Anastasia Widyaningsih. Community Responses to Displacement Threats in Flood-prone Areas

COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO DISPLACEMENT THREATS IN FLOOD-PRONE AREAS The Case of Ciliwung River, Jakarta

Anastasia Widyaningsih

COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO DISPLACEMENT THREATS IN FLOOD-PRONE AREAS The Case of Ciliwung River, Jakarta

Anastasia Widyaningsih

Thesis submitted to obtain the degree of Master in Human Settlements Promoter Prof. Pieter Van den Broeck

Academic Year 2016-2017

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To those who lost their homes,

The cover image was taken by author in Kampung Tongkol, April 2017

PREFACE This study, I would say, is a recap of what I have learned during the past year. The major eviction occurred in Kampung Bukit Duri in the first week of my arrival in Leuven was a clue to what I need to do next. That unfortunate event bothered me with many questions and drew my study focus to revolve around the topic of ‘displacement’ and ‘development’. I still cannot believe that throughout my study and working experiences as an urban designer, I have learned the most fundamental things from the people along the riverbank. After all, this study is nothing but an attempt to understand a city in its broadest sense.

It was in the Urban Anthropology class that I first came across with the notion of ‘informality’ and ‘the right to the city’ which helped shaping my perspective on urbanization issues, especially in developing countries. Series of lectures of Human Settlements introduced me to many other stories on ‘housings and all that matters’ and inspired me to take Kampung Susun as a case study.

The most interesting was the Strategic Spatial Planning studio where I happened to study a real case of community involvement in an urban revitalization project in Antwerp. The fact that it was in European context showed me that developed countries, at some points, also faced similar problems. Its condensed yet fruitful lectures in the following semester were eye-openers to the world of planning which contributed immensely to my theoretical approach. Finally, the Colonial & Postcolonial Urbanism classes has made me ponder on: How far are we from Independence?

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Pieter Van den Broeck for his invaluable advice and guidance in helping me structure my thoughts. Indeed, this research would be very difficult for me if I did not have a clear understanding in the first months. His encouragement and support also made thesis writing enjoyable yet challenging, considering the fact that this is my first experience to write tens of thousands of words in English. I also offer my gratitude to Prof. Bruno De Meulder, Prof. Kelly Shannon, and Prof. Hilde Heynen for their comments during the midterm review and Bieke Cattoor for her support and feedback during the writing workshop. My wholehearted gratitude goes to Sri Suryani, the first person whom I made contact with to start my research. I was so grateful that she was willing to share her firsthand experiences in working with the residents of Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo with me. I also express my humble gratitude all my informants, especially to Mr. Sandyawan Sumardi from Ciliwung Merdeka, Gugun Muhammad from Urban Poor Consortium, the residents of Kampung Tongkol, Lodan, and Rusunawa Marunda for trusting me to learn from you.You are truly my inspirations!

My study in KU Leuven would not have been possible without the scholarship from Flemish Interuniversity Council (VLIR) and the support from my family who let me pursuing my dream far from home. I thank Wenes Widiyani and Dipika Pradhan for our crazy Christmas trips and Ana Karina, my ‘thesis buddy’ for her company during the writing process. Thanks to all my peers and friends in KU Leuven that made Leuven my second home. Last but not least, I would like to especially thank my urbanist partner, Derrick Juda, for his endless support, encouragement, and thoughtful discussions about the city and beyond that keep me passionate about my study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF APPENDICES LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS - ACRONYMS ABSTRACT

7 8 10 10 11 13

INTRODUCTION

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1.1 Background 1.2 Research Aim and Objective 1.3 Research Context and Theoretical Approaches

15 15

LITERATURE REVIEW

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2.1 Micro-scale Analysis: Displacement, Resettlement, and Resistance

2.1.1 On Displacement

2.1.2 Risks of Resettlement

2.1.3 Resistance

2.1.4 The Ambivalence of Informal Settlement 2.2 Macro-scale Analysis: The World Political Economy

2.2.1 Neoliberal Policies

2.2.2 Large-scale Urban Projects and Real Estate Mechanism

2.2.3 Colonialism, Urbanism, and World-economy

2.2.4 The Right to the City 2.3 Summary

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METHODOLOGY

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3.1 Research Questions 3.2 Research Hypothesis 3.3 Research Design and Strategy 3.4 Case Study Selection 3.5 Data Collection Methods 3.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews and Site Observation 3.6 Methodological Reflection

25 25 25 26 27

JAKARTA IN THE FACE OF GLOBALIZATION

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4.1 The Changing Politics and The Lurking Kampungs

4.1.1 Dutch Colonial Era

4.1.2 After Independence

4.1.3 The New Order 4.2 The Mega City’s Urban Problems

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21

23

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4.2.1 Legal Dualism of Land

4.2.2 Perennial Floods 4.3 Large-scale Urban Development Projects

4.3.1 Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project (JUFMP)

4.3.2. The Giant Sea Wall

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DEMOLITION OF KAMPUNGS Stories from Ciliwung’s Middle Stream

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5.1 A Former Meester Cornelis 5.2 Ciliwung Merdeka Foundation 5.3 The Socioeconomic Web of Kampung People 5.4 In Times of Flooding 5.5 From Threat to Initiative

5.5.1 A Political Campaign 5.5.2 Kampung Susun Proposal 5.6 Eviction Process

5.6.1 A ‘Shock Therapy’

5.6.2 The Last People’s Market Festival

5.6.3 The Eviction Days

45 46 47 49 50

THE PROBLEMS WITH RUSUNAWA

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6.1 The Contested Resettlement Policy 6.2 The Risk of Resettlement 6.3 Struggling Life in Rusunawa Marunda

59 60 61

RIVERBANK KAMPUNG REINVENTED Stories from Ciliwung’s Lower Stream

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7. 1 A Settlement behind Old Batavia’s City Wall 7.2 Urban Poor Network 7.3 Thinking Conservation

7.3.1 Maritime-based Historic Tourism

7.3.2 Participation in Urban Conservation 7.4 Redefining the Riverbank Settlement

7.4.1 ‘Inspection’ Kampung

7.4.2 An Alternative Solution to Housing Problems 7.5 A Political Contract

73 73 74

GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDIX 1 - List of Interviwees APPENDIX 2 - Analytical Methods and the Use of Various Data Sources

85 90 94 96

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LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1 Figure 3.1 Figure 3.2 Figure 3.3 Figure 3.4.

Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.6.

Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.5.

Figure 5.6.

Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.4.

Figure 6.5.

Figure 6.6.

Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.3.

Figure 7.4.

Figure 7.5.

Figure 7.6.

Theoretical Framework Research Trajectory Map of Actor and Institution Map of Indonesia Major Displacements in Jakarta between 2013-2016 Pluit City’s marketing billboard in Baywalk City Site plan of Batavia in 1753 Site plan of Batavia in1904 The emerging new towns and industrial estates all around Jakarta Metropolitan Region in the late 1990s The NCICD Master Plan Map of JUFMP Project Activities in Ciliwung Merdeka Map of Kampung’s Potentials superimposed with the JUFMP’s affected area Map of Kampung’s Potentials based on participatory mapping The conceptual idea of Kampung Susun for Bukit Duri (KSBD) The design proposal of Kampung Susun for Kampung Pulo (KSKP) The Demolition Day Playing court in Cluster C Marini in front of her unit in Cluster A8 The far location of Rusunawa Marunda Children playground in Rusunawa Marunda Economic activities in Rusunawa Marunda Initiatives to support the residents’ livelihoods Vicinity Map of Kampung Tongkol Cement mixing activities next to the historic Eastern Warehouses Green initiatives in Kampung Tongkol and Lodan The conceptual design of the Prototype House Ina, her mother, and her son in front of their unit in Prototype House Tagline of the political contract

LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix 1 Appendix 2

List of Interviewees Analytical Methods and the Use of Various Data Sources

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS - ACRONYMS ACHR Asian Coalition for Housing Rights AMDAL Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan (Environmental Impact Analysis) ASF-ID Architecture Sans Frontier - Indonesia BAPPENAS Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan National (National Development Planning Agency) BBWSCC Balai Besar Wilayah Sungai Ciliwung-Cisadane (Ciliwung-Cisadane River Basins Agency) BLUD Badan Layanan Umum Daerah (Regional Public Service Agency) CM Ciliwung Merdeka CO Community Organizer DGCK Directorate General of Cipta Karya (Human Settlements) DGWR Directorate General of Water Resources DKI Jakarta Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta (Special Region of Capital City Jakarta) FWBK Forum Warga Bantaran Kali (Riverbank Residents’ Forum) HABA Housing and Administrative Building Agency JEDI Jakarta Emergency Dredging Initiative JUFMP Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project KAKC Komunitas Anak Kali Ciliwung (Ciliwung Tributary Community) KSBD Kampung Susun for Bukit Duri KSKP Kampung Susun for Kampung Pulo LBH Jakarta Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta (Jakarta Legal Aid Institute) MoF Ministry of Finance MoPW Ministry of Public Works NCICD National Capital Integrated Coastal Development NLA National Land Agency PAP(s) Project Affected Person(s) RP Resettlement Plan RPF Resettlement Policy Framework RPTRA Ruang Public Terpadu Ramah Anak (Child-friendly Integrated Public Space) RT Rukun Tetangga (the lowest level of neighbourhood unit) RW Rukun Warga (neighbourhood unit comprises several RTs, see above) Rusunawa Rumah Susun Sewa (Rental Low-cost Apartment) Satpol PP Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja (Public Order Agency) TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Force) UPC Urban Poor Consortium

ABSTRACT

This study deals with the dynamics of displacement and resettlement processes in regards to flood mitigation in the city of Jakarta, Indonesia. It seeks to get a better understanding about the situation and explores the emergence of social innovation performed by the affected communities alongside the Ciliwung River, taking Kampung Bukit Duri, Kampung Tongkol, and Rusunawa Marunda as case studies. Using macro and micro-level analysis, the theoretical framework draws on preliminary hypotheses to tests the correlation of such processes with wider political and economic context. This study does not put the flood issue aside, but rather tries to uncover and argue about the underpinning discourses that are used to justify the displacement. In the end, this study aims to contribute a critical understanding for a better response towards resettlement planning.

KEYWORDS: Riverbank community, kampung, rusunawa, displacement, resettlement, resistance,

flood, social innovation, Jakarta

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background At the end of September 2016, about 410 families in Bukit Duri subdistrict, South Jakarta who settled along the Ciliwung riverbank were evicted, following the river normalization project which requires 7,5 meters setback from the waterways. The joined the other 54,000 people who have been displaced in the past four years since the World Bank-aided flood mitigation project, Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project (JUFMP) or previously known as Jakarta Emergency Dredging Initiative (JEDI) was launched. The package of the project includes river dredging and construction of concrete embankments along the designated floodways. That means relocation of some riverbank communities are required to make way for the project realization, threatening more urban poor families with displacement in the coming years.

Despite the newly-built low-cost apartments that had been provided, about 60 families in Bukit Duri refused to move and ended up staying in their relatives’ houses. They are still waiting for the decision from the District Court regarding their class action lawsuit against the authorities’ premature procedures in evicting them. Even though some of them have a solid land ownership evidence in hand, they are claimed illegal by the city administration for dwelling in a state-owned water-catchment area along the riverside and thus, worsening the flood hazard. In fact, the city government has violated the policy by ignoring the processes that have to be done prior to relocation including identification of land ownership, consultation, and compensation entitlement for the residents’ property rights.

Nevertheless, amidst the stigmatization and threats of eviction, a community in Bukit Duri came up with alternative solutions for the resettlement plan. With the assistance of Ciliwung Merdeka, a local NGO, the residents developed and proposed an in-situ multi-story public housing design scheme that adapts to their way of living and introduces a participatory approach in the planning, designing, and financing processes of the project. Unfortunately, after several attempts to bring this to the authority, the city administration rejected their proposal due to some regulation issues, gesturing ‘a closed door’ for community initiatives.

1.2 Research Aim and Objective Departing from those unfortunate events, the objective of this research is twofold. First, it is intended to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of resettlement processes in regards to flood mitigation projects by referring it to the globalization of economy whose forces have influenced the pattern of urban development in Jakarta. This study does not put the flood issue aside, but rather tries to uncover and argue about the underpinning discourses of ‘risk’ and ‘development’ that are used to justify relocation by contesting it with the politics of ‘displacement’

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that predates in Jakarta. Second, it also explores the emergence of social movements performed by Ciliwung riverbank communities as a genuine attempt to break the common urban development pattern that often sets the poor aside. Based on those objectives, this paper positions itself in a critical situation where the current official plans and policies are challenged and therefore, aims to contribute to a better response towards resettlement plans.

1.3 Research Context and Theoretical Approaches There is indeed a large body of literature dedicated to flood issue in Jakarta as flooding has become part of the city’s urban life for decades. The topics that revolve around it are simultaneously evolving as the mitigation processes go on. They are ranging from technical evaluation of flood mitigation plans (Akmalah and Grigg, 2011; Steinberg, 2007; Caljouw et al., 2005), resilience and coping mechanism of people living in flood-prone areas (Simarmata, 2015; Hellman, 2015; Wilhelm, 2011; Marschiavelli, 2008), the flourishing of river communities’ social movement (Padawangi and Douglass, 2015; Padawangi, 2014), and alternative solutions for concrete embankment (Prescott and Ninsalam, 2016;Vollmer, 2015). The latter topic suggests soft infrastructure and emphasizes the importance of community involvement in flood management to achieve a more comprehensive and effective solution for reducing flood risks.

Additionally, there is also an environmental injustice as the flood issue is used to legitimate the eradication of informal sectors. Porteous and Smith (2001) identify that many reasons for displacement take place at different scale and with various motives. The suffering of the victims is very often regarded as ‘an inevitable sacrifice for the greater good’ (also in Harvey, 2012; Durand-Lasserve, 2006). Additionally, they argue that displacement is a highly uneven process as it discriminates some community groups in some places as the victim. In this case, it is the vulnerable riverbank communities living in flood-prone areas who are at the risk of displacement for flood mitigation projects. By taking a deliberate act of evicting the communities without thorough procedures, the city administration has victimized people who are already marginalized and thus, reinforced the socio-spatial inequality preexisted in the society.

This fact, however, takes me back to the ‘global city’ aspiration that was raised in mid 1990s for which rapid development of the large-scale commercial and high-end residential projects has led to an extensive kampung demolition all over Jakarta (Firman, 1999, 1998; Bunnel and Ann Miller, 2011). It necessarily makes my hypothesis about the correlation between the ongoing urban projects and real-estate mechanism and situates this paper at a point where the concern about flood issue has been subverted by the rising socio-spatial injustice. Porteous and Smith point out that the everyday displacement is a by-product of the mundane operation of the world political economy which is brought about by, first of all, socio-spatial inequalities (Porteous and Smith, 2001). Moreover, one could expect to find a relation between the river normalization with the controversial waterfront development project, The Great Garuda (initially named NCICD/National Capital Integrated Coastal Development) in Jakarta Bay and the upcoming big sporting event, Asian Games, which is scheduled to take place in Jakarta in 2018. Both superficially become the triggers to upgrade and beautify the city.

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2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Micro-scale Analysis: Displacement, Resettlement, and Resistance 2.1.1 On Displacement To begin with, I would like to emphasize that we must refrain ourselves from perceiving displacement as a normal operation of destructing homes in the pursuit of development progress, let alone believing it as an attempt to reduce poverty. We must not stop questioning the motives and probe the processes since it very often fails to meet the procedures of protecting the most vulnerable victims and usually ends up benefitting all but those in need. Thus, we have to direct our attention to the risks faced by the displaced communities to reveal their exact needs and rights and to uncover the justifications made by the authorities to evict them.

This study starts from displacement as ‘everyday domicide’ defined by Porteous and Smith (2001) in their book Domicide: The Global Destruction of Home. Domicide is a new term coined

by Porteous which means ‘the deliberate destruction of a home by human agency in pursuit of specified goals, which causes suffering to the victims.’ They stress the importance of acknowledging the emotional distress experienced by the displaced persons to understand the significance of resistance against displacement. Besides, this research also refers to studies about everyday domicide as ‘development-induced displacement’, or in some circumstances labeled ‘eviction’ whose variants depend on the level of ‘negotiation’ (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). Furthermore, it explicitly extends the discussion of the ‘climate change-induced displacement’, e.g. sea level rise, mitigation projects, or extreme weather events as its dynamics apparently have similarities with the one caused by development force. Some of them are impacting livelihoods, affecting less powerful populations in society, and involving little international protection (Wilmsen & Webber, 2014).

According to Porteous and Smith (2001), ‘everyday domicide’ perpetually occurs all over the world and can affect anyone except the very wealthy. It contrasts with ‘extreme displacement’ which occurs infrequently, involves major operations, and has an impact on a notably huge number of people in a large area, such in war, colonialism, or mega resettlement projects. It is a global phenomenon that comes about as an inevitable result of the normal operations of the world’s political economy which leads to the process of ‘economic impoverishment and socio-political disempowerment’. It makes the affected communities lose control over their assets, self-esteem, and cultural identity (Porteous & Smith, 2001; Dwivedi, 1999).

Moreover, a forced-eviction disguises itself as a ‘negotiated’ displacement is often portrayed as ‘good governance’ practice where the government uses the power of expropriation in the name of public improvement, environmental rehabilitation, and urban renewal, or at least, provide regulation, to dislocate the most underprivileged and marginalized groups from their lands (Harvey,

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2012; Durand-Lasserve, 2006; Porteous & Smith, 2001). Although theoretically, the stakeholders may compensate the people who lose their assets, in reality that option is insufficiently realized.

Compensation packages are exceptionally inadequate (Dwivedi, 1999) and resettlement policies are poorly planned. While compensation links strongly to legal matters, Wilmsen and Webber (2014) identify key failures of resettlement planning and practice that include (1) a limited recognition of human agency; (2) a lack of interrogation in the development of a resettlement plan; (3) politics surrounding the identification of the affected communities, and (4) a simplistic understanding of community dynamics and livelihood. Moreover, Oliver-Smith (1991) pointed out that the decision to move or not to move depends on (1) internal differentiation within communities, (2) a multi-faceted relationship to the immediate surroundings and the state, (3) the quality of resettlement policies, and (4) the availability of activist groups (also adapted by Dwivedi, 1999).

2.1.2 Risks of Resettlement

AAccording to Cernea’s risk model, there are eight main ‘risks of impoverishment’ (with poorly organized and unorganized resettlement) resulting from displacement, such as (1) landlessness; (2) joblessness; (3) homelessness; (4) marginalization; (5) increased morbidity; (6) food insecurity; (7) loss of access to common property; and (8) social disarticulation (Cernea, 1995 in Dwivedi, 1999). The model, however, has been an essential guideline to identify what needs to be included in resettlement policies to prevent the risk of impoverishment (Dwivedi, 1999, see World Bank, 1994). Dwivedi (1999) also adds few variables to Cernea’s model which include (1) risk perception; (2) the role of mediating agencies who define and politicize conditions of uncertainties and risks; and (3) the dynamics of policy making.

Referring to Beck (1992), Dwivedi (1999) highlights that ‘risk is understood as the subjective calculation of different groups of people embedded differently in political economic and environmental conditions’. The urgency and existence of risks are fluctuating, depending on the variety of values and interests from each party (Beck, 1992 in Dwivedi, 1999). Therefore, we need to observe the different stakeholder’s point of views and particularly, to identify the characteristic of the affected persons to understand their perception towards displacement risks (Dwivedi, 1999). To this end, for this research, we must first understand the life-world of kampung residents to spot their problems and needs that influence their decision to either resist displacement or risk resettlement. As Dwivedi (1999) emphasizes: “[...]when the affected people perceive their risks to be more than what is culturally accepted or when mediation of action groups result in a redefinition of what risks are acceptable, resistance to displacement is bound to be acute as will be demands for changes in public/state assignments of liabilities and compensation.”

Since the displacements in this research are conducted regarding flood mitigation project, the risks we are talking about should also incorporate the risk of flood damage; how do the different agencies perceive flooding? The answers then are linked to the degree of exposure to the hazard and the capacity of the affected people to respond and adapt. In this sense, a lot of literature works about climate change use the terms of ‘resilience,’ ‘adaptation,’ and ‘resourcefulness’ to place the affected persons as the focal point of risk reduction plans.

By recognizing the human agency, the affected persons are regarded them as the enablers of their future (Dwivedi, 1999). Therefore, their role in the decision-making of displacement and resettlement policies should be fostered (Wilmsen & Webber, 2014).

However, in the practical implementation, the human agency of the affected persons is often belittled. In most cases, ‘the uprooted communities are treated as, at best, recipients of charity and welfare, or at worst, as victims or problems’ (Gupte & Mehta, 2007 in Wilmsen & Webber, 2014). It portrays the affected persons as ‘vulnerable and susceptible’ (Chakrabarti & Dhar, 2010 in Wilsem

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& Webber, 2014). Consequently, while vulnerability arguments may conceal their resilience and resourcefulness capacity from the policy makers in justifying top-down interventions (Wilsem & Webber, 2014), an impressive demonstration of those capacities can backfire too as it can be used to rationalize relocation.

2.1.3 Resistance “Perhaps, after all, Lefebvre was right, more than forty years ago, to insist that revolution in our times has to be urban – or nothing.” (Harvey, 2012: 25) Throughout this literature review, it is argued that displacement has been a new form of ‘violence’ required by the capitalist development in a city. On the one hand, developmentinduced, or we might say market-driven, displacement is a symbol of the authorities’ abuse of power to heartlessly separate local life from its place (Bauman, 1989 in Oliver-Smith, 2001). On the other hand, to be resettled is ‘one of the most acute expression of the affected people’s powerlessness as it constitutes a loss of control over their space and material assets (Oliver-Smith, 2001).

