The New face of Syria

Issue 1568 • November/December 2011

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9 770261 087119 The Majalla

Issue 1568

The

New face of Syria War and Peace

In the wake of the Arab Spring, the US must deal with Islamist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood – what challenges and opportunities are presented?

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The Wealth of Nations

The current uprisings in the Arab World have already made a dent in oil prices.

What does the future hold for markets that rely on the petro-dollar?

Candid Conversations

Daniel Yergin provides an insightful analysis of the changing geopolitics of energy and its implications for the world today

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• EDITORIAL

Established in 1987 by Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz Al-Majalla Established by Hisham and Ali Hafez Chief Executive Officer Dr Azzam Al-Dakhil Editor-in-Chief Adel Al-Toraifi Managing Editor Azeddine Senegri Senior Editor Maryam Ishani Editors Michael Whiting Amy Assad Editorial Secretary Jan Singfield Designer Matt Dettmar Submissions To submit articles or opinion, please email: enquiries@majalla.com Subscriptions To subscribe to the digital edition, please contact: subscriptions@majalla.com To subscribe for kindle edition: kindle@majalla.com Disclaimer The views expressed in this magazine are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or views of The Majalla and its editorial team.

Al Majalla © 2011 HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited.

All rights reserved. Niether this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Limited. For digital subscription inquiries please visit www.majalla.com/subscriptions

London Office Address HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Limited Arab Press House 182-184 High Holborn, LONDON WC1V 7AP DDI: +44 (0)20 7539 2335/2337, Tel.: +44 (0)20 7821 8181, Fax: +(0)20 7831 2310 E-Mail: enquiries@majalla.com Advertising For advertisement, sponsorship and digital edition, please contact: Mr. Wael Al-Fayez w.alfayez@alkhaleejiah.com Tel.: 0096614411444 F.: 0096614400996 P.O.BOX 22304 Riyadh 11495, Saudi Arabia Cover image © Getty Images

Editorial This month we feature an extensive interview with the President of the Syrian National Council, Burhan Ghalioun.

The leader of the prominent Syrian opposition group discusses the merits of the Arab League’s initiative to end the Syrian crisis, confronts criticisms concerning the fractured nature of the Syrian opposition and claims that the Assad regime is all but over.

We have also asked Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, Caryle Murphy, to offer a new look at social media and its role in the uprisings in the Arab World and tell us what have we learned about the potential of—and the limits to—technology.

Joyce Karam examines the constantly shifting position of the US government in their relationship with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, looking at the possibilities (and the limits).

Energy expert Amy Myers Jaffe and co-author Keily Miller look at the future of oil in a climate of extraordinary instability.

Nabila Ramdani examines whether Algeria is ready to follow the lead of its neighbour, Libya, and questions the relationship between Algeria and the Qadhafi family.

We invite you to read these articles and much more on n our website at www.majalla.com/en. As always, we welcome and value our readers’ feedback and invite you to contact us with your questions and comments.

Adel Al-Toraifi Editor in Chief

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Contributors Amy Myers Jaffe Amy Myers Jaffe is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies and director of the Energy Forum at the Baker Institute, as well as associate director of the Rice Energy Program.

Jaffe's research focuses on oil geopolitics, strategic energy policy including energy science policy, and energy economics. Her co-author in this issue, Keily Miller, is a research associate for the Energy Forum at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy.

Joyce Karam Joyce Karam has been working as the Washington Correspondent for Al Hayat newspaper since spring of 2004. Al Hayat is the leading and most widely read Arabic daily based in London. Prior to joining Al Hayat, Ms. Karam worked as a journalist at Assafir and Annahar newspapers in Beirut, mostly covering the postwar situation in Lebanon. In 2002, Ms. Karam worked as an editor at the United Nations public affairs offices in Beirut. Ms. Karam holds a Masters in International Peace and Conflict Resolution and a Bachelors degree in Journalism.

Nabila Ramdani Nabila Ramdani is a Paris-born freelance journalist of Algerian descent who specialises in Anglo-French issues, Islamic affairs, and the Arab World Nabila is also particularly interested in the human consequences of America’s War on Terror and terrorism issues linked to Al-Qaeda. She writes columns for The Guardian, London Evening Standard, and New Statesman. Nabila also produces features and news stories for a wide range of other Fleet Street publications, including the Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, Daily Mail, Mail on Sunday, and Sunday Times.

Caryle Murphy Caryle Murphy is an independent journalist based in Saudi Arabia. A longtime reporter for the Washington Post, Ms Murphy was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting (1991) and the George Polk Award for Foreign Reporting (1990) for her coverage of Iraqi-occupied Kuwait and subsequent 1990-91 Gulf War. She is the author of Passion for Islam, which explores Islam’s contemporary revival and the roots of religious extremism in the Middle East.

Published by Scribner, the book examines Islam’s resurgence through the prism of Egypt, where Murphy lived for five years.

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• CONTENTS

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14 Contents

Quotes of the Month War and Peace

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On Politics

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The New Face of Syria

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The Twitter Generation

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Profile

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The Wealth of Nations

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Editor’s Choice

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Candid Conversations

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Country Brief

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Thinking Out Loud

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The Arts

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The Critics

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The Final Word

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• Political Islam and the US: Can the Muslim Brotherhood and the US become friends?

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• The Delicate Democracy: What is the state of the democratic project in Iraq?

• The Algerian Paradox: Is Algeria in a position to follow neighboring Libya’s lead?

The President of the Syrian National Council (SNC), Burhan Ghalioun, considers the end of the Assad regime in Syria to be close at hand

Mainstream media and society as a whole are finding this social media phenomenon and its users an important new partner, but to what extent is this new generation redefining the Middle East?

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• Maher Al-Assad • The Future of Oil: The Arab Awakening and the great Petro-Squeeze • Europe: A Season of the Apparatchiki • The Face of the New Enemy • Daniel Yergin

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• QUOTES OF THE MONTH

Quotes of the Month Images © Getty Images

“The burden of proof is overwhelming… and clearly shows official Iranian responsibility for this. Somebody in Iran will have to pay the price”

Prince Turki Al-Faisal, on an alleged assassination attempt of the Saudi ambassador to the US

“We cannot expect any fair approach by the enemies (of Iran), because they have always had deep enmity with the Iranian people”

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in an address to the nation of Iran calling on them to remain united in the face of growing international pressure

“We welcome “Syria is taking steps focused on two partnership with the main fronts – political reform and the opposition to manage the country’s affairs dismantling of armed groups” Syrian President” Bashar Al-Assad on how he is dealing and rebuild what the with how is dealing with the opposition to his rule crisis has destroyed” “If Bashar (Assad) has the interest of his country, he would step down, but he would also create an ability to reach out and start a new phase of Syrian political life” King Abdullah of Jordan

“We hold the Iranian government responsible for its failure to take adequate measures to protect our embassy, as it is required to do” British Foreign Secretary William Hague in response to the storming by conservative youth of the British Embassy in Tehran

Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on moving Yemen forward

“I have cut all contacts with the Syrian administration… We never wanted things to arrive at this point, but unfortunately, the Syrian administration has forced us to take such a decision” Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Erdogan, makes his diplomatic position clear

“What's happening in Syria today goes beyond all logic of repression, it goes beyond imagination.

What is happening to the Syrian people is making us suffer”

Morocco's new Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane on the crisis in Syria

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• WAR AND PEACE

Political Islam and the US Can the Muslim Brotherhood and the US become friends?

In the wake of the Arab Spring, the US must deal with Islamist groups like Ennahdha and the Muslim Brotherhood. What challenges and opportunities are presented by formal diplomatic relations?

Joyce Karam

Image © Getty Images

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he rise of Islamist movements in the aftermath of the Arab Spring is representing both a challenge and an opportunity to the West as it looks to successful democratic transitions and maintaining its security and strategic interest in the broader Middle East.

There are several indications of the growing importance of political Islamist movements in the Arab world: the victory of Ennahdha, a moderate Islamic party in Tunisia; the solid support (35 per cent) enjoyed by the Muslim brotherhood in neighboring Egypt; the participation of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood in the new Syrian National Council established in Istanbul last October; and the embrace of the head of Libya’s National Transitional Council, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, of “the Islamic Shariah as the main source of law.” The roots of these movements in Arab societies—going back to 1928 in the case of Egypt—in addition to an organizational capacity that trumps liberal and leftist groups, are giving them an advantage in filling the void left by the departing dictators in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.

Undoubtedly, the shifting political status quo makes the new Islamist movements key players in the democratic transitions ahead, and a force that representatives of Western governments must reckon with as they each try to maintain their influence in the region. However, the Islamists’ foreign policy agendas, oriented by rejecting imperialism and opposing Israel, pose a challenge for the West.

The Challenges Speaking to The Majalla about the rise of Islamic parties, Nathan Brown, author and expert on Arab politics and Islamist movements, suggests the key question is “whether they can be integrated as regular political actors without dominating the system.” The Iranian model embodies that risk, as Iran transformed into a military theocracy after a revolution that overthrew the authoritarian Shah in 1979.

For the West, Brown sees some bumps in the road as Europe and the US try to remain engaged and protect their vital security and strategic interests. He cites the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as one example, as well as counterterrorism and the US regional security presence. Since the fall of former President Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has made clear its intent to ‘rethink’ the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel if it takes power.

The Camp David peace agreement signed in 1978 between Cairo and Tel Aviv is, from the US perspective, “a corner stone for stability in the region,” Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs Tamara Wittes told The Majalla. “Both Israelis and Egyptians have benefitted from peace and stability it produced. We absolutely see the peace agreement as central; we want to see that commitment sustained,” Wittes adds—even as Egyptian hostility towards Israel increases. Attacks in early September on Israel’s embassy in Cairo prompted Tel Aviv to withdraw its ambassador.

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US to Work with Arab Spring's Islamist Parties

The challenge for the Obama administration is to build an American policy that is not around movements or individuals, but around political systems

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton recently declared that the Obama administration would work with ascendant Islamist parties in the Muslim world, answering one of the central US policy questions arising from the Arab Spring.

Delivering an address at the National Democratic Institute, Clinton offered a forthright embrace of the democratic changes enveloping North Africa and the Middle East. She said the United States would work with any individuals and parties willing to uphold fundamental values.

Religious and secular parties alike "must reject violence. They must abide by the rule of law and respect the freedoms of speech, religion, association, and assembly. They must respect the rights of women and minorities," Clinton said. "They must let go of power if defeated at the polls."

"In other words," Clinton added, "what parties call themselves is less important to us than what they actually do."

Clinton welcomed the Islamist party Ennahda's strong showing in "an open, competitive election" in Tunisia last month, and said America will work with the party's leaders as they join secular groups in writing a new constitution and governing the newly democratic country.

At the same time, the US has cautiously reached out to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, another Islamist opposition group likely to wield significant power in the future. Officials from the United States reported that they would be “satisfied” if the Muslim Brotherhood comes out ahead in the parliamentary elections in Egypt.

“I think the answer is yes, I think we will be satisfied, if it is a free and fair election,” said the administration’s special coordinator for Middle East transitions, William Taylor. Taylor recently visited Cairo and met with several of the country’s interim military rulers.

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Image © Getty Images

The other challenge for the West is to acquaint itself with the new actors that the Arab Spring has brought to the table. “The days where the US [and others, ed.] can view the domestic situation in the Arab world through the eyes of the rulers are over,” says Brown, and the “challenge for the Obama administration is to build an American policy that is not around movements or individuals, but around political systems.” This will be a new way of doing things, according to the expert, and closer to how the US operates in Europe. Up until 2007, Washington did not have any direct contact with Egypt’s Muslim brotherhood, and not until last June did US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton welcome dialogue with members of the group who are not members of the Egyptian parliament.

Wittes confirms the administration’s contact with Egypt’s Brotherhood today, and most political groups in the country, emphasizing that “there isn’t one set of policy towards the 11

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• WAR AND PEACE

Muslim-Americans Give Obama 80 per cent Approval Eighty per cent of Muslim Americans approve of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president, according to a newly released survey conducted by the Abu Dhabi Gallup Center, a partnership between Gallup and the Crown Prince Court of Abu Dhabi.

According to the survey, 65 per cent of JewishAmericans approve of the job Obama is doing; 60 per cent of atheists, agnostics, and those of no religion approve; 50 per cent of Catholics approve; 37 per cent of Protestants approve and 25 per cent of Mormons approve.

Although published this month, the survey of Muslim-Americans was actually completed on 9 April.

(In Gallup’s overall polling in the week that ended 10 April, Obama’s approval was at 45 per cent, slightly higher than the 42 per cent it hit in October.)

Obama’s approval among Muslim-Americans has declined since 2009, but still remains far higher than the approval President George W. Bush won among Muslim-Americans in 2008. In that year, only 7 per cent of Muslim Americans said they approved of the job Bush was doing.

In 2009, 84 per cent of Muslim-Americans said they approved of the job Obama was doing. That dropped to 78 per cent in 2010 and then rose to 80 per cent this year.

The Abu Dhabi Gallup Center says it interviewed 3,883 self-identified Muslim-Americans between 1 January 2008 and 9 April 2011 to get its polling trends in that community. The interviews were part of Gallup’s ongoing polling of at least 1,000 American adults, 350 days per year.

By Terence P. Jeffrey

Image © Getty Images

Muslim Brotherhood” but rather “one set of policy towards all political actors across the region who want to engage in elections and in democratic politics.” The criteria for such a policy was laid out by US President Barack Obama when he spoke in Cairo in 2009, and has three pillars at its core, explains Wittes: a “commitment to nonviolence to achieve political goals”; a “commitment to the democratic rules of the game—after the elections as well as before”; and “a respect to equality in society for everybody, including women and minorities.” The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has renounced political violence since 1972, after former President Anwar Sadat allowed it into the political system.

To Brown, however, reaching out to such groups is not an end in itself and should be accompanied with “building relationships with the entire society, and that doesn’t happen effectively by declaring certain actors off limits,” referring to actors such as Hamas in the Palestinian territories. While many European countries have relations with Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Washington has no official contact.

Another set of complications might come from the Islamist movements themselves, who have historically tried to keep distance from the United States and derive much of their support from being anti-imperialist and opposing US policies in the region (especially in relation to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and drone attacks in Pakistan and Yemen). Their ties to Iran—most evident through Hamas—are also alarming traditional US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan dominates the opposition and has so far not been satisfied with King Abdullah’s announcement of reforms and changes to the power structure. Riyadh, on the other hand, has maintained good relations with the former heads of state in Egypt and Tunisia, and views with caution the rise of the Islamist movements.

Qatar is an exception in its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. Doha hosts Yusuf Qaradawi, the group’s most renowned spiritual leader, and has reportedly offered Hamas a new venue as an alternative to Damascus. It also played a crucial role in negotiating the prisoner exchange deal between Hamas and Israel and stands as a main ally for the National Transitional Council in Libya.

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There is a sense of historical righteousness and inevitability of the triumph of popular revolt that is driving Washington to embrace the revolutions and call on leaders with whom it did business to step down Opportunities Islamist movements come in different shapes and sizes, from the moderate Ennahdha to the more conservative Salafists. While a broad agreement on policies might never be achieved between the West and different Islamist parties, there are many opportunities that the current dynamic brings. Wittes points to “lots of interests that we share with the people of the region on behalf of peace and stability, against nuclear proliferation and in rejecting violent extremism.” She adds that Washington “is acting on the premise that we have a lot in common, and we will have lot of common interest with democratic governments.”

Wittes suggests that “democratic governments, because they are rooted in popular consent and because they represent their citizens, are stronger partners globally for the US.” A senior official who has worked for years on reform in the Middle East, her confidence stems from an American-style belief that “open political systems are a good thing” and that “the more diversity you have in the political market, the better is the quality of the process.”

Another opportunity the changing status quo brings is that it is opening a new chapter between these Islamist movements and the West. The support of the US, France, and Britain for Issue 1568 • November 2011

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the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, preceded by the NATO campaign in Libya, is putting the Western allies ahead of others (notably Russia and China) in gaining the confidence of the new governing majorities. In many cases, there is a sense of historical righteousness and inevitability of the triumph of popular revolt that is driving Washington to embrace the revolutions and call on leaders with whom it did business to step down.

Another asset for the West is that the rise of the Islamist movements in the new regional dynamic has gone a long way towards diminishing Al-Qaeda, ‘enemy number one’ for the United States. “It [the Arab Spring] weakens Al-Qaeda,” says Wittes, adding in a joyous and empathetic tone that “one of the most beautiful things about the Arab Spring, and in Tunisia and Egypt in particular, is not only that these young people took their future in their own hands and rejected the voices telling them to wait their turn, but they also rejected voices that said the only way to get things done is through violence and confrontation.”

Wittes, who has followed the Middle East through its many ups and downs, sees “the commitment to nonviolence” as “something amazing to watch and a powerful repudiation of Al-Qaeda.” It also “presents an alternative positive vision, a democratic vision,” she says. “That is why there is so much promise.”

The success of democratic transitions in the countries undergoing revolution requires having the Islamist movements as a voice at the table. However, making sure that these groups do not dominate the process or stifle democratic progress will be as important for the West as it tries to influence the outcome and protect its core interests in the new Middle East.

Joyce Karam holds a Masters in International Peace and Conflict Resolution and is Washington Correspondent for Al-Hayat Newspaper.

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• ON POLITICS

The Delicate Democracy

What is the state of the democratic project in Iraq?

Whether Iraq is a democracy or not is a polarizing question, one that often leads to lengthy disputes over the aims and impact of the US occupation. With ongoing sectarian violence, corruption and crumbling infrastructure what is the reality of life under the project that has been Iraq’s political system?

Federico Manfredi

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ontemporary Iraq is a divided nation, beset by sectarianism and violence and hostage to the interests of a self-serving political elite. Whether Iraq is a democracy or not is a polarizing question, one that often leads to lengthy disputes over the aims and impact of the US occupation. An impartial assessment, however, requires us to make a distinction between the reality of life within Iraq and the nature of the country’s political system.

