1.3. Defining Religion

space goes hand in hand with the religious function of such material things: to mediate humans’ relationships to their religious communities and their Gods. Hence, authors such as Houtman, Meyer and Morgan set out to study “the material coordinates or forms of religious practice” (Morgan, 2010, p. 6).

What this recent “re-materialization” of religious studies brings to the table is a clear idea of the central role of media in such functions and practices. Meyer and others argue that mediation and mediatization have always been central to religious practice (2006; de Vries & Weber, 2001; Morgan, 1999; Stolow, 2005):

“Take for example the Catholic icon: though carved from wood, painted, and set up – thus obviously ‘human made’ –, to the believing beholder (and possibly its maker) it appears as an embodiment of a sacred presence that can be experienced by contemplative gaze, prayer, or a kiss. In this perspective, the transcendental is not a selfrevealing entity, but, on the contrary, always ‘affected’ or ‘formed’ by mediation processes, in that media and practices of mediation invoke the transcendental via particular sensational forms.” (Meyer, 2006, pp. 13-14)

In our contemporary times, not much changes except for the choice of media. Bollywood films give Hindu communities the same kind of sensational experience of the sacred that the Passion of the Christ did for many Catholics and Pentecostals alike (Dwyer, 2006; Klaver, 2012; Morgan, 2004). Similarly, television is seen by many Pentecostals as the most appropriate medium to spread faith (Birman 2006; De Witte 2003; Hackett 1998), royal portraits are central to Thai Buddhist practices (Morris, 2000), and the list goes on with pictures (Meyer, 2010; Morgan, 1993), lithographs (Pinney, 2004), and let’s not forget: holy books such as the Bible and Qur’an.

1.3. Defining Religion

For the purpose of this dissertation, then, the way I use ‘religion’ is above all as a cultural construction, mediated to the believer through objects (such as crucifixes) and actions (such as prayer). To define how I will use ‘religion’ throughout the next 200 pages, religions are ‘beliefs in a supernatural substance mediated by objects and

actions, given meaning to collectively.’ The definition is three-fold: epistemological, ontological and social. First, that the epistemological attitude typical for religion is one of belief, i.e., to hold something true without needing proof, or to directly observe it. Secondly, what is (ontologically) to be believed in, is a supernatural substance, such as a god, gods, a ’force,’ or ‘something’ (i.e., “ietsism” [Elliott, 2017]). So far, this definition is a substantialist concept of religion as a “belief in spiritual beings” (Tylor, 1903, p. 424), a mysterious power or force (Marett, 1914), the superhuman (Spiro, 1966) or any superempirical, transcendent reality to which the empirical is subordinated in significance (Robertson, 1970). According to Markus A. Davidsen, the benefit of such a definition is that it “contains no reference to the forms (e.g. the presence of a canon) and functions (e.g. securing or disrupting social cohesion)” that are commonly associated with institutional religions such as Christianity (2013, pp. 388389). Furthermore, Davidsen regards it as particularly suitable for the identification of religion in unexpected places – in his case, Tolkien’s literature (ibid.) – in my case: videogames.

Thirdly, belief takes shape socially. As material-religion thinkers show, much of how people talk about and act on religion is social. When they study religious sensations they study religious cultures and the way in which objects mediate supernatural substances to them. e.g., As Meyer argues

“we need to recognize the phenomenological reality of religious experience as grounded in bodily sensations […] as social scientists we have to come to terms with the mediated nature of experiences that are claimed to be immediate and authentic by their beholders, and authorized as such by the religious traditions of which they form part.” (Meyer, 2006, p. 16)

What does it mean for religious experiences to be “authorized […] by the religious traditions of which [their believing beholders] form part” (ibid.)? By contrast to someone who grew up in a Christian or Hindu community, something like a crucifix or a lithograph of Kāli will prompt no sensation in someone who does not know of and believe in what those objects mediate for someone who does. Religious belief in a supernatural is, then, above all imbued with meaning collectively: through cultural