The US, Iran and Trouble in the Gulf

UK and the European Elections

Democrats, Republicans at Odds Over Gulf Tensions

A Weekly Political News Magazine

A Weekly Political News Magazine

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Issue 1749 - May - 24/05/2019

Issue 1749 - May - 24/05/2019

Theresa May: The Prime Minister Forced to Make a Hard Exit Over Brexit www.majalla.com

The US, Iran and Trouble in the Gulf www.majalla.com

Editorial Ever since its implementation in 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been controversial. Many critics of this deal between Iran and the P1+5 (UK, US, France, China, Russia and Germany) argue that the deal gives too many concessions to Iran and does not address other elements of Iran’s region destabilizing activities. The current US President Donald Trump is a staunch critic of the deal and as such, in 2018, he did what he promised to do while he campaigned for the presidency; pull the US out of the JCPOA and reinstating sanctions on Iran. Since then, Iran has threatened to resume enriching uranium in violation of the deal. This week’s issue of Majalla explores the JCPOA from its history, to its content and the implications of the rising tensions between Iran and the US. The first cover story explores the history of nuclear negotiations between Iran and Western powers. The article goes back to Iran’s early attempts at building nuclear capabilities in the late 1980s and highlights several breakthrough years such as 2002 when the international community first found out about its nuclear facilities. The article then moves on to the failed negotiations between the EU3- (UK, France, and Germany) and Iran in the 2000s. Then, the article explores the negotiations between Iran and the P1+5 in the 2010s, which ultimately led to the JCPOA. The second cover story by Yasmine El Geressi explores the recent escalations between the US and Iran which translated into a series of sabotage attacks on four oil tankers off the coast of the UAE. Some US intelligence sources indicate that it is highly likely that Iran or allies close to it are behind the attack. Moreover, threats from Iran to resume enriching uranium and Trump’s recent tweet threats have escalated the situation further. The writer also spoke with Yousef Azizi, an Iranian affairs researcher and asked whether or not a war between the US and Iran is imminent, the implications of such a war and whether or not the JCPOA is dead.

Ali El Shamy writes about the European Parliamentary elections which recently took place in the UK. The current Brexit crisis took over the platforms of the running parties, as the two big parties’ (Conservative and Labor) lost public favorability to smaller parties. The writer discusses the reasons why smaller parties, namely the Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats, are doing well this time around and the implications the results could have on domestic British politics and EU politics as a whole.

Joseph Braude writes on the recent escalation in the Arabian Gulf, which persuaded the United States to dispatch an aircraft carrier there and evacuate personnel from the American Embassy in Iraq. He would go on to write about the division between the Republicans and Democrats on the situation with Iran, as the former have shown defiance in against the regime, while the latter are much more hesitant over the prospects of confronting Iran.

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A Weekly Political News Magazine

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A Weekly Political News Magazine

42 Keeping Your Weight Stable in Older Age

Issue 1749- May - 24/05/2019

10 The JCPOA Negotiating Process

26 Why North Korea Is Testing Missiles Again

32 30 Mexico’s New President Turns Back the Clock on Democracy

32 Huawei Will Make Do Without Google, But How Well?

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48 The Real Killer

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Buddhist monks pray at Borobudur temple during celebrations for Vesak Day on May 2019 ,18 in Magelang, Central Java, Indonesia. Buddhists in Indonesia celebrate Vesak at the Borobudur temple annually, which makes it the most visited tourist attraction in Indonesia. It is observed during the full moon in May or June, with the ceremony centered at three Buddhist temples by walking from Mendut to Pawon and ending at Borobudur. (Getty)

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An Indian youth scouts around for mud crabs and snakehead fishes as he walks on the parched bed of Chembarambakkam lake on the outskirts of Chennai on May 2019 ,21. Water levels in the four main reservoirs in Chennai has fallen to one of its lowest levels in 70 years, according to Indian media reports, with the current levels amounting to only 1.3 percent of full capacity. (Getty)

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Trump Threatens Iran’s ‘End’, Pentagon Mulls Military Request to Send Troops to Middle East

Middle East. One of the officials said the requested troops would be defensive in nature. It is unclear if any specific request will ultimately be presented to the White House.

U.S. President Donald Trump threatened Iran in a tweet on Sunday, raising concerns about a potential U.S.-Iran conflict at a time when tensions between Washington and Tehran have risen. “If Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran.

Never threaten the United States again,” Trump said in a tweet. Trump has tightened economic sanctions against Iran, and his administration says it has built up the U.S. military presence in the region. It accuses Iran of threats to U.S. troops and interests. Tehran has described U.S. moves as “psychological warfare” and a “political game.”

On Wednesday, two US officials told Reuters that the US Department is considering a U.S. military request to send about 5,000 additional troops to the

US to Hold Bahrain Economic Conference to Launch Middle East Peace Plan The US will hold an international economic “workshop” in Bahrain in late June, seeking to encourage investment in the Palestinian territories as the first part of Donald Trump’s long-awaited Middle East peace plan, the White House said on Sunday. The conference in Manama on 25 and 26 June will bring together government and business leaders from Europe, the Middle East and Asia, a senior Trump administration official said. Attendees will an attempt to help jump-start the economic

portion of the US peace initiative, which is expected to include proposals for resolving political issues at the heart of the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, a second senior US official declined to say whether Israeli and Palestinian officials would take part.

Yemen's Houthis Attack Saudi's Najran Airport by Drone Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement on Thursday launched a drone attack on a Patriot missile battery in the airport of the Saudi city of Najran near the Yemeni border, the group’s Al-Masirah TV said on Thursday. The Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis said the drone was intercepted and destroyed by the kingdom’s air defenses. The Houthis, who ousted the Saudi-backed Yemeni president from power in the capital Sanaa in 2014, have stepped up missile and drone attacks on Saudi in the past 10 days in a resurgence of tactics that had largely subsided since late last year amid United Nationsled peace efforts. The group claimed responsibility for last week’s armed drone strikes on oil assets in Saudi Arabia and on Sunday said they would attack 300 vital military targets in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

This is the third Houthi strike or attempt to strike Najran in a week, according to Saudi and Houthi reports.

House Speaker Pelosi Urges Trump Family 'Intervention' with U.S. President House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi said on Thursday she wished President

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Google Blocks Huawei Access to Android Updates After Blacklisting Donald Trump’s family or staff would conduct an “intervention” with him for the good of the United States after he threw what she called a temper tantrum at a meeting with Democratic congressional leaders a day earlier. Trump fired back, questioning Pelosi’s mental state by saying she has “lost it” while calling himself an “extremely stable genius.” As the acrid fight intensified between the Republican president and the Democrats who control the House amid talk of impeaching Trump, work on a two-year federal budget deal has ground to a near standstill as the task of basic governing in Washington has become increasingly complicated. Trump, who is seeking re-election in 2020, and Democratic leaders for a second straight day lobbed accusations and insults at each other after the collapse of an infrastructure deal that could have pumped 2$ trillion into the U.S. economy, if lawmakers and the president had found a way to pay for it.

Tearful Theresa May Resigns as UK Prime Minister Fighting back tears, Theresa May said on Friday she would quit, setting up a contest that will bring a new British prime minister to power who could pursue a cleaner break with the European Union. May’s departure will deepen the Brexit crisis as a new leader is likely to want a more decisive split, raising the chances of a confrontation with the EU and a potentially unpredictable snap parliamentary election. Her voice cracking with emotion, May, who endured crises and humiliation in her failed effort to find a compromise Brexit deal that parliament could ratify, said she would resign as Conservative Party leader on June 7 with a leadership contest beginning the following week. Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the main opposition Labour Party, said the new prime minister must hold a parliamentary election to “let the people decide our country’s future”.

India's Modi Stuns Opposition with Huge Election Win Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi scored a dramatic election victory on Thursday, putting his Hindu nationalist party on course to increase its majority on a mandate of business-friendly policies and a tough stand on national security. Official data from the Election Commission showed Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party ahead in 302 of the 542 seats up for grabs, up from the 282 it won in 2014 and more than the 272 seats needed for a majority in the lower house of parliament. That would give his party the first back-to-back majority for a single party since 1984.

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Google suspended Huawei’s access to updates of its Android operating system and chipmakers have reportedly cut off supplies to the Chinese telecoms company, after the US government added it to a trade blacklist last week. Google said it was complying with an executive order issued by Donald Trump and was reviewing the “implications”, later adding that Google Play – through which Google allows users to download apps – and

the security features of its antivirus software Google Play Protect would continue on existing Huawei devices. New versions of its smartphones outside China would lose access to popular applications and services including Google Play, Maps and the Gmail app. Huawei will continue to have access to the version of the Android operating system available through the open source licence that is free to anyone who wishes to use it. But, according to Reuters who first reported the ban on Sunday, Google will stop providing technical support and collaboration for Android and Google services

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The JCPOA Negotiating Process How Years Of Increased Risks And Talks Produced The Controversial Deal By: Majalla-London On May 2018 ,8, the Trump administration formally pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a nuclear deal that the P1+5 (the US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) agreed to with Iran. Trump has long been a critic of the JCPOA and has gone as far as to call it the “worst deal ever” during his campaign trail for the presidency. The year that followed the US’s withdrawal from the deal has been one of increased sanctions on Iran and spiraling tensions between the Islamic Republic and the US and its regional allies. Now Iranian regime recently announced that it would reduce its commitments to the deal, and has given the international community a -60 day ultimatum to resolve the crisis or it will resume high-level uranium enrichment. As it stands, the JCPOA is all but dead

and recent escalations have more or less been the final nail on the casket of the deal. In spite of this, the rest of the P1+5 have vehemently fought to keep the deal afloat as they did not want the years of negotiating with Iran to die in vain.

IRAN’S EARLY NUCLEAR AMBITIONS The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran has sought nuclear capabilities since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, during which it signed nuclear cooperation agreements with China, Pakistan, and Russia. To curtail the threat of Iran possessing nuclear capabilities, the US put pressure on China and Russia to scale back their supply to Iran. However, the NTI has indicated that there is a reason to believe that individual Russian scientists did help Iran build some

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facilities such as a 40MW heavy water research reactor at Arak.

THE EARLY 2000s: START OF NEGOTIATIONS

US Secretary of State John Kerry (L) meets with Iran›s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on April 2016 ,22 in New York.

(Getty)

In August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed that the Iranian regime had built nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak marking the beginning of heightened scrutiny over the regime’s dubious activities. Later that year, the Bush administration warned the Iranian regime against building nuclear weapons and in response to the criticism Iran invited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out inspections on its facilities.

The first nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West happened in 2003 when the EU3- (the UK, France, and Germany) sat down with Iranian negotiators to find common ground. These negotiations seemed fruitful at first since Iran agreed to signing the Additional Protocol which gives the IAEA broader access to the nuclear facilities within the state. Some progress seemed to have been made that year as Iran agreed to stop uranium enrichment after negotiations with the EU3-. Nevertheless, Iran violated the agreement early on as it continued making centrifuge components and small scale conversion experiments.

The following year, the CIA reported that Iran was modifying its Shahab3- missile which would enable it to carry a nuclear warhead, that same year the IAEA found hidden documents that displayed plans of constructing an advanced centrifuge and uranium casting. Such findings encouraged the IAEA to request the Iranian government to be more transparent with its facilities.

However, a rift happened between the regime and IAEA as the former refused to cooperate with the latter, and Iran subsequently went back on its promise and announced that it would pursue uranium enrichment.

2006-2005: BACK TO SQUARE ONE In 2005, Iran restarted uranium enrichment in its Isfahan plant, an action that caused the EU3- to end its talks with the Islamic Republic. Iran’s non-compliance to previous agreements as well as its non-peaceful nuclear build-up caused the IAEA to put the case to the UN Security Council, something the regime wanted to avoid from the beginning. In 2006, Iran would tell the IAEA that it would stop complying with the Additional Protocol and subsequently resumed its uranium enrichment activities it would go on to produce uranium for the first time in April of that year. Iran’s nuclear developments paved the way for renewed negotiations which would be led by the P1+5 (permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany). The P1+5 tried negotiating a deal with Iran which would stop its uranium enrichment activities for an indefinite period of time; naturally, the Iranian regime rejected the deal.

