Guðmundur R Lúðvíksson
Gudmundur R Ludviksson, artist
Exhibition in Wijnhaven Rotterdam
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a serious emotional disturbance that’s characterized by disappointing and unstable personal relationships, intense anger, feelings of emptiness, and fears of abandonment - real or imagined. It’s one of several types of personality disorders, all of which reflect an inability to accept the demands and the limitations of the outside world. These disorders may regularly interfere with your behavior and your interactions with family, friends or co-workers. Among the other personality disorders are paranoid personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, histrionic personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder. People with BPD have an enormous need for love and a terrible fear of closeness. They have disturbed thinking and are constantly in a state of emotional turmoil. They’re calm and rational at times, but they may explode into inappropriate anger or rage at some perceived rejection or criticism. Borderline personality disorder is more common than other perhaps better-known mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. BPD is most common in young women. Treatment consists of psychotherapy and medications. Signs and symptoms of borderline personality disorder may include: -- Difficulty controlling emotions or impulses -- Frequent emotional ups and downs -- Impulsive actions -- Mood swings -- Stormy relationships
-- Intense anger, possibly involving physical fights -- Casting others in terms of good or bad -- Feeling of emptiness inside -- Fear of being alone -- Unlike the mood changes in disorders such as depression and bipolar disorder, which may last for weeks or months, the mood swings in BPD generally last just hours. People affected with BPD are terrified of being alone, yet they push others away with their erratic behavior. They often get into repetitive, rather predictable crises often related to the fear of abandonment, while in reality their behaviors often lead to just that. Common occurrences, such as a spouse being a few minutes late, may prompt sudden fury or despair. People with BPD are likely to believe this “abandonment” implies that their partners don’t love them anymore or that they’re “bad.” When a loved one is perceived as uncaring, a person with BPD may react with extreme sarcasm, lingering bitterness or verbal abuse. These outbursts may be followed by feelings of guilt. People with BPD may idolize a new lover and demand lots of time together. This switches quickly to devaluing that person and feeling that the person doesn’t care enough or isn’t dependable. As a result, relationships often are stormy and unstable. Affected people may also experience sudden and dramatic shifts in their self-image, which can be expressed in a shift of their goals and values. They may quickly change their opinions and plans about their career, sexual identity and types of friends.
Art work by Ludviksson. In Wijnhaven Rotterdam Nedherland 1994. Filled space of painted nilon lines ( 204 )
Causes The term borderline comes from the thinking of psychiatrists in the 1940s and 1950s that the disorder bordered on and shared features of psychotic and neurotic disorders. But that view doesn’t reflect current thinking. Doctors don’t know for sure what causes borderline personality disorder, but there are clues. Most likely, no single factor explains its development. Instead, it may be a combination of: Hereditary predisposition. You may be at a higher risk of BPD if a close family member - mother, father or sibling - has it. Childhood abuse. Some people with BPD may have been physically or sexually abused as children. Neglect. Some people with BPD describe severe deprivation, neglect and abandonment during childhood. Neurologic injury in early childhood. There appears to be a high prevalence of childhood head injuries in people with BPD. Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) occurs in approximately 2% of the population. It is a disorder in which a person has a pattern of unstable personal relationships, a self-image that is not well formed, and poor impulse control in areas such as spending, sexual conduct, driving, eating, and substance abuse. Additionally, the person suffering from BPD fears abandonment and will go to any length to prevent this. They feel chronic emptiness.
One of the hallmarks of BPD is known as “splitting”. This is where the person with BPD will swing between idealizing and devaluing people in relationships. They will pit people against one another, making one group the “white hats” and the other the “black hats”. A person is either good or bad, the person with BPD being unable to reconcile that there is both good and bad within a person. And this categorization of a person may shift from day to day, the person being good one day and bad the next. There may be suicidal threats, gestures or attempts made by the person with BPD. There may also be self-mutilation that occurs. Their mood may be very prone to outside stress, with feelings of depression and anger readily provoked, with anxiety also a common occurrence. With extreme stress, the person with BPD may experience paranoid ideation, or may have dissociative symptoms such as “running on automatic” and disconnecting from reality. The treatment for BPD may consist of medication and therapy. Antidepressants may help with depression while specific SSRI’s (prozac, zoloft, etc) may help with impulse control. Mood stabilizers (antiepileptics such as tegretol, depakote) can help with mood swings and irritability. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, and the related Dialectical Behavior Therapy are the two most common therapies used in the treatment of BPD.
