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Barry St Ledger (claimant) v. Frontline Distribution Ireland Ltd (respondent): Employment Appeals Tribunal, UD 56/94 (Dublin, 25 May 1994, 14 July 1994) Issues - Unfair Dismissal-Method of selection for Redundancy- Whether nature of the job changed Legislation - Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973 to 1991-Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977(No. 10)to 1993 (No. 5)-Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 (No. 21) to 1990, section 7(2)(d) and (e) Facts The claimant was a warehouse supervisor who was dismissed and replaced by a Mr Kennedy whom the respondents claimed was better trained to do the work. Mr Kennedy had passed an examination which, with further study, might lead to a diploma. When their job specifications were compared the only differences were that Mr Kennedy reported to a different person and that Mr Kennedy was able to do the work without the assistance of a part-time helper. Determined Redundancy is impersonal and it involves change. The defi nition in section 7(2)(d) and (e) involve change in the way the work is done or some other form of change in the nature of the job. The definition in 7(2)(e) must involve, partly at least, work of a different kind. More work or less work of the same kind does not mean 'other work'. The Tribunal was satisfied that the nature of the work did not change, nor did the manner in which it was done. Therefore there was no redundancy within the meaning of either definition 7(2)(d) or (e) of the Redundancy Payments Acts. the The full text of the Tribunal's determination: During the course of the hearing informed were we resumed hearing the When Tribunal withdrew to consider a ruling. d us to that the case was settled. Nonetheless the solicitors for the parties requeste course. due in it circulate to , guidance future for and, ruling announce our by a The claimant was a warehouse supervisor who was dismissed and replaced work. the do to trained better Mr Kennedy who the respondent company claimed was On behalf of the respondent it was argued that the dismissal was justified because s it arose from redundancy. Definition (e) of section 7(2) of the Redundancy Payment and upon, relied was 1971 Act s Payment ncy Redunda the by Act 1967 as amended to a lesser extent definition (d). These definitions are: (d) the fact that the employer has decided that the work for which the employee
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been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) shouldhenceforward bedone in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained, (e) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained.
On the first day of the hearing we were told that Mr Kennedy had a diploma which made him better qualified than the claimant. It transpired that he did not have a diploma but had only passed an examination which, with further study, might later lead to a diploma. The hearing was adjourned to allow the parties set out on paper the training, qualifications and general careers of both the claimant and Mr Kennedy, as well as job specifications covering work done by the claimant before dismissal and by Mr Kennedy afterwards. The claimant furnished full details of his career and a job specification of the work carried out by him when in the respondent's employ No details were supplied in respect of Mr Kennedy's training but two job specifications, before and after the dismissal, were handed in by the company. On examination of the job specifications it is clear that Mr Kennedy does the same work as the claimant did, with the exception that he reports to a different person. One other difference is that Mr Kennedy is able to do the work without the assistance of a part-time helper, but the respondent was not relying on a reduction in numbers as part of its case. We were also given a comparison of the relative abilities of the claimant and Mr Kennedy to cany out the work. In the absence of a specific diploma, we were concerned with training rather than qualifications. In fact the respondent did not show that Mr Kennedy had any special training, and the respondent's solicitor, in argument, tried to equate training with ability. The solicitor for the respondent argued that these factors made out a case for redundancy within the meaning of definition (e). He said that, though the nature of the work remained the same, the volume had increased and Mr Kennedy was better able to handle the increase. And he argued that the words 'other work' in definition (e) include an increase in the volume of the work. We cannot accept this argument. Redundancy has two characteristics which are of importance in this case. It is impersonal and it involves change. Impersonality runs throughout the five definitions in the Act. Redundancy impacts on the job and only as a consequence of the redundancy does the person involved lose his job. It is worthy of note that the E.C. Directive on Collective Redundancies uses a shorter and simpler definition: 'one or more reasons not related to the individual workers concerned'. Change also runs through all five definitions. This means change in the workplace. The most dramatic change of all is a complete close down. Change may also mean a reduction in needs for employees, or a reduction in numbers. Definitions (d) and (e) involve change in the way the work is done or some other form of change in the nature
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of the job. Under these two definitions change in thejob must mean qualitative change. the Definition (e) must involve, partly at least, work of a different kind, and that is the of work less or work More work'. 'other words the on put can only meaning we event any In change. ve quantitati only is and work' 'other mean not does kind same in the quantitative change in this case is in the wrong direction. A downward change an but (b) , definition another under the volume of work might imply redundancy upward change would not. For redundancy to arise in the present case the respondent would have to satisfy us that the nature of the job changed, and that in connection with the change, and only had in connection with the change, Mr Kennedy had certain training that the claimant not. We are satisfied that the nature of the work did not change, nor did the maimer in which it was done. Therefore there is no redundancy within the meaning of either definition (d) or (e). There is another reason why redundancy does not arise in this case. We were given or no evidence that Mr Kennedy had any special training, either in the formal sense ability. more had Kennedy Mr related to work experience. The respondent said that able Ability is not the same as training. It is irrelevant whether Mr Kennedy is better deny to be would otherwise hold To claimant. the by to do the work previously done the essential impersonality of redundancy. For the claimant: / McCarthy, solicitor, Kenny Stephenson Chapman For the respondent: S. McCormick, solicitor, Eugene F. Collins Division of the Tribunal: D. MacCarthy SC (Chairperson), M. O'Leary, N. O'Neill Mary Phelan Barrister
Martin G. Concannon (claimant) v. Chairman and Board of Manage ment of St Grellan's Boys National School Ballinasloe, Co. Gal way and the Department of Education (respondents): Employment Appeals Tri bunal UP 1148/92 (Dublin, 29 September 1994) Issues - Unfair Dismissal - Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to strike out a case or an appeal Legislation - Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 (No. 10) and 1991 (No. 5) Redundancy (Redundancy Appeals Tribunal) Regulations 1968, SI No. 24 of 1968 - Unfair Dismissals (Claims and Appeals) Regulations 1977, SI No. 286 of 1977