In December 2006, noncooperation from Iran’s part led to UN Security Council Resolution 1737 which imposed sanctions Iran and countries which that supply the regime with missiles or other

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Regardless of opposition from many members of Congress and many Iranian MPs, the deal would eventually go through both legislative bodies. nuclear technology. The following two years saw a continuation of this cat and mouse game, as Iran refused to accept any deal brought to the negotiating table while the UN Security Council kept imposing its sanctions on the regime’s activities. George W. Bush’s second term as president would come to an end in early 2009, and the election of Barack Obama gave hope that a new chapter in negotiations would take place.

OBAMA ATTEMPTS TO APPEASE IRAN Shortly after becoming the president in 2009, Obama announced that the US would be seeking a new approach when negotiating a deal with Iran, namely the fact that the US would participate in P1+5 talks without the condition that Iran had to comply with UN demands first. For the longest time, Tehran claimed that its nuclear ambitions were for peaceful purposes and one of the said purposes was to fuel its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Humoring such claims, the P1+5 sought a “fuel-swap” deal with Iran, in which the latter would give up its 3.5 percent enriched uranium and in exchange, the P1+5 would give the Islamic Republic 20 percent enriched uranium which would only be used in the TRR. Months later in early 2010, Iran started to produce its own 20 percent enriched uranium, thus rendering a fuel swap deal useless, what’s worse is that Tehran could now use the uranium for any purpose it wished, be they peaceful or nonpeaceful. That year, the US Congress approved sanctions against firms and businesses that invested into Iran’s energy sector as well as companies that sell refined petroleum to Iran, while the EU placed sanctions on Iran’s trade and energy sectors.

IRAN’S INCREASING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES In a lot of ways, the year 2011 was a wakeup call for the international community about the hasty need for a way to stop Iran’s increased activities. In 2011, the regime started operating its Bushehr power plant and announced that it would triple its 20 percent enriched uranium production. That year, Russia tried leading negotiations as Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov proposed a new deal between Iran and the P1+5. Russia’s plan was a 5 stage one which would involve Iran capping its uranium enrichment at 5 percent, ratifying the IAEA Additional Protocol and suspending its enrichment activities for three months and at each stage of implantation the P1+5 and UN Security Council would lift sanctions on Iran. The Islamic Republic approved

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of Russia’s plan, but the US, UK, and France did not think sanctions should be lifted this early on and as a result, nothing came of Russia’s proposal. In November of that year, the IAEA released a report of Iran’s secret nuclear weapons program which it started in the late 1990s and the early 2000s; moreover, the report indicated that Iran may have been involved in a number of weapons-related activities after 2003.

2013: PROGRESS IS MADE Following Iran’s increased capabilities, the P1+5 made more of an effort to negotiate with Iran in 2012 as talks became more frequent and venues such as Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow hosted the multilateral talks throughout the year. However, the efforts made in 2012 pail in comparison to those that occurred in 2013. Hassan Rouhani’s election provided a new opportunity for the P1+5 to take a new approach in negotiations this was because Rouhani himself was a former nuclear negotiator and promised to be more transparent on Iran’s nuclear capabilities. It should be noted, however, that he also asserted that Iran would not stop its nuclear ambitions. The latter months of 2013 proved to be significant, one specific moment that stuck out was September’s UN General Assembly Meeting which saw Iran’s newly appointed foreign minister, Javad Zarif, meet with the foreign ministers from the rest of the P1+5. What’s even more significant is the fact that former US Secretary of State John Kerry had a private bilateral meeting with Zarif, which ended with both men agreeing on finding a deal within the end of the year. The following October, Iran and the P1+5 met again in Geneva where Iran presented its own proposal which contained broad strokes that would lead into a more substantive deal, it also had a 6-3 transitional period which would be used to help Iran build more confidence among the international community. This proposal would eventually become the framework for the Joint Plan of Action. In November, the foreign ministers from the P1+5 and Iran met again in Geneva and where the Joint Plan of Action was signed, this agreement stated that Iran would have to stop further developing its program, reduce its 20 percent uranium stock and grant the IAEA further access to its nuclear sites and

However, the fact that the Iran has previously made concessions to the international community and failed to stick by them was a major point of contention, for instance there was the time when Iran violated its deal with the EU 3.

in exchange for compliance Iran would receive sanctions relief and would not have any further sanctions placed on it during the next six months. Finally, the six month period could be extended indefinitely if the P1+5 and Iran agreed to do so.

JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) The six month period agreed in the JPOA was meant to be a transitional period in which both parties agreed to a comprehensive plan. The negotiations would take place throughout all of 2014 and would extend into 2015. Despite many delays and drawbacks, the P1+5 and Iran finally agreed to a comprehensive plan in July 2015. Regardless of opposition from many members of Congress and many Iranian MPs, the deal would eventually go through both legislative bodies. Under JCPOA, Iran would have to decrease its centrifuges at the Natanz facility from 19,000 to 5,060 and would have to abide by this restriction until 2025, the Fardow facility wouldn’t be used for uranium enrichment for 15 years and Iran would have to ratify the Additional Protocol and grant the IAEA access to its nuclear facilities for routine inspections. In exchange, Iran would gradually receive sanctions relief thus giving it more opportunity to participate in the global market.

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President Donald J. Trump signs a National Security Presidential Memorandum as he announces the withdrawal of the United States from the Iran nuclear deal on Tuesday, May ,08 2018 in Washington, DC. (Getty)

CRITICISM OF THE JCPOA A comprehensive deal on Iran’s nuclear capabilities is largely unprecedented and has given the Iranian regime restrictions that few believed it would ever agree to in the first place. However, the fact that Iran has previously made concessions to the international community and failed to stick by them was a major point of contention; for instance, there was the time when Iran violated its deal with the EU 3. Moreover, the deal did not stop Iran from doing other region destabilizing activities such as funding and aiding terror groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthi militias, this is the reason why President Trump said that Iran broke “the spirit” of the deal, i.e. Iran isn’t living up to the peaceful nature of the deal. While speaking to Majalla, Naysan Rafati of Crisis Group stated that the deal was not designed to stop Iran from funding these groups, he also stated that the parameters of the deal needed to be broad since the P1+5 prioritized capping Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Despite this need for broader parameters, there were a number of unaddressed elements that needed to be acknowledged, for example, the deal did not stop Iran from testing non-nuclear missiles and there is the fact that Iran could have always resumed its nuclear buildup after the restrictions expired. Currently, there is a need for a new deal, as such Iran and the P1+5 need to go back to the drawing board and come up with an agreement that is fair for both parties. More importantly, any new deal that is negotiated should not pose any danger to other states in the region. However, recent news of Iran violating the JCPOA by resuming uranium enrichment does not indicate any prospects of negotiations in the near future.

Iran›s controversial heavy water production facility is seen in this general view, October ,27 2004 at Arak, south of the Iranian capital Tehran. (Getty)

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The US, Iran and Trouble in the Gulf New Tensions Risk US-Iran War Amid Nuclear Deal Fallout 14

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Both Iran and the US are on record denying that they want a war and its hard to see how it would be popular in either country. But the military situation in the Middle East is inherently unstable, and there are multiple potential flash-points. latest round of unsettling news and dangerous escalations have the world on edge.

A SERIES OF DANGEROUS ESCALATIONS The recent round of escalations began when the US raised the stakes by saying it has intelligence that suggests Iran plans to attack Americans in the Middle East. On May 5, National Security Adviser John Bolton announced that the US was deploying an aircraft carrier and bomber planes to the Persian Gulf in response to “a number of troubling and escalatory indications and warnings” of threats from Iran.

In a statement, Bolton said the move was meant “to send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime that any attack on United States interests or on those of our allies will be met with unrelenting force.” He said that the US “is not seeking war with the Iranian regime,” but added, “we are fully prepared to respond to any attack, whether by proxy, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or regular Iranian forces.”

The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strikes group was delayed to the Middle East in response to ‘troubling indications’ from Iran.

(EPA)

by Yasmine El-Geressi The strings holding the 2015 Iran nuclear deal together have been gradually snapping since President Donald Trump announced US withdrawal on May 2018 ,8. Following a year of “maximum pressure” from the US administration, the unravelling of the agreement, which was designed to ensure Iran's nuclear program will be "exclusively peaceful” by limiting its uranium enrichment program until 2030, is now accelerating with Iran’s announcement that it could stop complying with key parts of the deal. All of this comes against a backdrop of an escalating war of words between the Washington and Tehran and a troubling series of events in the Middle East in recent weeks. Both Iran and the US say they are not interested in war but the

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At the time, it was unclear exactly what that intelligence said, but while the facts are still in short supply, reports in the days since have provided a bit more clarity. Iran apparently intended to target US troops in Iraq and Syria, or even use drones against Americans in a key waterway near Yemen.

Three days later, Iran marked the anniversary of President Donald Trump withdrawing the U.S. from Tehran’s nuclear deal with world powers by announcing it also would begin backing away from the accord. It set a -60 day deadline for Europe to offer it a better deal before it would begin enriching uranium to higher levels that the West fears could allow it to obtain atomic bombs. These actions remain banned by the agreement. After Iran said it would retaliate, European powers rejected Iran’s “ultimatum”, urging the regime to stick to the terms of the

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2015 agreement despite America’s withdrawal.

But things didn’t stop there. A few days later, four oil tankers were damaged in sabotage attacks off the coast of the United Arab Emirates, a vital waterway aggressively patrolled by Iran through which a third of the world’s liquefied natural gas and almost 20 percent of the world’s oil production flows. Two of the oil tankers belonged to Saudi Arabia and one belonged to the United Arab Emirates. The fourth was owned by a Norwegian company.

Unnamed US officials told NBC News that it’s “highly likely” based on intelligence that Iran or groups allied with it were behind the attacks, a similar conclusion reached by a Norwegian insurance company that assesses risk to shipping vessels, according to a confidential report seen

by Reuters. Iran itself denied any involvement — but one day later, a pipeline in Saudi Arabia that allows it to avoid the strait became a target as well. Yemen’s Houthi rebels, with whom Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been fighting a war since March 2015, launched a drone attack on the East-West pipeline, which carries nearly 5 million barrels of crude oil a day to the Red Sea. The kingdom shut down the pipeline in response, causing a spike in global oil prices. Iran’s foreign ministry rejected accusations by Saudi Arabia that Tehran had ordered the attack, Nerves in the region were put even more on an edge when President Donald Trump tweeted that any conflict with the US would mean “the official end of Iran. Soon after, officials at the Pentagon said that the US is considering a request to send thousands more troops to the Middle East.

Sources quoted by news agencies said the extra personnel would be deployed in a defensive capacity. While the AP news agency said up to 10,000 extra personnel were being requested, Reuters put the number at 5,000. Officials, speaking on conditions of anonymity, said the discussions would also include a request for additional Patriot missile

Amid the brewing tensions, Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah visited Iran this week and said that Iran had indicated that is ready to negotiate its foreign policy but under different circumstances and not under pressure.

batteries and more ships in the area. The US has evacuated non-essential staff from Iran's neighbour Iraq, citing "credible threats" against its forces. Any decision to deploy more troops to the Middle East would represent something of a departure for US President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly stressed a need for Washington to reduce its troop presence there.

Meanwhile, Iran remains defiant. Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said Iran's youth would witness the end of Israeli and American civilization in their lifetime. "You young people should be assured that you will witness the demise of the enemies of humanity, meaning the degenerate American civilization, and the demise of Israel," Khamenei said in a meeting with students this week.