However, it is also argued that in the struggles to claim the right to the city, there is always room for resistance as urbanization continues, even though the power of current economic system seems unbearable (Oliver-Smith, 2001). The city is ‘an entry-point for anti-capitalist critique and political activism’ in seeking for spatial justice. It is full of potentials for spatial reproduction through its vibrant everyday life and social relations (Harvey, 2012). Essentially, through its resistance against oppression or exploitation, the city also becomes a catalyst for new political imaginaries and finally, the improvement of governance (Bonefeld, 2008; Chatterton, 2010).

Who, Why, and How Oliver-Smith (2001) argues that many variables should be analyzed to understand the degree of people’s participation in a resistance movement. Those include (1) the organization of groups within the affected communities; (2) the political situation in the nation and the state-local relation in the past; and (3) cultural aspects, such as languages, religion, and identity. It is also linked to the reasons why people resist resettlement mentioned in the previous chapter which contests the ‘voluntary’ nature of displacement.

Moreover, since there are various motives of displacement and resettlement policies, the characteristics of resistance may differ, ranging from foot-dragging, protest, lawsuits, political party action, guerrilla warfare, and many other tactics (Oliver-Smith, 2001). It is also a highly dynamic process, depending on the characteristic of the project and the actors related to it. However, when it involves stakeholders of large-scale urban development projects and deals with national plans and regulations, resistance may lead to significant changes in resettlement policies and practices, and eventually a new way of developing cities (Oliver-Smith, 2001).

Social Innovation To the degree that resistance to development-induced displacement becomes a broader action against the development practice itself, it is important to bring up the conception of the right to the city as a class-based political demand (Harvey, 2012, p.136 in Santos Junior, 2014). Since the current discourses about neoliberalism tend to depict ‘economy’ as a monolithic entity without taking into account the social dynamics of it, we need to call for an alternative analytical approach to economic and social transformation in society (Van Dyck & Broeck, 2013; Harvey 2012). One alternative can be developed around the concept of social innovation. Even though it brings about the term ‘innovation’ which is always associated with technology application or engineering process, social innovation, in this sense, principally values local knowledge and cultural assets of communities and prioritizes the creative reconfiguration of social relations in society. In

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short, the concept invokes an ‘innovation in social relations, as well as in meeting human needs’ (MacCallum, 2009), specifically the basic ones, and is emerged collectively from the local level (Moulaert, 2010). It can occur in different communities, particularly those that have been suffering from social exclusion, depending on the processes of consciousness-raising, mobilization, and learning (Chambon et al., 1982 in Moulaert, 2010). Moreover, Moulaert (2010) adds that this community-based initiative can stimulate the dynamics of urban cohesion and social development and bring it up to the city level.

Social innovation is also a territorialized process where changes in spatial arrangements influence the conditions of different types of social innovation (Van Dyck & Broeck, 2013). The territory is essential, both as a field of action and a field of analysis, and acknowledged as ‘a social construction relevant to the interpretation of histories and cultural phenomena’. (Van Dyck & Broeck, 2013).

While the ‘tangibility’ of urban space restructuring is high, the process also gives birth to new hopes and alternatives from the people who are affected by it (Van Dyck & Broeck, 2013; Moulaert, 2010).

2.1.4 The Ambivalence of Informal Settlement In the Third World context, the everyday displacement becomes more severe and problematic as poverty is ubiquitous and the housing supply for low-income groups is scarce. It is exacerbated by the unmitigated urbanization, globalization, climate change, financial crises, and other global circumstances which consequently force the urban poor to end up dwelling in informal settlements (Davis, 2007).

“Everywhere in the Third World, housing choice is a hard calculus of confusing trade-offs. As John Turner famously pointed out, ‘Housing is a verb’.The urban poor have to solve a complex equation as they try to optimize housing cost, tenure security, quality of shelter, journey to work and sometimes, personal safety. Squatter trade physical safety and public health for a few square meters of land and some security against eviction. [...]They are pioneer settlers of swamp, floodplain, volcano slopes, unstable hillsides, rubbish mountains, chemical dump, and desert fringe. Such sites are poverty’s niche in the ecology of the city, and very poor people have little choice but to live with disaster.” (Davis, 2007; Seabrook, 2007) Urban informality, in this sense, refers to ‘activities without authorization by government, whether through laws or other forms of regulation’ (Jenkins, 2006), even though it does not necessarily constitute poverty, but is closely associated with the poor communities. Roy (2005) points out that there are two dominant frames in the discussion about it; first, urban informality as a crisis, and second, urban informality as heroism. As crisis, Roy refers to Hall and Pfeiffer (2000) who see informality as an ungovernable phenomenon of urbanization since it has been threatening the urban life. Whereas, as heroism, she refers to Hernando De Soto’s famous notion of informality as ‘urban entrepreneurship’ where De Soto (2000) argues that urban poor are rich, but they are unable to access the formal system of capitalist’ rules of the game. He claims that giving their assets recognition would impactfully enable them to be part of the modern economy and in turn, they would supply capital to micro-entrepreneurs to create new jobs in the informal settlements (De Soto, 2000 in Davis, 2007).

However, Korff (1996) argues that formal and informal sectors are rather complementary. As the economy growing, it is not only the middle class who are benefiting but also the informal sector.

The growing middle class needs more supports from informal sectors, such as guards, drivers, maids, or cleaners, at the same time, the availability of cheap labor guarantees investments (Korff, 1996 in Wilhelm, 2011). Besides, it is observed that the spontaneous settlements give an alternative form of housing and shield the housing shortage problem as well as contribute to the social stability of the city (Barros & Sobreira, 2002 in Wilhelm, 2011).

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Community Responses to Displacement Threats in Flood-prone Areas

However, from government’s point of view, informality is much more regarded as a threat rather than a potential because it reflects their incapability to satisfy the basic needs of the huge number of poor population which they prefer not to see (Jenkins, 2006; De Soto, 2000). This is what Davis (2007) points out that the urban poor, especially in the Third World countries, always anticipate prestigious international events, such as conference, sporting events, beauty contests, or international festivals with great fear. Such exposure urges the authorities to simultaneously set up beautification or cleaning up projects for the city.

Moreover, the legal issue regarding tenure status weakens the urban poor’s bargaining power and capacity for negotiation, and makes them falling victims to any displacement. Inadequate evidence of land title or property lease means that they are not necessarily entitled to claim compensation for the replacement of their land or property unit. This mechanism is frequently found in countries where several types of property rights coexist (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). Consequently, the affected families with insufficient ownership evidence will tend to accept whatever is offered to them, being either compensated or rehoused to serviced sites on the periphery of the city (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). Conclusively, Durand-Lasserve (2006) stresses out: “In short, those who have settled on land whose value has increased over time, and who cannot provide sufficient evidence as to their rights on the land, are exposed to ‘market evictions’, as they are not necessarily entitled – in strictly legal terms – to be paid compensation.”

On the one hand, a high rate of economic growth might create new employment opportunities and increases the earned income of the urban poor, which is considered as the preconditions for improving the living condition of them. But, on the other hand, it also comes along with the rapid increase in land prices which simultaneously accelerates the market pressures on informal settlements (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). However, many urban regeneration projects are targeting slums not necessarily because they are the most in need of upgrading, but because they offer the most potential site for high-end residential development or commercial areas. After all, displacement for public improvement purpose is merely a smokescreen to generate cheap land for real estate markets (Porteous and Smith, 2001).

2.2 Macro-scale Analysis:The World Political Economy 2.2.1 Neoliberal Policies Everyday displacement comes about as an inevitable result of the mundane operations of the world’s political economy (Porteous & Smith, 2001). It has always been associated with neoliberalism since it became the ruling system of our time after the fall of communism in the late 1980s. Basically, as Sager (2011) points out that: “[...] the rhetoric of neoliberalism aims to give administrative efficiency, entrepreneurialism, and economic freedoms more impetus than democratic political steering. It can be viewed as a restructuring of the relationship between private capital owners and the state, which rationalizes and promotes a growth-first approach to urban development.”

However, even though the economic dimension of neoliberalism was forcibly restrained during the 2008 global crisis (Sheppard & Leitner, 2010 in Sager, 2011), its geographical dimension remains.

It has deeply embedded in the mindset of public sector administrators, especially planners, in countries in many parts of the world. Consequently, it influences all aspects that planners are professionally dealing with (Sager, 2011). To that extent, to identify and characterize the influence of neoliberalism in planning-related urban policies, Sager (2011) conducted a literature survey to show why neoliberalism becomes an important descriptor of the urban condition, and why it is THE CASE OF CILIWUNG RIVER

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highly relevant for planning. He highlights that: “Neo-liberalism is a keyword for understanding the urban condition, the re-thinking of social democracy, and the regulatory regimes of our time. Neoliberalism mobilizes urban space as an arena for market-oriented economic growth and elite consumption practices, and in so doing it transforms the politico-economic setting in which public plans and projects are implemented.”

Finally, in his survey Sager (2011) outlined typical planning concerns in neoliberal policies which have something to do with financial, management and construction system of infrastructure, housing provision, and development of the commercial area in a city.

2.2.2 Large-scale Urban Projects and Real Estate Mechanism In today’s urban world, neoliberalism manifests in the globalization of the economy which articulates in the dynamics of large-scale urban development projects in cities (Sager, 2011; Moulaert et al., 2003; Porteous & Smith, 2001). Such projects are not solely a local answers to distant global investment forces, but also a ‘localized project that mobilized assets available’ (Moulaert et al., 2003). Therefore, we should pay more attention to this global-local interaction (Moulaert et al., 2003; Wee, 2002). To analyze it, first of all, we need to identify who are the players and how they are interrelated to each other. It can be examined through the characteristic of investor groups and property types, the regulatory settings of the state, geopolitics that entails, and the spatial strategy of the investment (Rogers & Koh, 2017).

Moreover, the sociocultural dimension of the place also plays a significant role in this interaction.

Neoliberalism can easily infiltrate through the exploitation of social differences in a society in which the consuming desire of the dominant groups in society are successfully manipulated into reinventing a whole new urban world following their desire (Harvey, 2012; Moulaert et al., 2003).

This cultural transformation, accompanied by ‘a new, and often disciplining, regulatory regimes’, plunges them unfailingly into ‘the credo of externally-imposed competitive pressure’ which eventually leads to a problematic urban restructuring process of displacements - or as Harvey (2012) puts the process as ‘creative destruction’. Thus, it signifies a class dimension since those underprivileged and marginalized from political and economical power suffer first and foremost (Harvey, 2012; Moulaert et al., 2003; Porteous & Smith, 2001).

Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that ‘neo-liberalization is strongly path-dependent and that its spatial diffusion is highly context-specific’ (Sager, 2011). As for Asian context, the sociocultural dimension might not be entirely similar with those in its Western origins (Wee, 2002).

Therefore, we need an adequate conceptualization that is considering both local peculiarities and the universal features of neoliberalism (Sager, 2011; Wee, 2002).

2.2.3 Colonialism, Urbanism, and World-economy Five centuries back, the globalization of the economy was nurtured through the long history of imperialism in which twelve formal imperial states, including Spain, Portugal, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands took control of the world in different time frames. These ‘core states’ aimed to make the world one large-independent city with flows of resources, knowledge, and capital through colonialism (King, 1990). Like neoliberalism, this power also manifests in the spatial, social, and cultural dimension of its colonies. The impact on those dimensions can be easily distinguished from the spatial organization and urban system of the colonial city as they constitute as well as represent the social and cultural existence of society (Ibid, 1990). Among the well-known patterns are the establishment of port cities for trading purposes, the formation of colonial capitals for political or military purposes, and last but not least, the (re)organization of urban hierarchies that results in and inherits social segregation (King, 1990).

While considering the historical experience is necessary for analyzing the impact of the world-

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economy on contemporary urban society, this research also extends the discourse by contesting the trajectories of postcolonial cities in the face of globalization over the battle of remembering and forgetting the colonial past in search of a new identity (Johnson 1995: 63 in Yeoh, 2001).

Whether they will create a distinct or unique urban character is still a question. As Dick and Rimmer (1998) argue that in the context of Southeast Asia, the convergence process relies heavily on foreign expertise and capital and intensifies social polarization at the same time (Dick and Rimmer, 1998 in Yeoh, 2001), meaning that their trajectories will soon be overshadowed by globalizing power (Yeoh, 2001, 1999).

2.2.4 The Right to the City ‘The right to the city’ has been a long-standing ideological debate of our urbanization history, especially in the political and economic discourse between the capitalist and socialist worlds (Oliver-Smith, 2001). Popularized by Henri Lefebvre (1996 [1967]), the provocative phrase has also been a reference for many scholars to question the ambiguity on what is right, who should benefit from and to what kind of city (Santos Junior, 2014; Marcuse, 2009; Harvey, 2008; Roy, 2005, Oliver-Smith, 2001). The idea is derived from what Lefebvre has formulated that ‘the right to the city is like a cry and demand’. The formulation represents two dimensions. First, it is a requirement, a ‘cry’ for an equal distribution of social reproduction in the city, such as housing, education, health, sanitation, mobility, and participation that is tied to the struggles and movements against dispossession. Second, it is a project, a collective ‘demand’ for reinventing a new urban life based on social justice and happiness (Marcuse, 2012 in Santos Junior, 2014). It corresponds to Oliver-Smith’s (2001) observation that the right to the city has been interpreted as “the right to develop” and “the right to development” and each of them claims their moral positions in some basic human rights provision; one on political rights, the other on economic rights.

However, this is problematic, particularly in the context of postcolonial countries where the imbalance between both models is covered by the moral obligation to develop the societies to break away from backwardness (Oliver-Smith, 2001). As Roy (2005) suggests that ‘the right to the city’ can potentially come side by side with ‘the right to property’, the concept is distorted from defending the ‘less numerous and the less powerful’ to prioritizing ‘the greatest good for the greater number’ (Oliver-Smith, 2001).

“While ... the socialist model and agenda have ... fallen by the wayside, the capitalist model of development and agenda is clearly ascendant with its agenda of transformation toward modern industrial market economies justified morally as the best means to combat poverty and raise standards of living on a global scale.” (Oliver-Smith, 2001) Therefore, the challenge today is to open up the possibility to balance out both models and create a city that is ‘just, democracy, and emancipatory’ (Santos Junior, 2014).

2.3 Summary Summarizing all the topics relevant to my preliminary hypothesis, I draw a theoretical framework which will guide me in building the stories and arguments in the following chapters (see Figure 2.1). Informed by the key authors from scholarly literature, this framework depicts the interrelation between elements contributing to the dynamics of resettlement processes in Jakarta.

These elements are grouped into two analytical approaches; micro-level and macro-level analysis to create a sequential and hence complete story.

Micro-level analysis invites me to understand the dynamics of ‘displacement’, ‘resettlement’, and ‘resistance’ which have given a tremendous impact on the livelihoods as well as are nuanced by

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the affected families. Since urban development process drives the displacement in this thesis, this approach also draws an understanding about ‘the ambivalence of informal settlement’, especially in the context of Third World countries, in which the underprivileged groups in society are likely to be the victims.

Moreover, knowing the fact that these locally-impacting operations are connected to global forces, the macro-level analysis is essential to put ‘displacement’ in a broader context and illustrate the intricate interplay of power relations, actors, and processes in the global-local interaction. This approach brings the theories on world-economy, postcolonialism, and ‘the right to the city’ into the constellation as the background story as well as the contested discourse. All above-mentioned approaches are illustrated in the scheme below.

WORLD’S POLITICAL ECONOMY Sager, 2011

POSTCOLONIAL King, 2000; Yeoh, 2001, 1999; Johnson, 1995

REGULATORY REGIME Warbuton, 2016

GLOBAL CITY (MODERNITY)

Ismail 2013; Wee, 2002

DISCOURSES REAL ESTATE Rogers & Koh, 2017; Shatkin, 2016

Displacement

Wilmsen & Webber, 2014; Durand-Lasserve, 2006; Oliver-Smith, 2001; Porteous & Smith, 2001; Dwivedi, 1999

Development Investment Policy Reclamation Policy Flooding and Land Subsidence

Land Use Policy Flood Mitigation Water Management

UDPs

Moulaert et al., 2005 The Great Garuda (NCICD)

Other UDPs

Flood Mitigation Project (JUFMP)

Rusunawa

Santos Junior, 2014; Harvey, 2012; Roy, 2005

Risk

Dwivedi, 1999; Cernea, 1995; Beck, 1992;

Housing Policy DISPLACEMENT OF RIVERBANK COMMUNITIES

Procurement System RESISTANCE

Van Dyck & Broeck, 2013; Harvey, 2012, Chatterton, 2010; MacCallum et al., 2009; Oliver-Smith, 2001;

Figure 2.1. Theoretical Framework

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Community Responses to Displacement Threats in Flood-prone Areas

Macro-level Analysis

Land Tenure System

Micro-level Analysis

Housing Backlog

3 METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I restate the research questions and the preliminary hypothesis upon which this paper is designed and conducted. Furthermore, I sequentially explain the strategy of gathering and analyzing the data through which I seek to answer the research questions and to test the hypothesis.

It will be followed by the description of the case studies and last but not least, the explanation of the methods that I use in collecting data and analyzing my findings.

3.1 Research Questions

● How is the dynamics of resettlement processes of riverbank communities in Jakarta in regards to flood mitigation plans? ● How did the riverbank communities contest the pattern of urban development in Jakarta?

3.2 Research Hypothesis

The flood mitigation projects are the spearhead of other urban development projects in Jakarta whose processes are driven by the globalization of economy that manifests through real estate mechanisms. It has influenced the regulatory regime to do fast top-down interventions to solve urban problems which have led to unfair displacements of riverbank communities.

3.3 Research Design and Strategy “Qualitative research involves an in-depth understanding of social phenomena, human behavior and the reasons that govern human behavior through analysis of social, political, and economic processes” (Kitchin & Tate, 2013).

Before the fieldwork, a theoretical framework was drawn based on literature and newspaper articles review to illustrate the interaction between actors as well as to find information gaps that need to be addressed in this research. In micro-scale perspective, the framework analyzes the dynamics of the ‘displacement’ and ‘resettlement’ processes in regards to flood mitigation project where ‘resistance’ emerged, while in macro-scale perspective, it draws the correlation between the urban development project with the ‘world political economy’ and ‘historical experience’ of the city that will be tested in this research. It is informed by key authors and used as a critical tool to scrutinize the case studies in the field.

Qualitative methods were employed to understand a rather complex social phenomenon, as it will take me to the natural settings and allows me to use multiple methods of inquiry. Besides semi-structured interviews, this approach also entails site observations and document analysis.

Those primary data were combined with secondary data derived from literature and newspaper articles review to formulate a sound and validated thesis. Therefore, field work becomes a crucial part to get a deeper understanding and obtain the information using all the methods that I have

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designed. (see Figure 3.1). Further, through the theoretical approach, this paper examines the issue of displacement caused by JUFMP/JEDI river normalization project in two affected communities in Ciliwung river’s middle and lower stream segments, as well as a subsidized low-cost apartment in East Jakarta.

3.4 Case Study Selection

Since I am focusing on the lived experience of the underprivileged and marginalized communities in this study, their voice is what mattered most to me. Therefore, I singled out the affected families in two neighborhoods. They are (1) Kampung Duri and Kampung Pulo in South Jakarta which was mentioned in Chapter 1- Introduction and (2) Kampung Tongkol, Lodan, and Krapu in North Jakarta which is facing eviction threats in the coming years. The term kampung is derived literally from the word ‘camp’ and was associated with the native settlements who lived outside the city and practiced rural lifestyle. Although there are multiple definitions depending on the local context and historical period, kampung here refers to an enclave in the city that is ‘indigenous, unplanned, with low-rise building’ that exhibits ‘a lack of infrastructure and services, a high population density, and a generally lower-class but mixed socio-economic composition’ (Nas, 2005 in Silver, 2007).

RESEARCH PROBLEM CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

s?

nt

e um

g

Ar

tion ?

Narra NEWSPAPER Questions ARTICLES ?

REVIEW

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION

LITERATURE REVIEW FINDING INFORMATION GAPS & DISCOURSES

bs

er

va

red uctu i-str terview In

O

THEORETICAL APPROACH

Sem

DATA TRANSCRIPTION & DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

tio

Photo Documentation

n DATA COLLECTION

FIELDWORK PREPARATION ACTOR MAPPING

Figure 3.1. Research Trajectory Source: author

Besides, I also made an observation in one rusunawa (rumah susun sewa, low-cost rental apartment) to gain a complete understanding of the relocation mechanism. I singled out Rusunawa Marunda that is new home to the evictees from Kampung Tongkol and surrounding area. Despite their separated locations and different stages of situation, the combination of these three case studies shapes a complete story about the dynamics of eviction and resettlement processes in regards to flood mitigation projects since they are closely related to each other, especially in terms of sociospatial struggles.

Linked to the first research question, the first case illustrates the process of advocating alternative solutions for resettlement plan performed by the residents of Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo with the assistance of Ciliwung Merdeka Foundation which ended up with a forced eviction 26 |

Community Responses to Displacement Threats in Flood-prone Areas

and relocation of some families to several rusunawas. These cases possess essential elements about why and how their attempts were failed. It will then be completed by a brief introduction to the life in rusunawa in which the relocatees face other difficulties. Both case studies are complementary to illustrate the weaknesses and shortcomings of resettlement policy and plan.

