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HOUSING AFFORDABILITY

- Final Design Studio 2019/2020 -

AH 2019 - AFFORDABLE HOUSING DOMESTICTY RELOADED

Form, Uses, Spaces, Practices and Policy for Contemporary Dwelling

HOUSING AFFORDABILITY Students: Ebrahim Abnar Tuğçe Gücenmez Andrea Velkoska

Professors: Massimo Bricocoli, Gennaro Postiglione, Stefania Sabatinelli.

In collaboration with the Research Team “ForDwell-DASTU Dipartimento d’Eccellenza”: Gaia Caramellino, Stefano Guidarini, Fabio Lepratto, Simona Pierini, Roberto Rizzi; and with AIUC School scholars: Barbara Brollo, Antonio Carvalho, Lorenzo Consalez, Elena Fontanella, Francesca Gotti, Marco Jacomella, Massimiliano Nastri, Ingrid Paoletti; in coopertion with Double Degree programme TU Graz prof. Andreas Lichtbau.

INDEX

#01 HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: INTRO

1

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES Post-Industrial Welfare State Poverty in the European Countries Precariousness NEETs Housing Poverty

09

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS Demographics Life Expectancy Factors Dependency Ratio Family Structure and Cohabitation Living Apart Together - LAT

41

MIGRATION FLUXES 60 Factors of Migration Historical changes on migration flows Types of Migration Forced Migrants Over The World Major Countries for Refugee, Asylum Seeker, Internally Displaced People and Stateless Person Examples

GLOSSARY

102

6

INTRODUCTION

In the past few decades, with the shift to post-industrial societies, tremendous social, demographic and economic developments have been ongoing, both at the micro and at the macro scale. The results of these interrelated changes often depict incongruent pictures that can put vulnerable groups at greater risk.

Growing number of women in the work scene questioned traditional gendered division of family responsibilities. The fall in birth rates and the population ageing process jeopardize the sustainability of welfare states, already under pressure due to lower growth rates and neo-liberal policies. Changes in the production systems and technological advancements brought about more flexibility on the labor markets; the creation of a variety of new job typologies reduced the availability of permanent jobs. The more globalized, competitive and flexible EU market faced by precarious employment and uncertain economic horizons created a high risk of poverty for many groups. Flexibility, mobility and insecurity are also associated to prolonged transition towards adulthood autonomy, delay and decrease in marriage and childbearing, as well as diversifying living arrangements, including house-sharing, living apart together, multi-local living.

In parallel, more unpredictable flows of migrants, many of which forced to flee in search of better, more secure life, are at high risk to be in poverty and socially excluded also due to insufficient support and discrimination.

All the above-mentioned changes produce a variety of lifestyles, in which the specific combination of opportunities and constraints varies widely across individual conditions, income levels, places of residence, and require more appropriate types of affordable housing. The traditional family household cannot be held as a standard today and is not sustainable any longer. Architecture can play a major role in responding to human needs and aspirations, ever searching for housing solutions that are able to evolve in parallel to social changes.

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES

10

Socio-Economic Changes / The Post-Industrial Welfare State

THE POST-INDUSTRIAL WELFARE STATE

Although there is absence of clear definition of welfare state in a political vocabulary as it is widely used ambiguously and elastically (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981, Walker & Wong, 2013: 108), it can be defined as a government system which provides social and economic security of its population (Collins English Dictionary, 2000, Lowe, 2004).

Shifts in population trends, family structures, labour markets and the high expanses of welfare systems create challenges to the current establishment of welfare states. These changes require development of new policies and at the same time cause the emergence of new risks in people’s life that need social policy intervention, while the old risks are still present (Taylor-Gooby & Taylor, 2003).

During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the European welfare states were expanded and shaped under exceptional circumstances, aided by four key factors: 1- Golden age of relative continuous economic growth. Stable manufacturing sectors were the main characteristic of this era, providing family wage employment for the masses.

2- Stable nuclear family structures which provided care for children, elderly and in general dependent groups.

3- Neo-Keynesian national economic policies enabled the governments to ensure low unemployment and secure wages.

4- Political systems in which the coalitions of working and middle class could put pressure to legitimize tax use for provision of benefits and services (Taylor-Gooby & Taylor, 2003).

The welfare state’s role in industrial society was to answer needs which could not be met in market, meddle in the mismatch between income and need during the life cycle.

Social care, however, was mostly provided through the family system. Interventions in the family were limited. The outcome was the Keynes-Beveridge or Keynes-Bismarck welfare state: governments managed economies to promote full employment and organized social provision for needs which market and family did not meet (Taylor-Gooby & Taylor, 2003).

Socio-Economic Changes / The Post-Industrial Welfare State

11

NEW SOCIAL RISK DRIVERS

The social and economic changes occurred in post-industrial societies led to new social risks that people are facing. These changes and the driving factors in many ways have an interrelated effect on each other, empowering one another. They can be synthetised as follows.

Labor markets: At the macro-economic level growth rates are lower and more uncertain. This, plus technological advancement in production has affected the availability of good-quality low-skilled jobs on a mass scale. Labor market flexibility is another factor that requires uncertain temporary contracts which increase the risk of precariousness.

Globalization has put pressure on labor markets’ competitiveness indirectly, varying by policy of each country on national level (Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente, 2019, Ferrera & Rhodes, 2000, Cousins, 2005: 55-56).

Gender equality and work/life balance: Women have extended their presence in labor market in large numbers. Women’s participation rose from 45 to 61 percent from 1970s to 2000s which is due to importance of double earners to secure a family wage as well as to emancipation, higher investment in education and reach to greater equality for women. This reduced the availability of domestic unpaid work and care for dependent family members. There is a risk of absence from job market if this care cannot be bought on the market or provided by the state, and this sums up to the already existing risk of discrimination for women on labour market. So, a better balance in the distribution of the care workload between men and women within the family would be needed (Armingeon & Bonoli, 2007: 6, Taylor-Gooby & Taylor, 2003, OECD 2001b, 2002a).

Aging population: The increase in aging population of European countries is a major challenge for welfare states in term of expenditure on social care and pensions. The ratio of those over 65 to the population of working age in Europe is projected to rise by 73 per cent between 2000 and 2030 and the absolute number of elderly people is also growing. Data show that women aged 50-64 who cared for older dependents spent 22 hours weekly in this activity, while for men the amount was 16. It can affect women seeking for jobs if the care is not provided by the state or market. The impact of care responsibilities on women’s employment in turn affects the risk of family poverty. Data show that poverty rates for couple households in the EU where only one partner is in paid work are between three and six times higher than those where both work (Powell, & Hendricks, 2014: 50-51, Eurostat, 2002a, Tables A17 and A19, Esping-Andersen,

12

Socio-Economic Changes / New Social Risk Drivers

Recast of public welfare: One of the consequences of permanent austerity policy is that the public expenditure on social and health services are limited in parallel to neo-liberal policies taken by governments. This results in unmet demand and increased privatization of welfare services. There is a degree of risk to guarantee pensions by the private sectors as the future of economy that is supporting them is uncertain and also there is concerns on regulations to protect the pensions (Ferrera & Rhodes, 2000: 274, Taylor-Gooby & Taylor, 2003) Migration: Immigrants like nationals use welfare services and benefits and sometimes are even blamed for over-using them, but studies show that in most cases their use of welfare services is less than that of the local population. Data show that often their presence has a positive net contribution to public finance. Immigration might increase the ethnical diversity of the country, which can have effects in terms of redistribution, that tends to be higher among those who share the same background, and of risk of lack of support and residualisation of programs (MuĂąoz de Bustillo Llorente, R. 2019).

The new social risks created face rising demand as the most important pressure comes from population aging, restricted resources which the most contributing factor is a fall in economic growth in the shift from a mainly manufacturing production to a service economy, and limitations on government spending capacity mainly because of its weakened position by increasing capital mobility and growing difficulties in acting through demand-side approaches to unemployment (Taylor-Gooby & Taylor, 2003).

AGING POPULATION

GENDER EQUALITY WORK/LIFE BALANCE

LABOUR MARKET

1970 2000

precariousness

45%

+73%

2014

59%

full time permenant jobs

MIGRATION FLOWS

2000 2030

61%

?

RECAST OF PUBLIC WELFARE

65 working age

2x

1970 2000

78%

89%

employment rate

Socio-Economic Changes / New Social Risk Drivers

13

OLD RISKS

NEW RISKS

CITIZEN’S

GOVERNMENT’S

PERSPECTIVE

less effect at younger age.

PERSPECTIVE

AGE

Effects at younger age Cradle to grave care

state intervetion in areas of life seen private

Retirement and ill health, were part of the continuing life-experience

14

Involve labour market and private life

Unable to draw on child or elder care from the family or the state.

Horizontal redistribution

Support when wage wasnt enough Economc burdon providing benefits

Socio-Economic Changes / Comparison of Old and New Social Risks

Particular sub- groups Lower tax and social contribution

Policiy for people to suppurt them sleves compettivness legitimation and moral values.

COMPARISON OF OLD AND NEW SOCIAL RISKS

The new risks implications on economy and social life compared to the old ones can be seen through two different scopes, one as of each individual citizen and the other is how government policy response has changed about the issues.

From the citizen’s perspective the new risks share differ in four main characteristics from the old ones. Successful bypassing of the risk is of high importance because the failure can lead to poverty and inequality and loss of future life chances. New risks tend to affect people at younger age compared to old ones, at early stage of entering market and with care responsibility of family building. For people that manage to enter paid employment the risks don’t cease to exist as there are more incoming problems related to keeping up training and education level or child and elderly care of the family. As the risks involve both labor market and family life, it requires for state intervention into areas of life that used to be seen as private according to old risk perspective (Taylor-Gooby & Taylor, 2003).

From the perspective of government the answer to old risk was cradle to grave care involving high amount of tax and social contribution, horizontal redistribution and high political solidarity. The difficulty for governments is therefore in justifying cutbacks in such services by tactics of blame avoidance and cumulative change. New risks tend to be specific to groups and particular life stages, while mapping these groups is a challenge, as they don’t fit under traditional class and party structure. Responses to old risks were an answer to needs that could not be answered through the wage on the market, requiring high expenditure and economic burden for the government. Responses to new risks, instead, are more focused in supporting people to help themselves in a competitive globalized market, brining up issues of individual responsibility and public expenditure legitimation. As a result of all above, since the new social risk policies such as equal access to employment, the balance of family and work and issues of training and education are less likely to receive major expenditure, the EU seeks to promote a stronger role in this area, but this can come at the cost of reducing support for the old social risks (Taylor-Gooby & Taylor, 2003).

