September 2026
Private Education Matters
Table Of Contents 03 Antitrust
13 Disabilities
04 Free Speech
15 Religious Accommodations
06 Special Education
16 Arbitration
07 Breach of Contract
16 Business & Facilities
EMPLOYEES
20 LCW Best Practices Timeline
09 Wage & Hour
22 Did You Know?
10 NLRA
23 Cases We Are Watching
12 Defamation
24 Consortium Call of The Month
Contributors: Grace Chan Partner | San Francisco
Ailin Nevarez Associate | Los Angeles
Hannah Dodge Associate | San Francisco
Madison Tanner Associate | San Diego
Connect With Us! Copyright © 2026 Requests for permission to reproduce all or part of this publication should be addressed to Jacqueline Reid, Marketing Manager at 310.981.2000. Cover Photo: Attributed to pexels.com
Private Education Matters is published monthly for the benefit of the clients of Liebert Cassidy Whitmore. The information in Private Education Matters should not be acted on without professional advice. To contact us, please call 310.981.2000, 415.512.3000, 559.256.7800, 916.584.7000 or 619.481.5900 or e-mail info@lcwlegal.com.
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Students September 2026
Antitrust Students Challenge Colleges’ Early Decision Practices as an Agreement Not to Compete. Four current and former college students filed a proposed class action against 32 private colleges and universities, alleging that the schools conspired to restrain competition through their Early Decision (“ED”) admissions practices in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The students also sued the Consortium on Financing Higher Education (“COFHE”), as well as the Common Application and Scoir, two college application platforms. Under the ED process, a student applies early to one college and agrees to attend if admitted. Unlike Early Action programs, which allow accepted students to continue applying elsewhere and ultimately choose among competing offers, ED requires an accepted applicant to withdraw other applications. Although the Court noted that the student’s ED commitment is not itself legally binding, the Common Application’s ED agreement expressly advises applicants that their names and early commitments may be shared with other institutions. The plaintiffs do not contend that an individual college violates antitrust law simply by offering ED. Instead, they challenge what they characterize as a separate agreement among competing schools not to compete for students once another institution has admitted them through ED. According to the complaint, participating colleges share information about ED admits and agree not to recruit, admit, or make competing offers to those students. The plaintiffs allege that certain Ivy League institutions formalized this practice through a joint statement requiring participating schools to honor ED commitments made to other colleges, while other schools followed essentially the same practice. The students contend that this alleged agreement has
important financial consequences. An ED applicant cannot compare competing offers or use an offer from another institution to negotiate additional financial aid. According to the complaint, that makes ED particularly valuable to colleges because it identifies students willing to commit without knowing whether another school might offer a lower net price or a more favorable combination of grants and loans. The plaintiffs allege that the resulting reduction in competition allows colleges to provide less financial aid and contributes to higher tuition not only for ED applicants, but throughout the broader market. The Court declined to dismiss the antitrust claim against the 32 schools. At this early stage of litigation, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged an agreement among competing institutions. As direct evidence, the Court pointed to the Ivy League Joint Statement, under which member institutions agreed to honor another college’s ED commitment. Although only five defendants were parties to that statement, the Court concluded that allegations that other schools engaged in substantially identical conduct could support an inference that the agreement extended further. The Court also found sufficient circumstantial evidence of coordination among the schools. The complaint alleges that the schools use nearly identical ED processes and that schools have exchanged lists of ED admits to identify students committed elsewhere. For example, the complaint alleges that Dartmouth acknowledged sending ED admission lists to other Ivy League schools and that an Amherst admissions official confirmed sharing such lists with approximately 30 colleges. Once those lists were received, the plaintiffs allege, competing institutions terminated pending applications from students who had been admitted ED elsewhere. The Court also found the alleged financial incentives relevant. According to the plaintiffs, ED students pay more on average, and an individual school acting
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independently ordinarily would have little reason to stop competing for a highly qualified applicant, particularly one likely to pay full tuition, simply because another school had already admitted the student. The Court concluded that these allegations supported a plausible inference that the schools were coordinating rather than independently adopting similar admissions practices. The colleges argued that ED also produces legitimate benefits, including giving students an earlier admissions decision and potentially increasing their likelihood of admission to a preferred institution. The Court did not reject those arguments, but concluded that determining whether the alleged agreement’s benefits outweigh its anticompetitive effects requires a more developed factual record and should not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The students’ antitrust claims against the schools therefore may proceed.
The Court reached a different result for the Common Application, Scoir, and COFHE. Although those organizations allegedly provided the infrastructure through which colleges communicated or administered admissions, the complaint did not sufficiently allege that any of them actually joined the alleged conspiracy. The Court therefore dismissed the claims against all three organizations. D'Amico v. Consortium on Fin. Higher Educ. (D.Mass. Aug. 7, 2026) __F.Supp.3d__ [2026 WL 2279510] Note: This case is a useful reminder that private schools are not insulated from antitrust laws when they collaborate with other schools. Schools should exercise caution when sharing applicant information or coordinating admissions, tuition, financial aid, enrollment, or other competitively sensitive practices with peer schools, particularly where an agreement could limit families’ choices or reduce competition among schools.
Free Speech Silent Student Protest Against ICE Was Not Sufficiently Disruptive to Justify Discipline, Court Holds. Students at Florida International University (“FIU”) formed a student organization called ICEBreakers to oppose an agreement authorizing FIU police officers to exercise certain federal immigration enforcement powers. In March 2026, approximately 15 students wearing matching “ICE OFF FIU” T-shirts attended an indoor event at which FIU’s President was interviewing a former professional athlete. During the interview, the students silently stood and faced the audience for approximately one to three minutes before leaving the auditorium. They did not speak or carry signs, and the interview continued without interruption. According to the evidence before the Court, no attendee complained about the protest at the time. FIU nevertheless initiated disciplinary proceedings against several students under a University regulation
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prohibiting “protests, parades, marches, picketing, demonstrations, and other similar expressive activities” inside University buildings. The University’s own investigation produced evidence that the protest had not disrupted the event: the staff member overseeing the event reported that the speakers continued their discussion and that no attendees complained. FIU did not charge the students with disruptive conduct, but instead disciplined them for violating the blanket prohibition on indoor expressive activity. Following disciplinary hearings, six students received written reprimands and were required to submit two-minute “video reflections” explaining their understanding of FIU’s speech rules and how they would comply going forward. Failure to submit an acceptable video could result in a hold preventing a student from registering for classes or obtaining financial aid, transcripts, a diploma, or other academic records. The students and ICEBreakers sued and sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting FIU from enforcing the indoor-speech rule against them.