Meanwhile, learning from the previous movement, the case of Kampung Tongkol and surrounding area is linked to the second question about the dynamics of the contestation of the riverbank communities against the predominant pattern of urban development in Jakarta. In this sense, Kampung Tongkol’s residents with the assistance of Urban Poor Consortium manifested a built form of resistance by constructing a model house and renovating their kampung which contributes to recommendation for a better response towards resettlement plan.

3.5 Data Collection Methods

The primary data is obtained through two-weeks of field work, between 1-12 April 2017, which involves semi-structured interviews with the main interlocutors, field observation, and documents review of policies and plans gained from the stakeholders. Whereas, the secondary data is obtained through literature and newspaper articles review. With this structure, at least three different types of data source are utilized, and therefore, data triangulation is achieved.

Referring to the theoretical framework and the preliminary hypothesis (see Section 2.3 and 3.2), a map of stakeholders is created to identify the interviewees and find a way to contact them (see Figure 3.2). Details about these data collection methods are explained in the following sections.

3.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews and Site Observation

Key Interlocutors The semi-structured interview helps to shape a better understanding of the dynamics of resettlement processes as it is derived from different perspectives. In searching for the informants, I used snowball technique in which one interview leads to seeking other persons or places to investigate and find the information needed. It is employed to get both confirming or disconfirming narration about certain issues, as well as to acquire insights and better understanding about the phenomenon (Marshall & Rossman, 1999).

First of all, interviews with NGO representatives, activists, and residents from these kampungs were conducted. I was very critical in choosing informants due to the political situation in Jakarta as this research was conducted during the gubernatorial election period. There was a high tension between the supporters of the incumbent and the opponent. The latter was for whom the majority of Jakarta’s urban poor cast their votes. I also had to be careful in selecting the NGOs and activists to prevent bias. While I kept my eyes and ears wide open in observing the affected communities, I limited the informants from NGOs only for the ones who have direct relations with the case studies. In doing that, a friend who works in Ciliwung Merdeka Foundation as an architect has been my gatekeeper that connects me with other related activists.

Besides, it is also necessary to interview the relocatees to illustrate comparison stories between the moved and the not-moved residents since there are growing evidence about the downsides of moving to rusunawa. Therefore, I decided to interview some relocated families from Kampung Tongkol and Kampung Lodan (the neighboring kampung) in Rusunawa Marunda. As for the information about relocatees from Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo, I made use of Ciliwung Merdeka’s data and an official report from LBH Jakarta (Jakarta Legal Aid Institute) about the condition of the relocated families from these kampungs in rusunawa.

Further, to learn from the government’s point of view, I engaged representatives from several governmental agencies based on their key roles in designing and implementing flood mitigation and resettlement plan. They include the Ciliwung-Cisadane River Basins Agency (Balai Besar Wilayah THE CASE OF CILIWUNG RIVER

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World Bank Joint Steering Committee (BAPPENAS, MoF, MoPW, DKI) Project Management Unit (PMU) (MoPW, DGWR, DGCK, DKI) Project Implementation Unit (PIU) (BBWSCC, DGCK, DKI)

Governor of DKI Jakarta

Housing & Administrative Building Agency - DKI

Deputy Governor for Spatial Planning & Environment Head of municipality (Mayor) Head of district (Camat) Head of sub-district (Lurah)

RT/RW

Rusunawa Management Unit (UPRS)

Rusunawa Marunda

Rusunawa Rawa Bebek

Rusunawa Pulogebang

Rusunawa Jatinegara

Rusunawa Komarudin

Kampung Bukit Duri

Public Order Agency (Satpol PP)

Kampung Pulo

Kampung Tongkol

Kampung Lodan

Kampung Krapu

International

National

Provincial

Municipality

Ciliwung Tributary Community (KAKC) Ciliwung Merdeka (CM)

Urban Poor Network (JRMK)

Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH)

Urban Poor Consortium (UPC)

Urban Kampung Forum

Architecture Sans Frontier - ID University of Indonesia

ACORN (USA)

Asian Coalition for Housing Rights

Figure 3.2. Map of Actor and Institution.

Shaded grey is agency with interviewed representatives.

Source: author

Sungai Ciliwung-Cisadane, BBWSCC) who is responsible for river and flood risk management and the Jakarta Housing and Administrative Building Agency (Dinas Perumahan dan Gedung Pemerintahan Jakarta, DPGP-DKI) who deals with rusunawa provision. Besides that, I also interviewed interlocutors from real estate industry that has been working in private sectors, in both local and foreign developers to gain insights into the current real- estate mechanism in Jakarta.

In the second week of my fieldwork, I got a chance to talk to the Deputy Governor of Jakarta for Spatial Planning and Environment. However, since he is one of the top-level stakeholders, I did not expect to get a genuine explanation about the reason for the eviction, but rather to seek confirmation about certain issues. A complete list of the interviewees is attached as Appendix 1.

Interview Process Prior to the fieldwork, introduction about the research and invitation for participation was provided through e-mail correspondence or messenger. Since I attempt to understand the dynamics of resettlement plan from both sides, I have to be sensitive in addressing the inquiries.

Therefore, three sets of questions were prepared according to the different characteristics of the interviewee, being either a government official, an NGO representative or an affected family.

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Community Responses to Displacement Threats in Flood-prone Areas

conversation and had to be conducted in several visits due to a different scheduling of the interviewees. Lastly, most of my interviews involved voice recording and sometimes note-taking whenever it was possible since the interviewees were most likely more comfortable if I was not writing while talking to them.

Site Observation and Informal Conversation “Observation entails the systematic noting and recording of events, behaviors, and objects in the social setting chosen for the study[…]The researcher typically enters the area without predetermined ideas and is able to discover recurring patterns of behavior and relationships which will form the basis for further investigation” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999) I did several visits to Kampung Tongkol and the neighboring kampungs, Kampung Lodan and Kampung Kunir); and Rusunawa Marunda. Even though I am familiar with the life-world of kampung in Jakarta in general, those places are still new to me. In my first visit, I relied entirely on my informants to orient myself in the field as well as to build ‘trust’ from the residents. So, the next days I came back, I was able to allow myself to roam around and take pictures as much as possible and to encounter and talk to different persons.

These processes have significantly helped me to gain an understanding of the situation on the ground and to find perfect samples for the main stories of my research. In that sense, I managed to approach two housewives in Kampung Tongkol and Rusunawa Marunda. They were intentionally selected because, first of all, women, alongside with their children, are undeniably the most vulnerable and yet, the most invisible victims in this kind of circumstances. Secondly, women (i.e. housewives) may have a different way of perceiving things and thus, may have different opinions.

And lastly, they were the ones who are available during the day while their husbands are working far from home.

Moreover, informal interviews were also conducted to diminish barrier between interviewer and objects of observation as well as to encourage them to tell stories that are significant to them and to reveal their natural attitude and opinions. However, the interviews were challenging for me as I had to be as natural as possible while at the same time had to keep the conversation flowing. Even though the conversation took longer time, in the end, I managed to get their life histories as well as captured their true feelings.

3.5.2 Methods for Collection of Newspaper Articles To support the contextual description on flooding and eviction history in Jakarta, I collected secondary data from newspaper articles. I was aware that not all media are reliable. The fact that rapid-growing digital age has forced the media to publish 24/7 news as fast as possible to respond to the demand and to compete with other media has become my consideration in selecting valid news. For that reason, I chose multiple sources from the most credible and reputable media in Indonesia. Among others are The Jakarta Post, an English language newspaper; Kompas, an Indonesian national newspaper, and Tempo, an Indonesian weekly magazine that covers news and politics. All of them have an online portal which contains updated news.

Also, there is already a large body of literature and official reports which document the events of flooding and eviction in Jakarta city which I can utilize. To that extent, I narrowed down the use of newspaper articles to describe the events of flooding only after the major floods occurred in 2013 until the recent floods in 2016. Whereas for the events of eviction, my research on newspaper articles was limited to evictions carried out by the regime of former Governor Joko Widodo (2012 - 2014) and Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (2014-2017).

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documents relevant to the research were also analyzed to support and cross-validate findings from primary data. They were collected directly from the stakeholders during the fieldwork or indirectly from the literature.

3.6 Methodological Reflection “The qualitative researcher’s challenge is to demonstrate that this personal interest will not bias the study.” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999) What made me hesitant when I first approached this research was how to detach myself from the situation as the case had been disturbing my understanding. In the beginning, I was very confident with the new regime of the former Governor Joko Widodo and his successor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. When they first run as a candidate pair for Jakarta gubernatorial election, they convinced their electors that they will solve Jakarta housing problems by promoting kampung rehabilitation program, especially for riverbank communities. ‘Eviction’ was not in their vocabulary. But in the following years, the displacement of many urban poor communities still occurred and therefore, contested my viewpoint.

Finishing the literature review beforehand significantly helped to overcome that uneasiness and acquire deeper understanding about these multidimensional phenomena as it enabled me to learn from many other displacement cases around the world and the theories that entail. From that, I sketched a preliminary analytical framework and map of stakeholders to guide me in developing the questionnaires and identifying the main interlocutors. Thus, I commenced my field work with a clear conception of how I should position myself during the interviews and what I would find relevant in my data collection. Even though it was also clear that qualitative methods allowed me to go to the natural settings and meet the less heard (if not totally unheard) voices of the most vulnerable, my thorough understanding played the most significant role in choosing the right informants.

During my fieldwork, another difficulty that I faced was a response from some informants from both NGO and government sides who demonstrated an unwillingness to share information.

For the NGOs, I understand that I was a newcomer and they might be skeptical about the real contribution of my research to the affected communities. But still, it is a pity because to my knowledge, some other NGOs are aware that accommodating students or researchers can be a strategy to gain support and build a network that would benefit their movements in the future.

However, since there are cases where the researchers fail to deliver their responsibilities in sharing their findings as perhaps experienced by those NGOs, it made the data collection processes difficult for me and inherently puts pressures to my research outcome. As for the government, making contact with persons in the right hierarchical position is crucial. In my case, I was lucky to have colleagues who work as or have connection with representative from the government agencies. While relying on the bureaucratic formal process to obtain permission takes a long time, having these connections helps me a lot to approach the main interlocutors within a short period of fieldwork time. However, there was still hesitation from the government’s representative to talk to me due to political situation. Therefore, I needed to be very clear in stating my research goals (i.e. to seek for understanding from both sides) and be careful in addressing my inquiries.

Overall, time is definitely a major constraint. Two weeks of fieldwork was insufficient to gather as much as information as I have planned, not to mention the location of each site that is quite a distance from each other. Consequently, I had to prioritize some information over others, for instance, by paying more attention to finding the truth of what the affected families are heartily experiencing. Therefore, I dedicated more of my time to observe the sites and interview them and did not bother too much about gathering official data from the city administration as it can be obtained through email correspondence.

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Figure 3.3. Map of Indonesia Figure 3.4. Major Displacements in Jakarta between 2013-2016.

Outlined from Jakarta Spatial Plan 2010-2030, data from various sources. Drawn by author

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Figure 4.1. Pluit City’s marketing billboard in Baywalk City Source: Kemal Jufri/ The Guardian

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4 JAKARTA IN THE FACE OF GLOBALIZATION Situated on the northwestern coast of Java Island, Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, expands from the seashore just above sea level where thirteen rivers flow through and meet the Java Sea, carrying sediment and overflows to the plain. Among all these rivers, Ciliwung is the longest one which largely contributes to the perennial flooding. Administratively, Jakarta is an autonomous region similar to a province called the Special Region of Capital City Jakarta (Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta or DKI Jakarta) and is divided into five municipalities, i.e. Central Jakarta, North Jakarta, West Jakarta, South Jakarta, East Jakarta; and an off-coast regency of Thousand Islands.

A colonial capital of the Dutch East Indies Company (commonly known as VOC) in the past, Jakarta today has transformed into a mega city with a population exceeds 10,6 million (2016) in a total area of 661,5 km2. Together with its satellite towns, i.e. Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi, the agglomeration of Jakarta Metropolitan Region seems to be heading toward ‘global city’ status, given its supportive resources. While the core area of Jakarta has been evolving into a center for services and finance, the surrounding towns serve as industrial and new residential areas sustaining the growing population (Firman, 1998, 1999).

However, for a city that aspires to be global, Jakarta is still suffering from unresolved urbanization issues, such as housing shortage and environmental degradation, i.e. urban heat, air, and noise pollution resulting from its road and highway networks; not to mention the underlying flooding and land subsidence issues which are getting more severe in the last two decades. Besides its geographical location and heavy precipitation, anthropogenic factors such as massive urban development all over the region and negative behaviors are believed to intensify the hazard. In dealing with these problems, the former Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (colloquially known as Ahok), the successor of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) who became the president in 2014, opted for infrastructure-heavy solutions for flood controlling, despite many criticisms. Financially and technically supported by foreign investors, the measures include the restoration of several floodways throughout the city and the construction of a giant sea wall at the Jakarta Bay which lead to displacement of many poor communities in various locations along the rivers and the coastal area.

4.1 The Changing Politics and The Lurking Kampungs 4.1.1 Dutch Colonial Era

The Port City of Batavia Historically speaking, a ‘global city’ status has been embedded to Jakarta by the time the VOC came to Batavia (old Jakarta) in the first wave of imperialism in 1619 and made it a port city to expand its mercantile business in Asia. Inevitably, it became the center of worldwide exchange network with flows of goods, knowledge, capital, and not to mention slaves (Shannon et al., 2008:191-192).

Within more than three hundred years of colonization, the Dutch has tremendously transformed the colonial city’s urban form. Batavia in the 17th century was characterized by networks of THE CASE OF CILIWUNG RIVER

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Figure 4.2. Site plan of Batavia in 1753.

Artist: Pieter de Hondt. Source: http://media-kitlv.nl

Figure 4.3. Site plan of Batavia in1904.

The areas in orange are European settlement, whereas the areas in green are kampung settlement.

Source: http://media-kitlv.nl

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canals and regulated rivers channeling the Dutch’s canal system. The first to build was the fort and warehouses along Ciliwung riverbank to store the VOC’s commodities.

However, a massive fortification of the city happened in 1628 after the entire Batavia was razed during the siege of the Mataram Kingdom. Thus, it was subsequently constructed according to the Stevinian model as a means of a stronger military defense system. Even though the model did not plan for socio-spatial segregation, the majority of the labors were excluded from the city’s residential development and ended up living on swamps (Ibid, 2008). Unfortunately, a catastrophic malaria broke out in Batavia in 1733 and killed about 2,000-3,000 new European arrivals every year. It was seemingly due to the massive structural change of the canal system and the increasing fish ponds along the coastal area which triggered a sudden increase of mosquitoes breeding sites (Macdonald, 1957 in Brug, 1997). As the city became unhealthy, Batavia was finally dismantled in 1810. While the majority of the residents were relocated to the higher area in Weltervreden, the inner city was left to poor Indonesian Chinese and migrant traders from various ethnicity.

Ethical Policy At the beginning of the 20th century, the new Weltervreden area started to grow following the construction of Tanjung Priok port in the 1870s. Simultaneously, roads, trams, and other infrastructures were also installed to connect the new port with the old port Sunda Kelapa and Meester Cornelis area to the south. While the new European settlements were lined along the way to Weltervreden, kampungs, which accommodated the poor urban workers, emerged behind them in the flood-prone areas along the riverbank (Silver, 2007:44). To the Dutch government, kampung represented a high-density lower-class urban settlement that was underserviced (Ibid, 2007:61).

Between 1900-1940, Batavia grew more rapidly, especially since the enactment of the Dutch Ethical Policy, a responsibility to improve the welfare of their colonies. In that period, planners and architects were delegated from The Netherlands to help developing a new spatial plan for residential development which was ostensibly designed based on ‘ethnic segregation and apartheid spatial order’ (Evers & Korff, 2000, p. 183 in Wiryomartono, 2012). Prime areas such as Gondangdia, Menteng, and Meester Cornelis were assigned to the European middle class, surrounded by commercial blocks belong to migrant groups (i.e. Chinese, Indian, and Arab), whereas kampung people crowded the surrounding area outside the clusters (Wiryomartono, 2012; Silver, 2007:60). It marked the first phase of kampung’s spatial transformation in which many of them were emerged and raised the concerns on public health and services (Marcussen, 1990 in Silver, 2007:61).

4.1.2 After Independence The second phase continued after the nation’s Independence in 1945. In that period, the number of kampungs was rocketing due to a massive flow of migration triggered by insurgency and extreme poverty in rural Java (Marcussen, 1990). They were demanded by the city as labor forces, and since then congested the old inner district. While the old Batavia was visually abandoned and the coastal area was treated no more than a service ‘backyard’ with its port and other amenities, the focus of the nation-building was shifted to the inland area.

Not long after Jakarta was officially declared as Special Region of Capital City in 1960, President Sukarno took the opportunity to host the fourth Asian Games (1962) and Ganefo (Games of New Emerging Forces) in 1963. Aided by the Soviet, President Sukarno who was trained as an architectengineer concurrently launched an array of urban mega projects to transform and exhibit Jakarta not only as the nation’s ‘exemplary center’, but also as ‘the beacon of the New Emerging Forces’ of Asia (Kusno, 2000: 56-62). They included boulevards, Hotel Indonesia, Sarinah shopping mall, Senayan sports complex, and finally, the National Monument. There was also an attempt to expand the city’s boundary and create a larger metropolitan area. Assisted by the United Nations and the

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Dutch government, a master plan for new residential development on the outskirts was prepared referring to the Ebenezer Howard’s ‘garden city’ model which was booming in the West at that time. However, as the plan was catering the upper-middle class, the increasing concentration of deteriorating urban settlement in the old city center was hardly tackled (Silver, 2007: 122).

4.1.3 The New Order

Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) The third phase occurred after 1965 and it was a significant one because kampung was finally incorporated into the administrative and socio-political system of the newly established New Order regime. It led to the well-known Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) which was widely appreciated as slum-upgrading project initiative and awarded the Aga Khan in 1978. Appointed as the new governor of Jakarta in the last years of Sukarno’s regime, Ali Sadikin was determined to solve the city’s problems on services and management that had been neglected. Given the limited budget he had, Ali Sadikin’s strategy was to invest in the basic infrastructure improvement, such as paved street, drainage, sanitation, and social services such as education and health; and encourage the residents to continue improving their houses on their own. This project was considered successful for alleviating the poorest kampung condition (Marcussen, 1990 in Silver, 2007:139) even though the sustainability of it was still questionable since KIP was not incorporated in a larger spatial framework of the city (Steinberg, 1992 in Silver, 2007:139).

However, as the city continued growing, KIP seemed no longer a planning priority. Since the establishment of national housing agency, the National Corporation for the Development of Housing (Perusahaan Umum Pembangunan Perumahan Nasional, PERUMNAS), the focus of Jakarta’s urban development was directed towards the provision of private housing through the expansion of residential development to the outskirt areas (Silver, 2007:142-3). Not surprisingly, the upgraded kampung areas in the inner-city were later replaced by new business and commercial districts as well as high-end residential areas (Hudalah & Firman, 2012).

New Township Development Silver (2007) adds the fourth phase to mark the period between late 1980s and 2000 when a massive sprouting of new township development projects and land speculation occurred throughout the city involving large-scale displacement of many kampungs. Fueled by oil revenue, the development model in New Order’s era strongly reflects the “fragmentative interplay between global and local forces” (Rosenau and Wildsmith, 2013) for its dependence on investors and professionals expertise. It was also accompanied by the deregulation of many policies, particularly in automotive industry and investment. At the same time, a huge number of migrants, mostly from the hinterland, came to Jakarta as a consequence of a high demand of construction labors (Silver, 2007:60-62). They took up the ‘no man’s land’ which was usually under a legal dispute and started to embed in the socio-economical network of their surroundings and created what Peresthu (2002) refers as ‘squatter-kampungs’. Otherwise, they squeezed themselves into dilapidated units in older kampungs.

During the same period, an aspiration to be a ‘world city’ emerged following the rising economic growth of the city. This led to the changing landscape of the city which was promoted to attract more foreign investments as well as to boost local self-esteem (Silver, 2007:186-7; Firman, 1998).

A network of elevated highways was built along with shopping malls, office towers, and luxurious houses signifying an unprecedented progress of a ‘developmentalist’ regime that measures its achievement through the way the city is represented’ (Kusno, 2000). Behind all those buildings, kampungs were increasingly marginalized and victimized. During his administration, Governor Sutiyoso (1997-2006) necessarily positioned himself against illegal settlements, particularly along the Ciliwung riverbank, as well as street vendors, street musician, homeless, and pedicabs to discipline the informal sectors which has been represented as the ‘undesired part’ of the city.

According to Human Right Watch (2006), many tens of thousands of people were displaced with

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Figure 4.4.The emerging new towns and industrial estates all around Jakarta Metrpolitan Region in the late 1990s.

Note: Jakarta Waterfront City, Teluk Naga, Bukit Indah City and Bukit Jonggol Asri are not shown.

Source: Dick & Rimmer, 1998.

little notice and hardly compensated, let alone rehoused; and at worst, the displacement also involved open fires on community and setting aflame while people were still inside, making himself the cruelest governor in the history of Jakarta.1 However, his opposition, Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), asserts that the crude actions were supported by big developers, corporates, and eventually, President Megawati herself, whose interests are taking advantages from the slum clearance (Davis, 2007).

