Lokayata Vol V, No 02 ( Sept 2015)

1

Lokāyata Journal of Positive Philosophy (ISSN: 2249-8389)

Volume V, No. 02 (September, 2015) Chief-Editor:

Desh Raj Sirswal

Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS) Pehowa (Kurukshetra)-136128 (Haryana) http://positivephilosophy.webs.com http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

2

Lokāyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy (ISSN 2249-8389) Lokāyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy is an online bi-annual interdisciplinary journal of the Center for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS) . The name Lokāyata can be traced to Kautilya's Arthashastra , which refers to three ānv īk ik īs (logical philosophies), Yoga, Sam khya and Lokāyata.

Lokāyata here still refers to logical debate ( disputatio , "criticism") in general and not to a m aterialist doctrine in particular. The objectives of the journal are to encourage new thinking on concepts and theoretical fram eworks in the disciplines of hum anities and social sciences to dissem inate such new ideas and research papers (with strong emphasis on modern implications of philosophy) which have broad relevance in society in general and m an’s life in particular. The Centre publishes two issues of the journal every year. Each regular issue of the journal contains full-length papers, discussions and comments, book reviews, information on new books and other relevant academic information. Each issue contains about 100 Pages. © Centre for (Kurukshetra)

Positive

Philosophy

and

Interdisciplinary

Studies,

Pehowa

Chief-­Editor: Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal (Assistant Professor (Philosophy, P.G.Govt. College for Girls, Sector-­‐11, Chandigarh

Associate Editors: Dr. Merina Islam, Dr. Sandhya Gupta

Editorial Advisory Board Prof. K.K. Sharma (Former-­‐Pro-­‐Vice-­‐Chancellor, NEHU, Shillong).

Prof. (Dr.) Sohan Raj Tater, Former Vice Chancellor, Singhania University , Rajasthan).

Dr. Ranjan Kumar Behera (Patkai Christian College (Autonomous), Nagaland).

Dr. Geetesh Nirban (Kamala Nehru College, University of Delhi).

Dr. K. Victor Babu (Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Andhra University, Visakhapatnam).

Dr Rasmita Satapathy (Department of Philosophy, Ramnagar College, West Bengal.)

Mr.Pankoj Kanti Sarkar (Department of Philosophy, Debra Thana Sahid Kshudiram Smriti Mahavidyalaya, Paschim Medinipur, West Bengal).

Declaration: The opinions expressed in the articles of this journal are those of the individual authors, and not necessary of those of CPPIS or the Chief-Editor.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

3

In this issue……………..

Title of the Paper & Author

Page No. A

04-­‐14

AMALGAMATING SUBLIMITY AND MORALITY: A KANTIAN

15-­‐27

PROBLEM

OF

COMMENSURATION

IN

EDUCATION:

PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW Gaganjot Kaur

APPROACH Ahinpunya Mitra ECOFEMINISM : SOME GLIMPSES

28-­‐38

Reni Pal PLACE OF LOGIC IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

39-­‐49

Desh Raj Sirswal

MkW ñ ch-vkj- vEcs M dj dh nfyrks a ds mRFkku es a ;ks x nku dh ,s f rgkfld i` " BHkw f e

50-­‐54

iz d k'k pUnz cMok;k

Report of the Programme

55-­‐58

PHILOSOPHY NEWS IN INDIA

59-­‐62

CONTRIBUTORS OF THIS ISSUE

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

63

4

PROBLEM

OF

COMMENSURATION

IN

EDUCATION:

A

PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW Gaganjot Kaur Abstract The conventional scheme of education is a set of teaching and learning techniques with predominantly vocational goals, determined for every individual who is enrolled in an institute of formal education. Spiritual development of the individual remains largely untouched and consequently, many individuals compromise their real identities for a conventionally successful life. The problem is not limited to one’s professional compromises. Rather, the deeper crisis is a philosophical one – existential possibilities of an individual lie in oblivion. In this research article, I address the problem of commensuration in education and how it acts as an impediment to an individual’s holistic growth. The primary reference for this article is Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.

Keywords: Education, Commensuration, Edification Philosophy and education, as endeavours of individual pursuit, have a certain similarity in the way they have developed over the years, that is, both have become highly professionalized and scholastic. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard Rorty expresses his concern over the intransigent methods of philosophical thinking.

Similar concerns arise in the field of education as well.

In this article, I present the

relevance of Rorty’s ideas in the area of education.

I explain the problem of

commensuration in education – how the conventional methods have constantly been estimating the potential identities of individuals on a common criterion, and how this commensuration prevents individuals from feeling spiritually involved in the process and transcending their limited selves. In the later part of the article, I put together certain ideas on the need to edify education and how it may be achieved. Through this article, I intend to present a case for reappraisal of the common idea of education, its objectives and practices.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

5

AIMS OF EDUCATION Primarily, there are two aspects to an individual that call for perfection – intellectual and moral. For Aristotle, the goal of education is identical with the goal of man. Although all forms of education are explicitly or implicitly directed towards a human ideal, in Aristotle’s view, education is essential for the complete self-realization of man.

1

He categorizes virtues as intellectual and moral, and holds that the former is

achieved by being taught and the latter is the result of habit. Alfred North Whitehead contends that education should aim at producing men who possess both culture and expert knowledge in some specific direction. In their expert knowledge, they will find the ground to start from and their culture will lead them as deep as philosophy and as high as art.2 For Whitehead, valuable intellectual development is self-development.

Almost all institutions of formal education would agree on the view that education must facilitate the intellectual and moral growth of an individual. In all conventional schools, there is a well-defined subject-matter for the purpose of acquisition of knowledge. But, pursuance of moral development of students is only superficial – they are taught manners, etiquettes, right conduct, right speech, etc. but not the meaning and importance of moral commitments in one’s personal and social life. What remains largely absent from most of the curricula is acknowledgment of the individual’s existential and spiritual matters.3 Understanding one’s situation in the larger framework of life, and relevance and significance of one’s actions in the moral sphere, comes only through a thorough examination of oneself and one’s experiences. Intellectual and moral development of an individual without examination of the self is sufficient if education is seen as extrinsically valuable, as a venture that has high utility. For an educational experience to have an intrinsic worth, the learner must feel spiritually involved in the process. Complete self-realization or self-development can happen only when all the dimensions of human existence are addressed and worked upon – when there is transformation of the consciousness.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

6

In his Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer talks about the notion of bildung.

Literally, the German term bildung means education or self-formation, or culture.

However, Gadamer clarifies that bildung does not simply mean developing one’s capacities or talents.

He cites Wilhelm von Humboldt’s definition of bildung,

“something both higher and more inward, namely the disposition of mind which, from the knowledge and the feeling of the total intellectual and moral endeavour, flows harmoniously into sensibility and character.”4

Gadamer substitutes the notion of

knowledge with that of bildung as the goal of thinking.

He explains that “bildung is

not achieved in the manner of a technical construction, but grows out of an inner process of formation and cultivation, and therefore constantly remains in a state of continual bildung”.5 What we need is substitution of knowledge with self-formation as goal of education, too.

The experience of education can be completely transformed if the

learners are not only getting information about the world, but realize the possibility of self-transcendence. Development of an individual beyond his/her definable extent calls for an approach different from the usual school programs. Learning scientific facts, for example, is useless if it does not expand the horizon of the learner’s consciousness.

Using facts in one’s work is, of course, intelligent but that is only a very limited way of defining the aim of education.

COMMENSURATION OF INTERESTS AND IDENTITIES Despite all the criticism it received, Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature proved to be one of the most provocative works of the 20th century. The basic objective carried through the book is to question the notion of human mind as “mirror of nature”.

With a sharp anti-positivistic approach, he intends to set aside the notion of philosophy as the means to achieve objective knowledge. However, Rorty’s problem does not lie with the belief that philosophy is a knowledge-bearing discipline, but rather with the belief that a philosophical enquiry has significance only if it is an epistemological pursuit – that philosophy ought to be a knowledge-bearing discipline.

As a result of such

approach, the sense of wonder that Plato called – the beginning of philosophy – seems to get overcast by one’s longing for certain answers.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

7

In Rorty’s view, our present notions of philosophy are strongly tied-up with the Kantian idea that all knowledge-claims are commensurable, thereby making it hard to imagine philosophy without epistemology. By commensuration, Rorty means “bringing under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict. These rules tell us how to create an ideal situation”.6 Resolution of conflict is, of course, gratifying but it also causes complacence in thought.

Gratification that arises from resolution of

disagreements relies on the idea that man is meant to find the most accurate explanation to life that cannot be challenged. We see education serving the same purpose for us as epistemology does for philosophy. Thus, we yearn an approach that would simplify the task of imparting education. And, commensuration has already proven itself to be a very convenient technique. Thus, our notion of education is also so strongly tied-up with the customary practices of classroom teaching that it is hard to conceive of an alternative idea of education. In J. Krishnamurti’s words: In seeking comfort, we generally find a quiet corner in life where there is a minimum of conflict, and then we are afraid to step out of that seclusion.

This fear of life, this fear of struggle and of new experience, kills in us the spirit of adventure; our whole upbringing and education have made us afraid to be different from our neighbour, afraid to think contrary to the established pattern of society, falsely respectful of authority and tradition.7 For Rorty, the difficulty is rooted in the Platonic, Kantian and positivistic idea: that man has an essence – namely, to discover essences. And, to discover these essences, there must be a unified technique that is safe and guarantees success. Training for this realization begins as soon as a child is enrolled in a school. Based on assumption of commensurability of individual dispositions, contents of courses and methods of classroom teaching are founded.

Most of the subjects in school curriculum have been included there on grounds of being useful. But, apparently, there is no clarity regarding which subjects/skills are to be considered more useful than others or useful at all, and which subjects are to be seen http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

8

essentially connected with being educated. Also, it may be added here, that what is useful to one may not be useful to another. However, when a curriculum is designed, it is done for the entire class or group of students. Among these are students who would find a certain subject useful or personally satisfying, and also those who would not find them of any interest whatsoever. For example, David Carr notes that the standard school curriculum seems to contain forms of knowledge, understanding and skill of rather diverse human significance and value. These could be seen as useful for post-school individual functioning – like home economics and woodwork, or they could be considered indispensable to the vocational training of certain types of learner – like auto repair techniques or secretarial training.

However, there are many other skills and

subjects in school curriculum that are not useful in this sense. For example, physical education and dance are activities that are considered to be instrumentally useful and conducive to the health and fitness, but the time allocated to them is hardly sufficient to thoroughly learn either of the practices. It is also interesting to see that while it may not affect one’s standing as educated if one has never played a sport like golf or football, but it creates a suspicion on one’s educated-ness if one has never read a great novel, drama or poetry.8 Yet, the standard educational practices are followed in a mechanical way because they cut down the otherwise ambitious task of formulating curriculum that is more individual-centric. This is how commensuration happens, not only of interests but also of identities. Basically, every year, a school releases a batch of individuals who know the same skills (perhaps in varying degrees), have learnt the same subjects, and are mostly identical in their intellectual dispositions. In the context of philosophy, Rorty says that “to construct an epistemology is to find the maximum amount of common ground with others, and the assumption that an epistemology can be constructed is the assumption that such common ground exists.”9 Similarly, in constructing school curriculum for mass of students, the assumption is that their interests and identities can be brought to a common ground.

Desperation for objectivity in philosophy is found in education, too –

desperation for an objective structure of curriculum and model of education.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

9

NEGLECT OF EXISTENTIAL ISSUES The problem with conventional education is certainly not limited to its content or subject-matter.

There is a deeper issue that must be addressed here – the idea of

existence, or in a narrow sense – the idea of personal existence. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty refers to Jean Paul Sartre’s notions of en-soi and pour-soi, or being-in-itself and being-for-itself. The former refers to things that are definable and complete, but they lack consciousness; the latter refers to beings that possess consciousness but lack definability. These two may be understood as two dimensions to human existence. There is a part to us that is definable, fixed, and completely known.

There is also a part to us that is transcendent, dynamic, and never completely known. In order to understand the latter, as Rorty rightly suggests, we must first see ourselves as ensoi.

Similarly, to be educated, we must have a thorough understanding of the

descriptions of the phenomenal world. Understanding of the seen is a pre-requisite to understanding of the unseen.

However, it is tragic that in all the years of schooling, students learn how to exist as en-soi, but not as pour-soi. One’s self-realization dwells in being able to exist as poursoi. Schools functioning on the conventional methods of education may want to avert the responsibility of guiding children to become liberal creators, as this requires them to be always on the periphery rather than following a secure path.

There is no doubt that

conventional techniques of individual training at schools have been generating desired results, but it is these results, too, that we need to reassess the desirability of. Rorty attacks the methodologies of “mainstream” philosophers and says that they want to reshape all enquiry and culture according to that line of enquiry which they have tested and which has had a stunning success. The motive is to model all systems of thought based on rationality and objectivity in understanding.

This is exactly how schools and

other institutions of education generally function – they conform to the tried-and-tested methods. Yet, we cannot be sure if that, indeed, is a useful strategy.

