. Trump’s initial “10” (favorable to Russia) setting was clear when he noted that NATO might be obsolete, and that “It’s possible we might have to let NATO go.” He indicated that NATO partners who were not paying their share would have to begin to do so, or risk losing the protection NATO offered. Later, Trump noted he believed he could negotiate a better deal with NATO countries, perhaps implying he could find a way to do business with the alliance. However, he quickly followed with the statement that “you always have to be ready to walk” when discussing NATO negotiations.

President Trump will have to significantly moderate his NATO position. To begin with, his nominees for key foreign policy jobs in his administration (especially those with a military background) have seen the benefits of NATO, and will be moderating voices. In addition, a skeptical position on NATO would place Trump into conflict with traditional U.S. allies at the very outset of his presidency, which would give the appearance of his being unable to conduct effective diplomacy. This is a perception the new president will want to avoid, as there is nothing that upsets Trump more than appearing to be unsuccessful at anything. Trump views himself as a master negotiator, and if NATO’s integrity becomes an issue, Trump may find himself at a disadvantage at the beginning of almost any negotiation with Europe, security-related or otherwise.

SYRIA AND RUSSIA Candidate Trump stated that he did not object to Russia’s military activity in Syria, as he believed Russia was “bombing the hell” out of ISIS there.

Clearly he was linking to a neoprotectionist campaign theme of not bogging the U.S. down in foreign wars. Trump also noted that the U.S. should not be attempting to support anti-regime fighters in Syria when “we don’t know who they are”.

There may well be some moderation of this position, again due largely to the military officers Trump is bringing into key administration positions.

Several have deep experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they will probably argue for some sort of continued U.S. effort on Syria. But Trump clearly feels strongly about not making what he considers the mistakes we made in Iraq, so he could overrule his aides. Moderation factor: from a 10 to a 9.

Given Trump’s penchant for moderating or even reversing his campaign policies, it is difficult to predict precisely the direction he will take regarding Russia. It is also likely that the personal relationship between the two leaders will affect the new President’s decisions. But at least one thing is certain: Trump’s initial Russian policies will be far preferable to Moscow than those of the current administration, or those of Trump’s adversary during the election. ●

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Given Trump’s penchant for moderating or even reversing his campaign policies, it is difficult to predict precisely the direction he will take regarding Russia.

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Steve Hall, a Russia, intelligence, and cybersecurity expert at Duco, retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 2015 after 30 years of running and managing intelligence operations in Eurasia and Latin America.

Prior to his retirement, he served as the Chief of Central Eurasia Division, overseeing intelligence operations in the countries of the former Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact.

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THE FUTURE T OF U.S.TURKEY RELATIONS

By Amanda Sloat

he Trump Administration has inherited a challenging relationship with Turkey—a country feeling under siege from internal and external threats. When President Obama took office he had high hopes for building what he described a “model partnership” with a secular democracy that could serve as a bridge to the Muslim world. Seeking to mend relations frayed by disagreements during the Bush Administration over Iraq, Obama made Turkey his first bilateral visit in April 2009 following several European stops for multi-lateral meetings. However, U.S.-Turkey relations soured amidst foreign policy differences (especially over Syria), the deterioration of democracy and rights, and the aftermath of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt.

The extradition of Islamic cleric Fetullah Gulen will be at the top of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s to-do list with his new American counterpart. Erdogan has accused Gulen, a Turkish national who has lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999, of masterminding the attempted coup. While the Turks view Gulen’s extradition in political terms, the U.S. government has taken a strictly legal approach: in accordance J A N U A RY 2 0 1 7 18

with extradition treaty requirements, the Department of Justice must review evidence and determine whether it can persuade a federal judge of probable cause. The Turkish government has submitted numerous dossiers, and U.S. government lawyers visited Ankara last fall to aid the investigation. Yet absent a compelling case, the U.S. will be unable to extradite him and the issue will remain a bilateral irritant.

President Erdogan will also be keen to discuss the Trump Administration’s handling of the war in Syria— particularly any continued reliance on Kurdish fighters, the YPG. Erdogan’s priority shifted in recent months from supporting the defeat of the Assad regime to preventing the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region within Syria along the Turkish border. The Obama Administration walked a fine line in providing measured military support to the YPG in the fight against ISIS and assuaging the security concerns of its NATO ally. Ankara views the YPG’s effort to connect several cantons into a contiguous Kurdishcontrolled region as an existential security threat, which it has already taken military action to prevent. Turkey believes the YPG is synonymous with the PKK. Designated by the U.S. as a foreign terrorist organization, the PKK

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has been engaged in a decades-long armed struggle against the Turkish government in pursuit of Kurdish rights, with violence resuming in July 2015 following the collapse of a two-year ceasefire. The Kurdish question will need to be addressed in both Syria and Turkey.

There could be disagreements on Middle East policy more broadly, as some of President-Elect Trump’s campaign pledges run contrary to Erdogan’s desire to serve as a leader in the Islamic world. If Trump works more closely with Russia to focus on ISIS in Syria, it could affect relations with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar who have partnered against the Assad regime. (The dynamic relationship between Turkey and Russia—marked by support for opposing sides in Syria, heightened tension after Turkey downed a Russian fighter jet, recent cooperation in northern Syria, and the tragic assassination of the Russian Ambassador in Ankara—will remain a complicating factor.) A decision to strengthen U.S. ties with Egyptian President Sisi and designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization would be anathema to Erdogan. While Turkey has recently patched up relations with Israel, relocating the American embassy to Jerusalem

could create new tensions. Any move to scrap the Iran deal would leave Turkey feeling cornered given the economic ties and regional rivalry between them.

The deteriorating political situation in Turkey will remain a backdrop to these foreign policy discussions.

While the Turkish government understandably wishes to bring to justice those responsible for the coup attempt, its approach has appeared heavy-handed and non-transparent.

