International Relations Review Fall 2016 Edition

IR REVIEW The International Relations Review at Boston University

Fall 2016

The Code War Companies, Conflict Minerals, The Bloody Plight of Operation & the Congo Sangaris Exclusive Interview: Warfare in the 21st Century

Warfare in the 21st Century 39

Contents

Security 05 11

Jihadi Cool: The Hip New Face of Terrorism

By Kaitlyn Perreault, CAS ‘18

13

The Code War

By Danielle Wallner, CAS ‘19

19

The Bloody Plight of Operation Sangaris

By Christopher W. Brown, CAS ‘19

Nine Hours: The Cultural and Political Aftermath of the Turkish Attempted Coup

By Samira Jafar, CAS ‘20

Economics & Development 27

Tipping the Scales: U.S. Relief of Sanctions in Burma Threatens a Rebalance of Power

By Ines Boussebaa,COM ‘17, CAS ‘17

31

The Burden of Isolationism on the Sustainable Development Goals

By Desmond Molloy, SAR ‘19

35 37

Reconsidering Brexit: Sorting out the Facts and Moving Forward

By Benjamin Thesing, CAS ‘17 Redefining Effective Intervention in Syria

By Elizabeth Burke, CAS ‘18

Regional Politics 45

The Hukou System: A De Facto Barrier to Urbanization

By Meaghan Delaney, CAS ‘18

49

Post-Annexation Rejection: Crimea’s Social Detachment from the West

By Anastasia Kukunova, CAS ‘20

51

Putin’s Political Incisions and His Aim at ‘The West’

By Sydney Siwinski, CAS ‘19

55

Inside Dilma’s Impeachment: The Debate Surrounding the Process

By Clara Bezarra, CAS ‘18

SECURITY

05

Jihadi Cool: The Hip New Face of Terrorism

By Kaitlyn Perreault, CAS ‘18 As terrorist activity in the world grows, the origins and motivations of terrorist movements have changed. In recent years, this has led to an upsurge in youth movements with very different ideals than the organizations we most often hear about in the news. The new face of terror is young, motivated more by a search for community than an ideological hard line, recruited online and just as capable of violence as those groups that precede it.

11

Nine Hours: The Cultural and Political Aftermath of the Turkish Attempted Coup

By Samira Jafar, CAS ‘20 Despite its failure, the attempted coup that occured this summer in Turkey effectively managed to shake the course of Turkish politics, culture, and social norms. These events have led to an increase in political tensions and unstable religious divides in the region.

13 The Code War

By Danielle Wallner, CAS ‘19 As the world becomes more digitalized the prevalence of cybercrime seems to grow exponentially. From planted viruses, to information stealing, how will nation states and international bodies respond to warfare in this fifth domain of information?

19 The Bloody Plight of Operation Sangaris

By Christopher W. Brown, CAS ‘19 The French humanitarian operation “Sangaris” was a response to ethnic genocide in the Central African Republic and has been criticized by a variety of French politicians and intergovernmental organizations. This operation’s warranting and results are a crucial example of what does and does not lead to successful peacekeeping.

Jihadi Cool:

The Hip New Face of Terrorism

By Kaitlyn Perreault, CAS ‘18

Photo By Peter Evans, CAS ‘20

7

I

n the modern world, terror is a familiar face. For the past decade, this face has customarily been bearded, turbaned and angry, with “Allah Akbar” on its lips and crashing towers in the background.

Recently, the face of terror has shifted slightly; younger, with the flapping black flag of the Islamic State reflected in its eyes and a furrowed brow, we have seen this more recent iteration in every media update of the past year. As this face continues to change, terror’s next iteration does not necessarily seem logical, but it is here. The new face of terrorism is an instagram-ready “selfie,” heavily hash-tagged, posed next to an AK47, and captioned with rap lyric.1 The popular culture of terrorism has undergone a revolution in recent years and has exploded in popularity. Though antithetical to how many laypeople think about terrorism, the evidence of these new trends is undeniable.

Where there used to be organized meetings in religious houses, now there is informal recruitment through internet sites. Where there used to be dedicated chants from scriptures, now there are playlists of rap songs. Terrorism’s appeal has shifted to a younger, more globalized audience, and the clash of terrorism and pop culture is in many cases a jarring juxtaposition. In the music industry, rap tracks and hip hop music videos have become a major tool for violent fundamentalist movements.2 One popular song chorus says, “bomb by bomb / blast by blast / only going to bring back the glorious past.”3 Another song, popularized by an artist who has been internationally accused of perpetrating terrorist violence,

The International Relations Review gets more specific, singing, “9/11, who paid the price? / System got a Muslim trippin’ and torn into the justice system, / its lack of precision and a horrible condition. / So with my sword I slice and I bring justice back with appetite. / End of time, Armageddon, / leaving enemies with clenching fists and sliced necks, / heads with faceless expressions. / So where’s your weapons?”4

One vital note on the demography of the youth who engage with this Jihadi Cool culture is that, despite their attraction to fundamentalist literature and motivations, the vast majority are not themselves religious. Knowledge of Islam, schooling in religious areas, and levels of personal belief are notably low among the youth in question.5 Rather than a genuine religious motivation, social pressures and role modeling are primarily motivating these new activists.

As one study at Georgetown University concluded, after asking militants what pushed them toward violence, “the top three answers were motorcycles, guns, and access to women. You had to go pretty far down on the list to get to religious motivations.”6 In one notable case, two young operatives were found to have purchased Islam for Dummies and The Quran for Dummies immediately before boarding a flight to Syria to fight alongside ISIS.7

Groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS are well aware of the religious ambivalence of their new recruits.

They are actively pulling on trends in youth culture, turning such trademarks of popular culture as hip hop into one of the most successful marketing campaigns of recent decades. For those groups utilizing such techniques, the connection

to rap music, new merchandised clothing, and the promise of adventure, community, and violence have seen enormous success in recruiting youth through their emerging brand.8 One online ad, for example, boasts the headline “R U dreaming’ of wagin’ jihadi attacks, well there’s no need to travel abroad, cuz the frontline has come to you.”9 This informal language taps into an appeal to a younger generation that has been receptive to the message of many jihadists. These new techniques have been popularized in the past year, but it is a mistake to assume, as many do, that these new expressions of terrorism are only a recruitment technique utilized by existing terrorist groups. Rather, it is an expression of a newly evolving subculture of terrorism that it slowly but surely redefining the place of terrorism in the Western world.

The new terrorist culture, informally dubbed the “Jihadi Cool” influence, has focused on the recruitment and creation of terrorists from the West, particularly younger generations residing in Western Europe and the United States.10 The basic principle of a violent organization being romanticized and sought after by youth populations is hardly new; this model, applied in other historical and cultural contexts, parallels the rise of Masai warriors, Druze tribesmen, Sioux Indians, Scottish Chieftains, Japanese Samurai, American gangsters, and now, jihadi warriors.11 In the context of jihadist groups, the comparison to gangs is especially vital. Across both movements, the use of rap music, the idealizing of gun violence, and the similarities in the demographics of those being recruited are strikingly

Fall 2016 similar. The similarities between gang and terrorist recruits highlight systematically disadvantaged youth of low economic status in American or Western European inner-city communities.12 For all the youth, these violent organizations- be they gangs or jihadis- offer an escape from their impoverished lifestyles by offering them a new venue for action and escape. As one young recruit explained, “Jihadis look cool- like ninjas or video game warriorsgangstah and thuggish even- the opposition doesn’t.. they’re the voice of youth counterculture and

8 faces for most, the young recruit appreciated that, “sometimes they tastefully accessorize with an AK47 or a bomb belt.”15 Here, the speaker pulls out aspects of fashion in their idealizing of the jihadists. This highlights an important trend: youth are not rejecting Western culture as they romanticize jihadist groups.

Rather they are finding these ‘cool’ Western values in jihadist groups themselves, something the terrorists have learned to capitalize on.

In addition to the appearance of glory and a glamorous lifestyle, new recruits

youth are isolated in their home nations, the call to jihad becomes an offer of community: something far more vital than religious belief and far more enticing.

This is one of the reasons that we cannot equate the youth of these modern terrorist organizations with the major groups that dominate the media. Many active terrorists today are not only not associated with major organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIS, but are motivated in an entirely separate ideological context.

Most were children during the 9/11 attacks rather than perpetrators and

“Rather than Quranic scholars and disenchanted statesmen, the most active jihadists in the Western world today are disenchanted teens.” revolution for an underclass. Like ghetto culture- the inexplicable evolution of cool.” 13

External analysts are puzzled by the new expression in jihadi youth culture and the appeal of both jihadis and gangs, but through interviews and case studies a model has been accepted that highlights the power of peer pressure, the ideation of violence, and the glorification of extreme actions (dubbed “Rambo-envy”).14 Though notable especially in male populations, this idealization is not limited to them. One female recruit compared female suicide bombers to movie stars. Though female faces of jihad are less common given the customary covering of

are increasingly motivated by a feeling of isolation from society, not an adherence to fundamentalist ideology.16 In Western Europe especially, many immigrants or children of immigrants are poorly integrated into their communities and are faced with widespread discrimination, prejudice, and negative sentiments from media and society amidst a wave of xenophobia spurred by recent migration trends.

Muslim populations in particular are generally perceived to be more likely to be isolated from their communities and to have stronger cultural ties to their home nations, making them especially vulnerable to feelings of isolation and a yearning for community.17 As these

have grown up in their aftermath watching American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.18 Their motivation to find community above all else, and propensity to view the United States as an aggressive entity after seeing only recent American foreign policy opens the door to violent jihad; the romanticizing of the act in popular culture is, for many, enough to seal the deal. Rather than Quranic scholars and disenchanted statesmen, the most active jihadists in the Western world today are disenchanted teens. “Labeling them jihadis or radical Islamists would be, to them, the highest compliment,” one scholar weighed in. “In another time or circumstance, these are young people who would be called

9 losers or narcisstic punks.

Terrorist groups most commonly seen today are small conglomerations of individuals connected locally online. Despite popular belief, they are rarely connected to larger organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. While some youth may travel to Syria and receive training, even these are only loosely connected to the larger organizations; the attacks they carry out are planned entirely separate from leadership of any major networks and without logistical or material support.20 Recruitment is conducted primarily through personal networks, which effectively target at-risk populations of lower economic standing, high crime rates, and

The International Relations Review isolation from prevalent European or American cultures. These decisions are made more on an emotional basis than a rational or strategic one, without support from ISIS or existing groups to help. This trend of smaller, youth-oriented, popularly branded jihadi groups is less an innovation on the part of existing terror networks than it is a separate product of its own context.

This reality is often ignored in the media. On both the part of the smaller and larger organizations, claiming association with a group such as ISIS can be advantageous, which is why so many international attacks are still loosely attributed to the Islamic State. For new, small jihadist groups such as “Shariah4Belguim,” which

successfully carried out a public bombing this past year, association with ISIS creates the illusion of a larger community, making it more prestigious.21 For larger groups such as ISIS, the attribution of these farspread and constant attacks feeds into an image of success and grandeur, strengthening their image abroad and feeding back into the very strength that made them so attractive in the first place. This conflated image of their success is not lost on youth in the West. As one self-proclaimed jihadist blogged last spring, “the bottom line is that the Islamic State is the classic SciFi underdog battling a seemingly all powerful Evil America against impossible odds- and in the very best SciFi tradition- they are winning.”22

Fall 2016

The future of terrorism and terrorism prevention is altered with these new trends in mind.

Traditional attempts to re-educate Muslim populations about Islam in hopes of peace are inefficient in the face of youth who never based their decisions off religious reasoning in the first place. Travel to Syria is difficult to stop, meaning that motivated youth have the opportunity to receive training from groups such as ISIS easily. With less strategy or reason involved in their attacks, the violence from youth groups is accordingly much harder to predict, prevent, and act against; the random element of their work goes against existing prevention structures. And as the youth profiled

10 here are in the West, access to Western populations, travel, and sites worsens this threat. As one strategist warns, “the West is facing a threat from its own residents who want to be Rambo; it should resist the temptation to do the same.”23 The threat of terrorism has never been an easy one to counter or a direct threat to push back against, but now we must consider something even more daunting: the classification of terror as “cool” and the rise of evil into popular culture.

Photo By Kexin Yang, CGS ‘19

Photo By Jamie Morishima, CGS ‘17, CAS ‘19

11

The International Relations Review

Nine Hours:

The Cultural and Political Aftermath of the 2016 Attempted Turkish Coup

By Samira Jafar, CAS ‘20

O

ver almost as quickly as it began, the attempted coup-d’etat in Turkey this past July ultimately failed in its intentions. Armed with heavy artillery and a loathing for the current Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the rebellious members of a military faction took to the streets. Known as the Peace at Home Council (PHC), this rebel group’s actions in both Ankara and Istanbul resulted in a night filled with bloodshed, bombings, and the enablement of martial law that ultimately left over 300 people dead.1

The coup failed largely due to the impassioned counter-attacks carried out by Turkish nationals, and the rebel soldiers were dealt with by government officials.

The rebellion did not manage to carry out its supreme goal of overthrowing Erdogan and placing a new governmental body forward.

However, it did succeed in rousing the nationalist passions of many Turks and ultimately creating a new political era for Turkey itself.