Iraq has some noteworthy democratic elements: a constitution that was approved by the public in a national referendum; a popularly elected legislature; and a resurgent civil society prepared to stage public demonstrations demanding political rights. Thus, while Iraq is a severely flawed democracy that has repeatedly dashed the hopes and aspirations of its people, it is a democracy nonetheless which is significant when one looks at the situation in Syria or Libya. Iraqis are struggling to build a country that offers the possibility of working within the system to promote peaceful reforms, a deepening of democracy and the growth of economic opportunities.

However, it is not wise to be overly optimistic. Iraq remains a dangerous and unstable country, suffering the consequences of failed US policies, intrusions by neighboring states and ineffective public administration. After the “collapse,” as many still refer to the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi people stocked up on weapons and retrenched in their neighborhoods and communities. Some fought the United States. Many others fought one another, to settle old scores and to secure money and power in the new political order.

Regional powers also stepped into the fray, to support their favorite factions, as well as to derail US policy. Iran, in particular, eagerly seized the opportunity to teach a lesson to the United States, and force it to reconsider its revisionist designs for the region. Wealthy Iraqi exiles returned from abroad to run for office, while ruthless sectarian militias redefined the demographics of their districts with guns, bombs, and mortars.

The broad fault lines of Iraqi politics became evident to all: there were Shi’a Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds. And those with political ambitions proved themselves ready to go to any length to appeal to the fears and frustrations of their base.

Today, the peaceful and increasingly prosperous Kurdish autonomous region coexists with the chaotic and unpredictable Arabmajority provinces. Indeed, generally high levels of security in Erbil and other Kurdish cities have allowed many private businesses to prosper, and the economy is growing rapidly, buttressed by Turkish investment and a real estate construction boom. In the Arab parts of Iraq on the other hand, militias, insurgent groups and criminal gangs remain active and many urban areas still feel like war zones.

While it is true that the security situation has improved significantly over the past three years, that improvement is relative to the state of full-blown civil war that consumed the country in 2006 and 2007. In those years, politically motivated violence resulted in an estimated 35,000 deaths per year. That figure is now down to 3,500 deaths per year, which is certainly much lower, but still high in absolute terms.

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Moreover, the killings and the ethnic cleansing that took place in entire neighborhoods and districts all over Iraq have left the nation traumatized and fragmented. Ethno-sectarian chasms now separate Sunnis, Shi’as, and Kurds—in one of the most tragic expressions of democracy at work, the leaders of the various political parties have come to represent these divisions, playing on them to gain the support of their respective communities, while blaming the United States for the violence they contributed to incite.

The relationship between the government of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and the Kurdistan Regional Government, headed by Massoud Barzani, remains fraught with behind-the-scenes rivalries over the negotiation of oil and gas contracts, as well as over the control of disputed areas, most prominently Kirkuk. Barzani recently warned that once the US troops leave a civil war between Arabs and Kurds could “explode at any time.”

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Meanwhile, in the Sunni parts of the country, a slow but deadly insurgency continues to simmer. Armed groups frequently attack jewelry stores and other businesses to finance their activities, which include attacks on Shi’a civilians, as well as ambushes against government figures and the tribal sheiks associated with the Awakening Movement (a loose-knit Sunni coalition).

In Shi’a areas, splinters of the Mahdi Army have morphed into criminal gangs that prey on the civilian population. Moqtada Al-Sadr continues to struggle to rein in the rank-and-file members of his organization, and to remain relevant he has resorted to threatening to resume attacks on US troops if they fail to leave by the December 31 deadline.

The greatest problem facing Iraq today, however, may be the inefficiency of the central government. Despite its stratospheric oil revenues, the Maliki administration is still unable 15

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• ON POLITICS

to provide many of the most basic public services. Corruption is endemic and evident to all. While most Iraqis must make do with two hours of electricity per day, government officials live in luxury, in houses that have gardens and pools. They earn fabulous salaries and preside over bloated state institutions rife with patronage and nepotism. Worst of all, they are more interested in clinging on to power than in tackling the problems that are at the root of Iraq’s civil strife—namely the misappropriation of Islam for political gain and the destabilizing influence of Iran.

Maliki frequently blames extremist groups for hampering public policy and slowing down the pace of reform. But, in fact, Maliki has also shown a tendency to exploit episodes of violence to control society and limit the rights and freedoms that are enshrined in the constitution. In the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary elections he personally intervened to exclude hundreds of Sunnis from running for public office, on the grounds that they once had ties to the Ba’ath Party.

In most cases, though, these purges targeted individuals who had held very low-level positions in the Ba’ath Party or who were simply suspected of having had informal links to Ba’ath officials. The charges appeared to be primarily political, aimed at keeping Maliki’s adversaries at bay and appealing to the sectarian prejudices of his constituents. Maliki has also proved to be hostile to any type of public gathering critical of his government.

Peaceful demonstrators—in Baghdad as well as in other cities, such as Ramadi, Falluja and Basra—have repeatedly been harassed by security forces and in some cases arrested and tortured. The recent murder of the journalist and democratic activist Hadi Al-Mahdi cast another dark shadow on the government, making the right to freedom of speech look increasingly tenuous and uncertain.

Al-Mahdi’s death, however, has reinvigorated the demonstrations, contributing to make the demands of pro-democracy activists more salient and visible. Popular movements that arose in February, on the heels of the Arab Spring, are now calling for more demonstrations, using social media like Facebook and Twitter, as well as blogs, like Iraqi Streets for Change and websites such as altahreernews.com.

In the predominantly Sunni towns of Ramadi and Falluja, people are now demanding an end to government discrimination. It is true that under Saddam all high-ranking government officials and all the military top brass were Sunni. But while it is fair and necessary to exclude from the government those individuals who were close to Saddam, it is wrong to punish the entire Sunni community. Such a policy breeds sectarian divisions and fuels the lower ranks of the insurgency.

Most insurgents, after all, are poor and disaffected individuals in their late teens or early twenties. They are typically unemployed and hate the government because they think it does not represent them. The only way to soothe the grievances of the Sunni minority is to draw a distinction between Saddam’s supporters and the general Sunni population. And this is exactly what many civil society movements are trying to achieve.

In the southern port of Basra, the people who take to the streets to protest against government corruption and inefficiency have another demand. They want to see the oil wealth coming from their province fund local development projects, particularly in communities that suffer from extraction-related pollution.

Even in the Kurdish region the people of Iraq have taken to the streets with legitimate demands. The Kurds recognize that the two main regional parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, have monopolized power and do not tolerate any dissent. These two parties effectively control the Peshmerga (Kurdish armed forces) and are willing to use them against any individual or organization that threatens their authority. Smaller Kurdish parties, like Goran, have come repeatedly under attack. And on more than one occasion fighters have opened fire on protestors. Kurdish activists demand that the government be more transparent and accountable, and that political parties sever their ties to the Peshmerga.

In the University of Baghdad there is also a new democratic ferment. Students and academics are devising strategies to pressure their government, using social media to publicize open letters to Maliki and other members of the Council of Representatives. In the past few months, the government has responded to some of the requests of the Iraqi people, improving the electricity supply and removing some of the most corrupt officials from public office.

The fact that Iraq has a democratic framework means that its people can use democratic means to push the government to reform. It will be a difficult process, vulnerable to setbacks and subject to repression by the state security apparatus. But peaceful democratic reform is possible in Iraq.

Today, the only people that are still using violence to fight the government are those who hope to capitalize on the resurgence of a civil war. They are radicals, pursuing conflicting sectarian agendas, wishing to bring about intolerant and belligerent states. There are, however, millions of moderate Iraqis who are trying to build a strong state through peaceful and democratic means and they represent the best hope for national reconciliation, democracy and economic growth.

Federico Manfredi is a specialist on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. He has conducted extensive field research in conflict zones, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Colombia.

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• ON POLITICS

The Algerian Paradox

Is Algeria in a position to follow neighboring Libya’s lead?

The flight of Muammar Qadhafi’s family to neighboring Algeria demonstrates that despite a rich revolutionary history, Algeria is a long way behind the Arab Spring. But economic and social conditions are comparable with the rest of the region, so further unrest may not be far off.

Nabila Ramdani

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a 150,000-strong gendarmerie and 200,000-strong metropolitan police force. These figures exclude the formidable People’s National Army (PNA), which consumes more than three percent of Algeria’s GDP every year, and numbers at least 350,000 soldiers.

The police, military and security services will ensure that the Qadhafis are protected, if only because of the close relations Bouteflika enjoyed with Qadhafi during his many years in power. Prior to the uprisings, Libya supported Bouteflika’s FLN party during the long and bloody war of independence from France. As recently as February 2010, Bouteflika paid tribute

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he flight of Muammar Qadhafi’s family to neighboring Algeria demonstrates that despite a rich revolutionary history, Algeria is long way behind the Arab Spring. Economic and social conditions in the country are, however, comparable with those in the rest of the region, so further unrest may not be far off.

One of the most telling developments of the Libyan uprising was the flight of senior members of the Qadhafi family, including Muammar Qadhafi’s wife and three of his children, to Algeria. That they should have found refuge from one blighted country in another just across the border says a great deal about the troubled state of the region, and the reason why the Arab Spring was so long overdue.

It is sad to admit that Algerians would not have found the arrival of the Qadhafis in their country in the least bit surprising. Easily the most turbulent and bloody nation in modern North African, Algeria was a natural home for the family that has profited from 42 years of illegitimate rule. The country has suffered the same kind of autocratic government as Libya over the past few decades with, if anything, far worse repression.

All hopes for democracy ended with the start of civil war in December 1991, sparked by the cancellation of national elections after the first round of general elections, which was won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The National Liberation Front (FLN) had feared the political ascendancy of the FIS, and so effectively allowed the military to take over. The FIS turned into a guerrilla force, fighting the government during a decade-long civil war that saw up to 250,000 Algerians killed.

All that remains of parliamentary democracy is a nominal opposition, with current President Abdelaziz Bouteflika appointed by the army. It is a totalitarian regime in all but name, fighting a never-ending battle against terrorist groups like the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).

While the Arab Spring revolutions have reminded the world that power should lie with the people, Algeria is an example of a state in near-permanent revolt. It is a country in which undemocratic forces have always succeeded in gaining the upper hand. In short, the Algerian paradox is that its recent revolutionary history is precisely what has prevented its people profiting from the Arab Spring.

Bouteflika managed to suppress any murmurings of an Algerian revolt in February through the sheer weight of his security forces. On 12 February, huge crowds inspired by the success of the Egyptian protests prepared to take to the streets. In response, he put 30,000 police on the streets of Algiers alone. Many were highly trained riot control officers who had proved their resilience against all kinds of dissent time and time again; part of an internal security force of at least 350,000 members, consisting of

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to the “common ties” between the two peoples, while Qadhafi recalled the way Algeria contributed aid to Libya during the embargos imposed on his country by the UN Security Council between 1992 and 2000.

Sources in Tripoli suggest that at least part of the Qadhafi family’s fortune has been deposited in Algerian accounts, and not just because a revolution was imminent. Add to this that the fact that one Qadhafi son is married to an Algerian woman, and two others have residences in Algiers, and the reason why so many Qadhafis are there becomes more apparent. Remember as well that Algeria has not yet recognized the legitimacy of the National Transitional Council.

All that said, there remains a wide gulf between the support Bouteflika is showing towards the family, and the views of his fellow countrymen. If anything, harboring the Qadhafis is just another example of the ruthlessly self-serving regime that has for generations backed up Algerian domestic policy with violent enforcement measures. The bitter war of independence from France is still within living memory for the older generation of Algerians, and for the younger ones there were the socalled années de plomb (years of lead, i.e., bullets), a similarly bloody time in the years following the civil war.

In February, the mobilization of the police and army was accompanied by Bouteflika cynically lifting the state of emergency that had been in place for 19 years. This was an attempt to impress a Western media with a huge cache of influence on the fortunes of the pro-democracy movements. More crucially, he impressed Algeria’s silent majority, who were worried about yet another period of turbulence that would allow Al-Qaedainspired fundamentalist groups to flourish. While the Qadhafis were on their way to Algeria, a double suicide-bomb attack on the Cherchell military base near Algiers claimed dozens of lives and severely injured many more—highlighting the constant threat posed by these militant fundamentalist groups.

There was obvious anger at exorbitant food prices, lack of jobs and accommodation, and a heavily controlled media, but there was no collective voice pushing for radical change. Instead, disparate groups including feminists, Berbers, and single-issue campaigners called for change. Meanwhile, small businesses feared damage to their livelihoods from the unruly gangs that are constantly involved in violent, organized crime in cities like Algiers. Conservative Algerians have also expressed concern at the growing campaigns of civil disobedience in the country, which in 2010 alone resulted in some 10,000 disruptive acts, ranging from strikes and sit-ins to property being damaged.

Bouteflika has always used the country’s vast oil and natural gas wealth (another advantage Algeria has shared with Libya) to invest in job creation, salary increases, housing projects and food subsidies. These measures placated people, as did the recent introduction of a private media that is (ostensibly) not controlled by the government. Political reform, however, remains on the campaigners’ agenda: it is not something which has actually happened. Recent pledges are, opposition groups contend, cynical gestures solely aimed at impressing foreign observers in an age of instant, global communications.

This was the kind of compromise that had allowed Qadhafi to remain in power for 42 years. As his family settles into a new life in Algiers, many will remain doubtful about whether pro-democracy campaigners will be able to reform the situation. Others, meanwhile, may argue that the arrival of a dynasty whose tyrannical rule became so complacent that it was finally challenged and defeated after four decads in power may be just the inspiration that Algerians need to take their future into their own hands.

Nabila Ramdani is a Paris-born freelance journalist of Algerian descent who specialises in Anglo-French issues, Islamic affairs, and the Arab World.

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he President of the Syrian National Council (SNC), Burhan Ghalioun, considers the end of the Assad regime in Syria to be close at hand. Despite serious misgivings about the implementation of the Arab League’s current initiative to resolve the crisis—including questioning the effectiveness of Arab League observers—Ghalioun is “100 percent sure of victory for the people.”

In the context of continuing violence in Syria and daily reports of more bloodshed—not least this month’s double bombing in Damascus—The Majalla questioned Ghalioun on the internal security situation in Syria, the fragmentation of opposition groups, the role of the Free Syrian Army and the likely implications that Syria’s crisis will have for the region as a whole.

Do you still count on the Arab League to implement their initiative?

No one, not even the Arab League, has confidence in this regime.

It is not expected that such a regime will implement the provisions of the initiative, but rather we all—including Arab League ministers who drafted the plan—expect that Damascus will hinder the implementation. In fact, the regime has already started by fabricating the bomb blasts that resulted in the death and injury of large numbers of Syrians. The regime has sent out a message, implying that it can do anything to abort any attempt to uncover its crimes. Thus, no one feels optimistic about this initiative, or even its first steps.

If the Arab League is confident that the Syrian regime will not implement the initiative, why does it give the regime more chances?

The Arab League has given the regime a final opportunity to get out of the crisis without further bloodshed. I think the majority of Arab League ministers who supported the initiative anticipate its abortion by the regime, and intend to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. We are surprised at the League sending in observers while the first provision of the initiative has yet to be met—which demands that the regime withdraw all aspects of armament in the cities and stop the murdering machine. This is what the initiative is supposed to mean, not the visit of the observers. What we are seeing is a modest beginning that should be explained by the Arab League. How can it send observers without ensuring the withdrawal of forces and an end to the killing?

150 or even 500 observers reveals lack of seriousness in addressing the current situation, especially that we are facing a regime that has long history of lies and deception. In order to give the initiative a chance to succeed, the committee should be expanded and benefit from international agencies that have already experienced similar circumstances. The Arab League has no experience in this regard.

The Observers’ mission What do you think of the formation of the delegation and its members, are you satisfied with it?

We don’t interfere with the participants; it is the responsibility of the League, which appoints the members and organizes the general framework of the committee. We rather want a professional framework by experienced international organizations, and the number of members should be raised at least to 2,000 observers. We also want the tasks of this commission to be clearly determined, which is to observe the implementation of the initiative by the regime. If we accept the existence of the commission without the implementation of the initiative, I don’t know what their mission would be. Is it just to say that military forces are attacking the cities, and there are protests and killings? We know all this and the media is broadcasting it.

We need the observing commission to reveal whether or not the regime has implemented its commitments to the Arabs to stop the killings, and withdrawn the security forces and the thugs.

The New Face of Syria Burhan Ghalioun: Al-Assad’s regime is over Roshan Kasem

Do you still have contacts with the Arab league and do you coordinate your efforts to help the observers?

We have exerted extraordinary efforts to contact the observers, and we have set up a committee in Damascus to communicate with them and provide them with data, in addition to supervising the implementation of the Arab initiative. I tried to call the Arab League a few days ago, but couldn’t speak to the Secretary General, but I’ll call them again to follow up and convey our questions about the work of the committee, including how and why observers were sent before implementing the first provision of the plan.

Is the number of members in the observing delegation enough to accomplish their mission?

An observing committee cannot succeed if its requirements are not met. I think that 200 or even 300 observers are unconvincing and not sufficient. For instance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were about 3,000 observers, though the population is less and its area is smaller than Syria. I believe that talking about 20

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After all you have said, do you think that the Arab Leaugue is serious in the role it assumed to solve the Syrian crisis?

The coming days will show the seriousness of the League. Current indications do not suggest seriousness, but we don’t want to kill the initiative without giving it all possibilities to succeed.

We want to help it succeed.

No more Initiatives There is another initiative, proposed by Iraq, competing with the League’s plan. They think their initiative offers a sustainable solution to the Syrian crisis, unlike the Arab plan that aims at protecting civilians.

What is your opinion of this initiative?

We are surprised at having multiple initiatives. We have been told that there is an Iraqi plan to reach a sustainable solution in Syria, but have not seen it, just read about it in the newspapers.

When I spoke to an Iraqi official who called me, I told him that we don’t need more initiatives and asked them to support the Arab plan. We have no interest in moving to and from initiatives and wasting time. We have wasted much time while the Syrian people are being killed.

In your opinion, have Arab efforts decreased the pace of potential European initiatives? Is international action to solve the crisis delayed or suspended until further notice?

No, the whole world is convinced that if there is no Arab support, no initiative will succeed. There was no international action, just efforts to issue a resolution by the UN Security Council that was vetoed by Russia and China.

