Education Matters
Amy Conway (Brandt) Partner | San Francisco
Jordan Carman Associate | San Francisco
Stephanie J. Lowe Senior Counsel | San Diego
California Public Records Act
Court Of Appeal Holds CPRA’s “Promptly Available” Requirement Imposes A Flexible Standard.
Voice of San Diego (Voice) is an online news organization that regularly uses the California Public Records Act (CPRA) to obtain information about local government operations. Between 2015 and 2020, Voice submitted more than 75 CPRA requests to the San Diego Unified School District (District), making it the District’s most prolific public-records requester during that period.
In 2018, Voice sued the District, alleging that the District routinely delayed, obstructed, and withheld public records in violation of the CPRA. Voice focused on what it characterized as lengthy delays in the District’s responses to public-records requests and challenged the District’s practices for processing and producing records. The District responded that the CPRA does not impose a rigid production deadline and that the scope, complexity, and volume of many requests justified the time required to gather, review, redact, and produce responsive records.
Voice filed a petition for writ of mandate against the District and asserted several causes of action under the CPRA seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In 2021, Voice amended the petition to add a taxpayer claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a and added its editor-in-chief, Scott Lewis, as a plaintiff. The taxpayer’s claim alleged that the District illegally expended public funds by maintaining an unlawful practice of delaying and obstructing public records disclosures. Voice sought an injunction prohibiting the District from continuing that alleged practice.
The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of the District on portions of Voice’s CPRA claims and later rejected Voice’s remaining CPRA causes of action after a hearing on the merits. The trial court then conducted a separate hearing on the taxpayer’s claim. Voice argued that the District routinely violated the CPRA’s requirement that agencies make records “promptly available” and maintained a system designed
to slow responses to public-records requests. The District argued that the CPRA does not impose a fixed production deadline and that its response times reflected the breadth of the requests, privacy concerns, the volume of records involved, and other operational constraints. After reviewing extensive evidence, the trial court found that the District did not maintain an unlawful practice of delaying or withholding records and entered judgment in the District’s favor. Voice appealed.
The Court of Appeal first addressed the meaning of the CPRA’s requirement that agencies make records “promptly available.” Voice argued that agencies must produce records within days or a few weeks after making the initial determination that responsive records exist. The Court of Appeal rejected that interpretation. The Court of Appeal explained that, although the CPRA establishes specific deadlines for an agency’s initial determination regarding a request, the statute does not impose a specific deadline for the actual production of records. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Legislature adopted a flexible standard rather than a fixed timetable.
The Court of Appeal held that agencies must produce records quickly and without delay as the circumstances demand. Whether an agency acts promptly depends on the facts of each case, including the breadth of the request, the volume and location of the records, the need for exemptions and redactions, the size and complexity of the agency, and external circumstances affecting the agency’s operations.
The Court of Appeal then addressed whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the District complied with the CPRA. Voice argued that the District maintained a system designed to delay responses, relied on a single CPRA officer, and took months or years to complete some requests. The District presented evidence describing its procedures for handling hundreds of annual requests, including requests that required searches across numerous departments, schools, electronic systems, and hardcopy records. The District also presented evidence showing that many of Voice’s requests were broad,
required extensive review for privacy concerns, and generated large volumes of records. The Court of Appeal concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the District did not maintain an unlawful policy or practice of delaying or withholding records.
The Court of Appeal finally addressed Voice’s taxpayer claim. A taxpayer action under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a requires unlawful governmental conduct. Because the Court of Appeal concluded that the District complied with the CPRA, it also concluded that the District did not unlawfully expend public funds. The Court of Appeal therefore held that Voice could not obtain relief under section 526a.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court of Appeal held that the CPRA’s requirement that agencies make records “promptly available” creates a flexible, fact-specific standard rather than a fixed production deadline and that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the District did not maintain an unlawful practice of delaying or withholding public records.
Voice of San Diego v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 923.
First Amendment
Ninth Circuit Holds Agencies Likely Engaged In Viewpoint Discrimination By Terminating Environmental Justice And DEIRelated Research Grants.
