COLUMNS
The Map Room Speaks: Why COPA Would Damage New York City’s Multifamily Housing Market The Community Opportunity to Purchase Act (COPA) was vetoed by former New York City Mayor Eric Adams on his way out the door, but it remains a top priority for some policy makers, just as Good Cause Eviction took several attempts and various iterations before it passed. Undoubtedly, it will be proposed again.
Bob Knakal Chairman and CEO BKREA New York City (917)509-9501
New York City’s multifamily housing sector already operates under one of the most complex regulatory regimes in the country. While policymakers often frame new interventions as modest guardrails, the cumulative impact of layered regulation matters far more than any single proposal. The proposed COPA is a clear example. If enacted, COPA would materially weaken the apartment building sales market in New York City, reducing liquidity, discouraging investment and introducing new litigation risk — at a moment when the asset class can least afford additional headwinds. First, COPA would inject a significant level of uncertainty into multifamily transactions, undermining the confidence of institutional capital. Large-scale investors and equity providers prioritize clarity: predictable timelines, defined counterparties and enforceable closing conditions. COPA replaces that clarity with an indeterminate pre-sale process, extended notice periods and the possibility that third-party nonprofit actors may intervene late in a transaction. The mere risk that a deal could be delayed, re-traded or derailed is enough to alter underwriting assumptions. For institutional investors — who often provide equity to owner-operators — this makes New York City rent-regulated apartments less attractive relative to markets with fewer procedural obstacles. Second, COPA would meaningfully slow down the sale process, reducing liquidity across the multifamily asset class. Liquidity is not an abstract concept; it directly affects pricing, financing and long-term ownership decisions. Under COPA, many sellers would face mandatory waiting periods and administrative hurdles before accessing the open market. Transactions that might otherwise close in 90 to 120 days could stretch far longer, increasing carrying costs, interest expense and exposure to market volatility. Reduced liquidity translates into higher risk premiums, which in turn depress values. Over time, this dynamic discourages both new entrants and existing owners from reinvesting capital into aging stock. Third, COPA opens the door to strategic behavior by nonprofits that may have no genuine intent to purchase buildings. By signaling interest, these organizations gain access to sensitive regulatory records held by the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, including rent histories and registration data. This creates a perverse incentive structure: expressing interest
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becomes a low-cost mechanism to mine data that can later be used to support rent overcharge claims or other litigation. The resulting increase in legal exposure — particularly for long-held assets with legacy recordkeeping issues — would further deter transactions and invite years of costly disputes. A law intended to stabilize housing would instead amplify adversarial behavior and legal friction. Fourth, the cumulative effect of COPA would be to suppress investor appetite for rentregulated multifamily properties altogether. Investors evaluate not only current income streams but also exit optionality. If selling an asset becomes more difficult, slower and riskier, rational investors respond by reallocating capital elsewhere. This does not reduce the need for housing, nor does it magically preserve affordability. It simply shifts investment away from regulated rental housing toward less constrained asset classes or entirely different geographies. Over time, reduced investment means fewer renovations, deferred maintenance, worse living conditions for tenants and less capital available for building upgrades — outcomes that ultimately harm tenants as much as owners. This is a commonsense outcome of such policy — why can’t our policymakers see this? These concerns are compounded by the broader policy environment. COPA does not exist in a vacuum. It arrives alongside proposals such as a multi-year rent freeze pledged by Zohran Mamdani, which would further compress revenue growth and erode operating margins. When layered together, the result is a toxic policy mix. Owners face rising expenses, capped revenues, increased legal risk, fewer capital providers and diminished exit options. Few asset classes can remain healthy under that combination, and rent-regulated multifamily housing is no exception. COPA proponents argue that the law would preserve affordability and empower community ownership. Those goals may be well-intentioned, but good intentions do not negate market realities. Affordable housing preservation requires patient, long-term capital with operating expertise that is willing to fund acquisitions, renovations and ongoing operations. Policies that scare away that capital ultimately undermine the very outcomes they seek to promote. If New York City wants to protect tenants and preserve affordability, it should focus on targeted subsidies, streamlined regulatory processes and incentives that encourage investment and responsible ownership — not blunt procedural barriers that reduce liquidity and destabilize the market. COPA, as proposed, would do more harm than good. In an already fragile rent-regulated multifamily ecosystem, it risks accelerating disinvestment at precisely the wrong moment.
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