Meanwhile, the main initiative should come from the Arabs, and we have reiterated that the Arab League should play an effective role in solving political conflicts and differences inside the Arab countries. There is no alternative to the Arab initiative, but this does not prevent any humanitarian intervention to protect the Syrian people, which requires a stance taken by the Arab League. Therefore, the Arab League has to direct all its efforts to move from simply an Arab initiative, to an Arab initiative adopted by the UN Security Council.

There is a gap between your efforts and the action in the streets. Don’t you fear people inside Syria lose their patience while they are at the front lines against Assad’s regime, especially after they raised slogans calling for outside intervention?

The public in the streets are suffering greatly. The Syrian people have proved they are a great people. After 10 months of struggle, they were not offered any significant financial aid. We admit that, and refuse any distinction between opposition inside or outside Syria. I think that, today, all Syrian opposition groups want to topple the Syrian regime and no opposition side would accept to hold talks with Bashar Al-Assad.

Criticism How far did your efforts go to include opposition figures who previously accused you of exclusion, which drew criticism from Arab and European countries?

SNC is a coalition of seven Syrian opposition forces. It’s natural that SNC only includes those who agreed upon forming the council, so those who didn’t join the council are the people who refused to join it, and therefore there is no exclusion.

Who are the most prominent figures who recently accepted to join the council?

Most notably there is Haitham Maleh [80 year-old human rights activist], Walid Al-Bunni [prominent Syrian dissident] and Sadiq Jalal Al-Azm [renowned professor of philosophy].

We invited many figures and personalities to join and all of them, without exception, will find a place in the council.

However, we think that people who refused to join the SNC—of course it’s their right—have a different stance and disagree with the strategic choices of the council. Yet, we are ready to coordinate with everybody, even those who disagree with us, because the SNC isn’t a political party, it is one of the resistance tools aiming at fulfilling the objectives of the revolution. Plus, we have lately sent a delegate to launch a dialogue with other opposition parties in Cairo.

We have already released a document unifying the opposition stance and it will be submitted to the Arab League.

Some of the opposition figures described the council as an Islamic structure standing in for the Muslim Brotherhood with a secularist spokesperson represented by you. To what extent does the Muslim Brotherhood dominate the SNC?

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That is an exaggeration. Despite the fact that the council has more liberals than Islamists, the spotlight is fixed on Islamists due to the intense media interest in them.

The Syrian regime considers all the Islamists traitors and excludes them—that is one of the main points we disagree with—while the opposition has paid a high price for integrating the Islamists in the national movement.

Moreover, the regime have been trying to capitalize on that, describing the council as an Islamic council in efforts to weaken the opposition and distort its image. But the truth is different; the council is open to all Islamic or non Islamic forces.

There has been some western focus on the makeup of the SNC. Are minorities under-represented in the council?

We completely understand sensitive stance of western countries towards the minority issue, but their focus on that issue doesn’t mean they are talking about facts; it only reflects their commitment towards the minorities. That has nothing to do with the SNC as all the Syrian categories have been represented in it, even if not equally and of course there is a lack of equal representation in the executive board. For example, the number of women is much less than it should be, but that is because the council is a coalition between many forces which have chosen their own representatives.

However, there is a dire need to fill in the gaps—out of national interest, not from sectarian or separatist aspects.

What is the relation between your council and the Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria (Kurdnas)?

We were regularly contacting Kurdish movements, parties and figures until the formation of the Kurdnas. We have expressed our desire to effectively integrate Kurdnas to our council.

Does Kurdnas intend to join the SNC? They have the same goals; two days ago I was speaking with the chairman of the Kurdnas about that. I think they are currently considering how to join us and the type of representation. It’s up to them now. We repeat our invitation to them. Their place is reserved in the council: all the seats dedicated to the Kurdish movements and figures.

Political recognition Opposition against Bashar Al-Assad’s regime is still regarded as a rebel political front not as a legitimate alternative to the regime. Does that mean the Syrian regime remains coherent and to what extent has the fragmentation of the opposition hindered its progress?

There is no opposition in the world unified in one specific frame. It is also against democratic principles. The Syrian opposition is required to take a unified stance against a regime that is killing its people and that has already happened.

On the other hand, it’s not true that the regime is still coherent. Politically speaking, it’s over. For example, the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walid Al-Moallem, can’t leave Damascus. While economically, the regime is teetering. As for the society, all social classes have abandoned it; even businessmen who were betting on it have started to join the opposition, at least most of them.

The Syrian National Council (SNC) The SNC was established on 29 August, 2011, in Istanbul, with Burhan Ghalioun appointed as president of the council that comprises 94 prominent Syrian figures from inside and outside Syria.

The Council has been expanded to include 230 representatives of eight Syrian groups and parties: The Muslim Brotherhood, the Damascus Declaration Group, independent groups in exile and inside Syria, Kurds, Assyrians and the revolutionary movements including the Supreme Council for the Leadership of the Revolution and the Local Coordination Committees, in addition to the constituent committee of the National Council. The General Secretariat of the SNC comprises eight figures each representing his/her own party or group: Burhan Ghalioun, Haitham al-Maleh, Ahmad Ramadan, Farouq Tayfur, Abdul-Baset Sida, Motei Al-Bateen, Basma Qadmani, and Abdul-Ahad Satifo.

On 17 and 18 December 2011, the SNC held its first general assembly, in Tunis, and asserted its commitment towards the Syrian people’s choices and the targets of the revolution represented in toppling the head, figures and pillars of the Syrian regime.

The SNC has confirmed its adherence to the constitutional recognition of the national identity of Kurds, and considered the Kurdish issue an integral part of the country’s public national cause. It also announced that it is committed to the constitutional recognition of the Assyrian national identity, and called for solving this issue within the frame of the nation’s unity. The SNC has pledged to provide support for the Free Syrian Army, acknowledging its role in protecting the Syrian popular uprising.

The SNC has called on the Arab League, the United Nations and the international community to protect civilians and protestors in Syria within safe areas and other buffer zones.

On the security level, the regime has lost control over the country; it’s no longer able to control Damascus. In addition, its presence in some areas is similar to a gang of thugs attacking and killing people, not as an authority of the state. All this indicates that the regime is falling apart and on its way to collapse.

Why does the recognition of the SNC as an alternative to the regime constitute a problem, especially for countries such as the US and France who were calling for the step down of Bashar Al-Assad?

The recognition issue is very complicated. All the countries that have received us, or the chairman of the SNC, whether on the level of prime ministers or foreign ministers recognize our council; otherwise they wouldn’t have received us. This is a strong political recognition.

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Forces Competing for the Rule of a New Syria Traditional Parties Muslim Brotherhood Established in Syria in 1942, by Dr. Mustafa Al-Siba’i. Its current comptroller is Riyad Al-Shaqfa, and the group is considered an extension of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood which was founded by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) have historically been active participants in all fields of political action.

It had members in the Parliament and participated in forming the cabinet until 1962. The group has been absented from political life since President Hafez AlAssad passed a law, in 1980, banning the movement.

In 2006, the MB contributed to establishing the National Salvation Front in Syria, based in Belgium and founded by ex-Vice President of Syria Abdul-Halim Khaddam. The MB withdrew from the coalition three years later. After the eruption of the Syrian revolution, the MB has joined the Syrian National Council and is considered its biggest bloc.

Dissident Leftist Political Parties The Syrian Communist Party Founded in 1924 and gained great influence, especially in 1958. It stood against the union of Syria and Egypt in the United Arab Republic; subsequently its members were imprisoned and prosecuted during the union.

The party witnessed internal tensions from 1969 to 1972 then it split into two wings; one of them under the leadership of Khalid Bakdash while the other under the leadership of Riyad Al-Turk, which is known as The Communist Party – Political Bureau. It later joined the coalition of the leftist opposition movements, the Syrian National Democratic Assembly, after its establishment in 1979.

The Syrian National Democratic Assembly: was established in 1979, the group includes five leftist parties. Since 9 May, 2000, Hassan Abdul-Azim, the head of the Arab Democratic Socialist Union Party has become the spokesman of the party.

The Kurdish parties: The history of the Syrian Kurdish movement can be traced back to 1957. It consists of 12 Kurdish parties and three inclusive political platforms in addition to many other political parties outside those platforms, which are: • The Kurdish Political Council in Syria.

• Parties of the General Council of the Kurdish Democratic Alliance in Syria.

• Main parties which didn’t join these two frameworks, including the Democratic Union (which has close ties with Kurdistan Workers Party) and the Kurd Future Movement in Syria.

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Damascus Declaration The Damascus declaration is a document signed in 2005 by prominent civil, Islamic and liberal activists.

It demands ending 35 years of Assad family rule and replacing it with a democratic system.

The Declaration is considered the most comprehensive framework of Syrian opposition forces and it was the first opposition declaration released by groups inside Syria.

Regime Defectors Rifaat Al-Assad: The younger brother of the former president Hafez Al-Assad and the incumbent president Bashar’s uncle. Between 1966 and 1984, he was responsible of the Defense Companies (Saraya Al-Difaa) which was accused of committing massacres in Hama between 1978 and 1982. He is currently living in exile in London.

Abdul-Halim Khaddam: The former vice president of Syria went into exile in December, 2005, after his relationship with President Bashar Al-Assad deteriorated. He founded the National Salvation Front which included some of the Syrian opposition movements. The Muslim brotherhood withdrew from the front in April 2009.

Reform Party of Syria (RPS): Established in the US after the September 11 attacks in 2001, under the leadership of the Syrian-American activist Farid AlGhadry.The party considers itself the alternative of the two significant options; the ruling Baath party and the opposing Muslim Brotherhood. It supports toppling the regime with the help of American intervention and it also backs cooperation with Israel.

Movement for Justice and Development: Established in London in 2006. In its code of conduct, the movement demands a regime that prioritizes freedoms, peaceful circulation of power and cancellation of the state of emergency law.

The movement calls for political liberty, freedom to establish parties, the return of all exiled Syrians and the release of political prisoners.

Syrian Revolution General Commission: This commission was formed after the 2011 Syrian uprising and is considered a platform for committees that have emerged during the revolution.

The Kurd National Council: A platform formed on 15 March, 2011, consisting of all Kurdish parties in Syria except for two parties: the Democratic National Union and the Kurdish Future Movement in Syria.

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As for legal recognition, it means that we are the alternative to the ruling regime in Syria, which has a lot of consequences including withdrawal of their ambassadors from Syria, expelling Syrian ambassadors and admitting representatives of the SNC to the Syrian embassies. That means creating an alternative state which entails many legal and political complications which are not currently helpful.

We don’t want to engage in struggles and bear what we can’t afford at this stage. We have a political recognition and many countries are backing our demands regarding the stepping down of Al-Assad, and the Syrian people only demand the toppling of the regime.

Common consensus has it that toppling the regime won’t happen in the near future. What do you think?

The regime has not fallen until now for many reasons, including the ongoing support of some countries such as Iran, in addition to the regime’s dependence on violence, suppression and killing.

It is a regime that is not ashamed of the bloodshed. Moreover, the sensitive strategic geopolitical position of Syria has scared off many countries from standing in up to that regime without Arab support or a resolution from the Security Council.

There are other factors including the opposition’s insistence on preserving the unity of the country and rejecting any interference that could affect the sovereignty of the country and its independence.

Internal protection What about the protection of civilians through humanitarian corridors and buffer zones. Is it postponed until the end of the observers’ mission?

We are insisting on our demands in this regard. We call for a buffer zone to protect the people, but that must go through the Security Council. However, we are working on plans to protect civilians. We are studying many mechanisms to ensure that protection. We will not wait for foreigners to protect civilians but we will develop means to protect civilians from inside Syria, and that has already started.

Are you referring to The Free Syrian Army (FSA) when you are talking about internal protection?

Of course, it is the main pillar of the protection system, but there are other strong civil protection systems that we are working on. We are currently developing plans to ensure the best possible protection. We will not wait for the Security Council.

How do you coordinate with FSA, and could it be dubbed as the military arm of the SNC? No, the SNC doesn’t have a military arm. The SNC is supporting the FSA and all other parties that are trying to protect the Syrian people and protesters, we are coordinating with everybody; we are coordinating and consulting with the FSA. We want the FSA to be independent, not a military arm of any opposition political entity—especially since FSA is one of the main pillars of the Syrian popular resistance against tyranny.

Don’t you have concerns over the FSA affecting the peaceful character of the revolution?

Of course they are legitimate concerns, but things in fact are different. The FSA is only protecting protesters and that is not difficult to prove. You only have to watch TV channels; we are

watching everyday hundreds of thousands of protesters without any weapons. Isn’t it a peaceful and popular revolution?

This is the truth of the revolution, and the free soldiers are committed to protecting civilians not to waging a war.

How does the FSA gain logistic support?

Well, we aren’t intervening in that but they obtain what they need mainly from Syrian resources; from the army itself, they take what they can only from the armories of the Syrian army, not more.

What is the truth of weapons being smuggled from neighboring countries to the FSA? I don’t have enough information about that. But I don’t think there is armament from outside Syria. There has always been smuggling of weapons from Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and probably Turkey. We are talking about very small and light weapons for individual use, which are available in Syria and all over the world.

Could the FSA be an alternative to a military intervention?

Not on its own, but it is certainly one of the most important pillars of civil protection. Otherwise, we should develop civil mechanisms to protect civilians, we will try to develop the Arab initiative and we will find another means. We are currently working on that because we don’t bet on the fast change of UN position, at least in the coming few months. I think the next couple of months will be crucial to the regime. We might see the fall of the regime before we succeed in getting a resolution from the Security Council on any type of intervention.

The National Coordination Committee (NCC) Established in May 2011, led by Haitham Al-Manna’, it consists of a number of leftist Syrian parties, the Communist Labor Party, the Socialist Union Party and four Kurdish parties.

The Committee’s executive board includes Majed Habbo, Hassan Abdul-Azim, Hussein AlAwdat, Aref Dalila, Rajaa Al-Nasser, Abdul-Aziz Al-Khair, Mohammad Al-Ammar, Mounir Al-Bitar, Fayez Sara, Saleh Muslim Mohammad, Jamal Mullah, Mohammad Musa, Bassam Al-Malek, and Mohammad Sayyed Rassas.

The most important principle of the committee is the objection to any external intervention. Initially it did not call openly for the toppling of Bashar AlAssad’s regime, a significant difference from other opposition movements and the SNC. The Committee has called for a serious dialogue with the regime after providing the necessary conditions, the most important of which is stopping the security military solution, releasing all political detainees, forming an independent investigation committee, punishing those responsible for killing and shooting protestors, lifting the state of emergency and martial laws and acknowledging the right of peaceful protests.

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Do you believe in the probability of a coup d’état?

Until now there has been no coup d’état, which means it’s less likely to happen. But we shouldn’t rule out any probability even if it only represents 30 percent.

How much do you depend on defections as an alternative to a military coup d’état?

We know that there are messages sent by officers who are willing to defect from the army. At least there is a big wish for defecting, but the question is: is there a group of officers who are trying systematically to topple the regime? I don’t rule out this possibility, but we don’t have confirmed information about such attempts.

A European Fund Have France, or other European countries, offered you financial support?

We asked EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton to establish a fund to support Syrian people, in which all the EU countries would participate. Many countries supported the idea and we are waiting for the announcement of its establishment.

Many people hope that the Russian stance will change after the announcement of a draft resolution on Syria submitted to the Security Council, which faced American objections. Are you still convinced that Moscow’s position may change?

I’m optimistic that a little shift will happen. Moscow realizes that the Syrian regime is crumbling. There is ongoing contact between us and Russian Foreign Ministry and they are always sending us signals about their recognition of the rights of the Syrian people. They are also recognizing that the Syrian regime is committing crimes. We received many delegates from Moscow to assure us—I won’t mention their names. However, Russia still urges us to launch a dialogue with the regime, but we have repeatedly asserted that the regime has put an end to the dialogue path because it is still killing people. We call upon Russia to take obvious stances against the crimes committed against Syrian people. When Russia contacted us before submitting their draft resolution the Security Council, I asked them to seriously express their belief in the cause of the Syrian people and their recognition of the difference between the people and the regime. We also hope that they adopt the Arab initiative.

The role of neighboring countries How do you see the role of Saudi Arabia?

It is clear that Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, are taking the most powerful position in supporting the Syrian people politically as well as backing the Arab initiative. The Arab League initiative was initially a Gulf initiative and there is a consensus between most of Gulf States that the regime went so far in its brutality, killings and destruction that it has become impossible to deal with.

The national interest of neighboring and Gulf countries requires supporting Syrian people to ensure the minimum limit of stability in the region. The Syrian regime is the source of instability not only for Syrian people but also for the whole region.

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There is ongoing contact between us and Russian Foreign Ministry and they are always sending us signals about their recognition of the rights of the Syrian people Turkey engaged early in the Syrian revolution by imposing sanctions on the Syrian regime and also through what some described as an important role in forming the SNC. How do you see the Turkish role?

The current SNC wasn’t established under the auspices of Turkey. Therefore it didn’t intervene in its structure. The SNC came through a coalition of opposition forces without any intervention of whatever player. That doesn’t mean that Turkey doesn’t support SNC. Obviously, Turkey supports SNC and the Syrian opposition as a whole. However, The Turkish policy tends to be in harmony with the policies of the International community and the Arabs. SNC is endorsing the Arab role which entails political, strategic and practical commitments.

In your opinion, why is the Turkish role retreating in the current phase?

Certainly, Turkey has taken a strong stance from the beginning, but they have different evaluations of the amount of challenges and the pressures they can apply to bring the Syrian regime down. Certainly, cutting Turkish relations with the Syrian regime represents a pressure on the regime. According to our discussions with Turkey, they are tending to believe that it can’t act on its own, and any role should be in harmony with the Arab role and international efforts.

To what extent will Syrian interests intersect with the interests of Iran and Hezbollah after fulfilling the objectives of the revolution?

Of course, we will not think of cutting relations with them. It’s not logical to cut the relations with other states, even if that country has not taken positive stances towards our people’s cause. But certainly there is a difference between special relations and ordinary relations. I think after the change, there will be no justification to have exceptional relations between Syria and Iran. There won’t be such an Iranian-Syrian axis against other Arab countries.