Vietnam, China push for borderline of peace and friendship A Vietnamese high-ranking official has described the completion of demarcation and marker planting along the land borderline shared by Vietnam and China as an event of great historical significance in the two countries’ relations. Deputy Foreign Minister Vu Dung made the comment on the occasion of a ceremony marking the completion of demarcation and marker planting along the Vietnam-China borderline held at the Huu Nghi international border gate on February 23. The Vietnamese official also viewed the event as a new and important development step in the two countries’ relations, which opens new opportunities for bilateral economic and trade ties, and particularly contributes to further elevating the relations between border localities. “This (the completion demarcation) also serves as the foundation for each side to manage and maintain stability in the border area and to realise the plan of building the Vietnam-China border into the one of peace, friendship, cooperation and long-term stability for the interest of the people of the two countries in general and those who live in the border area in particular,” Dung said. Reviewing the process of demarcation and marker planting, Dung said following the two countries’ signing of a land border treaty in 1999 and the two legislative bodies’ ratification of the treaty later, the two sides had reached consensus on 12 legal and technical documents between 2000 and 2002, laying the ground for the demarcation and marker planting work. As a result, in December 2001, the first marker on the two countries’ borderline was installed at the
Mong Cai- Dong Xing border gate, and since October 2002, both sides concurrently deployed demarcation and planting work on the entire shared borderline. According to Dung, during 2002- 2003, the demarcation was conducted from west to east and the two sides installed 89 markers on the borderline. Since 2004, the two countries planted around 250-300 border markers each year. On December 31, 2008, Vietnam and China completed the demarcation and marker planting work in line with the agreement of their high-ranking leaders. Deputy Foreign Minister Dung highlighted the work a triumph of the Vietnam-China friendship and a vivid manifestation of the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership envisioned by the two countries’ leaders. The Vietnamese official also attributed the achievement to the prompt instructions of highranking leaders of both countries and tireless efforts of negotiators as well as ministerial and branch-level agencies involved in the work. So far, almost 2,000 border markers, including 1,500 main ones and more than 400 auxiliaries, had been installed along the 1,400-km VietnamChina land borderline. Regarding the tasks for 2009, the Deputy FM said both sides will continue discussions to finalise a protocol on border delimitation and marker planting and its appendices. The two sides will negotiate a new border
Art work by Ludviksson. In ButlerÂ´s Wharf Gallerie, London UK 1994. Filled space of painted nilon lines ( 204 )
management regulation and an agreement on international border gates management in addition to signing a cooperation agreement to tap tourism potential at the Ban Gioc waterfall. They will also issue a regulation on travel through the mouth of the Bac Luan river./.
All along the European border, the year 2006 set new records: Spanish authorities reported 6,000 refugees dead, drowned in the Atlantic Ocean while trying to reach the Canary Islands, off West Africa.1 Hundreds more suffocated in containers, trucks, and cargo boats in the ports of London, Dublin, and Rotterdam, or froze to death in Eastern Europe. Others, locked up in one of the innumerable internment camps spread all over the heart of Europe and North Africa, desperately decided to end their own lives.2 At the same time, Europe reported the lowest rate in years of refugees officially seeking asylum. This list obviously doesn’t point to a more peaceful world. What it indicates instead is that in Europe the criteria and procedures for securing legal refugee status have become so restrictive that most migrants no longer bother to apply for it. In 2006, Germany for example counted only 20,000 petitions for political asylum, the lowest number since 1977. If we include the member states of the European Union (EU), that number rises to 200,000.3 However, the real story of the border regime, and its constriction of the category for legal entrance and residence, is in the rising body count. For many years, critics of the European border
regime have been protesting the deadly effects of what is often called “Fortress Europe.” The term “fortress” and the images it conjures up are not inappropriate, if we think of Europe (and North America) in the global context. While free trade policies and neoliberal “structural adjustment” programs have wreaked havoc on the economies of almost every country in the Global South, and while new imperial wars have destabilized entire world regions, enormous power asymmetries enable Europe and North America to go on protecting themselves from the effects of their economic and foreign policies. High walls are being built around the wealthy cores of the Global North to keep out the millions of people who are forced to leave their home countries in order to survive.4 But is the fortress metaphor really adequate to describe the recent changes in European border and immigration policies? Are we really dealing here with impenetrable walls? What do we make of the fact that millions of people actually manage to cross the borders of the EU? Despite the security fences, motion detectors, camera surveillance, and drastically increased border patrols allegedly intended to exclude them, an estimated 5–6.5 million undocumented migrants currently live and work in Europe.5 Entire sectors of the European economy—such as agriculture, construction, the domestic service industry, and sex work—would likely collapse without access to cheap and unregulated migrant labor. In this essay, we argue that the metaphor of Fortress Europe has a number of analytical weaknesses. Most importantly, it conceives of the border as a linear and territorial demarcation; that is, as a borderline between two or more political entities that may or