Furthermore, the pursuit of journalists, civic activists, and Kurdish politicians in the name of security remains troubling. Hopefully the Trump Administration will urge Ankara to uphold its democratic obligations.

For the foreseeable future, Turkey will remain an important partner of the United States given its strategic location, NATO membership, economic ties to Europe, and key role in resolving shared regional problems.

Yet Ankara is frequently a challenging partner with its own—sometimes divergent—interests. The bilateral relationship will require sustained, high-level engagement to mitigate mistrust, address differences, and forge solutions. ●

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“For the foreseeable future, Turkey will remain an important partner of the United States given its strategic location, NATO membership, economic ties to Europe, and key role in resolving shared regional problems.”

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Amanda Sloat is a Turkey and Europe geopolitical expert at Duco and recently served in the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Southern Europe and Eastern Mediterranean Affairs. Amanda has nearly two decades of foreign policy experience, including service in the U.S. Administration and Congress as well as the non-profit sector and academia.

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U.S.-ASIA A RELATIONS IN A TRUMP ERA

By Mike Fuchs

sia is in for a rough ride over the next few years. U.S. foreign policy in Asia under President Obama—known as “the rebalance”— focused on shoring up the foundations of the U.S. role in the region and strengthening the rules and institutions that have underwritten peace and stability for decades. But under a President Donald Trump administration, this progress could quickly unravel.

While there are many challenges to the United States in Asia, the Obama administration’s rebalance policy was intended to secure U.S. interests for the long-term in the face of the changing landscape. Despite serious obstacles, it has made significant progress.

Negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership, for example, was an attempt to write trade rules that would protect American interests and values.

Meanwhile, bolstering alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia and others enhanced the region’s security structure, and engaging with regional institutions like ASEAN invested in the construction of stronger regional norms and mechanisms to enforce those norms. Finally, the Obama administration’s focus on building comprehensive ties with countries like China, India, Vietnam and Indonesia J A N U A RY 2 0 1 7 20

helped America catch up with changing times and shifting regional dynamics.

However, with a Donald Trump presidency all of this progress is at risk.

The challenges confronting the United States in Asia combined with President Trump’s dangerously uninformed attitude towards the region are a recipe for disaster.

The threats are serious. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are advancing. China’s risk tolerance to pursue control of the South China Sea is rising. China’s economic influence in Asia is growing as a force for political influence. Traditional U.S. allies in the Philippines and Thailand are taking an authoritarian turn, threatening the alliances.

Based on his history, campaign rhetoric, and actions since the election, Mr. Trump’s policy instincts and lack of understanding of the issues in Asia are a dangerous combination for U.S. interests in the region, from alliances to Taiwan to North Korea to upholding U.S. values.

U.S. alliances are the cornerstone of security in Asia, and yet Mr. Trump repeatedly throughout the campaign criticized U.S. allies. He has articulated an approach to U.S. allies in Asia and elsewhere akin to a protection racket,

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squeezing more money from America’s closest friends in order for America to live up to its existing treaty obligations.

This is dangerous because it undermines the deterrence that underpins regional stability in Asia and Europe.

Another piece of the puzzle of regional stability has been the modus operandi in Asia on Taiwan that benefits everyone, including protecting Taiwanese prosperity and security. But Mr. Trump has already undermined that stability with his conversation with Taiwan President Tsai-ing wen and his comments questioning the One China policy. Mr. Trump’s treatment of Taiwan as a bargaining chip with China is dangerous for the United States, Taiwan, and Asia.

Meanwhile, as North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have grown, Mr. Trump has veered between a willingness to talk to North Korea, to try to get China to exert its leverage, to encouraging Japan and South Korea to obtain nuclear weapons to deter North Korea. This unpredictability means he either has no plan, or is reckless, either of which undermines the efficacy of the U.S. deterrence as well as coordination with allies.

U.S. support for democracy and human rights is at the core of American

foreign policy, and yet in his phone call with Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte after the election Mr. Trump reportedly voiced his support for the war against drugs unleashed by the Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte that is drawing widespread concern for human rights abuses.

In just about every area of tension and difficulty for U.S. policy in Asia, Mr. Trump’s instincts would exacerbate tensions and threats to U.S. interests.

If Mr. Trump continues down the path he has signaled, U.S. policy in Asia would not only undo the progress made by the Obama administration— it very well could undo the progress made by administrations of both parties over the last 75 years. ●

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mike Fucsh is an Asia-Pacific expert at Duco and a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, directing U.S. policy on the South China Sea, regional security issues, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN.

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“In just about every area of tension and difficulty for U.S. policy in Asia, Mr. Trump’s instincts would exacerbate tensions and threats to U.S. interests.”

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The Future of Populism in a Trump Era As Donald Trump begins his term as President, he can claim victory in more ways than one: Not only was he able to secure the electoral college majority, but Trumpism is already having a significant impact on the stability of democracies an ocean away.

By Cathryn Cluver

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A

s Donald Trump begins his term as President, he can claim victory in more ways than one: Not only was he able to secure the electoral college majority, but Trumpism is already having a significant impact on the stability of democracies an ocean away.

Already emboldened by the Brexit vote in June, the election of “an outsider” as President of the world’s oldest democracy has given particularly core Europe’s right-wing populist parties a rather vainglorious halo. These three—France’s Marine LePen, the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders, and Germany’s Frauke Petry—stand to create a political environment which could ultimately eclipse the European project. All in 2017, the same year in which the Union plans to celebrate its very founding with the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. The European Union can survive Brexit. Frexit— Marine LePen’s goal in her planned referendum on EU membership— would be Europe’s death knell.

To be sure, populism of both the left and the right is not a new phenomenon across Europe and its roots, breadth, and strength are significantly nuanced by national circumstance, as Cas Mudde points out. The conditions that lead to their creation have a few things in common.