Socio-Economic Changes / Comparison of Old and New Social Risks

15

POVERTY IN THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

“Poverty is the worst form of violence.” — Mahatma Gandhi, Indian political and spiritual leader The economic crisis has had a major impact on lives of European citizens and many suffer different forms of poverty and social exclusion. The great recession and the connected austerity policies have affected aspects of basic life including healthcare, education, employment or participation in social life, homelessness and in-work and child poverty and even food poverty. Despite the EU target to reduce people in poverty and social exclusion by 2020 by 20 million, there was an increase in numbers between 2008 and 2014, from 116 millions to 122 millions, with poverty coming to affect one fourth of the entire population (Lecerf, 2016). ). Since the crisis, there has been a considerable increase in the levels of people experiencing poverty or social exclusion that reached a peak in 2012 with 123 million people (24.7% of the population). According to the latest statistics available at EU level from 2017, 113 million people (22.5%) were at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE). Moreover, a job alone is not sufficient to keep people out of poverty, with in-work poverty at its highest level (9.6%), well above the 2008 figure (8.5%) (Eurostat. 2016).

There are three indicators in this report, at risk of poverty, severe material deprivation and low work intensity. Because these sub-indicators tend to overlap and people can be affected by two or even all three of these types of poverty, a person is counted only once in the headline indicator, even if he or she falls into more than one category. Monetary poverty was the most widespread form of poverty in 2017, with 85.3 million people (16.9 % of the EU population) living at risk of poverty after social transfers. The second most frequent form of poverty was very low work intensity, affecting 35.3 million people or 9.5 % of the EU population aged 0 to 59. At the same time, 33.1 million people or 6.6 % of the EU population were suffering from severe material deprivation. Over a third of these populations were affected by two indicators of the poverty and 1 in 15 by all the three (Eurostat. 2016).

PO ERT wer

16

Socio-Economic Changes / Poverty in the European Countries

CAUSES OF POVERTY

Poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon caused by many different factors on individual level like level of education, social integration and health or due to socio economic policies and trends.

Structural economic and social changes: economic policies are always a key factor regarding poverty. After the oil shock of 1973 three main element of economic downturns, income inequality and welfare system reforms played major role.

Cyclical drivers: it is difficult to distinguish between cyclical drivers and structural ones but the cyclical ones usually happen in shorter span. For example, in the late Nineties, despite economic growth, poverty still remained a main issue in Europe.

Inequality drivers: gender, education, new family patterns and inherited poverty are of high importance when it comes to inequality drivers. Gender is still a main issue for labor market with unequal wages and problem to balance job and life responsibilities, that made women vulnerable to poverty especially in old age and when it comes to collecting pensions. Education is another main factor, as studies show the people with lower education have a higher chance of poverty. New emerging family structures also play an important role. New trends such as lone parenting, cohabitation without marriage and later parenting have effects on the risk of poverty. Women are particularly being affected the most, having dominance in single households and single parent households. And the last factor, inherited poverty: according to studies, there is possibility of transmission of disadvantages through family. It can be characterised by persistence of low education, inability to make ends meet and succession of not-in-work parent among children for two generations (Lecerf, M. 2016).

Who is next?!

RTY Socio-Economic Changes / Causes of Poverty

17

DIFFERENT GROUPS AT RISK

Women: women’s poverty is usually underestimated due to household methodology of most poverty indicators. They are also subject to lower pay due to gender and pension gap. The other contributing factor is the household responsibilities preventing them to be fully active.

Children: Children and young people, particularly the ones with low education and also NEETs, are at risk of poverty.

Older people: Elderly in some European countries are at increasing risk of poverty, particularly women.

Single Parent Families: single parent families especially lone woman parents are at risk.

Big Families: families with 3 children or more are at risk.

People born outside the EU: Migrants, refugees and also ethnic minorities are at high risk.

People with disability: people with disability and also people with long term sickness or health problems Unemployed people: long term unemployment implies a high poverty risk.

In-work poverty: there is an increase in the part-time jobs, and job is no longer a guarantee to go out of poverty.

Workers on minimum income: they have a high risk of poverty.

Low educational / skill level: Lack of access to higher education due to either geographical situation or economical reasons.

Housing tenure: People facing high rents and house expenditure burden are at high poverty risk

DIFFERENT GROUPS AT RISK

no!

JOB

18

Socio-Economic Changes / Different Groups at Risk

rent

MAIN CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Among these main challenges, particular attention needs to be paid to precariousness, NEETs, housing poverty and energy poverty.

Inadequate minimum income and limited social protection systems: low level of minimum income in relation to real costs of living and also limited coverage for vulnerable groups with restrictive eligibility criteria and high conditionality. Not enough info on people’s rights. Lack of universal protection specially in trail of transition to unemployment and risk of remaining out of the benefit system. Lack of inclusion approaches that can support people on minimum income as they move to a decent job (EAPN 2018).

Sustainable and adequate food: growth of food banks shows that the minimum income and social protection policies did not met the basic needs of the population at risk.

Lower income also reduces access to healthy food. Concerns on overall sustainability of current food model (EAPN 2018).

Over indebtedness leading to poverty traps: having little income forces people to make unacceptable choices like between heating and eating, and may get them trapped in debt and become over-indebted by aggressive loan agencies with high interests (EAPN 2018).

Education inequalities: The issue of unequal access to education for poorer children is varying, due to school systems and big difference between regions like rural and urban.

Limited youth employment schemes are also an issue. Overall, there is insufficient investment in basic education for adult learning, literacy, numeracy (EAPN 2018).

Unequal access to health: Universal free health care is being challenged by increased privatization and changed finance systems (especially co-payment by patients). Health inequality between rich and poor also has increased, which threatens life expectancy and healthy life. There is a decline in quality coverage and affordability of health care, especially in poorer regions (EAPN 2018).

Socio-Economic Changes / Main Challenges and Priorities

19

PRECARIOUSNESS DEFINITION

Precarious work as a concept does not have a universally accepted definition in Europe.

The definition is different according to each labor market and its regulations, welfare systems, system of industrial relations and collective bargaining. Olsthoorn (2014) conceptualized it by three main components: insecure employment, unsupportive entitlements and vulnerable employees. Precarious can be defined as intersection of these three to say vulnerable employees who have an insecure job and few entitlements to income support. However the risk is always relative and non-precarious forms of employment can be also at risk.

All types of contracts could potentially be at risk of precariousness, at different thresholds. Another way to define precariousness is by job quality, meaning that lack of autonomy, lack of employee voice, and control over job content, working time quality and low variation of tasks, no skill use, no productivity, no quality of environment, to name a few, are all factors that can lead to precarious situations for employees.

Here there are two analytical tools to identify precariousness: one is the type of employment relations (e.g. full time, part time, etc.) and the other individual risk to the employee, such as in-work poverty and low pay, social security, labour rights , stress and health, career development and training and low level of collective rights (Broughton, Green, Rickard, Swift, Eichhorst, Tobsch & Tros, 2016).

Unsupportive entitlement

Precarious employment

Vulnerable employees

20

Socio-Economic Changes / Precariousness: Definition

Job Quality

Insecure jobs

DRIVERS OF PRECARIOUSNESS

Drivers of precariousness can be summoned in three interrelated field: economic drivers, institutional and legal drivers and technological change. In a more competitive and uncertain post-crisis context new hiring is increasingly on basis of temporary and part time. Job seekers accept these contracts as the alternative would be unemployment. The financial crisis and its aftermath being a driver also resulted in lack of funds for labor inspectorates. The outcome may be that abuses are not detected.

Labour market regulation is of high importance regarding precariousness. Labour markets that ensure protection to workers in the areas of working conditions, protection against discrimination and dismissal, access to social rights and to collective rights are likely to have a lower overall risk of precariousness than those which do not. Within Europe there is the Anglo-Saxon model of high flexibility, higher levels of employment and in-work poverty, distinguished from the continental European model of tighter labor market regulation. Deregulation in continental model has resulted in the creation of an insiders versus outsiders cleavage.

Opening up the market to increased competition can increase the risk of a negative impact on the job quality and overall working conditions of workers.

Finally, digitalization is changing employment relations in some sectors, such as minicabs and accommodation, where new organizations, such as Uber and Airbnb operate through new technologies that need new forms of regulation.

Socio-Economic Changes / Drivers of Precariousness

21

PRECARIOUSNESS PATTERNS AND TRENDS

There are certain patterns and trends according to employment relationships which is also related to the sector and type of activity. Socio demographic characteristics such as gender education level and age play a major role. And all these patterns also vary in different EU countries as each have different labor market traditions and policies (Broughton, Green, Rickard, Swift, Eichhorst, Tobsch, & Tros, 2016) Based on employment relationship studies, in 2014 the main type of employment relationship in the EU was full-time permanent contracts, with 59% of the share of employment, although this is decreasing, while the share of non-standard forms of work is increasing. If this trend continues, it may well become the case that standard contracts will only apply to a minority of workers within the next decade. We have the trending phenomenon of gig economy and a horizon of how the employment relations will be more on basis of temporariness in future. Survey evidence shows that employees increasingly feel that their jobs are insecure. Average hours worked have, of course, fallen significantly since the construction of welfare states. Recent studies show that most European countries have experienced a gradual reduction in working hours over the past two decades, although this has been accompanied by the introduction of different working time arrangements and a different dispersion of work (Boisard et al., 2002a) From a gender point of view, men are more likely to work on a full-time and permanent basis than women (65%/52%), whereas women are much more likely than men to work on a part-time basis (12%/2%). Men are also more likely than women to work as a freelancers (13%/8%) and as self-employed with employees (6%/3%). Education influences the chances of full-time work positively and reduces the share of part-time and temporary work. By age, young workers are much less likely to be employed on full-time permanent contracts than older colleagues. Young workers are also much more likely to be employed on the basis of apprenticeship or training contracts and to be engaged in marginal part-time work and fixed-term work.

52%

12%

15%

64%

3%

2% 4%

59%

6%

13%

9%

2%

1%

7%

11%

4%

Socio-Economic Changes / Precariousness

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Types of contracts can depend also on economic activity of the employer. Most full-time, permanent contracts are concentrated in industries, public administration and education, while their lowest presence is found in agriculture, fishery and forestry.

Part-time working and marginal part-time work is mainly used in the service sector; self-employment, including freelancers, is most common in agriculture, fishery and forestry; fixed-term contracts are lowest in ICT, real estate, financial and professional services and temporary agency working is low in all sectors, although highest in manufacturing. From this data, it can be seen that the service sector tends to be more at risk of precariousness, having a lower incidence of standard forms of working than manufacturing industry. +55 YEARS OLD

53%

25-54 YEARS OLD

62%

25%

15-25 YEARS OLD

55%

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2%

1%

7%

11%

4%

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Socio-Economic Changes /Precariousness

23

TYPES OF CONTACT AND RISK OF PRECARIOUSNESS

All employment relationships are at some risk of precariousness. The risk of in-work poverty, lack of social security coverage and lack of access to labour rights are the most serious risks for individuals.