One Thousand Towers In the following years, the growing population and housing problems were not left unsolved. As Jakarta was prepared to be a world-class ‘service city’, the central government continues to urge Jakarta’s city administration to provide housing for low-income people, despite the land scarcity (Kusno, 2012). Sutiyoso’s successor, Fauzi Bowo (2007-2012) who actually preferred the provision of green space (Kusno, 2011) rather than low-cost apartment, eventually endorsed the 1,000 Towers program initiated by the central government which enabled private developers to take part in the provision of low-cost apartment targeting two million low-income people in Jakarta. But, as many have predicted, instead of producing subsidized units for the target groups, the program turned out to be a vehicle for private developers to sustain and expand their business on upper-middle class condominium, given the subsidy and its prime locations.

Consequently, the short-lived program came to an end in 2010 when the subsidy was stopped, causing many apartment constructions halted (Kusno, 2012).

4.2 The Mega City’s Urban Problems 4.2.1 Legal Dualism of Land At the heart of the housing problems in Jakarta lies the land rights issue which is resulted from the duality of legal systems where ‘Western’ land title and indigenous land title coexist and overlap each other. A long history of Dutch colonization in the country, especially the implementation of cultuurstelsel (cultivation system) policy, has created various land rights titles that become problematic in the present days.

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Leaf (1993), in his compelling article, describes three major categories of land rights in Indonesia which can be distinguished in today’s practice. The first category is girik rights or Tax Letter Right.

The land in this category is considered unregistered since they are inherited from the colonial system, but are fully legal. It recognizes the Indonesian-owned land on domein land (lands under control of the Dutch government) and the Indonesian-owned tanah usaha on eigendom (lands given over to private individuals). Both are now classified as ‘traditional ownership right’ and considered temporary or transitional. The second one is the rights on land owned by Europeans or foreigners (eigendom particuliere) which were revoked after Independence and expropriated as ‘state lands’.

However, within this category, there are also rights on garapan (arable) land or Use Right, which was formerly named tanah kongsi. Due to the government’s lack of inventory of state lands, the expropriated lands have been perpetually used and claimed by inhabitants who constitute today’s kampungs. It is not the same as ‘squatting’ since it is informally registered in kelurahan or sub-district administration (Kusno, 2012). Moreover, the data shows that the majority of lands in Jakarta’s kampungs are unregistered and comprises either girik or garapan rights (Hoffman and Marbun, 1990 in Leaf, 1993). Additionally, Leaf (1993) suggests that the identification of both land rights in any particular kampung should be based on the continuous occupancy proof, such as tax payments and its historical context since garapan land are dominant in the area which has a close relation with the Dutch in the past.

The third category is the registered land rights derived after the enactment of Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) in Sukarno’s era in 1960. It is a system that supersedes the land certification conducted

by National Land Agency (NLA, Badan Pertanahan Nasional). It is also where the aforementioned unregistered lands are legally recorded under the National law. However, Leaf (1993) points out that the new system has apparently created another dualism, referred to as ‘administrative’ dualism, because the procedures to obtain registered lands are explicitly exclusive to real-estate sectors. These include ‘obtaining permits for any building construction, using only permitted materials, building to standardized densities and space requirements and with prescribed setbacks for property lines, and maintaining only proper residential activities in a zoned residential area’ with a total cost that might exceed the basic fees paid to the National Land Agency. Ironically, this system is becoming the case for kampung removal rather than facilitating land certification for girik holders as it was intended before (Kusno, 2012).

Moreover, the practice was common during Soeharto’s New Order era in the 1990s where large tracts of state lands were converted into plantation estates, golf courses, and speculative lands by developers, which are apparently linked to Soeharto’s family. It happened all over the country and led to ‘a dramatic resurgence of agrarian protests across Indonesia’ to reclaim the ‘seized’ lands and became the determinant of reformation in post-Soeharto era (Lucas and Warren, 2003).

4.2.2 Perennial Floods Apart from the issues of rapid growth, land tenure, and housing for all, Jakarta has also been suffering from the underlying issue of flooding. It has been Jakarta’s yearly event since the arrival of VOC in the city, given its location in the lowland area of the island. Moreover, it starts to get more severe and frequent from every five-year cycle to whenever it rains and has put the most vulnerable groups who live in flood-prone areas at risk of recurrent flood hazard. With the unprecedented urban growth in the recent decades, it is observable that most of the causes are apparently man-made. Steinberg (2007) points out that the insufficient carrying capacity of flood control infrastructure, uncontrolled garbage dumping, which narrows the river basin and lessens the waterway capacity, and an increasing waterproof areas due to deforestation and urbanization have aggravated the impact of floods.

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no effective measures made until a major flood hit in 2002 that led to the implementation of Eastern Flood Canal (Akmalah & Grigg, 2011; Caljouw et al., 2005). While technical solutions to flooding are being proposed, the authorities tend to approach the problem with risk management rather than a comprehensive solution (Caljouw et al., 2005). They disregard the fact that Jakarta is becoming more densely populated which adds to the high vulnerability of the city to the hazard.

Moreover, the pre-eminence of technical solutions to flooding will implicitly specify the hazard as a mere natural phenomenon, neglecting other causes from human activities (Padawangi and Douglass, 2015). Additionally, they argue that the government has depoliticized disasters as flood risk reduction reason is used to remove the marginalized riverbank settlers by saying that it is for the sake of their own safety but at the same time accusing them for worsening the hazard (Ibid, 2015).

Conversely, some studies point out that community participation is crucial in flood mitigation efforts to enhance the institutions and community’s preparedness and reduce the impacts of flood disasters. Empirical data shows that people at risk who are usually residing in many informal settlements in Jakarta are able to perform ‘a high degree of social cohesion, as well as robust forms of self-organization, self-regulation and self-reliance’ in dealing with precarious environment (i.e. flooding events) (Wilhelm, 2010; also in Simarmata, 2015; Marschiavelli, 2008).

A more collaborative planning that puts forward the strengthening of communication and coordination among all stakeholders and community empowerment is suggested to achieve a better flood risk management in the future (Simarmata, 2016; Padawangi et al., 2014; Sunarharum et al., 2014; Akmalah & Grigg, 2011; Marschiavelli, 2008). A combination of structural and nonstructural measures is highly needed by DKI Jakarta, as flooding in a mega city poses multidimensional situations (Padawangi & Douglas, 2015; Caljouw et al., 2005). Thus, it has to reckon other urban development issues, such as spatial planning, housing, water resources, and solid waste management by involving the whole Jabodetabek to find real solutions for the chronic flooding issue (Sagala, 2013; Caljouw et al. 2005).

Unfortunately, another flood event occurred in 2007 and recorded as the deadliest as it caused at least 80 people died, 500,000 people lost their homes, and approximately USD 967 million of damage.2 Seventy percent of the city was inundated for days and the water level reached up to 4 meters above ground in some parts (Steinberg, 2007). The hazard had not been mitigated yet when as much as 29 people were killed and other 37,799 were displaced in 2013.3

4.3 Large-scale Urban Development Projects 4.3.1 Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project (JUFMP) Despite all studies that are focusing on community involvement in flood risk management, the government still goes for top-down engineering-dominated interventions. On July 2013, the long-delayed Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project (JUMFP) was finally launched. Aided by the World Bank, this project costs as much as US$190 million and is projected to be finished in twoyears’ time. It consists of two components, (1) the dredging of 11 floodways with total length of 67.5 kilometers, four retention basins with total area of 65.1 hectares, and 42.2 kilometers of embankment to improve the flow capacity, and (2) assistance for project management, social safeguards, and capacity building to enhance institutional coordination and tackle technical issues.

The latter part includes the establishment of Flood Management Information System, Resettlement Action Plan, Grievance Redress System, and Panel of Experts.4 A Joint Steering Committee was also formed to supervise the preparation and implementation of the project as well as to provide coordination and advisory support at the policy level. It is led by the National Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan National, BAPPENAS) and comprises representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public Works (MoPW), and the provincial government of DKI Jakarta. The Directorate General of THE CASE OF CILIWUNG RIVER

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Water Resources (DGWR) of Ministry of Public Works (MoPW) takes up the role as the JUFMP’s executing agency and establishes Project Management Unit (PMU) accordingly to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the project. The PMU comprises staffs from DGWR, Directorate General of Human Settlements (Cipta Karya, referred as DGCK) of MoPW, and DKI Jakarta.

Each of them is responsible for project coordination and implementation of the assigned project locations and linked sites. The latter category are not included in JUFMP financial scheme but are significantly related and targeted by the authorities to guarantee the accomplishment of the project’s goals (see Figure 4.6).5

4.3.2.The Giant Sea Wall On top of the flood mitigation projects is the construction of a giant seawall and the reclamation of 17 man-made islands on the coast of Jakarta which is determined by the success of the JUFMP. Introduced in the rise of climate change awareness in 2016 as the National Capital Integrated Coastal Development (NCICD), the project aims to minimize land subsidence and tidal flooding.

Supported by the government of The Netherlands and South Korea who are renowned for their sea defense technology, it proposes an offshore solution through the construction of an outer sea wall in the Jakarta Bay. At the same time, the project also promotes a waterfront development model for Indonesian cities in accordance with President Jokowi’s vision to put Indonesia as the “Global Maritime Axis”.

The giant sea wall provides 7.7 meters-high sea defense protection walls which are strengthened by the 17 artificial islands. The structure forms three retention lakes to which water from all the rivers flowing through Jakarta are discharged and processed as raw water. In the later phases, about 45 per cent of the 5,100-hectares reclamation lands will be sold to private developers for new real-estate development comprising residential, business, and commercial district which will occupy nearly half of the buildable area (see Figure 4.6).6 The composition is not without thorough calculation. According to the NCICD master plan, the government of Indonesia needs at least USD 26.5 billion to finance the infrastructure which can partially be covered through landselling and revenue generated from the new highways and port extension planned in the later phases. This financing concept was ‘a distinct wish of the Indonesian Ministry of National Planning’.7 Nevertheless, given its top-down and exclusive nature, the project approaches inevitably led to many critics and protests that accused it as favoring elite capitalists, not public interest.8 Moreover, the tension is aggravated by the fact that the city administration has been conducting forced evictions throughout North Jakarta in the past three years to make way for the implementation of NCICD project. In January 2017, the Jakarta Administrative Court accepted a lawsuit against PT. Pembangunan Jaya Ancol filed by fisherman communities and environmental activists. It stipulated the withdrawal of reclamation permits for Island F, I, and K due to incomplete environmental impact assessment (AMDAL). Without comprehensive analyses, the implementation of NCICD project will consequently destroy hectares of aquaculture and thousands of fishermen livelihoods as it obstructs their fishing grounds and forces them to relocate. Currently, the project is still under a moratorium due to incomplete feasibility study and legal challenges, suspending all the on-going construction works in the bay area.

Notes [1] Human Right Watch, 2006. Condemned communities: Forced evictions in Jakarta. Available at: https://www. hrw.org/reports/2006/indonesia0906/ [Accessed 3 Aug 2017].

[2] Dartmouth Flood Observatory (DFO), 2007. Global Register of Major Flood Events. http://www.dartmouth. edu/~floods/Archives/2007sum.htm [Accessed 29 Jul. 2017].

[3] Reliefweb, 2013. Floods in Jakarta and Its Greater Area ? Situation Report No. 03 as of 22 Jan. 2013. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/floods?jakarta?and?its?greater?area?situation?report?no?03?22?january?2013 [Accessed 29 Jul. 2017].

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Figure 4.5.The NCICD Master Plan depicts the western bassin in phase 2 with Garuda-shape islands and the eastern bassin in phase 3 with harbor extention. Source: KuiperCompagnons/Dutch Water Sector

Figure 4.6. Map of JUFMP Project shows the locations of Project Sites and Linked Sites conducted by different agencies.

Source: Ministry of Public Works

Outer Sea Wall DGCK (3 locations) DGWR (4 locations) DKI (9 locations) Linked Site

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[4] Ministry of Public Works and Housing, 2011. JUFMP: Environmental and Social Management Framework. Jun 2011. Available at: http://www.pu.go.id/images/uploads/banner/Ntc_110729114755_L3_Eng.pdf [Accessed 29 Jul 2017].

[5] Ibid, 2011.

[6] Based on joint publication released by Dutch-funded NGOs, BothEnds, SOMO, and TNI, 2017. Social justice at bay. The Dutch role in Jakarta’s coastal defense and land reclamation project. Available at: http://www.bothends.org/ en/Publications/document/177/Social-justice-at-bay-The-Dutch-role-in-Jakartas-coastal-defence-and-land-reclamation [Accessed 22 Apr. 2017].

[7] Ibid, 2017.

[8] The Jakarta Post, 2016. Green light for reclamation shows govt caters to capitalists not public: Activist. [online] 14 St. 2016. Available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/09/14/green-light-for-reclamation-shows-govt-catersto-capitalists-not-public-activist.html [Accessed 11 Aug. 2017].

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5 DEMOLITION OF KAMPUNGS Stories from Ciliwung’s Middle Stream

At the beginning of 2017, Jakarta State Administrative Court finally granted a class action to the lawsuit filed by 90 residents of Kampung Bukit Duri against the eviction notice carried out by the municipal government of South Jakarta in September 2016, declaring it as ‘illegal’ and lawviolating. According to Vera Soemarwi, the lawyer of Kampung Bukit Duri’s residents, the Governor Regulation no. 163/2012, which specifies the location of river normalization project’s first package from Manggarai Watergate to Kampung Melayu and enables the authorities to conduct eviction, has been expired by 5 October 2015. The city government has also violated Law no. 2/2012 which is used as a legal basis for land acquisition in Environment Impact Assessment (AMDAL) that had been conducted beforehand. The law stipulates proper procedures of land acquisition for development of public interest, including data collection and land ownership identification processes, and ensures reasonable and fair compensation to the entitled parties who lose their land and nonland assets for the project. Lastly, on the eviction day, the authorities also employed irrelevant regulation concerning public order, instead of all abovementioned. 1 It should be emphasized that the residents of Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo (the neighboring kampung which has been evicted earlier) are never against the river normalization project. They just demand a fair compensation and a more humane relocation process as once was promised by Jokowi and Ahok at the beginning of their administration, “menggeser bukan menggusur” (shifting instead of displacing). However, instead of having the promise implemented, the city government changed the direction and crusaded eviction to riverbank communities. As noted by Soemarwi, the riverbank kampungs have been labeled as the ‘ungrateful poor people’ (as they rejected the subsidized low-cost apartments provided by the government), ‘illegal’ squatters, the cause of flooding, as well as disrupting public order due to building houses on the riverbank.

However, all those stigmas have been proven wrong as the kampung residents are happened to hold proofs of land and property ownership at hand. According to her, from 360 plots that have been evicted, the majority of the landowner hold verponding on behalf of three landlords (H. Rais, H. Basuki, and Moestopa) dated back from 1902; whilst 13 residents hold Sertifikat Hak Milik (SHM, property ownership certificate) and Hak Guna Bangunan (HGB, building usage rights); and 16 residents hold the notarial deed of sale and purchase. The rest include informal deed of sale, purchase note and receipt, grant, and inheritance. 2

5.1 A Former Meester Cornelis Both Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo are situated facing each other on the meandering segment of Ciliwung river’s middle stream. Separated by the river, both kampungs are administratively located in two different sub-districts; Kampung Bukit Duri is part of Bukit Duri sub-district in Tebet, South Jakarta; meanwhile, Kampung Pulo is part of Kampung Melayu subdistrict in Jatinegara, East Jakarta. Given its geographical location, both kampungs have been suffering from frequent riverine flooding, especially in a period of heavy rain.

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The history of these kampungs can be traced back to the 16th century when it was initially an area owned by Meester Cornelis van Senen, a Christian preacher and teacher who fled his hometown in Banda Islands in the eastern part of Indonesia to Batavia. He was then given an area of five square kilometers about 12 kilometers southeast of Kasteel Batavia between Cipinang and Ciliwung river to cultivate for plantation and logging businesses. Before it was incorporated into Batavia in 1936, Meester Cornelis was an important satellite town (gementee) which has significantly grown as a busy commercial and residential areas, following the completion of Daendels’ Grote Postweg in 1811 and the establishment of railway connection from Meester Cornelis and Buitenzorg (now Bogor) in 1875 as well as tramway that connect the area with Old Batavia in 1881. The provision of some public transportation modes serving the area, however, signifies the importance of Meester Cornelis in that era (Poerbo, 2006).

Meester Cornelis died in 1661 but his name remained as the name of the area until the nation’s Independence. While the majority of lands in Meester Cornelis were later converted into Dutch-owned land, according to Sandyawan Sumardi, the head of Ciliwung Merdeka Foundation (interviewed in Jakarta in April 2017), Cornelis van Senen also inherited some of the lands to the locals in Kampung Pulo. However, in 1689 some parts of the land were fenced with bamboo barbed wire to protect them from Mataram and Banten military conquest that were threatening Batavia at that time. Thus, the area was later known as Bukit Doeri (old spelling, Thorn Hill) (Zaenuddin and Zidane, 2012). Since then, the area of Meester Cornelis and Bukit Doeri have attracted many migrants who were coming from the hinterland and rural Java to come and reside by paying taxes to the appointed landlords whose were granted verponding by the Dutch. That was apart from the existing inhabitants who were native Jakarta (Betawi) and other Chinese, Arabic, Padangnese and Batakese descendants. However, they still maintain a strong interdependency with their relatives in rural origins for there will be constant flows of people and money, especially during and after the holiday season of Eid al-Fitr where kampung people go back to their hometown and sometimes bring along their relatives when returning to Jakarta. This fact, however, creates residency problems as the number of people coming to and residing in Jakarta is gradually increased (Tilley, 2013). While kampung is seen as an arrival as well as a starting point for the new comers, it might be regarded by the city administration, which, nonetheless, puts kampung as a subject to government’s ‘control.’

5.2 Ciliwung Merdeka Foundation Ciliwung Merdeka (hereafter referred as CM) was established after a major flood occurred in Bukit Duri sub-district in 2000. Started as Sanggar (studio) Ciliwung Merdeka in RT 06 RW 12 which was built to facilitate alternative education and empowerment activities, CM aims to raise awareness and build solidarity as well as independence among riverbank communities, especially in coping with perennial flooding. Thus, when another major flood hit in 2002, not only that Bukit Duri residents managed to survive themselves, but also were able to help other flood victims in several disaster points all over Jakarta as they provided emergency aid, communal kitchen, and mobile medical service. Since then, they have also been actively involved and contributing to humanitarian and relief works throughout the country, such as helping landslide victims in West Java, tsunami victims in Aceh, as well as conflict victims in Kalimantan.3 In 2008, CM officially became a legal entity as a foundation which is run by a ‘work community’ consisting people of Kampung Bukit Duri, the neighboring Kampung Pulo, and CM’s Humanitarian Works Network. Their movements have also evolved from building solidarity among kampung residents into the improvement of the physical condition of their living environment. Therefore, in the following years, they initiated the construction of retaining walls alongside the riverbank, a composting house to process domestic waste in Kampung Pulo, eretan (bamboo rafts to connect both kampungs); and the installment of distillation pump for clean water in several locations within Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo. Sandyawan Sumardi, the initiator and the head 46 |

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of CM, believes that to make a social transformation in a certain area, first of all, there must be a shift in the mentality of the people. It is followed by a change in the social system, including communication and cooperation among the inhabitants as well as between the inhabitants and other internal parties. Finally, improvement of spatial and environmental conditions of kampung is needed, not to mention the people’s attitude towards them.4 Therefore, in 2009, CM initiated to conduct spatial and historical mapping in Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo (see Figure 5.3) which led to the development of an alternative design of ‘Kampung Susun’ (stacked / multi-story kampung).

5.3 The Socioeconomic Web of Kampung People Today, Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo are densely populated areas with over 48,000 people within a square kilometer, dwelling in rather informal settlements (Vollmer et al, 2015).

They are like the miniature of Indonesia where people from diverse ethnic groups are living together.5 With the majority of the livelihoods relying on the informal sector, the residents are typically but not exclusively low-income families with a minimum monthly wage rate of IDR 2.2 million (~EUR 144) (Vollmer et al., 2015). Additionally, located in the vicinity of two train stations of Manggarai and Jatinegara as well as a regional market, both Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo are flourished with micro-entrepreneurial activities, such as home-based food industry and street vendor. The market itself is a source of regular customers as well as suppliers for them.6 Some of them also open up warung (small kiosk) in their houses, selling food, snacks, or other everyday needs to serve their neighborhood (Hellman, 2015), sometimes also allowing a certain way of trade mechanism (i.e. paying at the end of the month). However, they have not yet been recognized, let alone accommodated by the city government.

Moreover, despite their entrepreneurial capability, kampung people are often seen as ‘parasitic burden’ to the economy and ecology of Jakarta for causing traffic jams, fires, and floods, even though in reality they have been an important part of the production of the city (Tilley, 2013).

Therefore, in an attempt to document and showcase their business profile and contribution to the wider economy network of the city, the residents of Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo with the assistance of CM mapped and documented micro businesses within their kampungs. As

Figure 5.1. Activities in Ciliwung Merdeka In clockwise order: (a) ‘eretan’ (bamboo raft) connecting two kampungs; (b) a volunteer teaching ballet dance; (c) flood rescue; (d) Pasar Rakyat (People’s Market); (e) garbage bank; (f) participatory mapping for KSBD Source: Ciliwung Merdeka

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JATINEGARA REGIONAL MARKET

500M

SMUN 8

CM train depot

BALI MESTER SUB-DISTRICT

tine

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Santa Maria school complex

at Bar

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Hermina hospital

KAMPUNG MELAYU SUB-DISTRICT CM

RUSUNAWA JATINEGARA BARAT

LEGEND Affected neighborhood Evicted household Economic activity Old house Sacred grave Mosque Tree Water pump

BUKIT DURI SUB-DISTRICT

Jl. KH Abdul Syafi’ie

Figure 5.2. Map of Kampung’s Potentials superimposed with the JUFMP’s affected area in Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo.