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The Court also discussed the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., where several students and coaches were upset after a student posted on Snapchat criticizing the school and school’s cheerleading team, using vulgar language and gestures. In that case, the Court found that a group of cheerleaders being upset and the approximately five to ten minutes of classroom discussion about the social media posts did not satisfy Tinker’s demanding substantial-disruption standard. Likewise, Eleventh Circuit precedent establishes that disagreement with student expression, hostile reactions by other students, or a theoretical possibility of discord generally will not justify suppressing the speaker’s expression. FIU’s policy was problematic because it did not distinguish between disruptive and nondisruptive indoor expression. While FIU’s rules expressly permitted outdoor expressive activities unless they materially and substantially disrupted University operations or infringed on others’ rights, its indoor rule prohibited covered expressive activity categorically. As the Court observed, the policy was broad enough potentially to reach conduct as limited as a single student wearing a protest button or a small group of students gathering in the student union to discuss their opposition to an issue.
The Court acknowledged that location still matters when determining whether student expression is disruptive. For example, 50 students chanting and clapping might be unobjectionable on an outdoor lawn but materially disruptive inside a classroom. What FIU could not do, however, was presume that all indoor protest activity was disruptive simply because of where it occurred. Even indoors, the relevant question remained whether the particular expression caused, or was reasonably likely to cause, a material and substantial disruption.
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The federal district court granted the preliminary injunction, concluding that the students were substantially likely to establish that FIU’s policy violated the First Amendment. The Court relied principally on Tinker v. Des Moines, a 1969 Supreme Court case where a group of students wore black armbands at school to voice their objections to the Vietnam War. In Tinker, the Supreme Court found that schools generally may restrict student expression when it materially disrupts school operations, causes substantial disorder, or invades the rights of others. The Court emphasized that neither a generalized fear of disruption nor the discomfort that accompanies an unpopular viewpoint is sufficient.
Because FIU’s regulation prohibited indoor expressive activity without regard to whether it materially disrupted University operations, the Court found that the students were likely to prevail on their First Amendment claim. It preliminarily prohibited FIU from enforcing the regulation against the individual students and other members of ICEBreakers while the litigation proceeds. The Court did not reach the students’ separate arguments that the policy was an unconstitutional content-based restriction or facially overbroad. Icebreakers v. Nuñez (S.D.Fla. Aug. 23, 2026) 2026 WL 2468485. Note: Although this case involves a public university, its analysis is particularly relevant to California private high schools because the Leonard Law (Education Code section 48950) generally prohibits private secondary schools from disciplining a high school student solely for speech that would be protected from governmental restriction if engaged in off campus. Schools may still adopt reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions and address disruptive conduct, but this case is a useful reminder to consider the actual or reasonably anticipated disruption before disciplining a student for protest activity.
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Special Education Federal Decision Could Change How California School Districts Serve Private School Students with Disabilities. The U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services has ordered the California Department of Education (“CDE”) to take statewide corrective action regarding how school districts carry out their responsibilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) for students with disabilities who attend private schools. The decision follows complaints brought by the Archdiocese of San Francisco and Diocese of San Diego after they raised concerns about practices in the San Francisco Unified School District and several San Diego-area districts and were dissatisfied with CDE’s response. Students who are placed in private schools by their parents generally do not have an individual right to receive the same special education services they would receive in a public school. But that does not mean IDEA has no application to them. Local public school districts have responsibilities to identify and evaluate privateschool students who may have disabilities, consult with private schools and parents about how services will be provided, and spend a proportionate share of their federal IDEA funding on services for eligible privateschool students. The Department found problems with how the districts were consulting with private schools. In some instances, decisions about what services would be offered appeared to have effectively been made before private school representatives had a meaningful opportunity to weigh in. For example, private school representatives in the San Diego area asked the districts to consider direct speech-language and specialized academic
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instruction, including through third-party providers, but the districts continued their existing consultative model without demonstrating that they had meaningfully considered those alternatives or providing the required written explanation for rejecting them. The Department emphasized that IDEA consultation is intended to be a genuine discussion in which private schools have an opportunity to influence how services are designed, not simply a meeting to inform them of decisions already made. The Department also identified concerns with child find, which is the process school districts use to identify and evaluate children who may have disabilities. Private school representatives had reported that students were sometimes expected to participate in interventions such as Response to Intervention (“RTI”) or Multi-Tiered Systems of Support (“MTSS”) before being referred for an evaluation. The Department clarified that districts may use these types of supports, but they cannot use them to delay or deny an evaluation once there is reason to suspect that a child has a disability and may need special education services. It ultimately found that the practices used by the districts did not adequately ensure that eligible private school students were being identified and counted. That finding also has potential funding implications. The number of eligible private school students identified through child find helps determine the proportionate share, or amount of federal IDEA funding that districts must reserve for services benefiting parentally placed private school students with disabilities. The Department directed CDE to ensure that districts recalculate those amounts for federal fiscal years 2021 through 2025, determine whether there were funding shortfalls, and remedy any shortfalls using available funding sources. The Department also found shortcomings in CDE’s handling of the underlying IDEA complaints,
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This decision is not limited to the districts involved in these complaints. CDE has been directed to take corrective action designed to ensure compliance by school districts and Special Education Local Plan Areas (“SELPAs”) throughout California.
Note: Although parentally placed private-school students generally do not have an individual entitlement to IDEA services, private schools still have an important role in the process. This decision reinforces that districts must meaningfully engage private school representatives in decisions about equitable services and may be helpful for schools that have experienced challenges with consultation or obtaining timely evaluations for students.
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concluding that CDE did not consistently investigate and resolve all of the material issues raised by the private school representatives. CDE must revise its complaint procedures as necessary so that future investigations address the issues raised and clearly explain whether the district complied with IDEA and why.
Breach of Contract Court Allows Student’s Contract Claims to Proceed Based on School’s Academic Policies.
According to Carter, the assistant dean told his father that the ACP would help “bolster” Carter’s science GPA, which had to remain at or above 2.80 for Carter to stay in the Program.
Joshua Carter enrolled in the University of MissouriKansas City’s (“UMKC”) joint B.A./M.D. program in 2011. The accelerated program was designed to allow students to earn a medical degree in six years. During the summer after his first year, Carter received a “D” in Cell Biology, a course required to advance later in the program. UMKC informed him that he would be placed on an Alternative Curriculum Plan (“ACP”), which would extend the six-year program by an additional year.