Although the acting US defence secretary Patrick Shanahan claimed this week that the threat from Iran has receded as the result of an American show of force in the Middle East, these recent escalations have raised fears that the two nations are being pushed closer to the brink.

WILL THE US GO TO WAR WITH IRAN? Both Iran and the US are on record denying that they want a war and its hard to see how it would be popular in either

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A display featuring missiles and a portrait of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is seen at Baharestan Square in Tehran on September 2017 ,27. (Reuters)

economic and political pressure. If this does not work, and the regime does not announce its readiness to negotiate, then plan B will be in the form of strikes on sites belonging to the Revolutionary Guards, and nuclear and military installations.”

If Iran persists in its intransigent position, the US will implement plan C: “a limited military deployment (in cooperation with its allies) to stifle the Iranian regime and dry up its lifeline. This could happen on the three Islands, the eastern coast of the Gulf, the Bandar Abbas and Abu Rish provinces, or in Ahwaz, which contains most of the oil fields,” Azizi explains.

Amid the brewing tensions, Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah visited Iran this week and said that Iran had indicated that it is ready to negotiate its foreign policy but under different circumstances and not under pressure. Azizi says that this statement confirms that US sanctions on Tehran are working and that the Islamic republic is ready to make concessions because “foreign policy” includes Iran’s interventions in Arab countries and its regional and international relations.

country. But the military situation in the Middle East is inherently unstable, and there are multiple potential flashpoints as the US and Iranian military forces are in close proximity across the region, and therefore the dangers of miscalculation or misunderstanding are high. Yousef Azizi, a prominent researcher in Iranian affairs, told Majalla that the probability of war is 50-50 and is dependent on many different circumstances, including what is “being discussed in Washington, especially within the narrow circle of President Donald Trump, National Security Advisor John Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and acting US defence secretary Patrick Chanahan.”

A war with Iran would potentially be more calamitous than the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which led to hundreds of thousands of deaths, bogged the US down in a costly and lengthy war, and helped catalyse the rise of ISIS. Democratic lawmakers have raised alarm bells about the White House wanting war, and they've made it clear they would oppose any military action without congressional approval. At the same time, Republicans in Congress are placing the blame on Iran for the confrontation and urging Trump to "stand firm.”

Azizi, who is the General Secretary at the Centre Against Racism in Iran, explains that there are three parts to America’s Iran strategy: “The first focuses on maximum

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However, Azizi explains that there is uncertainty surrounding whether Washington will return to the negotiating table, which Trump says he wants, because in May last year the US announced a list of 12 demands covering Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile tests, detention of U.S. citizens and foreign policy, that Iran must meet before the US will start any negations.

“Iran seems likely to use secret diplomacy to tackle these issues as it did in the years leading up the nuclear deal in 2015. It is certain that the current state of neither peace nor war, in the Gulf cannot continue for much longer,” Azizi said.

IS THE DEAL DEAD? Ever since Trump pulled the United States out of the nuclear agreement in May 2018, the Europeans have been desperately trying to keep it alive by continuing as much trade with Iran as possible so that Iran has an incentive to remain in the deal. The Iranians have set out a timetable for a staged withdrawal from the agreement dependent upon the actions of the EU. “This surgery is to save the [deal] not destroy it,” Rouhani said. He has also said the actions are justifiable under the articles of the deal which set out the countermeasures party could take is another party was clearly in breach of their obligations. It’s hard to imagine what the Europeans could do in the next sixty days to satisfy Iran’s demands without being hit by U.S. sanctions they cannot afford and thus, some observers have predicted that Iran will resume its nuclear activities in July, and the

President-elect Donald Trump looks on during a rally at the DeltaPlex Arena, December ,9 2016 in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Presidentelect Donald Trump is continuing his victory tour across the country. (Getty)

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani speaks during a press conference in New York on September 2018 ,26, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. (Getty)

deal will be declared dead.

that will inevitably result.

Azizi says that the Iran deal was near its death following the US withdrawal, but now its end is accelerating as a result of Iran’s activities and its threats to Europe which could lead to its total collapse. But he says that he does not predict that Iran will completely withdraw from the deal as the Islamic Republic are aware of the grave consequences

“I do not imagine that Iran will withdraw from the nuclear agreement because that would be suicidal. Is the Iranian regime is prepared to expose itself to international sanctions similar to those before 2015, while it is currently wailing under the sanctions of one state, the United States?

I don’t believe that Khamenei and his loyalists will commit such a foolish act as they are aware of the seriousness of this matter. Washington wants to transfer the nuclear file to Security Council and the G7 which will give it international legitimacy to punish Iran, this time not only economically, but military too, and perhaps in cooperation with its European allies,” Azizi explained.

“Iran seems likely to use secret diplomacy to tackle these issues as it did in the years leading up the nuclear deal in 2015. It is certain that the current state of neither peace, nor war, in the Gulf can continue for much longer.” Yousef Azizi

“Iran’s goal is to strengthen its currently weak position in any future negotiations with the United States. Iran knows that its withdrawal from the deal will not only provoke the EU, but also its traditional allies, Russia and Chia. I don’t believe that Iran will risk surrendering its neck to the Security Council, International sanctions and the G7. Iran is in an unenviable dilemma. But the EU is not burning all of its bridges with Iran so that it stays within the framework of a deal that has become useless to the Islamic Revolution since the US withdrawal.”

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A YEAR OF MAXIMUM PRESSURE The Iran deal was reached between Iran and the United States, the UK, Russia, France, China, Germany and the EU in July 2015 to ensure Iran's nuclear program will be "exclusively peaceful” by limiting its uranium enrichment program until 2030. US President fulfilled his campaign promise and withdrew the US from the agreement May 2018 ,8, a move that irritated European allies. He called the agreement “disastrous” and “one sided”, claiming it did not address Iran’s ballistic missile program or its roles in Middle Eastern conflicts. When he set out his policy, he pointed to Iran’s support for groups around the region such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda. He also claimed that the nuclear deal – formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – did little or nothing to forestall Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions and claimed the deal had allowed Iran to enrich uranium and “cause havoc within the Middle East and beyond.” He said that if the deal was to stand, there would soon be a “nuclear arms race in the Middle East.”

After pulling out of the deal, there has been a steady stream of measures designed to put “maximum pressure” on the Tehran regime. In August 2018, Trump re-imposed economic sanctions against Iran. The first set of sanctions targeted financial transactions that involve US dollars, Iran’s automotive sector, the purchase of commercial planes and metals including gold. Immediately after issuing the order, Trump tweeted that these were "the most biting sanctions ever imposed" and would "ratchet up to yet another level" in November when Iran's oil sector and central bank would be targeted. On 5 November, the US completed its full snapback oil and financial sanctions on Iran, but initially allowed its eight biggest buyers limited imports for another half-year.

This marked the heaviest economic pressure ever applied by Washington on the Islamic Republic.

Despite the US withdrawal, the multilateral agreement remains in force as the Europeans, along with China and Russia, have remained committed to the deal. The Trump administration has demanded repeatedly that the Europeans abandon the JCPOA but despite the difficulties facing the deal, mounting US pressure, and recent strains on relations with Iran, European governments and the EU have continued to engage with Tehran. Last summer the European Union passed a revisited blocking regulation promising to prevent European companies from suffering from U.S. extraterritorial sanctions.

They approved modest funds to support investment in Iran's ailing economy. In January, the E3 — France, Germany and the U.K. —established a "special purpose vehicle" to facilitate transactions for non-sanctioned trade with Iran, called the "Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges" but it has yet

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to become operational. Despite these measures Europeans have been unable to safeguard their oil imports from Iran and prevent it from being disconnected from international financial markets.

On April 22, the Trump administration announced the surprise news that buyers of Iranian oil must stop purchases by May 1 or face sanctions, ending the six months of waivers which had allowed Iran’s eight biggest buyers of crude to continue to import limited volumes oil. The move sent prices up to nearly six-month highs and Iran responded by revisiting its familiar threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, prompting fears about the potential ramifications for oil prices and broader financial markets.

Despite the exemptions, sanctions are having a dramatic effect on Tehran. Iran's GDP contracted by %3.9 in 2018, according to estimates from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF said in late April that it expected the Iranian economy to shrink by %6 in 2019. However, that projection preceded the expiration of the sanctions waivers. The Rial has lost almost %60 of its value against the US dollar on the unofficial market according to foreign exchange websites. The IMF estimates that inflation has soared to %31 in 2018 and predicts that it could reach %37 or more this year if oil exports continue to fall. The drop in Iran’s oil exports, its main foreign revenue source, has cost Tehran an estimated 10$ billion, according to US officials. As a result, the regime is under intense pressure from the Iranian people for reforms that answer their unmet economic and social needs.

The US added another layer to its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran on April 8 when it designated Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organization, marking the first time the US has formally labeled another nation’s military a terrorist group. The step drew Iranian condemnation and raised concerns about retaliatory attacks on U.S. forces. Critics of Trump’s decision said it was largely symbolic because U.S. law already carried penalties of up to 20years in prison for U.S. persons who deal with the IRGC, the country’s most powerful security services, because of its designation under another U.S. sanctions program, the U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist list. The IRGC, however, is the body driving many destabilizing regional activities that the Trump administration has declared must cease, through its support for regional proxies such as Hezbollah. Tehran took retaliatory action by naming the US Central Command (CENTCOM) as a "terrorist organisation" and the US government as a "state sponsor of terrorism".

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Democrats, Republicans at Odds Over Gulf Tensions

Republicans Defend President Trump’s Iran Policy, Democrats React with Trepidation

by Joseph Braude Amid a rise in U.S.-Iranian military strains, Republicans have mostly rallied around Trump while progressives accuse him of riding a reckless path to war.

TRUMP AND IRANIAN OFFICIALS TRADE BARBS Events of the past week have stoked mutual recriminations between the United States and Iran, raising concerns of a potential outbreak of hostilities.

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Events of the past week have stoked mutual recriminations between the United States and Iran, raising concerns of a potential outbreak of hostilities. arms, but it wasn’t far off.” On May 20, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted a response to Trump’s May 17 tweet, warning that «genocidal taunts won›t ‹end Iran.’” He told Iranian state media, «There will not be a war since neither we want a war nor does anyone have the illusion they can confront Iran in the region.»

REPUBLICANS RALLY, WHITE HOUSE CRITICS SOUND NOTES OF CAUTION Republicans rose to the defense of President Trump’s Iran policy. On May 20, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina tweeted, “The fault lies with the Iranians, not the United States or any other nation. If the Iranian threats against American personnel and interests are activated we must deliver an overwhelming military response. Stand firm Mr. President.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (L) and US President Donald Trump (R) (Reuters)

Earlier this month, the White House — citing intelligence reports of increased Iranian preparations to attack American troops in the Middle East — dispatched an aircraft carrier group to the Gulf.

Shortly afterward, the U.S. government evacuated personnel from the American embassy in Baghdad.

Plans also leaked of a potential deployment of 120,000 troops to the region.

Though Trump had previously denied these reports as “fraudulent and highly inaccurate coverage,” on May 17, he tweeted, “If Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran. Never threaten the United States again!”

Iranian officials, for their part, have signaled defiance.

On May 16, the Guardian reported that Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani had instructed Iranian proxy militias in Iraq to “prepare for proxy war.”

According to one local source, “It wasn’t quite a call to

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A few days earlier, Republican Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas made waves when he said in an interview that, though he “did not advocate military action against Iran,” he believed that the United States would prevail in a military conflict in “two strikes: the first strike and the last strike.”

Across the aisle, the leadership of the Democratic party has reacted with trepidation. On May 16, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, in an apparent bid to dissuade the President from a more confrontational course of action, said, “I like what I hear from the President that he has no appetite for [war] -- one place or one of the places that I agree with the President is in both of us and our opposition to the war in Iraq.”