However, Western European countries’ general inability to continuously transform their labor markets and welfare systems in a sustainable manner from the 1960s onward, the gradual fraying of the elite-consensus around the purpose of European integration, and the usurping of once classical social democratic party programs by moderate conservatives are common elements for European countries with strengthening rightwing populist parties. ➣

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➣ The effects of these structural weaknesses, the ongoing reverberations of the Euro crisis and the fraying of the liberal economic consensus coupled with the strong backlash to globalization and the mobility of people, products and capital that accompany it have given momentum to seductive extremes: fringe parties hijacking— nay, setting—the mainstream political agenda. Populist parties of the right and left currently control the largest share of parliamentary seats in six EU countries, and are part of governing coalitions in three.

Hungary’s Victor Orban has been turning his country into an “illiberal democracy” since 2010, European sanctions in 2000 couldn’t stop Austria’s Freedom Party from reinvigorating to send a far-right candidate into the December Presidential vote (ultimately a loss) and to sign a “cooperation pact,” with Vladimir Putin’s party in late 2016. Meanwhile, European Commission efforts to reign in Poland’s leadership from dismantling the constitutional court seem tepid.

Thus while leftist populist parties such as Greece’s Syriza and Spain’s Podemos have seen their wings clipped by economic realities, right-wing populists are gaining strength, aided by either outright outside funding from Russia partially in return for promised support of the annexation of Crimea, or by Russian meddling in the electoral process itself. Sound familiar?

LESSONS FROM BREXIT Brexit should be a case study for mainstream parties in the Netherlands, France and Germany.

UKIP and the “Leave” campaign, it has now been conclusively proven, lied to the British electorate, handing the responsibility of what will be treacherous negotiations toward “hard Brexit” to mainstream conservative Prime Minister, Theresa May. It mattered less that the Independence Party all but collapsed after the vote, because the Conservative party has “UKIP-ised”

“France’s Marine LePen, the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders, and Germany’s Frauke Petry—stand to create a political environment which could ultimately eclipse the European project.” and the Labour Party seems unsure it wants power in the near future.

Leaders of mainstream parties on the continent should take note – and fast. An inability to provide timely and effective responses to a need for economic and physical security will open the playing feel to a populist mudslinging. While the French campaign, for example should be about addressing critical fiscal issues and the implementation of far-reaching labor reforms to create growth and innovation, it will “be eclipsed by a populist debate about churches, mosques, headscarves, pork meals and what it means to be French.” In a neck-and-neck race with populist Geert Wilders, newly convicted of a hate crime, embattled Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, decided to stop making a positive argument for increased European integration. Though she has remained largely steadfast, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was recently cornered by right-wing of her party to make abolishing dual citizenship regulations part of the electoral program for 2017.

With the same conservative party wing echoing Petry’s party’s sentiments that the victims of the Christmas Market attack were “Merkel’s dead” we can already see the direction in which parts of this campaign could be heading.

Established continental parties must take heed, and quickly. External events stand to disrupt the election cycle in these EU founding member states, and the Netherlands go to the polls in a matter of weeks. Russia, similarly emboldened by a Trump victory will not stand idly by—its

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missile deployments in Kaliningrad, threats to the Baltics and cyber advances indicate just how far it might be willing to go. The conditions that lead to their creation have a few things in common. However, Western European countries’ general inability to continuously transform their labor markets and welfare systems in a sustainable manner from the 1960s onward, the gradual fraying of the elite-consensus around the purpose of European integration, and the usurping of once classical social democratic party programs by moderate conservatives are common elements for European countries with strengthening rightwing populist parties.

There is much good to build on: Germany is an example of what complex labor market reform can accomplish. NATO and the EU have never worked as closely or effectively together on border security and the protection of individual Europeans than today. As President Trump, Vladimir Putin and Marine LePen argue for a greater nuclear arsenal, European leaders must remain committed to the NPT and explain to voters how important nuclear weapons reduction is. A new European Global Strategy promises inclusive security and gains from globalization for Europeans. Member State politicians need to connect Europe’s successes with individual citizen’s lives. They must find effective means of linking European economic advances, to national policies to individual advancement.

If they fail or let their campaigns be hijacked, the Union will cease to exist 60 years after its inception. ●

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Cathryn Cluver is an EU, digital diplomacy, and cities expert at Duco and the founding Executive Director of the Future of Diplomacy Project at the Harvard Kennedy School.

She served on the management team of the European Policy Centre in Brussels, where she was the Deputy Editor of its public policy journal, Challenge Europe.

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TRUMP’S CONSEQUENTIAL ECONOMIC AGENDA

By Avik S. A. Roy

T

herelatively older voters who sent Donald Trump to electoral victory spent their formative years in the economically dominant America of the 20th Century. They also grew up in a global economy dominated by large industrial manufacturers who provided unprecedented prosperity to the blue-collar workers they employed.

Today, the world looks very different from these voters’ vantage points. The economic liberalizations of China and India have helped lift nearly a billion people out of poverty in the last quarter-century alone. But the very success of these emerging markets has left many in America feeling like their relative standing has declined.

Technology and globalization have also shifted manufacturing jobs away from high-cost, highregulation, high-unionization economies like America’s, moving them to emerging markets or to automation. America’s transition from a manufacturing powerhouse to one driven by the technology and service industries has rewarded the nation’s educated class, but has left behind those without a college degree.

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President-elect Trump is viewed by his skeptics at home and abroad as an ignorant madman, without any real knowledge of how economics or foreign affairs work. But while Trump’s personality is unusual, his political philosophy draws from well-established traditions in America and Europe.

Most importantly, his diagnosis of America’s economic ills is two parts right and one part wrong. He’s right that America’s tax code for businesses—among the steepest in the industrialized world—is a big part of why manufacturers are leaving America for other countries.

And over the past 25 years, America has endured an explosion of federal regulations that have increased both the cost and the complexity of building businesses in the United States. Trump’s resolve to make dramatic changes in both areas could do much to improve America’s industrial output and help the blue-collar workers he speaks so often about.