The definable aspect of the framework of human existence is that which is completely knowable – the human body and its functions, the physical world in which http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

10

human being exists and its various phenomena. Science has certainly been successful at explaining the anatomy of human body and neurological mechanism of the system. But theories about human mind, behaviour and existence are only approximate. It is in actions that one’s existence is manifested, and it cannot be denied that human beings are extremely dynamic and complex systems. We may have found descriptions for the definable part of human existence – en-soi – but, it is not possible to define that which is never final – pour-soi. The point here is that our education very well trains individuals in grasping information, but does not kindle their minds with the desire to explore their consciousness. Many individuals do not even have a basic vocabulary to wonder about their being beyond their en-soi reality.

EDIFICATION IN EDUCATION I would like to clarify here that I do not condemn conventional schooling, but I strongly believe that there is a serious need to reevaluate our idea of education and its objectives. We need such educational programs where examination of the outside world and the inside, knowledge and reflection, science and poetry, epistemology and art, can co-operate. But, it is appalling to see that understanding of one’s consciousness is often procrastinated for the reason that school children are not enlightened enough for something as deep as that. But, then, that argument may also be insinuated for other subjects that are taught in schools. It is astounding how students are grouped under certain broad classes and are taught the same subjects, adjourning their individual instincts. This commensuration makes the task of integrated education of the student rather counterproductive. The suggestion here is to edify education – to introduce new methods of learning and growing, to be comfortable with co-existence of incommensurable ideas, to understand that there is not just one way to be, to prevent education from further degenerating into factories mass-producing identical individuals.

Rorty uses the term “edification” inspired by Gadamer’s interpretation of bildung and explains: The attempt to edify (ourselves or others) may consist in the hermeneutic activity of making connections between our own culture and some exotic http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

11

culture or historical period, or between our own discipline and another discipline which seems to pursue incommensurable aims in an incommensurable vocabulary.10 Rorty’s views are rooted in the existentialist idea that human beings are selfcreative.

He realizes that there is apparently a conflict between the Platonic-Aristotalian

view that the only way to be edified is to know what is out there (to reflect the facts accurately), and the view that the quest for truth is only one among many ways in which one might be edified.11 The dynamics of a school with philosophy similar to the former (absolutist) view would be “normal” or conventional. On the other hand, a school founded on the principle of the latter kind is able to provide education that is “abnormal”12 or unconventional. However, Rorty explains that the contrast between desire for edification and desire for truth is not an expression of a conflict that needs to be resolved.

One fine example of an institution that has made self-formation its goal and has edified education is the Krishnamurti Foundation. The schools under the foundation are run on J. Krishnamurti’s ideas on education. Krishnamurti saw the present-day education as a complete failure as it overemphasizes technique without cultivating understanding of life. His idea of education emphasized not only an understanding of the self but also cultivating positive feelings and virtues like love and compassion. For him, the right kind of education should accomplish something greater than imparting technical knowledge to learners, that is, help them experience the integrated process of life.13 Another example would be the ‘Call to Care’ educational research initiative by Mind and Life Institute (Massachusetts, USA). The basic objective of ‘Call to Care’ is to address the limited attention that our educational systems pay towards cultivating care – what might be called the forgotten heart of education. The motive is to nurture the development of positive human traits like self-awareness, social awareness, care, and compassion, along with the cultivation of intellectual skills of students. It is based on the idea that these positive characteristics lead to engaged citizenship, healthy relationships, meaningful employment, and human flourishing.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

The program is currently in year one of

12

implementation with partner schools located throughout the United States and globally in countries such as Bhutan, Israel and Vietnam.14 CONCLUSION The problem with conventional forms of education that I have highlighted in this article is their incapability of addressing existential concerns of the individual. Training of students at schools is such that majority of the individuals pass most of their lives without ever attempting to explore the depths of their consciousness and understanding significance of their actions. Gadamer’s bildung and Sartre’s pour-soi are results of exploration of consciousness.

Adamant methods of education have created a necessity

of possessing such-and-such knowledge to be educated that possibility of alternative ideologies seems unlikely. It is dispiriting to see that although education was supposed to be a liberating experience for an individual, but has ended up becoming a burden.

Factors like subject-matter or content of education are only partially responsible here.

The root problem is that the learner does not feel involved in the process.

Only the education which lets an individual grow spiritually is edifying. But when it operates on the assumption of commensuration of identities, it hovers over as a burdensome obligation. We must understand that the conventional system is only one of the organized ways of education, and that there can be alternative systems, too.

Incommensurability is to be seen not as a hurdle but rather as an opening to new ideologies.

As Rorty says, “Incommensurability entails irreducibility but not

incompatibility...15” Synergizing technical knowledge with individual’s spiritual growth may come across as an orthodox and unnecessary idea to some. But, the hurried process of pursuing and utilizing education has become so aggressive that spiritual development of individuals is rather the need of the hour.

NOTES AND REFERENCES: 1. Charles Hummel, “Aristotle” PROSPECTS: The Quarterly Review of Comparative Education, Vol. 23, No. ½ (1993), 2, Accessed August 16, 2015. http://www.ibe.unesco.org/publications/ThinkersPdf/aristote.pdf.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

13

2. Alfred North Whitehead, Aims of Education (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 1 3. Use of the term “spirituality” in this article does not carry any religious connotation. Given the expanse of its use in various contexts, it seems difficult to define it but I use it in the sense of awareness of one’s self – in state of immanence as well as transcendence. In state of immanence, being spiritual would mean deeper understanding of one’s consciousness, as it is. In state of transcendence, being spiritual would refer to the exploration of one’s consciousness in experience with the world. Spiritual involvement of individuals in their education makes them more reflective about what they are taught, and there is better appreciation and utilization of the same.

4. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing plc, 2013), 10 5. Ibid.

6. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (New Jersey: Princeton University press, 1979), 316 7. J. Krishnamurti, Education and Significance of Life (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), 3, Accessed August 16, 2015, http://www.kritischestudenten.nl/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/J-Krishnamurti-Education-and-the-Significance-oflife.pdf.

8. David Carr, Making Sense of Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy and Theory of Education and Teaching (London: Routledge, 2005), Accessed August 16, 2015, https://books.google.co.in/books?id=F5tw8iTbDWkC&printsec=frontcover#v=on epage&q&f=false/.

9. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 316 10. Ibid., 360 11. Ibid.

12. Rorty uses the term “abnormal” for the kind of philosophy that edifying philosophers do - something that happens when someone joins in the discourse who is ignorant of conventions or who sets them aside.

13. J. Krishnamurti, Education and Significance of Life, 11-12, Accessed August 16, 2015,http://www.kritischestudenten.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/JKrishnamurti-Education-and-the-Significance-of-life.pdf 14. “Call to Care,” Mind and Life Institute, Accessed August 16, 2015, https://www.mindandlife.org/care/ 15. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 388

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

14

BIBLIOGRAPHY: Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. New Jersey: Princeton University, 1979.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. London: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing Plc, 2013.

Whitehead, Alfred N. The Aims of Education and Other Essays. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967.

Carr, David. Making Sense of Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy and Theory of Education and Teaching. London: Routledge, 2005. Accessed August 16,

2015.

https://books.google.co.in/books/about/Making_Sense_of_Education.html?id=7Dt1VnM9EsC&redir_esc=y Krishnamurti, J. Education and Significance of Life. New York: Harper Collins, 2010.

Accessed August 16, 2015, http://www.kritischestudenten.nl/wp-

content/uploads/2013/03/J-Krishnamurti-Education-and-the-Significance-oflife.pdf Hummel, Charles. “Aristotle.” PROSPECTS: The Quarterly Review of Comparative Education, Vol. 23, No. ½, (1993): 39-51. Accessed August 16, 2015. http://www.ibe.unesco.org/publications/ThinkersPdf/aristote.pdf

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

15

AMALGAMATING SUBLIMITY AND MORALITY: A KANTIAN APPROACH Ahinpunya Mitra

Abstract The present paper will attempt to identify the mode of sublimity’s relationship to morality in its different stages of development in Kant’s philosophy. In his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Kant recognises three forms of sublimity: the terrifying, the noble, and the splendid The disparate states of enjoyment with horror, quiet wonder, and splendid all constitute a mode of reverence to powers which transcend the self. The point of self-transcendence is more vividly realized in context of sublime as moral (genuine) virtue, which consists in acting in accordance with universal principles irrespective of our spontaneous emotional impulses. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, sublimity is ascribed to wills determined by the moral law, that is, wills that have transcended determination by any natural impulse. In the Critique of Judgement, Kant shows that in case of the mathematical sublime, imagination's inadequacy to comprehend infinity as an absolute measure is first experienced as a frustration, but then gives way to a pleasure arising from our awareness that this inadequacy in relation to an idea of reason exemplifies our ultimate vocation—to make reason triumph over sensibility.The experience of the "dynamically sublime" is characterized as a feeling which specifically represents the dominion of practical reason over ordinary inclinations.

I Philosophers who talk of the highest truth and the summum bonum have occasion to revert to the question of beauty, truth-beauty-goodness being the three facets of human life. Kant’s ethical theory in its rigority often looses connection with the warmth of life.

An amalgamation of his aesthetics and morality may help to achieve his ethical theory its deserved comprehensibility. With this end in view, the present paper will attempt to trace the development and structure of Kant's theory of the sublime in the different periods of his philosophy and to identify the mode of sublimity’s relationship to morality in these different stages. http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

16

II Immanuel Kant’s theory of the sublime is first articulated in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, published in 1764. Kant first informs us that the various feelings of enjoyment or of displeasure “rest not so much on the constitution of the external things that arouse them as on the feeling, intrinsic to every person, of being touched by them with pleasure or displeasure.”1 Accordingly, in order to enjoy the appropriate states of pleasure associated to the sublime and the beautiful, we must have a disposition for the sublime and the beautiful. Mountains with peaks above the clouds, descriptions of raging storms, Milton's portrayal of hell, all arouse ‘enjoyment but with horror’. In order that the enjoyment with horror could occur to us in due strength, we must have a feeling of the sublime. Again, flower-strewn meadows, valleys with winding brooks, or descriptions of Elysium occasion a ‘joyful and smiling’2 sensation. In order to enjoy this joyous, smiling sensation well, we must have a feeling of the beautiful. We experience the sublime and the beautiful as modes of ‘finer feeling’, distinct from the feeling of a stout man’s enjoyment of a coarse joke, or of a merchant’s enjoyment in calculating his profits, or a man’s enjoyment in finding the opposite sex as a mere object of pleasure.

Our disposition towards the sublime is made occurrent in three characteristic ways. Its feeling is accompanied either with a certain dread, or with quiet wonder, or with a beauty completely pervading a sublime plan. Accordingly, there are three forms of sublimity: the terrifying, the noble, and the splendid.3 The terrifying sublime can be elicited by a far-reaching depth and profound loneliness, the noble by great heights and the splendid by great buildings (such as the Pyramids).

Kant also defines the moral feeling in terms of sublimity. He describes true virtue as sublime.4 The so-called adopted virtues, such as sympathy, pity, complaisance, benevolence, friendliness, and honour, however ‘amiable and beautiful’, are by no means constitutive of genuine virtue, since they are not based on principles. Being grounded on principles renders a virtue genuine 5. Sympathy for a needy person's plight may lead us into an act of charity that makes us forgo the repayment of a debt. Sympathetic response here is an act of immediate impulse and does not betray genuine virtue. In this case, our

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

17

‘higher obligation’ to act from impartial principles of conduct has been ‘sacrificed’ to spontaneous emotional impulse which Kant calls natural instinct. Hence, according to Kant, although a feeling of affection for humanity is a presupposition of virtue, ‘true virtue’ consists in a special employment of this feeling—namely acting in accordance with universal principles irrespective of our spontaneous emotional impulses. It is, indeed, this very subduing of immediate impulse through principle which Kant finds sublime. In Kant’s own words, “Now as soon as this feeling is raised to its proper universality, it is sublime, but also colder.”6 Although things as precipices, virtue, and pyramids are disparate, they all give rise to the feeling of sublime in so far as they exercise powers of non-coercive authority over us. The disparate states of enjoyment with horror, quiet wonder, and splendid all constitute a mode of reverence to powers which transcend the self. Kant, in other words, implicitly construes the sublime as occasioned by powers which transcend the self, in some specifiable way. The point of self-transcendence is more vividly realized in context of sublime as moral (genuine) virtue. Genuine virtue in its orientation towards the universal, transcends personal inclination and thus exceeds our normal sensuous mode of being. By grounding the sublime in such self-transcendence from the sensuous level of our being to the universal, Kant is moving ahead towards establishing the link between the aesthetic experience of the sublime the realization of moral ends.