Taking a somewhat harder line, Democratic Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer called for the Acting Defense Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to testify before Congress: “If the President and Republicans in Congress are planning to take the United States into a conflict, even a war in the Middle East, the American people deserve to know that and they deserve to know why.”

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UK and the European Elections How the Continental Election Might Impact Domestic Politics

By Ali El Shamy If Brexit had gone as scheduled, the United Kingdom would have been out of the European Union by March 29 of this year and Brits would have lived through the first two months out of the EU. However, the last six months have been mired by parliamentary battles, MPs quitting their respective parties and Theresa May putting her deal to parliament and losing every

time. With the March deadline looming closer, Theresa May had little choice but to request an extension from the EU, lest risking the prospects of her country crashing out of the EU without a deal. The UK has now taken part in the European election, something that most Brexiters, initially, wanted to avoid, but just as exit polls indicate a Brexit Party victory, it is these ardent Brexiters who can be the most happy with the elections.

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Recently, Richard Corbett, the leader of Labor’s MEPs, has warned Corbyn that he could face a mass exodus of young, pro-EU voters if he does not back a second Brexit referendum.

Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage (C) holds up a placard at the end of a European Parliament election campaign rally at Olympia London, west London on May ,21 2019. (Getty)

WHY THE EU ELECTIONS ARE CONTROVERSIAL Many staunch Brexiters wanted to the UK to withdraw from the European Union and its bodies by any means necessary and as soon as possible. Now the UK is participating in one of the EU’s processes and depending on how long the Brexit deadlock will be British MEPs (members of European Parliament) will be part of EU legislation. This is the opposite of what Brexiters wanted as they wished to move away from EU legislation, not partake in it.

However, when former UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, registered his Brexit Party last February many frustrated Leave voters became more welcoming towards participating in the EU elections, this enthusiasm grew more when the Party officially launched their election campaign in April. Despite the fact that the Party is only a few months old, it has garnered large support from frustrated Brexiters who are not happy with how the political establishment

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has handled the withdrawal process. Moreover, the party has managed to garner support from traditional Tory voters, many of whom are unsatisfied with May’s drawbacks and incompetence.

The Conservative Party has taken heavy losses for the past few months, as the latest YouGov poll before election placed the Tories in fifth place with only 7 percent of those polled intend to vote for them, meanwhile, the Brexit Party standed at first place as 37 percent of those polled said they would vote for them. This isn’t the first time that Farage has been able to take votes away from the Tories, back in 2015 General Election the Eurosceptic UKIP (which was under Farage’s leadership) managed to gain two seats in Britain’s parliament, marking the first time the party has ever done that. Even before the elections, polls indicated that UKIP would make a breakthrough, so to discourage people from voting UKIP former Prime Minister, David Cameron, promised to hold a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU if he won the election. He did indeed win the election and a referendum was held the following year, and the rest is history. Speaking of UKIP, even though the party has previously managed to do well in European elections, it is currently polled at only 3 percent. The reasons for UKIP’s demise might be due to the fact that its former charismatic leader, Farage, decided to quit the party last December, citing the fact that he was unhappy with the direction that the party was following under the leadership of Gerard Batten. It should be noted that Batten has indeed made many questionable decisions since taking over the party; one such decision was appointing anti-Islam and former EDL leader, Tommy Robinson, as his political advisor. He has also allowed controversial members, such as YouTube political commentator Carl Benjamin (better known by his YouTube username Sargon of Akkad), to run for seats in the parliamentary elections. For the longest time, Farage managed to put a cap on controversial members of UKIP and presented a more “cultured” outlook on the party and would have probably barred such figures from becoming members.

TORY AND LABOR IN SHAMBLES The Prime Minister’s actions have prompted criticism from within her own party, for instance, Tory backbencher and Brexiter, Jacob Rees-Mogg has called for the Prime Minister to

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step down citing the fact that most Tory members he has been meeting recently have told him they would be voting for the Brexit party. He further warned about the hard times his party would face if it comes in fifth in the elections. Jeremy Corbyn’s agreement to hold cross-party talks with the Prime Minister and his reluctance to back a second referendum has caused him to lose support from part of his largely young and pro-EU voter base, thus Labor is currently polling in third place behind the Liberal Democrats and the Brexit Party. In an ironic twist, the ones who can be the happiest with the elections are those who are most vehemently against the European Union in the first place.

WHY BREXIT AND LIB-DEMS ARE AHEAD While smaller parties have not traditionally made big gains in domestic elections, European elections have recently given them an outlet to perform better and escape the rigid two-party system.

The 2009 European elections was an important turning point which saw Farage’s UKIP gain 13 seats, which made it tie with Labor and come in second to Conservative which won 26 seats.

The following election in 2014 was a blow for the Conservatives, as UKIP won 24 seats while they themselves came in third with 19 seats, Labor did not fare better as they came in second with 20 seats. While doing well in European elections has not traditionally reflected a good performance in domestic elections (for instance Labor lost its European majority in 1999 but stayed in power in the UK until 2010), many agree that this year’s election cycle is different. Moreover, many predicted that the Brexit deadlock might spell the beginning of the end of the UK’s two-party system, as more small parties have starting gaining leeway. To answer the question as to why the Brexit Party and Lib-Dems have done well in the polls, simply put it’s because they’re the only parties that have a clear vision on Brexit and they lack major internal divisions that have proved to be cumbersome for the other two major parties. The Conservative Party’s MPs are divided over the Brexit issue as some back remaining while others want to go out, moreover, Theresa May herself did not want to leave the EU and has chosen to pursue a “halfway” deal that pleased no one. The Labor Party is also divided over the question of respecting the vote and leaving or remaining within

Unlike the Tories and Labor, the LiberalDemocrats have called for a second EU referendum without any ifs, buts or maybes, and that simple basis alone has enabled it to gain support from remainers.

the EU, while many MPs have called for a second referendum, Jeremy Corbyn has been reluctant to do the same. One could say that Corbyn wants to avoid alienating his working class base, many of whom voted for Brexit, but as a result, he has alienated his young voter base which is largely against leaving the EU. Recently, Richard Corbett, the leader of Labor’s MEPs, has warned Corbyn that he could face a mass exodus of young, proEU voters if he does not back a second Brexit referendum. The anti-Brexit Change UK has not done a good job marketing itself and in a lot of ways, it looks like a hodgepodge of disgruntled former Labor and Tory MPs, rather than a functioning party.

On the other hand, the Brexit Party has done an extensive campaign appealing to leave voters and has gained name recognition despite how young it is. Furthermore, the party has also benefitted from having a cult of personality figure, such as Farage, as its leader and founder. More importantly, Farage has reflected a loud and clear message: out means out. Unlike the Tories and Labor, the Liberal-Democrats have called for a second EU referendum without any ifs, buts or maybes, and that simple basis alone has enabled it to gain support from remainers.

Moreover, the Liberal-Democrats have the name recognition and structure necessary to make it the leading anti-Brexit party.

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT? Even though the elections have already happened, the European Parliament will not sit their first session until July 2; the MEPs

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Liberal Democrats Party leader Vince Cable (C) reacts as he stands with party activists and canvasses for support for their candidates in the forthcoming European elections, in London on May ,22 2019. (Getty)

As Brexit Party Leader, Farage has reflected a loud and clear message: out means out. will also have a summer break and meet again in September.

In theory, if a withdrawal agreement is finalized before July or even September, then British MEPs would not have to sit through the coming parliamentary session and would not have an impact on the European parliament. However, as long the UK remains within the EU, the 73 UK MEPs will remain in their parliamentary seats. If or when the UK withdraws from the EU, then the 73 seats that the UK has will be allocated to other European states.

However, if the exit polls are to be trusted then the anti-EU Brexit Party will gain most of the UK’s seats. This could cause even more problems for the EU as the far right Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) coalition is set to gain many seats in parliament.

This coalition contains many of Europe’s notorious anti-EU parties such as the French National Rally, Austria’s Freedom Party and UKIP, so if the Brexit Party makes an impact in the elections it may join forces with the coalition. One thing is for certain, the European election results might be an indicator for major changes within British domestic politics in the near future, major changes that might be irreversible.

Supporters of the UK Independence Party wait for the arrival of party leader Gerard Batten in his new battlebus as he launches the party EU election campaign and manifesto on May ,01 2019 in Middlesbrough, England. (Getty)

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Why North Korea Is Testing Missiles Again

Is a Much Larger Escalation on the Horizon?

By Ankit Panda* and Vipin Narang* After 522 days without a ballistic missile test, North Korea is at it again. On May 4, two months after the failed Hanoi summit, Pyongyang fired a new type of solid-fuel short range

ballistic missile and tested two separate multiple rocket launch systems. Any hope that the test was a one-off evaporated just five days later, when North Korea again launched several of the new short range ballistic missiles, one of which traveled as far as 420 kilometers.

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Testing short-range conventional missiles not only boosts the morale of Kim’s forces but satisfies bureaucratic hard-liners that Kim will indeed pursue a “new way” if the United States fails to relieve sanctions. could leave Americans less safe and undercut the concerns of allied countries.

In the wake of the Hanoi summit’s failure—after which North Korean officials suggested that Kim may have “lost the will to negotiate further”—Pyongyang’s renewed commitment to testing missiles certainly looks ominous, and could portend a turn back to a confrontation between the United States and North Korea. What precipitated Kim’s first ballistic missile test in almost a year and a half?

TIMING IS EVERYTHING

People watch a television news programme showing file footage of North Korea's projectile weapons, at a railway station in Seoul on May 2019 ,9. (Getty)

Both South Korea and the United States went to great lengths to downplay the tests’ significance. To be sure, Kim hasn’t broken any promises he has made to the United States since 2018. North Korea’s self-imposed moratorium on missile testing, declared explicitly in April of that year, applied only to intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In an interview following the May 4 test, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the United States believes that North Korea remains in compliance, noting that the moratorium “was focused, very focused, on intercontinental missile systems, the ones that threaten the United States for sure.” Pompeo did not mention standing UN Security Council Resolutions that prohibit any ballistic missile tests by North Korea.

Unfortunately, Pompeo’s comments may have inadvertently signaled to Kim that the United States will tolerate—and continue to look the other way on—tests short of ICBM range.

But such shorter-range missiles still threaten South Korea, Japan, and American forces deployed in Northeast Asia. For the United States to suggest disinterest in North Korea’s tests

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Not coincidentally, North Korea conducted its most recent missile tests just after the United States and South Korea commenced a new joint military exercise, known as Dong Maeng. The exercise, in its inaugural iteration this year, replaces the larger-scale Foal Eagle and Key Resolve springtime exercises that the allies carried out previously.

Even as it represented reduced scope allied activities amid diplomacy, Kim described it as a violation of a direct commitment U.S. President Donald Trump had given him, saying the drills “seriously rattle” Pyongyang.

Kim sees Dong Maeng as a manifestation of Washington’s “hostile policy” and a violation of the joint declaration he and Trump issued in Singapore in 2018. In an April 13 speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim warned that the combined exercise, along with Washington’s test, in March, of an anti-ICBM defense system, would have consequences. The “wind is bound to bring waves,” Kim warned: Pyongyang would respond with “corresponding acts” for these transgressions. And sure enough, Kim answered exercise with exercise, while making sure to largely calibrate the intensity of his missile tests to match that of the allied drills. The cycle of provocations is likely to continue between the two sides. Just last week, North Korea lashed out at the U.S. Justice Department’s seizure of the sanctions-busting Wise Honest ship, describing the move as a further violation of the Singapore declaration.