As a result of the attempted coup, Turkey is now immersed in a new culture of paranoia and intense nationalism that echoes the current political agenda of the nation.

Historically, Turkey is not unfamiliar with the cultural and political shifts that follow largescale coups. In 1980, a successful coup was carried out by Chief General Kenan Evren, having

followed two other coups in 1960 and 1971, respectively.2 The 1980 coup was the result of intense tensions between right and left wing armed politics. It focused on the issue of secularism versus religious authority and how this power struggle impacted military efforts. Unlike the two-day power period possessed by the rebels of the most recent coup, the regime of the 1980s stayed in power for three years, allowing their dichotomy to take on a strong presence in Turkish cultural and social life.3 As a result of their efforts, Turkey slipped into a period of intense nationalism that rejected the efforts of the military faction. When Saim Bulend Ulusu, a prominent naval officer, attempted to assemble a 21-person cabinet of civilian participants, civilians and politicians alike balked at the idea of embracing the rebel regime. In doing so, Turkish civilians made way for a traditional rule and the eventual decline and overthrow of the Turkish Armed Forces’ leadership in 1983. 4

Although the most recent coup was a certified failure, it is still a definite echo of the sentiments that resulted from the earlier Turkish coups. After successfully crushing his opposing forces, Erdogan began breeding a culture of suspicion, skepticism, and almost violent nationalism. Erdogan took to issuing the arrests of over 35,000 citizens across various ages and fields, all of whom were suspected

Fall 2016 of contributing to the PHC.5 In addition to these arrests, thousands of officers and military generals have been stripped of their titles, even after Erdogan was not able to find a connection between them and the coup.

Aside from the more concrete examples of Erdogan’s hyperalertness, he and his officials have also contributed growing questions about other states’ involvement in the failed coup.

Pro-government newspapers have published numerous articles conspiracizing about the involvement of the United States’ State Department in the coup.

The American residence of one of Erdogan’s biggest foes, Fethullah Gulen, has frequently been cited as evidence of this idea.6 As a prominent political figure and former imam, he founded the Gulen Movement, which used Islamic teachings to challenge governmental tactics and simultaneously posed a threat to Erdogan’s power. 7

The newly reinforced nationalistic sentiments of Turkish citizens serve as a cultural representation of Erdogan’s farreaching ideals. Educators and business owners frequently tout their support for Erdogan while condemning the PHC. Turkish Airlines, one of Turkey’s most recognized brands, fired 211 employees over alleged PHC ties.8 They have also continuously issued statements to their passengers in order to restate their support for Erdogan and critique the rise of the PHC.9 In the face of criticism from foreign powers such as Germany and the United States, Turkish nationals have chosen to stand by Erdogan, preferring his steady but less democratic rule to that of a

12 rebel regime. More importantly, their retaliation was the main reason for the failure of the coup itself.

Another cultural impact of the attempted coup can be found in the rising animosity between secular and religious groups in Turkey.

Although secularism has been on the rise in Turkey ever since the start of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s rule in 1923, Turkey’s devoted secularists maintained a push for more efforts to further this practice in state politics.

10 Many were highly critical of more religious practices being held by the state, particularly the generation of funds to support religious efforts in the capital.11 With Erdogan’s reinforcement of more religious authority, tensions between secular and Islamic groups have reached an all-time high. On the day of the coup, local fundamentalist groups, who had mostly kept their identities private prior to the event, took the streets in an anti-coup rally. Local residents of Ankara, particularly those with more secular views, felt that the “polarization of Turkish society [was] still there.” 12

When it comes to the social theories that resonate with coups, especially in democratic societies, the behavior of Turkish nationals is not unusual. The success of a new political regime is heavily contingent upon the “breadth of support” it receives from the public; regimes whose goals correspond to those of the states’ civilians are more likely to be accepted.13 In many ways, the coup’s failure is a sharp response to the increased call for more secularism in Turkish politics. While Turkish nationals do not necessarily frown upon achieving secular democracy in their society, the hundreds of citizens who attacked the PHC on July 15 are proof of their skepticism

that this indeed may be achieved by the PHC, or that it is worth the price of a full coup. Additionally, the historical presence of more intense political regimes in Turkey’s politics, such as restrained socialism in the 20th century, is proof that some Turks may not have fully embraced the Western ideology of prioritizing democracy over all other political ideas.14

Although the coup of 2016 was undoubtedly a great political failure, it managed to return the traditional post-coup sentiments of 1980, echoing the discontent Turkish nationals felt with a regime whose violence and uproar did little to quell their concerns about national issues. The extent to which Turkish citizens are accepting of Erdogan’s rule has become inconsistent; currently, many Turks struggle to resist containment and arrest for alleged ties to the PHC. The nationalistic climate that has returned to Turkey this summer may persist with continuing support for Erdogan, or it may return to a governmental skepticism that could result in new steps toward a better democracy.

Photo By Peter Evans, CAS ‘20

13

The Code War

The International Relations Review

By Danielle Wallner, CAS ‘18

I

n 1995 the U.S. Military added a Fifth Domain to its list of Dimensional Operations. Land, Sea, Air, and Space are now joined by Information, signaling a new age in thought and even possibly a new age of war.1 As technology has continued to advance, the prevalence of this fifth domain of information continues to rise on a domestic, and global scale.

Recently, over 500 million Yahoo accounts were hacked into by an unknown force.

While no source can be found, many look toward foreign governments such as China, Russia, or North Korea.2 In the digital age, many aspects of international politics have changed, especially in relation to cyber security. From government hacks, to large scale data breaches in businesses, information is no longer a safe commodity. The international community does not know how to classify hacks.

Are they examples of untraceable covert action? Are they akin to bombings at an embassy, or a foreign government tapping a phone line? The lack of agreement and

knowledge on the issue of cyber crime is alarming. Although technology plays a larger role in the life of every individual and the operations of every nation, very few are equipped to deal with hacking and will continue to be unequipped until governing bodies stop trying to govern the digital age with laws from the analog era.

As the 21st century has progresses, the majority identify the term hack with the definition, “to gain access to a computer illegally.”3 Journalist Gabriella Coleman of New York University recognizes that, “hackers code Free and Open Source Software (F/OSS); hackers break into servers and boast to peers about their illicit exploits; some hackers refer to themselves as hacktivists and seek to tumble the walls of Internet censorship in China.”4 Hackers are capable of exposing a corrupt government, protecting businesses from more malicious attacks, and can even help build stronger tech infrastructure worldwide. Scholars, media professionals, and governments cannot define what a

Fall 2016

14

Photo By Kexin Yang, CGS ‘17, CAS ‘19

The International Relations Review

15 hack is and how it affects the modern nation state. The most common view of hackers for those outside the tech community is that hackers, “[engage] in an array of high-tech troublemaking.”5 However, hacking does cause many problems in the modern world. In 2011 alone the UK estimated cyber crime cost roughly £27 billion or $33 billion,6 while the United States itself estimates that cybercrime cost anywhere up to $120 billion domestically a year. Others estimate the global number’s value can reach up to $1 trillion.7 These costs are

the result of lost revenue drained from banks and business, lost ideas pulled away illegally, and even lost time as businesses and governments are forced to rebuild their infrastructure. The world continues to be ransacked by modern day digital pirates, terrorizing everyone from the smallest man to the largest nation.

Hacker culture isn't always malicious. Alison Powell of the London School of Economics recognizes hacking as having a “significant impact on ways of developing participation in creating

public interest knowledge and knowledge commons.” 8 This class [is defined] as the “white hats,” in which they are concerned individuals who are paid to look for bugs and vulnerabilities in software. For this reason they are known as the “good guys.”9 Many nations hire in-house hackers to test the strength of their networks, as reported by groups such as The China Daily in Beijing.

In a house shared by a group of aspiring hackers, a group of people deliberately hack into China’s government and corporate system.

Their goal is to, “build the ultimate, impregnable cyber-fortress.”10 While hacking may easily be called offensive and defensive, it does not quite fit into the moral categories of wrong and right. As technology becomes more enmeshed in citizens' daily live, governments and people must one day come to a consensus on the place of hacking in a postmodern state and in a digitally connected world.

Common conceptions of cyber warfare and security evoke images of national secrets, military tactics, and secret memos; however, a major target of these hackers is the global financial system that underpins modern economies. In 2014 JPMorgan, the largest bank in the United States, experienced the largest data breach in history, affecting over 100 million customers.11 The crime was committed by a worldwide cybercrime ring stretching from Azerbaijan to Israel.12 This isn’t just a problem found in the United States, Great Britain's Standard Chartered lost statements belonging to 647 private wealth clients whose information was on a server in its printing company.13 These hacks

Fall 2016 cost businesses their clients' trust as well as billions of dollars in losses.

As a result, expenditures on cyber security have drastically increased over the past several years. JP Morgan plans on spending $250 million in order to “double up on cybersecurity.” Private banks are not the only ones threatened by this new wave of robbery. In 2014 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was tricked into wiring almost $81 million of the Bangladeshi Government's money into a hacker controlled account in the Philippines. If the future of the world is based on the future of economics, all international players must be ready to defend their economies, businesses, and infrastructure from the ever growing threat of cyber crime.

While government hacks are dramatic and reminiscent of a type of Cold War romanticism, threats to private business due to cybercrime increase every day. As technology becomes a greater part of our daily life, there is a greater opportunity for a hacker to cause an economic or even physical catastrophe. Data is usually the main target of hackers when it comes to private businesses.

In 2016 hackers stole about 200 million Yahoo logins. This hack was executed by the purchase of a stolen database that Yahoo knew existed.14 Hackers, on the other hand, gleefully brag about their hacking capabilities, which brings into question, why is no one prepared for a cyber attack?

Thousands of black hat hackers plan to gather in Europe to discuss targets, strategies, and vulnerabilities at Black Hat Europe. One of the main targets is the hacking and tracking of cell phones through Long-Term Evolution (LTE) type

16 communication networks. The victims of such a hack would not even be aware they were targeted.15 This is not a new claim in the realm of hacking. An entire business is built on cybercrime, including an Israeli firm that is valued at $1 billion. The reason for such a high estimate lays with the claim that they can hack every iPhone worldwide. So far the hack has already been used on political activist campaigns in the United Arab Emirates and multiple government espionage schemes targeting journalists.16

Besides the loss of privacy due to global hacks, loss of life may also become a commonplace theme.

Hackers from the Keen Security Lab confirmed that they were able to hack the Tesla Model S from afar.

This included “open[ing] the trunk, activat[ing] the brakes and fold[ing] a side mirror while the vehicle was in motion.”17 While Tesla was able to patch the software, this exemplifies that as the world becomes more digital, all must be prepared for the responsibility that comes with it.

From large firms to small business, people need to be ready to expect a hack.

In July 2016, an already turbulent election cycle was made more complicated by the hack of more than 20,000 emails that were taken from multiple accounts.

These emails were later released on WikiLeaks and included damning information about intra-party politics, backroom deals, and undemocratic bureaucracy. The release of the emails culminated in the resignation of the Democratic Party Chairperson, Ms. Schultz.

The process in finding these hackers relied on a global effort, including a British academician and the

German security services.18 Almost immediately the Russians were blamed, even though the Kremlin denied responsibility.19 Accusations of hacking were traded between the U.S. and Russia with President Obama claiming that, “We have had problems with cyber-intrusions from Russia in the past, from other countries in the past.” President Putin fired back “ I don't know anything about it. And on a state level, Russia has never done this.” 20 In October of 2016, a U.S. official said Russia had in fact directed the DNC hacking and attempted to interfere with the U.S. election.21 This situation leaves the world at a crossroads. Is this an act of war or simply an act of foreign policy between two nation states?

The Office of Personnel Management is the human resources and record keeping department for almost all government employees, including everyone from public school teachers to CIA case officers.22 The OPM held records for all public employees from mailmen to CIA case officers and when it was hacked in 2015 over 22.1 million people were affected. Information stolen ranged from “addresses, mental health and criminal records” as well as 1.1 million sets of fingerprints.23 The hack hit 19.7 million people who had applied for a security clearance; in addition, 1.8 million spouses and family members had their information compromised.

24 While the U.S government never formally accused the Chinese government of orchestrating the hack, many high-level U.S. officials, including the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, believe that it was indeed responsible, “You have to kind of salute the Chinese Photo By Emma Purtell, COM’19

The International Relations Review

17 out all of its agents from China.25 The face of international politics and espionage are changing. The unseen digital age has created a culture of international hacking in which all nations deny taking part in, but most likely do.