Open-ended full-time contracts and open-ended part-time contracts are at a relatively low risk of precariousness. Full-time, open-ended employment are still the most common type of contract around the EU but the share is falling in favor of more flexible types of contracts. Full time employment has relatively low risk of precariousness but there are risks regarding health, low pay, in work poverty and working conditions in some sectors. Part-time work can offer high levels of flexibility and work-life balance to individuals and act as a way of increasing the female labour market participation rate.

However, part-time work can be at risk of being lower quality than full-time work, with less opportunity for career progression and in some cases with worse overall health.

Part-time working is highly gendered and concentrated in female-dominated sectors and occupations such as education, health and care.

Marginal and involuntary part-time work, fixed-term work and involuntary fixed term work, work and self-employment (with and without employees) are at a relatively medium risk of precariousness. Marginal part-time work (employees who work less than 20 hours in week) is increasing in Europe, mainly due to the increasing participation of women in the labour market with a low number of working hours and due to specific regulation. The risks involved with marginal part time is lack of works councils, career opportunities and share of low pay but on the positive side they had higher levels of satisfaction with working conditions and general health and much lower levels of psycho-social demands in comparison with full-time workers. For fixed term work Lack of job security is a key risk. Fixed-term work is also at risk of lower pay than permanent work and a lack of access to employment rights. In Terms of the duration of fixed-term contracts, at EU level, a quarter are between seven and 12 months, with just over 20 % up to three months. This may indicate that fixed term contracts are not being used as a stepping stone to more permanent forms of contracting specially the more low skilled ones. Self-employed individuals can be broken down into the categories of entrepreneurs, free professionals, craft workers, those in skilled but unregulated professions and those in unskilled professions. It is the latter two groups that are more at risk of precariousness. Bogus self-employment can be seen as an abuse of the employment relationship in that individuals are carrying out the same tasks, for one employer, as that employer’s employees. Bogus self-employed workers have the lowest incomes and the greatest household financial difficulty of any category of worker. Overall, there is evidence that self-employed workers tend to work longer.

Temporary agency work and posted work are at a relatively medium/high risk of precariousness. Temporary agency work overall has a minor share in Europe’s market, it often relies on particular labour market groups, such as young workers, and especially for jobs with low training costs. They face risks such as lack of trade union organization, lack of knowledge about their job and risk of precariousness in terms of earnings.

Agency work can potentially act as the first step for unemployed individuals to find their way in labour market. Posted works face minimum employment standards, Potential abuses and difficulties and being exploited.

24

Socio-Economic Changes / Types of Contact and Risk of Precariousness

Informal, undeclared work and in some cases zero hours contracts are at a relatively high risk of precariousness. Informal work due to the fact workers do not pay into tax and social security funds and are therefore not eligible for coverage by social security systems, resulting in a lack of entitlement to benefits and pensions. Women are mostly affected by informal and undeclared work, particularly migrant women in sectors such as healthcare and cleaning. Domestic workers, engaged in tasks such as childcare, care of the elderly or housekeeping, are at greater risk of working on the basis of an informal relationship. For zero hour contracts risk is higher if individuals need minimum levels of working hours and income. Zero hours contracts have no guaranteed minimum hours of work. Although zero hours contracts usually stipulate that zero hours workers are entitled to decline work, UK studies have found that in practice individuals often feel pressurized to accept any work they are offered so that they have no real choice.

In addition to above new forms of work are emerging, with advancement in technology and digitalization and there are implications of this in terms of risk of precariousness however, there is a lack of data on these issues and disagreement on the impact of technology-driven innovation on the labour market and risk of precariousness. For example ICT-based mobile work, in which a worker operates from various locations outside the premises of their employer has risk of work intensification, increased stress and a blurring of the boundaries between working life and non-working life Or voucher-based work, whereby an employer purchases a voucher from a third party, to be used as payment for a service from a worker, rather than cash. Risk factors include social and professional isolation, some job insecurity and lower access to career development. However, workers have the opportunity to move from the informal to the formal labour market, enabling them to benefit from improved social protection and sometimes higher levels of pay; and crowd employment, which uses an online platform to enable organisations or individuals to access a group of organisations or individuals to solve specific problems or to provide specific services or products. Risk factors include low pay, pay insecurity and lack of access to inhouse company benefits or training and development provision. However, these workers enjoy a high level of autonomy and flexibility and have the opportunity to learn new skills.

Socio-Economic Changes /Types of Contact and Risk of Precariousness

25

levels twice the EU average high increase (15.0 %) in 2014 work since the crisis

part time work

marginal involuntary

part time work

full time contracts open ended ďŹ xed term work

posted work

decrease from 65% in 204 to 54% in 2014

26

Socio-Economic Changes / Types of Contact and Risk of Precariousness

levels have doubled in the past decade 6%/3% 2004-2014

me self employment

still highest 6.6% after a fall from just over 12 % in 2003

temporary agency work

rates of transition from temporary to permanent contracts below 20 % zero hours

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contracts

Socio-Economic Changes /Types of Contact and Risk of Precariousness

27

NEETs: YOUNG PEOPLE NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION OR TRAINING

Youth unemployment is one of the principal social and economic challenges of this decade in Europe. Long periods of unemployment can have serious long-term effects for individuals, such as reduced earnings and social exclusion. EU labor markets, as described previously are becoming increasingly flexible. High number of people in temporary based contracts consist of young people. Youth looking for jobs are more vulnerable as they compete with more experienced job seekers. One of the very important decisions in life is when to move from education to work. Unlike the traditional habit, that is when people finished their highest level of education they moved to the job market, today there are new patterns and trends of transition from education to work. This transition in recent years has become longer and more unpredictable. Unlike before, people are working while still in education, switching jobs more often and take longer to be stablished in job market either by choice or necessity. It has been an increase in number of people to tertiary education that take part-time jobs or people who already have a job to come back to education. Overall the transition from education to market became more unclear, with different gradients (Eurostat2019).

By definition NEET stands for young people neither in employment nor in education or training. Young age is considered here 20-34 years old, as most people younger than that are still in education.

EU IT

21% 34%

12% 24%

15%

6%

NEETS BY GENDER

ACTIVITY STATUS BY GENDER (age 20-34)

NEET BY AGE

20-24

25-29

15%

17%

till lower secondert

NEET BY EDUCATION

NEET BY URBANIZATON

28

Socio-Economic Changes / NEETs

till upper secondary

30-34 17.3% tertiary

EU 38% IT 49%

14% 20%

10% 26%

18%

17%

15%

TRENDS AND DRIVING FACTORS

In 2018, there were about 15 million young people aged 20-34 who were neither in employment nor in education or training. There are varying factors and elements that may contribute to this number, among them low education, living in single-parent or low-income household, having a parent that experienced unemployment and living in rural areas (Eurostat2019).

There is a close link between economic performance and cycles to number of NEETs, as during the financial crisis in 2008 the number of NEETs jumped from 16.5% to 18% in 2009 peaking to 20.1% in 2013 going back to 16.5% in 2018. This brings a concern that a whole generation of young people can be out of market for years. Although in 2018 compared to 2013 there was a reduction in the proportion of young people who were employed and had completely left education or training while the share of young people in education and mix of job and education increased. This development may reflect a growing desire on the part of young people to obtain higher levels of qualification in the face of increased competition in labor markets, but may also reflect a lack of full-time employment opportunities during a period of economic downturn (Eurostat2019).

Socio demographic analyses show that women are more likely to be NEET. This gap may be due to a range of factors, such as social pressures that consider women’s role in the family more important, career advice and choices that may lead women to more narrow range of occupations and labor market issues. Employers tend to hire young men rather than women, due to discrimination because of child-bearing, and young women are more likely to be in low paid or precarious employment (Eurostat2019).

Activity status shows percentage of young women being inactive is about three times higher than young men (15.3%/5.9%) while the percentage of unemployed men is slightly bigger (6.4%/5.6%) The higher number of women not looking actively for jobs could be due to family structures and care responsibilities.

Comparing different education levels, in most European countries higher number of NEETs are found among those with low education while lower NEETs for those with high education.

By degree of urbanization, young people in the EU living in cities were less likely to be out of employment and education and training than those in rural areas and suburbs, although number differentiation was more mixed among the countries with overall low NEETs.

Socio-Economic Changes / NEETs

29

30

Socio-Economic Changes / Housing Poverty

HOUSING POVERTY

When considering living standards and well-being, housing is a fundamental characteristic. Indeed, most people would agree that being able to afford adequate housing of decent quality in a safe environment is a basic need, as a dwelling should provide shelter, adequate space for its occupants to live, eat and sleep, as well as a degree of privacy for the household as a whole and for its individual members. In this section we focus on three aspects regarding housing which specifically affect more vulnerable groups. Data on housing conditions and quality, affordability and living environment.

Socio-Economic Changes / Housing Poverty

31

HOUSING CONDITIONS

Poor housing conditions are one of the main contributing factors that prevent Europeans from enjoying an acceptable standard of living. Accordingly, in this section first we examine the distribution of housing stock looking in more detail at overcrowding, living space, tenure statues and their impact on the quality of housing available to people living in the EU. In addition some aspects of housing deprivation such as the lack of a bath or a toilet, a leaking roof in the dwelling, or a dwelling considered to be too dark can be taken into account to build a more complete indicator of housing quality.

The severe housing deprivation is defined as the percentage of the population living in a dwelling which is considered to be overcrowded, while having at the same time at least one of these housing deprivation measures.

Type of housing: If it is a flat, a detached house or a semidetached house. The data in 2017 shows on average Europeans tend to live more in houses either detached 29% or semidetached 27%. 43% of Europeans lived in flats. This share varies by country.

Tenure statues: Almost 7 out of 10 persons in the EU-28 lived in an owner-occupied dwelling. Many Europeans strive to become homeowners, as this may offer increased security of tenure, while at the same time providing a means of generating wealth.