may not be successfully enforced. While this may have been adequate to describe the border configuration of Europe up until the early 1990s (and especially the so-called iron curtain of the Cold War years), the European border regime recently has undergone dramatic transformations. New institutions, actors, rules, and techniques have emerged on this political field. As a result, the European Union has become a borderland. Europe also imposes its new immigration and border regime on other countries and regions on a global scale; therefore we can speak of a new “border imperialism.” If this is right, then we need to rethink our theoretical tools for analyzing borders and states. Based on how the new border regime is actually operating, we need to develop new concepts and categories to guide our field research and to draw conclusions about what these changes mean for political struggles “on the ground.” European Borderland as Border Regime The centerpiece of the new European border regime is the Schengen Agreement, first signed by Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in 1985. This agreement allows for the elimination of systematic border patrols between participating countries. At the same time, it creates a common, external Schengen border by defining, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing benchmarks for border patrols, visa procedures, cross-border police cooperation, and information sharing among all signatory states.6 Today, the Schengen Agreement has been signed by thirty countries, including all the EU member-states and three non-EU states (Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland). In addition, the Schengen Agreement has become part of the
so-called acquis communitaire, which means that future candidates for EU membership will have to meet the Schengen criteria and adopt European immigration, visa, and border policies. This is not necessarily in the interest of new member states. Turkey, for example, one of the “hot candidates” for future EU membership, has important crossborder relations with its eastern neighbors, including regional trade, tourism, and small-scale economic activity. However, before it can become a full member of the EU, Turkey will have to tighten its borders with Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and must allow EU-member states access to restricted information and border control operations.7 But the European standards for border enforcement are not only imposed on Schengen members and future EU candidates. By means of supranational European programs and bilateral agreements, EU-member states—notably Germany, Italy, and Spain—routinely “export” European border standards to states outside the EU. The standards are written into European financial, technical, and administrative aid, and are an explicit component of the law enforcement training and assistance EU states offer within “humanitarian” aid packages. A prime example is the European Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). Begun in 2005, this program aims at enforcing the 1,222-kilometer border separating the two countries from the EU. During its first six months, the European Commission allocated four million euros through the so-called Rapid Reaction Mechanism. The mission consisted of sixty-nine European experts and forty local staff members, all focused on “modernizing” local border controls. In the
second phase, lasting eighteen months, another sixteen million euros were poured in. The European staff assigned to EUBAM now exceeds 100 experts “on site.”8 Needless to say, it is often the financial aspect that motivates countries like Ukraine and Moldova to give up sovereignty over their borders. Many other states on the European periphery are vulnerable to this kind of interstate bribery. Exporting “modern” border standards means more than merely up-grading check points at international airports and seaports or reinforcing traditional patrols along territorial borders, however. These new policies define “border corridors” that encroach dozens of kilometers into national territory and are monitored by numerous state agencies. And as many incidents reported in recent years show, state authorities routinely exert pressure on local civil society actors to collaborate in controlling these corridors. In the mid-1990s, for example, taxi drivers in the former East Germany near the border with Poland were requested to ask suspicious looking passengers for their passports and visa documents.9 This kind of blurring of the separations between the civil sphere and that of state law enforcement is an important aspect of the new border regime. However, the most interesting point—and the most radical change —is that the internal extension of the European border no longer has any limits. All intra-European flows of communication and all routes of regional infrastructure, such as train connections and train stations, major urban metro stations, overland bus stations, inter-state highways, and public city plazas, are now defined as strategic sites of transit and therefore subject to intensified border enforcement. All over Europe,