Carter performed well under the ACP, earning an “A” in all five courses. He expected those grades to improve his science GPA based on two representations from UMKC. First, the Program’s Manual expressly stated that when a student repeated a science course, “only the final grade” would be used in calculating the student’s science GPA. Second, Carter alleged that the email containing his ACP stated that the three additional biology electives would count toward his science GPA.
Carter immediately objected, pointing to provisions in the Program’s Policy Manual that he believed permitted him to continue on the regular track subject to academic probation. UMKC nevertheless required him to accept the ACP as a condition of remaining in the Program. The ACP required Carter to retake Cell Biology and another course he had already passed, as well as complete three additional biology electives.
UMKC subsequently told Carter that it would not calculate his GPA as he expected. His original grade in one repeated course would remain because it was not eligible for grade replacement; the three biology electives would not count toward his science GPA; and his original and new Cell Biology grades would be averaged rather than replacing the original grade. Carter later fell below the Program’s required 2.80
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science GPA and was told that he could repeat his second-year coursework or leave the Program. He withdrew and eventually graduated from UMKC with an undergraduate biology degree. Carter alleged that, had UMKC calculated his GPA as promised, he would have remained above the required threshold and continued toward his medical degree. Carter sued UMKC, asserting several breach-ofcontract theories. In addition to the GPA calculation, he alleged that UMKC breached contractual obligations by improperly requiring him to participate in the ACP, failing to separately report undergraduate and medicalschool GPAs on his transcript, and misrepresenting that the entire six-year program was accredited as medicalschool education. The trial court dismissed his claims, and Carter appealed. The Missouri Court of Appeals explained that a university’s promises to its students can create contractual obligations when they are sufficiently specific. Those promises need not necessarily appear in a traditional signed contract: brochures, policy manuals, advertisements, and other university materials may form part of the contractual relationship between a student and the institution. At the same time, not every representation is enforceable. A student must identify a particular contractual promise that the university failed to honor; general or aspirational statements ordinarily are insufficient. Applying that distinction, the Court held that Carter had sufficiently alleged a breach based on the gradereplacement provision in the Program’s Manual. Unlike a general promise to support students academically, the Manual provided a concrete mechanism: if a student repeated a science course, only the final grade would be used in calculating the science GPA. The Court characterized this as an “objective, specific, and express representation” sufficiently concrete to support a contractual promise. The Court reached the same conclusion regarding the email containing Carter’s ACP. According to Carter, that communication specifically represented that the three biology electives UMKC required him to take would count toward his science GPA. Because that was a promise that UMKC would take a concrete, identifiable action if Carter completed the courses, it too could support a contract claim. By contrast, the assistant dean’s more general statement that the ACP would “bolster” Carter’s GPA did not identify any particular
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action UMKC promised to take and was therefore too aspirational to constitute an enforceable promise. The Court rejected Carter’s other contract theories. His claim that the entire B.A./M.D. Program was represented as accredited failed because he could not identify a specific promise that the first two years themselves would constitute accredited medical-school education or that every course would count directly toward his M.D. degree. The fact that the Program was marketed as an accelerated B.A./M.D. program created an expectation that some coursework would count toward each degree, not that all six years constituted accredited medical-school coursework. The Court similarly rejected Carter’s reliance on the Program’s higher tuition. It distinguished an earlier COVID-era case in which a university offered separate online and in-person programs at different prices, which supported an inference that students paying the higher price had been promised an in-person experience. Here, Carter acknowledged receiving the features that distinguished UMKC’s accelerated program, including early clinical experience, access to medicalschool coursework while still an undergraduate, and a pathway to completing both degrees in six years. The higher price therefore did not itself establish an implied promise that the first two years were accredited as medical-school education. The Court emphasized that it was deciding only whether Carter had sufficiently alleged contractual promises at the pleading stage, not whether UMKC actually breached those promises or whether Carter would ultimately prevail. Carter v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo. (Ct.App. Aug. 4, 2026) 2026 WL 2233843. Note: School policies and individualized communications can potentially create contractual obligations when they describe a specific action the school promises to take. Schools should review handbooks, enrollment materials, academic policies, and communications to families for language that may unintentionally limit a school’s discretion.
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Employees September 2026
Wage & Hour Nonprofit Employees May Volunteer for their Organization, But the Work Must Be Different From Their Regular Jobs. The U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (“WHD”) recently issued an opinion letter addressing when employees of nonprofit organizations may volunteer their time to the same organizations that employ them. The nonprofit organization breeds and trains service dogs and employs veterinarians, service-dog trainers, and directors (whose role is to supervise the trainers). Some of these employees wanted to volunteer outside working hours as “juvenile canine caretakers,” taking puppies into their homes and providing routine care, early training, and socialization before the dogs began specialized training at the organization’s facilities. The organization represented that participation was entirely voluntary, was not a job requirement or employment benefit, and would not interfere with the employees’ regular responsibilities. WHD explained that nonprofit employees may volunteer for their own employer, but several important limitations apply. The employee must volunteer freely and without direct or implied coercion, must have no expectation of compensation, and cannot volunteer to perform the same or similar type of services the employee is paid to perform. Whether work is the same or similar depends on the particular facts, including how closely the volunteer activities relate to the employee’s regular duties. WHD offered examples particularly relevant to schools. A school bus driver may volunteer as an assistant basketball coach because coaching is sufficiently different from driving a bus, but the same employee cannot “volunteer” to drive the basketball team to an away game. Similarly, a secretary at a nonprofit that provides programming services to atrisk youth could volunteer to chaperone a trip.
Applying those principles to the service-dog organization, WHD concluded that veterinarians and directors could potentially volunteer as puppy caretakers because their assumed regular duties were sufficiently different from routine puppy care and socialization. Trainers presented a different situation. Because their paid jobs already involved training, caring for, or socializing dogs, WHD concluded that the at-home work would likely constitute the same or similar services and therefore could not be treated as volunteer work. The opinion letter also explained an important distinction between exempt and nonexempt employees when the volunteer requirements are not satisfied. If a nonexempt employee performs purported “volunteer” services that are actually the same or similar to their regular work, those hours become part of the employment relationship and generally must be counted and compensated as hours worked. For an exempt employee, by contrast, additional nonexempt work generally does not require additional compensation so long as the employee remains paid on the required salary basis and the employee’s primary duty continues to be exempt work. The full opinion letter can be found here. Note: Private schools often have employees who want to volunteer at events, extracurricular activities, fundraisers, field trips, or other programs outside their regular jobs. This opinion letter confirms that such arrangements can be permissible, but calling the activity “volunteer” work is not enough. Before allowing an employee to volunteer, schools should consider whether participation is truly voluntary and unpaid and, importantly, whether the activities are sufficiently different from the employee’s regular job duties. The analysis is particularly important for nonexempt employees because mischaracterizing work as volunteer service can result in unpaid wages and overtime.
