Short Essay on Piracy in Somalia Liwia Kiryk

ShortEssayonPiracyinSomalia

LiwiaKiryk,November2021

LiwiaKirykisajuniormajoringinInternationalRelationswithafocusonAfrica.

Piracy in Somalia flourished between 2007 and 2012 due to illegal fishing and instability within the country. What is more, pirates reflect the logic of supply chains, imperialism, and security in how they counter and interact with the system of logistics as a whole. However, this rise of piracy is also deeply embedded in the country’s history. In order to understand why piracy began to flourish, one must go back to the presidency of Mohamed Siyad Barre.

In 1972, Barre decreed Somalia’s territorial waters 200 miles off the coast. Additionally, he tried to promote nation-building by creating a deep-sea fishing fleet, constructed fish factories, and created fishing cooperatives to jump-start the country’s economy. Although a domestic economy around fishing did not thrive, it led to the establishment of a fishing license system, which changed the sea from a “sea of fish” to “the sea as a natural resource belonging to the state that could be harnessed and exploited by the… government and other private actors through licensing” (Dua 34). Foreign companies were required to purchase licenses to fish in Somali waters, with the country taking a cut of the profits. This system produced complex competition between the local Somali fishers and international fishing companies. As more foreign companies began fishing in Somali waters, they started liaising with local fishermen for protection (and to keep local fishers out of their way), which led to the creation of local fishing militias and militarized security.

This paved the way to “violent confrontations between local protection groups and foreign fishing vessels, especially those that attempted to fish in the area without official or unofficial ‘licenses’” (Dua 54).

At the same time, the regime of Siyad Barre toppled, and the semi-autonomous region of Puntland was established. Puntland turned to fishing as a source of revenue and established a coast guard staffed by private military and security companies, which began policing the waters off the coast to ensure everyone had a license to fish. Here, the logic of protection and policing began to shift into a logic of piracy. The coastguard, with its “armed skiffs would intercept fishing trawlers at sea and ‘sell’ licenses to boat captains,” with the “fees from these licenses… divided amongst the crew and authorities on land” (Dua 56). This led to the emergence of an entire licensing economy. Like their later pirate counterparts, the members of these coast guards would capture a ship to inspect if it had a license and then sell the captain a license on the spot. The coast guard members would redistribute the money from the sale, just as pirates redistribute the ransom they receive after capturing ships. The forceful sale of these licenses by the coast guard created a complex relationship with the local fishing militias and crews, often operating in the shadows of the fishing economy, causing overlapping and skirmishing between the groups. Although the coastguard somewhat aided in the quelling of illegal fishing, many of these companies were eventually shut down because they fell out of favor with the present regime, leaving groups of well-trained and well-armed men unemployed. Equipped with resources and knowledge of the sea, alongside a memory of profiture through license selling, many of the men who once worked as “‘license protectors’” transformed into pirates (Dua 57).

These pirates reflect the logic of supply chains, not only because they create and are dependent on supply chains of their own, but also because they demonstrate the fragility of the network through the threat they pose to it. To understand the relationship pirates have with this

system, however, one must understand the system as a whole. Logistics refers to “the process of planning and executing the efficient transportation and storage of goods from the point of origin to the point of consumption” (Essex 1). While it used to play a pivotal role in the movement of military goods and personnel, it is now concerned with how goods are moved within the global supply chain. This system relies on intermodalism, that is, “the seamless movement of goods or people from origin to destination, using several modes of transportation” (Szyliowicz 2000). While the role of intermodalism within the global logistics system is to ensure that supply chains run as friction-free as possible, it is also what makes them most vulnerable. Any breakdown or choke point within this system can cripple the world economy, and it is precisely this weak point on which pirates prey. For Somali pirates, “piracy entails interruption and, through this interruption, an alternative mode of connection” (Dua 122). Pirates act as the choke points within the global supply chain by capturing ships; however, in doing so, they also create their own logistics systems.