EU IT

house 29% 25%

semi detached house 27% 24%

without mortage EU 43% IT 59% 1.7 EU IT room per person

with mortage 26% 13%

flat 43% 51%

market price 20% 18%

reduced or free 11% 10%

owner

tenant

1.8 1.4

1.5 1.1

house

at

house

at

1.8

1.5

1.6

1.5

B

room per person

1.7

32

Socio-Economic Changes / Housing Poverty

1.6

1.6

Overcrowding rate: The overcrowding rate is defined on the basis of the number of rooms available to a household, the household’s size, family situation and the ages of its members. Despite a slowdown in population growth, many EU Member States face shortage of adequate housing. Overall 15.7% of Europeans lived in overcrowded households in 2017. Within the population at risk of poverty, the overcrowding rate in the EU-28 was 26.5% roughly 10% more than average. There were considerable differences between EU Member States, with overcrowding more prevalent in the southern and eastern Member States, while cross-country comparisons revealed that the highest levels of overcrowding were usually concentrated in cities where space is often at a premium.

Rooms per person: Alongside the overcrowding rate, another measure which may be used to analyze living space is the average number of rooms per person. In 2017, each EU-28 inhabitant had an average of 1.6 rooms. The average number of rooms per person was slightly lower, at 1.6, for those people living in cities than it was for those people living in rural areas (1.7 rooms). The average number of rooms per person was somewhat higher, at 1.7 rooms, for EU-28 homeowners than it was for tenants living in rented accommodation, 1.5 rooms per person. As may be expected, the space available to people living in houses was, on average, greater than that available to people living in flats.

BY POVERTY

EU 16% IT 27%

27% 37%

BY URBANIZATION EU IT

16% 31%

14% 25%

16% 24%

Socio-Economic Changes / Housing Poverty

33

Dwelling’s size: Apart from the overcrowding rate, the size of the dwelling, can also provide a representative picture of housing quality, in terms of the availability of sufficient useful space in the dwelling. In 2012 (no later data available), the average size of the dwelling at EU-28 level was 95.9m2. The average useful floor area of a dwelling varied in size from 44.6m2 in Romania, 62.5m2 in Latvia and 63.2 m2 in Lithuania, to 141.4m2 in Cyprus. Europeans living in rented dwellings had, on average, less useful floor area at their disposal compared to homeowners. In the case of those living in dwellings with a market price rent, an average size of 74.5m2 for their dwelling was reported, while those living in dwellings with a reduced price or free of charge reported an average size of 78.7m2.

eu 28= 15.7%

<8 8<16 16<32 >=32

34

Socio-Economic Changes / Housing Poverty

LIVING ENVIRONMENTS

Living conditions are also affected by the quality of the local environment around the residential areas where people live. Some people express concerns about issues such as noise, pollution, crime, violence or vandalism, which may impact on their quality of life. Noise was the most widespread environmental problem for people living in the EU in 2017, with 18% of population expressing concern about it. Across the EU-28, any of these problems (noise, pollution, crime, violence or vandalism) were more likely to be faced by the population at risk of poverty than by the total population. There are strong environmental inequalities, with higher and more frequent harmful exposure affecting especially vulnerable population groups.

On average, 23.2% of the EU-28â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s population living in cities perceived noise from neighbors or from the street to be a problem in 2017. The share of the population suffering from noise was lower for those people living in towns and suburbs (16.6%) or in rural areas (10.4%). Pollution, grime and other environmental issues were perceived as problems by 19.4% of city-dwellers across the EU-28. Such problems were less prevalent among the subpopulations living in towns and suburbs (12.9%) and especially rural areas (8.1%). Almost one in five (18.0%) persons living in cities across the EU-28 perceived crime, violence or vandalism as a problem. This share fell to 9.9% among the subpopulation that was living in towns and suburbs, and to 5.8% for those people living in rural areas.

BY RISK OF POVERTY

21%

18%

EU 10% IT

16%

14%

> rural areas

6%

15%

12%

>

9%

6%

5%

8%

EU 17% IT 10%

towns and suburbs

12% 10%

10% 10%

EU 23% IT 20%

cities

19% 20%

18% 19%

Socio-Economic Changes / Housing Poverty

35

EU IT

10% 8%

BY RISK OF POVERTY

EU IT

36

Socio-Economic Changes / Housing Poverty

38% 33%

HOUSING AFFORDABILITY

In 2010, a European Commission Communication, titled the “European platform against poverty and social exclusion: a European framework for social and territorial cohesion” (COM(2010) 758 final), addressed the issue of affordable accommodation by declaring that ’access to affordable accommodation is a fundamental need and right’.

That said, housing costs often make up the largest component of expenditure for many households, thereby potentially leading to deferred or cancelled expenditure, possibly in relation to other basic needs.

Housing affordability may be analyzed through the housing cost overburden rate, which shows the share of the population living in households that spend 40% or more of their disposable income on housing. The cost overburden rate in EU-28 was 10.4% in 2017 while the percentage for those at risk of poverty was 37.9%, which had a decrease of 2% since 2014. There were, however, large differences between the EU Member States in cost overburden. These differences may, at least partially, reflect differences in national policies for social housing or public subsidies and benefits that are provided by governments for housing. The share of the population living in households that spent 40% or more of their disposable income on housing was significantly greater among EU-28 tenants than it was among homeowners in 2017. This was especially the case for tenants living in dwellings with a market price rent, for whom the housing cost overburden rate was 26.3%, while it was 4.7% for homeowners with a mortgage.

A focus on the share of the population that spent more than half of their disposable income on housing costs. Across the EU-28, close to one in six (15.7%) tenants living in dwellings with a market price rent spent more than half of their disposable income on housing costs in 2017. This number is higher than average in all EU-28 countries.

without mortage

EU IT

5% 4%

with mortage

6% 3%

market price

26% 28%

reduced or free

14% 14%

Socio-Economic Changes / Housing Poverty

37

eu 28= 15.7%

<8 8<16 16<32 >=32

38

Socio-Economic Changes / Housing Poverty

ENERGY POVERTY

Energy poverty can be defined as a condition in which a household is unable to access energy services at home up to a socially and materially necessary level (Buzar 2007).

There is an emerging knowledge on energy poverty in Europe. A pan-European research project shows that retired people, unemployed and those in low paid jobs, those dependent on social security benefits as well as elderly, disabled or single parent families are at the highest risk of energy poverty (EPEE 2009).

Despite significant differences across countries, all available indicators point to the fact that housing-related expenditure is absorbing an increasing part of householdsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; financial resources. This includes housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels. In 2017, the average amount spent by each inhabitant in the EU-28 on housing-related purposes averaged EUR 3,900. There were considerable variations between the EU Member States, reflecting differences in both rental/house prices and utility prices. The share of housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels in EU-28 final household consumption expenditure was 24.2% in 2017 (which was slightly higher than 11 years before).

The highest proportion was attributed to imputed rentals for housing (12.9% of final household consumption expenditure), followed by actual rentals (4.8%), electricity, gas and other fuels (3.9%), water supply and related services (1.6%) and maintenance and repair for dwellings (0.9%). In 12 of the 27 EU Member States for which data are available, expenditure per inhabitant on housing-related items was above the EU-28 average. Most of these are located in central and northern Europe. By contrast, expenditure was lower than the EU-28 average in peripheral EU countries. (Buzar 2007).

Overall, some 7.8% of the EU-28 population in 2017 could not afford to keep their home adequately warm. This share increased to 18.4% of the EU-28 population considering people at risk of poverty.

Energy prices rose more than the inflation rate, especially during the period 2011-2013.

However, from 2014 to 2016, the price of energy fell at quite a rapid pace; followed in 2017 again by a noteworthy rise. By contrast, the share of the EU-28 population that was unable to keep their home adequately warm peaked in 2012 and 2013, after which it fell at an increasing pace during the period 2014 to 2017. Low energy efficiency is also contributing factor.

IT

15%

29%

EU

8%

19%

UNABLE TO KEEP THE HOUSE WARM

BY RISK OF POVERTY

Socio-Economic Changes / Housing Poverty

39

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

DEMOGRAPHICS

Global demographic analysis shows that nearly every country is coming up against the phenomenon of its population growing old, while fertility rates are dropping. Proportions of groups of old people are constantly growing. The so-called ‘baby boom’ generation from the 1950s are facing increased longevity and are expected to pass the threshold to the 80+ year olds group of elderly, which is already large on its own. This demographic trend is expected to have the greatest impact on social transformations of our time, affecting the founding aspects of society such as the labour market, demand for goods, housing market, social protection, family structure, and intergenerational ties. Regarding the goals on healthy living and well - being, promoting gender equality, and making cities inclusive, safe and sustainable, this change is currently posing a challenge. On the other end of the spectrum there is an alarming drop in fertility rates in most of the Western countries in the past decades. Looking ahead fertility rates are the one trend that directly impacts the size of birth cohorts, thus determining the future changes in a society. Compared to 1980 when the average was 2.6 children per woman, currently the rate has dropped to a critical level of 1.4 children per woman in Europe.

In retrospective there were gradual changes in relationship types, job market and education opportunities for women, a postponement in marriage decisions, postponement in birth, that all had an affect on this now current trend. Furthermore, the image of the traditional family is fading, while new family types and cohabiting arrangement are emerging. The trends in this sector are mainly set due to job opportunities, income levels, mobility, increased fragility in relationships, increased consented cohabitation without legal marriage arrangement, etc. Due to instability about future relationship status, or finances, the number of couples who decide not to have children has increased to 1 in 5 households. A growing phenomenon is the one of couples who live apart together or ‘LAT’ for short. There are various reasons due to which people decide to make this choice, however the least frequent choice is willingly. The main reasons are when one lives in a different geographic location due to studies or work, then regarding financial situations partners who choose to remain in parents’ home, or if one or both partners are single parents and decide that this choice is better for the development of the children (Oláh, 2015). Increased occurrence of LAT couples further complicates and destabilizes relationships, contributing to delay the choice of marriage and pregnancy, and to the decline of fertility rates. This chapter gives an overview of the main drivers in major global demographic changes regarding aging, fertility rates and family structures.

42

Demographic Trends / Introduction

AGEING

In a general overview, countries that had booming fertility rates in the 1950s are now experiencing the fastest growth of the 60 to 80+ years old elderly cohorts. Moreover the growing rate is projected to accelerate in forthcoming decades. Around 60% of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s elderly population lives in the developing regions, and it is observed that their percentage is growing faster there than in the developed regions. Looking forward to 2050 it is projected that two out of every three oldest-old (80+) persons will live in developing regions Overviewing the demographic characteristics of the older population, the main trend shows that on average women are prone to live longer than men. Therefore they make up the greater part of the older people group, specifically in the more advanced ages.

The analyses show that the year difference by which women outlive men is 4.5 years, in the time period of 2010 to 2015. This gender difference is presumed to stay unchanged at a global level in the future decades.