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NLRA NLRB Advice Finds Gaza-Related Workplace Protest Was Not Protected by the NLRA.
relocate to nearby public property, the organizers proceeded with the protest on campus. Two employees were subsequently terminated for violating company policy and failing to comply with security directives.
The Division of Advice is a segment of the Office of the General Counsel within the National Labor Relation’s Board (NLRB) that answers questions posed by the agency's network of regional offices on cases that raise difficult issues or implicate potential changes to board precedent. The Division of Advice recently concluded that Microsoft did not violate the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) when it terminated two employees for holding an unauthorized protest on company property concerning Microsoft’s business relationship with the Israeli government. The Division concluded that the protest was not protected concerted activity because its objectives were not sufficiently connected to employees’ terms and conditions of employment.
The Division of Advice concluded that the terminations were lawful because the protest was not undertaken for employees’ “mutual aid or protection,” as required for protection under Section 7 of the NLRA. Although concerted activity can remain protected even when other objectives predominate, the Division found that the protest’s principal objectives were to pressure Microsoft to end its ties with the Israeli government, raise awareness about conditions in Gaza, and raise funds for humanitarian relief, and not to improve employees’ working conditions.
The dispute arose from an employee-led campaign called No Azure for Apartheid, which sought, among other things, to have Microsoft terminate its Azure cloud-computing contracts with the Israeli government and protect pro-Palestinian speech and fundraising on company platforms. Microsoft had previously taken no action against the employees involved in launching the campaign or circulating its petition, although it had disciplined two employees for offensive internal comments unrelated to workplace concerns. Several months later, one employee sent a companywide calendar invitation promoting an event at Microsoft’s Redmond campus that was organized by No Tech for Apartheid, an outside organization. The invitation encouraged employees to participate in a walkout, vigil, speaker series, and fundraiser opposing the technology industry’s support for what the invitation characterized as Israel’s “apartheid and genocide.” Microsoft security informed the organizers that the event could not be held on company property because it was advertised to nonemployees, was not authorized by Microsoft, and was sponsored by an outside organization. Despite repeated requests to
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The Division acknowledged that the campaign’s petition included a demand concerning employee safety and the protection of pro-Palestinian speech on Microsoft systems. However, it concluded that including that workplace-related demand in a broader petition was insufficient to establish that the protest itself had the objective of improving employees’ working conditions. In other words, employees could not transform an otherwise unprotected political protest into protected concerted activity simply by linking it to a broader campaign that also contained workplace concerns. The Division also rejected the argument that Microsoft’s relationship with Israel affected employees’ terms and conditions of employment because public reaction to that relationship could harm Microsoft financially and ultimately affect employees’ compensation or benefits. The Division characterized that connection as too attenuated, explaining that employee efforts to influence the employer’s overall business direction or managerial policies generally fall outside Section 7 merely because those decisions could ultimately affect the company’s finances. Finally, the Division found insufficient evidence that Microsoft’s stated reasons for the terminations were pretextual. It noted that Microsoft had not disciplined
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Note: This Advice Memorandum is not binding but relevant for private schools because the NLRA can protect employees who act together regarding workplace concerns, even when the underlying issue also involves political or social advocacy. The Division’s analysis, however, emphasizes that there must be a meaningful connection between the particular activity at issue and employees’ terms and conditions of employment; a broader campaign’s inclusion of workplace-related concerns does not necessarily make every protest or advocacy effort associated with that campaign protected.
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the employees for their earlier involvement in the No Azure campaign or distribution of its petition and that the disciplinary actions at issue concerned the unauthorized protest and failure to comply with security directives. The Division therefore advised the NLRB Regional Office to dismiss the unfair labor practice charge absent withdrawal.
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Defamation Second Circuit Rules That Church Autonomy Doctrine Bars Defamation Claims Arising From Church Investigation of Priest. Alexander Belya was a priest in the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (“ROCOR”) and served at a parish in Miami. In 2018, church leadership considered Belya for elevation to bishop, but the parties sharply disputed what happened next. Belya maintained that ROCOR’s Metropolitan and other bishops told him he had been elected and provided him with letters documenting the election. Church leadership maintained that Belya had merely been considered as a candidate and had not satisfied certain prerequisites necessary for his candidacy to move forward, including bringing his parish’s property under the authority of the Diocese. The dispute escalated in August 2019, when the Moscow Patriarchate publicly announced that it had approved Belya’s election as Bishop of Miami. ROCOR leadership asserted that the announcement came as a surprise because, according to the Church, Belya had never actually been elected. Church officials investigated and obtained three letters that had been sent to Moscow concerning Belya’s purported election. They identified a number of alleged irregularities in the letters, including that they described an election the officials maintained had never occurred and did not follow ROCOR’s procedures for communicating the election of a bishop (e.g., an official citation and a formal ecclesiastical biography of Belya). Following the investigation, leaders of ROCOR’s Eastern American Diocese sent a letter to the Church’s Synod raising concerns about the purported election documents and accusing Belya of other misconduct. The letter requested that Belya be suspended and investigated further. He was suspended that same day and ultimately defrocked in February 2020. The letter was later posted on Facebook by a former parishioner, and other social media posts and Orthodox news articles repeated allegations that documents concerning Belya’s election had been forged.
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Belya sued ROCOR entities and church leaders for defamation, principally contending that they falsely accused him of forging the letters. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants under New York defamation law and, independently, under the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed solely on the church autonomy ground. The Second Circuit explained that the church autonomy doctrine protects religious organizations’ independence in matters of faith and doctrine and closely related matters of internal governance. Although religious institutions do not have general immunity from secular law, courts cannot impose civil liability based on internal management decisions essential to a religious organization’s mission. Courts may still resolve disputes using neutral principles of secular law, but they must stop when adjudication would require excessive entanglement with religious doctrine or governance or require a factfinder to second-guess a religious organization’s understanding of its own affairs. The Court concluded that this protection extends beyond the ultimate decision to hire, supervise, or terminate a minister. Religious leaders must also be able to communicate about who is qualified to serve in positions of religious importance without exposing those constitutionally protected decisions to collateral attack through tort claims. Thus, defamation claims based on communications made as part of a religious institution’s investigation, discipline, or termination of a minister may themselves be barred by church autonomy. The Court found Belya’s claims protected on two related grounds. First, the allegedly defamatory letter resulted directly from church leaders’ investigation of Belya and served as a basis for the Church’s decision to discipline and ultimately remove him. Even assuming some statements in the letter were false and could theoretically be evaluated using secular evidence, permitting a jury to review the investigation would interfere with ROCOR’s constitutional authority to regulate the character and conduct of its religious leaders.