Source: Ciliwung Merdeka and various newspapers, re-drawn by author

Figure 5.3. Map of Kampung’s Potentials based on participatory mapping in Kampung Pulo. Source: Ciliwung Merdeka

illustrated below, the distribution of their goods covers various locations in the city, including those of wealthier neighborhood in Kelapa Gading. Additionally, Sumardi suggests that these kinds of economic activities can thrive anywhere and survive in any situation. He recalls that when the monetary crisis hit Jakarta in 1997, their businesses endured.7 Moreover, as old-kampungs are getting more and more isolated and marginalized in the midst of the rapid urban transformation of the city, the government tend to confuse them as ‘squatters’ who do not have any economic use (Tilley, 2013). In fact, the long occupation of Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo inhabitants can be proven by the existence of hundred years old Islamic graves and houses within Kampung Pulo as well as various types of land certificate held by the residents, which apparently becomes problematic in the later days.

5.4 In Times of Flooding The most severe flooding in Jakarta occurred in 2007 when almost 60 percent of the city’s area was inundated. In Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo alone, the water level reached more than 5 meters with duration up to 15 days (Marschiavelli, 2008). However, as it has been a regular event in Jakarta, living with floods has become an attitude. Without diminishing the reported number of loss and hardship, Hellman (2015) suggests that the majority of the inhabitants of Jakarta consider floods as unavoidable and ‘normal’ (biasa). Moreover, it is not surprising that with a close social relation, the residents of Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo have generated particular coping strategies based on their long-experiences in dealing with floods. Those include informal warning system, security system to protect their valuable belongings, evacuation procedure, as well as post-flooding activities (van Voorst, 2016; Hellman, 2015; Wilhelm, 2011; see also Simarmata, 2015 for flood resilience study in a district in North Jakarta).

For early warning system, they rely on communication structure with sluice gate keeper in Manggarai or their relatives who live in the upper stream area as formal warning system is usually bureaucratic and time-consuming. Thus, by the time a warning alarm rang from the top of the mosque, they have relocated themselves to a safer place (van Voorst, 2016; Wilhelm, 2011). When floods occur, their belongings are moved to the second floor of the house and at least one family member will stay at the rooftop to prevent looting (van Voorst, 2016; Hellman, 2015; Wilhelm, 2011). As van Voorst (2016) observed, during floods, kampung residents also tend to refuge to self-built shelters rather than to the ones provided by kelurahan (sub-district). She points out that there is widespread distrust in kelurahan officials as they are always believed to have other agenda to eradicate their kampung while their homes are left unattended. Therefore, whatever comes from kelurahan is seen as a ‘trick’ to fool them (Ibid, 2016).

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boats while delivering food or emergency kits to those who were trapped in the upper floors or rooftop of their houses (Hellman, 2015). Further, the ropes were also used as a collective hanger to dry clothes after the flood has receded.8 As floods retreat, the residents will return to their houses and start to clean out their houses, streets, and drainage systems from mud with the help of neighbors, and try to get back to their normal routine (Ibid, 2015).

However, their experiences in dealing with floods are not without emotional distress or material loss which burden their households each year. During his fieldwork in Kampung Pulo, Hellman (2015) found out that the affected families were also complaining about the difficulties in getting basic needs during and after flooding as electricity was cut and clean water was scarce. There were also hassles in distributing donation and in spending additional costs for renovating their houses from damages. However, apart from the social network that has existed among the residents, head of Rukun Tetangga (RT), who is usually a charismatic and trusted leader, still plays an important role in bridging the communication among and between the affected families with external parties, such as kelurahan officials, NGOs, and/ or donors. For instance, sometimes the head of RT has to mediate a case of stress-induced domestic violence apart from his duty to communicate with kelurahan to provide them with emergency aid (Hellman, 2015). In the end, this kind of bond created between the residents and a particular person may become both strength and weakness.

On the one hand, this relationship ties them to a specific location and neighborhood (Hellman, 2015), but on the other, it can be problematic when it comes to resettlement plan as the head of RT also takes a role as an official representation of municipal government.

5.5 From Threat to Initiative 5.5.1 A Political Campaign

At the end of July 2012, Jokowi and Ahok came to CM on a separate occasion as a candidate pair for Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. Accompanied by their supporting parties, they intended to gain political support from kampung residents. At that time, the rumor about relocation plan has spread throughout kampung as the Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project (JUFMP, widely known as ‘river normalization project’) has just been launched earlier in January which includes Manggarai Watergate to Kampung Melayu segment as the first package. It, nonetheless, became the main concern conveyed to the pair on the discussion. According to Sumardi, the occasion was used to address the kampung residents’ rights as Indonesian citizens to adequate housing and protection from forced evictions. However, as legitimate Indonesian citizens, they are also aware of their obligations to reify the ideology of the nation (Pancasila) and the 1945 Constitution; to comply with all laws and regulations in the country, especially in the Special Province of DKI Jakarta, in order to realize the development of a humane, just and civilized city of Jakarta. Therefore, in response to relocation plan, they proposed a conceptual design of Kampung Susun as an alternative solution which will allow them to stay in their land but still in accordance with the river normalization plan.9 Nevertheless, as an activist who has been dedicating his life advocating urban poor, Sumardi has learned from more than 20 years of experiences in dealing with politicians, regardless their reputation. He was also skeptical with the new regime, even though he saw it as ‘different from the predecessors’. On the day Jokowi came back to CM, a day after his inauguration as the elected governor of Jakarta in 16 October 2012, Sumardi managed to summon 14 other communities which have similar problems with land title, spatial plan, and environment as witnesses, and to give them opportunity to express their concerns.

“Before, I used to be an activist who initiated PAWANG (Paguyuban Warga Anti Penggusuran / Anti-Eviction Residents’ Community) in 2003 and organized a protest in DPR (Parliament) against Sutiyoso’s eviction policy.10 I also engaged academics and professionals such as architects and urban planners (formed as Forkim: Forum Permukiman/Human Settlements Forum) and proposed an alternative solution for resettlement. To me, eviction policy is anti-

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intellectual as it does not allow alternative solutions. At that time, Forkim and I were facilitated

by Sekretaris Daerah (Regional Secretary) to find alternative locations for resettlement. But after several meetings, the proposal was rejected.They argued that the program is not included in the fiscal years.Therefore, it should be canceled,” Sumardi recalls.11 At that moment, he presented about Kampung Susun for Bukit Duri (KSBD) proposal based on CM’s findings on five mapping categories that have been done in Kampung Bukit Duri (started in RT 6 in RW (Rukun Warga) 12, now including RT 3 in RW 11, as well as RT 3 and RT 6 in RW 10). They cover geography, demography, economy, historical anthropology, as well as land ownership. Jokowi who was already aware of relocation procedure as stipulated in the World Bank’s Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) which entails compensation and resettlement package was impressed by the ideas and subsequently mandated the representative of Housing and Administrative Buildings Agency (HABA-DKI) to follow up the proposal.12 He renamed it as Kampung Deret (kampung in a row) and promised to build another 27 kampungs all over the city in various themes.13 After the visit, CM simultaneously took a position as a facilitator for Kampung Bukit Duri’s residents to access information about relevant regulations and policies concerning resettlement plans, which are often held by local officials according to their agenda. Ciliwung Merdeka tried to raise awareness about the importance of protecting land as a vital asset as well as a meaningful place that bonds their life history with Ciliwung river. However, as the residents have acknowledged their weak position against eviction given their living location and environment, not to mention their poor economic condition, they posed different tendencies towards compensation and resettlement packages. In this case, CM also has to deal with gaps in knowledge and multiplicity of interests among the residents.14 Apparently, Kampung Pulo, which is located opposite to Kampung Bukit Duri, was also affected by the project. The residents knew nothing about it as the notification was suspected to be kept by the local officials. Moreover, in 2014, the city government launched Local Regulation no. 1/2014 stipulating Detailed Spatial Plan for Jakarta in which Kampung Pulo is reserved for floodway area and vertical housings. This fact inevitably triggered anxiety among the residents and concurrently urged CM to start advocating them.

5.5.2 Kampung Susun Proposal Kampung Susun is basically a multi-story public housing that adopts the characteristic of kampung life which will be built on-site. It dedicates its ground floor for social interaction and economic activities to take places, be that meeting, gathering, and marketplace. Besides, the building blocks are densified to respond the number of residents that have to be accommodated but are staggered to respect the topography and no higher than five stories. Those are to achieve construction cost efficiency and to allow eyes-on-the-street as many of the residents who make a living as street vendors park their carts in front of the house, as well as to monitor their children playing outside.15 In developing Kampung Susun proposal for both kampungs, CM worked side by side with a handful of architects, lawyers, community facilitators, hydrologists, urban planners, and researchers, addressing the issues on social, spatial, legal, and environmental aspects of the kampungs. However, for Kampung Pulo case, the idea was also to create flood-resilient buildings which adapt to water level rise during rainy days. After conducting data collection through participatory mapping with both Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo’s residents, CM called for design proposals and selected scheme prepared by Yu Sing. He is a young Indonesian architect renowned for his mission of providing ‘affordable housing for all’ with his studio, Akanoma. Additionally, to finance the project, CM and the residents proposed a 50:30:20 scheme where 50 per cent of the budget will be covered by the government, while 30 per cent tackled by the residents through collective housing

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Figure 5.4.The conceptual idea of Kampung Susun for Bukit Duri (KSBD) which allows the residents to incrementally build their houses in the provided basic structure. Source: Community Architects Network (CAN)

savings and the other 20 per cent by private investors. The residents will then incrementally construct their units according to the provided basic structure.

While Kampung Deret (or KSBD) idea was still uncertain, Ahok, the successor of Jokowi, gave the proposal of Kampung Susun for Kampung Pulo (KSKP) his blessing, only that the project should be executed by HABA-DKI because there is no regulation for community action plan. Thus, resettlement package was offered. Moreover, Ika Lestari Aji, the head of HABA-DKI after holding a public hearing with CM also stated that the city government agreed to give fair compensation to the affected families regardless their legal status.16 However, Sumardi figured out that the majority of the attendees who were representing different government agencies seemed to have no sufficient information or were acutely not aware of Kampung Pulo’s case. The meeting was finally abrupted.17 Lastly, a week after he made promises, Ahok changed his mind once again, claimed that the residents had occupied the land illegally, and instructed that they had to move as soon as possible and with no right to get compensation.18

5.6 Eviction Process 5.6.1 A ‘Shock Therapy’

“It was still on the week of Independence Day’s celebration.We thought eviction will not come sooner. On the night of August 19, 2017, we were gathering in Habib Soleh’s house when our neighbor came in panic, telling us that backhoes have been parked near our kampung. The eviction was real. We waited in our terraces the rest of the night and kept our eyes open to prevent any undesired thing from happening. In the early morning, a commotion ensued, people protested as the authorities started demolishing our homes without cutting off the electricity beforehand. It was then halted for a moment. We concurrently went back home to take our most important documents and belongings as much as we can and refuge them to the nearby vacant land.When a backhoe torn down my house, I could not help but cried.That was the first time I cried as an adult,” Uming, a 60 years old resident of Kampung Pulo recalled.19 On August 20, 2015, a clash occurred in Kampung Pulo. Tear gas was hurled at people, and a backhoe was burned down after a joint force of 2,500 personnel of the National Police, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), and the Public Order Agency (Satpol PP) demolishing 518 houses in three RWs and relocating the evictees to Rusunawa Jatinegara Barat, neglecting the legal process that was still underway. The protesters were expressing their resentment towards the uncertain and unclear decision regarding the evicted area, relocation, and compensation, while an oknum20 took advantage of the situation with provocation which turned out to be out of

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Figure 5.5.The design proposal of Kampung Susun for Kampung Pulo (KSKP) which responds to flooding and increases the density to rehouse the entire kampung. Source: Ciliwung Merdeka

control.21 However, the operation was unfortunately claimed legal by the Jakarta State Administrative Court as it was carried out in accordance with the legislation. According to Sumardi, there were political frauds suspected in the legal process as the presiding judge was relocated to another court before the testimony and some witnesses were also bribed.22 This fact automatically engendered fear and anxiety among Kampung Bukit Duri’s residents who were facing eviction threats in the coming months. To them, Kampung Pulo eviction has showcased that resistance is useless and there is no way to win against the government.23 Nevertheless, learning from this event, CM subsequently took a preventive strategy by preparing sufficient shreds of evidence to be used in the court for Kampung Bukit Duri’s case, including pictures and documentation of houses and land certificates.

5.6.2 The Last People’s Market Festival On January 12, 2016, the first eviction in Kampung Bukit Duri was carried out in RT 11, 12 and 15 in RW 10 located at the lowest point of the area. Again, the operation neglected the ongoing legal process. About 163 households in that neighborhood relocated to Rusunawa Cipinang Besar Selatan and Pulo Gebang.24 However, in this case, most of the residents voluntarily dismantled their houses before eviction as the district officials have warned them. According to Naswadi, a resident who has moved to Rusunawa Cipinang Besar Selatan, the official told them that they would suffer more losses if they refused to relocate to rusunawa, so they preferred to obey.25 Amidst the increasing distress among residents of Kampung Bukit Duri, CM took an initiative to hold the annual “Bukit Duri People’s Market Festival,” perhaps for the last time as a means of enhancing community spirit and encouraging the residents to dare to claim compensation. Besides culinary, music, and dance performance, the event also featured discussions and a workshop concerning spatial plan and policy related to river normalization project, inviting urban activists and academics. On that event, a consolidation to sue for class action was also initiated. It includes the affected families in RT 6 in RW 12, RW 10 and RW 11 (102 plots in total).

5.6.3 The Eviction Days On August 30, 2016, the first notice of the second eviction was received, delivered by personnel of Public Order Agency (Satpol PP) and kelurahan (sub-district) officials who roamed around Kampung Bukit Duri, banging on doors at midnight. The next day, a meeting was held by kelurahan officials to ‘socialize’ the relocation plan. The residents were assembled and join the meeting without filling out the attendance list as, based on previous experiences, it will be accounted as a proof of ‘agreement.’ On that occasion, the officials persuaded the residents to voluntarily move to THE CASE OF CILIWUNG RIVER

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rusunawa as everything has been provided.

“Living in rusunawa is more humane than in here.You all came to Jakarta from kampung (rural village) with a single suitcase, so it should be very easy to pack your things up and move to rusunawa,” Suryani recalled the mockery said by the officials.26 The following day, with the assistance of LBH Jakarta (Jakarta Legal Aid Institute), a lawsuit was filed against the eviction notice, questioning its authority and legality, and thus requesting for a delay. However, a week later, the second eviction notice came still. At that time, about 200 households decided to move to rusunawa, meanwhile, the remaining residents were gathered and directed into a guided tour to Rusunawa Rawa Bebek, 15 kilometers from their kampung.

They were given second chance to think about moving to rusunawa, the only option for them.

Nevertheless, the ones who are involved in the lawsuit are not entitled the option.

Mulyadi, the head of RT 6 RW 12, who gets involved in the class action added that from all the struggle processes, he felt utterly disappointed to see residents choosing to surrender one by one.

They decided to move to the provided rusunawa. Moreover, instead of being encouraged, he was cornered and considered ungrateful by his neighbors.27 Finally, the last notice sent on September 20, 2106, despite the ongoing legal process, followed

Figure 5.6.The Demolition Day Kampung Bukit Duri, Sept. 2016 (a) Sandyawan Sumardi led the peaceful rally during the eviction. Courtesy of Robertus Belarminus/Kompas (b) A backhoe was demolishing houses on the bank of Ciliwung river. Courtesy of Andrey Gromico (c) Tanah negara? Kok bayar pajak!!!

(State lands? Why did we pay taxes!!!)

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(d) People watching as a backhoe was tearing down houses. Courtesy of Rendy MR (e) Rumah susun bukan solusi.

(Rental apartment is not a solution).

Courtesy of Adhi Wicaksono (f) Youth and activist groups were watching in tears the demolition of Sanggar Ciliwung Merdeka. Courtesy of Garry Andrew Lotulung/ Kompas

Community Responses to Displacement Threats in Flood-prone Areas

by a major eviction one week later. However, unlike Kampung Pulo, the evacuation went without violent protest. Sumardi took the lead in a peaceful rally as Satpol PP and four backhoes started to raze their houses. They were displaying dignity for they stood still even though they were treated unfairly. Interviewed in the location, the representative of Public Order Agency argued that the operation could not be postponed as they had to keep up with the construction deadline.28 According to an official report published by LBH Jakarta, no less than 363 households were demolished on that day, including Sanggar Ciliwung Merdeka.29 Further, as this paper is written, eviction reoccurred in the mid of July 2017, causing another 358 households destroyed. In total, 884 households in Kampung Bukit Duri have been removed, marking an era of the massive forced eviction regime.

Notes [1] Ciliwung Merdeka, 2017. Program pembangunan Jakarta: normalisasi kali Ciliwung dengan merampas tanah warga [studi kasus putusan nomor: 205/g/2016/ptun-jkt] (Jakarta development program: normalizing Ciliwung river through land-grabbing). [online] 10 Feb. 2017. Available at: https://ciliwungmerdeka.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/FGD-Bedah-Putusan-TUN-LBH-Jakarta-10-Februari-2017. pdf [Accessed 15 Jul. 2017].

[2] Ibid, 2017.

[3] Sumardi S., 2017. Lucu sekali negeri ini (How funny this country is). Indonesiana.Tempo.co. [online] 12 Feb. 2017. Available at: https://indonesiana.tempo.co/read/107940/2017/02/12/sandyawansumardi/lucu-sekali-negeri-ini-sandyawan-sumardi [Accessed 15 Jul. 2017].

[4] Sumardi, interviewed in Jakarta 2017.

[5] Ibid, 2017.

[6] Soemardi, 2017, 4.

[7] Ibid, 2017.

[8] Muhammad, I., 2014. Traces. Ruang, Jakarta. [online] Available at: http://membacaruang.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ RUANG-9-vol-2-refleksi.pdf [Accessed 18 Jul 2015].

[9] Sumardi, interviewed in Jakarta, 2017.

[10] In that particular era, Indonesia was known as a country with biggest number of IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) where people were evicted without any solution to rehouse them (Human Right Watch, 2006).

[11] Sumardi, interviewed in Jakarta 2017.

[12] Ibid, 2017.

[13] Transformasi Indonesia, 2014. The reality of the Ciliwung people in Jakarta. [video] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=fIW3upWHSK8 [Accessed 15 Jul. 2017].

[14] Suryani on behalf of Ciliwung Merdeka, email correspondence 2016.

[15] Transformasi Indonesia, 2014.

[16] Berita Jakarta, 2015. Bahas kampung susun, komunitas Ciliwung Merdeka temui Basuki (Discussing about kampung susun: Ciliwung Merdeka community held a meeting with Basuki). [video] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vPce5_zNXAY [17] Sumardi, interviewed in Jakarta 2017.

[18] van Voorst, R. and Padawangi, R., 2015. Floods and forced evictions in Jakarta. [online] New Mandala. Available at: http://www. newmandala.org/floods?and?forced?evictions?in?jakarta/ [Accessed 15 Jul. 2017].

[19] Islam Bergerak, 2016. Menulis untuk mengingat (Writing to remember). Available at: http://islambergerak.com/publikasi/ [Accessed 3 Aug. 2017]. An excerpt from a writing workshop for the eviction victims in Rusunawa Jatinegara Barat, conducted collaboratively by Islam Bergerak, Ruang Arsitektur, and The Jakarta Post.

[20] n (pejorative) party, individual, element, person [21] Ciliwung Merdeka, 2015. Kronologi Keotik Penggusuran Kampung Pulo (The chronology of the chaotic Kampung Pulo eviction). [online] 23 Aug. 2015. Available at: https://ciliwungmerdeka.org/kronologi-keotik-penggusuran-kampung-pulo/ [Accessed 18 Jul. 2017].

[22] Sumardi, interviewed in Jakarta 2017.

[23] Suryani, interviewed by phone call 2017.

[24] LBH Jakarta, 2017. Seperti puing: laporan penggusuran paksa di wilayah DKI Jakarta tahun 2016 (Like a ruin: A report on forced eviction in DKI Jakarta in 2016). [online] 13 Apr. 2017. Available at: https://www.bantuanhukum.or.id/web/seperti-puing-laporanpenggusuran-paksa-di-wilayah-dki-jakarta-tahun-2016/ [Accessed 18 Jul. 2017].

[25] The Jakarta Post, 2015. City forces eviction despite housing backlog. [online] 24 Aug. 2015 http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/24/city?forces?eviction?despite?housing?backlog.html [Accessed 5 Jan. 2017].

[26] Suryani, interviewed by phone call 2017.

[27] Tirto, 2016. Jakarta Unfair: Mengenang Bukit Duri di atas puing-puing. (Jakarta Unfair: Commemorating Bukit Duri over the ruins) [online] tirto.id. Available at: https://tirto.id/jakarta-unfair-mengenang-bukit-duri-di-atas-puing-puing-bZg1 [Accessed 18 Jul. 2017].