In early 2025, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) awarded multi-year research grants to several UC researchers. The agencies funded projects involving climate policy, environmental research, medicine, water management, history, and humanities scholarship. In April 2025, the EPA, NSF, and NEH sent form letters terminating grants that funded the researchers’ projects and stating that the projects no longer aligned with agency priorities. Before issuing those termination notices, President Trump signed a series of executive orders directing federal agencies to eliminate diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA), environmental justice, and gender-ideology initiatives from federal programs and to review existing grants as part of broader efforts to reduce federal spending and implement the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). The agencies then identified grants associated with DEI, DEIA, environmental justice, and related concepts and terminated those grants.
Six UC researchers filed a class action on behalf of similarly situated UC researchers after federal agencies terminated or threatened to terminate their federally funded grants. The researchers sued President Trump,
agencies and agency officials. They alleged that the agencies implemented the executive orders by terminating grants associated with DEI, DEIA, environmental justice, and related concepts. They asserted claims under the First Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), due process principles, and separation-of-powers doctrines. They sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and reinstatement of the terminated grants.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified two classes: the Form Termination Class and the DEI Termination Class. The district court defined the Form Termination Class as researchers whose grant agencies terminated through form letters that provided no grant-specific explanation. The district court defined the DEI Termination Class as researchers whose grant agencies were terminated because of the executive orders targeting DEI, DEIA, and related concepts.
The district court concluded that the Form Termination Class would likely succeed on its APA claim that the agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The district court also concluded that the DEI Termination Class would likely succeed on its claims that the agencies violated the First Amendment and acted contrary to congressionally mandated directives. The district court ordered the agencies to reinstate the terminated grants.
The government appealed. The government argued that the researchers lacked Article III standing and that the district court abused its discretion by granting preliminary injunctive relief. The government asked the Ninth Circuit
DOGE, the EPA, NSF, NEH, and numerous other federal
to vacate the injunction. The researchers asked the Ninth Circuit to affirm the injunction and preserve reinstatement of the grants.
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the government’s argument that the researchers lacked Article III standing. Article III standing requires a plaintiff to show a concrete injury that a court can remedy. The government argued that the plaintiffs could avoid injury by securing replacement funding or reducing expenses and therefore could not establish a sufficiently concrete injury. The government also argued that the plaintiffs could not justify full reinstatement of the grants because no class member had shown a need for that relief.
The Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments. The Ninth Circuit held that the researchers established injury in fact because the grant terminations caused a loss of funding and because the researchers stated that alternative funding was not readily available. The Ninth Circuit also identified additional injuries, including reputational harm, disruption of ongoing research projects, and expenditures of time and resources to secure replacement funding. The Ninth Circuit characterized the government’s challenge to full reinstatement as a challenge to the scope of the remedy rather than to standing. The Ninth Circuit therefore concluded that the researchers satisfied Article III standing requirements.
The Ninth Circuit next addressed the Form Termination Class’s APA claim. The government argued that the Tucker Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction because the claim sought to enforce rights arising from the terminated grants. The Tucker Act generally requires parties to bring contract claims against the federal government in the Court of Federal Claims rather than in a district court.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the government. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Form Termination Class challenged the agencies’ termination of research grants and sought vacatur of the termination notices and reinstatement of the grants. Because that relief would effectively enforce the government’s obligations under the grants, the Ninth Circuit determined that the claim was contractual in nature. The researchers argued that the Tucker Act did not apply because they were not parties to the grant agreements. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument and explained that the nature of the claim, rather than the identity of the claimant, controlled the jurisdictional analysis. The Ninth Circuit therefore held that the district court likely lacked jurisdiction over the Form Termination Class’s APA claim.
The Ninth Circuit next addressed the DEI Termination Class’s First Amendment claim. The government argued that it had merely exercised its authority to stop funding programs that it no longer considered to serve the public interest. The researchers argued that the agencies targeted individual grants because of the viewpoints expressed in the funded projects.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the researchers. The Ninth Circuit explained that the First Amendment prohibits the government from suppressing disfavored viewpoints. Although the government may choose which programs to fund, it may not discriminate against speakers within an existing program because it disagrees with their viewpoints.