Syria will have closer ties with the Arab region as a whole.

I don’t think we can resume the special relations between new Syria and Iran, while Iran is publicly supporting the Syrian regime against its people. It’s not logical.

As for Hezbollah, I think it will change its stance when the situation in Syria changes. However, whatever what we say today doesn’t have any value. The Syrian people, through its elected parliament, will determine the future policies of Syria not the SNC. Are you optimistic about the future of Syrian revolution?

I’m not only optimistic, I’m 100 percent sure of victory for the people and I think the people have already won. But they still need to complete the mission and get rid of Assad regime. Undoubtedly, the victory of Syrians will come very soon.

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Generation How is social media shaping the new Middle East?

Twitter garnered a lot of attention during the Arab Spring, with some commentators giving great credit to the platform for initiating and guiding the widespread civil uprisings. A new generation in the Middle East is certainly using social media to express themselves and shape their society and world around them. Mainstream media and society as a whole are ďŹ nding this social media phenomenon and its users an important new partner, but to what extent is this new generation redeďŹ ning the Middle East?

Caryle Murphy

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• THE TWITTER GENERATION

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hey are easy to spot in Deborah Wheeler’s class at American University of Kuwait. They favor brightly colored Polo shirts, cargo shorts and sandals. Sometimes toting both iPhone and Blackberry, they will each send 20 to 30 text messages while attending Wheeler’s lecture.

“They’re so good at paying attention and texting,” she said, “that you don’t really realize it until it’s too late. We did have rule, that if the phone rang or I caught them texting, they had to bring me chocolate the next day. But I was getting fat. So I decided that I should just understand that this dialed-in, networked generation is just absolutely addicted to these technologies.”

Or consider Ahmed Shihab-Eldin. At the very moment that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stepped down, ShihabEldin was watching the historic event on the express train from Washington to New York. He could barely contain his excitement as he viewed live images of Tahrir Square streamed by Al-Jazeera on his laptop and texted friends in the square on his cell phone. “This is what is meant by global village,” said Shihab-Eldin, 27. “You can be traveling 85 miles an hour on a train and still be able to participate-both as consumer and producer of information and news.”

The students in Kuwait and Shihab-Eldin are homesteaders on the electronic frontier of the Internet, skillfully mining blogging sites, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and scores of other applications. Coming of age as these online tools came on stream, they have a love—some say obsession—for the social networking of cyberspace that is revolutionizing human communication and interaction.

They are the “Twitter Generation.”

Like connected, clicking youths everywhere, those in the Middle East have used social media to keep in touch with friends, share music, follow celebrities and pass around photos. But lately, they also demonstrated how these tools can be valuable assets for making history, employing them in the Arab Spring to usher in a remarkable transformation in the region’s political dynamics.

“The first three months of 2011 saw what can only be termed a substantial shift in the Arab world’s usage of social mediatowards…social and civil mobilization online…to organize demonstrations (both pro-and antigovernment), disseminate information within their networks, and raise awareness of ongoing events locally and globally,” concluded the Arab Social Media Report (ASMR). Issued in May by the Dubai School of Government’s Governance and Innovation Program, this report is perhaps the most comprehensive study of online social networking in the Arab world.

Social media’s rising stature prompts a host of questions about who is using it, its role in the Arab spring, its relationship to mainstream media and its impact on Arab societies.

Twitter is just one social media tool, but possibly because of its novelty and immediacy—tweets get read and responded to instantly—it acquired a high profile during the Arab Spring.

“Twitter is used for different things in different places, but in an authoritarian context like Egypt, it is a tool of dissent, and they used it for that relentlessly,” said David Faris, an assistant professor at Chicago’s Roosevelt University who spent four years studying how Egyptians use social media.

Jillian C. York, director for international freedom of expression at the Electronic Frontier Foundation in San Francisco, is a dedicated social media user herself with many friends in the Middle East whom she met online. “The use of Twitter has been more innovative in the Middle East and North Africa than anywhere else in world,” she said.

Defining the “Twitter Generation” Dedicated users of social media are a small vanguard in the Arab world, where access to the Internet and digital literacy levels are still low. But the number of people flocking to social media in the region is rising rapidly. This trend accelerated in the first quarter of this year, most notably in countries where protests occurred, according to the ASMR. Facebook is the most popular social networking tool in Arab countries, with 27,711,503 users as of April 2011. That is almost double the 14,791,972 on Facebook in April 2010, the ASMR found. In the first four months of 2011, Facebook users in the Arab world grew by 30 percent, with Egypt accounting for most newcomers in this time period (2 million). Egypt’s 6.5 million Facebook users comprise about a quarter of all users in the region.

As for Twitter, the ASMR estimates there are about 6.5 million users in the Arab world, of whom 1.5 million are frequent tweeters. The countries with the most users and tweets are United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In Saudi Arabia, tweets went up 400 percent in one year (the average increase in the same time period in the rest of the world was 90 per cent).

This social media vanguard is young. Around 70 percent of Facebook users in the Arab world are between 15 and 29 years.

And since they live in a region where at least 60 percent of the population is under 30, their online social media activity is bound to impact their societies.

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But defining such a new phenomenon as the “Twitter Generation” is not easy. Who better to ask than Shihab-Eldin, copresenter of Al-Jazeera’s The Stream, a news program about social media that links online communities to television audiences. Now based in Washington, Shihab-Eldin has spent half his life in the Arab world with his Palestinian-born parents.

“Reckless, instant, aware, nuanced, connected, compelled to communicate … even if they have nothing interesting to say,” he replied when asked to describe his peers. “But all in all, the first word that comes into my mind is brave, and honestly for me, that’s a product of the people I follow and the conversations I choose to pay attention to.”

Generalizing about the “Twitter Generation” is not easy, York said. “But what I’ve seen is a lot of younger people, a lot of tech-savvy people. Education seems to vary, lots have college degrees, or a minimum of a high school education.

They’re people who have been using digital tools not necessarily for political activism though. There are a lot of folks who just like Facebook.”

That corresponds to the findings of a 2010 survey sponsored

by American University of Beirut’s Issam Fares Institute and UNICEF and directed by Jad Melki, assistant professor of media studies at AUB. That survey found that “barely any Arab youth were using social media for political activism,” Melki said. “They were mainly using it for entertainment, for connecting with friends, and mainly for consumption rather than production of information.”

But his poll was conducted before the Arab Spring. Also, the 2,744 youths aged 13 to 28 he questioned lived in Lebanon, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. When Roosevelt University’s Faris examined social media use in Egypt, he found a different picture. And it helps explain the role of these tools during the recent uprisings.

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Social media and the Arab Spring: a symbiosis The role of social media in the Arab Spring has been hotly debated. But an emerging consensus goes like this: The revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries were precipitated by longstanding grievances in a broad swath of their populations and would probably have happened at some point.

But social media played a vital role in several different ways.

First of all, it prepared the ground for the revolts by influencing public opinion and creating online networks of likeminded people.

For years prior to the outbreak of Egypt’s 25 January protest, Faris found, digital activists had been using social media “to connect people who shared the same views about the regime, to organize protests … and to build a movement that could be deployed in a moment of crisis to undermine the regime.” These online activities, mostly blogging at first, were building “alternative public spheres” where dissent and information could be shared “as a way to do an end run around authoritarian state structures,” Faris added.

Facebook was especially important in both Tunisia and Egypt. The 2010 Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said,” created by Google executive Wael Ghonim to memorialize an Egyptian beaten to death by police, was key to galvanizing public sentiment and paving the way for the events of January 2011, according to many observers.

In the early stages of protests in both countries, social media was used as an efficient way to mobilize people and quicken the pace of events until they reached a critical stage. At this point, Twitter came into its own, said Faris. “Once action moved to street,” he said, “Twitter was more important … just in terms of sharing information about where the protests were developing.” The Twitter hashtag #Jan25 instantly created a unified community, he added, “bringing together everyone with internet access who was participating in these protests.”

Wheeler, an associate professor of political science at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland who gives a course in Arab human development at American University of Kuwait each summer, has been studying the impact of the Internet on Arab societies for more than a decade. “Not everybody who went to Tahrir Square had access to” social media, she said.

“But enough people did that you could mobilize and communicate in an open way.”

Finally, social media were essential in rapidly publicizing what was happening to the outside world. Within two days of Mohamed Bouazizi setting himself alight, Shihab-Eldin recalled, “there were solidarity protests in Berlin, in Italy, in Egypt” because people read about it on Twitter. “It didn’t exist in the mainstream media.”

In Tunisia, internet activists gathered information posted on social media by protesters and published it as a coherent package accessible and understandable to outsiders, particularly journalists, on nawaat.org. This site, created in 2004 for opposition critiques of the former Ben Ali regime, had already helped prime Tunisians for revolt by publicizing Wikileaks-released cables about government corruption.

While Melki generally agrees with this description of social media’s role in the uprisings, he believes that their effect and use has been exaggerated. “Although they did play an important role in the Arab Spring,” he said, “I don’t think it’s as much as what people in the media are saying.”

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Faris is more precise. “We have to give Facebook and Twitter their fair share of the credit,” he said. “Those two applications in particular were quite important in bringing about the events of January 25th … But once it was unleashed, they were no longer as important as they had been.

“What ultimately forced Mubarak to resign was not Facebook or Twitter or even [protests in] Tahrir,” added Faris. “It was the general strike initiated by organized labor starting on February 8th.” That strike, encompassing workers on the railway and bus systems, in the state electricity sector, in the Suez Canal and in many different factories left many businesses paralyzed.

Social media and mainstream media: a partnership Social media’s prominent role in the Arab Spring and its rising use among Arab youth raises the question of whether mainstream media is becoming irrelevant. An analysis of what happened before and during the Arab Spring suggests that, for now, both media need each other.

Faris said that many influential and widely read Egyptian bloggers were journalists themselves or had close ties to journalists. As a result, the material in their blogs, especially on sensitive issues like torture and unlawful detention, often showed up in independent newspapers and television stations. “That was really a sea change,” he said, “because it meant that the state no longer had control over narrative-making.”

When the uprisings began in Tunisia and Egypt, this partnership deepened. With its cameras barred from Tunisia, AlJazeera began excavating social media for videos, information and sources.

“In Tunis, when people would post YouTube videos to Facebook, the credibility of those videos would be questioned until Nawaat.org would put them on a website that Al-Jazeera would then play on tv,” said Melki. “Tunisians would see those videos on television and it would give them more credibility … This interaction between those three entities is really what helped in bringing down the barrier of fear.”

York was following the early Tunisian protests on Twitter.

It was only when Al-Jazeera’s coverage began, she said, that “the rest of world started to hear about it, the rest of the world being everybody who was not [already] watching it on Twitter.”

This was also when spill-over into Egypt began to materialize. “I think the domino effect owes a lot to social media,” York added, explaining that it gave mainstream media content that they could not get themselves. “Television is going to cover it no matter what,” she said. “But they would not be able to do it as quickly, easily, and efficiently without using social media to gain insight, to get sources.”

The impact of the “Twitter Generation” on society The “Twitter Generation’s” robust performance in the Arab Spring suggests that its collective impact on Arab societies will be significant, in part because of the changes that social media are creating in its youthful users.

As the ASMR states, “empirical evidence suggest[s] that the growth of social media in the region and the shift in usage trends have played a critical role in mobilization, empowerment, shaping opinions, and influencing change. A critical mass of young and active social media users in the

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Arab world exists today … One thing that is certain is that given the region’s young population and increasing penetration rates, social media will continue to play a growing role in political, societal and economic developments in the Arab region.”

So what is social media doing to its young users?

Most importantly, it is empowering them, “giving them a voice that didn’t exist before,” said Melki.

Social media offers “a new avenue for people to express themselves away from state-run media,” added Zaki Safar, 27, an electrical engineer at Saudi Aramco. “The flow of information is no longer controlled … so it is shifting power … back to the people, where it should be.”

Also, whether it is an appreciative comment on YouTube— where Saudi cartoonists and stand-up comics are drawing virtual crowds—or a retweet on Twitter, social networking is giving young people affirmation and confidence. This is a contrast to their usual experience, which often is to be ignored or issued commands.

As Safar put it, “when people reply back to my tweet, I know that I’m not alone out there, that I’m not just someone who is shouting out in the desert and the only thing I’m hearing back is my echo.”

Safar was an organizer of the recent campaign to overturn the Saudi ban on women driving, which was made possible largely by Facebook and Twitter. Supporters created a Facebook page “Women2Drive” to publicize the campaign; women who participated in the 17 June launch of the movement uploaded videos to YouTube of themselves driving. They also tweeted about their participation under the hashtag #W2drive, this allowed journalists to get an accurate count of the first day’s drivers. What is more, the Twitter user @W2drive now has almost 11,000 followers.

These online experiences are also emboldening. “Everyone now has a platform where they can talk,” said Riyadh blogger Eman Al-Nafjan. “And when you know that your neighbor has the same opinion you have, you feel brave enough to speak your own mind. It gets really contagious.”

Of course governments are monitoring Facebook and Twitter for dissent and using them to influence public opinion. Saudi users of Twitter quickly spot government tweeters, whom they call “egg people” because they don’t post their pictures with their tweets, keeping instead the default white oval icon.

Social media is also breaking down walls and borders. “Maybe the most noticeable thing is that I choose to spend time and energy in maintaining relationships with people who I don’t necessarily know, whom I’ve never met in person, and yet who I feel close to,” said Shihab-Eldin. He added that many of his peers gain “an increase in understanding in how they fit into their social fabric because they are communicating with people they have not communicated with before. They are being challenged …We really do live now in a world where borders, as we’ve seen in the context of the Arab uprising, are relatively meaningless in the movement of ideas.”

The full impact of this new frontier of social media is still unfolding. Wheeler believes that all these online experiences are incrementally but steadily creating new realities in the collective life of Arab societies.

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Given the region’s young population and increasing penetration rates, social media will continue to play a growing role in political, societal and economic developments in the Arab region “I think that young people who are dialed into these technologies are really aware of what’s going on in world, highly aware of what’s going on in their own society, are aware of US foreign policy, and they have opinions about these things” which they share “with people in the global community and their local communities,” she said. “I just think it’s a new era where politicians can’t hide.”

Caryle Murphy is an independent journalist based in Saudi Arabia. A long-time reporter for the Washington Post, Ms Murphy was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting (1991) and the George Polk Award for Foreign Reporting (1990) for her coverage of Iraqi-occupied Kuwait and subsequent 1990-91 Gulf War. She is the author of Passion for Islam, which explores Islam’s contemporary revival and the roots of religious extremism in the Middle East. Published by Scribner, the book examines Islam’s resurgence through the prism of Egypt, where Murphy lived for five years.

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The Brother Leader

Who is the man at the helm of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, now poised to lead Egypt in the post-Mubarak era?

Liberals view him as an uncompromising religious conservative and even within the Muslim Brotherhood some doubt his ability to lead. Will Mohamed Badie succeed in uniting the Muslim Brotherhood and forming a parliamentary majority?

Image © Getty Images

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he press conference was set to start at noon, but at one the long table at the front of the tightly packed room remained empty. The cameramen were still jostling to set up their equipment, jamming their heavy tripods into what remained of the spaces along the walls.

It almost didn’t matter, everyone knew the story they were there for. It was all about the man who would finally take his seat at the table at 2 PM: The Muslim Brotherhood’s General Masul, the General Guide, Mohamed Badie. It was September 2010 and parliamentary elections, were on everyone’s minds, as they are today. Especially when it came to predicting the power of the Muslim Brotherhood in those elections.

Mohamed Badie Abdul Mageed Samy, a highly educated man with roots in labour rights and a strong commitment to outreach, is poised to become one of the most influential powers in the ‘new Egypt.’ Yet, his rise from relative obscurity to the forefront of national politics has left many Egyptians perplexed. Liberals view him as an uncompromising religious conservative and even within the Muslim Brotherhood some doubt his ability to lead. Will Mohamed Badie succeed in uniting the Muslim Brotherhood and forming a parliamentary majority?

Badie is a mild mannered 68-year old professor of veterinary medicine at the University of Beni Suef. He was born in 1943 in El-Mahalla El-Kubra, a town that for its textiles as well as for a potent streak of political activism. Strikes in the small industrial town in 2008 gave birth to the youth wing of the Kefaya party, known as the April 6 Youth Movement for the date of one massive strike. The group’s social media saavy would become ubiquitous five years later in the uprising to topple President Hosni Mubarak.

Badie’s decision to support the demands of the Egyptian people rather than with a pan Islamic identity has won the organization more understanding and appreciation than it

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• PROFILE

enjoyed prior to the revolution. But several decades earlier, Mohamed Badie and Mahalla had become known to a president or two. In 1965, Badie arrived in Cairo to begin his studies in veterinary medicine. Not even nine months later he was arrested for political activism, as a member of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, and sentenced to 15 years alongside the controversial and more militant breakaway leader, Sayyid Qutb. He served nine of those years before a new Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, showed leniency and freed Badie along with other Muslim Brotherhood members (Qutb, instead, was executed by hanging in 1966).

Wasting no time, Badie returned to his studies and to his political work, serving in the Ikhwan (Brotherhood) administration in Mahalla and later representing the group’s educational association in Yemen. In 1996, he became a member of the Brotherhood’s governing council, the Guidance Bureau.

Badie became the eighth General Masul Guide or chairman of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in early 2010.

Arab media, as well as supporters and critics of the Brotherhood, followed closely the selection process that led to his appointment illustrating the continuing importance of the Egyptian branch in the region.

Badie enjoys the staunch support of organized labour, having served as the Secretary General of the General Union of Veterinarians and as the Treasurer of the Union of Medical Professionals, which makes him favorable to poor and working class voters. Still, his appointment in 2010 still came to many as a surprise, it sidelined many better known leaders in the organization, such as Abd alMoneim Abou el-Fattouh and Mohammed Habib.

With the Muslim Brotherhood daily gaining ground in Egyptian politics, some wonder if there couldn’t be a worse time for the generally more conservative Badie to be leading the organization. After all, he was the one who smuggled the controversial chapters of Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones out of prison. Some even wondered whether he would cause the splintering of the organization.