when foreign-looking individuals hop on the local subway, take an overland train, or simply “hang out” in public, they increasingly are approached by regular police or special border forces and asked to produce identity papers. In order legally to absorb all these traditionally public spaces into the border regime, national laws had to be changed, and government institutions and law-enforcement agencies had to be reorganized. In Germany, for example, the government agency responsible for border patrols and immigration check points used to be the Federal Border Guard (Bundesgrenzschutz). As the Schengen Agreement was successively signed by all of Germany’s neighboring states, this agency began to appear obsolete. By the mid-1990s, it was clear that the activity of the Federal Border Guard could be limited to patrolling Germany’s small number of international airports and seaports. Germany no longer had any borders with non-Schengen states in need of enforcement. But of course, coercive state apparatuses seldom undergo reduction, however rationally compelling that would be; instead, they get a new mission. As the legal area of operation for the Federal Border Guard largely disappeared through the redefinition of the old borders, the German government created new legal areas of operation by reclassifying train routes and train stations, inter-state highways, and big public city plazas as strategic transit areas—as de facto internal extensions of the border.10 Additionally, the Federal Border Guard has begun to cooperate with new partners, such as local police and private security contractors, and to support regular police units during special events such as political rallies and soccer games. It also hosts the GSG-9, an elite special-forces unit for
so-called counterterrorism, and is actively involved in German military deployments in foreign countries. The latter include both military operations and international missions for border enforcement and police training. Finally, the Federal Border Guard now collects and analyzes personal data from migrants and European citizens. Despite privacy concerns, personal information is increasingly accessible to government scrutiny as a result of cross-border data sharing and cooperation among European law enforcement agencies. The institutional—and in fact constitutional—“reform” of the Federal Border Guard culminated in July 2005, when the federal secretary of interior, Otto Schily, renamed it the Federal Police Force (Bundespolizei). Today, the Federal Police Force, easy to spot in their special uniforms and riot gear, counts 40,000 active members and is a very visible presence in everyday life all over Germany. Besides such recent legal and structural reforms aimed at defining, policing, and enforcing the Schengen borders inside and outside the EU, the new European border regime encompasses two more crucial elements: the outsourcing of immigration politics to non-state actors and the active shaping of public discourse about immigration.11 Over the last ten years, growing numbers of transnational agencies, think tanks, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have entered the political arena of migration politics. Concerned with research and publications, providing political advice and expertise to governments and politicians, and carrying out specific tasks and operations, these organizations have become an integral part of European immigration and border politics.
One of the main actors in this arena is the International Organization for Migration (IOM).12 Founded in 1951, the IOM has undergone numerous institutional and political transformations. Today, it has 120 member states, 300 field locations, 5,400 employees, and a yearly budget of $733 million (in 2006). By its own account, the IOM is the “leading international organization for migration management.”13 Many governments entrust the IOM with the deportation of undocumented migrants (so-called voluntary returns) and with the management of internment camps in which thousands of refugees are compelled to live. Groups such as Amnesty International and the international No Border activist network have frequently criticized inhumane conditions in IOM-run camps and the IOM’s active role in deporting refugees. But as a transnational organization with no elected officials and thus effectively beyond any democratic control, the IOM is hard to target.14 Along with other agencies and NGOs, the IOM also plays an important role in shaping the public discourse on international migration in the periphery of the Global North. Especially in EU-border countries that are not yet Schengen members, such as Turkey and Ukraine, these non-state actors function as a kind of “discursive joint” that mediates between new governmental migration policies and public opinion. Operating there as the extra-territorial and civil “voice” of the EU, they define migration as a political problem requiring extensive regulation, including measures of restriction and exclusion.15 This brings us to the third element of the new European border regime: discourse politics. Politicians, governmental agencies, NGOs, and
mainstream media frame current practices of exclusion with a discourse that shapes public opinion about immigration along two thematic lines. On the one hand, migrants are represented as a threat to social order, and immigration as a problem of social integration. Today in Europe, the dominant stereotype of the migrant is the Islamic alien, culturally unassimilated and hostile to democratic values. The newspapers are full of stories about “problem neighborhoods” —meaning those with high concentrations of non-EU citizens, such as the Neukölln district of Berlin. Impressionistic journalism, which fails to question the racist stereotypes it reproduces, has succeeded in constructing a European version of the U.S. urban ghetto—a parallel society that is crime ridden, abandoned by the state, and ruled alternately by youth gangs and superstitious tradition.16 The message is clear. Stop further immigration! Racist fear-mongering is reinforced by pseudo-scientific demographic scenarios, according to which the native population is decreasing (“German women are not as fertile as foreign women”), and will soon be numerically overwhelmed by “the others.”17 On the other hand, migrants—and especially women—are portrayed as victims: In this representation, their role as active protagonists who have made decisions about where they want to live is ignored or discounted. At the center of this image is the organized crime of human trafficking. Presumably, gangs and networks of criminals smuggle young women to Europe against their will, hold them hostage in brothels, and turn them into sex slaves. Again, the media are full of sensational stories that oversimplify and render one-dimensional complex patterns of movement and strategies for survival. The