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The Court reached the same result regarding the allegations later circulated on Facebook and in Orthodox media. Although those communications reached beyond ROCOR’s leadership, they repeated the findings of the Church’s protected investigation and remained intertwined with Belya’s purported election and removal. The Court held that, where
an allegedly defamatory statement emerges from a religious institution’s protected investigation of a minister and implicates internal governance, church autonomy may bar the claim even when the statement is later repeated beyond the institution itself. The Court expressly left open how the doctrine might apply to communications directed primarily to secular audiences or claims capable of resolution entirely through neutral principles.
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Second, the truth or falsity of the forgery accusation could not actually be resolved without examining ROCOR’s internal governance. Belya had evidence from a handwriting expert that the Metropolitan signed the disputed letters, and several church leaders acknowledged that the signatures appeared genuine. But ROCOR relied on evidence concerning its own procedures to support its position that the Metropolitan was not responsible for them, including who had authority to elect bishops, whether the required vote occurred, and whether the letters followed the Church’s protocols. A jury could not decide whose account was correct without deciding how ROCOR’s bishop-selection process operated and whether its internal procedures had been followed.
Belya v. Kapral (2d Cir. 2026) __F.4th__ [2026 WL 2408741]. Note: This decision is relevant for religious schools in that the church autonomy doctrine may protect not only a school’s ultimate decision concerning a ministerial employee, but also the investigation and internal communications underlying that decision in situations where adjudicating a claim would require a court to evaluate religious governance or second-guess the school’s understanding of its religious practices.
Disabilities Jennifer Ramsey began working for San Jacinto College District (“SJC”) in 2005 and, over approximately 15 years, received four promotions and generally positive performance reviews, eventually becoming Manager of Learning Technology. Beginning in 2018, Ramsey developed a severe medical condition affecting her vision, hearing, balance, and cognitive functioning. She took FMLA leave for surgery from November 2020 through January 2021 and was cleared to return to work without restrictions.
recent instances of tardiness and stating that similar problems had occurred “many times over the past several months,” a period that included her FMLA leave. Over the following months, SJC documented additional concerns involving tardiness (e.g., ten separate instances of Ramsey texting her supervisor that she would be late), late leave reports, missed meetings, and failure to meet deadlines. Some had no apparent connection to Ramsey’s medical condition, for example, Ramsey attributed late arrivals to traffic, a delayed appliance delivery to her home, and other personal circumstances. Around the same time, Ramsey received a “COVID-19 Hero” award after being nominated by her supervisor, and a July 2021 performance review noted concerns about accountability and timeliness but nevertheless rated her overall performance as “valuable.”
Eleven days after returning, Ramsey received her first written performance complaint, documenting two
Ramsey continued to experience medical problems and took another period of FMLA leave for surgery from
Court Revives Employee’s FMLA and ADA Claims Despite Documented Performance Concerns.
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July through September 2021. Thereafter, she received intermittent FMLA leave, including for migraine flare-ups. After she returned, additional performance concerns arose, including for missed project deadlines and repeated late arrivals. In November, her supervisor, Kam Marvel, issued a Final Corrective Action Notice citing continued tardiness, missed deadlines, and interactions in which Ramsey allegedly behaved unprofessionally and spoke in an elevated tone. Ramsey contended that some of the documentation omitted important disability-related context. For example, the corrective action criticized her for speaking in an elevated tone, but Ramsey asserted she had explained that her hearing difficulties affected her speaking volume. She had also requested softer lighting for her migraines and specialized headsets for her hearing problems. On November 19, Marvel acknowledged one of her headset accommodation requests and referred it to HR. Two days later, Ramsey told Marvel that she had a brain injury, believed there had been no empathy for her medical situation, that she had been written up three times, and that she talked with HR and believed she might have an EEOC claim. Marvel recommended her termination ten days later, and SJC terminated Ramsey on December 3 based principally on missed deadlines and errors in her work. Ramsey sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). A divided Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment for SJC on her ADA discrimination and retaliation claims and her FMLA retaliation claim, concluding that a jury could question whether SJC’s legitimate performance concerns were the actual reasons for her termination. SJC did not dispute on appeal that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Ramsey, including her repeated tardiness and missed deadlines. The central question was whether Ramsey had presented enough evidence for a jury to find those explanations were pretextual—that is, that they were not the College’s true reasons for terminating her. The Court identified several pieces of evidence that, considered together, could support a finding of pretext. Ramsey began receiving written performance criticism after returning from FMLA leave yet received a positive performance rating during the disciplinary process. More importantly, her Final Corrective Action Notice allegedly omitted disability-related context for conduct
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characterized as unprofessional, including her elevated speaking volume and her statement that “nobody accommodates me.” The Court also focused on Marvel’s knowledge of Ramsey’s condition. Marvel later declared that he did not know whether Ramsey had a disability or had requested disability accommodations when he recommended her termination. Yet the record contained evidence that Ramsey had discussed her migraines, hearing issues, brain injury, intermittent FMLA leave, medical appointments, and headset accommodation with him. His own notes also reflected Ramsey’s statement that she had a brain injury and believed she had a potential EEOC claim. The Court concluded that these inconsistencies could cause a jury to question the credibility of Marvel’s explanation for recommending termination. SJC argued that its Chancellor, who made the final termination decision, was unaware of Ramsey’s disability. The Court agreed there was no evidence the Chancellor herself acted with discriminatory intent, but applied the “cat’s paw” theory, under which an employer may be liable when an unbiased decisionmaker relies on a recommendation influenced by another supervisor’s unlawful bias. Because Marvel prepared key disciplinary documents and recommended Ramsey’s termination, a jury could find his actions caused the ultimate decision. The Court similarly allowed Ramsey’s retaliation claims to proceed. Her most recent accommodation request occurred only 12 days before Marvel recommended termination, and her discipline and termination also closely followed approval of her intermittent FMLA leave. Although timing alone was insufficient, the Court held that the timing combined with the other evidence of potential pretext created a factual dispute. Ramsey v. San Jacinto Coll. Dist. (5th Cir. 2026) 2026 WL 2268172. Note: Legitimate performance concerns do not necessarily insulate schools from disability or retaliation claims. When performance management overlaps with medical leave or accommodation requests, schools should ensure that disciplinary documentation is complete and accurate and that the ultimate decision rests on a careful and accurate assessment of the employee’s performance.