[28] Sorge Magazine, 2016. Suatu Pagi di Bukit Duri 28 September 2016 (One Morning in Bukit Duri 28 September 2016). [online] 1 Oct. 2016. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GN5jGX4EVfg&t=1097s [Accessed 18 Jul. 2017].

[29] LBH Jakarta, 2017, 24.

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Figure 6.1. Playing court in Cluster C Rusunawa Marunda, North Jakarta Source: author

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Community Responses to Displacement Threats in Flood-prone Areas

6 THE PROBLEMS WITH RUSUNAWA Eviction is not a new thing in Jakarta. It has been as a common practice, especially during the New Order Era, in which was executed in more violent ways, without any consultations or compensation (see Section 4.1.3). However, in present-day Reformed era, eviction of informal sectors is still happening. While instructions to evict are legitimated by Local Government Regulation no. 8 / 2007 concerning public order, the authorities claim that the evictions were carried out in more humane approaches. It includes ‘some degree of consultations, better warnings (at least three notifications prior to the date of the eviction), the promotion of self-dismantlement of structures (to salvage reusable components), some amount of compensation, and in some cases, resettlement packages’. The latter approach offers several options depending on the characteristic of the communities, ranging from ‘social grant’ (uang kerohiman) packages that cover resettlement costs to low-cost subsidized public housing (rusunawa).1

6.1 The Contested Resettlement Policy Developed under the World Bank’s supervision, the planning and implementation of JUFMP, nevertheless, adopt Environmental and Social Management Frameworks (ESMF) and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF). The frameworks ensure the required principles, procedures, and organizational arrangements are applied to the preparation of Resettlement Plans (RPs) for each project site, including the ‘linked sites’, that involves involuntary resettlement. Interestingly, the frameworks also recognize squatter landlords and encroachers as Project Affected Persons (PAPs), even though they represent illegal behavior; and thus, employs case-based negotiation and mutual agreement to determine the type of compensation.2 On the one hand, it reflects a balance between the various concerns of stakeholders and an attempt to protect the most vulnerable people from losing their livelihoods. But on the other, it gives rise to many violations and politics surrounding the identification of PAPs as they are often confused with informal land right holders.

Beside the negligence of the problematic legal dualism of land in Indonesia, there is indeed a lack of discourse in the development and implementation of the RPs, as demonstrated in the previous chapter.

Adding to the critics, in April 2017, Ciliwung Merdeka published an official report revealing data manipulation in the resettlement process of Kampung Bukit Duri residents to Rusunawa Rawa Bebek. According to them, there is a discrepancy between the number of people relocated to rusunawa suggested by municipal government of South Jakarta and their findings on the field. Based on data released by the management unit of Rusunawa Rawa Bebek, from 400 units in four building blocks reserved for the relocatees, 388 units have been occupied by them. In contrast, Ciliwung Merdeka found out that from 400 units, only 121 units (30,25%) were occupied by the affected families, whereas 12 units (3%) were still vacant and the rest, 267 units (66,75%) were occupied by those who were not actually affected by the JUFMP project and/ or did not own plots in Kampung Bukit Duri. They consist of those who have one plot but are entitled two units in rusunawa, those who make use of other people’s plots, and those who are not residents of Kampung Bukit Duri THE CASE OF CILIWUNG RIVER

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at all.3 While the city government used the number to proof that more than half of the residents have moved to rusunawa, and thus justified the upcoming eviction; the fact that the provision of rusunawa had been given to the wrong recipients caused an estimated loss as much as IDR 885,600,000 (~EUR 56,000) which the city government of Jakarta eventually bore.4 Even worse, as rusunawa becomes more attractive and not exclusive to the relocatees, 20,000 people are still waiting for their settlement as the targeted 9.244 units that are supposed to be ready by the end of 2017 are still far from accomplishment.5 The city officials also seem to be incompetent in implementing the principles and procedures of the RPs. A report suggests that the city officials at all level are not familiar with the approach on handling resettlement, particularly for squatters. Thus, internal consultation is suggested.6 It was confirmed by the head of Bukit Duri sub-district, Mardi Youce, during a legal process in Jakarta State Administrative Court November 2016. He confessed that in conducting eviction, the executors have no clear, written standards or guidelines. Everything happened during the demolition was based on ‘the art of game in the field’ depending on the situation, as long as the objective (to remove the affected households) was accomplished.7 However, it is understood that he was in a difficult position as he had to fulfill his job which forced him to ignore the needs of his people. While the project is failing to fulfill its aim to protect the most vulnerable victims, in the end, the low-level city officials, like Youce, are most likely the ones to blame if the JUFMP is not successful, as well as if it causes more problems.

6.2 The Risk of Resettlement Similar to eviction, the provision of rental low-cost apartments is, again, not new to Jakarta, only that it is now closely associated with the relocation of informal settlers in regards to JUFMP. Introduced in 2008 as 1,000 Towers program, it was intended to deal with land scarcity and housing shortage problems, catering the growing number of low-income groups in the metropolitan city (see Section 4.1.3). In that era, 133 building blocks (12.337 Units) were built, comprising 3,366 units of low-cost owned apartments (rusunami) and 8,971 low-cost rental apartments (rusunawa). 8 Among them is Rusunawa Pulo Gebang where relocatees from Western Flood Canal project was rehoused.9 Nevertheless, after the program was stopped in 2010, Ahok’s administration resurrected the program to accompany the resettlement plan, even though it was limited to rusunawa. Currently, there are 23 fully operational rusunawas with 15,291 units in total.10 Built in either a revitalized area in the inner city or in a new development land, the construction of rusunawa is financed by central and local government’s budget or developer’s contribution with 80 per cent subsidy allocated to the relocated families. The latter financing source refers to land value capture practice which is quintessential to the current regime as the city is undergoing a massive urban restructuring such as the installment of Mass Rapid Transit (MRT), Light Rapid Transit (LRT), and the development of its coastal area.11 Both projects definitely will increase the land value of the surrounding area and concurrently benefits private developers. However, due to land scarcity resulted from the exhausting urban development mode for the last two decades, most of the rusunawas are located on the city’s periphery.12 It is considered too far by most of the relocatees.

Besides burdening them with additional transportation cost, in some cases, it leads to termination of jobs. For instance, many evictees in Pasar Ikan, who make a living as a fisherman, preferred to build a temporary shelter over the ruins of their houses or stay on their fish boats to continue working and go home only once or twice a week.1314 Therefore, location becomes the primary determinant factor that makes resettlement not feasible for them.

“I think of life in the new towers compared to our previous life in Kampung Pulo as like taxis compared to bajaj (rickshaw). As soon as you open the taxi door, the meter starts running – with bajaj you can always bargain,” Iwan Setiawan, a relocatee from Kampung Pulo in Rusunawa Jatinegara Barat.15

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After being uprooted from their livelihoods, the fact that they have to pay a monthly rent adds more difficulties to the relocatees. In Rusunawa Jatinegara Barat, about 150 families have already received warning letters because they have their rent in arrears for six to eight months.

Forcibly evicted from Kampung Pulo, they are now at risk of another eviction as they have signed agreement letter beforehand, stating that the residents have to leave their units if they fail to pay the rent for three consecutive months.16 Until January 2017, the arrears in Rusunawa Jatinegara Barat reach IDR 400,000,000 (~EUR 25,300). In Rusunawa Marunda, the arrears reach as much as IDR 10 billion (~EUR 634,000), with 65 per cent of them is contributed by the relocatees.17 A similar problem is also experienced by many rusunawas throughout Jakarta. By June 2017, the total arrears from all rusunawas exceed IDR 32 billion (~2 million EUR). According to Agustino Darmawan, the head of Jakarta Public Housing and Settlement Agency, the arrears come from 8,976 units in 23 rusunawas occupied by low income and elderly groups who cannot afford the rental fee.18 Even though there was a rumour that the city administration will rescind the arrears, it does not seem to be realized. Suspecting fraud, the Vice Governor Djarot Saiful Hidayat stressed that the government will enforce the payment of arrears. He emphasizes that the government is forging the relocatees to work harder, except for the elderly.

“We will educate the people.We are not born as a weak nation, not a nation of beggars, not a nation of encroacher.We are a civilized nation and have value,” Hidayat adds.19 As the rental fee and bills keep coming, the relocated families cannot manage to maintain their income to pay all those things. According to LBH Jakarta, kampung residents who earn money from home-industry, food-selling, warung (see Section 5.3) or renting their rooms are most likely to suffer from losing their livelihoods.20 This is an important aspect that the authorities seem to overlook. Kampung people usually utilize their houses for living as well as livelihoods-producing.

The room unit in rusunawa is often insufficient to accommodate all family members, let alone to facilitate home-based industry. Rosita, a mother of three and a relocatee from Kampung Pulo in Rusunawa Jatinegara Barat, has to go to her mother’s house far away from the rusunawa to prepare grilled chicken satay before selling it out as the management does not allow her to do such business inside her unit.21 Similar to Rosita, Mutia, a mother of two who also moved to Rusunawa Jatinegara Barat from Kampung Pulo said that she used to sell chicken nuggets but due to restrictions to open a stall in her unit, she ends up making traditional pancakes to be sold by her neighbor at night. Before, she used to earn IDR 700,000 (~EUR 45), but now she barely gets IDR 200,000 (~EUR 13) per month.22 These correspond to a report by LBH Jakarta that shows an increase in the number of residents with income below regional minimum wage of IDR 3,100,000 from 65.6 per cent before eviction to 72.8 per cent after relocation to rusunawa.23

6.3 Struggling Life in Rusunawa Marunda Originated from Cirebon, a small city at the northeastern corner of West Java, Marini, an orphan, met Dedi in 2005 in Sunda Kelapa Harbor where he worked as an expedition courier.

They have been married ever since and residing in a humble house on the riverbank of Ciliwung tributary in Kampung Lodan, Ancol sub-district, North Jakarta, a place where Dedi was born and grown up. When the eviction destroyed their house in 2015, Marini, Dedi, and their four children aged, 11, 10, 9, and five years old had nothing to do other than evacuating their belongings and relocating to Rusunawa Marunda, 22 km to the east. They could not afford bad situation as they were thinking about their children’s future. Luckily, even though the relocation process was without any assistance from the city administration, they did not have to wait until they get the unit as many relocatees have experienced. Marini and Dedi were assigned to a 30 sqm unit with two bedrooms, kitchen, and an attached bathroom on the fourth floor of Block A8, a five-story building with unplastered interior wall and screed floor.

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month, they have to pay IDR 136,000 (~EUR 8.5) for the rent, around IDR 200,000-300,000 (~EUR12-19) for water, and IDR 50,000 (~EUR 3) for electricity, twice their expenditure back in Kampung Lodan. Losing his job at Sunda Kelapa, Dedi ended up taking whatever jobs available to make ends meet, while Marini could not help much. For a couple of months, they had to delay the payment as they often barely got money in their pockets. It was until the last three months when Dedi got a job in Jakarta Waterworks Agency that their lives started to get better.

With an IDR 3,3 million (~EUR 208) salary, slightly above the regional minimum wage, Dedi manages to pay off the rent arrears and afford motorbike installment, as well as a laundry machine for Marini to ease her domestic works. Every month, they have to spend around IDR 1,500,000 (~EUR 100) to pay all those stuffs. Their income increases, but so does their expenditure. Fortunately, they still can save some money to send to their parents in the village.

Every day, Dedi has to work from the early morning to the evening and continues with guarding the motorbike park as a side job until midnight, while Marini spends her day taking care her children and sometimes helping her neighbors with odd jobs.24

Figure 6.2. Marini in front of her unit in Cluster A8 Rusunawa Marunda, North Jakarta Source: author

Nestled on a 30-hectares of a formerly swamp land owned by Kawasan Berikat Nusantara, a government-owned industrial company, Rusunawa Marunda was part of the 1000 Tower program introduced in the previous regime (see Chapter 4.1.3). From 500 units in 2005, it has grown into 2,580 units spread into three clusters with 90 per cent occupancy rate. Besides regular people, the majority of the residents are relocatees from various places throughout Jakarta, e.g. Pluit Reservoir, Kalijodo, Pasar Ikan, and Pinangsia.25 Nevertheless, after being hampered by illegal renting issue a couple of years ago, Rusunawa Marunda is going to be expanded and promoted as the pilot project for low-cost housing development in Jakarta. With an array of facilities, such as clinics, schools, and gas pipe system as well as economic activities such as urban farming and fish cultivation, it promises a better life to the relocatees.26 However, apart from the acutely low purchasing power of the consumers who are mostly relocatees, the location of Rusunawa Marunda which is secluded and far from the city center is still the main factor that hinders any kind of economic activities to grow, making life in rusunawa harder for them.

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relative who has connection to government agencies, Dedi might still be unemployed. Unlike him, many men in rusunawa find themselves working in the management unit as either security guard, technician, or cleaning service. Even though it is a way to reduce unemployment, the position is temporary and the number of worker is still insufficient. As for women, the location restricts them to get jobs outside the area. According to Marini, working women will tend to give up their job after moving to rusunawa as they have to commute longer and pass through dangerous roads.

There are many cases of women falling victim to mugging or hit-and-run by trucks on their way home as the roads are dark and holey. The provision of Transjakarta27 feeder and free school buses in the past couple years helps to ease the mobility, even though many still prefer to use private motorbike as it is much faster. 28 Rusunawa Marunda was once known as an unsafe and unfriendly place for women and children as many sexual harassments and domestic violence were often occurred there. Among the cases, child abuse is the most prevalent.29 According to Suryadi, a security guard in Cluster B, those happened due to lack of surveillance during day time as people are still at work or taking rest inside their houses30, not to mention the changing landscape of vertical living which limits the visibility. It is only after the addition of Ruang Pubik Terpadu Ramah Anak (Child-friendly Integrated Public Space, hereafter RPTRA) that these vulnerable groups gained proportional attention in the development of rusunawa.

Introduced in mid 2016 through the enactment of Governor Regulation no. 139 / 2016, the first RPTRA in Rusunawa Marunda was built between the building blocks of Cluster A. Within the 160-square meters area, it comprises a futsal court, a playground, and indoor facilities, such as Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini (PAUD, Early Childhood Education Program), a library, a small store, a nursery room, a management office, and last but not least, Posko Pengaduan Kekerasan Seksual (Sexual Harassment Complaint Post, hereafter PPKS). The last-mentioned facility was initiated in collaboration with North Jakarta Child Protection and Population Control Agency in response to the increasing social problems in rusunawa.31 Run by six people who are also residents of the rusunawa, RPTRA Marunda aims to stimulate interactions and positive activities among the residents who are coming from different places.

Ranging from entrepreneurship, traditional dancing to batik32 dyeing, RPTRA offers various kinds of training to complement children’s education and most importantly, to develop women’s skills.

However, according to the representative of the management unit, the training is still ineffective to encourage women to start a new business to help their livelihoods due to lack of continuity, not to mention the limited capital power. He adds that the management still relies on the municipal government and donors, which do not come regularly, to hold such activities. In the end, what the residents expect from the government is creation of new employment, apart from one-time training that is only good for media coverage. 33 However, according to LBH Jakarta’s survey, in terms of physical environment quality, the relocatees find it generally improved. A 30 – 36-square meters unit is sufficient to accommodate three to six family members. Otherwise, they have to utilize their living room for sleeping. Similar response is also conveyed regarding the facilities inside the unit, such as kitchen, bathroom, and air ventilation, even though in some blocks these elements are not well-designed and arranged, resulting in leaking pipe systems, the relocatees still find it sufficient. Overall, the privacy and security are also considered as increased compared to their houses in kampung as security guards are watchful for 24 hours. Lastly, when Marini was asked whether she wants to go back to Kampung Lodan or not, she answered that there is no point to return to the kampung as all her neighbors have gone.34

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Figure 6.3.The far location of Rusunawa Marunda on the northeastern part of North Jakarta seems to be the main constraint faced by the relocatees.

Source: author

Figure 6.4. Children playground in Rusunawa Marunda.

There are many playgrounds and child-friendly public space/ parks, but most of them are vulnerable and indefensible due to low visibility from the street .

Source: author

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Figure 6.5. Economic activities in Rusunawa Marunda is emerging, even though still limited to the designated area. In this rusunawa, opening warung in room units is allowed.

Source: author

Figure 6.6. Initiatives to support the residents’ livelihoods.

In clockwise order: (a) green houses funded by the government; (b) small-scale urban gardening; (c) fish cultivation; and (d) batik production. Source: author

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Notes [1] Ministry of Public Works and Housing, Jun. 2011. JUFMP: Environmental and Social Management Framework.

Available at: http://www.pu.go.id/images/uploads/banner/Ntc_110729114755_L3_Eng.pdf [Accessed 29 Jul 2017].

[2] Ibid, 2011.

[3] Ciliwung Merdeka, 2017. Siaran pers politik hukum rusunawa dalam penggusuran paksa Bukit Duri studi kasis Rusunawa Rawa Bebek (Press release legal politics of rusunawa in Bukit Duri forced eviction case study of Rusunawa Rawa Bebek). [online] 3 Apr 2017. Available at: https://ciliwungmerdeka.org/siaran-pers-politik-hukum-rusunawa-dalampenggusuran-paksa-bukit-duri-studi-kasus-rusunawa-rawa-bebek/ [Accessed 1 Aug 2017].

[4] Ibid, 2017. The cost includes free rent in the first three months and 80 per cent subsidy each month.

[5] Media Indonesia, 2017. Tunggakan rusunawa naik menjadi Rp 32 miliar (The arrears in rusunawa increase up to 32 billion Rupiah). [online] 1 Aug. 2017. Available at: http://www.mediaindonesia.com/news/read/115530/tunggakanrusunawa-naik-menjadi-rp32-miliar/2017-08-01 [Accessed 3 Aug. 2017].

[6] Ministry of Public Works and Housing. JUFMP: Environmental and Social Management Framework. Jun 2011.

Available at: http://www.pu.go.id/images/uploads/banner/Ntc_110729114755_L3_Eng.pdf [Accessed 29 Jul 2017].

[7] Ciliwung Merdeka, 2017. The Battle of Bukit Duri. [online] 10 Feb. 2017. Available at: https://ciliwungmerdeka. org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Battle-of-Bukit-Duri.pdf [Accessed 2 Aug. 2017].

[8] Based on LPPD (Laporan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah Daerah, Local Government Administration Report) DKI Jakarta 2007-2012. Available at: http://www.jakarta.go.id/jakv1/application/public/download/LPPD.PDF [Accessed 3 Aug. 2017].

[9] Tempo, 2008. Rusunawa Pulogebang diresmikan Fauzi Bowo (Rusunawa Pulogebang inaugurated by Fauzi Bowo). [online] 24 Dec. 2008. Available at: https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2008/12/24/082152430/rusunawa-pulogebangdiresmikan-fauzi-bowo [Accessed 2 Aug. 2017].

[10] Based on data from Jakarta Housing and Administratives Building Agency, fieldwork in Jakarta, April 2017.

[11] Based on interview with Deputy Governor of DKI Jakarta for Spatial Planning and Environment in Jakarta 2017.

[12] Based on interview with the representatives of Jakarta’s Housing and Administrative Buildings Agency, 2017.

[13] Rappler, 2016. Warga Pasar Ikan rayakan Idulfitri di antara reruntuhan rumah (The residents of Pasar Ikan celebrate Eid al-Fitr in between the ruins of their houses). [online] 6 Jul. 2017. Available at: http://www.rappler.com/ indonesia/138847-warga-pasar-ikan-tidak-mau-mudik-demi-rumah [Accessed 3 Aug. 2017].

[14] Based on interview with the residents of Rusunawa Marunda, Jakarta 2017 [15] The Guardian 2016. My house was turned into debris. [online] 23 Nov. 2016. Available at: https://www. theguardian.com/cities/2016/nov/23/house-turned-debris-voices-evicted-kampung-pulo-jakarta [Accessed 2 Aug. 2017].

[16] The Jakarta Post, 2016. Relocated Families Face Another Eviction. [online] 24 Aug. 2016. Available at: https:// www.pressreader.com/indonesia/the-jakarta-post/20160824/281530815439134 [Accessed 3 Aug. 2017] [17] Media Indonesia, 2017, 5.

[18] Ibid, 2017.

[19] Detik, 2017. Warga rusun menunggak Djarot duga ada oknum yang mengorganisir (Rusunawa residents fail to pay rental fee, Djarot suspects there is oknum who organizes it). [online] 15 Aug. 2017. Available at: https://news.detik.com/ berita/3601270/warga-rusun-menunggak-djarot-duga-ada-oknum-yang-mengorganisir [Accessed 15 Aug. 2017].

[20] LBH Jakarta, 2016. Mereka yang terasing (They who are alienated). [online] 2 Dec 2016. Available at: https:// www.bantuanhukum.or.id/web/mereka-yang-terasing-laporan-penggusuran-paksa-rumah-susun/ [Accessed 2 Aug. 2017].

[21] The Jakarta Post, 2016. Poverty, alienation haunt rusunawa. [online] 20 Apr. 2016. Available at: http://www. thejakartapost.com/news/2016/04/20/poverty-alienation-haunt-rusunawa.html [Accessed 5 Aug. 2017].

[22] The Jakarta Post, 2016. The problems with Jakarta’s social housing. [Online] 20 Apr. 2017. Available at: http:// www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/04/20/problems-with-jakarta-s-social-housing.html [Accessed 5 Aug. 2017].

[23] LBH Jakarta, 2016, 20.

[24] Based on interview, with Marini and Dedi in Rusunawa Marunda, Jakarta 2017.

[25] Based on data received from Rusunawa Marunda Management Unit, Jakarta 2017.