For Kim, the relationship with Trump carries high stakes domestically as well as internationally. North Korean officials

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have made statements implying that the leader put a lot on the line at home to negotiate directly with the U.S. president in Singapore and—especially—Hanoi. At a press conference in Pyongyang in March, one of Kim’s most senior diplomats said that he had faced “thousands of petitions” from various constituents, including “officials [of] the munitions industry,” warning him not to not let talks with the United States lead to abandoning the country’s nuclear weapons. These petitions aren’t literal given Kim’s monolithic decision-making ability, but the comment was a reminder that negotiations with the United States aren’t likely to have received universal support across the party bureaucracy. When Kim walked away from Hanoi empty-handed, these skeptics may have felt vindicated.

For example, in April, at a lower-key “guided weapon test,” some of North Korea’s best-known so-called missile men— Jang Chang Ha and Jon Il Ho, for instance—made their first public appearances since 2017, presaging the new round of test activity.

Testing short-range conventional missiles not only boosts the morale of Kim’s forces but satisfies bureaucratic hardliners that Kim will indeed pursue a “new way” if the United States fails to relieve sanctions. By showcasing North Korea’s improvement of, and increasing comfort with, advanced solid-fuel missiles—which Pyongyang had presumably been working on during the moratorium and which provide significant advantages in terms of responsiveness, survivability, and their ability to potentially defeat missile defenses—Kim is reassuring his military that he remains committed to a strong national defense even as he negotiates with Washington. North Korea needs a “self-reliant national defense,” Kim told the country in April: “Peace can be ensured only by powerful military capabilities.” Pyongyang’s

Kim’s message to the United States, particularly since Hanoi, has been that any further progress toward denuclearization and improved relations will require Washington to make the next move, primarily through sanctions relief.

“new way” may turn out to be simply more of the old way.

Kim likely aims not only to appeal to hard-liners at home but to pressure hard-liners in Washington as well. In Hanoi, Trump tried to “go big or go home,” demanding that North Korea unilaterally surrender its entire nuclear and ballistic missile program before it could get any major sanctions relief.

This maximalist position was, unsurprisingly, a nonstarter for Kim. He walked away when the United States refused to entertain a step-by-step approach that might have begun with, for example, the dismantlement of key facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

Since then, working-level negotiations have seemingly remained in a coma, and North Korea has strongly criticized Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton for allegedly convincing Trump to stick to the maximalist position.

Pyongyang has even demanded that Pompeo be removed from the negotiations. The missile tests serve to remind Trump that North Korea can turn up the temperature quickly if a deal fails to materialize—and that this time, unlike in 2017, there will be no diplomatic off-ramp. In effect, Pyongyang has taken a “maximum pressure” approach of its own.

DIPLOMACY’S EXPIRATION DATE Ominously, North Korea has signaled that the new tests may

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US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun (C) leaves after a meeting with his South Korean counterpart Lee Dohoon at the foreign ministry in Seoul on May 2019 ,10. (Getty)

Pompeo has dismissed this deadline as nothing “particularly significant.” But North Korea has a strong track record of following through on its threats, and history may rhyme, if not repeat itself, this year.

In March 2005, the country’s foreign ministry announced that Pyongyang no longer considered itself bound by a moratorium it had negotiated six years earlier. In March 2006, it proceeded to test short-range Toksa missiles similar to the missiles it has tested recently, and then on July 2006 ,4, it followed up with multiple longer-range ballistic missiles and a single satellite launch vehicle, which shares characteristics with long-range missiles. This time, unlike in 2005, Washington may not receive formal warning that Kim no longer feels bound by the moratorium, since it is self-imposed. At the very least, Kim’s restraint on missile testing is slackening and the administration ignores the end-of-year deadline at its peril.

THE RIGHT U.S. OBJECTIVES

be a prelude to a much larger escalation. Trump insists he is in “no rush” on denuclearization or to move talks forward, but Pyongyang has set a very clear deadline—the end of this People watch a television calendar year—for getting negotiations back on track and for news showing a file footage of North Korean the United States to moderate its position. Otherwise, Vice missile launch, at a Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui has admonished, the United railway station in Seoul on April 2018 ,21. (Getty) States will face unspecified “undesired consequences.”

Kim’s message to the United States, particularly since Hanoi, has been that any further progress toward denuclearization and improved relations will require Washington to make the next move, primarily through sanctions relief. As Kim sees the matter, he refrained from conducting weapons tests last year, and so he is owed, and has earned, that relief. Now he is content to return to his old ways slowly if no “corresponding measures” materialize, particularly as he has repaired his relationship with China and resurrected a historical relationship with Russia. Trump, however, says he sees North Korea’s latest test as evidence that Pyongyang isn’t “ready to negotiate.”

Momentum for a return to the working-level dialogue appears to be quickly vanishing. If the administration hopes to resurrect that dialogue with North Korea on its nuclear weapons program, it would do well to take Kim’s end-ofyear deadline seriously. To do so will require re-examining U.S.objectives. A good deal—one that reduces risks and at least begins to slow the growth of the North Korean nuclear and missile programs—is preferable to a quixotic quest for the “final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea.”

Each day that passes without a grand deal is one where North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs continue to expand and improve, further reducing Washington’s leverage. If North Korea’s end-of-year deadline passes without a shift in the U.S. negotiating position, Kim may ring in the New Year with a bang. *ANKIT PANDA is Senior Editor at The Diplomat and Senior Fellow at the Federation of American Scientists. *VIPIN NARANG is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

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Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador delivers a speech during the official event to mark the beginning of the construction of a new international airport, at the Santa Lucia Air Force Base in Zumpango near Mexico City, on April ,29 2019. (Getty)

Mexico’s New President Turns Back the Clock on Democracy

López Obrador Has Consolidated Too Much Power

By Denise Dresser* The first five months of Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s presidency have been a roller-coaster ride for Mexico. The new government has moved quickly to differentiate itself from past administrations by enacting bold changes in a whirlwind of presidential announcements, decrees, constitutional modifications, and reforms. The results have been mixed and often unpredictable—but with a 65 percent approval rating, a mandate for transformation, and an ineffectual opposition, López Obrador has faced little obstacle to shaking up the status quo.

The president has promised to fight corruption, alleviate the plight of 53 million Mexicans who live below the poverty line, and address the rising levels of insecurity and violence that plague the country.

In order to achieve these goals and do so rapidly, López Obrador has dismantled many of the checks and balances that Mexico’s

reformers have struggled to construct over the past three decades.

He insists that institutions created during the neoliberal period, from roughly 1982 to 2012, serve to obstruct the “fourth transformation” he envisions. He intends to govern “without intermediaries,” through a direct relationship with the people. The new president’s approach is popular. But he has still to prove that he can achieve his visionary aims without consolidating excessive power and returning Mexico its recent past, before its democratic breakthrough in 2000, when its president and ruling party commanded overweening dominance.

A ONE MAN SHOW Upon taking office, López Obrador announced a plan to deliver scholarships, pensions, and cash to low-income Mexicans. He proposed twenty new social programs that he claims would link

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the recipients to him personally—making him what analyst María Amparo Casar has called the “great benefactor”: the patron of the state’s largesse.

Moreover, the force of the president’s personal leadership and charisma hold together Morena, his party, which has always been more of a movement and a disparate coalition, but which now faces the challenge of acting in concert.

Having made himself the center of his party and policies, López Obrador is in constant motion, traveling throughout the country and doling out benefits.

Every day, he delivers a presidential press conference, the “conferencia mañanera,” in which he explains his priorities, defines the public agenda, and lambastes the people and institutions he believes have not served the country well. According to the president, the judiciary, civil society, the “elitist media,” autonomous regulators, and members of the opposition, among others, have thwarted real democracy and enabled corruption that needs to be exposed and expunged. The president recites facts and figures meant to highlight the mess he inherited from previous administrations, issues commandments, offers lessons on morality, and cites the Bible. The briefings resemble sermons more than exercises in government accountability and transparency. López Obrador uses them to construct a political persona that transcends that of an elected official: he aspires to be Mexico’s spiritual guide.

The press briefing also serves as a call for the people to participate in an epic crusade against what López Obrador has identified as the mother of all evils: corruption. In the name of fighting corruption, which supposedly corroded government institutions prior to his arrival in office, the new president has dramatically reduced the budget of the federal bureaucracy, questioned the need for the National Transparency Institute and the National Human Rights Commission, named cronies to key public posts, manhandled the designation of federal regulators, and cut off public funding to all NGOs. He has also threatened to pack the Supreme Court by increasing its size from 11 to 16 members, and other measures he has introduced, ostensibly to clean up the judiciary, will bring it under tighter executive control. The president has made the fight against corruption into a political weapon to wield against his enemies, a tool to undermine resistance to his policies, and a shield to defend decisions that would otherwise elicit more scrutiny.

This crusade has now touched almost every aspect of public life in Mexico.

Arguing that the Federal Police was corrupt, López Obrador reformed the constitution in order to create the National Guard, a militarized force that will assume all public security tasks. Arguing that corruption had infiltrated state governments, he instituted a system of delegates, whom he appoints, and who will distribute funds for social programs throughout the country—bypassing elected officials at the local level. Arguing that corruption had tainted an ambitious airport construction project, he cancelled it, and has announced alternative projects that only contractors selected by his government will be allowed to participate in. On the grounds that the entities charged with regulating energy and telecommunications were corrupt, he handpicked technically inexperienced but loyal deputies to replace officials who had a more technical and independent profile. The president has used his fight against corruption to amass and centralize a great deal of discretionary power.

For all that he decries corruption, López Obrador and his team have displayed a profound ignorance about how public administration works, what rules need to be followed, and how constitutional norms define what the president can and cannot do. The times are defined by uncertainty. How the government plans to rescue Pemex, the state oil company, and how it will budget for the disbursement of unsupervised public funds to social programs remain matters for speculation. The president has articulated ambitious redistribution plans, but he has not specified how he will finance them given this year’s paltry

In order to rapidly achieve his goals, President López Obrador has dismantled many of the checks and balances that Mexico’s reformers have struggled to construct over the past three decades. predicted economic growth. Private and foreign investment could plummet if the new trade deal that the previous administration negotiated with the United States and Canada is not approved. And if the new government unravels crucial structural reforms, it will further scare off foreign and domestic capital.

Reality may bite López Obrador if his mismanagement of the economy and mixed signals to financial markets, investors, and consumers produce deleterious effects.

DEMOCRACY DERAILED So far, López Obrador’s fourth transformation seems to be taking Mexico backward, toward its experience under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled Mexico from 1929 to 2000: the overwhelming dominance of a single political party, headed by an all-powerful president who governed with few restraints. López Obrador’s supporters applaud the return of an omnipotent, morally unimpeachable leader, capable of enacting change in a country clamoring for social justice and greater equality. But those who fought to dismantle the hegemony of the PRI and create a framework of checks and balances view the current trend with concern: López Obrador is centralizing power without assuring that it will be used more transparently or democratically. As James Madison argued in The Federalist Papers, “When putting together a government, the great difficulty rests in the following: allow a government to control the governed; and the next step, force it to control itself.” Such is the task that López Obrador has failed to address. The president has not shown whether or how he will delimit his own power— for example, by preventing his administration from committing abuses; submitting his government to rules, procedures, and constitutional restraints; and by sanctioning corruption when it occurs in the ranks of his own party.

The goal of the modern state is to constrain the executive’s power by depersonalizing its use. López Obrador, by contrast, seems to believe that his conscience and personal honor are sufficient guardrails to assure democratic rule. The attitude is reminiscent of Mexico’s imperial presidency, when the country’s chief executive controlled the political and economic system in an omnipotent fashion. If the new president continues to lead in this direction, shoring up the power of the executive while weakening key institutions, Mexico could end up with a strong president at the helm of a weak, dysfunctional state.

Paradoxically, the change López Obrador will have brought to Mexico may include turning it into a less modern, less democratic place. *DENISE DRESSER is Professor of Political Science at the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

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echnology

Huawei Will Make Do Without Google, But How Well?