On the night of December 31, 2010 a bomb ripped through the al-Qiddissin Church in Alexandria killing 23 people and injuring dozens more. Al-Qaeda took responsibility for the attack, rattling the soul of Egypt and unnerving its two major religious communities. In the critical days that followed the attack, the Muslim Brotherhood, under Badie’s leadership, released multiple statements of solidarity, calling for national unity and inter-religious harmony.

Three days after the attack, Badie released a message titled, “One Nation in the Face of Sedition”, stressing that Islam calls for love, peaceful coexistence, fraternity and tolerance. Badie also condemned the attackers and demanded that if apprehended they be punished to the full extent of Egyptian law. His swift and straightforward reaction earned him widespread praise for contributing to defuse sectarian tensions in Egypt.

In the weeks that followed, Egyptian Muslims and Copts took to the streets in small marches and rallies for solidarity under banners that read Ana Masry, I am Egyptian.

Muslims also sat in churches and joined masses all over the country on January, 6 2011, Coptic Christmas Eve, declar-

ing that if they were attacked again, Muslims would die alongside their Coptic fellow Egyptians. They were met with the barricades, batons and tear gas of Egyptian State Security forces.

Three weeks later, Ikhwan were in Tahrir Square supporting calls for the end of Mubarak’s rule, tolerating social interactions that staunch religious conservative would have viewed as unacceptable, such as men and women marching, singing, and camping in the square alongside each other.

Badie’s decision to support the demands of the Egyptian people rather than with a pan Islamic identity has won the organization more understanding and appreciation than it enjoyed prior to the revolution. Moreover, Badie’s activism—the fact that he has experienced police brutality and detention and still steadfastedly demanded political change—means that he has strong political credentials for reforming the status quo.

The principles that made him the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood may well end up carrying him into a more central and critical role on the national stage. There are others waiting in the wings if he can’t handle the job, Kheiraet al-Shater is widely seen as the best candidate to lead the Muslim Brotherhood party and possibly even the country. He is much more media-savvy than Badie and promises to develop good ties with foreign investors.

When Badie finally took his seat at that late to start press conference back in September 2010, he resembled the man he always does, quiet, calm, loath to making any fiery statements. He announced coolly as he always did that it was forbidden for the Muslim Brotherhood to run for office or positions in government. He said it was haram and he would not budge on this issue. However, the Ikhwan was allowed to throw its support behind dozens of candidates and was expected to gain as many as 30% of the seats in the upcoming elections for parliamentary representatives.

Two months later, in November 2010, the Brotherhood’s candidates would be nearly wiped out in one of the most corrupt and rigged elections in Egypt’s history and would spend the rest of the year reeling from their losses. Today, as the ballots are counted, their support is estimated to be garnering them as many as 70% of the seats in parliament.

Three weeks later, Ikhwan were in Tahrir Square supporting calls for the end of Mubarak’s rule, tolerating social interactions that staunch religious conservative would have viewed as unacceptable, such as men and women marching, singing, and camping in the square alongside each other

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

The international oil industry has a long history of interruption from political turmoil. The current uprisings in the Arab World have already made a dent in oil prices. What does the future hold for markets that rely on the petro-dollar?

The Future of Oil

Amy Myers Jaffe and Keily Miller

The Arab Awakening and the great Petro-Squeeze

The Arab Aw great Petro-S

Image © Getty Images

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he international oil industry has a long history of interruption from political turmoil. Of the 28 countries that experienced civil conflicts over the course of the twenty-first century, approximately a third of them were oil-producing nations.* Control of oil facilities often becomes the key to leverage in these civil conflicts, as seen most recently in the struggle by the Libyan opposition to stay afloat in the campaign against Libyan strongman Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. Political strife also takes its toll on oil operations.

Local workers abandon their posts and foreign technicians are often evacuated, in some cases causing a slowdown or even cutoff of oil production. Splinter groups bomb critical facilities to deprive the ruling parties of revenue and fuel, causing disruptions that last until infrastructure can be repaired.

The prospects that the Arab Awakening could sweep across the Middle East sent oil prices skyrocketing. The sudden outbreak of large-scale anti-government protests in Egypt was the first event to rock global oil markets, as fears that oil traffic through Egypt’s Suez Canal would be curtailed raised spot oil prices by around 5 per cent in a matter of days. The announcement that Iran was sending naval ships through the Suez Canal pushed UK Brent prices even higher, to over $103 per barrel. While the Canal was never closed, pending oil exploration deals were put on hold and Egyptian natural gas operations were disrupted by the explosion of the Arab Gas Pipeline, leading to a month-long suspension of natural gas exports to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. No sooner had the market adjusted to the news from Egypt, when civil war in Libya forced the evacuation of foreign oil operators, fully shutting in Libya’s oil output of 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd). Meanwhile, European sanctions on Syria have reduced Syrian oil exports from 120,000 bpd to almost zero. In Yemen, political volatility so far has nearly halved the country’s normal oil output, and a worsening of hostilities could prove more destructive. Overall, prior to the unrest in Tunisia, oil prices rose from $92 per barrel in January 2011 to $120 per barrel by April, after violence erupted in Libya.

Oil markets were quick to recognize a contagion effect for Middle Eastern politics. Conditions for social unrest that would drive the Arab Awakening—high unemployment among young populations, dissatisfaction with the levels of personal freedom and human rights, economic stagnation, corruption and lack of government accountability—exist across the oil-producing regions of the Middle East.

Oil production totaling 21 million bpd in seven countries (Algeria, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) is potentially at risk. A new kind of oil price premium also emerged, only recently dislodged by negative global economic news. The Arab Awakening portends greater volatility in oil markets over time as the changed political outlook raises questions about the longer term effects of political turmoil and broadened political participation on investment in oil production capacity throughout the Middle East.

The Fu Oil

Shaking Up the Market: Why the Physical Toll Will Last Longer Than We Think As dramatic as it has been, oil price volatility from last spring does not tell the full story of the oil impact for the Arab Awakening. The short term rise in oil prices belies a greater problem: markets have yet to take into account the more lasting effects that shifting Middle Eastern politics will have on regional oil industries. History teaches us that abrupt regime change in oilproducing states can lead to a prolonged period of low oil output, often lasting decades. The length of the period of decline is determined not only by the level of damage to existing infrastructure that might ensue from political unrest or civil war, but more significantly by the process of consolidating power that follows the transformation of internal politics.

The long-term cycle of underinvestment in oil capacity that has accompanied revolutionary change in political leadership in the Middle East still plagues oil markets today. Iran’s oil production averaged around 6 million bpd in the late 1970s, but a crippling oil workers’ strike in December 1978 halted production and contributed to the fall of the Shah. By early 1980, with the rise of Iranian revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini and the start of the Iraq-Iran War, Iranian output had fallen to 1.5 million bpd. Today, three decades later, the country’s oil output capacity has recovered to only 3.5 million bpd—far below its pre-revolutionary levels.

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he Future of l

Arab Awakening and the Petro-Squeeze

The historical Libyan case is also instructive: When Muammar Qadhafi rose to power in 1969, Libyan oil production averaged 3.2 million bpd. The new revolutionary government called for an increase in the official posted price for oil, threatening to shut down production entirely should the West resist its demands. By 1975, Qadhafi’s strident approach to oil policy had driven Libya’s oil output to less than 50 percent of its capability. Ten years later, with Qadhafi still firmly in power, oil production had dropped to a mere one million bpd. The dramatic decline of Libya’s oil output during the first two decades of Qadhafi’s rule points to the difficulties of marrying revolutionary politics with the technically challenging task of running a multi-billion dollar oil infrastructure. In the 2000s, Libya’s economy began a slow and steady recovery aided by more conciliatory policies and a strong international market, but oil output never came close to pre-revolution levels, even with foreign assistance.

With Qadhafi’s fall from power officially recognized on August 21, 2011, the task that lies ahead for the National Transitional Council (NTC) and subsequent leaders is perhaps more challenging than that faced by Qadhafi in 1969. On top of the ancient social chasms that have re-emerged, the country’s economy is in dire straits, foreign operators have fled and security concerns within the country appear likely to keep most international operators from returning in the foreseeable future.

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Qadhafi may be gone, but it is anyone’s guess how quickly the country can resume oil production. The International Energy Agency, for example, is projecting that full production will not resume until 2015. No matter how well the transition to elective rule transpires in Libya, the lengthy process of nation-building and legitimization of authority is certain to hinder the level of investment required to repair the damage to oil facilities, reassemble the workforce and resume operations for a period of months, if not years.

Political Participation, Factionalism and Oil Funds To assume that the cycle of oil infrastructure underinvestment will be limited to countries undergoing revolutionary change is overly optimistic. The problem of oil in emergent electoral democracies is no less thorny. The broadening of political participation and related competition for public and private goods can give a disproportionate priority to short-term considerations as well as fuelling counterproductive, factional infighting on the subject of oil investment and related spoils. The few examples of nascent electoral democracy in the Persian Gulf have not yet been favorable to oil development. In Kuwait, political discord between an unpopular, royally appointed Prime Minister and coalitions in the partially-elected National Assembly have stalled the implementation of planned oil sector expansion projects. In Iraq, social protests, sectarian political infighting, and competition for national power and resources among regional leaders are all contributing to delays in the implementation of major billion dollar oil infrastructure expansion projects.

Kuwait’s Oil Ministry intended to increase production capacity from the current 2.9 million bpd to 4 million bpd by 2020, but the embittered political quarrelling in Kuwait has rendered the proposal highly unattainable, while at the same time weakening the credibility of Kuwait’s oil sector in the eyes of foreign investors. The National Assembly’s longstanding posture of blocking progress on major expansion programs in the oil industry remains problematic for the emirate, whose mature fields will increasingly require enhanced recovery techniques to stave off declines in oil production. Kuwait’s national oil company requires outside assistance to meet the technically challenging problems emerging in Kuwait’s oilfields, and its domestic industry lacks the manpower and expertise to develop new reserves on its own.

However, opposition in the National Assembly against foreign participation does not appear to be wavering, especially in the charged atmosphere following the Arab Awakening. In February 2010, state firm Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) signed a five-year deal with Royal Dutch Shell to develop deep gas reserves in non-associated gas fields in northern Kuwait. Kuwait has been desperate to find more natural gas to power rising local industrial and electrical demand. At the time, it was hoped that Shell’s deal with Kuwait would not raise objections from Parliament, since the development of associated natural gas with the aid of a foreign partner appeared less politically sensitive than oil development in Kuwait; plus, the natural gas to be developed would aid the reduction of domestic power shortages—a more popular mandate than increasing new oil production for export. Shell’s assistance was only invited after KOC ran into its own production problems trying to develop the resources without assistance.

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• THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

In spite of its obvious benefits, the deal still ran afoul of parliamentary politics. The National Assembly is now conducting an investigation into KOC’s award of Shell’s $800 million enhanced technical services agreement (ETSA) for the gas work and has forced the Oil Ministry to conduct a similar investigation. Parliamentarians have questioned whether the deal was open to fair competition. The move follows the resignation of Kuwait’s deputy prime minister, Sheikh Ahmad Fahad Al-Sabah, who had been a rising force in the energy sector as head of Kuwait’s Development and Infrastructure and Energy Committee. Sheikh Ahmad resigned his post in June to avoid a grilling from Parliament after being accused of corruption and mismanagement. The National Assembly’s response to the Shell deal is said to be stalling the possibility that other foreign firms will sign ETSAs with Kuwait until the controversy is settled – an example where elective politics is no friend to oil expansion.

Qadhafi may be gone, but it is anyone’s guess how quickly the country can resume oil production Iraq’s experience with electoral democracy has been similarly unfriendly to the development of its energy sector. Despite the commencement of oil expansion projects totaling 7 to 9 million bpd, Iraq’s emerging political deadlock has proven a barrier to getting the projects squarely off the ground. The spread of localized demonstrations in Iraq in the spring of 2011 by citizen groups frustrated by the dearth of basic services has exacerbated existing problems for the oilfield expansion programs, further disrupting the Iraqi government’s fragile coalitions and diverting funds and electricity services away from the oil sector. As in the case of Kuwait, political jockeying breeds tunnel vision. The redirection of those funds and electricity services—a classic case of rent distribution—has stalled the oilfield expansion projects, since the electricity needed both to pump seawater north to the southern oilfields as well as to fuel desalination plants is no longer available from the national power grid. Foreign oil companies say they are continuing to experience major delays and are questioning their ability to execute current contracted production targets given ongoing infrastructure development problems. According to a Baker institute working paper, foreign companies are still at an early stage of mobilization, and political decentralization inside Iraq remains a barrier to rapid implementation of projects to develop the oil, gas and electricity sectors.

As political participation broadens across the Middle East, countries are being forced to widen the distribution of economic benefits and patronage within their borders. As Arab publics increasingly weigh in on oil policy, changes in oil strategy will certainly take place.

[3] With governments facing pressures to expand public services, a trade-off occurs in which public funds are diverted away from the oil industry to social welfare services and salaries. Thus, the region will mortgage its future. Money diverted away from oil field expansion will translate into less future oil income as the demands of local populations grow larger and more expensive. Meanwhile, domestic fuel subsidies not only make it harder for national oil companies to turn a profit that can be reinvested, but they also expand the base of fuel-related entitlements that become harder to suppress. Mexico and Indonesia have already learned this hard lesson.

In the short term, the higher price of oil seems to stave off regime collapse. The public is led to believe by Islamists and other opposition groups that high oil prices are the key to improving quality of life. Yet demand for oil in the long run will prove elastic, and high prices will eventually prompt global buyers to increase fuel efficiency and advance unconventional energy substitutes, such as is now apparent from the boom in shale gas resources in North America.

The upshot of the region’s current political trends is that the Arab Awakening could easily and accidentally block the future expansion of oil production in the region. Thus, optimistic forecasts regarding the expansion by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) of oil productive capacity over the next couple of decades may not materialize. As events unfolded in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in early 2011, the amount of surplus oil that OPEC could offer the market shrank considerably.

OPEC spare capacity fell from 4.74 million bpd to 4.08 million bpd during the Arab Awakening. By June, with Libya’s pre-war production of 1.69 million bpd no longer available, OPEC spare capacity had decreased to 3.21 million bpd.

In the decades following 1979, trends were no more positive. OPEC’s oil productive capacity sat at 38.76 million bpd in 1979 against demand for its oil of 34 million bpd.

By 2005—some 26 years later—OPEC’s capacity had fallen to 30.6 million bpd against demand for its oil of 29.9 million bpd. Assumptions that OPEC will supply the additional 12.5 million bpd beyond its current output needed by global markets to balance higher oil demand projected for 2030 goes against both the grain of history and the current reality of the Middle East. With nearly every Arab member of OPEC—together totaling 44.6 percent of proven crude oil reserves worldwide—in the throes of political conciliation, the cumulative effect on future investment could be substantial. Even in the United Arab Emirates, where high state subsidies have largely shielded the government from public protest, these very subsidies have squeezed the profit of the country’s national oil industry margins so tightly that the government will soon be left with only two options: massive subsidy cuts or reallocation of investment away from oil.

Should the same fate befall Saudi Arabia, the oil market’s supply powerhouse and de facto central banker, it could be a rocky ride indeed. *Khair El Din Haseeb notes: “Transformation of these regimes into democratic ones which incorporate the participation of their peoples in primary decision-making processes will preclude their national security from remaining at the mercy of the United States…The Arab peoples will demand ‘just’ prices for their vital oil and gas resources, commensurate with the price increases of various goods in the West. They will not permit their regimes to continue to sell oil at current prices.” In Haseeb, “On the Arab Democratic Spring: Lessons Derived,” Contemporary Arab Affairs, April 21, 2011 Amy Myers Jaffe is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies and director of the Energy Forum at the Baker Institute, as well as associate director of the Rice Energy Program. Jaffe's research focuses on oil geopolitics, strategic energy policy including energy science policy, and energy economics. Keily Miller is a research associate for the Energy Forum at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy.

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• EDITOR'S CHOICE

Two major movements are shaking the foundations of Western Markets. On one hand, a crisis at the heart of eurozone nations has shaken their ties and brought into question the political will and ability of the group to stick together through thick and thin. So far the solutions have managed to keep the European Union cobbled together. Meanwhile a financially motivated uprising that began on Wall Street has gone global and unified a movement around a common enemy. Amir Taheri examines how a global economic crisis is straining democracy in Europe in his piece Europe: A Season of the Apparatchiki. Hussain Shobokshi looks further west at the villains of class warfare in his piece The Face of the New Enemy. Both submissions were among our favorites from this month’s analysis from Asharq Al-Awsat.

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O

ver the past year, the Arab states around the Mediterranean have witnessed pro-democracy revolts, while at the same time there has been a democratic setback in Europe. Of course, no one could be sure that the Arab Spring would produce democracy. But everyone would agree that, when it comes to the democratic setback that has struck Europe, we should be vigilant. By ‘democratic setback’, I mean the installation of unelected governments and, where that is not yet possible, the imposition of policies not approved by the people.

At this writing, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Greece, all members of the European Union, had ‘imposed’ governments. Italy had its first unelected government since Mussolini was hanged in 1945. The new government boasts that its members have never had political experiences, and never tested by an electorate.

Greece has its first unelected Prime Minister since 1974 when the dictatorship of the colonels ended. In Portugal and Ireland, both members of the EU, and in Iceland, not an EU member, new governments were installed after they pledged to carry out policies dictated by forces beyond the control of their electorates.

In Spain, just before last Sunday’s general election, Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero was forced to retire from politics at the ripe old age of 51. Even in Germany and France, supposed to be EU heavyweights, governments have had to change strategy under pressure from outside the democratic system.

By now you might have formed the impression that Europe is experiencing a series of coups d’état. By definition, a coup d’état is always anti-democratic. It happens when a group of officers use the army, a public institution that belongs to the people as a whole, to serve private interests, starting with the seizure of power. In a coup, the army that is meant to defend the country against external aggression becomes a tool for intervening in internal affairs. Having experienced two dozen coups d’état in half a century, Arabs know what that means.