The United States is not the only one government that has faced the wrath of international hackers. In 2010 Iran began to notice that, “centrifuges used to enrich uranium gas were failing at an unprecedented rate.”26 Unknown to the Iranians at the time was that theirs was not a technical failure, but that a virus, called Stuxnet, infected their software. From 2009 onward the developer of Stuxnet targeted many nuclear power plants across

the country. 27 This was not a hack for information, but a weaponized hack meant to target and disable a particular section of a country’s infrastructure. Experts claim that after Stuxnet an era of government hacking was ushered in. As Charles Poladian of the Christian Science Monitor put it, “If one government had the technical prowess to launch such a devastating cyberattack, it wouldn’t be long before others followed suit.”28 In 2012 the U.S. department of Justice indicted seven suspected Iranian hackers of attempts to break into U.S. technological infrastructure. 29 In Stuxnet’s case, hacking transitioned from a reconnaissance tool to a weapon. While no one has claimed

responsibility for Stuxnet many implicate the U.S. and Israel, given the technical sophistication and strategic interest to mount such an attack.30 Given the security implications of a Stuxnet-type attack, an American Congressional inquiry reached the conclusion that the U.S. needs to be prepared for a situation like Stuxnet domestically.31 Overall, hacking has become a crime, and a dangerous weapon. As the world becomes more globalized, the issue of international crime and how to deal with it becomes an even larger question, especially when it has to do with cybercrime. Do international or domestic laws follow the hacker, or do they continue to remain aloof and untraceable. The European

Fall 2016 and Information Security Division, is introducing the first pan-EU legislation of its kind. The legislation will focus on data protection and shows that the EU is now taking cyber security more seriously.32 The U.S. is also setting a precedent of their own. A Chinese businessman was charged with hacking into sensitive military information in the U.S. and “In addition to the 46-month prison sentence, the Los Angeles court also ordered Su to pay a $10,000 ...fine.”33 This set the precedent of trying and sentencing foreign hackers in domestic prisons instead of extraditing them.. While most spies receive diplomatic immunity,34 it seems that cyber spies are exempt from that treatment. Economic

18 espionage associated with hacking, according to President Obama, violates World Trade Organization Rules.35 The UN recognizes in “a study on ‘cybercrime’, it has unique relevance for all crimes” and has begun a campaign to raise awareness in all member states. 36 While more governments and non-governmental bodies continue to take action and stands on cyber crime, there is little consensus. The world must work together against this threat or be forced into a perpetual state of cyber warfare and crimes.

No person or state is immune from the effects of cybercrime or cyber terrorism. From government hacks to private business it is important that people begin to learn

and understand the true nature of the technology that drives them. In a study conducted by the United Nations, over 25% people were illinformed about cyber crime.37 While the world continues to globalize and digitize, it is only the individual that gets left behind. Hacking is just the next phase of international crime.

Thus nations, business and other bodies must work together to address these problems or the international stage will become a play of finger pointing, surveillance and minimal basic rights.

Photo By Alice Yih, ENG ‘18

Photo By Alice Yih, ENG ‘18

The International Relations Review

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Photo By William Chang, CAS ‘20

The Bloody Plight of Operation Sangaris

By Christopher Brown, CAS ‘19

L

ate this March, at a press conference in Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic (CAR), French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian announced that the French would pull out most of their peacekeeping forces by the end of 2016. This would mean ending Operation Sangaris in the CAR and leaving behind only a fraction of their forces to act as a vestige of the 12,000 UN peacekeepers in the region, and the European Union Training Mission (EUTM).1 The French withdrawal signifies the transition from a French and Chad-directed operation to one led by the United Nations, the EUTM and African Union (AU).

The French have awaited this shift in funding and management since their peacekeeping mission began in 2013.2 This change in leadership gives policymakers the opportunity to reflect upon both

the causes of conflict and upon the effectiveness of Operation Sangaris in accomplishing what the French Set out to do. It is thus essential to examine the peacekeeping mission and determine which general policy outlooks were most effective in establishing a permanent ceasefire, and which ones were not. The conclusions made here could be applied to similar states which the new UN and EUTM coalition may seek to aid in the future.

The conflict in this subsaharan state is far from resolved.

French news sources note that the CAR has not completely escaped the chaos of civil conflict. Politics in the CAR still remain tense between ethnically divided segments of the population, those being the minority of Muslim Séléka rebels and the majority of anti-Bakala. The CAR’s people live under difficult conditions, including lacking safety, health,

and educational administrations.

Under these circumstances, the two predominant groups of civil combatants still hold the power to do harm.3 Already this September, before the French completed their withdrawal, there were door-todoor killings allegedly perpetrated by ex-Séléka rebels, which have convinced the CAR’s UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSCA) to dispatch two more peacekeeping forces to the Kaga-Bandoro region.4 Even after three years of presence by the French and African coalition, the CAR is still brewing with tension and suffering from a lack of economic infrastructure. This paper will closely examine each of these two lasting problems in the region as causes of conflict in the CAR in order to suggest a course of action to the EUTM and UN coalition. Ultimately, their future policy role should be to target these

Fall 2016 with the CAR’s stability and their own ability to maintain the peace by reinforcing their budgets and training methods to prepare soldiers for foreign conflict, and by preventing war-profiteering while promoting investment into the economies of countries with situations similar to that of the CAR. In taking responsibility for these issues, the UN could permanently alleviate the tension which France’s operation failed to end.

The sentiment of failure towards this operation leads many to question France’s responsibility to protect in Operation Sangaris and also in future peacekeeping actions. Generally, the argument against the implementation and support of democracy in developing states blames the incompatibility of democracy with Muslim states.5 Initially, this conclusion seems convincing when taken in the context of democracy’s endless struggle in regions including those involved in the Arab spring and in the sub-sahara. The CAR in particular has undergone a series of military coups and revolutions stemming back into the late 20th century. Most recently, François Bozizé’s coup against Ange-Félix Patassé in 2003 radicalized many Muslims in the country, spurring the growth of Séléka rebels. These radicals built up force near the capital and mobilized against it with training superior to that of the resident military forces.6 The conflict between the democratic institutions put forth by Bozizé and the muslim rebels appears to support the common claim that democracy is incompatible with muslim states; a history of coups and never-ending unrest indicates futility in democracy. The CAR

20 cannot be classified, however, as a Muslim nation; 80% of its residents are Christian. 7

Even in Muslim states, democracy struggles for a wider variety of reasons. The reason for tension and volatility under the CAR’s democratic regime could be better explained as a natural part of the democratization process.

This point of view is described in Sheri Berman’s response to the Arab Spring. She writes, “Because authoritarian regimes lack popular legitimacy, they often manipulate and deepen communal cleavages in order to divide potential opponents and generate support among favored groups. So when democratization occurs, the pent-up distrust and animosity often explode.”8 The activity Berman describes would certainly encompass the abuses of individual rights by troops under Bozizé’s regime.9 Unrest in a new democracy with a largely Christian populace is not an uncommon trait of democratization. It should be expected in states such as the CAR as much as it is expected of European democracies, where “Reigns of Terror” often follow the first few attempts at democracy in a state. If western democracies would like to see democratization as successful and beneficial for themselves and for the world order, they should recognize that it may result in violence in the short-term.

As such, stable democracies like France are correct to recognize that is their responsibility, and furthermore, their priority, to help stabilize countries who are still struggling in their democratization, as they have the necessary means to do so.

France’s R2P is also justified by the human rights affair of mass

“If western democracies would like to see democratization as successful and beneficial for themselves and for the world order, they should recognize that it may result in violence in the short-term.” rape and genocide which resulted from the CAR’s power struggle.

The Christian reaction to when the muslim Séléka installed Michel Djotodia as the republic’s president clearly violated conventions on human rights. After the antiBalaka Christians commenced an ethnic cleansing in the CAR, more than 15,000 Muslims sought shelter under the cover of French and UN-backed forces.10 The antiBalaka’s war against the Séléka soon devolved into the amassing of gangs who would commit atrocities against Muslims in the CAR. These acts included, “execution of civilians, indiscriminate firing on civilians, killing and maiming, rape, sexual violation, arbitrary detention, and deliberate crimes against children, including their recruitment and use in warfare.”11 Clearly, this conflict could sufficiently be categorized as invoking the UN’s R2P. Such was Francois Hollande’s intended reason for intervening in the CAR. He believed that Operation Sangaris was a reaction to international duty, claiming, “France is not here… out of any self-interest,” and in his statement in Bangui, asserting that “France has come to defend human dignity… ...to disarm militias who are acting like gangsters, raping women and even killing people

21 in Mali were justified. It was only after French forces reached the CAR that the integrity of their mission lost public support.

The horror of Genocide and abuse in the CAR gave rise to tension between Hollande’s soldiers and the people they were meant to protect.

This tension is the first symptom of civil war which peacekeeping has failed to eclipse, and it must not be regarded as inevitable. It is just an indicator that the peacekeeping process deserves scrutiny. The source of discontent here is more complicated than racial or cultural differences inherent to any foreign intervention. It has to do, rather, with an interventionary state’s policy.

In “Intervention Revisited: Hard Choices and Tragic Dilemmas”, Falk explicates that an international peacekeeping coalition is doomed to fail when it isn’t supported by both indigenous political authorities and larger authorities such as the UN.13 France actually succeeded

The International Relations Review in receiving support from these institutions either before or during their intervention. The French may have taken the initiative in launching Operation Sangaris, but their sentiments were shared by the CAR’s Prime Minister, who called for a ceasefire and disarmament long before peacekeepers could arrive to enforce it.14 By 2013, they immediately sought UN and EU aid, and would receive it via a new NATO policy to create a rapidreaction force and the mobilization of an African Union task force under the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD).15 The French Operation even worked in coalition with African Union forces who provided 6,000 troops compared to the French 1600.16 As such, the negativity towards this intervention in the media is not explained by the criteria F(f)alk outlines in terms of interventionary politics.

The failure of the French operation to achieve a sentiment

of closure among her people and the international community is a result of how the French and UN peacekeepers acted. Based off of numerous accusations, members of the French ground forces became actors in the ethnonational violence.

In some cases, they acted with their own ethnonational prerogatives.

Initially, there were reports that French soldiers and units sometimes identified with causes contradictory to their mission; certain soldiers supposedly wore Nazi slogans on their uniforms. Their motives were also construed to be one-sided; when they selectively disarmed former Séléka partisans, those men were left vulnerable to attack by anti-Balaka gangs. The Séléka thus blamed the peacekeepers for continued violence against Muslims. Ultimately, this led to a protest by pro-Séléka Muslims in Bangui, which promptly turned deadly when protesters clashed with soldiers.17 The French may have seen themselves as morally invested

Fall 2016 the ethnic conflict at hand, but alas, not every soldier took upon himself the same responsibilities. Their moral investment turned into an ethnic involvement defined by Nazi emblems.

This escalated into the peacekeepers’ participation in sexual abuse amidst the CAR’s conflict. There are now well over 100 cases of rape to be investigated by the UN, whose human rights chief described the allegations as “sickening”. The French ambassador to the UN promised punishment for those involved in the scandal, which persisted for four months.18 While the intentions of the French intervention were, de jure, humanitarian, this ideology was not reflected by its soldiers.

Sexual assault scandals as horrible as the ones described in the CAR can serve to tarnish an operation’s reputation beyond its political blessings as described by Falk, who did not account for cases in which

22 soldiers act against their directives.

A policymaker in charge of the funding and training of these operations should not stop by blaming the soldiers themselves.

Not every armed interventionist is prepared for dealing with ethnonational conflict. While the soldiers must be held accountable by international courts, their commanders should review their training procedures and funding for their troops, in order to prevent such failings. The lacking preparation for interventions such as in the CAR were the result of a wave of budget-cutting for intervention in Africa which began in the late 1990s. Between 1990 and 2013, the collective budget for interventionary operations in Africa was amongst the top ten intervening countries plummeted tenfold, from $646 billion to $60 billion. In the 2000 Brahimi Report, it was discovered that UN peacekeepers often lacked essential equipment, including

helmets and rifles. Even as of 2009, this lacking preparedness persists.19 As such, it is imperative that the policymakers who push for intervention scrutinize and augment their budgets. This would help soldiers receive the equipment, and perhaps the training necessary to fight in an ethnically heated combat zone.

The other and perhaps more lasting issue which still plagues the CAR’s populace after the French Intervention is its crippled economic and governmental infrastructure.

This issue is not a disease in and of itself, but a symptom of poor growth. The ethnic conflict certainly did contribute to the region’s economic instability; the World Food Programme declared that lost harvests led to a risk of hunger for up to a third of the CAR’s population.20 Over 230,000 people were displaced internally, with another 62,000 taking refuge in neighboring countries.21 More

Photo By William Chang, CAS ‘20

The International Relations Review

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“The essential caveat to this discussion of Operation Sangaris’ “failures” is that, as a whole, the intervention was not a failure for the global community.” and lasting causes of the CAR’s infrastructural problems, and how these struggles predate its conflict.

Studies in ethnonational conflict claim that resource economies have an adverse effect on the duration and deadliness of conflict. As Michael L. Ross discusses in his study of thirteen civil wars, the presence of oil and mineral resources in countries which lack the infrastructure to exploit them can lead to foreign investment in rebels with the purpose of claiming these resources.22 There is a correlation between states with weak economic infrastructure and the presence of arms in a civil conflict. The CAR fits the bill for Ross’s claims: it holds mineral resources which it lacks the infrastructure to exploit, including both oil and uranium near Gourdil and Bakouma, respectively.23 Unfortunately, the CAR’s people lack the educational infrastructure necessary to provide expertise in producing marketable products from these resources. Furthermore, the CAR’s low median household income means an unprofitable level of demand. This is reflected in the UN Office of the High Representative for the Landlocked Developing Countries’ description of the CAR’s economic status, which asserts, “Important constraints to economic development include the CAR’s landlocked position, a poor transportation system, a largely unskilled workforce, and a legacy

of misdirected macroeconomic policies.”24 These facts about the CAR’s economy, when juxtaposed in the framework of Ross’s hypothesis, indicate that the source of power behind the CAR’s violent outburst of Genocide in 2013 was a result of its failing infrastructure. It would serve the French and the new UNEUTM coalition well to consider both incentivizing fair investment in the CAR and providing stimulus packages to the CAR in order to establish an infrastructure which can confidently manage and sustainably use its own resources.