III In his Critical philosophy, Kant develops the link between sublimity and morality broached in the Observations. In the Critical phase, Kant's first formulates his mature theory of the sublime in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals(1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). In the Groundwork, Kant suggests that it is “freedom from dependence on interested motives which constitutes the sublimity of a maxim” 7. Sublimity is ascribed to the moral performer not in so far as he is subject to the moral law, but in so far as, in regard to this very same law, he is at the same time its author.8 As a predicate, sublimity is ascribed to wills determined by the moral law, that is, wills that have transcended determination by any natural impulse (including even sympathy). In the Critique of Practical Reason too, Kant posits sublimity in almost the

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

18

same terms. There he says that ‘personality’, which involves ‘freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature’ and the capacity for being ‘subject to special laws (pure practical laws given by its own reason)’9, places before our eyes the sublimity of our nature (in its vocation)’.10 Personality therefore consists in sublime moral consciousness.

In both the treatises on Critical ethics, then, Kant suggests that only moral consciousness is worthy of the term ‘sublime’, for moral consciousness manifests the ultimate authority and transcendence of our rational over our sensible being.

In the Groundwork and the second Critique, the only occasions on which Kant uses the term ‘sublime’ are in relation to the determination of the will by the moral law, which is taken by him necessarily to involve the feeling of respect. The feeling of respect has a complex structure. The first stage is negative. The effect which the determination of our will by the moral law has over our feeling is inhibition. The inhibition consists in a checking of all those inclinations to self-love and personal interest which are at odds with the law's universality. Kant says, “For all inclination and every sensuous impulse is based on feeling, and the negative effect on feeling (through the check on the inclinations) is itself feeling.”11 Thwarting of all our inclinations and principles unwarrantably derived from such inclinations produces a feeling that is akin to pain. The negative feeling is then followed by a second positive stage. The checking and humiliating of our impulses and ‘self-conceit’ removes obstacles to authentic moral decision and makes it easier for our will to be determined by the moral law on future occasions, which reinforces our awareness that that which has destroyed our ‘self-conceit’ is a manifestation of our wholly rational supersensible self that is beyond space and time and is not subject to mechanistic determination by natural causality.The feeling akin to pain thus serves to elevate us with a sense of our ultimate rational vocation. 12 IV In his Critical ethics, Kant wishes to reserve the term sublime exclusively for the moral domain and locates it wholly beyond the aesthetic sphere. In the Critique of Judgement (1790), Kant deals with the sublime as an aesthetic concept and attempts to show how pure aesthetic judgments of the sublime might contribute to the realization of the ends of morality in the natural order. Kant extensively deals with the sublime in the

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

19

Second Book of Part I of the Critique of Judgement which is called the ‘Analytic of the Sublime’. At the outset, he makes a contrast between the beautiful and the sublime. The beautiful in nature is associated with the notion of form, which must consist in a kind of limitation. The experience of sublime, however, is associated with formlessness, in the sense of absence of limitation, provided that this absence of limits is represented together with totality. Thus the overpowering grandeur of tempestuous ocean is felt as limitless, but the absence of limits is also represented as totality. We call an object beautiful because as regards its form it seems preadapted to our faculty of judgement. The sublime, however, is ill adapted; it does violence to the imagination. We judge an object to be sublime for the reason that we are incapable of grasping it as a whole. The sublime object, devoid of form, contains a greater manifold of parts than our imagination can comprehend. The sublime, in proportion as it involves absence of limits, is inadequate to our power of imaginative representation; that is to say, it exceeds and overwhelms it.

And in so far as this absence of limits is associated with totality, the sublime can be regarded as the ‘exhibition’ of an indefinite idea of the reason. It is reason's demand for such a presentation of totality which is operative in relation to formless objects. This demand launches the imagination into a vain attempt to comprehend the magnitude of the formless phenomenon in a way that leads ultimately to the suggestion of a ‘superadded’ idea of ‘totality’. The sublime is then represented as being in accord with reason, considered as a faculty of indeterminate ideas of totality.

The sublime is not, therefore, the formless object itself, but rather the supersensible cast of mind which, through ideas of reason, can grasp the totality suggested by such objects. That is why Kant holds that natural objects are not themselves, strictly speaking, sublime, but rather express and evoke a kind of sublimity in the human mind. We can only explain the pleasure we take in the formless object in so far as “the object lends itself to the presentation of a sublimity discoverable in the mind”.13 In order to judge a thing sublime, we must seek a ground merely in ourselves and need not look for any external ground. It is our own mind “that introduces sublimity into the representation of nature.’’14 A judgement about the sublime is then an aesthetic judgement. An aesthetic judgement is one in which the representations, whatever their nature (that is, whether

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

20

sensible, aesthetic or rational) are referred or related in the judgement back to the subject rather than to an object.

Kant calls for a division of the sublime into two kinds: the mathematical sublime and the dynamical sublime. Kant defines mathematical sublime thus “Sublime is the name given to what is absolutely great.”15 Sublime is that “what is beyond all comparison great.”16 If we ascertained the quantity of our object by comparision with a fixed unit, we could not call any object absolutely great. It would be great by comparison with the unit or with other objects of known size. We judge an object to be absolutely great because we are incapable of grasping the object in its totality. We are incapable of comparing our object with others and ascertaining its objective size. We feel that we cannot imagine that any object could be greater. Mathematically determinant judgements ascertain objectively how great an object is, by taking other objects as the standard of measurement. But they never judge any object to be absolutely great. For it is clear that nothing can be given in nature, however great it may be judged to be by us, which could not, considered in another relation, be diminished down to the infinitely small. A mountain, for instance, may be great in comparison with any other mountain, but it will be judged to be small when it is regarded in some other relation. The concept of the absolutely great or of that which is great beyond all comparison is an aesthetic concept.

According to Kant, even when we assert that an object is absolutely great, there must be some standard. However, we do not allow a suitable standard for it to be sought outside of it, but merely within it. It is a magnitude which is equal only to itself. Kant says, “that is sublime in comparison with which all else is small.”17 According to Kant, there are two methods of estimating the magnitude of objects. The estimation of magnitude by means of numerical concepts (or algebraic symbols) is mathematical, but that in mere intuition (measured by eye) is aesthetic.

Mathematical estimation of a magnitude can progress indefinitely by simply adding one unit to another. However, the estimation must make use of a fundamental unit as a known quantity, which cannot be further determined. The magnitude of this irreducible fundamental unit is to be determined by grasping it immediately (without mediation of numerical concepts) in intuition. This is why Kant says that in the ‘last resort’ all

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

21

estimates of magnitude are aesthetic. Mathematical estimation is merely progressive and proceeds from one member of the numerical series to another by adding as many numbers to one another as we please, without being concerned about comprehension of the manifold. So, mathematical estimation of magnitude can never arrive at the idea of a greatest possible object. Aesthetic estimation, on the other hand, arrives at the idea of the absolutely great owing to the fact that it tries to comprehend the given intuitions in one intuition. Aesthetic estimation has to grasp an object in one intuition, to represent it to itself as a whole; and this cannot be done without a reference to the fundamental aesthetic measure, which is to be kept present to the imagination. The greater the object the greater must be the fundamental measure which we take as the basis of our measurement. In order to judge the magnitude of an object aesthetically, we have to increase the measure in accordance with the magnitude of the object. Otherwise we could not represent the object to ourselves intuitively. Imagination will at first try out easily comprehended measures such as a foot or a perch, but is then driven to find larger units as a measure for them, and then still larger units as a measure for these, and so on and so on. Now this cannot go on indefinitely. The more the measure is increased the more difficult it is for the imagination to grasp it in one intuition, and a point is soon reached which the imagination cannot exceed. This is the absolute measure beyond which no greater is possible subjectively. Imagination arrives at infinity itself as the only appropriate measure. When the absolute measure is reached by the imagination, we believe that there is given to us in intuition an object which possesses infinite magnitude. Now from the first Critique we know that there is only one faculty of the mind which is concerned with the absolute or infinite, namely, reason. We also know that reason makes every object subject to its idea of totality. So when we feel that there is an absolutely great object given to us in its totality, we are reminded of the principle of reason. The mere ability to think the absolutely great indicates a faculty of the mind transcending every standard of sense, thereby evidencing the superiority of our rational over our sensible being. We are thus led to the ‘idea of the sublime’. Thus Kant says, “The sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense.” 18

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

22

According to Kant, our judgement about the sublime is accompanied by a feeling of respect for our objects. Respect is the “feeling of our incapacity to attain to an idea that is a law for us.” 19 The feeling of respect is a ‘complex’ feeling of pain and pleasure. The feeling of sublime is a feeling of pain when we become conscious of the inadequacy of our imagination to make aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of certain sensible objects and our inability to conform to reason’s demand that we should recognize as the supreme measure nothing but the totality of the world, i.e. our inability to conform to the idea of absolute totality. The judging subject becomes in that way aware of its limitations as a sensuous being. But in becoming aware of this incompetence of its imagination the subject refers to its rational faculty, which gives it a standard compared with which every sensible standard is infinitely small. The subject feels that as a rational being it is infinitely superior even to the greatest natural object. He takes pleasure in the realization that every standard of sensibility falls short of the ideas of reason. To become aware of the incapacity of the imagination’s ever conforming to ideas of reason gives pleasure to a rational being. It makes us alive to our supersensible destiny. We feel raised above the world of sense. It is not necessary that the subject be conscious or aware of a temporal passage between the pain and pleasure of sublimity, however. Indeed, Kant elsewhere suggests that the mental movement is constituted by a simultaneous attraction and repulsion. This could be described as an upward/downward vibration – downward because of the humiliation of the sensible faculty, and upward because of the pleasant awareness of the supersensible nature that accompanies this humiliation.

According to Kant’s Critical philosophy, human beings are defined by their rational vocation, that is, their capacity to think or act independently of natural causality and in accordance with their own ‘idea of laws’. The pursuit of reason is a law for us, in so far as we are true to our ultimate vocation. Our feeling of the sublime as the awareness of “the supremacy of our cognitive faculties on the rational side over the greatest faculty of sensibility ”

20

exemplifies our ultimate vocation—to make reason triumph over

sensibility. We become aware that we are beings with capacities that transcend the limitations of our finite phenomenal existence. The mind ‘feels itself empowered to pass beyond the narrow confines of sensibility’. 21 Indeed a judgement of the sublime is able

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

23

“to induce a temper of mind conformable to that which the influence of definite (practical) ideas would produce upon feeling, and in common accord with it”. 22 On these terms the judgement of sublime produces a state of feeling analogous to the effect produced by morality, and this makes it conducive to morality.

Next we proceed to Kant’s discussion of the dynamical sublime. The dynamically sublime is an object which seems to the judging subject to possess infinite power.

According to Kant, nature can count as a power, thus as dynamically sublime, only in so far as it is considered an object of fear. In representing the object to ourselves we feel that even to try to offer any resistance to it is quite impossible. The object is thought to be infinitely superior to ourselves. However, according to Kant, if we are to judge an object to be dynamically sublime, we must not be in an actual state of fear. For a person in actual fear can no more play the part of a judge of the sublime of nature than someone who is captivated by inclination and appetite is able to judge the beautiful. He flees from the sight of an object filling him with dread, and it is impossible to take delight in terror that is seriously entertained. To experience the dynamically sublime we must be in a position of safety. The boundless ocean rising with rebellious force, the high waterfall of some mighty river, and the like, make our power of resistance of trifling moment in comparison with their might. But, provided our own position is secure, their aspect is all the more attractive for its fearfulness.23 The feeling of the sublime arises in us when we judge the object in such a way that we merely think of the case in which we might wish to resist it and think that in that case all resistance would be completely futile. We must not actually be in such a situation. We consider the object as fearful without being afraid of it. Thus the virtuous man fears God without being afraid of Him, because he does not think of the case of wishing to resist God and His commands as anything that is worrisome for him. But since he can imagine a situation where he would be in such a state through some futile attempt to resist the Divine Will, he recognizes God as one to be feared.

The experience of the dynamical sublime is produced by the experience of vast forces in nature. Drawing from a traditional eighteenth-century list, Kant mentions some of these forces: bold, overhanging, threatening cliffs; thunder clouds towering up into the

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

24

heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightning and crashes of thunder; violent volcanoes; devastating hurricanes; the boundless ocean set into a rage; a lofty waterfall on a mighty river. The irresistibility of these mights of nature forces upon us the recognition of our physical helplessness as beings of nature. At the same time, however, the experience of our insignificance in relation to such physical forces also leads us to the realization that there is another force in us, which gives us the faculty of practical reason and the freedom of the will. This force gives us a value that cannot be damaged even by forces which would suffice for our physical destruction. So judgements about the dynamically sublime, like the judgements about the mathematically sublime, also rest upon two conditions. The object which we judge sublime, through the irresistibility of its power makes us, considered as natural beings, recognize our physical powerlessness. But at the same time the object reveals a capacity for judging ourselves independent of nature. We feel that there is within us a faculty infinitely superior to nature, whereby the humanity in our person remains undemeaned even though the mortal men must submit to that domain. Nature may deprive us of everything (of all our worldly goods, health and life), but it has no power over our moral personality. The feeling of our physical inferiority excites a feeling of our moral superiority. To quote Kant, “…we readily call these objects sublime, because they raise the forces of the soul above the height of vulgar commonplace, and discover within us a power of resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to be able to measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature.”24 “Therefore, nature is, here, called sublime merely because it raises the imagination to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make itself sensible of the appropriate sublimity of the sphere of its own being, even above nature.”