Where Trump is less likely to succeed is in tearing up global trade agreements and shielding American businesses from foreign competition. A trade war will harm exporting U.S. manufacturers as

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much as it will help those manufacturers with rivals abroad.

Having said that, there is merit to the charge that China has been violating its World Trade Organization obligations with regard to intellectual property and trade secrets, and Trump’s forthright challenge of China’s malfeasance is long overdue.

On fiscal policy, Trump seeks to combine traditional Republican priorities—tax cuts and repeal of President Obama’s health-reform law—with traditional Democratic ones; namely, a trillion-dollar infrastructure package and a replacement for “Obamacare” that will achieve near-universal health insurance coverage.

The high cost of America’s health care system is one of its greatest barriers to economic mobility and fiscal stability. American health care as a false reputation as a place of unfettered capitalism where the indigent die on the street. In fact, U.S. per-capita public spending on health care is only exceeded by that of Norway and Luxembourg.

America spends more than enough to achieve universal coverage; the problem is that its subsidies are skewed to the very poor, the middle

class, and the wealthy, leaving tens of millions in the working poor uninsured.

President Obama aimed to solve this problem by increasing public spending on health insurance, without tackling the fundamental drivers of costly U.S. care. That approach has not worked as well as had been hoped, as tens of millions of Americans remain priced out of the plans that the new health law has sponsored.

Donald Trump has departed from traditional Republican rhetoric in asserting that, when it comes to health care, “everybody’s got to be covered” and “the government” is going to pay for it. He is in a unique position to forge a bipartisan solution that achieves the long-held goal of Democrats but in a way more in keeping with the Republican aspiration of fiscal restraint. If he succeeds, he will have been the most consequential U.S. president in a generation. ●

“America spends more than enough to achieve universal coverage; the problem is that its subsidies are skewed to the very poor, the middle class, and the wealthy, leaving tens of millions in the working poor uninsured.”

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Avik Roy, a healthcare and GOP policy and politics expert at Duco, is the Opinion Editor at Forbes, and founder of The Foundation for Research on Equal Opportunity, non-profit think tank focused on expanding economic opportunity to those with below-median incomes. He has advised three presidential candidates, including Marco Rubio and Mitt Romney.

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A TRUMP TRADE AGENDA

By Marc L. Busch

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oth Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton ran against trade in the 2016 presidential election.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), in particular, became the symbol of all of globalization’s ills. But, like President Obama, President Trump will soon discover that trade is an opportunity to favorably define a presidency.

Americans did not vote against trade in November. For all the hype, Politico reports that 70% of those surveyed had never heard or read about TPP. The Chicago Council finds, moreover, that the U.S. electorate understands the trade helps consumers, and has little effect on jobs. Trump can and should move forward on trade.

It starts with TPP. The text is state-of-the-art, but this has not been explained to the American people. Obama pitched TPP as 18,000 tariff cuts and a “pivot” to Asia, but it’s more than that. It’s a legal template, and it matters well beyond trade with the 11 countries looking to join. Indeed, the real payoff to TPP will be had in the form of an even deeper U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), as well as new negotiations at the World Trade J A N U A RY 2 0 1 7 28

Organization (WTO). Why? Most Americans earn a paycheck in a service sector. Technology makes it possible to trade more of these services across borders. The demand for these services is strong because the middle class is growing everywhere. The U.S., for example, has a trade surplus in services with China. In fact, America accounts for a staggering proportion of global trade in services, closing in on 30%.

The problem is that the WTO did little to liberalize this trade. TPP improves on the WTO, and this will put pressure on the WTO to complete the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) among the 23 countries in on these negotiations.

This “club” needs to be much bigger if U.S. traded services are to realize their full potential. TPP’s success will help get similar text into the myriad trade deals being negotiated globally, and motivate the WTO to be more creative on traded services in order to stay relevant.

Trump should prioritize this U.S. offensive interest.

Likewise, ideas are crucial to creating wealth in America. The United States designs things like iPhones, even if these are pieced together across global value chains.

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The return to investing in ideas hinges on having enforceable intellectual property (IP) rights.

TPP improves on the WTO, offering some better rules, but more can be done. The jobs at stake pay nearly 50% more than jobs that aren’t IP-based. Washington has not always championed stronger IP. Trump can set a new course by advocating for stronger IP provisions, and work these into the WTO’s Information Technology Agreement and the Environmental Goods Agreement.

What about U.S. manufacturers, ranchers and farmers? On these fronts too, TPP goes deeper than the WTO. In addition to cutting tariffs, TPP offers novel ways of dealing with nontariff barriers, especially quality standards. First, the pact calls for more use of science-based global standards, making it easier for U.S. firms and farms to export with lesser fear of arbitrary differences in national standards abroad. Relatedly, TPP will give American exporters more input into the process by which foreign countries regulate their markets. This matters for all U.S. exports, 93% of which are estimated to fall under the technical

regulations of our trade partners.

TTIP will do even more on this front than TPP, but not if TPP fails.

Trade policy is complicated, but the reason America trades isn’t: 95% of the world’s consumers live outside our borders. Fair trade?

Enforcement? Yes, but start out with deeper rules. Start out with TPP. ●

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Marc Busch is an international trade policy and law expert at Duco and serves as a member of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Standards and Technical Trade Barriers (ITAC-16), a public-private group reporting to the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative. Marc is the Karl F. Landegger Professor of International Business Diplomacy at the School of Foreign Service, Professor of Government and Business Administration at Georgetown University.

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“Trade policy is complicated, but the reason America trades isn’t: 95% of the world’s consumers live outside our borders. Fair trade? Enforcement? Yes, but start out with deeper rules. Start out with TPP.”

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TRANSFORMING THE WORLD’S ENERGY FUTURE

By Jon Powers & Kevin Johnson

T

he world is at a transformative moment in terms of how we produce and use electricity.

Global powers are experiencing a major shift in how their electricity is being produced. The traditionally fossil fuel dominated electricity marketplace is being replaced by new low carbon sources, and many developing countries are also capitalizing on these innovations.