unsubtle message: we need stricter border controls, tighter visa policies, and more police raids. Meanwhile, individuals and groups that give support or practical assistance to undocumented migrants are tendentially criminalized. According to this discourse, immigration authorities and law enforcement are acting “humanely” on behalf of the migrant-as-victim. These two contrasting representations— migrants as, alternately, both threat and victim— both function to manage public opinion and maintain support for the new border regime. Increasingly, then, the clear national borderline is both widened and extended back into national territory and projected out into the territory of foreign states. In effect, the old lines of national demarcation are being transformed into new and militarized border zones and spaces that overlay the social space of everyday life: Europe is becoming a borderland. This transformation is characterized by the re-categorization of spaces and territories, an expansion and diversification of the modes of border control and enforcement, and a public discourse shaped by distorting representations of migrants.18 But what is the result? Has it produced perfect closure and total control? Have the flows of migration been effectively blocked? Or does the new control regime itself function within a global and systemic regulation of migration flows? The Political Economy of the European Borderland The European border regime, as sophisticated as it may be, obviously does not lead to the complete exclusion of undocumented migrants from the EU. Currently, an estimated 5–6.5 million “illegalized”19 migrants live and work in Eu-
rope.20 Their exact number is unknown. In their everyday lives, they utilize diverse forms of counter-knowledge, social creativity, self-organization, and networks of mutual support. The images of the several hundred African refugees who, using improvised ladders and carpets thrown over barbed-wire, scaled the high security fences of the Spanish exclave Melilla in northern Morocco in October 2005, are enduring documents of one spectacular attempt to set foot in the EU.21 Fortunately, many other migrants are able to gain entry through less desperate measures. Many obtain temporary visas to study in a European university, visit friends or family, or work legally as au pairs or farmworkers. Once in Europe, many decide to overstay their visas. The personal needs and motives, the accidents of good and bad luck, the individual backgrounds and routes of entry are as varied as human beings from all over the world can be. There is no master-narrative of undocumented immigration, no story or trajectory that can be generalized into some invariable composite of migrant character or experience.
restaurants, and street vendors. Employment is an inadequate concept for the work they do in these capacities; performed without any legally enforceable labor contract, this work involves an exceptional degree of exposure to precariousness and coercion. Tobias Pieper points out that the European border regime is characterized by its ability to differentiate and regulate (1) highly qualified workers from the capitalist periphery who are actually recruited or invited to work in Europe; (2) low-skilled guest workers who legally come to Europe, mainly to Germany, on short-term visas to live and work under very restricted conditions; (3) an illegalized transnational labor force of workers who lack any formal rights or protections for the negotiation of their living and working conditions; and (4) economically superfluous refugees, who increasingly are denied any secure legal status in Europe.22
Of course, the current process of “precarization” of living and working conditions is not limited to illegalized migrants—even if it is clear that this However, all undocumented migrants in Europe group suffers the most from it. neoliberal policies do have one thing in common. In order to survive, have to be understood as an attack on the working they depend on the informal or unregulated labor class as a whole. Neoliberalism creates a market. While European workers and unions “sliding scale” of precarization that affects all struggle to defend the remnants of the dismantled groups within the working class, but each to a Keynesian welfare state, many migrants have different extent. In France, for example, this little hope of access to minimum wages and labor process of division and stratification has led to regulations. Entire sectors of the European spectacular eruptions of public unrest. It would be economy rely on their easily exploitable a distortion to interpret the 2005 labor-power. uprisings in the French suburbs as merely a series Depending on the regional labor markets—highly of race riots by Arab immigrants and differentiated within the EU—illegalized migrants undocumented migrants. While a background of work as manual laborers on racial injustice certainly played an important role construction sites, pickers and processors in there, these uprisings need to be seen in the larger agriculture, domestic servants or janitors, sex context of neoliberal “structural adjustment” workers, dish washers and prep-cooks in small processes. In that context, they appear as a form
of working-class protest against economic deprivation and deepening social inequalities.23 Indeed, even a cursory comparison of present working conditions to those of the recent past reveals how far neoliberal labor-market “reforms” have gone in undermining the position of the most vulnerable groups of the working class. In the 1950s, ’60s, and early ’70s, millions of guest workers immigrated to Europe, mostly to fill places in industrial production. These workers were at the low end of the pay scale, but their living and working conditions were legal, regulated, and relatively secure. In contrast, the millions of illegalized migrants who today are indispensable to EU economies are forced into completely precarious conditions.24
plan for the future. Many migrants have had their lives reduced to extremes of existential insecurity, first in their country of origin and then again at their European destination. The result is a new form of precarious, transnational existence in a “third space,” a continuous movement between two hostile non-homes.
