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CTLA Feature Articles and Case Notes

adequately take care of its employees who were responsible for operating some of its trains alone (SPTO); it was not sufficiently vigilant when it allowed certain trains to be immobilized on the main line at the top of a slope; and, despite its experience in the transportation of dangerous goods and its frequent and direct links with IOL the importer of the dangerous goods in question, it may not have had thorough knowledge of the petroleum products that it agreed to transport.

Conclusion

The evidence reveals quite clearly and unequivocally that the reason the train of tank cars moved on the night of July 6, 2013, was because the locomotive engineer who was responsible for securing the train did not do his job properly and, firstly, failed to apply sufficient emergency brakes and, secondly, failed to perform the mandatory and necessary tests to verify and ensure that a sufficient number of hand brakes were applied. Furthermore, by not returning to the site after being informed that the locomotive providing the necessary air pressure for the air brake system was shut down, this employee negligently ignored the consequences of this situation.

The evidence also reveals that while it is certainly preferable not to leave trains immobilized on a main line, particularly at the top of a slope, this can be done safely as long as appropriate measures are put in place to ensure that the train is adequately secured and will remain so, regardless of the circumstances.

Endnotes

1 2022 QCCS 4643. This is a 216-page judgment and our case analysis refers to the discussion concerning the liability of MMA and the action of CP. The Court also reviewed the liability of other parties that are not discussed in the article. The Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal on January 13, 2023.

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