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Employee Provided Sufficient Notice Of Her Religious Accommodation Request. An employee worked fully remotely for the Permanente Medical Group (TPMG) when TPMG implemented a COVID-19 vaccination requirement. The employee requested a religious exemption, and stated that receiving the vaccine conflicted with her sincerely held religious beliefs. TPMG asked the employee for additional information about her beliefs. Although the employee provided further explanation, TPMG denied her exemption request and ultimately terminated her employment for failing to comply with the vaccine mandate. The employee sued TPMG under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), alleging that TPMG failed to reasonably accommodate her religious beliefs. The district court dismissed her religious accommodation claims, finding that the employee had not provided
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Religious Accommodations sufficient notice of her religious objection to the vaccine. The employee appealed, asking the Court to outline how much information an employee must provide an employer to satisfy the notice requirement for religious accommodation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the employee’s religiousaccommodation claims. It held that an employee does not need to prove the sincerity or validity of a religious belief when requesting an accommodation. Instead, the employee must provide enough information for the employer to understand that a religious belief conflicts with an employment requirement. The Court concluded that the employee’s exemption request and subsequent explanations gave TPMG sufficient notice of the religious conflict, and allowed her Title VII and FEHA accommodation claims to proceed. Weiss v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc. (9th Cir. 2026) 182 F.4th 1139.
Is your school ready for the proposed IRS regulations? LCW offers California private schools proactive legal compliance audits of:
Admissions | Student Programs | Scholarships & Financial Assistance | Hiring & Employment | Affinity Groups Other School Policies & Practices Conducting the audit with LCW attorneys allows schools to receive a candid assessment and privileged legal advice.
Learn More • www.lcwlegal.com •
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Arbitration Arbitration Agreement Did Not Apply To Disability Discrimination Or Leave Claims. An employee worked for San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) before being terminated. The employee alleged that SD&E discriminated against her based on disability, failed to reasonably accommodate her, and retaliated against her for exercising her rights. She sued SD&E under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), and for wrongful termination. SDG&E moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement the employee signed when she was hired in 2005. The employment agreement required arbitration of disputes concerning any aspect of the agreement or conduct allegedly violating the agreement.
The California Superior Court granted SDG&E’s motion, reasoning that the employee’s claims arose from her employment and termination. The employee petitioned the California Court of Appeal, arguing that her claims fell outside the scope of the arbitration provision. The Court granted the employee’s petition and directed the lower court to deny SDG&E’s motion to compel arbitration. The Court determined that the arbitration clause was limited to disputes concerning or alleging violations of the employment agreement. Since the employee’s FEHA, and CFRA claims arose from independent statutory and public-policy grounds, rather than from violations of her employment agreement, she had not agreed to arbitrate those claims. Morales v. Superior Court (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 239.
Business & Facilities Court Refuses to Enforce Employer’s Arbitration Agreement Because Related Onboarding Documents Created an Unfair, One-Sided Dispute Process. In Cluck v. GEO Secure Services, LLC, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court’s refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee because the agreement, when considered together with a separate confidentiality agreement signed during the same onboarding process, created an unfairly one-sided system for resolving employment disputes. In 2022, GEO Secure Services, LLC, (“GEO”) a private company that operates federal detention facilities and
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prisons on behalf of various government agencies, hired Jeffrey Cluck to work at its El Centro detention facility. As part of GEO’s standard onboarding process, Cluck signed an arbitration agreement requiring disputes arising out of his employment to be resolved through binding arbitration. The agreement stated that arbitration was not a mandatory condition of employment and gave employees 30 days to opt out. To do so, however, an employee had to wait to be assigned an employee identification number, prepare a signed and dated statement, and then send it to GEO’s legal department by mail or fax. On the same day, as part of the same onboarding process, Cluck signed a separate confidentiality agreement addressing matters such as confidential information, intellectual property, competition, and solicitation of GEO employees. Unlike the arbitration agreement, the confidentiality agreement provided that
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After Cluck later joined a proposed class action alleging wage-and-hour violations, GEO sought to compel his claims to arbitration. The trial court refused, finding the arbitration agreement unfair/unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. GEO appealed. The Court of Appeal agreed that the arbitration agreement could not be enforced, although its reasoning differed from the trial court’s. First, the Court found procedural unfairness in how the arbitration agreement was presented. Although employees technically had the right to opt out, the process for doing so was not evident. The agreement was presented as a standard document to new employees during onboarding. It contained a single signature line for an employee to indicate agreement, rather than stating the signature was optional or including a check box allowing employees to simply opt out. An employee who wanted to opt out had to wait for an employee identification number to be assigned, prepare a separate statement, and then mail or fax it to Florida within the first 30 days of employment. The Court concluded that this process did not provide employees with a sufficiently simple and realistic choice to decline arbitration. More importantly, the Court held that the arbitration and confidentiality agreements had to be considered together, rather than evaluating the arbitration agreement by itself. Both agreements involved the same parties, were signed on the same day as part of Cluck’s hiring, and addressed how disputes arising from the employment relationship would be resolved. The fact that the confidentiality agreement focused more specifically on confidential information, intellectual property, and competition did not make it unrelated to the broader dispute-resolution arrangement between GEO and its employees. Reading the agreements together revealed the central problem. The arbitration agreement broadly required arbitration of the types of claims an employee would most likely bring against the employer, including claims involving compensation, overtime, rest periods, discrimination, and harassment. The confidentiality agreement, however, permitted disputes involving
confidentiality, competition, solicitation, and similar obligations, the types of claims GEO would be more likely to bring against an employee, to be litigated in court. As a result, the overall arrangement effectively required Cluck to arbitrate his most likely claims against GEO while allowing GEO to take its most likely claims against him to court. The Court found this lack of mutuality unfair and substantively unconscionable.
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disputes arising from that agreement would be litigated in court in Florida, including claims that would likely be pursued by GEO against an employee. It also gave GEO the right to seek remedies such as injunctions if an employee breached or threatened to breach the agreement.