In his 2000 book Magical Urbanism, Mike Davis describes this predicament as it is lived by Mexican migrants in the United States. He writes of rural villages and ethnic communities whose members live their fractured everyday reality on both sides of the border. Often physically distant from their families and loved ones, they remain intensely connected through e-mail, telephone, Skype, and enormous flows of economic remittances (the “migra-dollars”): “The new logic of social With no formal permission to work, reproduction under conditions of rapid and undocumented migrants are not protected by sometimes catastrophic global restructuring existing labor laws and regulations, and as a result compels traditional communities strategically to must endure forms of exploitation that exceed balance assets and population between two by far what is assumed to be “normal” capitalist different place-rooted existences.”25 Similar exploitation of the legal labor force. patterns of transnational networking and survival strategies can be observed in Europe, especially Targeted by fierce border and immigration in the southeastern and peripheral areas of the controls increasingly conducted within Europe, EU.26 and not merely along its outer edges, undocumented migrants are forced into permanent hiding The new European migration regime, then, does and thus prevented from organizing themselves not represent a complete closure and control of into any kind of collective political defense. territorial borders. What is new about it is rather the way in which it produces a very flexible and Today, many migrants leave their economically highly disposable transnational labor force. The and politically devastated home countries with most hopes of finding a better life in Europe. What they vulnerable parts of this labor force are discover instead is an environment that is legally systematically deprived of rights, resources, and and the means of secure social reproduction. economically structured to exclude them from political participation and which frustrates all This is not the result of a mastermind, however. their attempts to stabilize their life-situations and The new European border regime is shaped by
numerous conflicting interests, principles, and “imaginaries,” mediated through various political representations and procedures. As there are close links between the rise of neoliberalism and the formation of the new immigration regime, any complete political analysis would also need to analyze these links. Generally, in Europe as elsewhere in the Global North, parliamentary governments have accepted the need to implement neoliberal policies, purportedly in order to increase the global competitiveness of national economies. If we consider immigration policy as one aspect of the larger field of neoliberal political action, then we can identify a number of competing actors: •politicians, security specialists, and think tanks on the political right, especially nationalists and “law-and-order” social conservatives, who seek closed borders and zero tolerance towards undocumented immigration; •social-democrats and liberals who accept the need for state action to stem the flows of immigration but who generally are shy of heavy-handed police raids and visibly repressive border operations; •corporations and small businesses that benefit directly from cheap migrant labor and therefore lobby politicians and bureaucrats to tolerate an undocumented and unregulated work force; •national trade unions whose members are ambivalent about immigration, sometimes supporting anti-immigration policies to “protect” domestic workers from downward pressures on wages, but (more rarely) sometimes mobilizing to defend migrant rights and to integrate illegalized workers into the regulated legal labor market; and •human rights NGOs, progressive churches, and grassroots activists, who tend to support illegalized migrants unconditionally, but are barely visible among the major political actors.
Conclusion The European borderland produces a contemporary form of what Marx famously called the “industrial reserve army.” This must be grasped as the result of a globalized and conflictual process involving many actors and levels of operation. That said, the main profiteers of the current situation are easy enough to identify. Corporations and businesses that exploit cheap migrant labor, as well as firms that supply needed services—such as international banking, transportation, and telecommunications—to the immigrant community, make good money on the backs of this transnational labor force. Resistance is constituted only when migrants organize themselves politically and act in concert with local grassroots groups and trade unions for goals that include but are not limited to the legalization of status. Proposals that take into account and respond to the global inequalities and power asymmetries behind migration and illegality must be put on the agenda. And every successful campaign for an expansion of legal status should be seen as an opportunity for consolidating the base for continued grassroots struggle.