With this in mind, it is also imperative that any companies who fund violence for mineral extraction rights be punished. Paul Collier remarks, “Rebel groups can now sell the future rights to mineral extraction to raise funds for weapons purchases. A similar arrangement allegedly helped french oil giant Elf Aquatine acquire oil in the Republic of the Congo.”25 The Elf Aquatine example directs us to a history of failures for western governments, who neither prevented companies from supplying civil war fighters, nor investigated the allegations that they did. Even when Pascal Lissouba, a leader ousted from the Republic of the Congo, attempted to sue Elf, alleging that they funded his opponent, the French courts declined, declaring that they lacked jurisdiction.26 The most that the UN tried to do in the case of the

CAR was to prevent arms sales when their intervention started, issuing Resolution 2172, which would prevent arms exchanges from occurring with the CAR and begin sanctions against the new Séléka government.27 Unfortunately, these measures were reactive, and not preventative, which allowed violence to persist until the French-backed coalition in Operation Sangaris could get a foothold. It is imperative that the UN-led force acts with its available jurisdiction and investigates the possibility that other corporations exchanged money with the Séléka and/or anti-Balaka for resource-exploitation rights, and punish those groups accordingly.

This would establish a precedent of legal action and disincentivize such practices.

The essential caveat to this discussion of Operation Sangaris’ “failures” is that, as a whole, the intervention was not a failure for the global community.

Operation Sangaris was wellintended, achieving limited success by disarming ethnic gangs and preventing a complete collapse of the CAR.28 But there are ways to reduce the operation’s cost in the public’s eye, and pre-emptively reduce violence. The UN coalition has already begun to undertake this process, by investigating the preparedness of peacekeepers and. The UN has also attempted to provide economic stimulus to

Fall 2016

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“Operation Sangaris was well-intended, achieving limited success by disarming ethnic gangs and preventing a complete collapse of the CAR.” the CAR, who has received a net stimulus of 272 million from the U.S. in loans. 29

In the policies mentioned above, the new UN and EUTM’s decisions have begun to move towards a much cleaner intervention. The next step is for the new coalition to be proactive in retraining and re-equipping its troops, and more careful in its provision of economic stimulus.

In the case of other struggling countries, in order to eliminate the

need for future intervention, the profiteers, is essential to establishing UN must prevent arms sales and the a lasting stability in states such as funding of terrorist organizations the Central African Republic. before armed conflict begins.

Ultimately, it is imperative that interventionist states prepare their peacekeeping forces more intensely, and vet their soldiers more carefully for their missions. On a larger scale, the lingering tension in the CAR should prove that economic aid, particularly through the prevention of negative economic incentives such as those presented by war

Photo By William Chang, CAS ‘20

ECONOMICS & DEVELOPMENT 27 Tipping the Scales: U.S. Relief of Sanctions in Burma Threatens a Rebalance of Power

By Ines Boussebaa,COM ‘17,CAS ‘17 Russians have long suffered worse health outcomes than their Western counterparts. The government’s unwillingness to address looming health crises is making matters worse.

31 The Burden of Isolationism on the Sustainable Development Goals

By Desmond Molloy, SAR ‘19 As funding from government sources slows down, more and more global development projects must rely on private donors like Bill Gates and the Clinton Foundation. But these new cash flows have their own pitfalls.For the time being, the decisions made by foundation proprietors will remain immensely consequential for the fate of initiatives intended to prevent disease, build infrastructure and end poverty.

35 Reconsidering Brexit: Sorting out the Facts and Moving Forward

By Benjamin Thesing, CAS ‘17 After a tumultuous vote in June, the economic and geopolitical facts surrounding the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union are still being sorted out. While ignorance of macroeconomics impacted the outcome, an alignment of intelligent political decision could allow the independent U.K. to succeed in its new role.

37 Redefining Effective Intervention in Syria

By Elizabeth Burke, CAS ‘18 As the political conflict in Syria compounds with the resulting public health and humanitarian crises, the current strategies for intervention need to be reevaluated. Defining new methods of coordination and recognizing the possible limitations on cooperation are essential steps in addressing the implications of the Syrian Civil War.

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Tipping the Scales:

The International Relations Review

U.S. Sanction Relief in Burma Threatens a Power Rebalance

By Ines Boussebaa, COM ‘17, CAS ‘17

Photo By Ines Boussebaa, COM ‘17, CAS ‘17

Fall 2016

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resident Obama has recently removed United States sanctions on Burma (Myanmar) restoring trade benefits and terminating an order that labeled the previous military government a threat to U.S. national security. The removal of sanctions has occurred incrementally since last May. The U.S. started allowing citizens and companies to do business in Myanmar, loosened restrictions on state-owned banks, and removed several Burmese stateowned companies from the U.S.’s blacklist. The U.S. has taken these steps for various reasons as part of Obama’s “pivot to Asia” strategy, but it remains to be seen whether removing sanctions will benefit Burma.

Burma achieved independence from Britain in 1948. At the time, it was one of the regions’ stronger economies due to its bountiful natural resources such as industrial minerals and oil.1 In 1962 military officers staged a coup and created a military dictatorship, engaging in massive human rights violations, including subjecting citizens to forced labor and even killings. The results were a series of economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union, which were intensified in 1997 after the military dictatorship continued to violate human rights.

As a result of these sanctions, Burma has become one of Asia’s “least developed and poorest countries,

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with more than a quarter of the population living in poverty.”1 After 60 years of authoritarianism under the military, the country held its first free elections last November, where the National League for Democracy won a landslide victory. Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was previously under house arrest for 15 years, was elected state counselor and foreign minister. While these free elections were widely seen as a step forward for democracy in the country, the 2008 constitution continues to reserve special powers for the Burmese military.

In light of the recent democratic changes, the Obama administration moved forward with the implementation of their “pivot strategy,” a “re-balancing” of U.S. interests and closer economic and military ties with countries in East Asia, including Burma. Burma is strategically placed between China, India and Southeast Asia and holds an important place in the global competition between China and the U.S.2 The steps Burma took to a more democratic system have allowed the U.S. to initiate their tactical plans to assert itself in the area, diminishing Chinese influence in the process.

Historically, China has provided significant economic and military support to Burma, bolstering Burma’s military regime.

As a result, Burmese regime cronies became rich from trading with

China, which benefitted from access to natural gases, hydropower, mining and agricultural projects.

According to Foreign Policy, these large projects have fueled corruption in Burma, displaced communities and destroyed the environment.

Additionally, China had access to Burmese ports, giving it a strategic upper hand in the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia. Militarily, China has supplied aid and weapons to Burma, trained its personnel, and maintained military cooperation. As a result, Burma is largely dependent on China and China retains large interests in Burma that will become threatened as democracy moves forward.

China’s influence in Burma caused worry in the U.S. and relations with China have grown more tense as China advances internationally. As a result, the two countries are playing out a struggle for influence in Burma.

The recent moves towards Burmese democratization gave the U.S. an opportunity to remove sanctions and gain influence in the region, which will begin to put a check on growing Chinese power.3 Additionally, the sanctions relief will lead to greater openness with Burma, similar to the Obama administration’s policies in Cuba and Iran. Overall, the U.S. is moving to reduce sanctions in order to diminish China’s influence and improve economic opportunities for U.S. firms in the East Asian region.

While China and the U.S.

“China’s influence in Burma caused worry in the U.S. and relations with China have grown more tense as China advances internationally.”

The International Relations Review

29 play for influence in the region, the removal of sanctions greatly affects Burma. Newly elected state counselor, Suu Kyi, who originally helped convince the West to impose sanctions, is now hoping to remove sanctions, as she faces expectations of an improved economy from Burmese citizens. She knows that in order to meet citizens’ expectations for a successful democracy, there must be positive economic changes and removing sanctions will stimulate the growth of smaller businesses. Removal could also prompt U.S. companies to invest in Burma and spur overall economic development. Additionally, it will lead to a large boom in foreign direct investment after many years

of isolation, and removing tariff restrictions will help Burma move forward with trade. Suu Kyi hopes that the removal of sanctions will lead to better economic conditions, which will then cultivate a more established democracy. 4 While the Obama Administration and Suu Kyi may have high hopes for the future of Burma, political and economic changes may prove to be difficult.

The pace of political change is slow, and the military still controls many Parliamentary seats and government ministries, specifically security, defense and border ministries. In fact, the military still retains the right to dissolve Parliament in times of national emergency. By giving up

economic sanctions, the U.S. and Suu Kyi are giving up any leverage they may hold over the military and thus may not be able to push for more human rights protections.

Without the sanctions, human rights groups argue, the U.S. and Suu Kyi will have a harder time preventing the military from derailing democratic reforms.

Many businesses are closely linked to the military and have held onto their economic interests despite the shift to a more democratic, civilian government. If the military profits from business with the U.S. and is not impeded economically, it has no incentive to change. Keeping sanctions in place could successfully combat Burma’s crony capitalism.

Fall 2016 Activists also argue that sanctions were meant to press the military to relinquish power and now that progress has been made, pressure should continue until irreversible democracy has been achieved.

Many human rights groups also state the U.S. should continue applying pressure on Burma as the illegal trade of goods such as jade continues and the persecution of Rohingya Muslims persists.

The Obama Administration argues that removing sanctions can be done without the installation of full democracy, and that economic development will improve the chances of it succeeding. So far, the country has had free elections and allowed a free media, signaling

30 small improvements. In spite of this, Burma has a long way to go: journalists and activists are arrested, Rohingya Muslims are denied human rights and the military retains political and economic powers. The country may be more open, but citizens still face human rights violations, such as unlawful arrests. While sanction relief has begun, the U.S. has left several restrictions in place, including no military-to-military assistance due to the Burmese military’s involvement in politics and human rights abuses.

Additionally, the U.S will not grant visas to military leaders, specifically those with ties to the drug and arms trade. It remains to be seen whether sanctions relief with some

restrictions will encourage the growth of democracy.

The removal of sanctions benefits the U.S. by reducing China’s influence, opening up economic opportunities and increasing influence in the region.

It is not as clear, however, whether removing sanctions will entirely benefit Burma. While the economy may grow, the military may retain power, creating difficulties for democratic reform. Additionally, crony capitalism and human rights abuses may continue unabated. As all of this plays out, outside forces, specifically the U.S. and China, will persist in trying to tip the scales in their favor.

Photo By Ines Boussebaa, COM ‘17, CAS ‘ 17

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The International Relations Review

The Burden of Isolationism on the Sustainable Development Goals

By Desmond Molloy, SAR ‘19

Fall 2016

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A

t first glance, the 21st century is an excellent decade for global development thus far. Since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, the average global lifespan has increased by six years. By the most conservative estimates, nearly fifteen million lives were saved by the MDGs and their accompanying initiatives. But with the average life expectancy in poor countries still under sixty-five and a rapidly growing global population, more work is needed. Following their expiration in 2015, the Millennium Development Goals were replaced by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a wide-ranging set of objectives encompassing topics from ending poverty to stemming climate change. Critics charge that the SDGs are too abstract and accordingly much harder than the MDGs to implement.1 However, the biggest difference between the MDGs and the SDGs is the political climate.

The Millennium Development Goals were put forward in the internationalist 2000s, when an expanding global economy fuelled considerable investment in global development goals. By contrast, the SDGs are coming to fruition at a time of profound isolationism in the world’s richest countries.2 The voting public from Manchester to Muncie are increasingly skeptical of sending their tax money overseas.

Consequently, the role of NGOs and private foundations continues to increase. But such organizations tend to have shorter term horizons than their public-sector counterparts.

The SDGs’ success hinges upon

Photo By Jamie Morishima, CGS ‘17, CAS’19

The International Relations Review

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navigating the challenges of both funding sources.

The fuel for the Millennium Development Goals drew from a booming global economy. North American and European GDP grew steadily throughout the early 2000s and personal income continued to rise until the onset of the 2008 financial crisis.3 This gave national governments tax revenue to invest in global development while ensuring that their own citizens did not feel neglected. By contrast, the 2010s have been a pinched decade.

European governments took on heavy debt during better times, which they are now struggling to pay back. This has consequences for global development funding; Greeks and Italians are not lining up to contribute their own sparse savings to UNICEF and years of bailing their neighbors out have made more affluent northern European countries and the European Union itself wary of writing big checks.

Their contributions to the globe have stagnated since the financial crisis.4

Meanwhile, the United States and the United Kingdom, two of the biggest underwriters of global development, are being rocked by isolationist political movements hostile to the kind of global engagement inherent to development work. Polling data compiled by the Kaiser Family Foundation suggests that many Americans strongly oppose sending money overseas.5 The upswing in isolationist policy has gained force during the last years of the internationalist Obama administration. Across the Atlantic, Britain is suffering from a crisis of

economic confidence following a vote to leave the European Union.