The Ninth Circuit found that the agencies terminated grants because the agencies associated those grants with DEI, DEIA, and environmental justice viewpoints. The Ninth Circuit pointed to evidence showing that the agencies used keyword searches and similar screening methods to identify grants containing terms such as “equity,” “diversity,” “inclusion,” and “justice.” The Ninth Circuit characterized DEI, DEIA, and environmental justice as viewpoints rather than neutral subjects. It concluded that the agencies selected grants for termination because of the viewpoints reflected in the funded work.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished between a government’s authority to define the scope of a funding program and its ability to discriminate against viewpoints within an existing program. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the agencies likely engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination when they terminated grants because of the viewpoints expressed in the funded projects. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s arguments that competitive grant programs fall outside ordinary viewpoint-neutrality requirements and that constitutional limits apply only when funding restrictions regulate speech outside a funded program.
Because the DEI Termination Class demonstrated a likelihood of success on its First Amendment claim, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the remaining preliminaryinjunction factors only with respect to that class. The Ninth Circuit therefore considered whether the researchers had established irreparable harm and whether the balance of equities and the public interest favored injunctive relief.
The government argued that the researchers sought only monetary relief and therefore could not establish irreparable harm. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The Ninth Circuit explained that the loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable injury. The Ninth Circuit also emphasized harm that the district court had identified, including layoffs, interruptions of graduate programs, destruction of research projects, and damage to professional reputations.
The government also argued that the injunction interfered with executive policymaking, required the government to disburse potentially unrecoverable funds, and provided broader relief than necessary because the researchers could obtain replacement funding or reduce expenses. The Ninth Circuit rejected those arguments. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court acted within its
discretion when it found that the balance of equities and the public interest favored protecting constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit also found that alternative funding was not readily available, that delays threatened ongoing research projects with irreparable harm, and that the researchers alleged injuries beyond the loss of grant funds. The Ninth Circuit therefore upheld the district court’s decision to order reinstatement of the grants as interim relief.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the DEI Termination Class, concluding that the class was likely to succeed on its First Amendment viewpointdiscrimination claim and satisfied the remaining requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction as to the Form Termination Class, concluding that the Tucker Act likely deprived the district court of jurisdiction over that class’s APA claim.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, directing the district court to conduct further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Thakur v. Trump (9th Cir. 2026) 176 F.4th 1187.
Litigation
Court Of Appeal Rejects Appeal Because Employees Failed To Properly Cite The Record.
The Los Angeles Unified School District required employees to receive COVID-19 vaccinations during the pandemic. Jose Cardenas and 21 other District employees objected to the requirement on religious grounds and sued the District. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, and the employees appealed.
The Court of Appeal did not address the merits of the employees’ challenge. Instead, it considered whether the employees properly supported their appeal. The employees’ opening brief cited only three pages from their trial-court opposition brief to describe the facts of the case, and those pages did not contain citations to evidence in the appellate record.
The Court of Appeal explained that appellate briefs must fairly summarize the facts and support factual assertions with citations to the record. Because appellate courts often must review extensive records and evaluate specific pieces of evidence, they cannot perform that task when a party fails to identify where supporting evidence appears in the record.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the employees’ failure to provide record citations forfeited their appellate arguments. The Court of Appeal therefore affirmed the judgment without reaching the merits of the employees’ claims.
Cardenas v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 554.
Religious Accommodations
Ninth Circuit Upholds Denial Of Religious Exemptions To COVID-19 Vaccination Requirement.
Legacy Health operates eight hospitals in Oregon and Washington. In August 2021, as the COVID-19 Delta variant spread and hospitalizations increased, Legacy adopted a vaccination policy requiring individuals who worked at its hospitals to become vaccinated or obtain a medical or religious exemption. Nine employees at Legacy’s Salmon Creek Medical Center, including nurses, respiratory therapists, technicians, and a physician assistant, requested religious exemptions. Legacy denied the requests, placed the employees on administrative leave, and ultimately terminated all but one employee, who later chose to receive the vaccine and returned to work.
The employees sued Legacy Health and Northwest Acute Care Specialists, asserting religious-discrimination claims under Title VII and Washington law. They alleged that the employers failed to accommodate their religious objections to vaccination. Legacy moved for summary judgment and argued that granting religious exemptions would impose an undue hardship on its healthcare operations. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in Legacy’s favor. The employees appealed.