Regarding the types of settlements inhabited by the old population, the trends are showing that, in a quite counterintuitive way, growth is faster in urban areas compared to rural ones. The time period between 2000 and 2015 is showing a growth in older generations of 68% in urban areas and 25% in rural areas. The accelerated expansion of this cohort in urban areas is mostly attributable to trends in the urbanization and differences in mortality risks in the two types of settlements.

Figure 1: Share of older global population by age group and sex

Demographic Trends / Ageing

43

FERTILITY RATES

Taking a glance back to the 1950s and 1960s and comparing it to today, a major global trend change that can be observed is the immense drop in fertility rates. The mid 1970s were the period when ‘the golden age of family’ started fading and this was due to other social changes that acted as main drivers for the continuous decline of fertility. With the beginning of post-industrialism many new opportunities appeared, especially for women; but also many of the traditional functioning systems started disintegrating.

These changes gradually led to lower marriage rates, delaying of marriage and birth, higher divorce rates, unstable jobs. An increased difference in welfare systems across Europe led to highly increased or decreased time periods of leaving the parents’ homes for young people. This affects decisions about marriage and childbirth too due to instabilities in income levels, help around childcare, being able to provide an independent home after leaving the primary family nucleus. Family structure and gender roles are experiencing major changes as well. Childbearing trends have arrived at critically low levels, and this directly affects the whole social structure in the future decades (Oláh, 2015).

The de-standardization of family structures and cycles are linked with the continuous decline in fertility rates. Eventually, critically low levels have been reached in childbearing patterns that put Western societies at risk of losing the possibility for population replacement. Regarding Europe, in the period of 2000 to 2015 the average rates have dropped from 2.6 to 1.4 children per woman, which is a seriously alarming situation, especially when compared to the constantly growing percentage of old population (Oláh, 2015).

While social view on women shifted, so did the women’s preferences. After achieving emancipation and being able to invest more in their education, the number of women who are interested and feel confident in investing in a career and not only in family is increasing. Moreover for some of them (difficult to count an exact number) a career is a primary or even an exclusive choice. The newly gained independence and availability of opportunities led women to the delay of their choice of starting a family. This delays both the decisions of starting a marriage and the decision on childbearing. If up until 1980 women would get married and pregnant in their early twenties, nowadays these events have been postponed to the late twenties to thirties period of age for first time mothers.

44

Demographic Trends / Fertility Rates

Reproductive preferences are another factor contributing to valuable information regarding fertility rates. The appearance and fast spreading of efficient contraceptives in Western countries allowed couples to have almost complete control over their family size, compared to the past when these technologies were not as advanced. In an overview of preferred family size among men and women in Europe, taking in consideration the childbearing period trends (26-39 years old), the findings show that childless or one-child families are not a popular choice, compared to the most common two-children family ideal, and the non-negligible percentage of couples that prefer three or more children family (OlĂĄh, 2015).

Partnership patterns and the increase in divorce rates are another factor in the decision of childbearing. Increased instability in partner relationships affects this in the way that a couple, not knowing their future status and not being able to plan it due to other factors, wouldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t start a family in such an unstable environment. Therefore, the marriage and childbearing periods are postponed further. On the other hand, the number of extra-marital births has increased in Europe since 1970, when its share was no greater than 10%. In recent years this trend grew to 1 out of 4 births being in a non-married couple. This shows that marriage is not the almost exclusive frame for childbearing as it used to be in the past, since many children are born before a couple gets married, in couples who do not intend to get married, from single-parents, or from parents who have not re-married (yet) after divorce (OlĂĄh, 2015).

Demographic Trends / Fertility Rates

45

46

Demographic Trends / Partnership Patterns

PARTNERSHIP PATTERNS

The decline in marriage tendency is paralleled by an increase in the average age at first marriage. Also the choice not to get married is not always linked to low childbearing trends. The analyses from 1970 to 1990 show that many more women than in the past become first-time parents few years before entering first marriage. During the 1960, couples entered marriage usually in their early-twenties in Europe. From the 1980 onward the mean age of first marriage began to increase to mid-twenties up until late thirties. This varies across the regions of Europe, however taking a glance at the latest trends, 2000 - 2015, these show that many couples are choosing the non-marriage option at all. The postponement of marriage has been in fact correlated with an increase in cohabiting but not married couples (Oláh, 2015).

Non-marital cohabitation is a phenomenon on its own. It appears heterogeneously across the region of Europe and various interpretations are attached to it. Mostly it is referred to in context of understanding the types of relationship and levels of commitment couples are devoted to in these unions. Two most popular connotations to this rising trend are as a stage of life leading to marriage, or a type of relation on its own, without expectations of it evolving in something more. However the cohabiters’ plans of extending the family are still often closely related to plans for marriage (Oláh, 2015).

These emerging patterns of cohabitation, as well as the increasing rate of divorce have an impact on family structure and stability. Consensual unions are on average more fragile than marriages and the choice of not having offspring is more likely in this situation. Another factor is the expected time to spend in one relationship, which analyses show is shortened. Blended families are another situation where partners often choose not to have more children in order not to complicate things further; since it is already difficult for the children’s development to adapt to new siblings and stepparents, understanding their own position in the new blended family may be complicated by adding more members (Oláh, 2015).

LAT or Living Apart Together is another expanding trend in Europe. Due to various reasons, couples are willingly or not having to live apart, which creates difficult conditions for taking a relationship a step further and increasing commitment. According to research in these situations it usually depends on the period this relationship lasts for, as well as the age period of the partners during which they decide on LAT relationship whether they will end up having children (Ayuso, L. 2019).

Demographic Trends / Partnership Patterns

47

Figure 2: Percentage of the population aged 60 years of over, for the world and regions

Figure 3: Fertility rates expressed as children per woman for world and regions

48

Demographic Trends / Living Conditions

LIVING CONDITIONS

Plenty of studies have predicted that the population in Europe will continue shrinking, comprising of mainly older generation. Main factors are the prolonged period of low fertility levels and the increased longevity in lives of older people. However, the two contrasting age groups have independent characteristics, drivers and reasons, which act as catalysts in their growth or decline. Further on in this section, four such factors are reviewed for both age groups: healthcare; education, employment and labor involvement; participation in society; enabling environment and living conditions. The information is taken from reports of statistics regarding children and young people in Europe, comprehending past, current and future developments in the spheres of education, medical care, lifestyle, professional life, housing situation. The same themes are reviewed in generations of old people through a tool called the Active Aging Index utilized to monitor occupation and involvement of the elderly in everyday life, as well as to understand their potentials, the impact of the fluxes in activity participation, and how enabling is the environment surrounding them. It is important to understand that all of these factors affect each other. Looking in more detail of what is behind the demographic trends driving current changes will help understand better the lives and choices of the two age groups.

Demographic Trends / Living Conditions

49

LIVING CONDITIONS IN OLDER GENERATIONS: HEALTHCARE

The growing portion of old people in need of medical care is affecting the health care system as well. However, it is an interdependent relationship considering that the improvements in health care technologies and its increased availability in the past years have facilitated the proliferation of this cohort. At their age, the elderly tend to develop multi-morbidity conditions, calling for costly medical care. Public and private health care institutionsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; development rocketed in the period between 1960 and 1970, as well improving the population coverage and provision of service. This was linked to the patientsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; willingness to invest more in their health in turn for better services, along with their high expectations.

Another research suggests that health care expenditure can be highly attributed to developments in health technologies. The progress in new technological advancements depends on how it affects costs regarding treating the patients as well as whether it complements or replaces already existing methods. The ability to treat previously untreatable conditions is another factor affecting expenditure in this sector. Therefore, the growing multitude of methods emerging to treat a greater variety of conditions amounts to increase in longevity. This affects falling mortality rates at all ages. However, increased longevity does not always mean an increasing number of healthy years. In many situations, especially when observing the elderly share of population, mortality rates drop at the expense of increased morbidity. Illness becomes chronic and treatment period is prolonged, thus, rising health care costs.

This brings a great impact on the demand and supply of healthcare goods and services, which is generated by several factors. In a general overview the main determinant aspects are population size and structure, their health status, individual and national income that help regulate access to health care goods and services. Looking at them separately and in more detail: the supply side depends on availability and distance of health care services, the framework in charge of providing them and the technological advancement; on the other hand, demand of health care services depends on the number of people in need, meaning the size of this group, but also their health status linked with their age and gender and most importantly the share of elderly people included.

There is a research showing the relationship between the age groups of individuals and their health care requirements in the EU countries. Results display that spending increases with age, more specifically at 55 and over for men, and 60 and over for women.

A debate poses the theory that maintaining a good health condition during a lifetime brings about lower health care costs and higher savings, since high expenditure on medical care are invested in the last years of oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s life. The improvements in technology and availability in health care services and treatments in the last decade are one of the reasons that resulted in allowing the old generations portion to grow fastest, from 2015 on, compared to the rest.

50

Demographic Trends / Living Conditions

EMPLOYMENT

The engagement in the labor market of older generations is one of the concerns of the Active Aging process â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a project developed by the EU to improve and track the quality of life among this group of population. This is one of the four domains, which are associated with real life experiences, meaning that they are directly involved in the situation, instead of it depending fully on external factors. According to the AAI, employment rates of people over 60 years old have improved between 2012 and 2014.

Nonetheless there is a big gender gap in most European countries, leaving women in the smaller share, with 30% of men versus 15% of women active in labor (Karpinska, Kasia, and Pearl Dykstra, 2015). Giving them the opportunity of providing finances themself, lightens the strain on the old age dependency ratio. Other than that, including the elderly share of population in activities gives them the benefit of socializing, which improves their well-being. It is important to improve this system in order to give them the sense of being heard, especially since analyses are showing that in Europe in 2015, from 8-10% of people 65 and over didnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t have someone to ask for help regarding socio-economic issues or discussing personal matters. Social interactions with family and friends have an effect on the quality of life in the sense that it acts as a buffer against the negative effects of stress. In 2015 in Europe, the frequency of old population getting together with family and relatives at least once per week was measured to 51.9%, and getting together with friends equaled 53.2% (Eurostat online data codes: ilc_scp15 and ilc_scp16).

Demographic Trends / Living Conditions

51

ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

An age-friendly city or community is a good place to grow old. Age-friendly cities and communities foster healthy and active ageing and thus enable well-being throughout life. They help people to remain independent for as long as possible, and provide care and protection when they are needed, respecting older people’s autonomy and dignity.

A very important factor in the older population is how much their environment is able to facilitate their needs. The healthcare system may work perfectly, and there may be infinite possibilities for employment and participation in society, but if the surrounding is not enabling they cannot use any of these amenities. According to a research done between 2000 and 2015, most of the old population lives in urban areas and this is due to the difference in mortality risks, detected to be higher in rural areas. Another research shows that, on a global level, population is mostly growing old in developing countries compared to developed ones (United Nations. “World population ageing.” 2015).