In the case of the recent coups in Europe, we are not dealing with military conspirators. The European armies, or what is left of them, have not moved. The coups in question are carried out by a fraternity of bureaucrats and technocrats that, over decades, have captured strategic positions within the decision-making apparatus.

When the military stage coups, they do so in the name of ‘the nation’ which, in that context, is a hollow but dangerous abstraction. The military coup-makers’ discourse is simple: ‘the nation’ is in danger and needs the army for protection! The threat is defeat, the promise victory!

In the current European experience, the coup-makers act in the name of another dangerous abstraction: ‘the market’. They claim that elected leaders have cannot protect the economy, another abstraction, and that politics damages the interests of ‘the nation’. Many of those swept to power in recent coups are bankers and/or former members of EU bureaucracy, part of the Apparatchiki of the democratic world.

“The fact that our government is outside politics is its strength,” says Mario Monti, the former EU official manoeuvred into premiership in Italy.

In Greece, Lucas Papademos, another banker turned Prime Minister, claims that not being a member of Parliament is ‘“a great advantage’” in dealing with “dangers facing the nation.”

Europe: A Season of the Apparatchiki Amir Taheri

Monti and Papademos mock the “slowness” of the democratic process and promise to “bulldozer in major measures to reshape the economy.”

The anti-democratic mood in Europe is sustained by the claim that only experts could save the world from “the worst crisis since the Great Depression”.

What one might call the illusion of expertise is not new. The claim that government should belong to elites, whether military, religious, intellectual, or ethnic, is as old as politics.

Plato, inspired by the anti-democratic teachings of Socrates, advocated it in his Republic twenty-five centuries ago. Both men had been involved in an abortive coup led by Alcibiades and influenced by elite rule in Sparta. (In contrast, Aristotle insisted that the average citizen must have a say in all matters.)

The idea of rule by elites also found an expression in Leninism in the shape of the ‘dictatorship of the Proletariat’ with the Communist Party at the vanguard. Its Nazi version replaced the

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mythical ‘proletariat’ with a more mythical Aryan race.Fascinated by the Industrial Revolution, some British thinkers, among them H.G. Wells and Aldous Huxley, tried to circumvent politics by advocating ‘scientific solutions’ applied by scientists.

In the 1960s, the technocratic elite created the Club of Rome to decide long-term policies for the world. The exercise ended as a farce. In China, among other non-Western cultures, rule by experts created the Mandarin network that made the country the sick man of Asia, ready for exploitation by colonial predators. In Islam, the quest for “The Sublime City” (Al-Madinat AlFadhilah), produced a string of secret societies, starting with the “Brethren of Purity” (Ikhawan Al-Safa) in Basra, ending with the Hashasheen (Assassins) among other terrorist organizations.

The idea that bankers or bureaucrats are best qualified to solve Europe’s problems might have made some sense if one could treat a country as a bank or a company. However, trying to run human societies the same way as banks, companies or Issue 1568 • November 2011

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grocery stores is daft, to say the least. The West owes its historic success to the development of a system that, despite many defects, mobilizes the intellectual energies of a large segment of society rather than any narrow elite. Imposing governments by business elites is as bad as handing power to the military or to philosophers for that matter.

The elite governments are likely to fail lamentably. But before they do, they could do much harm by opening new space for anti-democratic populist movements on the extreme left and right. The cry about Europe’s economy being in danger should not make us oblivious of the more important political threat.

This article was printed in Asharq Al-Awsat Amir Taheri is a columnist for Asharq Al-Awsat and has published 11 books in 20 languages. Taheri's latest book "The Persian Night" is published by Encounter Books in London and New York..

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• EDITOR'S CHOICE

The Face of the New Enemy Hussein Shobokshi

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he ongoing and constantly developing protest movement in the industrialized West known as “Occupy” is growing stronger and more profound in content.

It has transformed the enthusiasm of the resentful youth and disaffected society into genuine legal demands and lawsuits, employing the services of several experienced lawyers and influential and active human rights organizations. Naturally, the movement now has a clearly defined enemy with a face, name and address. This enemy is a global consortium of banks, which have conducted scores of suspicious financial operations to abnormally increase their profits and secure enormous incentives for their top executives.

Today these banks are considered an integral part of economic autocracy, the consolidation of the social hierarchy, and the redistribution of wealth according to the preferences and agendas of favored associates, supporters, and close circles of the financial, economic, and political decision-making elite.

As the damage resulting from the US financial crisis spread over to the European continent, it was natural to see the heads of several top bank executives and some central bank managers roll. The latter had neglected their role in monitoring the managerial corruption pertaining to the financial policies and irresponsible loaning system practiced by the former. The Occupy movement now intends to take legal action in the US by filing a lawsuit against junior executives in an information technology company. These employees are alleged to have been contracted by different banks to reveal the protesters’ economic

entitlements and freeze their bank accounts, in order to force them into paying off their debts or evacuate their houses, in a manner similar to blackmail. The Occupymovement intends to follow the example of law authorities dealing with organized crime, when junior elements close to the criminal circles are pursued. One link of the chain should lead to another. This method has proven to be highly effective before.

The Arab Spring is still assigning tasks to political supporters of the ousted regimes. However, there are clear signs in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya of efforts to uncover elements of corruption that have penetrated the economic and financial bodies of these states. Middle Eastern movements—the equivalent of the Occupy movements in the West—are endeavoring to disclose the way in which banks became instruments of social suppression and autocracy par excellence. In the past, banks would selectively place certain individuals and groups on black lists and highlight others, in a carefully predetermined fashion. It was as if those banks wanted to glorify or humiliate whomever they liked, by virtue of the powers granted to them. Gradually, those banks grew into hotbeds of corruption and private benefit. Their profits soared in a disgusting manner, while their economic contributions remained very limited. They continued to offer loans to broad sections of small- and medium-scale companies, believing that credit and debit cards represented genuine support for the economy and for the state’s general welfare, but of course this was utter nonsense.

I was in a meeting recently with a highly respected Asian banker. He told me that the collapse of the Arab banking system was inevitable amid the chaos in decision-making, the random nature of choices, the spread of favoritism in recruitment, and the absence of accountability and responsibility. He added that if Arab banking had carried on without problems until that moment, then this would have been the result of pure luck, but the downfall was only a matter of time. His words were harsh but not far from reality. There is an increasing global movement against the hegemony of mammoth banking corporations over economic affairs. They are being criticized for acting as means to maximize the benefits of a privileged few. This movement will serve as a true pressure tool to change this situation. The banking system will become more humane, more ethical and more responsible amidst a new changing world which rejects injustice, autocracy and corruption. Banks have assumed the status of the enemy in society’s war against economic grievances. They had better prepare for the showdown.

This article was printed in Asharq Al-Awsat Hussein Shobokshi is a Businessman and prominent columnist. Mr. Shobokshi hosts the weekly current affairs program Al Takreer on Al Arabiya, and in 1995, he was chosen as one of the "Global Leaders for Tomorrow" by the World Economic Forum. He received his B.A. in Political Science and Management from the University of Tulsa, Arizona.

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• CANDID CONVERSATIONS

Shifting Energy Landscapes An interview with Daniel Yergin

In an exclusive interview with The Majalla, Daniel Yergin provides an insightful analysis of the changing geopolitics of energy and its implications for the world today. He also explores questions about the future of oil and the role of new technologies in changing this energy landscape. He examines energy security in light of the Arab Spring, before finally discussing the Middle East’s future and changing role in the worldwide energy market. Yergin also presents a candid analysis of the future of nuclear energy after Fukushima.

Daniel Yergin is a leading energy analyst and his Pulitzer Prizewinning book, The Prize, is highly regarded in the oil industry.

Yergin currently serves as the Chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, which he co-founded, and received his PhD from Cambridge University. Yergin won the United States Energy Award for "lifelong achievements in energy and the promotion of international understanding" in 2007. His new book, The Quest, was published in September 2011 and has been critically acclaimed as the best available analysis of the geopolitics of energy today.

What do you see as the major trends shaping this new energy landscape? Have you observed any changes since the publication of The Prize?

One of the reasons I decided to write The Quest is because so much had changed. The Soviet Union had disappeared. Central Asia and the Caspian have become part of the global energy system. The rise of China has been an extraordinary development.

Really, China played a very small role in The Prize—a minor oil exporter at the time. So, those are two of the big changes.

Climate change has gone from being the concern of a relatively small group of people to being a major energy, and indeed political, question. I think these are some of the ‘megachanges’ and I think this kind of renewed focus on energy efficiency is another big trend.

Are the US and China prepared to compete in this new energy environment?

I think there is a risk of that. It’s interesting that the only country that gets two chapters in the book is China, because Chinese energy is so important on the global scene. The US and Chinese energy relationship is a very important element in their overall relations and has great geopolitical implications, and has to be managed carefully.

Do you think it’s being managed carefully at the moment?

I think there is a lot of intention to it. There is an effort to have continuing dialogue so each country understands the other’s energy position and needs. With better understanding comes better clarity, but clearly, when you look at issues such as the South China Sea, to take one, there is a risk for misunderstanding. As we have seen recently, different Chinese spokesmen are taking different positions on that issue. That of course relates to relations with the US, but also relations with all the other countries that border the South China Sea. The Chinese face an immense energy challenge: 20 million people a year are moving from the countryside to

the city and their energy demand is growing very fast. So, energy is clearly one of the top preoccupations of the leadership and their system is changing so rapidly. Figure that by about 2020, China may be consuming more oil than the United States.

In mind of China consuming more oil than the United States and their increased demand, what are your thoughts on China’s response to the Arab Spring and its role in the Gulf ?

There are many levels to the Chinese response. I think also very important for the Chinese is their ever-growing stake in the security and stability of the Gulf. The recent ratcheting up of an already tense relationship with Gulf countries will create challenges for China on how it will orientate its policies.

Are we running out of oil? Should we be more concerned about the future of world energy supplies?

Basically, the peak oil argument is that half of the world’s oil has been consumed and we are on this downward slope, and great crises are going to ensue. I think that the peak oil view played an important role actually in the price run up in 2007 and 2008, because beliefs matter in market and it was strong and very reinforcing. In our view, 20 percent of oil has been produced based on what we know today and technology has opened up new horizons. Right now, one of the hottest things in the United States is shale oil. US oil production is up 10 percent since 2008.

What are your views on shale oil in the US and Latin America overtaking oil output in the Middle East?

I am not sure we are there yet. We think in our analysis that shale oil could add 2 million barrels a day to US output by 2020. Certainly, North Dakota is now the fourth largest oilproducing state in the United States.

Do you see any new energy sources decreasing the current 80 percent share of energy coming from oil?

One of the things I wanted to achieve in The Quest was that it was not just about oil but gives you a panoramic view of the energy world, including the new technologies and the alternatives and so forth. Throughout the book, I found myself thinking about where have these things come from in order to get a sense of where they are going. In the book, I write about the rebirth of renewables. These have become significant businesses but these are still quite small compared to the overall energy business.

There is still a drive to lower the cost of solar; wind continues to grow in scale. So, they are big businesses but they are still small.

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What’s interesting is one area of research that Saudi Arabia is very interested in is, in fact, solar. The country has a lot of sun, and if the cost of solar could be brought down, that would reduce the amount of oil that needs to be used for electrical generation and frees that up for exports. So, there is a very practical interest in solar in the Gulf countries.

But, when I add it all up, we are looking at a world in which energy demand 20 years from now might be 35 to 40 percent higher than today, that means everything will grow, it will not be 80 percent oil, gas, and coal as it is today, but it still likely be 70 percent.

Real changes in the energy system will take place after 2030; all technologies take longer to develop. Shale oil burst on the scene in 2008, but it took a quarter century of development preceding that.

From 2030, do you see other energy sources balancing out the larger dependence on oil as the primary source of energy?

Some we can see and others we don’t see. That’s when we will probably see much bigger changes. There is such a focus on innovation all across the energy system right now and it all takes time, but people discover or rediscover oil is a very compact, efficient energy source. Last night, I was with one of the major innovators of the electric car and that subject is getting a lot of attention now. Even if it really takes off, in the most optimistic scenario, we don’t see it being more than 3 percent of the automobile fleet in 2020. There is a lot of momentum for an electric car but it will be half a decade to see if it gains traction beyond a niche. There is a lot of policy push for it.

You discuss how transportation is so critical to these discussions and questions of energy security.

In a way, I did not expect it. The book evolved over time and the world changed as I was writing it. I did not expect ending on the future of the automobile, but that’s indeed where I end: with the question mark of what kind of cars people will drive in 20 or 30 years. Not just in the developed world but in the emerging markets: what will people in China and India driving in 2030 or 2035? It’s still a very much an open question. There is a push for electric cars, but there is also a real push for more efficient vehicles. Today, the average new car in the US gets 30 miles to a gallon, by 2025, it’s supposed to be 54 miles, almost a doubling. It’s quite a struggle for many of the automakers.

What are the long-term consequences of the Arab Spring on future energy supplies and the role of the Middle East?

It has upended part of the strategic basis that has contributed to relative stability in the region. One of the first things that the new government in Egypt did was allow an Iranian warship go through the Suez Canal. It’s kind of symbolic of a strategic shift. It’s still early days, but it certainly increases the uncertainty about what will be the strategic balance in the region.

In light of Qatar and new exploration in Saudi Arabia, what do you see as the future of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the Middle East?

It’s interesting; you have of course Qatar at the forefront of this global trade. Other countries are now short of natural gas because electricity demand has grown so fast. It’s sort of ironic that the Gulf is the largest source of LNG, but also, within the Gulf . . . there is a lot of anxiety about whether there is enough gas to generate electricity.

Will the Gulf continue to be the centre of gravity for energy in the upcoming years?

Yes, but we are seeing with development of oil in the Western hemisphere a somewhat of a shift in the balance. In terms of production, it may not be as concentrated as it had been thought.

Technology that has developed in the US—such as shale oil— and is now migrating around the world will effect in due course production, but these technologies will be applied in the Middle East and may in fact augment production in the region.

With Iraq and Libya in transition, do you think they will get back online?

With Libya, some parts of production will come back faster.

We still don’t know what the political system and the decisionmaking will be. Iraq clearly is recognized as having very large oil resources, much of it not developed. There was a kind of extreme optimism before about how fast and big it will be. But, it will be slower and take longer.

Iraq is certainly a country in a substantial position to very substantially grow its oil output, but one has to be realistic about the politics, the logistics, the people issues, the technologies- all those things that need to be in place to have continued, sustained investment that would make a Iraq a big player. We already saw a tit-for-tat game, with Iraq raising its reserve estimates and Iran raising its estimates to make sure it’s still higher.

What is the future of Iran’s position in the Gulf and the global energy system?

It’s importing gasoline, but it is trying to squeeze that down.

Iran clearly has a struggle to maintain its investment and output. Its inability to be a gas exporter is telling since it shares a gas field with Qatar, which is at the forefront. Iran has so many political and economic difficulties, but its political system makes it very hard to address them.

What are the main vulnerabilities to this energy system and which ones need better focus?

Coordination and communication among the major importers and exporters of oil continuously needs to be strengthened. It’s such a key aspect of it. Obviously, thinking through this threat, physical security is an important part of it. Cyber security and vulnerability is an issue for the energy industry, and the classic issues involve the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. As our society becomes electrified and more and more dependent on electricity, the safety and security of the grid system is a key thing.

Is nuclear energy dead after Fukushima?

Up until the accident in Japan, we would have been talking about nuclear renaissance. It’s a patchwork: China will proceed, the US administration says its wants to proceed because it’s a carbon-free large electric source, the coming shutdown in Germany, the indecision in Japan, the UAE is going ahead with its four nuclear reactors.

There is still a question about developing small nuclear modular reactors that can be built in a factory and moved to a site. So, it’s not dead- its 20 per cent of US electricity, almost 80 percent of French electricity, there are many more question marks over it. Germany is pretty explicit on what it wants to do, but Japan is facing a lot of tough decisions in the aftermath of Fukushima. One consequence is that Japan will import more liquefied natural gas. There will be a lot bigger market for LNG than thought a year ago.

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• COUNTRY BRIEF

Libya Timeline 5th century BCE rise of Carthage, in present day Tunis 500 BCE Present day Cyrenaica under Greek control 146 BCE Carthage falls to Romans 7th century CE Muslim invasion, beginning of Caliphates’ rule 16th century Beginning of Ottoman rule 1911 Beginning of Italian colonial rule 1934 Italy names their possession ‘Libya’ 1951 Independence, beginning of Monarchy of King Idriss 1959 Discovery of oil 1969 Captain Muammar Qadhafi seizes power following coup d’etat 1976 Publication of Qhadafi’s Green Book 1977 Libya named Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 2011 Libya uprising and overthrow of Qadhafi February Protests begin in Benghazi and rapidly spread to other cities March Loyalist forces retake key cities, including Brega, Ajdabiya; siege of Misrata begins 3 March National Transitional Council (NTC) established, under the chairmanship of Mustafa Abdul Jalil 17 March UN passes resolution authorizing Nato-led military intervention in Libya; first sorties fly two days later 15 May Rebels declare Misrata liberated July Rebel forces intensify offensive from Nafua mountains near Tripoli 28 July Assassination of rebel commander Abdul Fatah Younis 13 August Tripoli surrounded and rebels begin advance into the city

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Mustafa Abdul Jalil

23 August Rebels enter Qadhafi’s Tripoli compound Bab al-Azizia 29 August Algeria announces that Qadhafi’s wife Safia Farkash, daughter Ayesha, and sons Muhammad and Hannibal are part of a group of Libyans who crossed into Algeria that morning 15 September Battle of Sirte begins 20 October Qadhafi is captured and killed near Sirte, as is his son Mutassim 23 October NTC declares Libya liberated 31 October NTC names Abdurraheem al-Keeb Libya’s interim Prime Minister; NTC chairman Abdul Jalil serves as President 19 November Qadhafi’s son and one-time heir apparent Saif is captured near Ubari In western Libya

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he territory constituting modern Libya has been inhabited for several thousand years. Rock paintings attest to the pastoral cultures that settled along the coastal plain and depict a grassland environment populated with large mammals, including giraffes and elephants.