London is unlikely to open its wallet as readily as in the recent past.

The global North is turning away from development funding. Nobel laureate Angus Deaton argues that globalization has created an underclass in countries like the United States, one that sees the elite as thinking “more about those across the ocean than those across the train tracks.”6 After years of war overseas and terror attacks at home, many also perceive the world beyond their borders as a dangerous place.

Their reaction, expressed through

“After years of war and terror attacks at home, many also perceive the world beyond their borders as a dangerous place.” nationalist political movements like Trump and the UK Independence Party, both of which have advocated closed borders and a “home first” approach, is to turn inward or invest in defense instead.7 But globalization also pays dividends for development professionals. The increase in personal wealth in North America and Europe has created a web of well-heeled nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), among them the Clinton, Rockefeller and Gates Foundations. Donations from

private foundations have doubled as a percentage of development funding since 1990.8 Private charity is far from new to development; Rotary International played a key role in driving polio out of India, an initiative itself begun by the Rockefeller family in the 1920s.9 But the Sustainable Development Goals will rely much more on family foundations and other private organizations than their predecessors.

While private funding may initially seem like the perfect solution to the drying up of public funding for global development, it comes with its own set of challenges. Critics often characterize private foundations as secretive and undemocratic and a more material challenge comes from donor fatigue. Natural disasters, outbreaks of disease and other headline-capturing events often generate a surge in donations from all sources. But private funds are less likely to keep giving after the initial event, hampering efforts to rebuild healthcare systems and other infrastructure post-disaster.

Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, an initial surge of relief funding from private charities and donors receded quickly.10 This was not because of a decrease in demand. Six years on, Haiti’s infrastructure has not fully recovered and restoration work continues. These efforts are largely funded by the United States, which has provided $3.1 billion in installments, ensuring a steady supply of funding to long-term projects such as a power plant for the city of Port-au-Prince. 11 The most optimistic observers have predicted that global poverty and deprivation could be

Fall 2016

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Photo By Alice Yih, ENG ‘18

eradicated in the next 14 years. Their pessimistic counterparts see a world in which climate change, conflict and other forms of social decay prevent humanity from reaching its potential. The most likely outcome seems to be somewhere in between.

The forces of globalization have poisoned the well of public goodwill for large-scale, long-term public investment in global development.

But the new technologies and new international moneyed class created

by those trends have contributed to huge gains in living standards worldwide. However, it remains unclear whether these gains might be stalled by donor fatigue or rendered unnecessary by a change of heart among First World voters.

For the time being, the decisions made by foundation proprietors will remain immensely consequential for the fate of initiatives intended to ease suffering amd raise the standard of living worldwide.

The International Relations Review

35

Reconsidering Brexit:

Sorting Out the Facts and Moving Forward

By Ben Thesing, CAS ‘17

S

ince the United Kingdom voted in a slight majority to no longer be part of the European Union, financial and political unrest have surrounded the decision. English politicians like Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage, who fervently pushed for the Leave side of the referendum, slyly backed away from leadership positions in the new, (transitioning to be) fully independent U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron promptly announced his decision to step down, as he found himself unfit to lead an independent Britain after pushing for the Stay side.

After some crude remarks from her opponents, Theresa May emerged as the next Prime Minister. In the short term, disregarding the frustration of younger citizens, most of whom voted to stay in the E.U., there has been a certain degree of raw acceptance of the outcome.1 In the long run, however, such public acquiescence will no longer be sustainable as The U.K. will only continue to face greater challenges in the months and years ahead.

Due to the restricted

amount of time allotted to negotiate thousands of new trade contracts, and comprehend what an E.U. without the U.K. will look like, there has been some complacency throughout the global community regarding Brexit. In the marketplace, the initial panic has slightly subsided; investors who hedged on U.S.based companies saw their initial losses disappear, as those stocks rallied over the past months.2 Yet, there should still be some justified concern over what will become of London, a city still considered to be the central marketplace of Europe.

As new trade deals are written, Paris or Berlin could emerge as the E.U.’s financial center. Before the Brexit vote, many of the world’s largest international firms, like HSBC and Goldman Sachs, threatened that such an exit would result in their removal of staff from London to elsewhere in Europe. In short waves, this has been true: the music and transportation conglomerate, Virgin, cancelled a deal that would add as many as 3,000 jobs to the British economy,3 and the Central Bank of Ireland has already

prepared for a significant transfer of financiers from the U.K. to Ireland.4 Yet, it is hard to imagine that London will lose its status and crumble; the companies it serves are daily drivers of the global economy.

Financial powerhouse Morgan Stanley has denied plans to move 2,000 jobs from London to Dublin, but politicians should remain aware and stay ahead of these plans if they desire to keep jobs in the U.K.5 Parliament should not take London’s status for granted, and must begin working on incentives to prevent a diaspora from weakening the city’s economic impact.

Britain should be concerned about two additional weaknesses as it strives to head out on its own: its position as a service economy and its dependence on low-skilled foreign labor. The U.K.’s workforce is nearly 85 percent skilled labor, and many firms around the world rely on this workforce for technical support in their daily operations. 6 Yet, there are many jobs within the U.K. that will only be taken on by low skilled laborers that enter the country via Schengen, a policy that

Photos By Jamie Morishima, CGS ‘17, CAS’19

Fall 2016 the U.K. will no longer be a part of. With this policy change, the potential for illegal immigration to become one of the most contentious topics in the U.K. in the next few years is increasing. Individuals from less well off European countries will continue desiring the relatively better paying and pound-denominated jobs available in U.K. Furthermore, much like in the U.S., there is little chance that reducing the number of low-skilled immigrant workers will significantly affect the portion of native workers filling these empty positions. About 16.7 percent of those employed in England are migrants, all of whom also represent 16 percent of the U.K.’s unskilled labor force.7 Yet, studies by the U.K. Office of National Statistics demonstrate that these migrants do not necessarily displace U.K. natives who tend not to seek the same positions to which foreign workers apply. These studies indicate over 700,000 additional E.U. workers in the U.K. since 2013, but these increases have been more than made up for by over 1,000,000 U.K. workers entering the workforce during this time.8 Other government statistics also show the immense tax gains from immigrant workers, and The Office of Budget Responsibility estimated that E.U. workers help the U.K. government grow by .6%

Photo By Melissa Berry, CAS ‘17

36 annually.9 Therefore, it appears that British politicians tapped into the fears of the minority-disapproving instead of relying on economic fact.

At present, one third of all E.U. 14 workers in the U.K. are unskilled,10 and if these individuals are sent back to their home countries, the economic fallout could be extremely detrimental.

Farms and factories, depending on said laborers, could find themselves at an immediate loss without realistic means of finding replacement labor.

Further, because England is a net importing country, politicians and companies negotiating new trade deals must remain wary of the ways in which political fallout could negatively impact U.K. citizens. If other nations were to interpret the U.K.’s actions as largely harmful to their trade and geopolitical strategies, they will not negotiate in their favor. This could potentially result in food products from France, commodities from East Asia, and services from the U.S. significantly inflating in cost. The U.K. is at an intense crossroads, and only careful and humble negotiations will result in a positive outcome for the fifth largest global importer.

What English politicians, starting with Prime Minister May, must do is ensure long-term macroeconomic stability. They must

accept their exit decision wholeheartedly and rally as a nation to prove they are capable of thriving independently. The government needs to assume a nearly academic tone to stringently critique its geopolitical strategy, and follow a path that suits its constituents and global onlookers whose investment decisions are equally as important.

The central bank must continue stress-testing institutions, and encourage them to work with other budding financial hubs to ensure a smooth transition during this exit period. The government must reach out to the now disenchanted youth (75 percent of those under 24 years old voted to remain in the E.U.)11 to try to understand their resentment and find a middle ground for those who did not support an exit.

Lastly, the U.K. must continue to strengthen its position in the global sphere if they are going to succeed independently; its economy and government provides too many globally demanded resources to fall short in the present transition. It is yet to be established how this will be accomplished with the recent ruling that Parliament must approve the exit, yet these goals must be prioritized nonetheless.

Photo By Yasmin Morias, CAS ‘17

Photo By Alice Yih, ENG ‘18

The International Relations Review

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Redefining Effective Intervention in Syria

By Elizabeth Burke, CAS ‘18

O

n September 20, 2016, a UN humanitarian convoy was attacked just outside the city of Aleppo, Syria, with 18 out of 31 trucks destroyed. These trucks were carrying medical supplies as well as food and sanitation items, intended to aid over 300,000 people.1 This event is just one example of the repeated failure for humanitarian intervention, a reality that has only exacerbated the public health crisis borne out of the Syrian civil war.

The situation in Syria has rapidly deteriorated since the onset of the civil war and the quality of life for the Syrian people is dramatically impacted by the violence and lack of humanitarian support. Since the crisis began, it is estimated that 11.5 percent of Syria’s population was killed or injured, with around 1.9 million people wounded since March 2011. Moreover, life expectancy has dropped from 70 to 55 years.2 Access to medical supplies is nearly impossible, as over 50 percent of hospitals and health centers are either only partially functioning or

are totally out of service.3

There is no shortage of data supporting the fact that the Syrian civil war has decimated the population, by forcing dangerous migration and destroying the living conditions of an entire country.

The question that must now be considered is how is the world responding to the humanitarian crisis in Syria and how must that response change in order to be more effective?

The international community has mobilized to bring aid to Syria. Thousands of organizations are involved in raising funds, gathering supplies, and coordinating missions to deliver materials on the ground. Countless UN organizations have taken action as well as individual nations and groups of countries in the form of coalitions.4

However, despite the efforts of these organizations and coalitions, the humanitarian crisis in Syria continues to worsen. In July, the World Health Organization confirmed the resurgence of once-

extinct infectious diseases like polio, measles, typhoid and hepatitis. It is estimated that at least 200,000 citizens have died due to noncommunicable chronic diseases.5 There is a clear disconnect between the intentions of international actors and the Syrians suffering on the ground.

The greatest problem that affects the efforts to help Syria - in all areas, but especially when it comes to issues of health and livelihood - is lack of a common “top” priority. Since it never fares well for countries to ignore humanitarian crises, the pressure to contribute in some way has pushed leaders to join task forces and pledge their resources, but all while considering their own national interests and maintaining strict policies on accepting refugees.6 Humanitarian efforts are compromised by these individual interests, rendering the aid ineffective when the proper measures aren’t taken to secure its success.

For example, the U.S. has contributed nearly $6 million dollars

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Photo By Nikta Khani, CAS ‘20

to addressing humanitarian concerns in Syria since the crisis began in March 2011. On September 27, 2016 the U.S. announced a pledge of an additional $364 million dollars in humanitarian aid, largely in response to the convoy attack.7 However, the U.S.’ actions in Syria are constrained by their relationship with the Assad regime.

Many actors are calling attention the U.S.’ continued communication with the Assad regime about the delivery of aid packages, despite the Syrian government’s interference in such deliveries.8 The U.S. is trapped by their desire to maintain a good relationship with Assad, ultimately limiting their ability to provide the necessary humanitarian aid to the Syrian people.

The UN is facing similar criticism from the international community on the basis of their accommodations for Assad’s government. An article published in August 2016 by the Guardian exposed the UN’s practice of awarding contracts to government bodies and charities closely linked to

president Assad and his family.9 The article highlights how the Assad regime was paid, both directly and indirectly, a total of $10 million dollars in contracts under the umbrella of an aid program with humanitarian goals. The program is seen as largely unsuccessful by critics because the aid is often obstructed by government officials, slowing the process of delivery and crippling hopes of coordination. Over seventy aid groups have withdrawn from “The Whole of Syria,” the aid campaign operated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (UNOCHA), with claims that the UN and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent were allowing the Syrian government to block aid.10 The Assad regime in Damascus unanimously controls the decisions of local officials in charge of processing aid convoys and thus far has failed to ensure any security for these missions.

In addition to concerns related to appeasing the Assad regime, hundreds of organizations have pulled their aid contributions

because of security concerns, particularly in areas controlled

by ISIS. As the international community continues to rethink intervention, some are labeling U.S. policy in Syria with a focus on the Islamic State and humanitarian aid as an afterthought.11 Efforts need to be coordinated at the local level, ensuring the safety of delivery and reduction of tensions. It is essential to develop relationships with community groups on the ground in Syria in order to establish effective paths for delivering aid packages.12 As the public health crisis continues to worsen and the population of Syria keeps shrinking, it is imperative that the U.S. and other nations reconsider their approach to preparing, coordinating, and delivering humanitarian aid to Syria.

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The International Relations Review

Exclusive Interview: Warfare in the 21st Century

A conversation with Professor Ivan Arreguin-Toft about the future of warfare in an era of rapidly advacning technology.

Conducted By Ellen Gilley, CAS ‘17

Photo By Kexin Yang, CGS ‘17, CAS’19

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We most often hear about cyber warfare when sponsored by a government, such as Russia or China. Can independent radical groups use cyber warfare, or is it unrealistic for non-state actors?

The usual argument goes like this, like in terms of levels of abrogation: an individual can only do so much harm, no matter how brilliant they are. But if you combine a bunch of really brilliant individuals with the resources of the state, you could get a bigger, more damaging effect.

