A diplomatic about-face

Ferdinand Marcos Jr. visited Beijing in early January and it got heavy play in China's state media, touting the nascent partnership between the two nations.

Less than a month later, the Marcos administration would turn around and announce during the visit to Manila of U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin expanded access for U.S. forces in the Philippines, raising the number of military facilities the Americans could use from five to nine.

Manila's defense department did not say where the new sites would be located. But at least two were said to be in the northern Philippines, according to media reports, within a short distance from Taiwan which China insists is part of its territory. To sweeten the deal, the U.S. said it would spend more than $82 million for infrastructure investments at the five existing sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the two countries.

The Chinese quickly slammed the U.S., accusing Washington of “escalating” tensions in the region.

Beneath the diplomatic speak,

Marcos made it clear that the erstwhile cozy relationship his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, had with Beijing is history.

Given the way Chinese coast guard vessels have run roughshod over Filipino fishermen and the deep mistrust the Philippine military has for China, the decision by Marcos to swing back to the country’s treaty ally should have been expected. Dismissing the landmark Hague ruling favoring the Philippines does not endear China to Filipinos.

It was a question of when Manila would run back to Washington’s embrace, not if.

At one time, The FilAm asked a high-ranking former Philippine army officer who the military trusts more: China or the U.S.? Who is the bigger security threat to the Philippines? The reply came swiftly and without prevarication. On trust: The

U.S. The bigger threat to Philippine security: China.

Philippine security officials were candid enough to admit they wanted the U.S. back as a counter to China's aggressive actions over the Spratlys.

As for the U.S., they are back in the Philippines without the burden of having to deal with the Philippine Senate. There will be no treaty to speak of and no need to secure the votes of grandstanding senators. It will not be called a “military base” as the agreement covers rotation of U.S. forces, not permanent basing.

One wit put it as “having bases without the bases.”

No one seems to be paying attention to the protests of the Philippine Left against the bases given China’s questionable actions in the region. The Left is in disarray and, in the view of some Filipinos, a discredited force that cannot seem to go beyond trite sloganeering.

The ramifications of the deal are being glossed over for now. Does this increase the risk of the Philippines being dragged into war over Taiwan? Yes, it does. But make no mistake about it. A dormant partnership is back in place and running at full throttle.

By Claire Mercado-Obias