Google Suspended Business with the Chinese Telecommunications Giant After US Blacklist 32

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If Google lost the Huawei market - and potentially that of other Chinese players - it would also threaten Android’s global business.

by Alice Su Life without Google is normal in China. About 1.4 billion Chinese people wake up each day to check WeChat instead of Gmail, navigate with Baidu instead of Google Maps, and watch videos on Youku instead of YouTube.

But will the rest of the world want to buy phones that use only these Chinese alternatives?

Under a Trump administration blacklist, Huawei will have to either persuade consumers to do that, or scale down and limit itself to the Chinese market.

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On Sunday, Google suspended business with the Chinese telecommunications giant, following two executive orders President Donald Trump signed last week. Those orders ban U.S. purchase of technology from companies deemed a threat to national security and block Huawei from buying American products without U.S. government approval.

That means Huawei would be cut off from crucial hardware such as chips, processors and modems from Qualcomm, Intel and other American companies.

Unless the ban is dropped as part of ongoing U.S.China trade talks, Huawei could end up leading a “decoupling” of the American and Chinese tech worlds that encompasses everything from supply chains to the end user’s choice of apps.

Huawei founder and CEO Ren Zhengfei scoffed at the orders on Saturday, telling Japanese media in Shenzhen, China, that the company would be “fine” without U.S. components.

“We have already been preparing for this,” Ren said.

Huawei reportedly has a stockpile of enough chips to keep the company going for several months. Its subsidiary HiSilicon also designs and supplies chips for Huawei smartphones, though industry experts say their chips are not on par with American ones.

HiSilicon President He Tingbo wrote a letter to her staff on Friday saying the firm has been developing backup chips for years in case an “extreme scenario” like this one unfolded, and would help enable Huawei to be selfsufficient.

Huawei is not a major customer for San Diego-based Qualcomm, which supplies %50 of the global market for smartphone processors. Analysts believe the smartphone chips that Qualcomm sells to Huawei are limited to a few models sold outside China. Huawei does license Qualcomm’s cellular patents, but the two companies are in a dispute over how much is owed in patent fees. Investors worry that Huawei could stop making payments.

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A lack of U.S. components for Huawei network gear could slow its rollout of 5G cellular service, which is important for Qualcomm. “The longer-term impact is Huawei is important for 5G infrastructure networks, and if they’re unable to ship, 5G could really grind to a halt,” said Mike Walkley, an analyst with Canaccord Genuity.

Huawei’s phones run on Android and include the Google Play set of apps in devices sold abroad. Most Google apps are not available on models sold in China, where they are illegal.

Huawei will still have access to the open source version of Android’s operating system, but Google will not provide access or technical support on its proprietary apps and services, the company said.

Google reassured Huawei users on Twitter on Monday that existing phones would retain access to Google Play.

But future phones will lose access to the Google Play store, apps such as Gmail and YouTube, and updates to the Android operating system.

Google did not respond to questions about how it would keep existing Huawei phones’ access to Google services.

“We are complying with the (Trump administration) order and reviewing the implications,” the company said in a written statement.

Huawei is the world’s second-largest smartphone seller, ahead of Apple and behind Samsung. It accounts for about a third of the European smartphone market, but is lesser known in the U.S. market because carriers such as AT&T and Verizon don’t sell Huawei devices.

“They were en route to become the biggest smartphone seller in Europe, and not just in Europe but worldwide,” said Francisco Jeronimo, London-based associate vice president of IDC, a global market intelligence firm.

The ban completely changes the picture, he said.

“Without access to Google services it’s nearly impossible for them to sell smartphones outside China.”

If Google does not get a U.S. license to sell to Huawei, the Chinese company would struggle to sell its phones outside China and mobile carriers might stop selling Huawei phones.

If Google does not get a U.S. license to sell to Huawei, the Chinese company would struggle to sell its phones outside China and mobile carriers might stop selling Huawei phones, hampering Huawei’s international expansion, he added.

But if Google lost the Huawei market — and potentially that of other Chinese players — it would also threaten Android’s global business.

Elliott Zaagman, co-host of the China Tech Investor podcast, said the ban would hurt both Huawei and American businesses.

Huawei bought 70$ billion worth of components for its products last year, including 11$ billion from U.S. businesses.

Zaagman said that “11$ billion is a lot of money and hurts a lot of big American companies as well. You’ve got to believe that a lot of lobbyists are in Washington trying to find loopholes to this ban.”

Huawei has been in conflict with the U.S. since last year, when Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou was

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Huawei Founder and CEO Ren Zhengfei speaks during a session of the World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting on January 2015 ,22 in Davos.

(Getty)

The idea of a smartphone with no Google may sound absurd to Western consumers.

But China already has 43 percent of the global smartphone market.

Chinese government would take, please wait and see,” he said.

The day after Trump’s executive orders, China officially arrested two Canadians — a former diplomat and a businessman — who had been in custody since December, when they were detained shortly after Meng’s arrest in Canada. China has accused both of espionage.

Huawei has been developing its own operating system, but company spokespeople said as recently as last week that it preferred to use Android.

If no exceptions to the ban are given, however, Huawei and other Chinese companies may move toward developing an alternative operating system and ecosystem of apps for their phones sold abroad.

Huawei did not respond to specific questions about how it would move forward. It will provide security updates and after-sales services to all existing Huawei products, the company said in a written statement.

“We will continue to build a safe and sustainable arrested in Canada at the request of the U.S. on charges software ecosystem, in order to provide the best experience for all users globally,” the statement said. of financial fraud.

Washington has pressured allied governments to The idea of a smartphone with no Google may sound ban Huawei equipment over cybersecurity concerns, absurd to Western consumers. particularly that the Chinese government will be able But China already has 43 percent of the global to access and control key infrastructure through 5G smartphone market — significant power, according to Jeronimo. networks built by Huawei.

Huawei denies accusations that the company has engaged in activities threatening U.S. national security. He predicted that even if the trade war ends and bans on In China, state and public support for Huawei have grown Huawei are withdrawn, Chinese technology companies amid an escalating U.S.-China trade war, including the would build an alternative operating system within the Trump administration’s recent move to increase tariffs next five years, so that they can rely less on unstable foreign supply chains. on 200$ million in Chinese goods to %25 from %10.

Beijing has criticized U.S. actions against Huawei as “It’s very likely that the biggest Chinese makers, Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, Lenovo, they will work with politically motivated.

“China supports Chinese companies defending their the Chinese government to build an alternative to legitimate rights according to laws,” Chinese Ministry Android,” he said. “This would completely change the of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lu Kang said at a news smartphone market and would open the door for other alternatives to come up either in China or Europe or conference Monday.

“In terms of what measures either Chinese companies or somewhere else.”

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Quentin Tarantino Shocks Cannes Again with Epic ‘Once Upon a Time ... in Hollywood’ How the Director’s New Film Combines Familiar and New Elements 36

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For most of its -159minute running time, “Once Upon a Time … in Hollywood” both does and doesn’t behave the way you might expect a Quentin Tarantino picture to behave.

Brad Pitt, Quentin Tarantino, Margot Robbie and Leonardo DiCaprio attend the photocall for "Once Upon A Time In Hollywood" during the 72nd annual Cannes Film Festival on May 2019 ,22 in Cannes, France. (Getty)

By Justin Chang* The day before the Cannes premiere of “Once Upon a Time … in Hollywood,” his hotly anticipated movie set in Los Angeles during the tumultuous events of 1969, Quentin Tarantino published an open letter online. He addressed it to audiences at the festival, opening with the words “I love Cinema,” which may be the most redundant thing this movie-mad auteur has ever written (and given his endless, self-admiring flurries of dialogue, that is saying something). The letter then implored us not to reveal “anything that would prevent later audiences from

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experiencing the film in the same way.”

A version of this entreaty was repeated from the stage by a festival representative shortly before the picture screened Tuesday for members of the press, some of whom booed and snorted in response. I didn’t join in. Even as someone who believes that excessive spoiler sensitivity is a sign of an entitled, infantile approach to moviegoing, it’s easy to understand Tarantino’s anxiety, especially after a leaked script nearly led him to shelve “The Hateful Eight.”

(Many, of course, still wish that he had.)

Twenty-five years after “Pulp Fiction” won the Palme d’Or at this festival, Tarantino’s movies may no longer have quite the same audacity or revelatory power, but the ability to shock — and, if you’re lucky, to make you think — remains an important tool in his kit. This turns out to be the case even when he’s dealing with real-life subjects such as Sharon Tate, Roman Polanski and members of the Charles Manson cult, whose well-documented stories would, by now, seem beyond spoiling.

Not quite, apparently. I will do my best to oblige Monsieur Tarantino and his collaborators on this richly evocative, conceptually jaw-dropping, excessively foot-fetishizing, inescapably terrifying and unexpectedly poignant movie.

Still, if you wish to preserve the purity of a first viewing, it is probably best if you read no further and that you read nothing else about the movie before Sony Pictures releases it in U.S. theaters July 26.

Like Tarantino’s 2009 picture, “Inglourious Basterds,” “Once Upon a Time … in Hollywood” is both a luxuriant, sometimes lumbering ode to a bygone era of moviemaking and a singularly bold reinterpretation of a violent chapter of history. The title is practically a spoiler in itself: We are not just in the dream factory, but also within the realm of fantasy. Our guides to this cracked-mirror vision of Hollywood, which kicks off in February 1969, are Rick Dalton (Leonardo DiCaprio), an actor whose career peaked years ago with the western TV series “Bounty Law,” and Cliff Booth (Brad Pitt), a war veteran who is Rick’s longtime stunt double and best friend.

The first screen pairing between DiCaprio and Pitt proves worth the wait, even if the practical realities of the actor-

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stuntman relationship don’t seem to interest Tarantino all that much. That’s fine; the personalities are what matter.

DiCaprio, his golden-boy wattage persuasively dimmed, is both mockable and sympathetic as a handsome has-been actor, the unwitting star of his own male midlife-crisis movie. He’s cradled beautifully by Pitt as the most loyal of pals, someone who’s always there to lend a shoulder — or some serious muscle — as needed. (The second-billed Pitt may be playing the lower man on the industry totem pole, but this is very much his movie.)

It would be a hoot to watch these stars in boozy, cigarettechomping buddy-comedy mode even if they weren’t tethered to such a loving and persuasive re-creation of the movie industry at the time. Fans of the era may be reminded of legendary actor-stuntman pairings such as Burt Reynolds and Hal Needham, and some will supply their own real-life reference points for Rick and Cliff’s work, even if they are unable to match Tarantino’s characteristically obsessive scholarship.

“Bounty Law” is a distant cousin of western serials including “Gunsmoke” and “Bonanza.” One of Rick’s more successful movies, “14 Fists of McCluskey,” might be a callback to “The Dirty Dozen.” Barbara Ling’s production design is a wittily intricate treasure trove of fake movie memorabilia, though there’s some real stuff in the mix too. A one-sheet for the 1949 Roy Rogers western “The Golden Stallion” is just one of many decorating the walls of Rick’s Benedict Canyon home.

Yes, Benedict Canyon. The early sight of a Cielo Drive street sign cuts ominously through Tarantino’s flood of references and reminds you that he does have a very dark story to tell. That story is slow to coalesce, however, in a movie that doesn’t always draw a distinction between

Like Tarantino’s 2009 picture, “Inglourious Basterds,” “Once Upon a Time … in Hollywood” is both a luxuriant, sometimes lumbering ode to a bygone era of moviemaking and a singularly bold reinterpretation of a violent chapter of history.

period detail and narrative thrust. Is Mike Moh’s amusingly cocky Bruce Lee impersonation a gratuitous touch or a key piece of foreshadowing? Do the extensive scenes of Rick struggling on the set of his latest movie count as character development or mise-en-scene overkill? (Thanks to Julia Butters’ lovely performance as Rick’s preternaturally confident child costar, I didn’t much care either way.)