I’m very suspicious of that logic. I don’t necessarily think that it’s that linear. There are times when an individual hacker, even a teenager, man or woman, could come up with an exploit, or something that could seriously damage the national security of another state. And there are times when teams of really brilliant people have tried for years and not been able to come to much. A thing to keep in mind about cyber-harm and cyber-security is the nonlinear nature of both the threats and the countermeasures. Normally we just think that the more resources you have, the more threat you have. And that’s true with things like nuclear weapons, biological weapons, less so with chemical weapons, but with weapons of mass destruction, you need good resources, the resources of a state, to really make a challenging threat there.

So then how has the development of new technologies to wage warfare revolutionized State sanctioned aggression? What are some examples of governments using technology to intimidate other nations?

One [example] which is less well known is the video cassette recorder technology, and how it affected the fall of the Soviet Union. For years the U.S. and its allies had maintained what we would now think of as information warfare, against Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and most famously against the Warsaw Pact. And we did this in the form of Radio Liberty or Voice of America. The argument was that if people in these places could get transmit receivers they could listen to western broadcasts. These would have music, pop culture, but also information about how the world went. And so we could use this kind of warfare to show them how good life was outside the Iron Curtain, and enable them to make this important comparison to standards of living. And then in the mid-80’s, ancient history at this point, video cassette technology came out. But what it did for the first time was for people to take these tapes and the people on the other side could view these cassettes. And this was an explosive technology. It turned out that when Gorbachev introduced Perestroika and then later Glasnost, this was probably the big things. People could see how people in the U.S., in Britain, in France and these other places, how they lived. They had been told that they had the highest standard of living in the world, and they could see from these tapes that this was just not true. So this turned out to be an incredibly volatile technology, and in terms of magnitude, much more influential than Voice of America had ever been.

And now you can think of the third generation as the internet, which is bringing down governments everywhere. The Arab spring is largely the result of this internet technology, especially mobile phones with screens. The ability of young people to see how corrupt their governments are. I mean if you’re living in an oil rich state, and you can’t find a job, the most obvious explanation is that your leaders are sucking all the gold out of the ground and taking it for themselves, and they’re not creating any opportunities for you. But if you didn’t know that, if you didn’t know that this wasn’t the way things just are, you could actually be perpetually kept in thrall.

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The International Relations Review

So, radicalism and ideas, and technology playing into that, how has it incorporated in playing into the utility of barbarism?

Well, barbarism is a really interesting idea. So suppose ISIS shows a video of a beheading.

That’s a heinous act by almost any culture’s definition, but it is said that they are really good at shaping the message. You have to think of who they’re trying to broadcast to; they are only seeking a narrow portion of the audience. The orange jumpsuit is important because these people know from watching movies and videos that their prisoners are tortured and incarcerated in orange jumpsuits. By using that symbolism and beheading an educated person, they’re sending a different message. They’re saying that, “We’re powerful too. We can do this to you,” and also that, “We are not limited in the way you’re limited.” But again that plays to a small audience with a preexisting narrative of humiliation and abuse. So they win in two ways: they win by recruiting that minority that will be most useful to them with that image. The second thing is, the thing they absolutely need to survive, is that they need an intervention. Part of it is also to goad us, the rape of Yazidi women, the use of chemical weapons, the beheadings, all have a utility in goading westerners. It puts them in a dilemma: either they intervene, in which case the jihadis win, because they can’t be defeated by force, and that powers their message. Or we [the West] don’t go, and then we look like hypocrites. We say we stand for no more genocide, and yet we’re standing by when this is happening. And that’s a very tricky thing.

What do you think about weapons advancement and how do you think that has added to extremist success in the developing world or even the developed world?

There is an argument for countries like Iran and potentially non-state actors to ask a simple question. Suppose you have a problem that can be solved by even a modestly effective drone. You could get this drone to deliver a tiny bit of a biological agent into a place that you couldn’t access before. You could use the internet to find out how to buy the components to make a drone, which may not be as protected as the complete package. And that’s what we’re seeing more of, especially with biological warfare as a technology. It turns out that the pathogens themselves, for example versions of anthrax, are actually easier to get a hold of than the information on how to make them. But now the information on the web allows you to find out how to use Crisper, which can change the sequencing of genetic codes of viruses, to have a fairly low threshold to mess around with this. In fact in safe areas, high schoolers are doing this for science projects that even 5 years ago would have been impossible. How would we protect against an airborne version of anthrax?

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In regards to security and women when women react in ways while in positions of power considered less peaceful how does that affect other state or non-state actors in their reaction to women in leadership and security?

I guess what we’d expect in what we call loosely more patriarchal, traditional societies, is that men believe they might get an advantage. They’re very often disappointed with female leaders and part of the reason is that the women who have made it this far in leadership have become multi-lingual. They are fluent in the language of coercion, force, etc. which comes from the dominant culture from which they’re drawn. Hillary Clinton already has a reputation as a hawk, and so the question becomes did she work very hard to become a hawk, to gain the respect of enough colleagues and supporters to do her job? Was it part of her natural inclination anyway? In other words, does it belie the traditional stereotypes of being peaceniks or being doves. And, if it’s the former, if she’s socialized to do her job, is it that once she reaches a threshold she can then back off from, and say that other instincts will take hold and not be as aggressive as before? Many men, for example Vladimir Putin, who would think it’s an advantage to have a woman as their adversary to manipulate in some way that a man wouldn’t be. Putin’s obviously dealt with women heads of state, and if he really felt that way, maybe he would be embarrassing Trump rather than Clinton with the hacked emails. But we don’t know if that’s gender or if that’s because he believes Trump is an incompetent leader and it would thus be an advantage strategically for Russia to have an incompetent president.

“It puts them in a dilemma: either they intervene, in which case the jihadis win, because they can’t be defeated by force, and that powers their message.

Or we don’t go, and then we look like hypocrites.

We say we stand for no more genocide, and yet we’re standing by when this is happening.

And that’s a very tricky thing.”

Photo By Elizabeth Burke, CAS ‘18

REGIONAL POLITICS 45 The Hukou System: A De Facto Barrier to Urbanization

By Meaghan Delaney, CAS ‘18 China’s housing registration system, hukou, is a de facto barrier for urban development. Hukou coupled with the the rapid urbanization of Chinese cities shakes the core values of the country and is ultimately an incubator for urban failure. By analyzing patterns of assimilation amongst rural-urban migrant populations in Beijing and Shanghai, the hukou system consistently fails in its attempts to coexist with the current climate of urbanization in large Chinese cities.

49 Post-Annexation Rejection: Crimea’s Social Detachment from the West

By Anastasia Kukunova, CAS ‘20 Early 2014 kept the Western world on its toes as Ukraine underwent a sociopolitical revolution and as Russia swept in to annex the strategically located Crimean Peninsula. However, since then, Crimea’s people have become the largely overlooked victims of sanctions and strained relations with the U.S. and Europe.

51 Putin’s Political Incisions and His Aim at ‘The West’

By Sydney Siwinski, CAS ‘19 Russia appeals to far-right political parties as they gain support throughout Europe, using techniques of action-encouragement seen from the Soviet Union in the Cold War era. NATO and the EU acknowledge the potential threat posed by Russia, but the lack of decisive action only reinforces Putin’s attack on their efficacy and strength.

55 Inside Dilma’s Impeachment: The Debate Surrounding the Process

By Clara Bezarra, CAS ‘18 The Brazilian government made headline news this year when President Dilma Rousseff was impeached. Citizens in the country as well as prominent figures in the political world have since then engaged in a debate surrounding the question: was Rousseff’s impeachment legal or did it take the form of a coup d’état? The answer, it turns out, is a mix of the two.

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Photo By Kexin Yang, CGS ‘17, CAS ‘19

The Hukou System:

A De Facto Barrier to Urbanization

By Meaghan Delaney, CAS ‘18

I

t has been more than sixty years since Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China and started the quest to become a world power. While working to carve a sphere of influence in the international community, Mao presented domestic policies that would hopefully poise China for competitiveness and industrialization, but instead created some unfavorable outcomes. Today,

The Communist Party of China acknowledges Mao’s failures in economic sphere, however the party has overlooked some of Mao’s defunct social programs, mainly the hukou system, one of the most controversial policies to come out of Maoist China.

Outlining the origins of the hukou system is fundamental to understanding the scope of the problem that hukou places on

current Chinese urban policy. In a lofty attempt to shift the China from an agrarian society to an industrial economy, Mao established the Great Leap Forward. However, “ ‘The Great Leap Forward’ campaign turned out to be a great disaster,”1 Aside from the ‘Great Leap Forward’ propelling China into a famine that took the lives of more than fourteen million Chinese citizens,2 he also instituted the xia-

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“Today, the hukou system functions as a vehicle in Chinese society used to create an internal apartheid among rural and urban citizens by creating different levels of citizenship and draws hard lines between urbanites and migrant workers.”

-feng Five-Year Plan. Xia-feng, meaning ‘sent-down’, was the colloquial term for the mandate enforcing the deportation of urban populations into the countryside.

The forced migration of intellectuals and cosmopolitan populations via xia-feng displaced millions and uprooted livelihoods. “An estimated twelve to seventeen million urban educated youths were forced to move out of the cities to resettle in rural villages or remote areas.”3

To track the number of populations sent down to rural areas by xia-feng, Mao concurrently enforced the hukou system4, a housing registration system, to track, limit, and control provincial migration. Hukou parallels a dual level internal passport, codifying citizens with either an urban or rural status, which in turn gives the Chinese government the power to decide which citizens can cross provincial borders and receive social benefits. Unfortunately, the hukou system undoubtedly favored urbanites by providing access to state welfare while rural dwellers had to assimilate to their new environments with miniscule help from the state.5 “Chinese citizens were classified as urban or rural based on their hukou; urban residents received state-allocated jobs and access to an array of social services while rural residents were expected to be more self reliant”6

Despite the short term success of hukou restricting internal migration, sixty years later, the

system remains in Chinese legislation where it stands as a symbol of discrimination and inequality. Given the rapid urbanization of China in the last forty years and the projected increase of populations in Chinese megacities, the hukou system is not compatible with current Chinese society.

Today, the hukou system functions as a vehicle in Chinese society used to create an internal apartheid among rural and urban citizens by creating different levels of citizenship and drawing hard lines between urbanites and migrant workers. The separation continues to deepen and become more contentious as China’s urbanization rates increase.

Hukou coupled with the the rapid urbanization of Chinese cities is ultimately an incubator for urban disparity. By analyzing patterns of assimilation among rural-urban migrant populations in Beijing and Shanghai, the hukou system, which attempts to coexist with the current climate of urbanization in large Chinese cities, consistently fails. If China continues its trajectory of urbanization, the hukou system has to be repealed or the megacities will not be able to sustain themselves and adequately serve their inhabitants.

Many urban planning professionals consistently struggle with how to accommodate large migrant populations into urban society with the red tape of the hukou system. Kevin Chen, the regional planner of Beijing and Shanghai for

the urban development firm, HoK, explains the plight of urban planners in Beijing, “China’s urban designers must deal with unprecedented urbanization, as immigrants coming into our cities have tripled the urban population over the last thirty years.

How to better accommodate these millions of migrant workers and other permanent residents with city hukou, or household registration, becomes a significant challenge.7

From an urban planning perspective, housing is critical to sustaining large scale cities.

Both Beijing and Shanghai are classified as megacities, that is their population’s total over ten million people. This number continues to grow, but because of the hukou, intense restrictions are placed on rural citizens. The policy does not allow them to apply for low-income housing or Public Rental Housing (PRH). Both forms of housing are extremely desirable to migrants working factory jobs because rental rates are government controlled.

However, for the people that need it most within Chinese cities, gaining access to this housing is a pipe dream. Currently migrants without local urban registration are not inherently entitled to low income housing, including PRH. In some cities such as Beijing several years of local registration are required before rural hukou holders can apply for low-income housing.”8 With the high number of migrants already working in Chinese cities and that number constantly increasing,

The International Relations Review

47 most migrants do not have stable places to live. From a planning perspective, this could lead to large numbers of Internally Displaced Peoples and cause a sharp increase in homelessness.

Aside from the future ramifications, such as hukou limiting access to low-income and PRH housing, the original purpose of government subsidized programs completely loses its value because of the system. Any low income policy that neglects the needs of a large poor populations defies the purpose of that policy-- social justice and thus can be considered to have failed.9 Ultimately, with such a large population cut off from government aid, such as housing, this creates an incubator for resentment towards the government and urbanites.

Resentment is not just expressed through migrant workers, as many urbanites see themselves as above

migrant workers because of the hukou system and therefore often adopt feelings of resentment and xenophobia towards them.

Xenophobia is the operative word because studies show that urban residents do not see problems with poor urbanites, but specifically see rural migrants as problematic in their cities.

In a survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, nearly one-third of respondents in Shanghai said they would not like to live next door to a migrant, against only one-tenth who said they would rather not live next to a poor person. This survey would suggest that urban dwellers do not have an issue with citizens of low economic status, but specifically an issue with internal migration into their cities. Chinese urbanites seem as anxious as Europeans about migration from poor to rich places,

even though in China the migrants are fellow citizens.10 As numbers of rural migrant residents clock in at over two hundred million, their presence in urban areas is transparent. However, because of the hukou system, the assimilation process is nearly non-existent. Thus, a space for fear mongering and xenophobic opinions towards rural migrants is created and moreover, a urban policy failure persists/ exists etc.