[26] Berita Jakarta, 2013. Rusunawa Marunda akan dijadikan kawasan percontohan (Rusunawa Marunda will be made a pilot area). [online] 6 Dec. 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0JF50ULjj4E [Accessed 4 Aug. 2017].

[27] Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system in Jakarta.

[28] Based on interview with Marini in Rusunawa Marunda, Jakarta 2017.

[29] CNN Indonesia, 2016. Polisi bekuk tersangka pencabulan anak di Rusun Marunda (The police arrested child abuse suspect in Rusun Marunda). [online]. 9 Feb. 2016. Available at: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ nasional/20160209175704-12-109847/polisi-bekuk-tersangka-pencabulan-anak-di-rusun-marunda/ [Accessed 5 Aug. 2017].

[30] Ibid, 2017.

[31] Based on interview with Rahayu, an RPTRA manager in Rusunawa Marunda, Jakarta 2017.

[32] A technique of wax-resist dyeing applied to whole cloth with diverse patterns influenced by a variety of cultures [33] Based on interview with Kevin, an officer of Rusunawa Marunda Management Unit, Jakarta 2017.

[34] Marini, 2017, 28.

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7 RIVERBANK KAMPUNG REINVENTED Stories from Ciliwung’s Lower Stream

Because without resistance, people become wounded human material who “only know how to think and behave as victims” (Makiya, 1994 in Porteous & Smith, 2001) Behind a busy warehouse area in North Jakarta, some riverbank kampungs are dreading for their turn to be relocated after receiving an eviction notice at the end of 2014. The city administration is planning to clear up the 10-meter setback of the river for inspection road. As a response, the residents of Kampung Kunir and Balokan in Pinangsia sub-district as well as Kampung Krapu, Tongkol, Kencur, Japat and Lodan in Ancol sub-district subsequently assembled a meeting and formed up Forum Warga Bantaran Kali (Riverbank Residents’ Forum, hereafter FWBK) to consolidate and strengthen the spirit of community.

Situated on the bank of Ciliwung tributary, these kampungs are part of the ‘linked sites’ (see Section 4.3.1). The area is not necessarily flood-prone as the river segments have been regulated1, as also confirmed by the residents. The only flooding event occurred was due to clogged rainwater run-off from the surrounding warehouses2. Looking back in 1994 when Program Kali Bersih (PROKASIH, Clean River Program) were carried out, the authorities actually have acquired about four to five meters of the riverbanks for the embankment, construction of inspection road, as well as installation of a drainage system. Eventually, the construction works were not completed and the area were re-occupied by the residents. Acknowledging those facts, FWBK came up with the idea of cutting down their houses to give back the land to the government. It seemed like a winwin solution to counter the eviction plan whereby the residents whose homes settling within 5 meters dismantle their houses and shift back beyond the boundary. Nevertheless, the eviction still happened in Kampung Kunir, Balokan, and Kencur in May 2015, causing 310 families to lose their houses and move to rusunawa.

“The eviction notice came all of sudden without any consultation.The kelurahan officials were no help at all, they said the area should be cleared within a week. It was nearing Eid Al-fitr, we did not know what to do. Everyone was in panic. My son was distressed. He was in the middle of his primary school’s final exam.The event had been bothering his study focus and eventually made him failing to be accepted in public school. He said that it will be better for our family if he continues to ‘pesantren’ 3 so we do not have to pay extra money for transportation,”Yayuk, one of the residents in Kampung Lodan, recalls.

According to Muhammad Gugun, a resident of Kampung Tongkol and an urban poor activist, the operation was intentionally carried out to intimidate and break the community’s spirit, apart from the fact that those kampungs’ residents were smaller in number4. The eviction, nonetheless, discouraged FWBK to continue striving.

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E LUAR BATANG

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Figure 7.1. Vicinity Map of Kampung Tongkol.

Old Town historic district, Jakarta Source: author

7. 1 A Settlement behind Old Batavia’s City Wall The history of these kampungs cannot be separated from the long history of the city’s formation which dates back in 1619 when the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) made Batavia its headquarter in Asia. The first to build were the fort (Kasteel Batavia) and warehouses along Ciliwung river which were located in the same area where the kampungs are today. Following the siege of Mataram Kingdom in 1628, the old Batavia was fortified. Started from Ciliwung River to the east, fortification walls were constructed with 22 bastions that were placed at regular intervals.

Water was also introduced as defense mechanism, thus canals crisscrossed the ground plan of the city’s grid system (Sutton, 2015). However, in the present days, some of the remaining structure have been converted into streets, such as Kali Besar Timur Rd., Kunir Rd., Nelayan Timur Rd., Pos Kota Rd., and Cengkeh Rd. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, at the beginning of 18th century, the fort and city walls were demolished due to flooding and malaria and the old town of Batavia was abandoned as the Dutch administrative moved further south to Weltervreden (now Jakarta Pusat). Several Dutch buildings still exist in the present-day Jakarta Old Town (Kota Tua Jakarta), including the Town Hall (now Museum Fatahillah), the Court of Justice (now Museum of Fine Arts and Ceramics), Western Warehouse in Sunda Kelapa Harbor (now Maritime Museum), Culemborg bastion (now Syahbandar Watchtower), the remaining Zeeburg bastion, and the Eastern Warehouses (Oostzijdsche Pakhuizen, see Figure 7.1). However, as the city grew, the Old Town district was visually unrecognized. With a limited interpretation towards conservation and the prevailing nationalistic sentiment against colonialism, the revitalization of the historic district is still lessprioritized, if not yet subjugated by the predominant urban development model (Martokusumo, 2003, 2001; Cobban, 1985). In the 1970s, the (Fatahillah) square was still used as a bus terminal and the Town Hall as a barrack; the old warehouses were decaying while Pasar Ikan was packed full of people who earned a living through trading and fishery activities (Cobban, 1985).

At the same time, informal settlements also emerged along Ciliwung river tributaries as a consequence of rapid urbanization. According to Gugun, Kampung Tongkol was established in 1970 as an additional residence for the staffs of Ditpalad (Direktorat Peralatan Angkatan Darat, Directorate of Army Equipment) Kodam Jaya, whereas Kampung Balokan and Kencur were intended to house the employees of the nearby warehouses and factories5. In the following decades, the children of older residents got married and built houses next to their parents, while new migrants also came and resided. Nevertheless, these processes were not necessarily accompanied by a solid proof of land ownership, despite the evidence of land tax payment receipts (i.e. IPEDA and IREDA) and Sporadik6, making them vulnerable to eviction in the later days. According to Gugun, they prefer to live there because it is closer to their workplaces, such as Mangga Dua, Glodok, Pasar Baru, Pasar Pagi, and Pelelangan, and definitely less costly. He argues that registering their lands through the formal legal system is unaffordable for them, let alone buying new certified lands.7

7.2 Urban Poor Network Established following the fall of Suharto’s New Order in September 1997, Urban Poor Consortium (hereafter referred as UPC) is a collective organization consists of institutions and individuals whose work is dealing with urban poverty, such as activist, architect, artist, journalist, and anthropologist. It is “part social movement, part umbrella body for community-based organizations, part militant advocate” and is trying hard not to define itself as one institution in order to enable

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the poor to thoroughly express their needs and strengths (Simone, 2014). As a grassroot, UPC started its movement in the first half of the 1990s, to counterbalance the repressive political regime which did not allow for any social-political movement to grow in the country and has since been actively involved and evolved in pro-poor movements, ranging from community organization, networking, to advocacy.

However, whilst UPC believes that the change towards a just and civilized society should come from the people, not the elites, it also realizes that it should be followed by education and empowerment as the people were unfamiliar with social organization and movement as an excess of long dictatorship under the New Order, let alone dared to dream of an alternative social system and hence governance. Therefore, it also pays attention to community capacity building which can be improved through leadership training and legal education for community organizers (COs).

They are members of Jaringan Masyarakat Miskin Kota (Urban Poor Network, hereafter JRMK), a community-based organization for Jakarta’s urban poor endorsed by UPC, and is linked to a wider urban poor network throughout Indonesia.8 In the case of Kampung Tongkol, Gugun Muhammad, who joined UPC in 2003, is the one who acts as a community organizer (CO). After several meetings among the community leaders, and an attempt to gather social and political power by joining a mass organization, he finally initiated the formation of Komunitas Anak Kali Ciliwung (Ciliwung Tributary Community, hereafter KAKC) in the end of November 2015. Under the guidance of JRMK and UPC, the community intends to revive its spirit and stimulate a strong movement from the remaining kampungs.

7.3 Thinking Conservation 7.3.1 Maritime-based Historic Tourism Apart from the legal issue and reflecting to the recent eviction occurred in the Pasar Ikan (fish market) area, just 500-meter to the northwest of these kampungs, the fact that they are located side by side with archaeological features might also put pressure on their existence. On April 2016, about 694 households were demolished and more will follow in the coming months in order to make way for the sea wall project’s realization as well as to revitalize the dilapidated Sunda Kelapa old harbor area.9 Surrounding the Maritime Museum, the area of Pasar Ikan, Kampung Akuarium, and Kampung Luar Batang are projected to be part of a maritime-based historic tourist area envisioned by the city government, even though the plan is still uncertain. Moreover, the eviction was carried out nearly without any communication with the residents who have been living there for more than five decades.

According to Matthew Michele Lenggu, a public lawyer from LBH Jakarta (Jakarta Legal Aid Institute), the eviction in Pasar Ikan was ridden by business developer’s interests, given that there is no clear vision for the future of the area, let alone community involvement in the process.

He refers to the master plan released by PD Pasar Jaya (a regional government-based market management company), the only document accompanied the eviction notice, that illustrates the future of Pasar Ikan area as an outdoor food court plaza.10 It, nonetheless, gives rise to suspicions among the residents that their kampungs will be converted into an entry area of a luxurious superblock complex, Pluit Sea View, built on the reclamation islands to the north of Pasar Ikan.11 Moreover, Candrian Atthahiyat, the former head of the Cultural Heritage Conservation unit of Old Town management agency, argues that while revitalization of Sunda Kelapa historic district is strongly needed, the social and cultural aspects which are shaped by the kampungs’ residents should not be eliminated in the process.12 Additionally, an archaeological feature, Zeeburg bastion, which is located in the area, also damaged during the demolition. This signifies the unpreparedness of the city government, if not unawareness, in handling historical buildings. It is, however, linked to the fact that conservation has not been seen as an alternative approach to urban revitalization project, let alone given sufficient attention (Martokusumo, 2001), making the case more about a 74 |

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Figure 7.2. Cement mixing activities next to the historic Eastern Warehouses.

Courtesy of Ria Febrian

Figure 7.3. Green initiatives in Kampung Tongkol and Lodan In clockwise order: (a) composting; (b) small-scale urban farming; (c) ‘before-after’ signage along the riverbank; and (d) cleaning the river regularly. Source: author

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demolition of ’unwanted’ deteriorating poor communities rather than an effort to revitalize an old historic district.

7.3.2 Participation in Urban Conservation Martokusumo (2003) who studied the Old Town Jakarta suggests that since the enactment of Law no. 5 / 1992, a new legislation concerning Heritage Objects, the implementation of conservation in urban revitalization project is still restricted to protection and adaptive reuse of historic structures. At the same time, destruction of archaeological features remains uninterrupted. He adds that in a period between 1990-1992 when a new flyover for the Ancol - Tanjung Priok Toll Road (Harbor Road/Jl. RE Martadinata) was constructed, bisecting the historic district, some archaeological features were also destructed, including the Eastern Warehouses which is located next to Kampung Tongkol, as also witnessed by the residents. The construction of new flyover has disregarded the existing morphological structures and eventually engendered new urban problems (Martokusumo, 2003). Today, the Eastern Warehouses are not only damaged, but also are threatened by harmful activities and unrelated uses from the nearby cement mixing site and truck parking area underneath the flyover, creating indefensible spaces and segregation with the surrounding neighborhoods.

“What we are always worried about (from living next to archaeological sites) is that we are likely to be blamed for causing damage to the sites. In fact, it was the city government itself who did it with the construction of new flyover as well as TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces) who issued the permit for the cement mixing site to operate since the area belong to them.The latter also the one who demolished some parts of the structures so that trucks and containers from which they collect money can enter and park there. In the end, it becomes a parking business for them,” Gugun recalls13 Built next to Kasteel Batavia between 1748-1759, at the peak of VOC’s commercial development, these warehouses were used to store corn, rice, beans, peanuts, peas, and other foodstuffs, and also to defend the territory in the eastern area. It was an efficient military assignment whereby the guard soldiers could maintain the safety of food supply while guarding the boundary.14 Today, from four warehouses in the past, only one is left and struggling to remain standing.

Despite the unpleasant condition of the historic warehouses, historians, conservationists, academics, as well as tourists still find the building charming and valuable, given that it is the only remaining boundary marker of Batavia or the Old Town of Jakarta on the east side. Starting from Fatahillah Square, people usually take a heritage trail to the Maritime Museum which is within 20 minutes walking distance and end at the Eastern Warehouses. Herlily and her group of architecture students from the University of Indonesia are no exception. After several visits to the Eastern Warehouses, they finally discovered the kampungs behind the historic structures which actually have potentials and important roles. Not only did they find them important eyewitnesses of the negligence of the historic buildings over time but also the guardian who helped monitoring them from further destruction. Herlily points out that the kampungs’ existence has balanced the ‘masculinity’ of the area in which truck is the predominant ‘actor’. Ultimately, it has great potential to be developed as a part of the historic tourism of the area.15

7.4 Redefining the Riverbank Settlement 7.4.1 ‘Inspection’ Kampung Learning from previous eviction cases in Kampung Pulo, Kampung Bukit Duri, and Pasar Ikan, which ended up in the courts and struggled for justice, KAKC decided to take a different direction by proposing alternative solutions proactively as a way to negotiate with the authorities. It seems to be less exhausting and more exciting than going through the legal process. Moreover, Gugun stresses that the residents need tangible achievements that encourage them to keep fighting.16 76 |

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Therefore, with the help from UPC, the University of Indonesia (UI), Architecture Sans Frontier Indonesia (ASF-ID), and individuals, the residents of Kampung Tongkol, Lodan, and Krapu geared up to continue rehabilitating their kampungs in order to contribute to the conservation of the river and the historic structures.

Based on a potential map derived from a participatory mapping conducted together with architecture students from the University of Indonesia, the kampung residents envisioned their kampungs as an ‘inspection’ kampung, meaning that as they cut down their houses and moved beyond the five-meters setback, the riverbank areas will serve as their front yard as well as inspection road. Thus, instead of concrete road, the kampung itself will be the ‘buffer’ and ‘regulator’ of the river. Moreover, given that there are a number of productive fruit and vegetable trees in the area and handicraft activities demonstrated by the women, Herlily suggests that the everyday life of kampung residents can be a source of attraction for the visitors. Here is where they can try local cuisines and buy handmade souvenirs.17 As for the environmental contribution, the kampung residents took the initiative to resuscitate the abandoned drainage structure built by the city government back in the 1900s and construct a collective septic tank to treat sewage and wastewater. They also manage to reduce individual household waste by 60-80 per cent with ‘three doors’ strategy. Developed by LabTanya, an architecture bureau which promotes ‘Kota Tanpa Sampah’ (City without Garbage) campaign, the strategy includes thinking before buying or consuming (eg. avoid products with excessive packaging, bring their own plastic bags); minimizing the production of waste (eg. eat wise, donate old clothes to charity); and last but not least, waste-sorting.18 “Originally, we were experimenting with a centralized community composting house.We have sorted our household waste; plastics and organics are separated and sent to the composting house. A garbage cart was also provided to collect them door to door. However, due to limited resources, the composting house ended up unused. We do not have money to pay someone to take care of it. A centralized composting turns out ineffective, therefore every household is doing it individually.” Gugun recalls (interviewed in Jakarta, 2017).

Furthermore, the compost is subsequently used to fertilize their vegetables and herbs planted in self-made growing containers. Parallel to that, bamboo rafts were also assembled to help them clean the river regularly and an ‘eretan’ stop was built to connect Kampung Tongkol and Kampung Lodan.

In responding to the historic structures, the residents of Kampung Tongkol also torn down the rear side of their house and cleared out the 8-meter setback area between the wall and their houses. Because there are only few square meters of living space left, the renovation works have to include reconstruction of some houses which requires a substantial amount of money. Since it cannot be secured in a short period of time only through community collective savings, in October 2015, KAKC tried their luck by submitting a proposal to Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR)’s Decent Poor Fund Program for kampung upgrading and won USD 10,000 revolving loans for the second prize.19

7.4.2 An Alternative Solution to Housing Problems “We have been living here for three generations. My great grandfather was a security guard for the Dutch-owned warehouses located behind my house.The land was granted by his employer and has been inherited to my parents who lives on the ground floor, whereas I live on the upper floor with my husband, Gugun, and two children.” Ina recalls (interviewed in Jakarta, 2017) Ina and her family, along with six other families, which are actually her aunts’ and uncles’ families, THE CASE OF CILIWUNG RIVER

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IN SP

PROT OT

Figure 7.4.The conceptual design of the Prototype House.

Left-right: (a) The resident is presenting the model to his neighbors. Using model is considered a proper way to communicate the design. (b) The kampung residents is involved in the construction process with the assistance of architects from the ASF-ID. (c) The width of the units are varied from 1,75 to 2,5 m. (d) The common room at the attic is also used as storage. (e) The back of the house. At first, the kitchen was inside the unit, but due to limited space, the residents moved it outside.

Photo source: ASF-ID and author. Illustration by author.

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Figure 7.5. Ina, her mother, and her son in front of their unit in Prototype House.

Source: author

were the ones who took the opportunity to rebuild their houses. They were chosen not only because their houses were desperately in need of refurbishment, but also, they were the only ones who were brave enough to take the risk of loss if eviction still occurs.20 Initially assisted by Kamil and Brahm who are independent architects and good friends of Gugun, the design was further developed by a group of architects from ASF-ID. Due to limited land availability, the Prototype House were redesigned based on cohousing concept where six families are living in one threestory building consisting of four units and sharing some common facilities, including electricity, water supply, and sanitation, while one other family lives in a separate new building.21 According to Kamil, negotiation was inherently an important part of the design process through which private and public zones inside the building are determined. Undergoing several discussions, series of in-situ workshops, and model-making, the inhabitants finally learned to negotiate and adapt to new spatial arrangements. Each unit is shared within one family with the biggest one belongs to Ina’s mother as the oldest in the family. Room on the ground floor is dedicated for the elderly, while rooms on the upper floors which are accessed through a communal balcony are entitled to the children.

“We intentionally designed the top floor as a communal space for the inhabitants to held meeting or gathering, but after a year we found out that it has been modified for another bedroom as well as storage. There are things that we, architects, might think are socially worked out for kampung people, but turned out not possible. We thought they (kampung people) are highly social individuals, so we gave them a communal room inside the building for social interaction. In the end, what is essential for them is a private space which is lacking, given their limited living spaces,” Kamil adds (interviewed in Jakarta 2017).

Built on-site participatively, the primary structure of the Prototype House is made from reinforced concrete frames with autoclaved aerated blocks, locally called ‘hebel’, making up the walls. The materials were chosen because they are lightweight, easy to assemble, and requires small amount of mortar. While timber from the ruins was recycled for the floors, bamboo was introduced for the roof structure to keep the building light. To this extent, ASF conducted bamboo preservation and construction workshops to guarantee practical knowledge transfer to the kampung residents.

Last but not least, all building materials were also bought from the surrounding markets.22 However, it was tough to evade scrutiny from external parties, especially the local authority.

According to Gugun, during the construction process, people from the sub-district (kelurahan)

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office, including Satpol PP, came to interrogate, claiming the building as illegal.23 Not prepared for the worst case; therefore, KAKC decided to keep the Prototype House project obscure to minimize interruption. On the other hand, they exposed different initiatives to keep people coming to their kampungs, such as cleaning the river and heritage walk as part of the advocacy.24 Two months later, in January 2016, the project was finally completed. Komunitas Anak Kali Ciliwung (KACK) happened to showcase the transformation of their kampungs with the Prototype House as an alternative housing solution for riverbank settlement, making their resistance more legitimate and visible.

7.5 A Political Contract In the second week of my fieldwork, on April 9, 2017, KAKC held a ceremony inviting the candidate pair for Jakarta’s Gubernatorial Election 20172022 who are the opponent of the incumbent for signing a political contract with JRMK. The contract consists of 31 entities, including 26 kampungs all around Jakarta Metropolitan Region, Serikat Becak Jakarta (Jakarta’s Cycle Rickshaw Drivers Union), three street vendors groups, and one rusunawa. Supported by UPC, JRMK took the opportunity provided by the incoming election to convey their pro-poor programs and make their efforts more impactful by participating in political momentum. The contract includes five conditions, such as (1) spatial plan for kampung settlement; (2) legalization of kampung land; (3) affordable housing program for urban poor; (4) business licensing for street vendors; and (5) job-shift support for cycle rickshaw drivers. Those are in exchange for a specific Figure 7.6.Tagline of the political contract. number of votes stated in the contract. According to Gugun, ‘Tanah untuk penggarap’ (Land for cultivators) ‘political contract’ option was selected not necessarily Source: Literasi to confront the eviction plan, but rather to contest the visibility, legality, and participation of urban poor in the politics of “the right to the city” in a broader sense. It is seen as a way to make a thorough change which start with participation in the policy-making process. Through this transactional approach, JRMK are managed to incorporate their program without having to take part in the structural body of any political party. Besides, the points of conditions are made generic so that each kampungs can adapt based on their localities and needs, including those were not involved in the contract.25 With its widespread network, UPC plays a significant role in organizing this political action.