Guðmundur R Lúðvíksson 1954
Education / Menntun
1992 -1995 Willem de Kooning Academy Rotterdam Holland Contemporary art 1995 - Staatliche Hochschule fur bildende Kunste Frankfurt am Main 1987 - 1991 Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts, Contemporary art 1971 - 1974 Hotel and Restautant School of Iceland & Hotel Saga -Cook Chef
Exhibitions / Sýningar
1985 - Nordic house Foryar island 1986 - AKOGES Gallery Vestmannaeyjum Iceland 1987 - AKOGES Gallery Vestmannaeyjum Iceland 1990 - Grottu Seltjarnarnesi Iceland 1990 - Blue Showbox Gallery Reykjavik Iceland 1990 - Gallery Djúpid Reykjavík Iceland 1991 - Video Gallery Umeå Sweden 1991 - Akraborg “ Hafsauga “ Iceland 1991 - Gallerí 11 Reykjavík Iceland 1991 - Art museum Hafnarborg Hafnarfirdi Iceland 1992 - Indenpended Art Festival Reykjavík Iceland 1992 - Gallery Kaffi Splitt Reykjavik Iceland 1991 - Gallery Djúpid Reykjavík Iceland 1992 - Art museum Hafnarborg Hafnarfirdi Iceland 1992 - Mokka kaffi Reykjavík Iceland 1992 - Gallery 17 Reykjavík Iceland 1992 - Indenpendet art festival Reykjavik Iceland 1994 - Oge hostspital RotterdamHollandi 1994 - Modern art museum Reykjavik Iceland 1994 - Gallery Shade Thames London England 1993 - Modern art museum Reykjavik Iceland 1993 - Kunstpavillon Aalborg Denmark 1994 - Gallerie Black 10 Rotterdam Holland 1994 - FineArt museum Hafnarborg Hafnarfirdi Iceland 1995 - The living art museum Reykjavik Iceland 1995 - Delft Gallery Delft Holland 1995 - Gallery NEFTU Rotterdam Holland 1995 - Gallery Blaak 10 RotterdamHolland 1995 - Gallery 39 Hafnarfirði Iceland 1995 - Art museum Kirkjuhvoll Akranesi Iceland 1995 - Art museum Hafnarborg Hafnarfirdi Iceland 1995 - INK BANK - Gallerie Rotterdam Holland
1995 - Toronto Canada 1996 - Art festival Ketilhúsi AkureyriIceland 1996 - Gallery Showbox Iceland 1996 - Art festival of Akureyri Iceland 1996 - The city theatre Reykjavík Iceland 1997 - Art museum of Hafnarfjordur Iceland 1997 - The living art museum Reykjavik - On Iceland show Iceland 1997 - The living art museum Reykjavik - 13 Young artist Iceland 1997 - The living art museum Reykjavik - 16 dagar. Iceland 1997- Gallery MAERZ Linz Austria 1997 - Sound gallery Iceland 1997 - Galleri Barmur Iceland 1997 - Gallery Slunkaríki Ísafirði Iceland
1998 - Gallery Fold Reykjavik Iceland 1998 - Höfn Hornarfirði Iceland 1999 - Art festival of Akureyri Iceland 2001/2002 - Reykjavik Art museum Iceland 2003 - OK Temporary Art Museum Linz Austria 2003 – Gallerí Elliðakotsland Iceland 2004 - Gallery Smidjan Reykjavi Iceland 2004 - Gallery In my Field @ home Iceland 2005 - AA/80b Gallerie Rotterdam Holland 2006 - GS Iceland 2006 - Novosibirsk State Art Museum Russia 2006 - Art festival Reykjanesbæ Ljosanott Iceland 2006 - Gallery New Building Reykjanesby Iceland 2007 - Zig Zag Gallery Svarta Loft Ljósanótt í Reykjanesbæ Iceland 2007 - Gallery Art Domain Leipzig Germany 2007 - Gallery Svarta Loft Reykjanesby Iceland 2008 - Gallery Art Domain Leipzig ( First prize ) Germany 2008 - Gallery Cosy Corner Reykjanesby Iceland 2008 - Art and Cultur Center Grindavik Iceland 2008 - Gallery 1og8 Reykjanesbæ Iceland 2008 - Karolina Gallery Akureyri Iceland 2008 - Art festival “Ljosanott 2008 “ Reykjanesbæ Iceland 2008 - 400 company Gallery Reykjanesbæ Iceland 2008 - Gallery Kotturinn Cosy Iceland 2008 - Art project with children Iceland - Germany 2008 - Gallery Kotturinn Cosy / Cartoon drawings Iceland 2009 - Art Domain Gallery Leipzig Germany 2009 - Light Night Reykjanesbæ - Rainbowdance Iceland 2010 - Art Museum Of Reykjanesbær Iceland