25

Thus

once more it becomes clear that sublimity is not contained in anything in nature. It belongs to the human mind alone. We call things sublime on the ground that they make us feel the sublimity of our own minds. Sublimity, strictly speaking, is only a state of our mind brought about by the contemplation of the natural phenomena that we call sublime.

Kant believes that our experience of the dynamically sublime, like our experience of the mathematically sublime, produces a mixture of pain and pleasure, which is even closer to the moral feeling of respect. The pain is felt because our imagination presents to

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

25

itself the infinite superiority of nature, the pleasure because this makes us think of our existence as rational beings, of the pre-eminence of our rational nature over physical nature even in its immeasurability. Thus in the case of the dynamically sublime, it is not that imagination cannot get a grip, but that we are fearful of destruction and what Kant thinks redeems the situation is the thought of the power of righteousness, a power which no natural nor supernatural force can overcome. Again it is an idea of reason, this time of practical reason, which helps out in the face of something affronting to sensibility and this time it is practical sensibility. Kant’s thought here seems to suggest that in confronting the sublime the noumenal self shows itself competent to the task to which the phenomenal self profoundly feels itself to be inadequate.

Unlike the mathematical sublime, the dynamical sublime plays a much more direct role in the context of an awareness of our moral existence. When beholding mighty natural objects from a position of safety we recognize them to be fearful, we are faced with the challenge to imagine situations where, even in the face of possible destruction by the mighty object, we would remain unflinching going against our natural inclinations to be

overwhelmed by fears pertaining to our physical well-being and safety, and

through our courageous moral bearing, would refute its (and thereby nature's) claim to dominion over us. We would then be acting on principles of moral conduct which testify to our true vocation as rational supersensible beings.

V The theme of the sublime is a crucial factor in the very constitution of Kant's ethical philosophy. Kant recognized that moral motivation (doing something simply because it is right, out of respect for the law prescribed by our own rationality) required an impulse from feeling in order to be effectual as motivation without linking it to natural motives. He found this source in the sublime. In feeling the sublime we experience a feeling that is, like the moral feeling of respect, contrary to sensible interests. The sublime prepares us to esteem something even against our self-centered interests. Such habituation can help us act out of moral respect when the right time comes.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

26

NOTES AND REFERENCES: 1. Immanuel Kant, Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime, trans.

Patrik Frierson & Paul Guyer (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 13 2. Ibid., 16 3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 22 5. Ibid., 24 6. Ibid., 23 7. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York, Harper & Row, 1964), 106 8. Ibid., 107 9. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949), 193 10. Ibid., 194 11. Ibid., 181 12. Paul Crowther, The Kantian Sublime: from Morality to Art, ( Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989) , 23 13. Immanuel Kant,, The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952), 92 14. Ibid., 93 15. Ibid., 94 16. Ibid.

17. Ibid. 97 18. Ibid. 98 19. Ibid., 105 20. Ibid., 106 21. Ibid., 103 22. Ibid., 104 23. Ibid., 110-11 24. Ibid., 111 25. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: Ahinpunya Mitra, Aesthetics :East and West: A Comparative Study of Anandavardhana and Kant, ( New Delhi, Readworthy Publications, 2014

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

27 Â Â

Immanuel Kant, Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime, trans.

Patrik Frierson & Paul Guyer (Cambridge University Press, 2011) Immanuel Kant, Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York, Harper & Row, 1964) Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949) Immanuel Kant,, The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952) Jeffrey Barnouw, The Morality of the Sublime: Kant and Schiller , Studies in Romanticism, Vol. 19, No. 4, , 1980.

Paul Crowther, The Kantian Sublime: from Morality to Art, ( Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989) Paul Guyer, Feeling and Freedom: Kant on Aesthetics and Morality, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1990.

Robert R. Clewis, The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

28

ECOFEMINISM : SOME GLIMPSES Reni Pal Abstract Environmental ethics and feminism are two hotly debated contemporary issues in the field of moral philosophy. Just like environmentalism, the women’s movement became established as a worldwide influence since the 1960s. A particular type of feminism is ecofeminism, which was its origin to the relationship between women and nature.

Ecofeminism is a merger of ecological movement and feminist movement. In 1991 the World Bank declared that women took significant role in preserving natural resources like water, soil, forest, energy etc and they had sufficient knowledge about their surrounding environment. In daily life from preparing food to cosmetics, even in case of treatment women depend on the natural environment much more than men. Both nature and women are exploited, deprived and dominated by men. During the last two decades, Indian women have participated prominently in environmental struggles at the grassroots level. There are several brands of ecofeminism like Liberal Ecofeminism, Radical Ecofeminism, Social Ecofeminism, and Socialist Ecofeminism. The ultimate goal of ecofeminism is to restore the natural environment and quality of life for people and other living and nonliving inhabitants of the planet.

Ethical inquiry is of two kinds – theoretical and practical. Applied ethics is that branch of ethics, which deals directly with questions of moral practice, rather than questions of ethical theory. It is central to the whole of philosophical thought as it highlights the practical consequences of ideas about the nature of life and human thought.

Environmental ethics and feminism are two hotly debated contemporary issues in the field of moral philosophy. The problem of environmental ethics is closely connected with the relation between man and nature, especially man’s relation with the environment. Awareness of environmental problems gathered momentum since late 1960s. Just like environmentalism, the women’s movement became established as a world-wide influence since the 1960s. The 1960s saw the Women’s Liberation Movement which was a protest against the inequality they faced vis-à-vis man. It was in the late nineteenth century that women’s movements emerged in the West demanding http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

29

greater educational opportunities, rights to income and property, right to employment and right to vote.

Within the women’s movement there is a wide range of groups and ideologies. A particular type of feminism is ecofeminism which was its origin to the relationship between women and nature. Ecofeminism is a merger of ecological movement and feminist movement. Though the term ‘ecofeminism’ was coined by the French feminist Francoise d ‘Eaubonne in 1974, it became popular only in the context of numerous protests and activities against environmental destruction.

The relation between nature and gender, especially women has become an important issue. Mainly from the beginning of 1970s the very concept of the connection between gender and nature started to spread among people. In the 1980s this equation demanded attention of the government and the policy-makers. In 1991 the World Bank declared that women took significant role in preserving natural resources like water, soil, forest, energy etc and they had sufficient knowledge about their surrounding environment. The role of women started to achieve importance regarding the environmental issues. According to the environmentalists, women have direct links with the natural environment, more so than men and they realize the nature in a far better way than men. This is possible because of the following reasons: 1. In daily life from preparing food to cosmetics, even in case of treatment women depend on the natural environment much more than men. Women are more conscious about the food value of green vegetables and herbs than men and so they try to keep those in daily menu. Women like to depend more on herbal cosmetics and they prefer homeopathy and ayurvedic treatment rather than allopath.

2. Instead of regarding the forest as having a commercial value, rural women of Third World Countries set it as a source of domestic needs. Women are the gatherers of the three basic ‘F’s – fuel, food and fodder. The term ‘fuelwood’ means a wide variety of materials used for burning such as twigs, leaves, dry grass, straw, animal dung etc. A common understanding of fuelwood collection is http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

30 Â Â

that it causes deforestation. However, since women mostly collect dead wood, their work does not damage the trees. Forest is also a source of food supply.

While men hunt forest animals, women collect a variety of foods such as fruits, nuts, leaves, bark, roots, fungi, honey etc. The collection of animal fodder is also usually done by the women. They collect leaves, branches, grass etc. to feed domestic animals which are kept for their meat and milk. Forest products are also used by women to make such household items as bowls, spoons, brushes, rope, mats and baskets. Many plants are also collected for medicinal purposes. Village women play an important role as both water suppliers and water managers. It is the women who have knowledge of the location, reliability and quality of the local water sources.

3. In the developing countries about 90% women are attached with agricultural work and are dependent on land or any other natural resources for livelihood. Though mostly men are the owners of land, it is the women who protect and give labour in that land. Women greatly depend on nature, and their responsibility about the nature is greater than men. Even the mentality of women about the use of natural resources is different from that of men. Women always prefer to secure the natural resources for the use of their future generations while men give stress on its present monetary value.

4. Mainly in the Third World countries women are not given the right to buy land or property. But it is mostly the women who are engaged in preservation of nature and in prevention of the depletion of natural resources.

5. According to the ecofeminists like Carolyn Merchant, Bandana Shiva the most significant point regarding the relation between nature and women is that both nature and women are in the marginal positions from the economic perspective.

Both are considered as the exploitable resources and both are the victims of existing patriarchy.

Over the last two decades ecofeminism as a social issue emerged when feminists got interested in environmentalism and it is a platform where environmentalism and feminism become blended with each other. The feminists of the Western countries first http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

31

marked the supremacy of men and exclusion of women in the environmental discourse.

Their objectives were as follows: a. The place of women in the environmental struggle is to be ascertained. b. The experience of women is to be utilized in the environmental struggle. c. The traditional gender discrimination is to be eradicated through it.

No particular definition of ecofeminism is built yet. Bandana Shiva and Maria Mies seek to build a theory from the practical experiences of Third World Women at the grassroots level. These experiences are two-fold: (a) The impact of marginalization caused by the depletion of natural resources along with dislocation due to development project, and

(b) alternative strategies of survival as resistance to development. They

focus on a materialist understanding of society to alter the current exploitative paradigm which is sustained and legitimized by patriarchy. For them an ecofeminist perspective propounds the need for a new cosmology and a new anthropology which recognizes that life in nature (which includes human beings) is maintained by means of co-operative, mutual love and care.

According to Val Plumwood, it has been stereotyped that nature and women are theoretically weak and doubtfully liberated. The problem lies in the epistemic concept of dualism embedded in the masculine knowledge system, which constructs ‘difference’ using a hierarchical logic. This dualism views both women and men as damaged or distorted. With an ecofeminist position, it is possible to recognize human identity as continuous with nature and not alien to it. All ecofeminist positions reject the assumed inferiority of women and nature as opposed to the superiority of reason, humanity and culture.

Ecofeminism draws attention regarding two points as follows: 1. Both nature and women are exploited, deprived and dominated by men. Because development, in the conventional sense, is Eurocentric with its focus on increasing economic growth which is sought to be secured by large-scale industrialization and ever-increasing mechanization. This demands ample http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

32

geographical space, colonies which are not possible without hampering nature sacrificing natural resources. On the other hand, women are likely oppressed by men. Both women and nature are treated as object of enjoyment. So there is a vertical relationship between nature and women.

2. Women and nature depend on each other. As women depend on the natural environments to meet most of their material needs much more than men, a proximity is built between them. The source of power of both women and nature is productivity. Women have a particular connection to nature through their experience of the ‘production of life’. Women conceived of their own bodies as being productive in the same way as they conceived of external nature being so.

So here we can see a horizontal relationship between women and nature.

Although ecofeminism emerged in several countries at around the same time, it did not represent a homogeneous idea. There are several brands of ecofeminism.

Liberal Ecofeminism: Liberal Ecofeminism has its roots in liberalism. “The political theory that incorporates the scientific analysis that nature is composed of atoms moved by external forces, with a theory of human nature that views humans as individual rational agents who maximize their own self-interest, and capitalism as the optimal economic structure for human progress.” [1] Liberal feminists argue that women are as much rational agents as men are, and given proper educational and economic opportunities they can realize their own potential for creativity in all spheres of human life. Liberal feminists, having an ecological perspective, are of the opinion that environmental problems are caused by overuse and misuse of natural resources on the one hand, and, on the other, by the failure to regulate environmental pollutants. To solve this problem the liberal ecofeminists suggest: “Given equal educational opportunities to become scientists, natural resource managers, regulators, lawyers, and legislators, women like men can contribute to the improvement of the environment, the conservation of natural resources, and the higher quality of human life. Women, therefore, can transcend the social stigma of their biology and join men in the cultural project of environmental conservation.” [2] http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

33

Radical Ecofeminism: Radical Ecofeminism developed in the late 1960s, with the second wave of feminism. It is a response to the view that women and nature are mutually associated and deprived in Western culture. Here the assertion is that women have a biological affinity with nature by virtue of their nurturant energies. However, the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century degraded nature by regarding the nurturing Earth as a machine to be mastered and dominated by male-developed and controlled technology, science and industry. Radical feminists are of the opinion that an emerging patriarchal culture in prehistory had dethroned the mother Goddesses and made female deities subservient to male gods. As a protest against this, radical ecofeminists are strongly of the opinion that if men have sky or sun gods, why should women not have their moon or earth goddesses?

Goddess worship and rituals are attempts to treat nature and women as powerful forces.

From historical and cultural perspective women seem to be closer to nature because of their physiology, psychology and social roles. Physiologically women bring forth life like nature undergoing the pleasure and pain of pregnancy, childbirth and nursing. Although men are viewed as more rational with greater capacity for abstract thinking, women are really seen to have greater emotional capacities than men with greater ties to the particular. Socially men take the responsibility of child rearing and domestic jobs which make them closer to the hearth and out of the workplace. Some ecologists call radical ecofeminism as cultural ecofeminism.