Inspired by Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), a communitybased organization in the US who made a political contract with Obama for 2008 US Presidential Election, UPC has practiced this approach several times, including the 2007 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, even though their candidate pair lost on that occasion. Taught by ACORN’s representatives who intentionally came to Jakarta to train UPC’s members in 2007, they mobilize COs in JRMK to apply one-on-one ‘rap’ methods to persuade people to support their program.

As the name suggests, the method includes a systematic conversation within a certain time limit which will be repeated until the person change their mind and give their vote to the candidate.26 However, as the spatial plan of kampung settlement becomes the primary concern, during the mobilization, the COs also brought along some maps retrieved from the provincial Spatial Plan (RTRW) and Detailed Spatial Plan (RDTR) concerning each kampung’s land uses to open up the information on the land status and zoning.

“If their kampungs are already in a designated area for settlement but still in bad condition, we encourage them to rehabilitate their kampungs accordingly. But, if their kampungs are already in good shape, we motivate them to upgrade the land status. At the beginning, the kampung

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residents insist to get the right of ownership, which is actually unrealistic. There is no way that the government will grant land title to ‘illegal squatters’ (authority’s term). So, we lower the demand to having the right of use (Hak Pakai), provided that it can be upgraded gradually into the right of ownership (Hak Milik) after 20 years.The obtained ownership will be owned by a cooperation, not individual.Thus, the land will be used based on the principle of expediency, not capital accumulation,” Gugun suggests.27 Additionally, in order to facilitate the legalization process, JRMK also proposed the formation of Badan Layanan Umum Daerah (Regional Public Service Agency, hereafter BLUD) which focuses on assisting urban poor to get their right to housing, including land registration which always complicate them due to manifold procedures and bureaucracies.28 However, Gugun emphasizes that while solutions for all relevant aspects (i.e. legal, spatial, and design) of kampung settlement have been provided, it is a political will that determines its realization. For him, if this political action succeeds, the spatial plan will change drastically and kampung will finally find its place in the city. But if it goes in the opposite direction, at least they already have the rights to seek justice in the courts.29 Notes [1] Based on interview with Yahya from Ciliwung-Cisadane River Basin Agency (BBWSCC) in Jakarta 2017.

[2] Gugun, interviewed in Jakarta 2017.

[3] Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia [4] Ibid, 2017.

[5] Gugun, 2017, 2.

[6] Statements of physical possession of land and buildings on state land [7] Gugun, interviewed in Jakarta, 2017.

[8] Urban Poor Consortium’s website, http://www.urbanpoor.or.id/ [accessed 17 Jul. 2017].

[9] LBH Jakarta, 2016. Penggusuran warga Pasar Ikan untuk kepentingan siapa (Pasar Ikan eviction for whose interests), [online] 11 Apr 2016. http://www.bantuanhukum.or.id/web/penggusuran-warga-pasar-ikan-untuk-kepentingansiapa/ [Accessed 26 Jul. 2017] [10] Ibid, 2016.

[11] Republika, 2016. Tokoh Luar Batang nilai penggusuran Pasar Ikan terkait reklamasi (Luar Batang’s figure see Pasar Ikan eviction is related to reclamation). [online] 11 Apr. 2016. http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/jabodetabeknasional/16/04/11/o5gw37354-tokoh-luar-batang-nilai-penggusuran-pasar-ikan-terkait-reklamasi [accessed 26 Jul. 2017].

[12] Rappler, 2016. Wisata bahari Kampung Luar Batang Pasar Ikan (Maritime tourism Kampung Luar Batang Pasar Ikan). [online]12 Apr. 2016. Available at: http://www.rappler.com/indonesia/129126-wisata-bahari-kampung-luar-batangpasar-ikan [Accessed 26 Jul 2017].

[13] Pusat Dokumentasi Arsitektur, 2016. OH 20052016 Kampung Tongkol. [video] 6 Jul 2017. Available at: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=QsFljNZyDpw&t=1811s [Accessed 26 Jul. 2017].

[14] Kompas, 2005. Benteng Timur Batavia (sedang) dihancurkan (Batavia’s Eastern Warehouses is (being) demolished). [online] 26 Mar. 2005. Available at: https://arsitekturindis.wordpress.com/2005/03/26/benteng-timur-batavia-sedangdihancurkan/ [Accessed 26 Jul. 2017].

[15] Pusat Dokumentasi Arsitektur, 2016, 13.

[16] Gugun, interviewed in Jakarta, 2017.

[17] Pusat Dokumentasi Arsitektur, 2016.

[18] Literasi, 2017. Gugun Muhammad: tagline kita tanah untuk penggarap (Gugun Muhammad: Our tagline is land for the cultivators! [online] 21 Jun. 2017. Available at: http://literasi.co/gugun-muhammad-tagline-kita-tanah-untuk-penggarap/ [Accessed 26 Jul. 2017].

[19] ACHR, 2017. ACHR E-news. Jan. 2016. Available at: http://literasi.co/gugun-muhammad-tagline-kita-tanah-untukpenggarap/ [Accessed 26 Jul. 2017].

[20] Kamil on behalf of ASF-ID, interviewed in Jakarta, 2017.

[21] Ibid, 2017.

[22] Architecture in Development’s website, 2016. Co-housing project at Ciliwung riverfront. Available at: http:// www.architectureindevelopment.org/project.php?id=570 [Accessed 26 Jul. 2017].

[23] Gugun, 2017, 16.

[24] Kamil, 2017, 20.

[25] Gugun, interviewed in Jakarta, 2017.

[26] Literasi, 2017, 18.

[27] Ibid, 2017.

[28] Gugun, 2017, 25.

[29] Ibid, 2017.

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8 GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8.1 On the Dynamics of Resettlement Plan This study departs from the social phenomena happened in the city of Jakarta in the past three years in which many riverbank communities were evicted to make way for Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project implementation. Throughout this research, it is argued that the evictions were strongly influenced by market-driven urban development purposes rather than simply induced by environmental crisis, as claimed by the city administration. It affects the livelihoods of the most vulnerable groups in the society and leads to an economic impoverishment and a socio-political disempowerment of the victims. Linked to the first research question, this study has illustrated the dynamics of resettlement process experienced by riverbank communities in three case studies, (1) Kampung Bukit and Kampung Pulo in Ciliwung’s middle stream, (2) Kampung Lodan in Rusunawa Marunda, and (3) Kampung Tongkol, Lodan, and Krapu in Ciliwung’s lower stream. It points out that displacement has been portrayed as ‘good governance’ practice through which the city government uses its power of expropriation, or at least enacts regulation, to remove ‘the undesired part’ of the city for the sake of environmental rehabilitation means.

The first case has shown how the flood mitigation project has led to a removal of two kampungs that actually pose robust socioeconomic potentials and contributions to the city. Clearly, there is a tendency to see the riverbank communities as a ‘problem’ rather than a ‘victim’ of the flood hazard which makes the agency of the affected persons is inherently disregarded. Because of the location of the kampungs and the underpinning tenure status problem, the marginalized communities likely fall victims to displacement. The differences of risk perception certainly complicates the situation/ condition. While flooding is no longer the main constraint for the residents of Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo, given their resourcefulness, resilience, and adaptation capacities, they still regard resettlement to rusunawa as ‘culturally unacceptable’. On the contrary, the government keep their eyes close to the fact that these communities are facing multi-dimensional and non-hazard-related constraints on a regular basis and even consider them as ignorant of their safety.1 There was indeed dynamics in the resettlement policy-making process signified by the ever-changing decisions. As the political situation changed, forced eviction became inevitable. In doing so, the city government also applied certain mechanism, as also noted

by Sandyawan Sumardi and LBH Jakarta.2 Besides stigmatization, it included limited consultation with the affected families, neglecting the ongoing legal process, utilizing different regulations in the eviction day, mobilizing an excessive number of joint military force to intimidate, and data manipulation. This ‘unsympathetic’ treatments, indeed, undermined the community’s’ trust in the government and urged them to continue with a class action.

Even though the eviction was supported by resettlement policies and plans through the provision of rusunawa (subsidized rental apartment), the planning and implementation processes were still poorly executed. There was indeed a lack of supervision and consultation, both external and internal, during the identification process of PAPs, as shown in both cases, which led to a THE CASE OF CILIWUNG RIVER

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misappropriation and mismanagement of the RPF and RPs. It is understood that the involvement of multi-level governance hinders an efficient communication between the stakeholders, but the fast-paced nature of the project makes way for infringements. Moreover, the second case has also drawn an understanding about the rationale behind risking or not-risking resettlement from the perspective of the evictees. Linked to the first case, it further illustrates that the quality of rusunawa also influences their considerations to accept resettlement. To this extent, the location of rusunawa is seen as the main determinant factor affecting all aspects of their lives (e.g. economic, social, health, and safety), apart from the fact that they have to pay a monthly rental fee. These shortcomings are also found in many displacement cases around the world as observed

by Wilmsen and Webber (2014). It means that while the planning approach of the city government of Jakarta seems more reactive than preventive, the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), of which the World Bank provided, has not yet succeeded to guarantee the minimization of risks.

It is observable that people do respond differently to this situation depending on each individual or family’s perception towards risk and their capacity to sustain it. In the first case, the availability of Ciliwung Merdeka helps to determine the definition of risks (Dwivedi, 1999). and the form of resistance. Assisting both kampungs for almost twenty years, Ciliwung Merdeka has significantly transformed the relation among residents, between the residents and external parties, and eventually between the residents and Ciliwung river. In other words, their existence has contributed to the capacity building of the riverbank communities in the long absence of government interventions. However, in case of eviction, their movements were limited as they have to deal with time pressure and changing political situation, not to mention the number of neighborhoods (RTs/RWs) they have to cater. Therefore, legal process seems to be their last resort to seek justice for Kampung Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo. On the one hand, their movement has been a reference for other evicted communities to seek justice at the courts.

It includes the mapping method of documenting the historical and legal aspects of kampungs which is significantly useful during the legal process. On the other, their choice of lawsuit will inevitably change the relation with the city government. To that extent, Sumardi suggests that they will continue their advocacy for urban poor and seek for partnership with another government bodies.3 4 Conversely, in the second case, the unavailability of mediating agencies (i.e. activist groups) assisting them during eviction and relocation processes unfortunately forced them to take everything at once or nothing at all. Thus, to be resettled expresses their powerlessness to counter the city government’s abuse of power (Oliver-Smith, 2001). Marini and Dedi’s story suggests that their decision to move to rusunawa is also an attempt to secure the future of their children, even though their life in rusunawa are still uncertain. Learning from the cases, family with little children or elderly parents will tend to accept resettlement to avoid problems, regardless of their land tenure status.Therefore, if the government wants to provide the minimum quality of resettlement plan, the needs and concerns of these vulnerable groups have to be first considered and tackled.

Nevertheless, a ‘crack of hope’ (Moulaert et al., 2010) emerged in the Ciliwung’s lower stream.

The third case has illustrated how the eviction threat has been a momentum of change for the riverbank kampung residents and an opportunity for a new form of resistance. The residents of Kampung Tongkol, Lodan, and Krapu have organized themselves to upgrade the quality of their kampung and change their attitude towards the river as a means of survival as well as negotiation strategies. They bravely sacrificed their house to be halved down and took a position as the ‘guardian’ of the river. This situation, however, has led to spatial redefinition and reproduction of riverbank area that is always evolving (Van den Broeck and Vervloesem, 2016).

While the eviction threat is still haunting, the fact that these kampungs is not necessarily a JUFMP’s project site and the uncertain political situation (i.e. upcoming election) have given space and 86 |

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time to realize the initiatives. Moreover, the ‘spatiality’ of them which are located in the historic district of Old Town Jakarta also brings about new discourses to the case, i.e. ‘urban conservation’, ‘tourism’, and ‘green movement’. While the development and identity-making of the historic Old Town district as well as the coastal area of Jakarta are still limited to marketoriented approaches, their initiative of ‘inspection kampung’ adds cultural and historical values to the process. Not only did it try to answer conservation issue with the tourism initiative, but it also attempted to solve spatial and architectural aspects of a kampung settlement.

The role of community organizers within a kampung is also central to the effectiveness of the movement. Linked to national and even global urban poor network, this community organization system spreads throughout the city, empowering and mobilizing women and youth groups to be the main actors in the improvement of their neighborhood. It also allows new collaboration with other stakeholders (i.e. ACHR, University of Indonesia, ASF-ID) which ensures valuable contribution and exposure to the process. In accordance with the notion of ‘empowering’, the case of Kampung Tongkol also put a spotlight on the involvement of architects in the making of Prototype House as they upgrade the level of ‘participation’ in the planning and design process. Unlike the first case, in this initiative, the architects and academics worked side by side with the residents in which empowerment and knowledge sharing took place. Lastly, all those initiatives actions became more powerful as the residents participated in the political contract made between JRMK with the non-incumbent candidate pair of Governor of Jakarta who finally won the election in April 2017. By taking this position, the urban poor has changed the relation with the authorities and raised their struggle to regional and even national level.

With all resources and supports from the community networks, these kampungs’ residents not only sought for a redefinition of riverbank settlement and alternatives of resettlement, but also contested their spatial existence in the midst of the modernized city.

8.2 On the the Contestation of Jakarta’s Urban Development Pattern In the past three years, the city of Jakarta has been an arena for development-oriented economic growth practice through the manifestation and commodification of infrastructure development, i.e.

MRT, LRT flyovers, flood levees, and giant sea wall, while at the same time an arena for socio-spatial struggle. Warbuton (2016) refers it as the ‘new developmentalism’ which is characterized by ‘an aversion to politically sensitive problems of law reform, corruption, and even good governance’.

Thus, using neoliberalism theory is seemingly sufficient and crucial to examine the impact of such projects to the urban condition. Even though ‘neoliberalism’ is still considered a ‘dirty word’ in Indonesian politics (see Bunnell & Miller, 2010; Firman, 1999), it becomes more noticeable these days. It is not only through the restructuring of urban processes in regards to infrastructure and housing provision, but also the way the city government ‘treats’ its most vulnerable and marginalized groups in its society. While the success of the JUFMP is preconditioned to sustain the NCICD project, the provision of rusunawa is required in the planning and implementation of the former project. In between those mechanisms is kampung settlement which is likely to be subjected to guarantee the success of such projects through a ‘creative destruction’ process (see Harvey, 2012).

However, supported by foreign investors and professional, these projects are not simply some ‘give and take’, but also are strongly influenced by two contradicting forces within the society which determine the acceptance of such projects or investments (see Rosenau & Wildsmith (2013) who study Jakarta on the 1997 financial crisis). Before massive evictions occurred, criticisms concerning the engineering-heavy approach in flood mitigation plan had raised and created tensions within THE CASE OF CILIWUNG RIVER

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the ‘educated’ people in the society. They were the ones that promoted the use of concrete embankment and other technical measures as a quick and ‘effective’ solution and the ones that put forward soft infrastructure and community involvement as a more humane and hence sustainable solution. By the time the projects involved eviction of the marginalized kampungs, the tensions were inevitably getting stronger. Eviction is nothing but a trigger for many movements to take place, not only from the urban poor communities, but also from the activists, academics, and conservationist. While the majority of Jakartans consider the projects as daring as they relocate the affected communities to a safer and better place and at the same time, protect the rest of the city from flood inundation; the opponents deem the government as unjust, undemocratic, and is strongly backed by capitalists’ interest. Even though flood control measures are undoubtedly needed, this situation reflects an imbalance relation of power in the city as the projects are carried out at the expense of the most vulnerable groups in society.

The study on the colonialism and urbanism history of Jakarta helps to understand the perpetual marginalization and exclusion experienced by the kampung residents. First of all, their existence has not been given a balance portion in the spatial plan of the city. The socio-spatial problems inherited from the Dutch colonial era has not been resolved and rather recreated in the transformation of Jakarta over time. Second, while kampung dwellers are suffering from the legal duality of land, they have been administratively marginalized by the complication of procedures in registering their land. Even worse, this condition is inherently used by the city administration to wage kampung removal. Third, the socio-economic power of kampung residents is still widely unrecognized even though it has been an important part of a wider network that keeps the city running.5 Lastly, the socio-political power of them is often dismissed. It seems that the government is still not ready to embrace community-based initiatives, even though some communities have been empowered by NGOs and academics.

In the end, these problematic policies and projects apparently became one of the reasons that cost the ruling Governor his election his election in the beginning of 2017. It is such a pity, considering the very high satisfaction rate for his administration due to his strong commitment and effectiveness in eradicating corruption and improving bureaucratic performance during his tenancy.

Nevertheless, I would not argue that it was due to a failure in identifying the fragmentation within the society because the city government has selectively opted for more ‘tangible’ projects favoring upper-middle class. I would rather argue that it was due to misjudging the capacity of the urban poor to resist and ‘fight back’. As the democratic atmosphere is getting more conducive, not only the ‘creative’ class who ‘demands’ for improvement that need to be heard, but also the marginalized (but empowered) groups who ‘cry’ for the fulfillment of the basic needs (see Marcuse, 2012 in Santos Junior, 2014). The question about the ‘right to the city’ then rests in the balance of both dimensions (Santos Junior, 2014) to, first of all, minimize the fragmentation and hence create a firm social cohesion towards a just and democratic society.

To end this part, it is understood that as a postcolonial as well as a capital city in a developing country, there is a ‘moral obligation’ that burdens the city government of Jakarta to conduct ‘improvement’ as a way out from backwardness. It has been a ‘battlefield’ for the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the search of a new identity to get rid of the colonial past (including the long-standing authoritarian regime). However, a strong capitalist intrusion can be a new form of colonialism too, especially if the process creates unhelped victims. It does not necessarily mean that foreign investment is bad either. While it is important for the manifestation of physical improvement in a nation-building process to represent independence or modernity, the way it is implemented is also fundamental. Otherwise, we should agree to what Kusno (2010) argued that “in the case of Indonesia, that the dialogue with the colonial past has resulted, among other things, in the reproduction of a form of colonialism itself”.

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8.3 Recommendations What is exciting in the case of Jakarta is the emergence of social movements in the struggle of ‘the right to the city’. Throughout this study, the marginalized groups are not passive and invisible. They have transformed critics into actions by proactively proposing solutions, even though some of the initiatives were not successful. Moreover, here and there in this study, the city government still needs a lot of improvement in the planning and implementation processes of its policies. Learning from the case studies, here I try to formulate some recommendations for a better response towards resettlement planning.

First of all, the city government undoubtedly needs to revisit the resettlement policy, especially regarding the eviction process. Displacement and resettlement should be the last option for any effort related to climate change risk reduction. As the displacement itself is a symbolic action which causes the loss of homes and livelihoods of its victims, an insensitive execution will definitely communicate an ‘abuse of power’ and signalize a weak relationship between the government and its people. Therefore, it should be carried out in a more humane way which requires the recognition of the victim’s agency. Besides the capacity building program that is suggested to reinforce the internal communication and awareness within the government bodies6, the top-level authorities strongly need to scrutiny the policy-making and reinforce the implementation process to avoid any oversight errors, especially regarding land tenure issue. However, the power of people in a developing country like Indonesia is still widely undermined. The relation between government and marginalized communities still needs to be fostered. To that extent, training and financial support should also go to local NGOs, humanitarian agencies, social communities, grassroot initiatives, as well as educational programs as mediating agencies have been an important part in bridging the gaps, For sure, performing eviction and relocation under Resettlement Plans is a huge difference compared to the previous regimes, despite all the shortcomings. It is highly potential to be a successful urban ‘development’ project that solves the housing backlog problem with an emphasis on a strong political will as it determines its success. Linked to the land tenure issue, the government needs to form a separate agency (i.e Regional Public Service Agency, BLUD) that focuses on the housing provision for low-income groups and works seamlessly between different agencies (including NLA, DGCK, and DGWR), as JRMK and UPC has also suggested (see Section 7.5). Nevertheless, a more extreme yet possible solution is to rethink the incorporation of flood controlling measures with public housing provision that caters the unmitigated low-middle income groups along the riverbanks. Due to the scarcity of land and proximity to the city center, this approach is worth a thought to generate more productivity as well as to sustain the social cohesion of the city as a whole, with emphasis that it also links to a bigger spatial framework. After all, as this study has shown, while the engineering approach to environmental crisis reflects an economic needs to revitalize and capitalize parts of the city as well as to grow businesses and investments, a negligence of the social dimension will only lead to a multitude of social and economic problems that burdens the government in the long run.

Notes [1] This perception was captured during interviews with the representatives of government agencies, Jakarta 2017.

[2] Sumardi S., 2016. Stigmatisasi, justifikasi, hancurkan! (Stigmatization, justification, destroy!). [online] medium.com https://medium.com/@forumkampungkota/stigmatisasi-justifikasi-hancurkan-f8b956bc6f9c [Accessed 18 Jul. 2015].

[3] Based on interview with Sandyawan Sumardi in Jakarta 2017.

[4] Due to decentralization which gives authority to the provincial government and the fact that Jakarta is the capital city, different aspirations and directions from the central and provincial government may exist.

[5] When financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997, a huge number of industrial, construction, and services labors were shifted to the informal trade sectors, such as street vendor (see Firman, 1999).

[6] Ministry of Public Works and Housing. JUFMP: Environmental and Social Management Framework. Jun 2011.

Available at: http://www.pu.go.id/images/uploads/banner/Ntc_110729114755_L3_Eng.pdf [Accessed 29 Jul 2017].

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