The Court also noted additional terms that favored GEO. Claims under the confidentiality agreement had to be litigated in Florida, where GEO was incorporated but far from where Cluck lived and worked; the agreement waived a jury; and it required Cluck to agree in advance that a breach would cause GEO irreparable harm and entitle GEO to seek injunctive and other relief. Taken together, the Court concluded that the agreements imposed substantially greater burdens on Cluck than on GEO. Finally, the Court declined to simply remove the problematic provisions and enforce what remained. The unfairness went to the heart of the parties’ overall dispute-resolution arrangement: employees were directed toward arbitration for their claims while GEO preserved a preferred court forum for the claims it was most likely to pursue. Under those circumstances, the Court concluded that severing individual provisions would not be appropriate and affirmed the order denying GEO’s motion to compel arbitration. Cluck v. GEO Secure Services, LLC (Aug. 3, 2026, D087341) ___ Cal.App.5th ___(certified for partial publication). Note: Schools should ensure that their arbitration agreements, and any related agreements employees sign during the hiring process, are fair and mutual. Schools should be cautious of provisions that require employees to arbitrate the claims they are most likely to bring while allowing the school to pursue its own likely claims in court. Courts may consider these agreements together when deciding whether the overall arrangement unfairly favors the employer. Schools should also avoid opt-out procedures or other requirements that make it unnecessarily difficult or burdensome for employees to exercise their rights. Reviewing onboarding documents as a whole can help identify inconsistent or one-sided terms that could ultimately make an arbitration agreement unenforceable.
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INTRODUCING
This year’s new partners
Megan Atkinson
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore (LCW) is pleased to announce that Megan Atkinson and Yesenia Carrillo have been named Partner effective October 1, 2026. The promotions recognize Megan’s and Yesenia’s exceptional legal work, trusted counsel to clients, and significant contributions to the firm. As Partners, they will continue to serve clients across key areas of LCW’s practice while contributing to the firm’s leadership and continued growth. “Megan and Yesenia have distinguished themselves through outstanding legal work, sound judgment, and a deep commitment to our clients and the firm,” said
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Yesenia Carrillo Firmwide Managing Partner Melanie Chaney. “They have each earned the trust and respect of clients and colleagues, and we are excited to welcome them to the partnership and look forward to their continued leadership at LCW.” Megan Atkinson, based in Los Angeles, focuses her practice on public safety employment matters and labor and employment litigation. She represents public entities in complex disciplinary proceedings and defends employers against claims of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in state court. Atkinson has been recognized by Best Lawyers among its “Ones to Watch” and by Super Lawyers as a Southern California Rising Star. Yesenia Carrillo, based in Fresno, advises educational institutions, public agencies, and nonprofit organizations on labor, employment, governance, and operational matters. A skilled advocate, trainer, and negotiator, she also brings significant civic and professional leadership experience to her practice. Carrillo has been recognized as a Northern California Rising Star and as one of Business Street’s “40 Under 40.”
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September 2026
INTRODUCING
Our new senior counsel
Charles Hellstrom
Jenny Denny
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore (LCW) is pleased to announce the designation of Jenny Denny and Charles “Charlie” Hellstrom to Senior Counsel, effective October 1, 2026.
contribute significantly to the strength of our firm. We are pleased to recognize their accomplishments with their Senior Counsel designations.”
The Senior Counsel designation recognizes attorneys who bring substantial experience, sophisticated legal knowledge, and a demonstrated commitment to serving LCW’s clients. Jenny and Charlie are valued resources to clients and colleagues throughout the firm.
Charlie Hellstrom, based in Sacramento, advises public employers and litigates complex employment, wage and hour, and business disputes. He has substantial trial, arbitration, and motion practice experience and was part of the LCW trial team whose work in Burgess v. City of Sacramento was recognized by the Daily Journal as a 2025 Top Defense Verdict. Hellstrom has also been named a Northern California Rising Star.
“Jenny and Charlie exemplify the experience, skill, and dedication we value at LCW,” said Firmwide Managing Partner Melanie Chaney. “Both are trusted advisors who bring thoughtful, practical counsel to their clients and
Jenny Denny, based in Los Angeles, advises public and private educational institutions on employment, student, faculty, governance, disability accommodation, and Title IX matters. Her experience as a public school teacher, education policy leader, and federal government attorney gives her a distinctive perspective on the legal and operational issues facing schools and colleges. She is also a dynamic and highly regarded trainer for LCW clients.
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lcw best practices Each Month, LCW presents a monthly timeline of best practices for private and independent schools. The timeline runs from the fall semester through the end of summer break. LCW encourages schools to use the timeline as a guideline throughout the school year.
OCTOBER 1ST THROUGH 15TH • File Verification of Private School Instruction o Every person, firm, association, partnership, or corporation offering or conducting private school instruction on the elementary or high school level shall between the first and 15th day of October of each year, file with the Superintendent of Public Instruction an affidavit or statement, under penalty of perjury, by the owner or other head setting forth the following information for the current year: o All names, whether real or fictitious, of the person, firm, association, partnership, or corporation under which it has done and is doing business. o The address, including city and street, of every place of doing business of the person, firm, association, partnership, or corporation within the State of California. o The address, including city and street, of the location of the records of the person, firm, association, partnership, or corporation, and the name and address, including city and street, of the custodian of such records. o The names and addresses, including city and street, of the directors, if any, and principal officers of the person, firm, association, partnership, or corporation. o The school enrollment, by grades, number of teachers, coeducational or enrollment limited to boys or girls and boarding facilities. o That the following records are maintained at the address stated, and are true and accurate: The attendance of the pupils in a register that indicates clearly every absence from school for a half day or more during each day that school is maintained during the year (Education Code Section 48222.) The courses of study offered by the institution. The names and addresses, including city and street, of its faculty, together with a record of the educational qualifications of each. o Criminal record summary information of applicants that have been obtained pursuant to Section 44237. 20
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timeline OCTOBER / NOVEMBER • Consider a LCW audit of current school policies and practices (e.g., admissions, student programs and activities, scholarships, financial assistance, hiring, affinity groups) in light of the Treasury Department and IRS’ proposed regulations on tax-exempt status, which are expected to take effect for tax years beginning after May 31, 2027.