Other projects / Önnur verkefni
Northen light towers sculpture / Norðurljósaturnarnir Vordur on Reykjanes / Vörður á Reykjanesi Crisis Christmas / Kreppu jól 2008 Crisis Art exhibition / Kreppusýning 2009 Handworks - 100 photos / Daniel & Gudmundur / Handverk, samstarfverk Lessons in art / Kennsla í myndlist Working with childrens / Iceland & Germany / Unnið með leikskólabörnum
Awards / Viðurkenningar
City Reykjanesbær / Reykjanesbær City Hafnarfjördur / Hafnarfjarðarbær City Gardur / Garður City Sandgerdi / Sandgerði Myndstef Icelandair The Ministry of Education, Science and Culture Iceland / Menntamálsráðuneytið Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Iceland / Utanríkisráðuneytið 1st Prize of the 2007 Palm Art Award. Art Domain Gallery Leipzig 2008 Manngildissjodur Reykjanesbæjar 2008 Impra 2008 Menningaráð Suðurnesja 2008 Menningaráð Suðurnesja 2010
Other works / Önnur verkefni:
Vídeo work for the Icelandic TV / Vídeó verk fyrir RÚV Stadement for theatre / Sviðsmyndir fyrir leikhús
Poem envelop / Ljóðaumslag Teaching art / Ýmis kennsla í myndlist Artist music Súputeningurinn ( With; Bjarna Þórarinssyni - 50 cassettur ) Wall work ( 32 meter x 3,70 meter ) Café Bleu Kringlunni og Breidin Akranesi / Veggverk Play show for Children “ Daði dvergur í stóra skógi. / Leikrit fyrir börn 7 storys for radio / 7 smásögur fyrir útvarpsflutning Workshops in Iceland, Holland, Canada, Belgium, Norway, Sweden,Denmark, Poland Cartoon drawings for LK ( Theatre ) / Teiknimyndir fyrir leikhús Independed art festival Reykjavik 1992 / Óháða listahátíðin Music Composer - Nýtt líf / film / Kvikmyndatónlist Art without of border / List án landamæra
Books,newspaper. TV / Bækur, blöð, sjónvarp;
Iceland by number - Book Hafnarborg 1988 - 1993 - Book Morgunbladid - Newspaper Helgarposturinn - Newspaper Visir - Newspaper DV - Newspaper Vikurfrettir - Newspaper Gestgjafinn - Magasin Mosaik - TV Cultur O.K Center for Contemporary Art Upper Austria Newspapers Linz Leipzig News - Newspaper Living Art Museum - Book Gudmundur R Ludviksson 1991 - 2006 - Book A medan ljosin loga - Poem 2008 God & the animals - Book Troðningur / Art Magazine
CD / LP / Cassett / Tónlist, útgefið efni
1. Selfoss ( LP ) - 2. Vinna og ráðningar ( LP ) 3. Ég lifi ( LP ) - 4. Gallabuxur ( LP ) - 5. Í skóinn ( LP ) 6. Jólasnjór ( LP ) - 7. Án vörugjalds ( LP ) - 8. Stóra Barnaplatan ( CD ) 9. Barnaspil ( CA ) - 10. Litlu jólin ( LP ) - 11. Brekkusyrpa ( CA ) 12. Guðmundur R “Live” ( CA ) - 13. Á kránni ( CD ) 14. Í fréttum er þetta helst ( CA ) - 15. Laddi “ Einn voða vitlaus “ ( CD ) 16. Papar ( CD ) - 17. Á móti sól ( CD ) - 18. Súputeningurinn ( CA ) 19. Undir Norðurljósum ( CD ) - 20. Dinglad upp a folkid ( CD ) 21. Ljósanætur lokka ( CD )
Cartoon Drawings / Skopteikningar Vikurspaug Annað
18 sinnum sótt um starfslaun listamanna / 18 sinnum verið hafnað um starfslaun.
Guðmundur R Lúðvíksson