Consistency and Inconsistency in Stories: The Case of Dr Crippen

be whether they committed the crime of which they were accused, but why they were declared guilty at the fi rst trial. And because there were three subsequent decisions (not guilty, guilty, not guilty), for each we can ask what explains it. There are plenty of studies undertaken by researchers in sociology, psychology, law, criminology and associated fi elds that off er interesting hypotheses in this regard, and these are the foundation to each of the chapters that follow.

But this is not a book about what might broadly be termed the sociology of law. Its focus and objective are rather diff erent. Each chapter takes a well- known case from the annals of criminal trials and uses it to illustrate some of the processes at work in the construction of guilt or innocence. This case- study approach brings with it one great advantage and two important limitations. First, case studies provide a rich description of the processes at work in the construction of guilt and innocence, even if they are not immediately evident, and help to illuminate the otherwise abstract – although invaluable – concepts and theories that are of relevance in explaining outcomes. Second, however, a single case can never conclusively demonstrate that the explanation proposed for its outcome is valid. Confi rmation of explanations requires a sample of cases with varied outcomes (in this case, judgments of both guilt and innocence) in order to demonstrate that a particular cause is associated with a particular eff ect. Third, a single case will generally combine a number of processes that lead to its outcome. Our answer to the fi rst limitation is already stated: we believe the cases chosen illustrate, sometimes quite vividly, the abstract hypotheses proposed by researchers, even as they fail to constitute proof that the hypothesised process was at work. For example, the portrayal of Amanda Knox by the prosecution and a signifi cant portion of the media as a sexually deviant and violent female fi ts the feminist theory that women who kill are judged by harsh patriarchal standards. Our answer to the second limitation is that although we select and review each case in relation to a specifi c process in the construction of guilt and innocence, in subsequent chapters we identify additional processes at work in some of the cases already reviewed. We do not subscribe to a monocausal view of the construction of truths. For example, in addition to patriarchal values that might have infl uenced the court which fi rst convicted Knox, it is also likely that her ‘confession’ – produced under duress and soon retracted – contributed to the perception of her guilt.

Our defence of the use of cases is also based on the widespread attention that they have attracted. From a practical perspective, this means that there is a lot more material available with which to approach them. But more than that, these cases have attracted attention because they have involved signifi cant, often highly fraught, disputes about guilt and innocence. As such, the counterposed strategies for arguing one side or the other bring the manufactured quality of ‘truth’ to the fore. The Knox/ Sollecito trials