Development of distributed clean energy solutions are allowing nations to leapfrog generations of outdated technologies. There is a similar trend in the telecommunication industry, where developing nations are able to utilize cell phones while skipping the cost prohibitive infrastructure of landlines with wires and poles running through the country. Clean, distributed energy now allows solar panels to sit on a residential or commercial rooftop that powers storage batteries in the basements no matter how remote a community may be. The development and policy implications of these types of advancements are truly significant.

While international agreements and policy has helped innovation break out, it is now market demands that are clearly the driving force J A N U A RY 2 0 1 7 30

accelerating the rapid deployment and adoption of clean energy in both developed and emerging markets across the world. Even countries previously reluctant to act, like India and China, have submitted plans as part of the Paris Climate Agreement, outlining how they plan to tackle climate change internally. American leadership and engagement has been instrumental in demonstrating the transformative market potential that clean energy technologies offer to create local jobs and mitigate the impacts of climate change.

Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s recently released a new report “Climatescope” that announced a shift in the center of the clean energy universe. The report notes another first; emerging markets are now out-deploying the developed world markets when it comes to renewable energy. These shifts are occurring because it is beneficial to do so— for their own health and security.

The policy and planning that has driven the clean energy revolution has made significant progress, and we are now living in a world where clean energy is cost effective as well. As Bloomberg recently pointed out, “the world recently passed a

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turning point and is adding more capacity for clean energy each year than for coal and natural gas combined. Peak fossil-fuel use for electricity may be reached within the next decade.” Emerging economies are making strategic investments that are helping to lift millions out of energy poverty, and clean, distributed generation will continue to be key.

America stands to benefit from this significant market shift. The agreement in Paris helped to unleash clean energy innovation in the U.S. and around the world, that is putting individual nations back in control of their energy security. Our country is well-poised to lead in a global clean energy economy. The U.S. was the second largest investor in renewable energy in 2015, but other countries are not far behind.

It is important to also recognize the complexity of these issues, and the challenge as growing economies that are lifting millions out of poverty have vast demand for power. For instance, China has the most solar, wind and hydropower capacity in the world and it is estimated that by 2020, over 15 percent of China’s energy capacity will come from non-fossil fuel

sources. But, as the nation’s demand for energy continues to steadily rise, the Chinese are rapidly bringing new coal powered plants online as well.

As Fortune recently pointed out, China has “50.8 GW of new coalfired energy capacity between the years of 2013-15. For scale, the country’s total installed energy capacity in 1980 was 66 GW.” The key to continued growth of the clean energy sector will be investment.

During Climate Week 2016 in New York City, the United Nations (UN) released a report that indicated it will take $90 trillion dollars in public and private capital to address the worst impacts of climate change. The good news is clean energy proves to be a great investment and is already outpacing capital in fossil fuels thanks to large institutional financial backing.

Despite this rapid growth, there is still a dramatic funding gap, and in order to bridge that gap, we need to be able to access the collective private capital available and capitalize on the clean energy revolution.

President George W. Bush’s former Secretary of Treasury, and former Goldman Sachs CEO, Hank Paulson points to the opportunity in “green investing” in his latest op-ed in the New York Times. $90 trillion is a large

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“clean energy proves to be a great investment and is already outpacing capital in fossil fuels thanks to large institutional financial backing.” price tag, but it should not be seen as a bill, rather a worthy investment. It is feasible to fund the clean energy revolution, but we need everyday investors participating in this market. As markets and nations around the world—both developed world powers and developing nations with energy deficits—are embracing clean energy, we need forward looking policies and financial mechanisms, like CleanCapital, to keep this momentum going. ●

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Jon Powers & Kevin Johnson are energy experts at Duco and the co-founders of Clean Capital, a clean energy finance company. Jon served as President Obama’s Chief Sustainability Officer in the White House, and Kevin has seven years of Merger and Acquisition and business development experience for several of the world’s largest renewable energy companies.

D I P L O M AT I C O U R I E R .c o m G L O B A L I Z AT I O N

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN 2017

By Stanley R. Sloan

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s the United States enters the first 100 days of Donald Trump’s presidential term, transatlantic relations face greater uncertainty than at any time since the aftermath of the Second World War. Much of that uncertainty results from conflicting signals that have come from President Trump.

But the outcome will likely be found in the interactions between future Trump administration policies, European political developments, and the external threats to transatlantic security and cohesion.

The bottom line question is whether illiberal political tendencies in America combined with similar tendencies in Europe, interacting with challenges posed by Russian revisionism and Islamic State threats, are now producing a perfect storm that could blow away the transatlantic alliance.

Political dynamics in Europe were already signaling trouble more than a year ago, when it appeared that populist tendencies in many European countries could undermine the European Union, NATO, and Western interests more generally. The British referendum that decided the UK should leave the EU – known popularly as the J A N U A RY 2 0 1 7 32

“Brexit” – last June reflected such tendencies in Great Britain. In 2017, the Brexit process seems likely to further raise the level of uncertainty about the entire future of the European project as well as of the UK’s place in the world and its “special relationship” with the United States.

Meanwhile, elections in core EU members France and Germany will test whether populist pressures in those two countries will challenge leadership by traditional parties. In France, the leader of the right-wing National Front, Marine le Pen, will compete strongly for the French presidency. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s return to power seems likely but reactions to her relatively permissive approach to Middle Eastern immigrants and those Germans who support a less confrontational approach to Moscow could weaken her ability to govern Against that stormy backdrop, the mysteries surrounding likely Trump administration policies toward transatlantic relations are the cause for greatest concern. During the U.S. presidential primaries, Trump asserted that the NATO allies were not paying their fair share for Western defense. This was not so

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exceptional, as other U.S. officials, including former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, had issued similar warnings in years past.