According to cultural feminists, human nature is grounded in human biology.

These ecofeminists opine that “the perceived connection between women and biological reproduction is cited as a source of women’s empowerment and ecological activism”. [3] The activities of the cultural ecofeminists are implicitly motivated by the connection between women’s reproductive biology (nature) and the male-designed and produced technology (culture). In this ground cultural ecofeminism is criticized by other feminists having the defect of essentializing the sexual identity of both women and men. It also lacks a serious analysis of capitalism. So it can not be an effective strategy for change.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

34

Carolyn Merchant describes aptly the environmentalism of radical ecofeminists.

These ecofeminists argue that “male-designed and produced technologies neglect the effects of nuclear radiation, pesticides, hazardous waste sites near schools and homes as permeating soil and drinking water and contributing to miscarriage, birth defects, and leukemia. They object to pesticides and herbicides being sprayed on crops and forests as potentially affecting children and child-bearing women living near them. Women frequently spearhead local actions against spraying and power plant siting and organize others to demand toxic cleanups. When coupled with an environmental ethic that values rather than degrades nature, such actions have the potential both for raising women’s consciousness of their own oppression and for the liberation of nature from the polluting effects of industrialization.”[4] Social Ecofeminism: Social ecofeminism admits that the idea of dominating nature stems from the domination of humans by humans. It aims to liberate women by overturning economic and social hierarchies. It envisions a society of decentralized communities which transcend the public –private dichotomy essential to capitalist production and the bureaucratic state. Women emerge as free participants in public life and in local municipal workplaces. Social ecofeminists criticize cultural or radical ecofeminism for the following reasons. According to social feminists, radical feminism rejects rationality by worshipping Mother Goddesses. Moreover social feminists claim that radical feminists wrongly biologize and essentialize the caretaking and nurturing traits assigned by patriarchy by women.

Socialist Ecofeminism: In socialist ecofeminism environmental problems are regarded as the cause of capitalist patriarchy and the ideology that nature can be exploited for human progress through technology. Historically, the growth of capitalism has destroyed subsistencebased agriculture and cottage industries in which production was made mainly for consumption instead of market and men and women were economic partners. The rise of

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

35

capitalist economy with its mills and factories paved for the men to get jobs in these mills and women’s labour got confined to household chores. Thus women’s home keeping labour remains in the market place. In capitalism, both women and nature are exploited by men.

Socialist ecofeminists in general and Marxist ecofeminists in particular, regard nature as the material basis of human life, supplying the basic necessities, i.e., food, clothing, shelter and energy. They give stress on the materialism instead of spiritualism as the driving force of social change. Socialist ecofeminism regards society-nature relationship as dynamic, interactive and dialectical.

Socialist ecofeminists are actively involved in ecological struggles of workingclass women and all subaltern classes and castes. Their ultimate goal is the establishment of a socialist state which would provide everybody a high quality of life by developing sustainable, non-dominating relations with nature.

Socialist ecofeminists focus on the reproduction of life which is both biological and social. They define reproductive freedom according to the demands of Third World Women’s groups (i.e., equal access to employment, equal pay, child care centers, social security etc.) so that women can choose whether to have children, when to have children and in what number to have children. Socialist feminist environmental theory gives both reproduction and production central places.

Relevance of Ecofeminism in India: While ecofeminism emerged among white women in the North in 1970s, it emerged in the South a decade later. During the last two decades, Indian women have participated prominently in environmental struggles at the grassroots level. The ecofeminist movement has been a convergence of feminist and environmental movements. In India the most prominent ecofeminist is Vandana Shiva, who in one of her most influential work Staying Alive (1989) wrote: “Third World women are bringing the concern with living and survival back to center-stage in human history. In recovering the chances for the survival of all life, they are laying the foundation for the recovery of the http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

36

feminine principle in nature and society, and through it the recovery of the earth as sustainer and provider.”[5] Ecofeminism challenges the concept of development and Enlightenment and thus finds itself closer to a Gandhian legacy than the Nehruvian passion for modernization.

The modern agricultural technologies with their focus on high-yielding variety crops have given rise to monocultures which destroy biodiversity. Monoculture is also practiced in animal and plant breeding through genetic engineering with a consequent loss of diversity of animal and plant life. All this is done on the name of ‘development’ and ‘modern science’ which is Euro-centric, ‘growth’-oriented and ecologically unsustainable. This development (Vandana Shiva prefers to call it ‘maldevelopment’) and science are the twin pillars of the model of modernity imposed by the North on the whole globe. This Eurocentric development is actually maldevelopment because at the heart of this development is violence, a violation of both nature and women.

As against the patriarchal world-view on which rests the process of maldevelopment, Shiva upholds the feminine world-view, as presented by the Chipko movement which was initiated in 1960s and became popular in 1970s. She worked with Gandhian activists when she took part in the Chipko Andolan in Garhwal. Following Maria Mies, Shiva argues that women have a special relationship with nature through their experience of the production of life. The interaction of women with nature is a reciprocal process.

As demands for community participation in sustainable development gathered widespread support through popular movements in 1970s, many governments in the South made laws to encourage people’s participation in specific areas and sectors. Since 1980s a good number of women’s organizations, in various parts of the world, particularly in the South, have taken a leading role in regenerating natural resources – land, water and forests. Today, various case studies on women’s proactive role in ecoregeneration are available. Let us take, for example, the women’s Samitis of Bankura district of West Bengal.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

37 Â Â

In May 1980, the government of West Bengal organized a Reorientation Camp for Migrant Women Agricultural Labourers at Jhilimili, a village in Ranibandh Block of Bankura District. Ranibandh is one of the least developed areas of Bankura with a large concentration of tribal population which depended for centuries on the forest for their livelihood. As per the forest policy of the government, merchants and contractors has access to the forest which caused widespread tree-felling and soil erosion destroying the natural hydrology of the forest. At the same time the tribals were deprived from their customary rights to collect the forest produce. As a result of the wide deforestation droughts became a frequent phenomenon. Thousands of men, women and children had to take recourse to seasonal migration to the nearby districts. As seasonal labourers women had to work under horrible conditions with very low wages. They were often subject to sexual molestation by the employer or his recruiting agents.

At the Reorientation Camp, the women put demands for restoration of their right of access to forest produce and for employment in their own area. West Bengal’s Minister for Land Revenue and Land Reform was present there and he regarded these demands as quite legitimate. Finding a favourable response from the government, about 30 women who had joined the Jhilimili Camp, formed an organization of their own, namely the mahila samiti. Within nine months, three such samitis were formed. With the help of co-operative state officials at the district level and the local Panchayat Samiti, three different types of activities were initiated for these mahila samitis. The samiti of Jhilimili was given an agency by the local Forest Cooperative to organize the collection of kendu leaves (used for making bidis) and sal seeds. The samiti at Chendapathar started producing plates and cups from sal leaves. The third group at Bhurkura was given seven acres of wasteland which is to be converted into a plantation of Asan and Arjun trees on which tussar silk worms could be reared. The Bankura Samitis, thus, have evolved from spontaneous group activity to a widespread movement of wasteland reclamation and ecogeneration.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

38

Similar examples can be given not only from other parts of this country but also from various other countries of the South to show that women are as capable as men in acting as proactive agents of social change and sustainable development.

In the conclusion it can be said that the ultimate goals of several brands of ecofeminism differ in various issues. But there is perhaps more unity than diversity in women’s common goal of restoring the natural environment and quality of life for people and other living and nonliving inhabitants of the planet.

REFERENCES: 1. Merchant, Carolyn (1990).

Ecofeminism and Feminist theory.

In Irene

Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (Eds.), Reweaving the World. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 100.

2. Merchant, Carolyn (1990).

Ecofeminism and Feminist theory.

In Irene

Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (Eds.), Reweaving the World. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 101.

3. Datar, Chhaya (2011). Ecofeminism Revisited: Introduction to the Discourse.

New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 11.

4. Merchant, Carolyn (1990).

Ecofeminism and Feminist theory.

In Irene

Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (Eds.), Reweaving the World. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books,102.

5. Shiva, Vandana (1989). Staying Alive. London: Zed Books Ltd., 224.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

39

PLACE OF LOGIC IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Desh Raj Sirswal Abstract The title of the present paper might arouse some curiosity among the minds of the readers. The very first question that arises in this respect is whether India produced any logic in the real sense of the term as has been used in the West. This paper is centered only on the three systems of Indian philosophy namely Nyāya, Buddhism and Jainism.

We have been talking of Indian philosophy, Indian religion, Indian culture and Indian spirituality, but not that which are of more fundamental concepts for any branch of knowledge whether it is social sciences or humanities. No aspect of human life and the universe has been left unexamined by Indian philosophers, and this leads to a totality of vision in both philosophical and psychological fields. In this paper we will discuss the main thinkers, sources and main concepts related to Indian Logic.

LOGIC IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Philosophy in India has been called ‘Darsana’, which means vision, insight, intuition, and these words itself signifies that Indian philosophers pursued the quest of having a total vision of life and universe, based on personal experience, and not on a limited place of modern methodology.1 There have been a good number of divergent philosophical systems (six Aastika systems, Buddhist, Jains & Carvaka). But there is a common current of idealism and spiritualism running through all of these. Wemost of the discussions on Indian philosophy leave the Carvaka system (Indian Materialism) which does not survive and of which only references are traceable. In the Nasadiya Sukta of the Rigveda contains ontological speculation in terms of various logical divisions that were later recast formally as the four circles of catuskoti: ‘A’, ‘not A’, ‘A and not A’, and ‘not A and not not A’. This is the most ancient expression of Indian Logic.

The development of Indian logic can be said to date back to the anviksiki of Medhatithi Gautama (c. 6th century BCE); the Sanskrit grammar rules of Pānini (c. 5th century BCE); the Vaisheshika school’s analysis of atomism (c. 2nd century BCE); the analysis

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

40

of inference by Gotama (c. 2nd century BCE), founder of the Nyāya school of Indian philosophy; and the Tetralemma of Nāgārjuna (c. 2nd century CE). Indian logic stands as one of the three original traditions of logic, alongside the Greek and Chinese traditions.

According to Matilal, logic as the study of the form of correct arguments and inference patterns, develop in India from the methodology of philosophical debate. The art of conducting a philosophical debate was prevalent probably as the time of the Buddha and the Mahāvirā, but it became more systematic and methodological a few hundred years later.2 He defines Indian logic as the “systematic study of informal inference-patterns, the rules of debate, the identification of sound inference via-a-vis sophistical argument and similar topics.” 3 Medhatithi Gautama

founded the anviksiki school of logic. The Mahabharata

(12.173.45), around the 5th century BCE, refers to the anviksiki and tarka schools of logic. Pānini developed a form of logic which had some similarities to Boolean logic for his formulation of Sanskrit grammar. Logic is described by Chanakya (c. 350-283 BCE) in his Arthashastra as an independent field of inquiry anviksiki. Now we will discuss the above mentioned philosophies in reference to their sources, logicians and logical speculations. These are as follows: Nyāya The principal interests of the philosophers of the Nyāya school are epistemology and philosophical method. These are the philosophers who most forcefully advocate the socalled pramana method as a method for rational inquiry. The main philosophers and texts in early Nyāya are –Nyāyasutrā by Gautama Akaspadā (c. AD 150); Nyāyabhasya – commentary on Nyāyasutrā by Vatsyayana (c. AD 450) ; Nyāyavārttika – commentary on Nyayabhasya by Uddyotakara (c. AD 600); Nyāyamañjari – an independent work on Nyāya by Nyāyavārttika

Jayanta (c. AD 875); Nyāyavarttikatatparyatika– commentary on by

Vacaspati

(c.

AD

960);

Atmatattvaviveka,

Nyāyakusumañjali, and other treatises by Udayana (AD. 975–1050).

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

Laksanvali,

41

Navya-Nyāya Navya-Nyāya, the ‘new’ Nyāya is a philosophical system inve nted by Gangesa Upadhyaya (c. AD 1325). It tries to find solutions to many of the criticisms that the early Nyaya conception of rational inquiry were confronted with by the sceptics. Raghunatha Siromani (c. AD 1500) revolutionised the teachings and methods of the school. Both he and his great follower, Gadadhara Bhattacharya (c. AD 1650) wrote short independent tracts on particular philosophical problems and concepts.

Gangeśa’s book Tattvacintāmani dealt with all the important aspects of Indian philosophy, logic, set theory, and especially epistemology, which Gangeśa examined rigorously, developing and improving the Nyāya scheme, and offering examples. The results, especially his analysis of cognition, were taken up and used by other darśanas.

Navya-Nyāya developed a sophisticated language and conceptual scheme that allowed it to raise, analyse, and solve problems in logic and epistemology. It systematized all the Nyāya concepts into four main categories: sense or perception (pratyakşa), inference (anumāna), comparison or similarity (upamāna), and testimony (sound or word; śabda).