For most of its -159minute running time, “Once Upon a Time … in Hollywood” both does and doesn’t behave the way you might expect a Quentin Tarantino picture to behave. The storytelling is entirely linear. The talk loops and drones endlessly, as usual, but it’s also slow to gather

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Brad Pitt and Leonardo DiCaprio star in Columbia Pictures "Once Upon a Time ... in Hollywood."

(Andrew Cooper/Sony Pictures)

momentum. The loose hangout vibe achieves some of the mellowness and melancholy of “Jackie Brown” (a very good thing). A chill enters the picture whenever attention shifts to the Manson family, especially when we arrive at their temporary digs at the Spahn Movie Ranch, but overt acts of violence are (initially) few and far between.

Given the movie’s lurching stop-and-go rhythms, you could blink and miss some of the actors listed in the huge ensemble cast, including Scoot McNairy, Clifton Collins Jr., Damian Lewis, Rumer Willis and Rebecca Gayheart.

You will, however, remember the faces of Bruce Dern and the late Luke Perry (in one of his last performances), and

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also of Margaret Qualley, Austin Butler, Mikey Madison and Dakota Fanning as Mansonites. Most of all, perhaps, you will remember Margot Robbie in the role of Sharon Tate, who pops up every so often, hijacking the narrative as she goes about her day, her luminous presence working in almost contrapuntal rhythm to the main story.

I am both reluctant and obliged to say more. When the picture was first announced in 2017, many expressed their reservations about Tarantino, not a director known for his tact or sensitivity, taking on a story that would deal with a subject as horrific and painful as the Manson murders. And that was months before the #MeToo storm broke, bringing with it the downfall of Tarantino’s longtime collaborator Harvey Weinstein, plus Uma Thurman’s account of having been subjected to reckless treatment on the set of “Kill Bill.” A resurfaced 2003 audio clip of Tarantino defending Roman Polanski (played by Rafal Zawierucha in a few scenes) didn’t help matters.

In short, “Once Upon a Time … in Hollywood” arrived in Cannes on Tuesday saddled with the kind of foul-smelling baggage that perhaps only a filmmaker of Tarantino’s reputation, an artist still revered as one of the industry’s last true big-picture originals, could possibly overcome.

Does he overcome it? It’s far too early to tell. But after a first viewing, it seems clear to me that Tarantino delved into this project intent on allaying our worst fears and doing right by his subject. And he does this, of course, in the language he speaks best: the love of cinema.

Where the character of Sharon Tate is concerned, that love takes the form of a seemingly unconnected subplot that shows her casually walking up to a Westwood theater screening her 1968 movie “The Wrecking Crew.” We see the real Tate light up the big screen, and Robbie’s eyes glow with joy in the audience, as she watches the person she’s playing. It’s a moving act of homage, and it is not, crucially, the only way in which Tarantino seeks to inspire a fresh and compassionate reconsideration of Tate’s memory.

The final act of “Once Upon a Time … in Hollywood” is funny, scary, troubling and exhilarating by turns; the meandering structure clicks into place as it becomes clear where Tarantino has been taking this story and, given his track record, perhaps could only have taken this story.

This is hardly the first time that this director has turned fiction and reality into blood-slicked bedfellows; nor is it the first time he has made the outrageous suggestion that cinema, as both an art and an industry, can make up for some of life’s most grievous imperfections in ways that nothing else can. Spoilers or no spoilers, you may not be terribly surprised, which doesn’t mean you won’t be astonished. *Justin Chang is a film critic for the Los Angeles Times This article was originally published in the LA Times.

A Weekly Political News Magazine

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Issue 1749 - May - 24/05/2019

Theresa May: The Prime Minister Forced to Make a Hard Exit Over Brexit www.majalla.com

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ealth

Keeping Your Weight Stable in Older Age How to Gain Weight Safely When You’re Down a Few Pounds

Harvard Health You’ve spent your whole life trying to keep extra pounds off. Now your doctor says you actually need to gain a few pounds to stay healthy. But healthy weight gain isn’t so simple. “Some people find it difficult to add enough calories to their usual diet. It takes a lot of effort,” says registered dietitian Kathy McManus, director of

the Department of Nutrition at Harvard-affiliated Brigham and Women’s Hospital.

WHERE TO BEGIN A dietitian can help you come up with an eating plan based on your specific calorie needs. It starts with understanding how quickly you’ve lost weight and why (see “Why are you underweight?”).

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Meal structure is also important, eating mini-meals throughout the day is better than relying on large feasts.

-300calorie meals throughout the day than dump 900 calories at dinner,” she explains.

What if you’re not up to eating a mini-meal at some point during the day? “Have a protein drink. It could be something you make at home or something ready-made that you buy,” McManus says.

If it’s ready-made, you’ll want a drink with about 10 to 20 grams of protein per -8ounce serving, and as little added sugar as possible. (If sugar is the first or second ingredient, there’s probably a healthier option.)

WHY ARE YOU UNDERWEIGHT?

Senior Hispanic woman on medical scale. (Getty)

Your age, size, activity, amount of weight lost, and overall health will be key to designing a diet that’s right for you.

Meal structure is also important. McManus says eating mini-meals throughout the day is better than relying on large feasts. “If you’ve lost weight, you’re used to eating a lower volume of food, and you get fuller faster. It’s better to spread several

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There are many reasons for weight loss in our older years. “Unless it’s because someone is dieting, weight loss is a cause for concern, especially if the person has lost %10 of their prior body weight,” says Dr. Suzanne Salamon, associate chief of gerontology at Harvard-affiliated Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center.

Sometimes weight loss results from a lifestyle change, like the loss of a loved one or a loss of independence. You may be depressed and lose interest in eating. Or you may have to cut back on food because of a tight budget. “Usually weight loss suggests an underlying health condition, such as an overactive thyroid, depression, cancer, or dementia that causes people to forget to eat or shop for food,” Salamon points out.

Other possible causes of weight loss: • a recent hospitalization • a loss of taste or smell due to Parkinson’s disease or another condition • medication side effects such as nausea, diarrhea, or decreased appetite • dental problems that cause difficulty chewing • infections such as pneumonia or skin infections • disability or pain that makes it hard to prepare food for yourself.

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Whatever the reason, weight loss increases the risk for malnutrition: insufficient calories, protein, vitamins, and minerals you need to function properly.

THE BEST FOODS TO EAT McManus steers people toward nutrient-dense foods with the most nutrition bang for the buck: they have lots of vitamins, minerals, fiber, lean protein, or unsaturated fat.

For example, a slice of white bread has about 70 calories, but very few vitamins and minerals.

However, one slice of whole-wheat bread has about 70 calories, plus four times the amount of potassium and magnesium and three times the zinc.

Other examples of nutrient-dense foods: green, leafy vegetables (kale, spinach); fruits (berries, apples); whole grains (oatmeal, quinoa); beans and lentils; lean protein (fish, poultry, lean meat); dairy foods (low-fat milk, cheese, or yogurt); and unsaturated fats (nuts, seeds, avocado).

MAKING IT WORK Don’t worry about counting grams of nutrients.

“Just aim for a balance of healthy carbohydrates, unsaturated fats, and protein,” McManus says. She advises power-packing each mini-meal with as many nutrient-dense foods as possible. Examples include oatmeal with berries and walnuts; a salad

(Excessive) weight loss increases the risk for malnutrition: insufficient calories, protein, vitamins, and minerals you need to function properly.

with spinach, tomatoes, cheese, black beans, shelled sunflower seeds, and avocado dressing; or brown rice with raisins, almonds, chicken chunks, and asparagus pieces. For something simple, try scrambled eggs with cheese or whole-wheat crackers with peanut butter.

Eating this way throughout the day will help you regain the weight you’ve lost. “I look to see 2 to 3 pounds per month if they’re going in the right direction. It won’t be faster than that,” McManus says. “You have to hang in there and be consistent over time. Slow and steady wins the race.”

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Senior Asian woman reading label at grocery store. (Getty)

Mixed race woman eating salad on sofa. (Getty)

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Theresa May: The Prime Minister Forced to Make a Hard Exit Over Brexit By: Ali El Shamy

percent of the vote.

1 - Early Life and Early Tragedy Theresa May was born on October 1956 ,1, in Sussex to Huburt Braiser and Zaidee Mary and grew up as an only child. Her father was a clergyman and he would eventually become a vicar in the Church of St. Mary the Virgin in Oxford, as such the famous University City became the place of upbringing for the young May. Theresa May attended school at the then newly formed Wheatley Park School and subsequently went to Oxford University where she graduated with a degree in geography in 1977.

Shortly after graduating, tragedy struck the young May as her father died in 1981 after a car accident and her mother died from M.S. a year later, as a result neither Huburt nor Zaidee got to see their daughter go into politics.

3 - Shadow Cabinet Positions Right from her first entry into parliament, she served in shadow cabinets, her first shadow cabinet position was Shadow Spokesman for Schools, Disabled People, and Women. In 1999, she became the Shadow Education and Employment Secretary, and she eventually became the Chairman of the Conservative Party in 2002. Between 2003 and 2004, she held several cabinet positions such as Shadow Secretary of State for the Family. After David Cameron was elected the Conservative Party leader in 2005, he appointed her the Shadow Leader of the House of Commons. This wouldn’t be the last time Cameron gave her an important post, fast forward to 2010 Cameron, as the newly elected Prime Minister, appointed her as the Home Secretary.

2 - Entry Into Politics Before going into politics, May would work in the financial sector having worked for the Bank of England and the Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS). She would eventually become a councilor for the London Borough of Merton where she served as the Chairman of Education and Housing Spokesman. The first election she stood for was the 1992 General Election, where she was the Conservative candidate for the North West Durham seat, but she lost to the Labor candidate Hilary Armstrong. She then ran in the 1994 Barking by-election but lost again to the Labor candidate Margaret Hodge. She finally had her big break in 1997, when she was selected to run as the Conservative candidate for the new Maidenhead seat and successfully won having gained almost 50

4 - Home Secretary As Home Secretary, Theresa May made the controversial decision to cut police budgets which subsequently caused a reduction in the number of police officers in the streets of England and Wales.

Many believe that these cuts are a factor behind the stabbing incidents which have accelerated since the mid2010-s. She also had a hardline stance against illegal migration to the UK and refused the European Union’s proposed compulsory refugee quotas. In 2016, she campaigned for remaining in the EU by arguing that it would be better to control borders while staying in the organization rather than leaving it.

5 - Becoming Prime Minister In 2016, shortly after the Brexit referendum resulted

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in Leave winning by 52 percent of the vote, David Cameron resigned as Prime Minister. Theresa May was one of the Conservative leadership candidates and she convincingly won the first round of votes, she would later become the new Prime Minister after Andrea Leadsom stepped down from the race, leaving May as the sole candidate. When she became Prime Minister, she stated that she was committed to honoring the result of the referendum and wanted to get the best possible exit deal with the EU. 6 - May’s Miscalculations and Withdrawal Bill One year after getting appointed Prime Minister, she called a general election wanting to gain a bigger majority in parliament, thereby making it easier for her to pass decisions to parliament. This decision was a major miscalculation as the Conservatives actually lost seats, while they didn’t lose the majority they were forced to make a coalition with the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party. In 2018, she published her withdrawal plan which was approved by the EU but criticized both by the British public and parliament. The reason for this was because the withdrawal plan didn’t include important issues like the Northern Irish border and delayed other issues like the customs union; moreover, Brexiters didn’t think it was hardline enough. The rest of the year was one of turmoil for May, as she had her Withdrawal Agreement rejected in parliament three times and faced a vote of no confidence from within her party and then within parliament, surviving both. In 2019, she agreed to hold cross-party talks with opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn in order to find a solution to the deadlock. The talks did not amount to anything and the Prime Minister faced serious calls to resign from her port.