However, Trump took it an unprecedented step further, arguing that the United States should not come to the defense of an ally if that ally had not “earned” the U.S. commitment. This position, never fully retracted by the presidentelect, suggested abandonment of the key collective defense commitment (Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty) that has been the central operative provision of the treaty. Under Article 5, all allies agree to treat an attack on another ally as an attack on them all. This was precisely what all allies did in response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

The uncertainty concerning future U.S. commitments to NATO has been so unsettling that it has stimulated speculation about a nuclear deterrence role for Germany, or some combination of French/ British nuclear deterrents.

Trump’s decision to nominate well-respected General James Mattis as Secretary of Defense suggested that his position might be softened

by Mattis’ support for traditional

U.S. alliances. But Trump’s obvious inclination to “do a deal” with Russian President Putin and his nomination of Exxon CEO Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State strengthened speculation that Trump might direct Tillerson to negotiate a deal, perhaps removing the sanctions imposed on Russia for its 2014 aggression against Ukraine, including annexation of The Crimea.

One of the very big questions for 2017 therefore is whether or not President Trump will reaffirm Western interests and the values of “democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law” enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty and disavow previous statements weakening the U.S. commitment to collective defense. The future of the transatlantic alliance could rest on his choice ● ABOUT THE AUTHOR Stan Sloan is a transatlantic relations and NATO expert at Duco, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a visiting scholar in political science at Middlebury College. He was the drafter in 1973 of the U.S. intelligence community’s first estimate on the future of European defense cooperation. His most recent book is Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain (Manchester University Press, 2016).

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“Trump’s decision to nominate well-respected General James Mattis as Secretary of Defense suggested that his position might be softened

by Mattis’ support for traditional U.S. alliances.”

D I P L O M AT I C O U R I E R .c o m SECURITY

ENERGY T SECURITY AND TRUMP’S HIGHER OIL PRICE WAGER

By Andrew Bowen

he president-elect has weighed in on nuclear weapons repeatedly via his beloved Twitter and in interviews, debates, and speeches, albeit superficially, ambiguously, and often self-contradictorily. We have a firmer sense of his party’s priorities; Trump is likely to embrace many and will need to contend with others if he takes a different tack.

While the OPEC deal gave a year-end rally to oil prices after a turbulent year, depressed prices are likely to continue to be the new normal for 2017. This New Year will be a better year than 2016, but only by a small uptick.

With mid-terms on the horizon, President Donald Trump is betting on an energy rebound to deliver jobs to those who turned out for him in great numbers in Pennsylvania and the wider shale-rich parts of the U.S. Domestically, Trump will push to re-start the U.S.’s energy industry by fast tracking long-delayed pipeline projects, pulling back a number of Obama’s cumbersome environmental and energy regulations, investing in new infrastructure to enhance the nation’s energy grid, and potentially lifting the energy export bans. Abroad, the President will turn his sights on J A N U A RY 2 0 1 7 34

pressing Saudi Arabia and Russia to do their part in cutting back production and stabilizing the market.

Higher oil prices are key to bringing further economic growth at home in his first year in office. Will this work?

FACTORS THAT KEPT PRICES LOW IN 2016 ARE STILL IN PLAY These include over-supply of the market (Russia, for example, produced at its highest levels in decades), energy diversification and renewables are on the rise, depressed global demand (slowdown in China but rising demand in India), U.S. shale’s lower re-start costs, and returning producers (Libya and Iran).

HIGHER PRICES/HIGH STAKES It’s not just the incoming administration, which needs a boost in energy prices. Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Iran’s year-long wrangling to reach a deal to cut production has been a welcome relief to their fiscal reserves which had been greatly hit by falling prices. Their market share battle (a war as well on American shale) had become too costly. Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitious Vision 2030 reforms likely would have lost traction in 2017 if the young prince failed to secure a

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production deal. Riyadh now has room in their 2017 budget to offset the austerity measures with fiscal stimulus.

OPEC’S RETURN After months of skepticism, OPEC’s year-end save brings the cartel back in play in moving the markets, but their ability to shake the market is still greatly diminished and agreement amongst members still remains a fraught diplomatic exercise. As much as they need higher oil prices, Riyadh and other cartel members still have to contend with the U.S. and Russia. It’s also an open question still whether OPEC members and non-OPEC members who signed onto the deal can follow through with their cuts.

MIXED GEOPOLITICAL FORECAST Geopolitical events will certainly impact 2017’s markets and this upcoming year looks to be no less volatile. With Trump looking to reset relations with Moscow and more pro-Russian leaning governments emerging in Europe, tensions with China are more likely to dominate 2017 than tensions with Russia will likely dominate 2017. ISIS will likely face substantial setbacks this year.

Yemen and Libya will continue to

be hotspots, Iran will unlikely to be as big of point of contention as the leadership in Tehran seeks to avoid a confrontation with Washington.

Angola is headed closer and closer to civil war.

This leaves the new administration in Washington with a mixed price forecast as it navigates its foremost priority, strengthening America at home so it can compete more effectively abroad. Black swans such as Iran taking aggressive action in the Strait of Hormuz or shale not exceeding expectations may lead to a rise of prices in 2017.

However, even with all these observations, forecasting the market is never a precise science and psychology is always at play. If all else remains equal, one should not expect prices to reach above $70. ●

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Andrew Bowen, a national security and energy expert at Duco, is a Visiting Scholar in Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

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“With mid-terms on the horizon, President Donald Trump is betting on an energy rebound to deliver jobs to those who turned out for him in great numbers in Pennsylvania and the wider shale-rich parts of the U.S.”

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TRUMP:

“BIGGEST PROBLEM, TO ME, IN THE WORLD, IS NUCLEAR, AND PROLIFERATION”

By Philipp C. Bleek

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he thought of President-Elect Donald Trump’s fingers on the proverbial nuclear button is chilling to many national security professionals. In addition to a strikingly different temperament than the current occupant of the Oval Office, the Trump administration will bring a mix of continuity and change, seasoned with considerable uncertainty, to various nuclear weapons-related policies.