In addition to the social perceptions of rural hukou holders, institutionalized discrimination against rural migrants is also passed down to future generations. Access to education is very difficult for children whose parents do not hold urban hukou. Even if a child is born in a city and their parents hold a rural hukou, the rural hukou is still passed down to the child.

From birth, children are being

Fall 2016 classified as less compared to their urban youth counterparts.

They are automatically born into institutionalized inequality.

Numerous studies have been conducted about the effects of hukou realizations on youth populations in China to show that it does have an adverse effect on child development. “The city-born children of migrants suffer the same discrimination, often being denied access to urban state-run schools and having to clear higher hurdles to get into university.”11 For example, in Beijing, rural hukou holder’s children who are classified as local residents do not have rights to take higher education examinations in the city. Creating another road block for higher education within urban areas. Access to education is integral to urban sustainability and by the Chinese government not applying equal levels of citizenship

48 to children born in cities, the problem will worsen and continue a cycle of unfair treatment to youth seeking equal opportunity.

Access to urban housing, social perception, and education are measures of urban sustainability and success. Using these parameters, The hukou system has hindered the progress of Chinese cities. The Chinese government is aware of the policy failures and is currently looking towards hukou reform. In 2016 , the party decided to speed up the pace of hukou reform, officials have called for equal rights for their urban residents. However, despite these efforts, the reforms are slow and not uniform. In February 2016, Xi was cited saying the hukou reform will target only suitable people. These ‘desirable’ urban migrants are defined according to their employment record, education level and housing situation.

Furthermore Mega-cities such as Shanghai and Beijing will have the strictest criteria.13 For the Chinese government to accommodate the influx in migrant populations that are bound to come within the next ten years, repealing not reforming hukou is the only sustainable option to encourage responsible and accommodating urban development. Given the projected rates of migration, eventually citizens with rural hukou may outnumber the number of citizens with urban hukou. The question is not if the Chinese government will make proper reforms, the question is how many voices will it take to make the government finally repeal the archaic system.

Photo By Kexin Yang, CGS ‘17, CAS ‘19

The International Relations Review

49

Post-Annexation Rejection:

Crimea’s Social Detachment from the West

By Anastasia Kukunova, CAS ‘20

I

n the last two years, tensions between the Russian Federation and the West have skyrocketed.

It doesn’t take an expert in foreign policy or a Model UN participant to know this; there are constant headlines detailing Vladimir Putin’s unjust acts or outlining Barack Obama’s speeches urging Russia to loosen its hold on Ukraine. However, the actual effects of the unjust acts are often ignored. Vladimir Putin’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula is a prime example of this.

When the annexation was declared in March of 2014, it became a nonstop topic of debate and discussion. World leaders condemned the action as illegal, and the UN General Assembly did not recognize Crimea’s change in status.1 Sanctions were enacted on officials in the Kremlin and in Crimea; the United States blocked the export of goods and technology to Crimea, and the European Union banned cruise ships from docking at the peninsula.2

Consequently, the world forgot about Crimea and its people.

In an attempt to send a powerful and

clear message to Vladimir Putin and his supporters, the rest of the world shut out innocent civilians.

Almost two years after the annexation, the hashtag #krymnash (“Crimea is ours”) still floats among the general Russian public. Western businesses like McDonald’s closed their doors in Crimea and tech giants like Apple, Google, and Amazon withdrew their services.3 As a result of sanctions and ongoing internal turmoil, inflation hit the ruble, increasing its exchange rate to almost twice its original value of thirty-two to one U.S. dollar in 2014, and drastically increasing the cost of goods and production.4 Meanwhile, the European Union and the United States are portrayed by the Russian mainstream media as criminals wanting to infiltrate and destroy Russia and its values.

Heartbreaking as it may be, Crimea’s residents cannot be expected to know any better because they no longer have access to the outside world. When a person cannot leave their country, it is difficult to get a balanced perspective on domestic and foreign affairs. When

someone cannot download a paid news app from Google Play simply because of where they live, it is hard to find trustworthy information.

When innocent peoples’ money and assets are frozen, just because they live in Crimea, getting upset is a logical reaction, and they do not focus on the world at large. It makes it even easier to portray Russia, and Putin, as the heroes who rescued Crimea from the “wrath of Obama” and “Gayropa”: a combination of gay and Europe, now a commonly used term in the Russian language criticizing Europe’s supposed ethical transgressions and legalization of gay marriage. As a result, Russian nationalism only grows stronger, and that nationalism is based on propaganda.

The European Union does not recognize Crimea as Russian territory, as it should not. However, this makes it almost impossible for Crimean citizens to travel abroad, as they are not officially recognized as Russian citizens by other countries.

Crimeans who have access beyond Russian news know that they are essentially being held hostage by

Fall 2016

their state. Their only hope of travel is if they have relatives or property in recognized Russian territory, which allows them to obtain a passport more easily.5 One specific consequence of this is the lack of availability for students to access study-abroad programs, even for those in English or French immersion schools.

Crimean citizens are now essentially stateless people, making it even easier for the Russian government to hold them behind its re-emerging Iron Curtain.

I am half-Russian, halfUkrainian, and my mother grew up in Crimea. Before it was annexed, I had the fortune of traveling to Crimea many times to visit my mother’s friends and family. One distinction that stood out to me during every trip was how open and curious the people were, especially the younger generation. Although many of them have never traveled outside the country, the majority speak at least two languages - Russian and Ukrainian - and learn English and an additional foreign language in school. They are well educated— both as citizens who have survived the Soviet Union, and as citizens embracing a new order and new opportunities. After the referendum

50

received its debatable 96.7 percent majority vote, 6 it broke my heart when I realized that my friends who spoke Russian, Ukrainian, English, German, and French may never have an opportunity to use the languages they have been learning from the age of six.

Yes, the Russian Federation is becoming more isolated than ever due to the successful efforts of Vladimir Putin. Yes, Western food products are seized and destroyed.7 Yes, freelance Russian news sites such as Yezhednevny Zhurnal and Kasparov.ru (the latter is run by former World Chess Champion Garry Kasparov) are blocked.8 While the European Union, the United States, and their allies cannot completely control what the Russian government does, these forces can control what they can do about the situation and can choose the degree of sanctions.

Although civilians were not intended as targets of sanctions, they unfortunately have become just that. Yes, politicians should be punished. However, people should not be left ignorant or deprived— not if the West can help it.

A school exchange program, or even a simple device like a laptop, can change one’s perspective forever.

Unfortunately, the likelihood of the Russian Federation closing its borders as the Soviet Union did is growing day by day. As long as the Russian state has not yet done so, it is Europe and the United States’ job to keep their countries, industries, and societies open to Russian and Crimean citizens before it becomes too late and a positive influence is truly shut out from innocent people.

Technology—one of mankind’s clearest signs of progress—opens doors for the curious, for the innovative, and for the yearning.

As recently as 1990, computers, cellphones and credit cards were not available to Crimean and (at the time) Soviet citizens. A return into that isolated sphere can be prevented if citizens have the ability to do what many of us take for granted: typing, scanning, and reading. It is the West’s responsibility to keep Crimea’s people aware and in touch with the rest of the world, regardless of geopolitical conflict.

Photo By Anastasia Kukunova, CAS ‘20

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The International Relations Review

Photos By Anastasia Nevskaya, CAS ‘17

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Putin’s Political Incisions and His Aim at ‘The West’

By Sydney Siwinski, CAS ‘19

“Putinism is defined as the combination of post-totalitarian authoritarianism, nationalism, and anti-Westernism” - Alina Polyakova

In the wake of a significant financial collapse, a global refugee crisis, and a distinct increase in political tensions throughout Europe and the world, NATO and the EU are facing challenges.

Relatively new parties that have emerged throughout Europe have begun to question their existence and legitimacy.1 As European citizens feel increasingly threatened by external forces as well as the overriding power of the European Union, parties that reject the current state of European affairs are gaining leverage and support.

Far-right groups with conservative nationalist values have begun to appeal to many Europeans: these far-right groups promote the protection of civic liberties, preying upon people’s disenchantment with the EU as well as their antiimmigrant sentiments.2 These feelings come from a place of selfpreservation: people increasingly feel as though their current state of being is at risk from the position of the controlling EU and the Syrian Refugee Crisis. Two powerful opponents, the West and Russia, have closely followed the various crises with ever-developing policy responses and political statements.

The degree of consensus between

Russia and Western nations, though oscillating, is typically very low. 3

The relationship between Russia and the West is in constant flux; today, tensions are at an all time high–NATO countries, including the United States, and the EU have placed Russia under strict economic sanctions, making discreditation of both institutions a primary objective for Vladimir Putin.4 Though anti-Westernism has persisted as a Russian sentiment for significantly longer than Putin’s rule, he is taking new steps to challenge democratic rule and governance systems in the EU and the United States.5 However, simply accusing democratic rule for its weak and ineffectual nature through Europe is ineffective, as Russia’s own system has been historically stigmatized as totalitarian.6 As a result, Putin has begun employing some tactics that are familiar to the global stage.

Among the better known of these is the befriending of countries that may be persuaded to reject integration and alliance with the West. Owing to its particular geographic and cultural history, Putin is able to present Russia as the defender and savior of ‘failed states’ in Eastern Europe, especially to weaker, poorer states that have largely been

ignored by Western Europe.7 With sentiments of Euroscepticism raging throughout the continent, Putin can effectively convince these states that being a ‘failed state’ is still superior to a hostile state aligned with Western nations and the EU.8 This is a perspective that Putin himself supports, making Russia a natural ally for those disillusioned groups throughout Europe and allowing Russia to expand its influence.9The aggressive overtures approach to former Soviet Bloc states clearly exhibits Putin’s aim at a Russian ‘sphere of influence’ within the region, thus expanding their influence in Europe as a whole.10

Putin does not stop there. To create further divisions within European nations, he has contributed financially to the campaigns of conservative, far-right parties in various–even Western– states.11 For these parties, Putin’s genuinely conservative values align well with their own sense of disillusionment with the state of the European Union.12 With growing support for far-right political parties in European civil society plus the support of the Russian government, the prospect of a right-wing Europe and a discredited and devalued EU grows.13 For Vladimir Putin,

The International Relations Review

53 this would be a significant victory.

His aims mirror those of other Russian figures throughout the 20th century; Joseph Stalin, for example, was particularly keen to support communist political parties popular throughout Europe at the time.14 Both Putin and Stalin employed a similar strategy of using political support and encouragement– though from different groups– to weaken and drive a wedge between the governments of Western European countries and large public groups within the countries. Rather than connecting to their own existing national governments, far-right parties look to Russia as a ‘role-model’ of policy implementation and action.15 The addition of rising Euroscepticism allows Russia to propagate its views via a disinformation campaign. With limited access to media throughout a significant portion of Russia and Eastern Europe, people are left with a positive impression of Putin, a sense of Euroscepticism, and very little else.16

Aside: Interestingly, this was not always the case for Putin’s Russia.

Upon his rise to power, Putin sought to make diplomatic connections to various leaders throughout Europe and the United States. Additionally, the new political structure of Russia in the early 2000s reflected Western models in many ways. However, Putin’s aims at Western institutions

are not new. The only change is the shift away from discreetly undermining Western organizations and the move toward outright provocation.17

Here another parallel can be drawn to Stalin’s Soviet Union.

In a nation of poor, working-class people and a culture of secrecy, access to information was highly controlled. Only information that cast the regime in a favorable light was provided to the Russians, making a harsh dictator appear to be a benevolent ruler, acting in the interest of the people.18 Putin’s approval–88 percent–though potentially skewed, demonstrates that this disinformation is effective.

NATO and the EU have responded to Putin’s political advances, but only through stricter sanctions that merely allow Putin to paint Russia as a victim and gain support from the far-right parties.19 The reaction of the EU to Russia only allows Putin to take advantage and make further inroads with the parties that already feel significantly disconnected from the governance of the EU. With further development of scepticism towards the EU spreading throughout Europe, Russia and Putin continue to pursue their ultimate goal: a devaluation of Western institutions in the global sphere that allows Russia to rise as a global power.

Russian political tactics have

hardly advanced since the Cold War; Russia remains anti-West, and they maintain the perspective that the only way to build international inroads is to significantly alter the public opinion of European nations in favor of Russia. Putin has a variety of tools to achieve this at his disposal, including nuclear threats, hacking, or dividing up nations from within. The next step for the rest of the world is to also recognize the pattern and develop a more cohesive response to counter Putin’s advances. Russia has some leverage: cheap oil buys lenience, but the steps taken by the EU thus far have only driven Putin and Russia further away from acceptance of a system that represents completely dissimilar values. Rather than sanctions scaring Putin straight, he has adopted a far-right approach that agrees with many parties on the rise in Europe. Instead of than changing Russia’s ultimate goals, he has adopted new, potentially more destructive means of reaching an international power status. Sanctions will not suffice if the world values oil over democracy, and attempts at diplomatic negotiations with the Kremlin have been futile.20 The EU must take the time to consider which pursuit is of more value in the current international climate.