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did you know...? • The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service is seeking public comment for the notice of proposed rulemaking that would end federal tax-exempt status for private schools that engage in racial discrimination. LCW’s special bulletin on the proposed rule can be found here. The comment period will last until November 3, 2026, at 11:59 P.M. • The U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), which provides legal advice to federal agencies, issued a new opinion addressing whether religious organizations that participate in generally available federal funding programs can be required to separate their religious activities from the services supported by federal funds. Current rules for certain federal programs administered by the Department of Health and Human Services, including programs supporting childcare, substance-abuse treatment, and other social services, prohibit participating organizations from using federal funds for religious worship, instruction, or proselytization and may require religious activities to occur separately from federally funded services. OLC concluded that, in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, these restrictions are generally inconsistent with the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause because the government may not make a generally available benefit conditional on a religious organization giving up or separating its religious practices. Although the opinion specifically addresses HHS programs, its broader reasoning may be relevant to religious schools that participate in federal funding programs. • The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York reached a settlement with Point O’ Pines Camp for Girls, a residential summer camp, resolving allegations that it violated Title III of the ADA by failing to reasonably accommodate a camper with Type 1 diabetes during the summers of 2023 and 2024 and discharging her before the end of camp because of her disability. Under the settlement, the camp agreed to evaluate campers with disabilities on a case-by-case basis, provide reasonable accommodations, train all employees and staff on ADA compliance, and provide relevant staff with training concerning the specific disabilities of incoming campers.
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September 2026
cases we are watching • LCW previously reported on Fellers v. Kelley, a case involving parents who were sanctioned by a New Hampshire public high school after silently wearing pink “XX” wristbands at a girls’ soccer game to protest the participation of a transgender athlete. The First Circuit has now reversed the trial court’s ruling, concluding that the parents are likely to succeed on their claim that the School District engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. The Court emphasized that the parents did not chant, confront players, or otherwise disrupt the game; there was no evidence that any player even saw the wristbands, and the only significant disruption occurred after school officials intervened. The Court also found significant administrators’ descriptions of the wristbands as “hateful,” “anti-trans,” and “exclusionary,” concluding that the record supported an inference that the parents were sanctioned because officials disagreed with their message. The First Circuit remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate interim relief. • Deloitte has agreed to pay $21.5 million to resolve Justice Department allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by certifying compliance with federal contracting requirements prohibiting race and sex discrimination while allegedly using race and sex in employment decisions. DOJ alleged that Deloitte tracked business units’ progress toward race- and sex-based workforce goals; considered those goals in hiring, promotion, staffing, and some senior leaders’ evaluations and compensation; identified employees by race and sex when making promotion and staffing recommendations; and limited certain mentoring, leadership development, and other professional opportunities based on race or sex. The settlement is another enforcement action under DOJ’s Civil Rights Fraud Initiative, launched in May 2025 to use the False Claims Act against recipients of federal funds that allegedly falsely certify compliance with civil rights requirements. • The Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division found that George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences intentionally discriminated based on race in admissions for its 2024 and 2025 entering classes, in violation of Title VI and the Supreme Court’s 2023 Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard decision. According to DOJ, although the University instructed admissions officials not to give preferences based on race or ethnicity disclosed through application checkboxes, the medical school used essay questions to obtain information about applicants’ race or ethnicity and considered that information in selecting applicants for interviews; DOJ found that Black applicants were significantly more likely to receive interviews and received higher interview scores than comparable Asian applicants, and that the school admitted some Black and Hispanic applicants over White and Asian applicants with higher MCAT scores and other credentials. DOJ is seeking to resolve the matter through settlement negotiations and indicated that it will file suit if those efforts are unsuccessful. • www.lcwlegal.com •
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Consortium Call Of The Month LCW has four private education consortiums across the State! Consortium members enjoy access to quality training throughout the year, discounts on other LCW products and events, and unlimited, complimentary telephone and email consultation with an LCW private education attorney on matters related to employment and education law questions (including business & facilities questions and student issues!) We’ve outlined a recent consortium call and the provided answer below. Client confidentiality is paramount to us; we change and omit details in the Consortium Call of the Month.
Question: The Director of Finance and Operations at an independent school contacted LCW to ask what the new background check and mandated reporter requirements apply to volunteers under SB 848, particularly in light of the recently enacted SB 1083.
Answer: The LCW attorney advised that SB 848 did not add any new obligations requiring background checks for volunteers. With that being said, the attorney advised that it is a best practice for volunteers to undergo background checks, and some insurance companies require schools to do background checks for volunteers. If an insurance company does not require it, factors a school may want to consider when determining which volunteers should undergo a background check may be whether the volunteer will be alone with students or have supervisory duties over students, and how much time they will spend with students. In terms of whether a volunteer is a mandated reporter, the attorney advised that under SB 848 a “volunteer” is a mandated reporter and must undergo training if it meets the following definition: a person who is over 18 years of age and who interacts with pupils outside of the immediate supervision and control of the pupil’s parent or guardian or a school employee.
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September 2026
New to the Firm Join us in welcoming the newest members of the LCW team. A.J. Thomas
Brock Seraphin
A.J. Thomas joins LCW as Senior Counsel in our San Francisco office, advising clients on labor relations, employment compliance, workplace investigations, executive employment negotiations, and governance matters.
Brock Seraphin joins LCW as Senior Counsel in our San Diego office, bringing extensive litigation experience and advising employers on complex workplace matters, including discipline, accommodations, investigations, and employment disputes.
Ailin Buigues Nevarez
Catherine Baumgartner
Ailin Buigues Nevarez joins LCW as an Associate in our Los Angeles office, bringing extensive experience in government contracts, procurement, nonprofit governance, operational compliance, and strategic legal counseling.
Catherine Baumgartner joins LCW as an Associate in our San Francisco office, bringing experience in employment litigation, workplace compliance, and complex civil litigation, including cases through trial preparation and resolution.
Brittany Mckinley
Caz Ashjian – Fresno Caz Ashjian joins LCW as an Associate in our Fresno office, focusing on employment litigation and workplace compliance, including wage and hour, discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and leave law matters.
Brittany McKinley joins LCW as an Associate in our Los Angeles office, with experience in corporate governance, commercial contracts, strategic business transactions, and complex commercial litigation.
Angelo Villarreal Angelo Villarreal joins LCW as an Associate in our Fresno office, bringing experience in labor relations, collective bargaining, workplace investigations, employment counseling, and public agency governance and compliance.
We’re pleased to introduce seven attorneys joining our offices across California, bringing a diverse range of experience and expertise to serve our clients and communities.
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Liebert Cassidy Whitmore