The president-elect has weighed in on nuclear weapons repeatedly via his beloved Twitter and in interviews, debates, and speeches, albeit superficially, ambiguously, and often self-contradictorily. We have a firmer sense of his party’s priorities; Trump is likely to embrace many and will need to contend with others if he takes a different tack.

Both Trump and his party have suggested that our nuclear arsenal and associated infrastructure are dangerously small and decayed, though much of this appears to be partisan posturing. Trump will inherit a long-term and costly effort to revitalize that infrastructure and replace all nuclear delivery platforms.

Loose talk aside, tinkering around the margins is more likely than dramatic change. But even staying the course J A N U A RY 2 0 1 7 36

will require addressing significant budgetary challenges.

U.S. nuclear posture has long been linked to Russia’s, with the two sides reducing their forces in parallel via a series of strategic arms control agreements. But that process may have largely run its course. Deeper reductions hinge on addressing thorny issues like limiting missile defense capabilities, accounting for actual warheads rather than more easily verified delivery systems, and addressing shorter range tactical systems. The political will and trust this would require are largely absent at present.

One can imagine this being Trump’s “Nixon goes to China” moment, just as, relatedly, one could imagine our mercurial soon-to-be president taking a cue from Reagan and unexpectedly embracing nuclear abolition, especially if he could be convinced this would cement a grandiose legacy.

Conversely, if the US-Russian relationship continues to deteriorate —which appears plausible, notwithstanding our presidentelect’s apparent regard for Putin— none of this will be politically viable.

And if potential crises or outright conflicts with Moscow emerge, they will play out in the shadow of both sides’ nuclear weapons.

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Both Trump and his party have been deeply critical of the Iran nuclear deal, which rolls back and freezes Tehran’s efforts to bolster its nuclear weapons-related capabilities. Rhetoric notwithstanding, there is unlikely to be a better deal on the table. If it sabotages the current agreement, the Trump administration will face difficult choices in either accepting, while trying to contain, Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities or undertaking military action to try to degrade them, with uncertain and potentially counterproductive results. As for North Korea, it is likely to be at least as much of a headache for Trump as it has been for all his recent predecessors, and he is no more likely to find elegant solutions to its growing nuclear capabilities, and intransigence more generally, than they did. India and Pakistan are also plausible sources of nuclear-related crises, as is China, toward which Trump has signaled a harder line.

Finally, if we take the presidentelect at his word, he intends to renegotiate our alliances to either extract greater compensation for what he views as undue American burdens or force allies to fend more for themselves. He also cavalierly suggested that he would not be

overly concerned if allies like Japan or South Korea responded by pursuing their own nuclear weapons.

Yet despite such disconcerting statements, the basic structure of U.S. alliance commitments seems likely to persist for the foreseeable future. But such past and likely also future rhetoric is a fascinating, and scary, test of the conventional wisdom that our allies are acutely sensitive to the nuances of these relationships.

For better but more likely for worse, we are about to enter uncharted territory. ●

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Philipp C. Bleek, a nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation expert at Duco, is Assistant Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies program and Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, both at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. He previously served as Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. The views expressed in this article are his own, and do not represent any of his current or past employers.

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“Trump will inherit a long-term and costly effort to revitalize that infrastructure and replace all nuclear delivery platforms. Loose talk aside, tinkering around the margins is more likely than dramatic change. But even staying the course will require addressing significant budgetary challenges.”

D I P L O M AT I C O U R I E R .c o m SECURITY

INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IS KEY TO SECURING U.S. BORDERS

By Matt Chandler

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onsider for a moment, even amidst President Trump’s late night Tweets aimed at allies and foes alike, that our new commander-in-chief truly means to enact an isolationist agenda that seeks to withdraw the United States from its long-held commitments to allies and partners abroad. Impacts abound across multiple channels, from our robust defense alliances, to those that pertain to trade. However, one key question cuts across both his “Make America Great Again” domestic focus and his evolving foreign policy priorities. How do we secure our nation’s borders?

President Trump’s border security intentions have been summed up in a now-famously succinct manner. Build a wall and make Mexico pay for it.

But, there are two issues with walling the U.S. away from perceived threats.

First, it assumes that our border is a first line of defense behind which we are safe from external threats if we provide billions of dollars of physical infrastructure. Second, it assumes that border security is a unilateral function that can be carried out by the United States alone. What hopefully becomes part of the President’s foreign policy equation is how critically intertwined U.S. J A N U A RY 2 0 1 7 38

border security is with engaging our foreign partners and allies.

It is true in both definition and historical practice that an international border is a physical line in the sand, with implications that are farreaching—economic, political, security, and human-related. But in a globalized world, the border, and thus border security, has changed. Outside factors, including both commerce and threats, have evolved the notion of a border from a first line of defense to the last.

Technology and information have given the U.S. the ability to push the border out, identifying and interdicting threats as they approach the U.S. before they ever reach the physical border while at the same time expediting the flow of legitimate traffic. These threats can take many forms, from individuals with derogatory terrorist, criminal, or customs histories to illicit or suspicious cargo. U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel do this in several ways, for example, using data to target threats hidden amongst inbound passengers and cargo, or by conducting physical screening at preclearance locations at foreign airports around the world. The outcome is a drastically smaller haystack in which to find the needle at the physical U.S. border.

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Obviously, pushing the borders out, so to speak, is not something the U.S. can do unilaterally. It takes careful diplomacy, strong relationships, and a shared vision of what international partnerships can do to protect people across the world. Led by Secretaries Napolitano and Johnson, U.S. Department of Homeland Security staff, with support from their State Department colleagues, over the last eight years have expanded information sharing agreements, giving us the data necessary to conduct robust intelligence-based targeting to know when to deny a passenger boarding a plane at a foreign airport or subject them to additional screening upon arrival. Cooperation with host governments allows U.S. law enforcement personnel to forwarddeploy, ensuring dangerous people or goods do not travel toward the U.S. These agreements have proven critical in keeping individuals departing from conflict zones like Syria from traveling to the U.S., for example. This demonstrably improved border security is predicated on strong international alliances and partnerships.