Later, the Phoenicians established trading posts along the coast and by the 5th century BCE Carthage (in present-day Tunisia) controlled much of North Africa. By 500 BCE, the Greeks controlled what became known as Cyrenaica in the east, the Carthaginians controlled the west, while the southern interior, what became known as Fezzan, was home to nomadic Berber tribes.

Following the fall of Carthage in 146 BCE, Roman rule extended across Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and into northern Fezzan, although this regional breakdown overstates the differences. Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were cosmopolitan territories whose citizens shared a common language, legal system, and Roman identity. During the Roman period, Tripolitania enjoyed a golden age of prosperity. It declined with the Roman Empire, eventually falling into ruin during the wars between the Romans and Vandals. There was little to oppose a Muslim invasion in the 7th century CE.

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Independence and Coup At independence in 1951, the Kingdom of Libya was established as a constitutional monarchy under King Idris, Libya’s first and only monarch. Following the discovery of large oil reserves in 1959, foreign engineering expertise and subsequent petroleum sales swelled the Kingdom’s coffers, and it wasn’t too long before dissenting factions became unhappy with the monarchy and its control of the nation’s burgeoning wealth.

Muammar Qadhafi, an ambitious young army captain, was instrumental in the coup that led to the removal of King Idris in 1969. From that time, Qadhafi was the de facto leader of Libya, which since 1977 has been officially called the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Although Qadhafi did not assume a formal title in the Libyan government, he did assent to a nominal promotion to colonel, but was usually referred to as the Leader of the Revolution, or simply Brother Leader.

Qadhafi ruled over Libya for an astonishing 40 years, gradually shaping the country to his will. After the publication of his notorious Green Book in 1976, in which he puts forward his Third Universal Theory, political society began to be remodelled in deference to tribal customs and Sharia law. Power, in theory, was decentralized into the hands of local legislative congresses, but in practice it flowed from Qadhafi and his inner circle.

Uprising and Revolution Following uprisings in neighbouring Tunisia, in February 2011 Libya became embroiled in a bloody civil war. The uprising that began in the eastern city of Benghazi, historically an anti-Qadhafi stronghold, swept westwards, prompting a brutal crackdown by government forces. The controversial military assistance lent by foreign governments to rebel forces under a UN-sanctioned and NATO-implemented no-fly zone. Its generous interpretation stretched to include supplying rebel forces with armaments, substantially aided the rebels in the east of the country.

A National Transitional Council (NTC) based in Benghazi was quickly accepted as Libya’s legitimate government by several foreign powers, eager that Qadhafi’s regime should come

Key Facts Capital: Tripoli Independence: 1951 (north), 1967 (south) Government: National Transitional Council (provisional) Chairperson: Mustafa Abdul Jalil Prime Minister: Abdel-Rahim Al-Keeb GEOGRAPHY Area: 1,759,540 km2 (679,362 sq miles) Border Countries: Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan, Tunisia Terrain: temperate coastal plain, rocky mountains, hot desert interior Water: Mediterranean Sea PEOPLE Population: 6.16 million (2007 est.)

Ethnic Groups: Arab/Berber 97%, European 2%, other 1% Religions: almost entirely Sunni Muslim Languages: Arabic, English, Italian ECONOMY GDP (per capita): $15,172 (2011 forecast) Exports: crude oil and refined petroleum products, natural gas, chemicals Currency: Libyan dinar Inflation: 6.1% (2011 forecast) to a quick and unequivocal end. Qadhafi’s government was heavily damaged by a NATO air campaign and a succession of minor rebel victories.

On 24 August 2011, rebel forces advanced into Tripoli, forcing Qadhafi and his family to flee as the rebels stormed the family compound. For two months the whereabouts of Qadhafi and his family remained unknown, fuelling speculation that they had taken refuge in Algeria or Niger. Rebel forces continued advancing on loyalist strongholds before a showdown in Qadhafi’s hometown of Sirte on 18 October resulted in his capture and execution by rebel forces. Qadhafi’s son Mutassim was also captured and killed, while is Saif AlIslam has recently been captured and is awaiting his pending trial before the International Criminal Court.

NTC Chairperson Mustafa Abdul Jalil declared Libya liberated on 23 October. A week later, the NTC elected Abdel-Rahim Al-Keeb as Libya’s interim Prime Minister while arrangements are made for national elections in April 2012.

When a new and stable government takes power in Libya, it will have to confront the 40-year legacy of a system that has systematically broken down viable political and economic structures. On the other hand, the new government will have the support of an international community anxious to redeem the extreme efforts exerted since March 2011 and which may be required for some time yet.

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Image © iStockphoto

For the next several centuries, the region was controlled by the Arab Caliphates, Ummayad, Abbasid, and Fatimid. It regained some of its former prosperity, with Tripoli becoming an important market for slaves and other exports from Sudan and the African interior. After the ruling Berber dynasty broke with the Shiite Fatimids and joined the Sunni Abbasids, the Fatimids retaliated by forcing the immigration of 200,000 Bedouin families. This permanently altered the region’s cultural and linguistic profile and established its Arab character. From the 16th to 19th centuries the region was under Ottoman rule, although for much of that time Ottoman authority was absent. In reality, a local governing elite ruled the territory from Tripoli, with the Sultan of Constantinople’s pasha functioning more or less in a ceremonial role.

As during the Roman period, the decline of the Ottoman Empire and beginning of the European scramble for Africa saw the territory become contentious once more. From 1911, Libya was Italy’s colonial possession, although the territory was only named Libya in 1934. Tripolitania and Cyrenaica came under British administration, and Fezzan under French administration, during the Second World War; independence plans were fast-tracked after the War.

At independence in 1951, the Kingdom of Libya was established

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• THINKING OUT LOUD

Attacking Iran?

Not Just Yet Speculation about an American or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities have dominated news headlines around the globe. With the IAEA's latest report on Iran's alleged nuclear weapon activities finally out, such talk has continued, even though the prospect of a pre-emptive strike in the near future remains slim.

Nima Khorrami Assl

Image © Getty Images

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peculation about an American or Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities have recently dominated news headlines around the globe. With the IAEA’s latest report on Iran’s alleged nuclear weapon activities finally out, such talk has continued, even though the prospect of a pre-emptive strike in the near future remains slim.

It is fair to say that IAEA’s much-awaited report has, much like previous reports, failed to reveal anything novel with regard to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The report’s indication that Iran is keen to acquire the know-how and technological capability to assemble a bomb is nothing new, and was in fact predicted by the Israeli intelligence agency back in 1995. In addition, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Ali Larijani, had (perhaps unintentionally) made this objective crystal clear during an official visit to Tokyo in February 2010, when he stated that Tehran wants to develop nuclear capabilities “similar to those of Japan”. Japan does not have nuclear bombs of its own, but the lead-time for the Japanese armed forces to assemble a bomb is 24 hours, and thus Larijani’s remarks shed light on the nature and scope of Iran’s nuclear ambition.

Regardless of the Iranian government’s intention and the logic behind Iran’s nuclear drive, talks of an attack are more likely to be part of a wider psychological campaign against the regime in Tehran, with its advocates hoping that such rhetoric will give them bargaining points in future negotiations with Iran.

There are two broad reasons behind such assertion. The first, according to an analyst in Tehran, is that Iran is much more likely to react forcefully to a strike rather than (as it is commonly anticipated) seeking to negotiate out of massive reprisals by the US and its allies. To this end, Iran’s aim would be to escalate the war into a regional conflict by projecting power to its neighbors and Israel. Not only are the vast majority of Gulf cities— and their skyscrapers—within the reach of Iranian missiles, but Iran can also mobilize its sleeping cells in Dubai, Manama, and Kuwait City to steer social unrest and cause fear amongst the public. Add to this the possible consequences of a hostile reaction from the large Iranian community in the Gulf to a strike with the blessing of the GCC governments. Tehran could also target Americans and Europeans in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it will not hesitate to give the go-ahead to Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad to unleash their missiles on Israel. And to make

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matters worse, all this will almost certainly increase the price of oil in a time of global economic crisis, even without Iran attempts to block the Strait of Hormuz.

The second benefit of this rhetoric is that it results in a costbenefit analysis of the Iranian threat in American and Israeli foreign policy: it helps to open Pandora’s Box. Thanks to the Iranian threat and Iran’s hegemonic ambitions in the Gulf— whether real or perceived—Washington has been able to establish a profitable market for its defense companies in the region, thereby increasing its influence over the Gulf states’ strategic decision making. Simultaneously, this justifies the US’s massive (and still expanding) military presence in the region. With regard to Israel, Iran’s nuclear program has enabled Tel Aviv to form a united Arab front, a ‘buffer zone’ against its most powerful regional foe. It has achieved this by manipulating the Arab regimes’ fear of Iran, and by developing a common strategic interest in containing Tehran without making a single compromise over the Palestinian question. Surely, a nuclear Iran will change the regional balance of power to the detriment of US and Israeli interests, and thus there ought to be no doubts that they will seek to avert this by any means. For the time being though, maintaining the status quo seems to be a better strategic option, especially as various estimates have found that last year’s Stuxnet attack has delayed Iran’s progress towards full-circle enrichment for three years.

They ultimately support the regime and the institution of the Supreme Leader, but people no longer do Looking into the immediate future, it can therefore be expected that there will be tougher sanctions imposed on Iran by the US and its European allies. Regime change is now being seriously considered, but given the state of Iran’s economy and the regime’s unprecedented unpopularity, hard-hitting sanctions, not a military strike, provide the most prudent option.

The eventual termination of Iran’s nuclear program can only happen once there is a new regime in charge; however, according to an Iranian activist, the unpopularity of the regime is evident in the public’s indifference to the house arrest of the socalled Green Movement leaders. “They ultimately support the regime and the institution of the Supreme Leader, but people no longer do,” says the activist, “so it does not really make any difference if they are free or not, we now want real change”.

In contrast, a military strike could have the negative effect of uniting the public behind the regime—as it did in the IranIraq War—by encouraging the public to perceive the West and Iran’s neighbors as enemies of the Iranian nation rather than the Iranian regime. In this case, not only will Iran’s maturing democratic movement fade away, but the entire Iranian nation might then support the regime in its nuclear ambition.

Nima Khorrami Assl is a Beijing-based writer and researcher specializing in policy and analysis of geo-economics and security development in the Middle East and Asia Pacific, Mr. Assl has carried out a number of projects for both governments and private clients. He has published op-eds in The Guardian, Open Democracy, and Defence IQ.

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• THINKING OUT LOUD

Fighting for Stability As Libya struggles to integrate its rebel army, armed men storm a TunisAir flight leaving Tripoli.

Paula Mejia

Image © Iason Athanasiadis

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he road back to stability in Libya will be arduous.

Not only is the country facing a transitional process without the benefit of governmental institutions to ease the difficulty of managing the various responsibilities of a state, but it must also face the added task of demobilizing an entire population that is often suspicious of the interests of those vying for power.

Illustrative of the disorder that continues to reign in Tripoli, TunisAir, the Tunisian national airline, was forced to suspend flights to Tripoli at the end of November when 300 armed men swarmed the runway and stopped a plane from taking off. The TunisAir flight was carrying 47 wounded Libyans to be treated in Tunisia. The fighters, from a nearby suburb of Souq, stopped the plane as a means of pressuring the government to investigate a recent attack on fellow fighters by proQadhafi groups.

Other complaints regarding the security situation in the country demonstrate that the presence of weapons is dangerous even when political rivalries are not at stake. Numerous complaints have been made about young men who carry weapons on the streets of the capital and fire into their air for fun, often killing people.

Libya’s religious leaders, however, have made an attempt to function as mediators in this chaotic environment. In response to the violence, on 28 November they urged the authorities to disarm former rebels and form a national army that backs the transitional government’s struggle to exert control over the remaining pro-Qaddafi forces.

Some 250 imams released a statement as part of the country’s first conference, organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, advising that the transitional government “speed up the process of establishing a national army and the collection of arms”.

Though their intentions are certainly in the right place, given the potential dangers that the prevalence of arms may have on the country’s future stability, their advice is much more difficult to implement than they might imagine. Indeed, the National Transitional Council has taken important steps in developing a credible army and encouraging those not interested in joining its ranks to lay down their weapons.

Many rebels, however, have refused to surrender their weapons, at least until the political future of Libya (and implicitly, their place in it) is guaranteed.

Making matters more complicated, Libya’s new army has not proved easy to organize either. According to a recent article in the New York Times, “The soldiers do not yet march in step or even keep their formations straight.

Some answer their cellphones when they should be taking orders. Some smoke in the middle of exercises. Others push and shove as personal disputes break out over one thing or another.”

Illustrative of the disorder that continues to reign in Tripoli, TunisAir, the Tunisian national airline, was forced to suspend flights to Tripoli at the end of November when 300 armed men swarmed the runway and stopped a plane from taking off Their behavior is not entirely surprising. After all, the new army is mainly comprised of the rebels that were called ‘ragtag’ for a reason when they formed earlier this year. They have never been especially well-known for taking orders, for organization, or even for knowing how to use the weapons they have.

Neither has Libya ever had a truly professional army, which complicates matters further.

Nevertheless, Libya lacks alternative options. It will have to rely on its those who gave the country freedom to accept the dangers and responsibilities that come with the change the country is undergoing; only then will Libya’s political future have hope.

Paula Mejia is a contributing writer for The Majalla based in Tunisia.

As a freelance journalist and consultant for the African Development Bank, her work has focused on the economic and social challenges in Africa, with a special focus on Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. She is a graduate of the London School of Economics, L'Institut D'Etudes Politiques de Paris and the University of Chicago.

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• THINKING OUT LOUD

The Farsi1 Effect Is a satellite channel responsible for the rising number of conversions to Christianity in Iran?

Nima Khorrami-Assl

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ast week I was in Dubai where I managed to talk to a group of Iranian holidaymakers about the current socio-political situation in Iran. To my utter disbelief, when I asked them what they thought has been the most important yet unnoticed societal development in the country over the last couple of years, they unanimously singled out the increasing appeal of Christianity amongst the Iranian youth, especially women. Eager to know what they considered the key factor behind this, they again managed to surprise me by blaming Farsi1 TV channel. “If you want to know why many Iranians are converting to Christianity, watch Farsi1,” I was told.

I took their advice seriously and committed to watch Farsi1 for a whole week. After the first night, though, I immediately realized why those Iranians saw a direct link between the Farsi1 programs and the accelerating rate of conversion to Christianity in Iran. Today, Farsi1 is arguably the most popular TV channel in both Afghanistan and Iran. Nevertheless, none of its programs have an Islamic element.

Instead, almost all its series and soap operas, excluding the South Korean ones, tend to introduce or advertise, albeit in-

directly, Christianity. One soap opera that aught my eye was El-Clon, which airs in prime time. It is a story of a Colombian man challenging his clone for the love of a Moroccan woman.

And as the story evolves, it is shown how free Christian women are compared to Muslim women, who tend to get emotionally abused in the hands of their Muslim husbands who are supposedly adhering to the tenants of the Quran.

To begin with, it ought to be noted that Christianity is not a new religion in Iran. It arrived there 500 years earlier than Islam.

In fact, there was a viable Christian community in Iran until its members fled the country en masse after the 1979 Islamic revolution, fearing intimidation and prosecution. What is fascinating about the contemporary surge of Christianity, therefore, is the rapid growth of a ‘house church movement’ in the face of the government’s massive crackdown on non-Islamic religions.

There has also been brutality, to the extent that Christianity now seems to constitute a serious challenge to the official ideology, second only to the challenge posed by the Green Movement.

This, in turn, begs the question of why so many Iranians are turning away from Islam and instead find comfort in Christi-

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anity. Is it only due to the content of satellite TV programs—a Western-led cultural war according to the Iranian officials—or is there a more fundamental reason behind this social and religious development in a predominantly Muslim country governed by an allegedly Islamic government?

Undoubtedly, the media has played a role. Mass media are the deliverers of a message through which audiences comprehend—and indeed, form opinions on—events, individuals, and ideologies of any kind. This is a process known as agenda-setting. As such, new media can be used, and indeed is being used, to create desired effects or outcomes that influence audience behavior, will, and perceptions. Stefan De Groot, a field worker at a Christian persecution watch group called Open Doors Middle East, has confirmed this view by stating that “in spite of state pressure, the house church movement [in Iran] has seen spectacular growth… this is not happening just because of dreams and miracles. The majority of people now come to faith through the multimedia, and especially satellite TV.” Nevertheless, we have to be cautious not to exaggerate the media’s influence, as there are socio-political realties at play. Iranians with access to TV satellite channels have many options to choose from, but they, like people from other countries, tend to watch those programs which resonate with their opinions and the realities of their lives. Unlike TV channels with a (political) agenda—such as, in this case, Mohabat TV—commercial TV channels such as Farsi1 would naturally seek to understand what is most common in their prospective audience and cater for it, in order to expand their market share as any other commercial entity would do. Given that there is so much resentment of Islamic TV programs in Iran, as evident from the fact that the IRIB is the least-watched TV channel in Iran, it would be reasonable for a business like Farsi1 to broadcast non-Islamic shows.

It follows then that the increasing appeal of Christianity in Iran has more to do with the ill-informed and misguided policies of the Iranian government than a simple media influence. The idea behind Iran’s Islamic revolution was to establish the first modern state governed solely by Islamic Law. Ayatollah Khomeini believed that a more prosperous society could have been created if Iranians adhered to the tenets of the Quran. Thirty-two years on, however, the revolution is faltering and many young Iranians are disillusioned. Corruption, poverty, economic stagnation, and international isolation are the only achievements of the Islamic revolution in the eyes of the post-revolution generations. For three decades, Islam has been imposed on Iranians through aggressive religious indoctrination at high schools and universities, as well through the state-owned companies. All these groups have been deprived of their socio-political freedoms in the name and defense of ‘pure Islam’. Rather paradoxically, the Islamic government has managed to tatter and diminish many Iranians’ belief in Islam, and hence it is fair to say that the Iranian regime’s social policy, similar to its economic and foreign policies, has, simply put, been a failure.