Jainism Jainism made its own unique contribution to this mainstream development of logic by also occupying itself with the basic epistemological issues, namely, with those concerning the nature of knowledge, how knowledge is derived, and in what way knowledge can be said to be reliable. Jain logic developed and flourished from 6th Century BCE to 17th Century CE. Important Jaina philosophers include Siddhasena Divākara (c. AD 700) Haribhadra Suri (c. AD 750) Hemacandra (c. AD 1150), Mallisena (c. AD 1290), Yasovijaya (c. AD 1624-88), Kundakund (2nd century AD). Their belief in the principles of tolerance, harmony and rapprochement lead them to a philosophy of pluralism in metaphysics and ethics and to perspectivalism in epistemology and semantics. Jaina’s main texts include: Pañcāstikāyasāra (Essence of the Five Existents), the Pravacanasāra (Essence of the Scripture) and the Samayasāra (Essence of the http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

42

Doctrine) by Kundakunda; Tattvārthasūtra by Umāsvāti or Umasvami ;Nyāyāvatāra (on Logic) and Sanmatisūtra (dealing with the seven Jaina standpoints, knowledge and the objects of knowledge) by Siddhasena Divākara;Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya and Yogabindu by Haribhadra; Yogaśāstra and Trishashthishalakapurushacharitra by Hemacandra.

Buddhism Indian Buddhist logic (called Pramana) flourished from about 500 CE up to 1300 CE. Nāgārjuna’s of Madhyamikā school (c. AD 150) interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha was called the Doctrine of the Middle Way. He argues that all philosophical and scientific theories are empty of content. He is a severe critic of the Pramanamethod for conducting rational inquiry, and he claims instead that the only way to reason is by exposing incoherences within the fabric of one’s conceptions. Candrakirti (c. AD 600) is an influential exponent and interpreter of Nāgārjuna.

The three main authors of Buddhist logic are Vasubandhu (c. AD 400 - 800), Dignāga (c.

AD 480 - 540), and Dharmakīrti (c. AD 600 - 660). The most important theoretical achievements are the doctrine of Trairūpya

and the highly formal scheme of the

Hetucakra (“Wheel of Reasons”) given by Dignāga. He is form Yogacāra Buddhism and his great follower Dharmakirti (c. AD 625) interpreted the teachings of the Buddha in a very different directions, as a kind of idealism. There is a still living tradition of Buddhist logic in the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, where logic is an important part of the education of monks.

The members of this school were brilliant logicians and made many important advances in philosophical theory. Although they are idealists, they are also advocates of the pramāna method as the correct way of investigating and resolving philosophical problems. They disagree with the Nyāya about almost every matter of philosophical substance, but because they share a common approach to the rational resolution of philosophical dilemmas, the encounter between the two schools is fascinating and is an important axis in the evolution of Indian philosophical thought. The main text of Buddhist logic include:Mulamadhyamakakārikā (The Middle Stanzas) by Nāgārjuna; http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

43

Vigrahavyāvartani (Reply to Critics) by Nāgārjuna; Prasannapadā by Candrakirti; Pramānasamuccaya (Collection on Knowing) by Dignāga

; Alambanapariksā

(Examination of Supports) by Dignāga; Hetucakradamaru (Chart of Reasons) by Dignāga; Pramāavārttika (Commentary on Knowing), by Dharmakirti;Nyāyabindu by Dharmakirti ; Vādanyāya, by Dharmakirti.

Main Concepts of Indian Logic Logic developed in ancient India from the tradition of Vādavidyā, a discipline dealing with the categories of debate over various religious, philosophical, moral, and doctrinal issues. There are so many concepts that are the central to Indian systems of logic. But mainly it is concerned with pramanas as we said earlier. Nyāya deals with inference.

Inference is a form of mediate knowledge of knowing something by knowing something else. The Nyāya school of thought is better known for its extensive works in logic and on argumentation. The widely used terminology for inference is anumāna. Anumāna literally means ‘after knowledge’. Nyāya tradition calssifies different types of anumāna.

First of all, it is said that anumāna can be of two types:

1. Svarthanumāna (For the sake of oneself): In this, inference drawn in one’s own mind as a result of repeated observation earlier. You see the smoke on the mountain top and in your own mind you draw the conclusion that there must be fire at the top. It is rather causal process.

2.

Pararthanumāna (For the sake of others): When in a dialectical or debate situation where you have to prove what you inferred and also show how you have inferred it. It is not an informal matter. It requires demonstration of the inferential process as well as the evidence or ground for making the inference.4

The Nyāya system holds that true cognition (pramā, yathārthānubhava) is of four kinds: (1) perceptual (pratyaksa), (2) inferential (anumiti), (3) analogical (upamiti), and verbal (sabda). According to the Nyāya logic, the proper formulation of your inference should have five parts.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

44

The methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by moving from particular to particular via generality. (1) the statement of the thesis of inference, (2) stating the reason or evidence for this thesis, (3) citing an example is such that it is well accepted by others, (4) application of the present observation to the generalization, and (5) conclusion or assertion that the statement of the thesis has been proven.5 It has five steps, as in the example shown: There is fire on the hill (called Pratijñā, required to be proved) Because there is smoke there (called Hetu, reason) Wherever there is fire, there is smoke (called Udaharana, ie, example) as in a kitchen.

There is smoke on the hill (called Upanaya, reaffirmation) Therefore there is fire on the hill (called Nigamana, conclusion) In Nyāya terminology for this example, the hill would be called as paksha (minor term), the fire is called as sadhya (major term), the smoke is called as hetu, and the relationship between the smoke and the fire is called as Vyapti(middle term). The concern clearly was to promote the notion and practice of a good debate, and to differenticate it from the pointless, destructive debates. In Nyāyasutra, three kinds of debtates were identified by Aksapādā: 1.

Good debate or Vāda in which the proof and refutation of thesis and antithesis are based on proper evidence (pramāna) and with contradicting any background or already established assumptions (siddhānta).

2.

Devious or sly debate , or Jalpa, in which the proof and refutation use unfair, measures such as hair-splitting empty pedantry (chala), false rejoinders (jati) and defeat situations (nigrahasthāna).

3.

Purely destructive or refutation-only debate or Vitanda, in which no positive counter thesis is proved.6

Aksapādā also classified inference as : Apriori (purvavat, from cause to effect), A Posteriori (sesavat, from effect to cause) and From analogy (samanyato-drsta, perception of homogeneousness. A three fold classification of inference also found according to http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

45

Navya Nyāya. Nyāya also deals with Hetabhasas. Hetu further has five characteristics: (1) It must be present in the Paksha, (2) It must be present in all positive instances, (3) It must be absent in all negative instances, (4) It must not be incompatible with the minor term or Paksha and (5) All other contradictions by other means of knowledge should be absent. The fallacies in Anumana (hetvābhasa) may occur due to the following: 1.Asiddha: It is the unproved hetu that results in this fallacy. (Paksadharmata):(a) Ashrayasiddha: If Paksha (minor term) itself is unreal, then there cannot be locus of the hetu. e.g. The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus like any other lotus. (b) Svarupasiddha: Hetu cannot exist in paksa at all. E.g. Sound is a quality, because it is visible. (c) Vyapyatvasiddha: Conditional hetu. ‘Wherever there is fire, there is smoke’.

The presence of smoke is due to wet fuel.

2. Savyabhichara: This is the fallacy of irregular hetu :(a) Sadharana: The hetu is too wide. It is present in both sapaksa and vipaksa. ‘The hill has fire because it is knowable’. (b)Asadharana: The hetu is too narrow. It is present only in the Paksha, it is not present in the sapaksa and vipaksha. ‘Sound is eternal because it is audible’. (c) Anupasamhari: Here the hetu is non-exclusive. The hetu is all-inclusive and leaves nothing by way of sapaksha or vipaksha. e.g. ‘All things are non-ternal, because they are knowable’.

3. Satpratipaksa: Here the hetu is contradicted by another hetu. If both have equal force, then nothing follows. ‘Sound is eternal, because it is audible’, and ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced’. Here ‘audible’ is counter-balanced by ‘produced’ and both are of equal force.

4.Badhita: When another proof (as by perception) definitely contradicts and disproves the middle term (hetu). ‘Fire is cold because it is a substance’.

5.Viruddha: Instead of proving something it is proving the opposite. ‘Sound is eternal because it is produced’.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

46

The Nyāya model of inference was modified and replaced by an influential formulatism of Dignāga, the Buddhist logician. Dignāga’s theory of inference describes a structure of inference based on the nature of sign (hetu) can properly stand for another. He formulated the ‘triple nature of sign’, three conditions which a sign (hetu) must fulfill in order that it leads to valid inference: 1.

It should be present in the case (object) under consideration.

2.

It should be present in a similar case or a homologue.

3.

It should not be present in any dissimilar case, any heterologue.

The sign as pointed out above, is also the reason for the inference and is called the hetu.

The inferred property is sādhya and location is paksa.7 It is equivalent to the three terms of a syllogism, the middle term, minor term and major term respectively. A standard example of a traditional syllogism is the following: All men are mortal beings.

Socrates is a man.

Therefore, Socrates is mortal being.

Every syllogism consists of three sentences, and three terms. The sentences must be in their logical form, i.e. they must exhibit a subject, a predicate and a copula which is not a part either of the subject or of the predicate. In this tripartite division of a sentence in its logical form, the copula has the following characteristics: (a)

It must be a form of verb ‘be’.

(b)

It must be in the present tense.

(c)

It may be either affirmative or negative.

We can compare and contrast the Navya-Nyāya theory of inference with the traditional syllogism, Aristotelian syllogism, and sometimes with the theory of modern symbolic logicians.8 From the 14th century CE, with the Navya-Nyāya school, Indian logic http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

47

became more formal. Logicians came up with a novel idea of universal qualification, rules for sentinetial logic etc. The debate between the Buddhists and Nyāyikas continued over the centuries. This fertile interaction catalyzed new concepts as well as refined many fundamental concepts in logic and epistemology. Logical ideas were sharpened in these debates, which included proponents of other traditions such as the Vedāntins as well. It has been observed that Navya-Nyāya is closer to modern logic.

One another important concept of Indian logic is Vyapti. The Sanskrit term ‘vyapti’ is rendered into English in variety of ways as ‘pervasion’, law or law like statement etc. In the present contexts, especially in logic and epistemological contexts ‘vyapti’ captures the sense of inductive or empirical generalization. Vyapti or law like statement is one of the premises, and Indian thinkers have shown considerable interest in the formulation of vyapti or law like statement.9 We can find a good deal on Vyapti by all main systems of Indian logic. Nyāya system also deal with Vyaptigrahyopaya.

Jains developed a logical formulation that was distinct from the standard account of logic in ancient and medieval India. The seven-fold method of conditionally valid predication or the (Saptabhangi-Nayavāda) is considered as an important element in the Jain system.

The theory of multiplicity of view points (Anekāntavāda) is an integral part of Jain logic.

According to Jain logic, the ultimate principle should always be logical and no principle can be devoid of logic or reason. Thus one finds in the Jain texts, deliberative exhortations on any subject in all its facts, may they be constructive or obstructive, inferential or analytical, enlightening or destructive. In the process, the Jains came out with their doctrines of relativity used for logic and reasoning: Anekāntavāda – the theory of relative pluralism or manifoldness Syādvāda – the theory of conditioned predication and Nayavāda – The theory of partial standpoints These Jain philosophical concepts made most important contributions to the ancient Indian philosophy, especially in the areas of skepticism and relativity. Jaina theory of anekāntavāda can be taken to form the basis of a semantics for a simple propositional http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

48

language. The semantics validates the Jaina theory of sevenfold predication – both about the language and within the language. Jaina logic can therefore be given a rigorous formulation in terms of modern logical techniques. But we have also used these techniques to interrogate Jaina logic itself, particularly concerning its account of assertion and its relativism. The techniques not only highlight certain of its problematic features but also provide possible solutions to some of those problems. The application of contemporary logical techniques to historical theories in Indian logic can be just as fruitful as their application to historical theories in European logic.10 Matilal notes that logic in Indian arose out of two different traditions- one, the tradition of debate and dialectics, and the other, the epistemological, empirical tradition, because of which the distinction between logic and epistemology, as in Western logic, is not made in Indian schools of logic. Ganeri, a recent scholar on Indian Logic, has rightly pointed out that the early European scholars approached Indian logic with little knowledge about many other complexities and developments in Indian logic such as the Navya-Nyāya and with a presumption of intellectual superiority. It also is a fact that these had namely Western logic. It is possible that they projected element of their own philosophy legacy on to the Indian thought systems while trying to understand them.11 Here is a suggestion made by Sarrukai in regards to Indian logic is, “for Indian logic, it seems that the central concern was to make logic scientific. This implies that logical statements have to respond to empirical concerns. While this move militates against the very notion of logic in the western tradition, it is precisely this demand on logic that makes Indian logic essentially correlated to scientific methodology.”12 Here we are going to conclude this article with this statement that Indian logic has a rich tradition and there are varieties of views and questions related to Indian logic. In the late 18th century, British scholars began to take an interest in Indian philosophy and discovered the sophistication of Indian study of inference. We should concentrate on this aspect of Indian philosophy, then we can have a good approach to deal with Indian philosophy honestly because the very essence of Indian philosophy is it’s logically

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

49

analysis that help us to understand all theories concerning to metaphysics and epistemology.