In Europe there is a project about Age-Friendly Environments where the fundamental idea is the ‘person-environment fit’ which is defined as a person’s ability to age well and independently and this depends on the relationship between their physical and mental capacity and the ‘press’ or barriers of their environment. There are 8 domains that deal with enabling environments for the elderly in this program. The first 3 domains focus on the physical component, taking care of structural barriers outside in their environment aiming to lower the disability threshold, and they are: ‘outdoor environments’, ‘transport and mobility’ and ‘housing’. The social sector of their lives is dealt with in the participatory and inclusive social environments domain, which can be highly interrelated to the physical environment domain. In this group of domains they are encouraging old people to live actively and take care of their health: ‘social participation’, ‘social inclusion and non-discrimination’, ‘civic engagement and employment’. The last group of domains covers the ways in which municipal and local government can contribute to supportive environments, important for providing communication and coordination between sectors: ‘communication and information’, ‘community and health services’ (WHO. “Age-friendly environments in Europe” 2017).

52

Demographic Trends / Living Conditions

LIVING CONDITIONS IN YOUNGER GENERATIONS: HEALTHCARE

There are three basic indicators that help define the degrees and prevalence of health status when making analysis of a population: self-perceived health, long-standing illness or health problem, and activity limitation. According to these factors, the young people in Europe are perceived as having constantly better health condition. This age group requires notable attention and observation, since health-related behavior surfaces in the adolescent period of life, and it is strongly affected by social and environmental factors. In a self-evaluation in 2013 in Europe, where participants were 16-29 years of age, an average of 92% stated that they were in ‘good’ or ‘very good’ health. On the other hand 4% of young people in Europe, in 2013, expressed that their medical examination needs were unmet, due to high costs, distance of medical services and long waiting lists (Eurostat online data code: yth_hlth_070).

Another type of research is the life expectancy at birth indicator that is connected to mortality levels. In the EU countries its levels are among the highest in the world. Taking in consideration the lower mortality rates, the young people in today’s Europe are expected to live longer than ever. Improved lifestyle, rising living standards and greater access to health care services are some of the reasons behind this prediction. In 2012 the life expectancy for a newborn baby was 80.3 years (Eurostat online data code: demo_mlexpec). The infant mortality rate displays a ratio of the portion of deaths of children who were born alive aged 1 year or less to the live births in a certain year. It is calculated per 1000 live births and in Europe this rate has declined for 90% since 1961 (Eurostat online data code: demo_minfind). This change is mirroring the improvements and advancements in medical treatment, the quality of delivery room technologies and methods and prevention of infant deaths. The overview of children and young people’s deaths shows that external factors are the most common cause. Transport accidents, intentional self-harm, accidental falls and assault are some of the situations that serve as an example of external factors.

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EDUCATION

Equal rights and opportunities of education must be provided for children and young people and this trend has been improving a lot in recent years. By making it more available the future possibilities for employment, success, social integration and wellbeing increase, and contribution toward an overall global development is secured. For early childhood education, rates of attendance are increasing steadily in Europe for those aged 3 to 5, while for younger children coverage rates are lower and very diversified across and within Member States. Research results show how attendance of good quality early child education are linked to better school performances. In the case of tertiary education, which considers universities, colleges and institutes, in Europe in 2012, the results showed that a majority of females 41%, and 31% of males, aged 30-34 have attended and successfully completed this type of education. An abundance of educational experience equals more opportunities for the job market, so the goal was that by 2020 the threshold of population that concluded tertiary education studies would be 40% (Eurostat online data code: educ_enrl1tl). Another important objective of the EU is to provide the population with the opportunity to learn at least two foreign languages starting from early education institutions. Meanwhile knowledge in mathematics, sciences and reading is considered as fundamental element of an individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s civic and professional life. Student mobility programs are another project funded by the EU, which helps young people acquire skills and knowledge as well as intercultural experiences.

The quality of education and childcare cannot be measured exactly, however there are factors that contribute to understanding the situation. Some of the most important indicators are those associated to class size and teacher to student ratios â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the lower the ratios, the higher the quality. In Europe there are large disparities among the countries regarding this issue. An average was calculated to be 13 students per teacher in 2012, however the situation in some countries is not even close to this (Eurostat online data code: educ_iste).

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Demographic Trends / Living Conditions

HOUSING CONDITIONS

The living conditions of children in Europe regard housing cost and quality and satisfaction, which also contribute to well being. The factors that aid in measuring the quality, facilities and available space in a household can also be used in making assumptions and analysis about financial situations within a society. A dwellingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s deficits indicate its quality, and the most important ones are a lack of sanitary facilities and problems in the general condition of the living unit (such as scarcity of light and leaking roof). In 2012 in Europe, the greater share of families with children were satisfied with their housing conditions, although this analysis can be considered subjective. Among the most often cited reasons for dissatisfaction is the shortage of space (one in five households with children in Europe, 2012). Close to one quarter of households with dependent children suffer from overcrowded homes (Eurostat, EU-SILC ad-hoc module 2012, variable HC080).

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Figure 4: Total dependency ratio for the world and regions

65 years or over

0-19 years

Figure 5: Children and young people aged under 20 years and older persons aged 65 years or over as a percentage of the global population in the dependent ages

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Demographic Trends / Dependency Ratio

DEPENDENCY RATIO

Taking in consideration the driving forces in demographics it can be expected that following cohortsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; lives last longer and fewer children would be there as prospective support in their later years. Here the population age structures will be described in terms of intergenerational support systems. It is possible by the use of a tool to measure the potential support needs. The support and dependency groups are assumed to be children and elderly who are in a period of their lives when they rely on the working age groups of society. Two types of systems exist through which finances can be provided for the support groups: direct transfer within a family, and indirect transfer by public transfer programs. The dependency ratio is defined as the proportion of young people up to the age of 20 plus old people who are 65 or older measured against the number of adults aged 20 to 64 years old. This indicates an average of the percentage of society needing support by each working age person. The specific ages of the groups vary among countries globally since factors such as pursuit of higher education and youth unemployment extend period of young peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s dependency, while health and financial considerations affect the periods of old peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s decisions about retirement.

Nonetheless, the previously mentioned age groups serve as a starting point for analysis of the dependency-support ratios.

The total dependency ratio has dropped to an unprecedented minimum regarding global statistics in 2015. Compared to the peak of an average of 112 dependents per 100 working-age people in the early 1970, the ratio declined gradually as a reflection of ongoing decrease in the global fertility rates to arrive at 74 dependents per 100 working-age individuals, in 2015. The predictions for the next decades, up to 2030, are expecting a gradual increase of 76 per 100, and up to 2050, it is projected that there will be 79 to 100. This slight increase is due to the constant growth in the share of old people, displayed by the major demographic trend mentioned before. When only the old-age dependency ratio is observed, the data are sharply increasing in European countries.

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FAMILY STRUCTURE AND COHABITATION

Across the past five decades, family structure has substantially changed and grown from the initial traditional image it used to represent. In the period of late 20th and early 21st century there was an emergence of non-traditional family forms and relationships, mostly due to the choice of young men and women to avoid long-term commitment regarding both romantic relationships and childbearing (Olรกh, 2015). The growth in diversity regarding family types suggested that the idea of a family is de-standardized and there is a change in the family life-course.

In Europe in 2013, less than one third, around 37%, of all households had children living there. Regarding couples, the statistics showed one in five households of all households or 20.5% with children, while 4.3% were single parent households with children. Out of all households only 5.8% were the ones where extended families lived, for example grandparents, parents and children (Eurostat online data code: lfst_hhnhtych). Marriage is not anymore considered the exclusive reason for partners to live together, but there are new living arrangement phenomena emerging around Europe. In 2013, 12.2% of young people in the age range 16-29 in Europe were living in a consensual union without any legal basis, while 10.7% of the same age group lived as married couples or in a consensual union with legal basis. As a consequence the rates of children born outside marriage are increasing, reaching 40% of all born children in 2011 in Europe (Eurostat EU-SILC 2013).

All these changes bring about a need of new typologies of housing, also considering the unstable financial situation of the young in their period of transition. What used to be the norm size of a household in Europe is shrinking in past decades, and it can be attributed to all generations of society, due to more elderly living alone, higher divorce rates, shift of a household structure from extended family oriented toward nuclear family oriented. In 2016 in Europe the two prevalent types of households were composed of one person 32.5% or two persons 31.2%. Greater households constitute a much a smaller share of only 16.3% comprising of three people, 13.6% of four people household, 4.4% of five people households and 2% of six or more people (Eurostat ilc_lvph03).

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Demographic Trends / Family Structure and Cohabitation

LIVING APART TOGETHER â&#x20AC;&#x201C; LAT COUPLES

Increasing trend in the patterns of family structures in Europe are couples who live apart together. This is defined as two people in an intimate relationship who do not habitually share the same home. Their marriage status isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t important, as well as the reason behind them not sharing a household. What is essential is that they consider themselves a couple in front of others (Lesthaeghe, 1995). Since the idea of a couple is nowadays evolving and being redefined, where new communication technologies play a major role, so are preferences such as importance of physical closeness, social construction of love, commitment or sexual fidelity. These are intimate and subjective choices, which brings about the creation of new family and cohabiting arrangements.

Studying the LATs is difficult since their status is undetermined in regards to whether they consider it a stable phenomenon or a transitional situation. In order to make an analysis they are often compared to individuals who live alone, cohabit or are married.

According to research results, their plans for the future depend on three factors: period of life the partners are in at the moment, the way they understand and articulate their relationship, and cultural and social pressures. One fifth of the LAT couples in Europe have stated that they remain in the same living arrangement three years after the relationship began. Meanwhile 30% stated that they do not intend to live with the partner in the future, compared to 70% who said they plan to live together in the future. Regardless of the fact that they do not live together, geographical proximity is an important factor and there is usually high frequency of contact between the LAT partners. However the most important factor seems to be the way these individuals experience and understand their relationship. 75% of LATs have an understanding that living together is not an essential part of a relationship and that the decisions made by the couple are intimate (Ayuso, L. 2019).

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MIGRATION AND FLOWS

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INTRODUCTION

In the Cambridge Dictionary migration is defined as the process of people traveling to a new place to live, usually in large numbers. There are two main types of migration: voluntary migration and forced migration. Voluntary migration may depend on the changes in oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s life course (getting married, empty-nest, retirement), politics (for instance for those who aim to move from a conservative state to a more liberal one), individual preferences (for instance about suburban life versus city life). Forced migration comprises four main types, on which we focus in this chapter. Refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced people, and stateless persons. Looking through the migration history will help to understand the changes over time in the world flows. We focus on forced migration, and we will go deeper into flows in Europe after analyzing the factors of migration. There are also critical major host countries which are not in Europe that will be considered. Changes over time in these countries will help us to understand the importance of migration at different scales: the global scale, the European scale, the national scale.