As the new Administration considers priorities, it should seek to expand this type of engagement abroad, not curtail it. It should repair relationships with

critical partners and campaign trail targets like Mexico, whose cooperation is necessary to secure our border. In a world of globalized threats and opportunities it only serves to reduce progress by hiding behind walls. ●

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Matt Chandler is a homeland security expert at Duco and a partner at Frontier Solutions, a Washington D.C.-based investigatory, compliance, due diligence and crisis management firm. He previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, focusing on counterterrorism, intelligence, border security, immigration, and federal law enforcement-related issues.

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“President Trump’s border security intentions have been summed up in a nowfamously succinct manner.

Build a wall and make Mexico pay for it. But, there are two issues with walling the U.S. away from perceived threats.”

D I P L O M AT I C O U R I E R .c o m SECURITY

CYBERSECURITY IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

By Jamil N. Jaffer

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rom the rise of increasingly capable nation-states—like Iran and North Korea— conducting destructive attacks against American private sector companies, to the continuing pace of IP theft by China striking at the very heart of our innovation economy, the new team at the White House will have its hands full. And this doesn’t even account for ongoing efforts to infiltrate critical infrastructures by nation-state proxies and efforts to influence political, economic, and military conditions in the United States through cyber-enabled intelligence. Or recruitment activities, the reality of our aging federal cyber infrastructure, and the lack of serious federal government policies on joint public-private cyber defense and cyber deterrence.

Given this dizzying list of challenges, the likely limited bandwidth to address these issues in the first 100 days, and the urgency of the threat, one might ask what critical issues the new administration ought to tackle immediately after inauguration day. To that end, there are five key steps that the Trump Administration should—consistent with its policy platform—take that might have a J A N U A RY 2 0 1 7 40

useful impact on our nation’s cybersecurity in the near-term.

First, as we did in the Cold War, the new administration should define the scope of cyber activities that would provoke our nation to action.

That list must include efforts to conduct destructive attacks on the property of any American government or corporate assets, regardless of where they are located; activities targeting American critical infrastructures, and activities directly affecting our body politic—including, but not limited to, efforts to influence our political process or to fundamentally undermine our economic capabilities, including through the theft of the American core corporate intellectual property.

Second, the administration must make clear that it will respond swiftly and severely to activities that cross the lines described above. If we are to have credibility, we must also be prepared to actually take action when such lines are crossed. For better or worse, today, American redlines largely go disrespected because of our prior failures to enforce them. We also ought to make clear that our responses will be calibrated to the threat and may not necessarily take place in cyberspace.

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Third, the Trump Administration should incorporate technology infrastructure into its $1 trillion initiative to build roads, bridges, and buildings. As it encourages private sector investment through tax credits and other incentive programs, the administration must, likewise, encourage investment in technology infrastructure including the buildout of high-speed network access to underserved areas and the broad deployment of cloud infrastructure for public and private needs. In addition, the administration should encourage the use of American infrastructure technology domestically and abroad, even in the face of efforts by other nations—like China—to subsidize their industries through low-to-no interest loans and government-enabled IP theft.

Fourth, the Trump Administration needs to establish a White House mechanism for engaging the American private sector in national security decision-making. As the recent Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity recently recommended, the new administration should create a forum for top private sector executives from key infrastructure sectors to be regularly briefed on critical national

security matters with a cybersecurity nexus and to provide their input directly to the President through the National Security Advisor.

Fifth, the Trump Administration should require the U.S. intelligence community to immediately begin providing classified threat information directly to American critical infrastructure companies in a machine usable format that protects intelligence sources and methods.

While Congress recently passed threat sharing legislation, the reality is that both the federal government and the private sector have remained reticent to share the most useful information.

The government ought to show good faith by being the first to give in this area and start sharing immediately.

Like any new administration, the Trump team will face a steep learning curve on the wide range of threats the nation faces around the world, particularly in cyberspace. However, there are some key steps that it can take in the near-term to have a significant impact on our cybersecurity posture. By establishing the conditions for a serious, workable deterrence system, treating technology as a core infrastructure component, and establishing a tight working relationship with the private

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“the Trump Administration should require the U.S. intelligence community to immediately begin providing classified threat information directly to American critical infrastructure companies in a machine usable format that protects intelligence sources and methods.” sector, the Trump Administration can take the very ideas at the core of its electoral platform and apply them to good use in cybersecurity in the first 100 days. ●

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Jamil Jaffer, a cybersecurity and national security expert at Duco, recently served as the Chief Counsel and Senior Advisor for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he worked on key national security and foreign policy issues, including leading the drafting of the proposed Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against ISIS in 2014 and 2015, the AUMF against Syria in 2013, and revisions to the 9/11 AUMF against al Qaeda.

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12/29/16

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Taiwan Civil Government

It's A New Day In Washington

And Change Is On The Horizon C

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Congratulations President Trump In this new era of U.S.-Taiwan relations we would like to tell our story.

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THE FACTS

• The U.S. appointed Chiang Kai-Shek to Administer Taiwan after the Allies defeated Japan in WWII • The U.S. became the principal occupying power over Taiwan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952

THE LAW

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• Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

• The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 established commercial, cultural and other relations with Taiwan without official government representation and without formal diplomatic relations.

• Taiwan has remained an unrecognized state since then, living under a U.S. policy of “stratgic ambiguity” • The Republic of China is a government in exile that does not represent Taiwan, and Taiwan is not the Republic of China in exile.

• Article 7(6) of the 1961 Convention articulates the basic international norm that a person shall not lose their nationality if such a loss would render him stateless.

• Congress and the President need to act to change the status of Taiwan.

Taiwan Civil Government Learn Our History At TaiwanCivilGovernment.com Materials distributed by Global Vision Communications on behalf of the Taiwan Civil Governemnt.

Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

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