Notes & References: 1. Safaya, Raghunath, Indian Psychology, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.; 1976,p.02.

2. Matilal, Bimal Krishna “Introducing Indian Logic” in Indian Logic: A Reader, Edi. by Jonardon Ganeri, Surrey Curzon Press,2001, p.184.

3. ibid, p.183.

4. Chakraborti, Chhanda , Logic: Informal, Symbolic & Inductive, New Delhi: Prentice hall of India Pvt. Ltd.,2007,p.498.

5. Sarrukai, Sundar, Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, Centre for Studies in Civilizations, New Delhi, 2005,p.51.

6. Matilal, Bimal Krishna “Introducing Indian Logic” in Indian Logic: A Reader, p.184.

7. Sarrukai, Sundar, Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science,p.54.

8. Bhattacharya, Sibajiban “Some Aspects of the Navya-Nyāya Theory of Inference” in Indian Logic: A Reader, Edi. by Jonardon Ganeri, Surrey :Curzon Press,2001,p.162.

9. Ingallali, R.I. “Inductive Confirmation in Indian Logic” in Journal of Bihar Philosophical Research, Year 2005, p.01.

10. Priest ,Graham “Jaina Logic :A Contemporary Perspective” in History and Philosophy of Logic,29 August, 2008, p.277.

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340701690233 11. Chakraborti, Chhanda , Logic: Informal, Symbolic & Inductive, p.501.

12. Sarrukai, Sundar, Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, p.13.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

50

MkW ñ ch-vkj- vEcs M dj dh nfyrks a ds mRFkku es a ;ks x nku dh ,s f rgkfld i` " BHkw f e iz d k'k pUnz cMok;k 'kks/i=k lkj MkWñ ch-vkj- vEcsMdj tks Hkkjrh; lafo/ku ds tUenkrk FksA ,d egku f'k{kk 'kkL=kh] vFkZ'kkL=kh] ys[kd] izksQslj] ofdy] dkuwuK] eks{knkrk lc dqN ,d gh FksA MkWñ Hkhejko vEcsMdj nfyr tkfr ls lEcfU/r leL;kvksa ls Hkyh HkkWfr ifjfpr FksA nfyr tkfr ls lEcfU/r gksus ds dkj.k mUgs Kkr Fkk fd fdl izdkj mPp oxZ viuh tkfr ds izHkko dk iz;ksx fuEu tkfr dks izrkfMr djus ds fy, djrs gSA if'pe f'k{kk vkSj ogk¡ ds ifjos'k esa jgdj MkWñ vEcsMdj dk n`f"Vdks.k dkQh foLr`r gks x;k FkkA mUgksaus vius fo'kky n`f"Vdks.k dk iz;ksx nfyrksa ds Hkfo"; dks lq/kjus esa yxkus dk fuf'p; fd;kA bl dk;Z ds fy, MkWñ vEcsMdj dks lrr~ la?k"kZ djuk iMkA fo"k; iz s o 'k nfyr oxZ dh lkekftd o jktuhfrd fLFkfr lq/kjus ds fy, iz;Ru djus okys T;ksfrck Qwys ds ckn egku nfyr elhgk MkWñ ch-vkj- vEcsMdj Fks ftUgksaus viuh Å¡ph gSlh;r] vPNs dk;ksZa] mPp f'k{kk vkSj psruk ds fodkl }kjk nfyrksa dks lq/kjus esa cgqr ;ksxnku fn;kA MkWñ vEcsMdj th rhu egkiq#"kksa ls cgqr T;knk izHkkfor FksA ftu dks mUgksaus vius vkn'kZ vkSj xq# ekukA og Fks egkRek cq¼] HkDr dchj nkl vkSj T;ksfrck Qwys th A muds ekxZ ij pydj vEcsMdj th us nfyrksa dh fLFkr lq/kjus esa viuk egRoiw.kZ ;ksxnku fn;kA nfyr oxZ ds mRFkku ds fy, dk;Z MkWñ ch-vkj- vEcsMdj th dh egkurk bl ckr esa gS fd mUgksaus viuh egku fon~ork vkSj 'kfDr dk iz;ksx nfyr oxZ dk m¼kj djus ds fy, fd;kA muds fy, ns'k] vius O;fDrRo ls Hkh vf/d egRoiw.kZ Fkk ijUrq nfyr oxZ mudks vius ns'k ls Hkh egRoiw.kZ FkkA muds vius 'kCnksa esa& ¶eSa dgrk gw¡ fd tc dHkh esjs O;fDrxr fgrksa vkSj esjs ns'k ds fgrksa esa dksbZ la?k"kZ mRiUu gks tkrk gS rks eSa ns'k ds fgrksa dks vius O;fDrxr fgrksa ls Hkh Åij j[krk gw¡-------- tc dHkh esjs ns'k ds fgrksa vkSj nfyrksa ds fgrksa http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

51

esa dksbZ la?k"kZ mRiUu gks tkrk gS] tgk¡ rd esjk lEcU/ gSa] eSa vNwrksa ds fgrksa dks ns'k ds fgrksa ls Hkh Åij j[kw¡xkA¸1 cfg"Ñr fgrdkfj.kh lHkk dh LFkkiuk % Mk0 vEcsMdj us 20 tqykbZ 1924 dks cfg"Ñr fgrdkfj.kh lHkk dh LFkkiuk dh ftldk mn~ns'; nfyr oxZ dk fodkl rFkk mudh mUufr dk ekxZ [kksyuk FkkA nfyr yks x ks a dks fu%'kq Y d dkuw u h lgk;rk miyC/ djuk 1 vDVwcj 1926 bZ0 esa tc iwuk ds dqN mPp oxZ ds ukeh O;fDr;ksa us nfyr oxZ ds rhu usrkvksa ij eqdnek ntZ djk;k fd mUgksaus czkã.kksa dk vieku vkSj fuUnk dh gS rks vEcsMdj th us muds eqdnes dks vius gkFk esa fy;k vkSj ,slh nyhysa nh fd nfyr usrk eqdnek thr x,A vc os nfyr oxZ ds laj{kd dgykus yxsA vEcsMdj us R;kx dh ;g Hkkouk vkSj fu%'kqYd lsoko`fÙk vius vafre fnuksa rd iznf'kZr dhA nfyrks a ds fy, jktuhfrd vf/dkjks a ds fy, la ? k"kZ lu~ 1918&19 bZ- esa MkWñ ch-vkj vEcsMdj us nfyrksa dks T;knk ls T;knk vf/dkj nsus ds iz;Ru fd;sA ftlds fy, fnu jkr mUgksaus nfyrksa dk lq/kj djus ds mik; fd;s FksA blhfy, MkWñ vEcsMdj lkfgc loZizFke nfyr oxZ ds izfrfuf/ ds :i esa lkÅFkcksjksa desVh ds lkeus mifLFkr gq,A ;gk¡ mUgksaus izLrko is'k fd;k fd nfyrksa dh tula[;k ds vuqikr ls vyx&vyx fo/ku ifj"kn~ esa bu yksxksa ds fy, lhVs lqjf{kr j[kh tk, vkSj nfyrksa ds fy, i`Fkd pquko {ks=kksa dh Hkh O;oLFkk dh tk, ijUrq lkmFkcksjks desVh us MkWñ vEcsMdj ds lq>koksa dh vksj dksbZ fo'ks"k è;ku ugha fn;kA mUgksaus izkarksa dh dqy 791 lhVksa esa ls 24 lhVksa ij nfyr oxksZa dk vkj{k.k Lohdkj fd;kA dsUnzh; fo/ku ifj"kn rFkk dkSafly vkWQ LVsV esa rks ,d Hkh lhV ij vkj{k.k u fn;k x;kA ckn esa 1919 bZ- ds xouZesUV vkWQ bafM;k ,DV ds v/hu izkarksa esa nfyr oxksZa ds fy, 13 lhVsa vkjf{kr dh xbZA dkykUrj esa dsUnzh; fo|ku ifj"kn~ esa Hkh ,d nfyr lnL; euksuhar fd;kA nfyr yksxksa ds jktuhfrd vf/dkjksa ds fy, la?k"kZ ds lEcU/ esa VkbEl vkWQ bafM;k us 20 vizSy 1942 ds vad esa bl lEcU/ esa fy[kk ¶jktuhfrd vkSj vkfFkZd 'kfDr ds fcuk nfyr yksx lkekftd

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

52

,drk ikus esa dfBukbZ dk lkeuk dj ldrs gS vkSj MkWñ vEcsMdj us bl ckr dh tkudkjh izkIr djds cgqr Bhd fd;kA¸2 MkWñ Hkhe jko vEcsMdj us vusd ckj vaxzsth ljdkj dks dgk fd og ljdkjh vkSj v¼Z ljdkjh ukSdfj;ksa ij nfyr tkfr ds yksxksa ij yxs gq, izfrcU/ gVk ns vkSj mUgsa bu ukSdfj;ksa ij cMh la[;k esa HkrhZ djsA MkWñ vEcsMdj th dks cgqr Øks/ vk;k tc fczfV'k ljdkj us nfyr yksxksa dks vlSfud oxZ ekudj mUgsa lsuk esa HkrhZ djus ls oafpr dj fn;kA bl lEcU/ esa vEcsMdj th dk dguk Fkk& ¶;g fdlh /ks[ks vkSj fo'okl?kkr ls de ugha fd fczfV'k ljdkj us lsuk esa HkrhZ gksus ds }kj nfyr yksxksa ds fy, can dj j[ks gSa] fo'ks"kdj tc bUgha nfyr yksxksa us fczfV'k ljdkj dks Hkkjr esa lkezkT; LFkkfir djus esa lgk;rk dh Fkh vkSj ;g Hkh ,sls le; esa tcfd baxyS.M dh ljdkj Lo;a usiksfy;u ls yMs tkus okys ;q¼ksa esa O;Lr FkhA3 vUr esa vEcsMdj ,sls vuqfpr dkuwuksa dks gVkus esa lQy gq, vkSj lsuk esa HkrhZ ds }kj nfyr yksxksa ds fy, lnk ds fy, [kksy fn, A MkWñ vEcsMdj us nfyrksa ds jktuhfrd vf/dkj ds fy, yUnu 1931 bZñ esa vk;ksftr xksyest lEesyu esa mUgksaus nfyr oxZ ds fy, lhVs vkjf{kr djus o i`Fkd pquko {ks=kksa dh ek¡x j[khA la;qDr vFkok i`Fkd fuokZpu iz.kkyh ds lEcU/ esa mUgksaus Lohdkj fd;k ¶la;qDr vFkok i`Fkd fuokZpu iz.kkyh ds iz'u ij gekjh fLFkfr ;g gS fd ;fn vki gesa lkoZHkkSe O;Ld erkf/dkj nsus dks rS;kj gS rks ge dqN lhVsa lqjf{kr fd, tkus ij la;qDr pquko iz.kkyh dks ekuuus ds fy, rS;kj gS vkSj ;fn rqe gesa lkoZHkkSe O;Ld erkf/dkj nsus dks rS;kj ugha rc gesa i`Fkd fuokZpu iz.kkyh }kjk vius izfrfuf/ Hkstus dk vf/dkj pkfg,A ;g gekjh fLFkfr gSA¸4 lu~ 1931 bZñ esa vk;skftr xksyest lEesyu egkRek xk¡/h vkSj eqgEen vyh ftUukg ds eè; lkEiznkf;d pquko iz.kkyh ds iz'u ij vlQy gks x;k ijUrq 1932 esa ?kksf"kr ¶dE;wuy vokMZ¸ esa MkWñ vEcsMdj dh ek¡xksa dks dkQh gn rd Lohdkj dj fy;k x;kA nwljh vksj egkRek xk¡/h us bls ns'k fgr ds izfrdwy ekuk vkSj blds fo#¼ vkej.k vu'ku j[kkA ifj.kke QyLo:i ¶iwuk iSDV¸ vfLrRo esa vk;kA blds vuqlkj nfyrksa ds fy, lhVksa dk vkj{k.k rks Lohdkj dj fy;k x;k ijUrq i`Fkd pquko {ks=k dh O;oLFkk lekIr dj nh xbZA MkWñ vEcsMdj bl QSlys ds fojks/h Fks D;ksafd blls nfyrksa dk lkekftd dyad lekIr ugha gksrk FkkA MkWñ vEcsMdj us ukfld ftys ds ,d xk¡o esa 13 vDVwcj 1935 bZñ dks tulHkk dks lEcksf/r djrs gq, ?kks"k.kk fd og Nwr&Nkr okys bl /eZ dks R;kx dj nwljs /eZ dks Lohdkj dj ysaxs A og igys flD[k /eZ vkSj ckn esa ckS¼ /eZ dh rjQ >qd x;sA