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1. Factors of Migration People migrate to achieve a better quality of life, so the reasons for migrations are related to some kind of inadequacy of the region where they live. We draw attention to push–pull models that assume that population growth and environmental degradation directly cause migration.

Push Factors: These are reasons for leaving a place – emigrating – because of certain difficulties like food shortage, war, floods, calamities, etc.

Pull Factors: These are reasons for moving into a place –immigrating – because of an aspiration, dream, or something desirable like abundance in food supply, a better climate, more freedom, labor demand, etc.

A multi-pronged understanding of migration is needed, that takes account of many aspects, like economic, political, social and natural factors. We shall go through them.

Economic Factors: Unemployment is a major driving force for migration. It might be due to low education or low skill level or to the lack of jobs in the area of residence, especially in rural- areas (this explains why migration rates in rural areas are much higher than in urban centers). Over history, there have been many migrations due to economic reasons. For instance, hundreds of thousands of people who have moved from peripheral countries to European countries with strong and growing industrial economies during the Fordist decades, where a huge lack of workforce in the industrial production was observed.(Gautam 1970)

Table 1 . Economic Factors of Migration, (Aguiar, 2015)

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Political Factors: Many people are forced to migrate because of wars, civil wars or state policies which discriminate against particular categories of citizens, or oppression of political opponents. These people are forced to leave and unable to return home, due to serious risks of being persecuted. For instance, millions of the ongoing civil war in Syria has caused over 11 million people to migrate to find safety. Data show that around 6.2 million Syrians are internally displaced, and over 5.6 million Syrians are refugees.

(Kohen, 1995) Social Factors: Migrants are going away from the place where they live because of insufficient welfare conditions, poor education opportunities, bad health, etc. Families migrate to provide a better future for their children, or are often separated by migration, with one parent (usually the father) moving to a new context, and sending remittances to their household in the country of origin. (Giovetti, 2019) Natural Disasters: Landslides, earthquakes, droughts, floods and volcanic eruptions occur and jeopardize the security of many families, causing migration. In several African countries, for instance â&#x20AC;&#x201D; including Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia â&#x20AC;&#x201D; droughts became increasingly severe, leaving immeasurable citizens without the power to grow food, without access to scrub water, and the risk to use dirty or contaminated water.(Giobetti, 2019)

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2.Historical Changes on Migration Flows 3. Historical changes on migration flows Humans have always migrated in groups to seek freedom from war and conflict, to get away hunger and poverty, to locate new economic possibilities and employment, to flee from religious intolerance or political repression, or even to trade and to travel to new places. The historian Robin Cohen (1995) has recognized some major migration intervals, which have taken place over the last four centuries: • Slavery, 1550 to the end of the 18th century; • Permanent settlement in the colonies, 1500s to mid 19th century; • Migration within Europe, Africa and Asia, 17th-18th centuries; • Indentured labour, 1834-1917; • Migration to the New World, 1800s-1930; • Post WWII migration, late 1940s to 1960s; • Post 1970s migration.

In particular, post WWII migration happened when labour was needed in the post-war reconstruction efforts in Europe. It happened with the economic boom in Europe, North America and Australia. For instance, people from former colonies in the Carribbean and South Asia came to Britain to find a job, and from former French colonies in North Africa went to France.

For a few categories of migrants, along with the ones from Britain to Australia, this migration became perceived as an everlasting circulate that turned into endorsed by the receiving nation - it value just £10 (below a tenth of the usual price) for a fare to enable humans to emigrate to Australia (as a result recognized as ‘ten-pound poms’).

Many other corporations of migrants, including migrants from Turkey to Germany, were given transient visas as ‘guest workers’. Many of these labor migrants, inclusive of South Asian migrants to the UK, went directly to settle inside the receiving country.

Since the 1970s, the range of sending and destination international locations has grown phenomenally. In addition to the conventional immigration receiving countries inside the Americas, Western Europe, and Australia and New Zealand, several different countries appeal to a growing populace of migrants. These include locations that had traditionally been nations of emigration, like Italy, Spain, and Portugal in Southern Europe.

Additionally, the escalation of oil charges and the ensuing economic growth in the Gulf vicinity has caused large immigration to those nations to satisfy the demand for labor, although most of this isn’t everlasting migration. There has also been an upward push in labor migration to newly industrialized international locations in Asia such as Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore from poorer countries in Asia, like Burma and Bangladesh.

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The latest phase of migration displays ever different features. According to the UN, the number of women migrant population has increased. We can say that in 2005 half of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s migrants were women. There were more female migrants than males in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, Oceania and the former USSR (Koser,2016). Women usually migrated either to join their family or they migrated with their family in earlier periods. In more recent times, women are also labour migrants, often the primary earners for their families.

Transient and circular migration are also becoming more important, as opposed to permanent migration. People are more likely than before to migrate more than once in their lives, to specific countries, and to go back to their country of origin. (Kohen, 1995)

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3. Types of Migration Human migration is the permanent or semi-permanent relocation of people from one location to another. This movement may occur domestically or internationally and can affect economic structures, population densities, culture, and politics. Receving countries can benefit from migrants, for example, since they bring with them new trades, talents and a less expensive workforce. At the same time, big inflows of migrants can result in pressure on housing supply, healthcare and training services provision. Moreover, cultural variations can result in racial tensions.

Why do we focus on forced migration? Forced migration is a dramatic process, the result of persecution, danger or exploitation. Forced migration often affects host countries more than voluntary migration, because these flows are more unpredictable and generally forced migrants need more assistance. Upon arrival, shelter and emergency reception are needed. Soon later, encompassing accompaniment towards integration is needed. Job insertion and achievement of autonomy are often hindered by language and cultural barriers, but also by bureaucracy and discrimination. This situation brings economic and political problems.

Forced migration is not always violent. One of the largest involuntary migrations in history was caused by development. The construction of Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Three Gorges Dam displaced nearly 1.5 million people and put 13 cities, 140 towns, and 1,350 villages underwater. Although new housing was provided for those forced to move, many people were not compensated fairly. Some of the newly designated areas were also less ideal geographically, not foundationally secure, or lacked agriculturally productive soil.

For all these reasons, we focus on the four main types of forced migration, that are refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced people and stateless person. These are the definitions according to UNHCR.

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Refugees are people fleeing conflict or persecution. They are defined and protected by international law, and must not be returned to situations where their life and freedom are at risk.

1960

2018 Figure 1: Map of host countries changes worldwide concerning refugees, (UNHCR, 2019)

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The refugee condition has always existed, but it has enourmously increased over time, for several reasons. As we can see from the maps, during the 1960s, flows are readable but not effective as it is in 2018. The number of refugees in 1960 was 1,656,664; in 2018 it has risen up to 20,360,562. According to the latest searches, the major source country of refugees is Syria, and the major host country is Turkey. Lebanon hosts the largest number of refugees relative to its national population (UNHCR 2019).

Figure 2: Major host countries of refugees (UNHCR, 2019)

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The refugee condition has always existed, but it has enourmously increased over time, for several reasons. As we can see from the maps, during the 1960s, flows are readable but not effective as it is in 2018. The number of refugees in 1960 was 1,656,664; in 2018 it has risen up to 20,360,562. According to the latest searches, the major source country of refugees is Syria, and the major host country is Turkey. Lebanon hosts the largest number of refugees relative to its national population (UNHCR 2019).

Figure 3: Major source countries of refugees (UNHCR, 2019)

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Internally displaced people (IDPs) have not crossed a border to find safety. Unlike refugees, they are on the run within their country of origin.

1960

2018 Figure 4: Map of host countries changes worldwide concerning internally displaced persons

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Internally displaced persons are more numerous than refugees worldwide. There is no data about them for the 1960. Data start showing numbers of IDP from 1993 on. In 1993 internally displaced persons were 4,198,400; in 2018 they are estimated to have risen up to 41,425,147. Numbers are showing how many people have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence. According to the latest searches about internally displaced persons, the major concerned country is Colombia (UNHCR 2019).

Figure 5: Ten largest IDP populations (UNHCR, 2019)

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Stateless person is â&#x20AC;&#x153;a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its lawâ&#x20AC;?. In simple terms, this means that a stateless person does not have a nationality of any country. Some people are born stateless; others become stateless at a certain point in their life, for different reasons.

1960

2018 Figure 6: Map of host countries concerning stateless persons

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Socio-Economic Changes / Migration and Flows

An asylum-seeker is someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed.

Every year, around one million people in the world seek asylum. National asylum systems are in place to determine who qualifies for international protection. However, during mass movements of refugees, usually as a result of conflict or violence, it is not always possible or necessary to conduct individual interviews with every asylum seeker who crosses a border. These groups are often called â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;prima facieâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; refugees.

1960

2018 Figure 7: Map of host countries changes worldwide concerning refugees

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Asylum seekers are not recorded by data in 1960; in 2018 their number is estimated at 3,503,284. It is hard to ignore the fact that every year the number of people who are seeking to find safety is increasing. According to the latest searches about asylum seekers, the major source country is Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the major host country is the United States of America (UNHCR 2019).

Figure 8: Major cource countries of new asylum-seekers l 2017-2018 (UNHCR,2019)

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Figure 9: Major recipient countries of new asylum-seekers l 2017-2018 (UNHCR,2019)

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Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Germany France Italy Serbia and Kosovo United Kingdom

Germany

Bosnia

Serbia Kosovo

Germany

Germany

France

Germany

Country / territory of asylum/residence Figure 10: Number of persons of concern in major European countries, (UNHCR,2019)

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Afghanistan Colombia Iran

Afghanistan

Jordan Lebanon Pakistan Sudan

Turkey

Turkey

Colombia

USA

Colombia

Turkey Afghanistan

Figure 11: Number of persons of concern in major Non European countries, (UNHCR,2019)

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4. Forced Migrants Over The World

Figure 12: Map - Amount of people concerned by forced migration by receiving in the world (UNHCR,2019) This map shows the amount of people concerned by forced migration over the world.

Considering the world scale gives different information. It is easy to understand that every country has different types and different number of migrants. Some countries have more refugees, others have more stateless persons (UNHCR 2019).