As piracy moves from sea to ocean, it grows larger and more sophisticated and begins to mobilize the same logistics of system flows that it blocks. It becomes in need of a continuous flow of money and supplies, which it attains through its own supply chains. In Somalia, these supply chains consist of Diya groups, which provide pirates with the funds they need to go out to sea. Khat farmers supply the pirates with the substance during their travels. Intermediaries assist in the search for ships to capture and then negotiate terms of ransom after a ship has been captured. Lastly in the supply chain are the currency exchangers and internet cafes that help put their ransom money to use. Piracy cuts across borders like the global supply chain, to create a new jurisdiction. While logistics transcend national borders to create webs of seamlessly and speedily moving goods, pirates also do this in the way they are seen as outside of the network of the supply chain, while also being anchored to Somalia through the various groups which

socialize them. It is in this way that pirates also reflect the logic of imperialism.

Within the context of piracy and logistics, imperialism can be understood “‘primarily as an economic system of external investment and the penetration of markets and sources of raw materials’” (Cowen 8). During colonization, imperial states like Great Britain established colonies under the pretense of civilizing people when the true goal was to extract resources from these nations. In Africa, they created railroad lines that stretched inward and ended at mines and plantants, and focused on extracting and producing tradable goods. Through the creation of this system, the colonizers controlled the geo-economic space of these nations, which “relies on the unimpeded flow of goods, capital and information across territorial boundaries,” (Cowen 51). Imperial logics placed people who were outside of these places of extraction as having no order in their world; those outside of the network were designated and denigrated as pirates or terrorists. This perspective lingers in our modern-day understanding of pirates. They are also seen as outsiders and as “communis hostis omnium (common enemy of all)” (Dua 12). While they are members of a state, they transgress sovereign space. Out in the ocean they transcend any form of belonging to a specific state, and create illegal supply chains, and thus out of the bounds of the real space on which logistics chains rely. In this sense, “piracy might be makhruh: falling into the gray area between haram (unlawful) and halal (lawful)” (Dua 62). Because of this gray area in which pirates operate and the damage they cause to the supply chains, pirates also reflect the logic of security.

As a whole, the security of the logistics system is ”directly connected to the security of citizens and society” (Cowen 78). Pirates undermine the security of this system by capturing ships, but in doing so, require their own forms of security. They find this security by anchoring themselves in Diya groups, composed of individuals whose lineage traces back to a common ancestor. These groups protect pirates “from the uncertainties of the ransom

economy,” and transfer the responsibility of a pirate to repay his debt to the entire group (Dua 63). Additionally, the protection offered by these groups is “future-oriented as a source of credit and collateral,” much like the forward-looking nature of private insurance companies, which secure ships traveling through the global supply chain (Dua 73). While Diya groups offer protection in the form of a transfer of financial responsibility, maritime insurance companies secure supply chains through a constant edifice of surveillance and prediction regarding the possibility of a ship’s capture. What is more, the provision of insurance acts like a regulating mechanism (like a law), much like the Diya groups, which “[blur] the boundaries between the realms of civil and criminal law” (Dua 68).

The rise of piracy in Somalia can be attributed to increased illegal fishing and economic instability; however, it is also embedded in the nation’s history. Pirates reflect the greater logic of supply chains in that they demonstrate the fragility of this system while also being dependent on their own form of it. When it comes to imperialism, the fact that they transcend sovereign space makes them seen as ‘outsiders’ and ‘enemies of the state.’Their ability to hold this role in society, while disrupting global supply chains lies in their ability to create their own security systems. Nevertheless, pirates are complex actors who reflect the logic of supply chains, imperialism, and security in how they counter and interact with the logistics system as a whole.

Works Cited Cowen, Deborah. Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in the Global Trade. University of Minnesota Press, 2014. Dua, Jatin. Captured At Sea: Piracy and Protection in the Indian Ocean. University of California

Press, 2019. Essex, David. “Logistics. ” SearchERP, TechTarget, searcherp.techtarget.com/definition/logistics. Szyliowicz, Joseph S. “Intermodalism: The Challenge and the Promise. ” Transportation Law Journal, vol. 27, no. 3, 2000, pp. 299–315., trid.trb.org/view/684119.