nology and media (newscast satellites, video, cable TV, the first PCs). The transmission and distribution of news became increasingly faster and the content became more international and global. New information technology and media further influenced education, learning processes, and our perception in general (for example our understanding of time and space) (Schäfers 1998, p. 239). New media and communication technologies opened up new possibilities for everyone, yet, at the same time, they asked for new skills and qualifications. The expectations and the pressure to perform grew accordingly. New communication technologies were the catalyzer for the West German performance society. The production and distribution of media grew tremendously and lead to increasing competition and growing pressure to perform. At the same time, this development was the material-technical base for further automatization of the individual and offered new possibilities if the necessary qualifications were met. In addition to the “hardware” of new communication technologies that opened up new possibilities and conditions, the “software” of the democratic constitution of the FRG also played an important role. First and foremost, freedom of expression and freedom of press were protected by the constitution. Even if Michael Gehler (2011, p. 194) argues that West German media was not entirely free and independent of political interests, and that it was actively involved in the cold war between West and East, West German media, the cultural scene and the arts developed comparatively independent from influence or control by the state. An independent media scene is crucial for a public discussion of social affairs, it is important for free and critical opinion formation and is the base for the development of an “emancipated citizen.” Just as new communication technologies were an important material-technical premise for the automatization of the individual, a functional and independent information and media scene were a crucial premise for the development of an “emancipated citizen” who is capable to develop an autonomous and independent opinion. At the same time, it became more difficult to live up to the growing expectations. Up to day, we are expected to accumulate knowledge in all different social sectors, to permanently keep that knowledge up to date, and to critically discuss our own profound opinion, meaning to act as “emancipated citizens.” More and more people are unwilling to meet that demand, partly because of the fast-paced and confusing information flood. The economic and social state of the FRG was such that we can talk about a knowledge-based information society starting with the 98 Ukázka elektronické knihy, UID: KOS276415
mid 1990s. A democratic tradition, a social market and the resulting private prosperity, education, and freedom of speech lead to a change in dominant, guiding values from materialistic values geared towards physical and economic security and material gain, to more individualistic values geared towards self-expression and quality of life. According to modernization theories, this development in the FRG is typical for the post-modernization of a value system (Inglehart, Welzel 2007, p. 58). Given the economic and social development of the FRG after 1945, I can reformulate the hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 in regard to the West German value set as follows: H West Germany: The West German set of values ascertained in this study is expected to incorporate more post-materialistic values that are geared towards the individual’s freedom of choice and quality of life, and less materialistic values that are geared towards physical and economic security. West German concepts of life and partnership are expected to be performance-oriented, and in accordance with values that guarantee individual self-determination, quality of life and self-responsibility.
3.3.2 East Germany after 1945 a) Economic and political development An overview over the economic development in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) after WW2 has to focus on the defining political system, which influenced the GDR’s development to a much stronger degree than the democratic political system in West Germany ever did. I will thus concentrate on important political decisions and developments and their consequences for the GDR’s economic situation. My summary is based on the work of three historians focusing on the period in question (Heydemann 2003, Wehler 2008, and Gehler 2011). Even though the destruction caused by the Allie’s air raids during WW2 was much smaller in the East than it was in the West, the population of the Soviet Occupation Zone (SOZ/GDR) suffered just as much or even more from the war’s consequences until the mid-1950s. This was partly due to the strict reparation claims of the Soviet occupying forces that started with the demolition of about 3,400 industrial plants right after the war, leading to a drastic decline in the production capacity of the SOZ/GDR. 200 of the more important industrial companies were 99 Ukázka elektronické knihy, UID: KOS276415
transferred to the Soviet Corporation (SAG), which, up until 1953 only generated reparation payments for the Soviet Union (see also Wehler 2008, p. 90). Overall, the SOZ/GDR had to pay a total of 14 billion US Dollar as reparation payments (Heydemann 2003, p. 88) and, in 1946, had to cover half of the Soviet’s expenses for the occupation. In 1953, the reparation payments of the SOZ/GDR still made up 13% of the GNP, and only in 1954 did the Soviet Union refrain from further reparation payments and began to cover the expenses for the occupation itself (Wehler 2008, p. 91, Heydemann 2003, p. 19, p. 88). Even more important for the economic development were political decisions, first and foremost the monopoly of power of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and its restructuring following the example of the Communist Party (KpdSU) of the Soviet Union (Heydemann 2003, p. 13). Through the Stalinization of the SED, the authorities in Moscow were able to influence, to politically indoctrinate, to regulate and to “ideologize” most areas of social life in East Germany. This finally led to the founding of a German Worker- and Farmer State on October 7th of 1949 (Heydemann 2003, p. 13). The 3rd party convention of the SED in 1950 set the course for Socialism, and introduced planned economy with a five-year plan (1951–1955). Following instructions from Moscow, the focus was on the heavy industries, such as steel construction and ironworking, even though the SOZ/GDR did not have the necessary natural resources and had to import them at high cost. Since over half of the investments in the early 1950s went into heavy industries, other preexisting industrial sectors, such as engineering, precision industries or the famous optical manufactures in Jena could not grow. Similar to the consumer goods industry, they had to reduce their production (see also Steiner 2007, Heydemann 2003, p. 89, Wehler 2008, p. 91). The constant loss of human capital was another decisive factor for the social and economic development of the GDR. In 1952/3 almost 500 000 residents fled the rising repression, the state’s indoctrination and the declining quality of life. When the State decided to rise the labor standard again by 10% and therewith worsened the already difficult living conditions, workers took to the street on June 17th, 1953. Thousands of workers in Berlin and other cities took part in demonstrations and almost all businesses went on strike. The uprising itself and the violent reaction of the Soviet occupation forces clearly showed that the real power was in the hands of the Soviets. It also showed that the party had very little support in the population and that the party’s existence and preservation was 100 Ukázka elektronické knihy