Figure 13: Yearly changes of persons of concern in the world (UNHCR,2019)

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Figure 14: Map - Amount of people concerned by forced migration by receiving world regions (UNHCR,2019)

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%52

Female

%57 %44 %41

Africa

Europe

%49

%45

%47

Children

%48 %49

%37

Americas

Middle East and North Africa

Asia and Pacific

Figure 15: Demographic characteristics of refugee population by UNHCR regions-end 2018 Migration flows happen all around the world. It could be one country from another border country or continent to continent. Currently the bigger challenge is related to Syria, the major country of origin for refugees. They mostly flee to Turkey, which is next to Syria, but huge numbers seek to reach Europe.

Syrian Arab Republic

Venezuala South Sudan Dem. Rep. of Congo Afghanistan Iraq El Salvador - Honduras Guatemala - Mexico

Turkey

Peru Sudan Uganda United States of America Germany

Figure 16: Countries of asylum and countries of origin of refugees and asylum seekers in 2018, (UNHCR, 2019)

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As legal arrivals to Europe are reduced to minimal numbers, both refugees and economic migrants often undertake routes to reach and pass European borders that imply major risks for migrantsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; security and life, with impressing numbers of deaths. For the first half of 2018, more people arrived in Greece than Italy or Spain, in the second half, however, the primary entry point became Spain as more and more â&#x20AC;&#x201C; due to more severe closure policy in Italy â&#x20AC;&#x201C; people attempted the perilous sea crossing over the Western Mediterranean. Elsewhere in Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina recorded some 24,100 arrivals as refugees and migrants looking for new routes to EU Member States were transiting through the Western Balkans. Cyprus received several boats wearing Syrians from Lebanon, alongside arrivals from Turkey and extra by means of air, straining lodging and processing capacity; and, towards the end of the year, small numbers of people tried to make the sea crossing from France to the UK.

Passing from the sea is not the only option to reach Europe, but it is the deadliest scenario. Dead and missing along the routes are due for 49% to drowning in the sea, 31% to car/ truck crash, 8% is weather related.

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5. Major Countries for Refugee, Asylum Seeker, Internally Displaced People and Stateless Person Maps to show major countries for each topic

Figure 17: Map of person of concern in Turkey, (UNHCR,2019) Refugees are the majority of persons of concern in Turkey. Total amount of persons of concern is 3,99 million.

Figure 18: Yearly changes of persons of concern in Turkey (UNHCR,2019)

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Figure 19: Map of persons of concern in Italy, (UNHCR,2019) Refugees and asylum seekers are the majority in Italy â&#x20AC;&#x201C;Total amount of persons of concern is 295.599 .

Figure 20: Yearly changes of persons of concern in Italy (UNHCR,2019)

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Figure 21: Map of persons of concern in Germany, (UNHCR,2019) Refugees and Asylum Seekers are the majority in Germany. Total amount of persons of concern is 1.45 million.

Figure 22: Yearly changes of persons of concern in Germany (UNHCR,2019)

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Figure 23: Map of persons of concern in Colombia, (UNHCR,2019) Internally displaced people are the majority in Colombia. Total amount of persons of concern is 9.02 million.

Figure 24: Yearly changes of persons of concern in Colombia (UNHCR,2019)

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Figure 25: Map of Persons of concern in Thailand, (UNHCR,2019) Stateless persons are the majority in Thailand. Total amount of persons of concern is 582.130.

Figure 26: Yearly changes of persons of concern in Thailand (UNHCR,2019)

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EXAMPLES Since the unpredictable migration flows generate huge and urgent needs for shelter and accommodation, there are several references about emergency housing solutions that deserve attention. â&#x20AC;˘ Berlin Tempelhof Airport Shelters, Germany The refugee housing facilities at Berlinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s former Tempelhof airport include an unusual story. Built inside several hangars of the big aviation hub at the height of the refugee crisis in the past due 2015, the Tempelhof refugee accommodation become assembled as an emergency solution on the time.

Initially housing 2,500 migrants in October 2015, occupancy numbers declined steadily, as migrants have been relocated to other locations either inside Germany or elsewhere within the European Union, or in which resettled outside of the EU. One 12 months on, there have been fewer than 700 refugees living in the hangars at Tempelhof via overdue 2016. Two years into the initiative, only approximately 200 refugees remained housed there, according to Theresa Jochan, spokeswoman of Tamaja - the operator of the refugee facility. (Parsloe, 2017)

Figure 27: Order of the rooms.

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Figure 28: Interior of rooms.

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Figure 29: Area between rooms.

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• Okayama Prefecture, Japan, Shigeru Ban After the earthquake in Japan, many households discovered themselves residing on the ground of shelters and gymnasiums, sharing one space with strangers in an identical situation. even though this became tolerable for a few days, their loss of privacy began becoming a problem after weeks of living in this way.

“They made of two sizes of cardboard tubing, plywood, ropes and white curtains, the modular system allows for fast and easy assembly and disassembly. the structure can be made different dimensions for different sized families depending on where the cloth is hung. 1,800 individual units of PPS paper partition system were assembled in 50 provisional shelters for evacuees affected by the disaster. it is a cost effective solution to harness materials that are easily available and recyclable.” (Bora, 2011)

Figure 30: The structure of shelter.

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Figure 31: The area before the structure.

Figure 32: The area after the structure.

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• Calais Jungl e, France The Jungle is one of the main examples of refugee camps. The difference from the other camps is that The Jungle is an unofficial refugee camp in Calais. It is built by refugees for themselves. The Jungle is like a small city. There are almost all the functions they could need such as doctors, schools, places of worship and even night clubs. It has a shopping street, libraries, and a hotel “But there are no such things as architects, urban planners or engineers. What is built in the Jungle is based on the refugees’ desires, memories and shared symbols. Shelter, religion, education, trading and culture are five clear aspects of any community and they are present in the Jungle.” (Flinder, 2016)

Figure 33: A view from the top.

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Figure 34: A view of the church and the material of the shelters.

Figure 35: New types in between with the old ones.

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â&#x20AC;˘ Dadaab- Kenya The Dadaab refugee complex has a population of 217,108 registered refugees and asylum seekers as at the end of October 2019. Dadaab refugee complex consists of three camps. The first camp was established in 1991, when refugees fleeing the civil war in Somalia started to cross the border into Kenya. A second large influx occurred in 2011, when some 130,000 refugees arrived, fleeing drought and famine in southern Somalia.

In the year of 2019, Kenyan authorities had concerns about the security issue of the camp. They consider to close the camp. It is not the first time that they had discussed about closure of Dadaab. Also in 2016 they tried but The High Court in Kenya has blocked the government.

Figure 36: Top view.

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Figure 37: Some shelter types

Figure 37: Some shelter types

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• Ludwissvorstadt, Munich The “bauhütte” was demolished. Walls were torn down, wallpaper stripped, and floors removed to prepare the “belleveu” for its forthcoming renovation. Renovation has an idea to retain as much as possible. People from asylum seeker center worked in this construction. This place built for refugee women with children. Some german students also volunteered to work in the construction. About this project they think to create more social and integrated place.

Figure 38-39: Demolishing of the existance interior strucure.

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Figure 40: Entrance.

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GLOSSARY

RISK OF POVERTY Or monetary poverty a threshold set at 60% of national median equalized disposable income after social transfers, reflecting the relativeness of poverty in time and place.

SEVERE MATERIAL DEPRIVATION The rate is defined as the enforced inability to pay for at least four of the deprivation items. unexpected expenses; one week of annual holiday away from home; arrears; a meal with meat or fish every other day; to keep the home a warm; a washing machine; a color television; a telephone; or a car; VERY LOW WORK INTINSITY RATE the share of population aged 0 to 59 years living in households where the working age inhabitants worked less than 20% of their total work potential during the past year.

PRECARIOUSNESS Insecure employment, unsupportive entitlements and vulnerable employees. Precarious can be defined as intersection of these three.

NEET Young people between 20-34 years old neither in employment nor in education or training.

OVERCROWDING RATE The overcrowding rate is defined on the basis of the number of rooms available to a household, the householdâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s size, family situation and the ages of its members HOUSING COST OVERBURDEN RATE The share of the population living in households that spend 40 % or more of their disposable income on housing.

ENERGY POVERTY When a household is unable to access energy services at the home up to a socially and materially necessary level.

SEVERE HOUSING DEPRIVATION The percentage of population living in the dwelling which is considered as overcrowded, while also exhibiting at least one of the housing deprivation measures: leaking roof, no bath/shower and no indoor toilet, or a dwelling considered too dark.

DEMOGRAPHY the study of statistics such as births, deaths, income, or the incidence of disease, which illustrate the changing structure of human populations.

LAT Two people in an intimate relationship who do not habitually share the same home, but they consider themselves a couple in front of others

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GLOSSARY

DEPENDENCY/SUPPORT RATIO the proportion of young people up to the age of 20 plus old people who are 65 or older to the number of adults aged 20 to 64 years old. This indicates an average of the percentage of society needing support by each working age person CONSENSUAL UNION a spoken agreement between partners in a romantic relationship about living together, with or without legal basis DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVER major factors and trends affecting the demographic changes ACTIVE AGING INDEX a tool used to monitor occupation and involvement of the elderly in everyday life COHORT a group of people with a common statistical characteristic LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH an indicator of longevity that mainly considers mortality levels for prediction; person-environment fit’ -which is defined as a person’s ability to age well and independently and this depends on the relationship between their physical and mental capacity and the ‘press’ or barriers of their environment REFUGEE Refugees are people fleeing conflict or persecution. They are defined and protected by international law, and must not be returned to situations where their life and freedom are at risk.

ASYLUM-SEEKER An asylum-seeker is someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed.

Every year, around one million people in the world seek asylum. National asylum systems are in place to determine who qualifies for international protection. However, during mass movements of refugees, usually as a result of conflict or violence, it is not always possible or necessary to conduct individual interviews with every asylum seeker who crosses a border. These groups are often called ‘prima facie’ refugees.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPS) Internally displaced people (IDPs) have not crossed a border to find safety. Unlike refugees, they are on the run at within their country of origin.

STATELESS PERSON Stateless person is “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law”. In simple terms, this means that a stateless person does not have a nationality of any country.

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GLOSSARY

MIGRATION the process of people traveling to a new place to live, usually in large numbers.

FORCED MIGRATION Forced migration is a negative form of migration, often the result of persecution, development, or exploitation.

VOLUNTARY MIGRATION Voluntary migration is migration based on oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s free will and initiative. People move for a variety of reasons, and it involves weighing options and choices. It is where the migrant has a choice whether or not to migrate.

Push Factors These are reasons for leaving a place, which is called emigrating, because of certain difficulties like food shortage, war, flood, calamities, etc.

Pull Factors These are reasons for moving into a place, which is called immigrating, because of an aspiration, dream, or something desirable like abundance in food supply, a better climate, more freedom, etc.

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