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The majority of people now come to faith through the multimedia, and especially satellite TV Nima Khorrami Assl is a Beijing-based writer and researcher specializing in policy and analysis on geo-economics and security development in the Middle East and Asia Pacific. Mr. Assl has carried out a number of projects for both governmental and private clients in the Middle East and has published op-eds in The Guardian, Open Democracy, and Defence IQ.

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• THE ARTS

The Inner World of a post-Civil War Generation Reviewing Mounira Al-Solh & Bassam Ramlawi at the Stedelijk Museum Bureau Amsterdam In the past decade, Lebanese artists known as the post-civil war generation have made a splash in the international art world.

Nat Muller In the past decade, Lebanese artists known as the post-civil war generation have made a splash in the international art world.

These include the likes of Walid Raad, Akram Zaatari, Joana Hadjithomas and Khalil Joreige, Lina Saneh, Lamia Joreige, and Rabih Mroué. In their work these artists, who all came of age during the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war, have been predominantly occupied by an individual and collective history, memory and amnesia, and the politics of representation.

Recently, a younger generation of Lebanese artists—all in their early 30s—have stepped in. Building on the thematic and visual language of their slightly older colleagues, these artists bring humor, pop culture, and a savvy knowledge of the expectations and pressures of the contemporary art world into the mix. A prime example is the work of Mounira Al-Solh. Placing her at the forefront of her contemporaries in Lebanon is her agile and humorous questioning of how identities and voices— national as well as artistic—might (or might not) sit together.

Working between her native Beirut and her adopted home in Amsterdam, much of Al-Solh’s work queries the possibilities and impossibilities of roles accessible to contemporary artists and their impact in a globalised consumer culture. The experience is—to say the least—fractured. Thus comes in the voice-overs, role play, alter egos, and dressing-up that are all characteristic of her art.

More often than not, Al-Solh does not provide an answer but keeps pushing questions. Her video A Double Burger and Two Metamorphoses: Proposal for a Dutch cat, a Dutch dog, a Dutch goat, and finally a Dutch camel (2011) is exemplary of this tactic.

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Here, ‘Dutchness’ prejudices the art of hosting. A slew of contemporary post-modern philosophers are combined, mixed and shaken into a game of dialogue and role-play. Posing alternately as an animal—ingeniously wearing toothbrushes for ears—and as the character Mounira, the subsequent conversation between Mounira and Mounira playing one of the animals, veers from the philosophical to the quotidian to the absurd. The conversation also centers around the making of the video itself, and as such the viewer is never allowed to lose themselves in the performance or the medium, but is constantly reminded that this is a construct.

For her first large-scale solo exhibition in The Netherlands, Al-Solh has chosen to exhibit next to Bassam Ramlawi, her male alter ego. A juice merchant from Beirut only a few years older than herself, Ramlawi was (like Al-Solh) educated both in Beirut and in The Netherlands. Through the character of Ramlawi, Al-Solh can tread into territory where she would usually feel uncomfortable venturing: painting, machismo, and art as a trade.

Ramlawi’s series of 44 drawings, From Waiting Blue to Lingering Yellow (Or Vice Versa) (2010) addresses temporality in its most quotidian and mundane form: namely the instances when one waits for someone or something. Ramlawi draws a snapshot of what occurs when waiting: waiting for a friend in the car, at the beach, a glass of mint tea, for something mysterious, or just for a Sunday to pass by. These drawings are overlaid with a transparent orange sheet of paper with parts cut out, revealing the drawing proper. The color and texture are reminiscent of the plastic candy

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wrappers Ramlawi used to find in his father’s juice shop, a way of wrapping—and perhaps partly unwrapping—an event in time.

In the video Seven Reversed Scenes about Bassam Ramlawi (2010) we are introduced to Bassam Ramlawi by Mounira Al-Solh in drag as the man himself. Complete with faux moustache, hat and pipe, a caricature of an ‘artiste,’ Ramlawi tells us about his love and life, and about a particular period when he could not paint anymore. Here fiction seeps into Al Solh’s own biography.

Originally trained as a painter, Al-Solh has experienced her own artistic struggle with painting as a discipline. It seems that through Ramlawi she is re-examining her own relation to the medium.

Al-Solh always insists on having a presence in her work, in some way or other. This is not the case for the series of 19 short videos The Mute Tongue- 19 Arabic Proverbs (2011), where she relays her performance to the Croatian actor Siniša Labrović who acts out 19 Arabic proverbs in a literal fashion. For example, ‘Like the deaf in a loud wedding‘ shows Labrović sitting reading a newspaper at a very loud Lebanese wedding. Here, Al-Solh visually translates something that is never meant to be taken literally. However, The Mute Tongue, as with much of Al-Solh’s work, is not so much about translation as it is about movement and mobility between different registers, be they artistic, social, national, geographical, or conceptual.

Nat Muller is an independent curator and critic based between Rotterdam and the Middle East.

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• THE CRITICS

Military Solutions State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America’s Empire

by Stephen Glain Crown Trade, 2011 Stephen Glain's new book is a thoroughly researched insight into the increasing militarization of American foreign policy.

Stephen Glain is an American veteran, not of wars or military incursions, but of more than twenty years’ experience as a foreign correspondent and intrepid journalist. Stationed in various posts in Asia and the Middle East, from Hong Kong to Amman, Glain has been in the ideal position to observe just how his nation comports itself abroad. Exceptionally, he has done all this at a time when the United States completed its inexorable rise to the status of the world’s sole superpower.

According to Glain his new book, State vs. Defense, was written in an anti-war spirit that owed much to the knee-jerk and ill-informed American response to the September 11 attacks. Having spent much of his career abroad observing the effects of US foreign policy and the practically unbroken belt of American military presence stretching across continents, he came to view the overwhelming prevalence of soldiers as

A Lesson in Undemocratic Institution Building Failing Oversight: Iraq’s Unchecked Government byInternational Crisis Group Middle East Report N°113 26 September 2011 As the withdrawal of American troops draws nearer, International Crisis Group draws attention to the Iraqi government’s immediate problems with corruption.

The challenges to the Iraqi government’s legitimacy may ultimately harm the stability that has developed since 2008.

Since 2008, the Iraqi state has appeared to be strengthened by the relatively large decline in violence. However, since violence has decreased, the corruption embedded in every administrative level has become increasingly apparent: the international watchdog organization Transparency International ranked the country at the very bottom of its global corruption perceptions index (175th out of 178 in 2010). Corruption has become widespread and entrenched in the structures of the Iraqi state and this has con-

representatives of the US as “more consistent with an empire than a republic.” What is more, he argues that the post-Cold War geopolitical climate did not necessitate such overbearing military presence, except to further US hegemony for its own sake. The militant response to 9/11 exacerbated America’s position as a latter-day empire, relentlessly pushing the frontiers of its control, and—for Glain— has ultimately done more harm than good. Today, it is the tub-thumping rhetoric directed against a supposed threat from China that risks prolonging a military misadventure that has gone on for the better part of a century.

Taking the form of a compelling historical narrative, State vs. Defense seeks to uncover how and why the sword has so consistently been wielded over and above the olive branch in US policy. Glain consults never-before-seen Soviet archives to dispel myths propagated by US security experts intending to heighten Cold War tensions. He examines a succession of legislation that has, over the years, empowered military action at the expense of diplomatic missions. And he takes advantage of numerous first-hand accounts of major players in the formation and implementation of US foreign policy—the outspoken General Anthony Zinni is a notable resource, who gives a glowing endorsement of the book on the dust jacket.

It is a thorough and rigorously researched book, which leaves the reader in little doubt as to the influence of the

tributed to a severe decay in public services. This report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) attempts to confront these issues head-on. Yet the ICG was ultimately unable to make recommendations that reach beyond the diagnoses of illness in government institutions.

During the six years of violence after the 2003 US invasion, an ever-stronger culture of impunity emerged among senior officials; at the same time as investigators, auditors and law enforcment officials were paralyzed. In 2004, an early attempt to confront these problems by the US Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) saw the creation of the current oversight framework to limit corruption. While the ICG report does not provide much insight into the conditions prior to the 2003 US invasion, it does highlight many of the structural deficiencies of the current framework. The CPA, according to the report, enacted a number of problematic reforms from the start. These reforms stripped the Board of Supreme Audit— previously Iraq’s only such institution—of its powers and made it unable to oversee public procurement and refer suspected corruption cases directly to the court.

This authority was instead transferred to the Integrity Commission, an institution established in 2004, which is still unable to function independently due to staffing

problems and limited access to government departments. The Integrity Commission has therefore been dependent on the Inspectors General, another CPAestablished institution, with auditors in all state institutions (including ministries).

The difficulty here is that the legal and administrative framework of the Inspectors General is completely deficient, and the institution is therefore not particuarly efficient in carrying out its task. Further confounding the problem is the Council of Representatives, seemingly the most important institution in the new oversight framework, which the ICG report found to be the most ineffective of all.

Thus continues the story of nonfunctioning institutions in the Iraqi oversight framework. These institutions, in turn, cannot be held accountable by the judicial system, which has shown itself to be highly vulnerable to political pressure. Its rulings in a number of high-profile disputes have given the Maliki government more leeway to govern as it pleases, with ever fewer institutional checks. In general, the report shows that the levels of corruption are almost unthinkable, with problems ranging from deep structural deficiencies to personal connections between judicial and executive powers.

Similarly, the origins of corruption stem from a nearly endless number of fac-

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Pentagon—a massively inflated military organ at the center of an international network costing over 1 trillion dollars.

Crucially, the Pentagon’s incredible power over policy is shown not to have emerged in the war-mongering heyday of the Bush administration; it is in fact the result of a decades-long story in which military solutions to diplomatic problems have too often been sought.

Despite the layers of history which have contributed to the current militarization of America’s tactics, the recent past is not spared criticism. For keen observers of the Middle East—who will already be familiar with Glain’s trenchant analysis in one of his fields of expertise—the final chapters of the book give astonishing insight into how the US turned its guns upon Iraq and lived up to Glain’s accusations of wanton imperialism. Glain pulls no punches: The story of how the Bush White House blundered from one destructive misstep to another in its Middle East Wars is as well told as it is scandalous. It is American militarism in its most unalloyed form, and it came about the same way free societies succumb to authoritarian rule: with a leadertors, such as the massive inflow of capital since 2003, the breakdown in security and in the criminal justice system leading to impunity, targeted assassinations of state officials impeding the work of oversight agencies, and gaps in the legal and institutional framework established to provide a check on government.

The effects of corruption saturate Iraqi society. Billions of public dollars have disappeared due to incorrect accounts for public procurement, while nepotism and bribery continue unabated. Consequently, living standards have declined, especially in social care sectors such as health and education, “even paling in comparison with the country’s own recent past.” Meanwhile, the impending US withdrawal at the end of 2011 will test security forces’ ability to maintain any level of law and order. (At the same time, the law clearly does not apply to the most powerful members of Iraqi society.) Such lack of legitimacy on the part of ruling elites increases the risk of insurgency—and the demands of the people have only become more pronounced with the spread of dissent throughout the Arab world.

Spontaneous demonstrations broke out in February of 2011 in Suleimaniya, the Kurdistan region’s second-largest city. Iraqi youth leaders picked up on Issue 1568 • November 2011

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ship that rewards sycophants and the likeminded, co-opts the ambitious, and punishes those in dissent.

The author goes on to tell a sorry tale of Machiavellian dealings in the corridors of power, in which bullying, egotism and unabashed war-mongering were the order of the day: Thus did Rumsfeld, Cheney, and their aides, by harnessing the war wagon of their elephantine egos and delusions to the vast resources at their disposal, plunge America into its greatest foreign policy disaster since Vietnam.

Evidently the work is not a dry re-telling of history, but a cutting analysis of a deeply troubling phenomenon. Indeed, the book is a kind of cautionary tale, which hardly ends on an uplifting note. Glain is careful to point out that under the Obama administration the militarization of foreign policy has gone on unchecked, advancing like a runaway train and giving little sign of slowing. Glain’s parting shot is to draw attention to the testy relationship between the rapidly developing China and the US: if history is anything to go by, a cataclysmic event could be just around the corner.

the development and launched a series of countrywide demonstrations on 25 February, dubbed the ‘Day of Rage’.

Maliki responded with a 100-day period in which the government was to improve service delivery to the people and reduce corruption. This deadline expired on 7 June with no relevant legislation passed during the 100-day period. Subsequent demonstrations in Baghdad, albeit poorly attended, have been met with violence from pro-government forces, which have not been stopped by the police and thus appear to be acting with the consent of the regime. While the regime may be attempting to buy itself time until expected oil revenue will allow an improvement in oil deliveries, dissent has spread to corners of the government itself, as the chief of the Integrity Commission resigned on 9 September. In the meantime, demonstrations have sprung up in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square.

It is clear from the report that substantial reform is long overdue. The ICG argues that there has been no lack of opportunities in this regard, as technical experts “have excelled in presenting workable proposals” even though exceedingly few have been adopted. Such proposals include a law forcing political parties to disclose their financial interests, rules to improve the oversight institution’s performance,

and a law to protect the independence of the Supreme Court. Until such actions are taken, the report argues, the government will continue to be unchecked and corruption with not be stopped.

Ultimately, the report advocates a strengthening of the anti-corruption measures already in place, particularly through legal reform. However, as the report has spent much time showing, the political establishment has continually shown itself unwilling to approve such legislation. More worrisome is the report’s conclusion that even if such legislation was passed, personal agreements between branches of government are likely to obstruct any effects of such legislation. There remains little reason to believe that the government would advocate any reform other than that which allows it to consolidate its own power.

The final sentence of the report, stating that the necessary reform requires “unity of vision and good faith” touches upon issues that the report mostly fails to address. The report ends with the conclusion that the Iraqi government must save its people from the Iraqi government.

It is a contradictory conclusion, asking a government which benefits from the corruption to implement anti-corruption reforms, and so this final analysis is optimistic at best and unhelpful at worst.

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• THE FINAL WORD

The Political Wisdom of Bashar Al Assad Adel Al-Toraifi

M

argaret Thatcher was asked once whether it was politically wise for a leader to tackle a crisis in the making by confronting it quickly, instead of waiting for it to arise. She paused for a second and then answered: "Most of the time, what we believe to be pre-emptive political wisdom does not end up that way. Each pre-emptive action we deem to be intelligent has a delayed reaction. What really matters is the slow yet long-term response, which occurs over a substantial period of time."

Syrian President Bashar Al Assad should have realized that by destroying channels of communication with the outside world and attacking foreign diplomats and embassies, he would arouse hostility. In a historic step, the Arab League froze Syria’s membership and went even further by calling on the Syrian army "not to engage in acts of violence and murder against civilians".

This has been interpreted as a message that the majority of Arab League members no longer regard the Ba’ath regime in Syria as the legitimate representative of the Syrian state. In an interview with BBC World News TV, King Abdullah emphasised this, saying, “If I were in his shoes, I would step down.”

The most lethal weapon that can be used against any regime is the collapse of its legitimacy abroad. If a near-consensus is reached not to recognize a political regime, then there is no hope for its survival. Ever since the emergence of the crisis, the Syrian regime has provoked the hostility of the US and the European Union and afterwards, spared no Gulf or Arab state with insults and accusations. It seems that Damascus has not learnt from the Libyan lesson wherein the main cause of the Gaddafi regime's collapse was the international and regional agreement for its elimination.

President Al Assad tried to manoeuver with all available tactics, until the voices emanating from Damascus became contradictory as well as reflective of the great confusion within the ruling establishment. It appears that after security elements took control of the decision-making process senior state officials no longer know what is going on. Over the past three months, the regime's media machine in Syria and Lebanon has tried to reassure its elements and allies by repeating the phrase "The crisis is nearly over", and by stressing that the regime is trying its best to limit daily casualties. In reiterating this, the media machine labours under the illusion that it can change the psychological warfare equation based on sectarian and ethnic alignment.

Moreover, those defending Damascus’s position warn that Syria has not yet played its trump cards; stating that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syrian allies in Iraq and Gaza, as well as sleeper cells in the Gulf, have yet to be called upon. The regime’s propaganda goes so far as to threaten to set the region ablaze, as warned the Syrian President in an earlier interview.

In reality, Syria today is a broken country—regardless of the President’s threats—because it is impossible to heal the sectarian and social rift caused by the recent developments. The President and his regime’s elements are now engaged in ruthless fighting, having run out of other solutions. They realize that killing more protesters is the only option left, because the other scenario would mean the collapse of the Baath party and its establishments.

Needless to say, the option of fighting until the bitter end is sorely lacking in political wisdom. President Al Assad and his regime have passed up all available opportunities to weather the crisis. He even refused to make “nominal” concessions, and thus has ended up under threat of international intervention, either through a buffer or no-fly zone, both of which could pave the way for his overthrow.

President Bashar Al Assad is right about the possible exposure of the region to great harm in the event of his regime’s demise, and about the probability of the outbreak of a civil war due to the absence of agreements between the different sects.

Naturally, his allies would interfere to the best of their ability to make this happen, and punish others for intervening in Syria.

But what President Bashar Al Assad does not understand is that by threatening to carry out such a scenario, he is actually fostering the idea that his regime might fall, despite all the feverish attempts he is making to keep it in place.

The most lethal weapon that can be used against any regime is the collapse of its legitimacy abroad The Syrian regime’s hourglass has begun to count down. As journalist Mshari Al Zaydi says, “The sand is moving slowly from the top to the bottom”. The important question here is whether Syria’s allies in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, will fight for the Al Assad regime, or sacrifice it to protect their own interests?

Bashar Al Assad’s father Hafez Al Assad once realized that the importance of Syria to Iran lies in Syria being an active member in pan Arab politics. What Bashar Al Assad seems unable to grasp is that an isolated Syria on the Arab level, and frozen on the regional level, might not be worth the sacrifice for Iran and its allies.

Lately, Bashar Al Assad has tried to rectify the catastrophe of Syria’s frozen membership by calling for an emergency Arab summit, in the hope of gaining the sympathy of some Arab leaders to buy more time. But it appears that the damage is already beyond repair. The coming days might prove that what has been marketed over the past decade as President al-Assad's political wisdom was nothing but mere illusion.

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