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the undue hardship standard. Title VII requires employers to reasonably accommodate employees’ religious beliefs unless doing so imposes an undue hardship on the employer’s business. The Ninth Circuit explained that, under Groff v. DeJoy, an employer establishes undue hardship by showing that a proposed accommodation would impose a substantial burden in the overall context of its business. The Ninth Circuit also explained that undue hardship may include health and safety risks and operational burdens, not just financial costs.
The Ninth Circuit next considered whether Legacy established undue hardship. The employees argued that Legacy improperly denied their requests for religious
exemptions. Legacy argued that exempting unvaccinated frontline healthcare workers during the Delta-variant surge would create significant risks to patients, staff, and hospital operations.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Legacy. The Ninth Circuit found that Legacy presented unrebutted expert evidence showing that vaccination reduced transmission risks and that alternative safety measures, such as masking, testing, and other protective equipment, were not effective substitutes for vaccination in the healthcare setting. The Ninth Circuit also found that granting the requested exemptions would create three related risks: infected employees could miss work and create staffing shortages, infected employees could expose coworkers needed to care for patients, and infected employees could transmit COVID-19 to vulnerable patients. The Ninth Circuit concluded that those risks created a substantial burden on Legacy’s business of providing safe and effective healthcare.
The employees argued that other hospitals granted religious exemptions and that later data suggested accommodating a small number of unvaccinated employees would not create significant risks. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the undue-hardship inquiry focuses on the circumstances facing the particular employer at the time of the decision. Because Legacy relied on the scientific and medical information available during the Delta-variant surge, and because the employees offered no evidence rebutting Legacy’s expert testimony, the Ninth Circuit found those arguments unpersuasive.
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the employees’ argument that Legacy failed to consider alternative accommodations in good faith. The employees argued that Legacy could not rely on an unduehardship defense because it denied exemption requests without individualized consideration of alternative accommodations. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument. The Ninth Circuit explained that an employer may rely on undue hardship as a complete defense if no reasonable accommodation would avoid the hardship. The Ninth Circuit further found that Legacy’s evidence
established that no effective alternative to vaccination existed for employees who worked in close contact with patients and staff. Because the employees offered no evidence creating a factual dispute on that point, the Ninth Circuit concluded that no reasonable jury could find that a workable accommodation existed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Legacy established undue hardship as a matter of law because granting religious exemptions to unvaccinated frontline healthcare workers during the COVID-19 Delta-variant surge would have imposed substantial health, safety, and operational burdens on its healthcare system.
Williams v. Legacy Health (9th Cir. 2026) 174 F.4th 1201.
Note:
Although this case involves a hospital setting during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis provides useful guidance for Districts evaluating religious accommodation requests. The decision reinforces that employers may establish undue hardship through health, safety, and operational risks, not just financial costs, and that courts will assess those risks in light of the employer’s particular operations and the information available at the time of the decision.
Benefits Corner
IRS Increases ACA Employer Mandate Penalties For 2027.
The IRS has announced the adjusted 2027 penalty amounts for violations of the Affordable Care Act’s employer shared responsibility provisions (otherwise known as the ACA Employer Mandate). The ACA Employer Mandate authorizes the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to assess a penalty on applicable large employers under one of the following two circumstances:
A. Penalty A: The applicable large employer fails to offer “substantially all” of its full-time employees and their dependents the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage and any full-time employee receives a subsidy for coverage through Covered California (26 U.S.C. section 4980H(a)(1)); or
B. Penalty B: The applicable large employer offers coverage to full-time employees and their dependents that is “unaffordable” or does not offer “minimum value,” and a full-time employee receives a subsidy for coverage through Covered California. (26 U.S.C. section 4980H(b)(1).)
The amount of the penalties changes year-to-year. For plan years beginning after December 31, 2026, Penalty A will be $3,780 per year ($315 per month) multiplied by the number of full-time employees employed by the employer, less 30. Penalty B will be $5,670 per year ($472.50 per month) multiplied by the number of full-time employees who obtain subsidized coverage through Covered California. These penalty amounts for 2027 are higher than the amounts currently in place for 2026 ($3,340 per year for Penalty A and $5,010 per year for Penalty B).