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

53

MkWñ Hkhejko vEcsMdj ,d mPpdksfV ds laxBudrkZ FksA mUgksaus vDVwcj 1936 bZñ dks ¶baf.MisMsaV yscj ikVhZ vkWQ bafM;k” dk laxBu fd;k ftUgksaus 1937 bZ dh fo/ku lHkk dh cEcbZ izSthMsalh dh lHkh vkjf{kr lhVsa thr yh FkhA bl izdkj MkWñ lkfgc us 1942 bZ- dks vuqlwfpr tkfr la?k dk fuekZ.k fd;kA bl izdkj vEcsMdj nfyr tkfr ds jktuhfrd vf/dkjksa dks lqjf{kr j[kus ds fy, lc dqN fd;kA bl ckr ij xoZ djrs gq, mUgksaus Lo;a dgk ¶os bl ckr dh ?kks"k.kk djrs gq, izlUu gS fd nfyr yksxksa us cgqr gn rd jktuhfrd psruk izkIr dj yh gS bruh psruk Hkkjr ds dqN gh oxks± us izkIr dh gSA¸ blds lkFk gh mUgksaus nfyrksa dh dkUQzsalksa esa Hkkx ysuk (1920) nfyrksa ds fy, ¶ewduk;d¸ tSls lekpkj i=kksa dk vkjEHk (1920) lekt lerk la?k dk laxBu (1927) nfyrksa ds lkekftd vf/dkjksa ds fy, lR;kxzg (1927– 28) lafo/ku ds fuekZ.k esa ;ksxnku (1946) esa viuk egRoiw.kZ ;ksxnku fn;kA okLro esa MkWñ ch-vkj vEcsMdj nfyrksa ds elhgk fl¼ gq, A iafMr usg: ds 'kCnksa esa& ¶MkWñ vEcsMdj mPp dksfV ds egku yksxksa dh fxurh esa vkrs gSA lkFk gh MkWñ vEcsMdj th dh thouh ys[kd /Uut; dhj fy[krs gSa ¶lHkh yksx Lohdkj djrs gS fd os ekuo ds lEeku ds egku la?k"kZdrkZ vkSj nfyrksa ds egku laj{kd FksA bl ns'k vkSj lEHkor;k vU; ns'kksa dk Hkh dksbZ euq"; mudh cjkcjh ugah dj ldrkA mu tSlk mRlkgiw.kZ fofo/ 'kkunkj vkSj vnHkqr thou pfj=k fdlh dk ugah gks ldrkA¸5 mila g kj MkWñ vEcsMdj th ds iz;Ruksa ds QyLo:i gh nfyr tkfr;ksa dks /hjs&/hjs loksZPp LFkku feykA vkt fuEu tkfr;ksa ds izR;sd {ks=k esa mPp LFkku izkIr fd;k gS ftuesa ls HksnHkko vkSj tkfrokn lekIr gksus dh dxkj ij gSA nwljs yksxksa ;k mPp tkfr;ksa ds cjkcj nfyrksa dks lEeku igqapkus okys MkWñ ch-vkjvEcsMdj gh Fks ftudks vius fny dh xgjkbZ;ksa ls ;kn fd;k tkrk jgsxk A la n HkZ : 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Dhananjay Keer, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : Life and Mission, Ch. XXII. Page 32.

The Times of India 22/04/1942, p.01.

K.L. Chanchreek- Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, p.158.

Ibid.

Dhananjay Keer, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : Life and Mission, Ch. XXVII, p.523.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

54

la n HkZ xz a F k lw p h : 1. Wikipedia, Dalit.Wikipedia 2. Diwakar, D.M. (1999). Dalit Question of Inequality, Exploitation and Movilization: A Micro View of Ground Realities, Man and Development, Vol. XXI, No. 3.

3. Census (2011). Census of India, Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 4. Dhananjay Keer – Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : Life and Mission Ch. XXVII, XXII. 5. K.L. Chachreek , Dr. Ambedkar.

6. The Times of India ,22/04/1942.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

55

REPORT OF THE PROGRAMME

Report on Teachers’ Day Celebration-2015

The Positive Philosophy Society of the Department of Philosophy, P. G. Govt. College for Girls, Sector-11, Chandigarh organized an event on “Teachers’ Day Celebration – cum- Get-Together” on 3rd September, 2015. The details of the function are given below: Ms. Nidhi Semwal and Ms. Roshni coordinated the function. Ms. Nidhi introduced the Positive Philosophy Society with its objectives and also about the importance of Teachers’ Day celebration. She said this programme is dedicated to Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam ji. Ms. Arnika Yumnam addressed new students by sharing her experience as well as guides them regarding the college life.

Two posters on Dr. A.P. J. Abdul Kalam were inaugurated by The Positive Philosophy Society and Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS) respectively. Ms. Kanika Mehta and Ms. Manisha Joshi shared the message of Dr. A.P.J.Abdul Kalam for youth and teachers.

The following students were selected for the working committee for the session 2015-16: President: Ms. Arnika Yumnam (BA-III), Vice-President: Nidhi Semwal

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

56

(BA-II), Secretary: Ms. Aanya (BA-I). Associate Members: Ms. Bhanu Priya (BA-I), Ms. Roshni (BA-II), Ms. Sharandeep Kaur (BA-III).

Ms. Shavnam, Ms. Arnika Yumnam, Ms. Manju and Ms. Manisha Joshi honoured for their excellent score in BA. Final, BA Second and BA First Year examinations (2014-2015) respectively.

An interactive session with new students also held. Students shared their views and performed some entertainment activities, as directed by senior students. Some senior students also performed singing and dancing activities.

Teacher-Incharge, Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal encouraged students to write and explore their thinking through creative initiatives. He also motivated them for quality learning and better academic engagements.

On this occasion a welcome party too given to B.A. First year students by senior students. A special thanks to Ms. Nidhi Semwal, Ms. Roshni, Ms. Arnika Yumnam and other students for their valuable efforts and contributions to made this event successful.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

57

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

58

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

I

59

PHILOSOPHY NEWS IN INDIA

National Level Essay Writing Competition on “Dr.B.R.Ambedkar: The Maker of Modern India” 19th November, 2015 The Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS) Pehowa (Kurukshetra) on the occasion of the 125th Birth Anniversary of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar & World Philosophy Day-2015, going to organize a National Level Essay Writing Competition on the theme “Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: The Maker of Modern India”. The competition aims at giving an opportunity to the youth of country to come across various aspects of the philosophy of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and focused on generating new ideas especially from young mind and see how they perceive Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s contribution to modern India.

About Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Dr. B. R. Ambedkar is one of the most eminent intellectual figures of modern India. He appeared on the Indian socio-political scene in early 1920s and remained in the forefront of all social, economic, political and religious efforts for upliftment of the lowest stratum of the Indian society known as untouchables, women and other backward classes. He was a great scholar who made outstanding contributions as an economist, sociologist, legal luminary, educationist, journalist, parliamentarian and above all, as a social reformer and champion of human rights. Dr.Ambedkar’s ideas, writings and outlook could well be characterized as belonging to that trend of thought called Social Humanism. He developed a socio-ethical philosophy and steadfastly stood for human dignity and freedom, socio-economic justice, material prosperity and spiritual discipline. He showed the enlightening path for Indian society via his ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity and made India a democratic country.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

60

Theme of Essay Competition : Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: The Maker of Modern India Sub-Themes: The Philosophy of Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Indian Society Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and His Political Philosophy Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and His Social Philosophy Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on Indian Religions Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on Buddhism Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and His Moral Philosophy Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Untouchables Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and His Educational Philosophy Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Women Empowerment Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s Message to Indian Youth Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Indian Constitution Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s Critique of Hinduism Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on Indian Democracy Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on Social Justice Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on Freedom, Equality and Fraternity Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Spirituality Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Indian Economy Dr. B.R.Ambedkar’s Views on Nationalism Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and His Legal Philosophy` Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and India’s Freedom Struggle Any other relevant topic related to main theme.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

61

Eligibility: All students pursuing any Undergraduate or Post Graduate courses from recognized college/institute/university. Age limit is 25 years or below for this competition.

Prizes: Prizes will be given to top 5 entries and a certificate also provided to those who follow proper guidelines. Best essays will be published in our journal “Milestone Education Review, October, 2015” issue.

Submission Guidelines: §

The essays submitted by the participants must be in ‘English and Hindi’ language only.

§

The essay must be typed in Microsoft Word with Times New Roman, Font size 12, 1.5 linear spacing.

§

Co-authorship is allowed.

§

Word Limit: 2000 Maximum words including footnotes.

§

The participants submitting an entry in this essay contest need to affirm that the entry is his/her own work. Plagiarism can lead to outright rejection of submission.

Criteria of Evaluation: The criteria to be applied in evaluating the entries are: Originality of the content Creativity and Rationality Style and Presentation of content Clarity and proper citations Registration and Submission: There is no registration fee for this essay competition. Participants should submit their essay with 10th class certificate and institutional ID proof along with registration form till http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

62

20th October 2015 on the given address. An advance copy of all documents should be submitted

before

last

date

via

email

id

cppiskkr@gmail.com

or

philgcg11chd@gmail.com.

For any details, Contact: Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal, Department of Philosophy, P.G.Govt. College for Girls, Sector-11, Chandigarh-160011. Mobile No.08288883993 For more details of seminars, conferences, jobs and workshops etc. kindly visit to Philosophy News in India: http://newsphilosophy.wordpress.com

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

63

CONTRIBUTORS OF THIS ISSUE Dr. Gaganjot Kaur, Assistant Professor, Kamala Nehru College, University of Delhi, Delhi.

Dr. Ahinpunya Mitra, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Triveni Devi Bhalotia College, Raniganj, Dist. Burdwan, West Bengal.

Dr. Reni Pal, Assistant Professor in Philosophy, Surendranath College, Kolkata.

Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, P. G. Govt. College for Girls , Sector-­‐11, Chandigarh.

Dr. Prakash Chandra Badwaya, Assistant Professor, Department of History, P. G. Govt. College for Girls , Sector-­‐11, Chandigarh.

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

64

Instructions to the Contributors Lokāyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy (ISSN 2249-8389) welcomes contributions in all areas of research proposed by the Centre. All articles are sent to experts who evaluate each paper on several dimensions such as originality of the work, scientific argument, and English style, format of the paper, references, citations and finally they comment on suitability of the article for the particular Journal. In case of review articles the importance of the subject and the extent the review is comprehensive are assessed.

Prospective authors are expected that before submitting any article for publication they should see that it fulfills these criteria. The improvement of article may be achieved in two ways (i) more attention to language (ii) more attention to the sections of the article.

Format of Submission: The paper should be typewritten preferably in Times New Roman with 12 font size (English) and Kruti Dev (10) with 14 font size (Hindi) in MS-­‐Word 2003 to 2010 and between 2500 to 3000 words. They should be typed on one side of the paper, double spaced with ample margins. The authors should submit the hard copy along with a CD and a copyright form to be sent to the editorial address.

Time Line: The last dates of submission of the manuscript are as follows: For April to September Issue: 31 August every year.

For October to March Issue: 31 January every year. st

st

Reference Style: Notes and references should appear at the end of the research paper/chapter. Citations in the text and references must correspond to each other; do not over reference by giving the obvious/old classic studies or the irrelevant. CPPIS follows The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th Edition. The Chicago Manual of Style presents two basic documentation systems: (1) notes and bibliography and (2) author-­‐date. Choosing between the two often depends on subject matter and the nature of sources cited, as each system is favored by different groups of scholars. The notes and bibliography style is preferred by many in the humanities. The author-­‐date system has long been used by those in the physical, natural, and social sciences.

CPPIS follows the first system i.e. Notes and Bibliography.

You can visit the following link to download our “CPPIS Manual for Contributors and Reviewers” for further instuctions: http://www.scribd.com/doc/137190047/CPPIS-­‐Manual-­‐for-­‐Contributors-­‐Reviewers https://www.academia.edu/8215663/CPPIS_Manual_for_Contributors_and_Reviewers

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

65

CPPIS, Pehowa (Kurukshetra) Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS) Pehowa is a joint academic venture of Milestone Education Society (Regd.) Pehowa and Society for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (SPPIS), Haryana (online) to do fundamental research in the field of Humanities and Social Sciences.

SPPIS Newsletter The Centre also circulates a Newsletter which includes new information related to events, new articles and programme details. One can register himself on the below given address and will get regular updates from us.

Link for registration: http://positivephilosophy.webs.com/apps/auth/signup

All contributions to the Journal, other editorial enquiries and books for review are to be sent to: Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal, Chief-­Editor, Lokāyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy, Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS), Pehowa, Distt. Kurukshetra (HARYANA)-­136128 (India) Mobile No.09896848775, 08288883993 E-­mail: cppiskkr@gmail.com, mses.02@gmail.com Website: http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

“My objective is to achieve an intellectual detachment from all philosophical systems, and not to solve specific philosophical problems, but to become sensitively aware of what it is when we philosophise.”

- Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal

http://lokayatajournal.webs.com