“Russian political tactics have hardly advanced since the Cold War; Russia remains anti-West, and they maintain the perspective that the only way to build international inroads is to significantly alter the public opinion of European nations in favor of Russia.”

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The International Relations Review

Inside Dilma’s Impeachment: The Debate Surrounding the Process

By Clara Bezerra, CAS ‘18

O

n August 31st of this year after lengthy proceedings, the Brazilian Senate voted to impeach President Dilma Rousseff ending 13 years of undisrupted rule by the Worker’s Party (PT).

Rousseff’s impeachment occurred after the government faced a crisis on three fronts: Brazil’s economy suffered a startling blow, a series of corruption scandals were revealed to the public and incriminated politicians of the highest echelons, and the spread of Zika exposed the government’s inability to handle a health crisis. Rousseff’s approval ratings fell below 10 percent,1 and a survey conducted during one of the April protests in Brazil indicated that almost 80 percent of participants favored impeachment.2 The process effectively began on April 17th making its way from the lower house of Congress to the Chamber of Deputies to the Senate, and finally the Supreme

Court.3 Although to some the impeachment was straightforward and legal, others claim that the removal of the Brazilian president from her post took the form of a coup d’état disguised by faulty democratic procedures. This latter group argues that the impeachment was a ploy by corrupt officials to remove Rousseff from power for no legitimate reason so that they could conduct a massive reorientation of policy. It is true that some members of the opposition in charge of conducting Rousseff’s impeachment were involved in the same scandal that led to her demise—when it comes to the Brazilian government, shamelessly corrupt politicians are the norm. Their warped morals, however, in the end did not hinder the Supreme Court’s ability to direct the impeachment processes by the book. The legitimacy of their intentions can be questioned, but a closer look at Rousseff’s accusations

and the procedure taken to address them proves that her impeachment cannot be classified as an illegal overthrow. Rousseff’s deposition revealed something else entirely.

The primary argument used by those who see the impeachment as illegitimate is that Rousseff was cleared of the main accusation brought against her. Contrary to popular belief, in legal terms Rousseff’s trial had nothing to do with the corruption scandal that has swept Brazil in the past years involving the country’s oil-giant, Petrobrás. The impeachment process was centered on the claim that she conducted illegal fiscal maneuvers known in Brazil as “fiscal pedaling” in order to manipulate economic data and win reelection by making it seem that the country’s economy was better off than it actually was.

According to a research document issued by the impeachment committee of the Senate, Rousseff

Photo By Brian McHale, CAS ‘20

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Photo By Brian McHale, CAS ‘20

was responsible for using pedaling to fill an 18.3 billion-dollar gap in the country’s public spending.4 According to the Brazilian constitution, this practice is an impeachable offense, and would have provided the Senate with a lawful justification for Rousseff’s impeachment.5 Carlos Pereira, a political scientist at prestigious Brazilian university Fundação Getúlio Vargas, argues that “The government lied about the messy state of their house by putting up a pretty window… [it] betrayed the people, and for this they must be punished.”6 The former president’s opposition, however, suffered a blow when an impartial investigation ordered by the Senate found no proof that Rousseff was directly involved in fiscal pedaling.7

Since Rousseff’s impeachment was conducted according to law it cannot be considered a full-scale coup, especially considering she was allowed to keep her political rights. However, the fact that she was impeached due to a minor infraction of the law has led prominent individuals in the political world to accuse the officials involved in the process of subverting democracy for personal gain. American historian Noam Chomsky referred to the impeachment as a “soft” coup. He explains that “though it’s technically legal, the charges are bogus and those bringing the charges are for the most part far more culpable.” 8 Similarly, an International Tribunal

for Democracy in Brazil hosted in Rio de Janeiro in July concluded that the impeachment is illegitimate.

American human rights attorney Azadeh Shahshahani, who served as a juror in the tribune, writes: “What is happening in Brazil is a conspiracy against democracy. Impeachment is being used for partisan purposes to depose a democratically elected leftist president. This is, in effect, a coup... an attempt by Brazil’s elite to regain power through non-electoral means and re-implement the neoliberal agenda.”9 Like Chomsky, Shahshahani reminds us that several of the procoup officials are under investigation of corruption. Michel Temer, the vice-president who has assumed office after Rousseff’s impeachment, has been charged with receiving massive amounts of bribes from Petrobrás leaked wiretap conversations have exposed a conspiracy by Rousseff’s rivals in the Supreme Court to guarantee her demise while at the same time interrupting the corruption investigations against them. Shahshahani also observes that “only a few of the pro-impeachment deputies gave as their reason the ‘crimes’ for which Rousseff was being impeached.”10 As Chomsky and Shahshahani note, it seems that the charges brought against the President had very little to do with her impeachment. Rousseff did commit a crime, but it is possible that her

impeachment was pre-destined the moment her trial began.

There is widespread misunderstanding in Brazil regarding the reasons for Rousseff’s impeachment. Most citizens believe she was impeached either for fiscal pedaling or for her involvement in the Petrobrás scandal. The truth, however, seems to matter much less than the fact that Rousseff was brought to justice. Did she commit a crime? Yes. Was it the primary reason she was impeached? Probably not. Financial Times journalist and expert on Brazilian politics Joe Leahy explains Rousseff’s position with an analogy: “Just as Chicago mobster Al Capone was caught for tax evasion, so Ms. Rousseff is really being impeached not only for the alleged budgetary offenses but also for the Petrobras scandal and the terrible state of the economy.”11 Whether this is fair given Rousseff’s track record or a blow to democracy

by Brazil’s corrupt leadership remains a contested issue. Now, Brazil is left in the hands of the unpopular and at least equally corrupt Michel Temer, the current winner of the political gamble that has plagued Brazil’s government for decades. The loser, as usual, is the Brazilian population.

Hope lies ahead in the new election of 2018, anxiously looked upon by the country’s population as an opportunity to start over.

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The International Relations Review

Editorial: How the Mosul Offensive Might Spark Changes In Intervention Policies

ECONOMICS & DEVELOPMENT O

By Cecilia de Almeida, CAS ‘19

n October 16th 2016, the coalition provides the Iraqi state with give rise to an affiliate organization to Iraqi Prime Minister Haider extra resources and intelligence to deal ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Until a harmonious al-Abadi declared open the with the ISIL threats, coalitions have also environment in which both Sunni and assault to reclaim the city of Mosul for been detrimental to the effectiveness of Shia Muslims can thrive is built, similar the Iraqi government after the fall of the the process. According the United States extremist jihadist groups will continue city to ISIS control in June 2014. The Department of Defense, without a single to rise and claim that they are the only offensive is part of a greater strategy authority responsible for prioritizing ones that can bring down the Shia plan to defeat ISIL in Iraq. The battle of and adjudicating between different controlled government and establish fair Mosul represents a military plan initiated multinational civilian and military lines conditions for the Sunni percentage of in March of the same year. Mosul is the of effort, various actors often work the population. After the interventions in second largest in Iraq, home to around at cross purposes without intending Syria, Libya and Afghanistan, it is time half a million people and is a hugely to.”4 Different nations have their own countries begin planning a long-term symbolic Iraqi city where Abu-Bakr goals and objectives to achieve, which solution to combatting the threat of al-Baghdadi, “declared ISIS self style sometimes can be counterproductive to terrorism. Until the political crisis in the caliphate more than two years ago”1 the actual purpose of the coalition itself. Middle East is settled, organizations with The recapture of cities such as On Monday, October 17th, Washington similar views to ISIS will continue to rise

By Ines Boussebaa,CAS Baiji, Fallujah, Ramadi by the Iraqi‘17openly acknowledge the presence of and threaten the national sovereignty have suffered worse outcomes Western government Russians – cities that arelong located “forward air health controllers amongstthan the their in these countries. There should be 5 in near proximity to Mosul -The increase US advisors,” which are to troops on looming a collaborative effort to target these counterparts. government’s unwillingness address health the chances of a successful recovery of the ground who are responsible for extremist institutions while working on crises is making matters worse. the city of Mosul. The city holds great ensuring a greater accuracy of the aerial stabilizing the social and political unrest economic value to the extreme jihadist bombardment campaign the U.S. has to hinder the rise of religious extremist group, being a key trading city close to recently pursued. The presence of these groups. the borders of Syria and Turkey. Thus controllers, known as Joint Terminal regaining control of the urban center Air Controllers, is a departure from would significantly reduce the group’s President Barack Obama’s policy of ability to mobilize weapons, troops and having no “boots on the ground” in the supplies. Taking the city back would battle against ISIS. allow the Iraqi government to address It is essential the Iraqi the severe humanitarian issues that been government understands that defeating present in the region ever since the ISIL ISIL in Mosul is only the beginning of take over. “When ISIS took Mosul in the road back to truly securing the region June 2014, it also took control of more against extremist groups. Baghdad will than 2.5 million people, whom the group have to initiate a campaign to rebuild subject to horrors”2 infrastructure in the region and prove

The fight against the extremist it can maintain governmental control group is being ultimately carried out by of the city. The government’s greatest the Iraqi government, but several other challenge is bridging the religious and nations are involved in controlling the ethnic segregation that is present in the terrorist in the region, predominantly city. Mosul is home to several ethnic being led by the United States and has minorities that are vital to the social the mission of, “Supporting military fabric to the Iraqi community, but the operations, capacity building and designation of power and territory training, stopping the flow of foreign after the recapture of the city will not terrorist fighters, cutting off ISIS access be an easy feat. Additionally, the Sunni to financing and funding, addressing minority in the country has always felt associated humanitarian relief and crisis, alienated by the Shia-led government exposing IS true nature.” 3 Although the in Baghdad, which could potentially

Tipping the Scales: U.S. Relief of 00 Sanctions in Burma Threatens a Rebalance of Power

Fall 2016

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The International Relations CGS’15, CAS ‘17 Anushka Pinto, Editor-in-Chief Review is created using Adobe CAS ‘17 Morgan Peterson, Editor-in-Chief In-Design CS5 and exported COM ‘17, CAS ‘17 Ines Boussebaa, Senior Staff Writer as a PDF. Adobe Photoshop CAS ‘18 Clara Bezerra, Senior Staff Writer and Adobe Illustrator are SAR ‘19 Desmond Molloy, Senior Staff Writer also used in the production CAS ‘19 Danielle Wallner, Senior Staff Writer process. The IR Review prints CAS ‘20 Samira Jafar, Staff Writer more than 1,500 copies from CAS ‘18 Madeleine Martin, Senior Copy Editor The Fenway Group located on CAS ‘18 Andre Gellermen, Senior Copy Editor Commonwealth Avenue.

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‘19 Gowtham Ashokan, REACT NewsAs funding from government sourcesCAS The publication run slows down, more and moreis global CAS ‘19 by the editorial board, which Raina Kadavil, REACT News development projects must rely on private like Bill Gates and the COM ‘20donors consists of copy editors, layout Mairin McQueen, REACT News flows have CAS ‘19 editorstheir and own the pitfalls.For editors-inCecilia de Almeida, Blog Writer Clinton Foundation. But these new cash chief.

The editorial board also the time being, the decisions made by foundation proprietors will remain handles external affairs, such About The IR Review immensely consequential for the fate of initiatives intended to prevent as blogging, public relations, The International Relations Review,disease, ISSN 2152-738X, is a subsidiary and of the Boston build infrastructure end poverty. marketing, advertising, and University International Affairs Association. The IR Review is an international relations logistics. magazine serving the undergraduate students at Boston University. With a circulation of nearly 1,500 the IR Review is considered Boston University’s premier academic journal.

Since it was founded in 2009, the IR Review has striven to create a forum for students interested in international affairs. The submissions features in the publication cover a myriad of topics and controversies, including but not limited to globalization, international Photo Credits security, human rights, international law and politics and sustainability.

A PDF of the current issue, as well as citations and archives can be viewed online at www.irr.buiaa.org.

The cover photo used for the Fall 2016 edition of the IR Review was taken by Kexin Yang, Guidelines for Submissions CGS ‘17, CAS ‘19.

Essay submissions are accepted year-round for the IR Review. All essays must contain at least 500 words and must not exceed 3,000. Essays must also include the author’s name, The photo used for the college, graduation year, a title, and citations to be considered for publication.

Economics and Development The IR Review reserves the right to revise submissions. All the revisions are sent to section was taken by Kexin Yang, the author for approval before going to print. The IR Review also reserves the right to edit CGS ‘17, CAS ‘19. photo submissions minimally. However, creative liberties are taken into account.

All work must be properly cited. Plagiarized work violates the IR Review’s Code of The photo used for the Ethics, as well as the Boston University Handbook, and will not be accepted. If the Regional Politics section was IR Review finds that a submission has been plagiarized, the staff will no longer accept taken by Nikta Khani, submissions from that author. Opinion pieces do not require a bibliography unless the CAS ‘20. author cites other sources.

Submissions are accepted on a rolling basis. The editorial staff can be contacted for The photo used for the questions regarding submissions at irr@buiaa.org.

Security section was taken by Kexin Yang, CGS ‘17, CAS ‘19

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The Burden of Isolationism on the Sustainable Development Goals

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