Here are some examples of how Penalty A and Penalty B are calculated based on the penalty amounts for 2027:
Penalty A Example: If an applicable large employer has 300 full-time employees and fails to offer “substantially all” of its full-time employees and their dependents the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage and at least one of those employees receives a subsidy for coverage through Covered California for 12 months, then the IRS could assess a Penalty A at $3,780 multiplied by 270 (300 minus 30 full-time employees), which is $1,020,600.
Penalty B Example: If an applicable large employer has 300 full-time employees and fails to offer coverage that is affordable and provides “minimum value,” and 10 of those employees receive a subsidy for coverage through Covered California for 12 months, then the IRS could assess a Penalty B for $56,700 ($5,670 multiplied by 10 employees who obtain the subsidy).
While employers who intend to offer full-time employees and their dependents affordable minimum essential coverage hope to never face these penalties, it helps to be aware of the adjusted amounts year-toyear as part of staying up to date on the ACA. For more information, see IRS Revenue Procedure 2026-22.
IRS Updates Sample Educational Assistance Plan And FAQs To Reflect Recent Legal Updates.
The past 12months have brought a number of legal updates to educational assistance plans (EAP) under section 127 of the Internal Revenue Code. In April 2026, the IRS updated its Frequently Asked Questions webpage about EAPs. Employers that provide educational assistance benefits to help employees pay for tuition, fees, books, supplies, equipment, and qualified student loans may exclude the payments, up to the annual limit, from employees’ gross income if the benefit complies with section 127. The IRS’s FAQs describe and clarify the benefit. Here are the highlights from the IRS’s FAQs:
• Updated Sample EAP Plan: To qualify as a valid EAP, the plan must be written and must meet certain other requirements. The IRS released an updated sample plan to assist employers with establishing EAPs that comply with section 127. (See IRS Publication 5993 for the sample EAP plan.)
• Educational Assistance Plan (section 127 Plan) Cap Increase: Starting in 2026, the $5,250 annual
cap for section 127 educational assistance benefits will be adjusted for increases in the cost of living. The IRS will announce what the new amount will be. Unused amounts cannot be carried forward to subsequent years.
• Repayments to Qualified Education Loans: Employer-provided student loan repayments are now a permanent benefit available through a section 127 educational assistance plan. The benefit includes principal or interest payments on certain qualified education loans incurred by the employees paid directly to a third party (such as an educational provider or a loan service) or directly reimbursed to the employee. Generally, EAP benefits for qualified education loans are only available if the employer amends the terms of its EAP plan to include the benefit.
• No Educational Assistance Benefits for Spouses or Dependents: EAP benefits only apply to employees. An employer cannot provide EAP benefits for the spouse or dependent of an employee.
For more information, please see the IRS’s EAP FAQ webpage: https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/updatesto-frequently-asked-questions-about-educationalassistance-programs
LCW In The News
To view this article and the most recent LCW attorney-authored articles, please visit: www.lcwlegal.com/news
• Jenny Denny’s Daily Journal article, “Federal standard, state patchwork: What the transgender athlete cases mean for Title IX compliance,” explores how the U.S. Supreme Court’s pending decisions in West Virginia v. B.P.J. and Little v. Hecox could shape the legal landscape for schools addressing transgender athlete participation. She explains that even after the rulings, educational institutions will likely continue operating within a complex mix of federal requirements, state laws, constitutional standards, and athletic association rules, underscoring the need for a thoughtful and measured approach to policy review. View the full article here
• The Daily Journal recently published an article by LCW attorney David Urban, “Addressing Campus Protests in 2026.” The article examines key legal considerations colleges and universities should identify and assess when responding to campus demonstrations, while ensuring compliance with the First Amendment. To access the full article, please click here.
Benefits Compliance Question
Question:
We offer employees tuition reimbursement under our section 127 educational assistance plan. As part of our policy, we have employees sign agreements stating that if they voluntarily resign or separate employment within one year of completing their educational course, they will be required to return the tuition reimbursement to us by having the amount withheld from their final paycheck. Is this allowable?