7. Tearful Teresa Resigns as Prime Minister In an emotional statement on 24 May, Theresa May said she will quit as Conservative Leader on June 7, drawing her fraught three-year premiership to a close. Speaking in Downing Street, May said it had been “the honour of my life” to serve as Britain’s

second female prime minister. Her voice breaking, she said she would leave “with no ill will, but with enormous and enduring gratitude to have had the opportunity to serve the country I love”. She said she had done her best to deliver Brexit and it was a matter of “deep regret” that she had been unable to

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do so. May finally decided to yield to the inevitable following a meeting with Graham Brady, chairman of the backbench Tory 1922 committee, where he made it clear that she stood no chance of winning parliamentary backing for her revamped Brexit deal and had lost the confidence of her party.

B

ook Reviews

The Real Killer Fighting the Scourge of Everyday Violence

by Thomas Abt A Savage Order: How the World’s Deadliest Countries Can Forge a Path to Security. Rachel Kleinfeld.

Pantheon, 496 .2018pp.

These are dangerous times: war in Syria and Yemen,

bloody repression in Venezuela, ethnic cleansing in Myanmar. Yet by some measures, the world is safer than ever before. The rate of violent death has been falling, albeit unevenly, for decades, even centuries. Fewer people are killed on the battlefield, on the streets, and in homes. Led by the psychologist Steven Pinker, who has collected reams of evidence

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The rate of violent death has been falling, albeit unevenly, for decades, even centuries.

Fewer people are killed on the battlefield, on the streets, and in homes. insights into why some governments allow violence to fester and what societies can do to end it. As Kleinfeld shows, some countries have managed to cut crime and save lives. Others can and should learn from them.

WHEN THE STATE FUELS VIOLENCE Kleinfeld begins with an important observation: most violence takes place in everyday situations, not on the battlefield. Each year, individual attackers, organized criminal groups, and state security services kill four times as many people as do all the current wars put together. Leaders should continue working to prevent war, but most progress in promoting peace will depend on controlling the more mundane forms of brutality.

Gang members in the Rocinha favela, Rio de Janeiro, 2007.

demonstrating that humanity has slowly but surely grown more peaceable, a new group of thinkers is urging policymakers and the public to consider not just what the world is doing wrong in terms of violence but also what it is doing right.

Rachel Kleinfeld is one such thinker, and her new book, A Savage Order, is to some extent an extension of Pinker’s work. Kleinfeld sets out to “study success” by examining regions where murderous violence has fallen. She also draws on her own research and experience promoting security and human rights to extract lessons for policymakers looking to pacify violent societies. Kleinfeld claims to have developed a “blueprint for action,” but that is an overstatement: her conclusions are too general to serve as a concrete guide for policymaking. Yet she does offer valuable

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That progress has to start in the most violent countries, such as Brazil, which suffers from an annual national homicide rate (over 30 per 100,000 citizens) that is 15 times as high as that of Belgium or Canada. Scholars often attribute the violence in such states to the weakness of their governments, pointing to incompetent police forces, inadequate bureaucracies, and a lack of government control over large geographic areas. But Kleinfeld points out that although some violent states have governments that are weak or fragile in the conventional sense, others are stable enough to tackle violence—if they so chose.

This distinction matters because it acknowledges that keeping the peace is fundamentally a matter of governance. Kleinfeld does away with the idea that violence is the product of culture, religion, or poverty and persuasively argues that domestic peace begins with a state monopoly on the use of force.

Kleinfeld’s work thus provides some much-needed accountability for governments that fail to protect

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their people. In most cases, the problem is not that governments are weak; it is that they are complicit, deliberately supporting criminal groups for the sake of both power and enrichment. In Bangladesh, Jamaica, and Nigeria, for example, political parties hire criminal gangs to herd their voters to the polls during elections and scare away the opposition, then protect the gangs between campaigns. Yet it’s worth noting that governments are rarely uniformly corrupt: criminal organizations may capture local or regional authorities but not federal ones, and the level of corruption often varies from place to place.

Kleinfeld’s indictment of complicit governments leads her to another observation: governments and societies descend into violence and escape it together.

When governments cripple their police and security services in order to exert control over them, they wind up normalizing everyday violence. Disputes among family members, friends, neighbors, and business associates turn bloody more easily. People resort to vigilantism to solve problems that the state will not.

The resulting low-level violence often outpaces more organized criminality. For instance, even in Latin American countries where gang and drug violence run rampant, the majority of homicides still happen on weekend nights, often triggered by petty, alcoholfueled disputes.

This kind of violence stems not just from the inadequacy of the security services but also from the perceived illegitimacy of the government and the criminal justice system. In poor communities, many

residents quite reasonably believe that the police and other officials are unable or unwilling to help them. As a result, they refuse to report crimes, testify in court, or serve as jurors. What is more dangerous, some resort to violence to solve mundane disputes. (Sociologists often refer to this phenomenon as “legal cynicism.”)

The more cynical people and communities are, the more violent they are likely to be.

GETTING OUT

Each year, individual attackers, organized criminal groups, and state security services kill four times as many people as do all the current wars put together.

Successful state transitions out of violence often depend on what Kleinfeld calls “dirty deals” between governments and violent groups. She deserves credit for stating publicly what many will only whisper behind closed doors: pragmatic leaders must sometimes make morally questionable tradeoffs to gain temporary truces. The “Medellín miracle” in Colombia—a massive decline in violence over the last two and a half decades in what had been the world’s most dangerous city—is often described as a

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Transnational gangs like MS13-. (Reuters)

triumph of so-called social urbanism. Commentators usually point to investments in infrastructure and services for neglected neighborhoods, such as rapid and reliable public transit and new libraries and parks. But Kleinfeld reveals that much of the city’s progress depended on hidden agreements, such as the one brokered in 2003 between the government and the paramilitary boss Diego Murillo Bejarano, known as Don Berna. In return for keeping the peace among Medellín’s many cartels, gangs, and other criminal groups, the government promised Don Berna and his fellow paramilitaries short prison sentences and protection from deportation to the United States, where they were wanted on drug and gang charges.

The more cynical people and communities are, the more violent they are likely to be. however, the truce had failed, and murder rates skyrocketed. The gangs’ leaders, confident that the authorities would bargain with them as they had in the past, ordered the killing of bus drivers in San Salvador to force the government back to the negotiating table.

Where leaders cannot bargain for peace, they may Although Medellín offers a success story, Kleinfeld employ aggressive measures, including the use of is careful to note that such methods are fraught with military force, anti-racketeering and asset forfeiture risk. Deals can set dangerous precedents. In 2012, laws, and electronic surveillance, to take back political leaders in El Salvadorsecretly reached a truce territory, purge corrupt officials, and break up criminal with the MS13- and 18th Street gangs that resulted conspiracies. Tough military and law enforcement in a dramatic drop in homicides. Three years later, tactics, like dirty deals, come with risks, especially

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when they violate human and civil rights. State authority taken to extremes easily leads to abuse: many leaders begin as reformers but wind up turning into the kind of authoritarians they once opposed.

At their best, dirty deals and tough tactics buy the government time to implement democratic reforms, which leads to Kleinfeld’s final observation: lasting peace requires a new political settlement. Once the deals have been struck, governments must secure broad support for an agenda of reform that reasserts the rule of law and brings power back to the people.

This finding, although undoubtedly true, is the least useful in the book. Deep reforms always require political support; the harder question is how to win it. Here, the book offers little concrete guidance.

Kleinfeld also argues that “the middle class is the fulcrum of change” and that violence declines when “the people with enough voice and power to change the system mobilize.” But that description is equally true of elites, and many reform movements have depended in significant part on the support of business and government leaders. Mobilization by the middle class is necessary, but not sufficient, to spur and sustain reform.

WHAT WORKS Kleinfeld’s candor in describing the challenges of reforming corrupt and violent states is refreshing.

The public in these places needs to be better informed about the potential risks and rewards of these tradeoffs if they are to empower their leaders to make difficult decisions and to hold them accountable for the results.

The best way to stop homicides is to work from the bottom up, improving everyday safety for the poor and working classes.

Kleinfeld presents her findings as authoritative, but in reality, they are merely persuasive. Most of them are based on observation and experience, not hard evidence. She is not to blame for this: there is little rigorous research addressing the intersection of crime, conflict, and governance. Kleinfeld does mention technocratic, evidence-informed policies that can improve social and economic welfare, but she doesn’t spend much time examining them; her book focuses on how to create the conditions under which such policies are possible. Frustratingly, that kind of change remains more an art than a science.

There are, however, specific actions that policymakers in poorer countries can take that would set the stage for more targeted interventions. First and foremost, to curb lethal violence, policymakers should focus their efforts specifically on such violence and abandon the false hope of addressing it indirectly via poverty, corruption, or other forms of crime. In fact, basic improvements in security make every other strategy to improve social and economic welfare more likely to succeed. In the United States, for instance, violence underpins concentrated urban poverty, locking into place poor schools, health care, and housing. This is true to an even greater extent in countries suffering from far higher levels of deadly crime.

The single most important and reliable measure of violence is homicide. Other crimes often go unreported, but the authorities know about most murders, because they usually produce an undeniable piece of physical evidence: a body. Homicide rates also serve as a useful indicator for other violent offenses, as they tend to rise and fall in unison over the long run. Governments, accordingly, need to ruthlessly zero in on homicide rates if they are to cut violence.

The best way to stop homicides is to work from the bottom up, improving everyday safety for the poor and working classes. Today, in many Latin American countries, such as Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, the authorities bring less than ten percent of killers to justice. Latin American leaders should focus on

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therapy,” which works to fix a wide range of problems in the lives of adolescent offenders, has been shown to consistently reduce criminal behavior and recidivism among young people. Drug treatment programs and drug courts, which deal only with drug offenders and focus on rehabilitation, have cut recidivism among people with substance abuse problems. And finally, alcohol restrictions, such as limits on the kinds of stores that can sell alcohol and the hours during which they can sell it, make fights and assaults on weekends and in the evenings less likely. Dozens of rigorous studies have shown that these approaches work in high-income countries.

Many low- and middle-income countries are now experimenting with the same strategies (although some of these may not be as successful as they were in high-income countries without careful adaptation to local circumstances).

As important as specific evidence-based programs are, policymakers need to pair them with wider reforms.

One of the most important institutional investments a state can make is to build systems that produce detailed and reliable crime data and research. Without the right information, governments will simply be thrashing about in the dark. ending that impunity and abandon the failed “kingpin strategy,” which emphasizes targeting only the heads of criminal organizations. Fighting organized crime is important, but it should not justify neglecting the daily slaughter caused by disorganized crime.

Policymakers in developing countries can also learn from evidence-based programs that have reduced violence in rich countries such as the United States.

“Focused deterrence,” which engages violent offenders with offers of assistance along with threats of punishment, has reduced shootings and killings in neighborhoods of Boston, New Orleans, Oakland, and elsewhere. “Hot spots policing,” which concentrates police resources on the specific addresses, city blocks, and streets with the highest crime rates, has led to significant improvements in Los Angeles, New York City, and Philadelphia.

Local governments have cut crime and antisocial behavior by offering cognitive behavioral therapy to people who are at risk of reoffending. A group of approaches known as “multidimensional juvenile

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States suffering from high rates of homicidal violence compete with nonstate actors to gain control over society. Little by little, governments must increase their capacity and legitimacy, creating distance between them and their competitors. This race is a marathon, not a sprint. Outside actors—other countries, international organizations, philanthropic foundations—can do the most good by helping and pressuring these governments to make the long-term investments and reforms necessary to win the race. Yet as Kleinfeld demonstrates, countries marred by murder and mayhem must ultimately take responsibility for the problem themselves. In the end, only they can solve it.

Thomas Abt ABT is a Senior Research Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. Previously, he served as Deputy Secretary for Public Safety for the State of New York. He is the author of the forthcoming book Bleeding Out: The Devastating Consequences of Urban Violence—and a Bold New Plan for Peace in the Streets.

This article was originally published in Foreign Affairs.