Answer:
There are a few different angles used to analyze whether an employer can automatically deduct the tuition reimbursement from an employee’s final paycheck.
First, whether or not an employer can require employees to repay previously-paid educational reimbursements depends on whether the educational expenses were for an employer-mandated course or training. If the educational reimbursement is for an employer-mandated training or course, the employer cannot seek repayment if the employee voluntarily separates or otherwise leaves employment. If the education benefit is for discretionary training or a course not required by the employer, the employer can seek repayment. (In re Acknowledgment Cases, 239 Cal.App.4th 1498 (2015).)
Second, there are also minimum wage considerations. The employer cannot withhold the repayment amount from the employee’s final paycheck to satisfy the employee’s debt if the withholding would reduce the employee’s wage below the statutory minimum wage. (City of Oakland v. Hassey, 163 Cal.App.4th 1477 (2008).) The prohibition applies even if the employee agrees to the withholding in writing. If the employee’s wage falls below minimum wage, there is a risk of a wage and hour claim.
Third, the area of the law regarding the repayments changed in 2026. For contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2026, Assembly Bill 692 (AB 692) prohibits contracts or work-related agreements from doing the following:
1. requiring a worker to repay an employer, training provider, or debt collector if the worker’s employment or work relationship ends; or
2. imposing any penalty, fee, or cost as a result of termination.
AB 692 also provides a number of specific, narrow exemptions that could apply in some situations. If the tuition reimbursement agreement was entered into before January 1, 2026, then AB 692 does not apply to that agreement. AB 692 applies to private employers but may not apply to public agency employers, given that the law does not state specifically that it does so. Nevertheless, all employers should be aware of the provisions of AB 692 so they can evaluate their “stay-or-pay” arrangements.
LCW BENEFITS BEST PRACTICES TIMELINE
Each month, LCW presents a monthly benefits timeline of best practices.
June:
• Prepare for the end of the fiscal year, including budgeting for employee benefits.
• Consider whether the employer wants to revise any of its benefit plan documents. Prepare for any changes as soon as possible to ensure the timely adoption of any amendments before the start of the next plan year.
Consortium Call Of The Month
Members of Liebert Cassidy Whitmore’s consortiums are able to speak directly to an LCW attorney free of charge to answer direct questions not requiring in-depth research, document review, written opinions or ongoing legal matters. Consortium calls run the full gamut of topics, from leaves of absence to employment applications, student concerns to disability accommodations, construction and facilities issues and more. Each month, we will feature a Consortium Call of the Month in our newsletter, describing an interesting call and how the issue was resolved. All identifiable details will be changed or omitted.
Question: Answer:
A Community College District client asked whether, if a Brown Act committee has a quorum at the beginning of the meeting, but loses quorum, it can still vote on and approve action items during the period of time when it doesn’t have quorum.
A LCW attorney clarified that once a Brown Act-covered legislative body or committee loses its quorum, it cannot continue to take official action on agenda items. Any vote taken while a quorum is absent is subject to challenge and is likely invalid because the body no longer has the minimum number of members required to act.
The Brown Act defines a “meeting” as “any congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative body at the same time and location, including teleconference location as permitted by section 54953, to hear, discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body.” (Gov. Code section 54952.2(a).) The Act also defines “action taken” as a “collective decision made by a majority of the members of a legislative body, a collective commitment or promise by a majority of the members of a legislative body to make a positive or a negative decision, or an actual vote by a majority of the members of a legislative body when sitting as a body or entity, upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order or ordinance.” (Gov. Code section 54952.6.) If there isn’t a quorum, then there are not enough members for a majority of the body to take an action.
CPA Practice Advisor Premium Perks on Liebert Library!
Expanded Section 4960 Rules Create New Financial Planning Challenges For Nonprofits.
In an article published in CPA Practice Advisor's Financial Reporting, LCW Senior Counsel Andrew Dorado discusses the expansion of Internal Revenue Code Section 4960 under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act and the resulting implications for nonprofit organizations. The expanded rules broaden the reach of the 21% excise tax on compensation paid by tax-exempt organizations, creating new considerations for nonprofit employers and their advisors. Read more here: Publication found here.
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore