IFATCA The Controller - 1st quarter 2003

The Next Issue The next issue and the subsequent issues for this year will continue the themes of ATM Safety and Capacity.

Also, 2003 celebrates the centenary of powered flight. The Controller will run a number of articles to commemorate this event.

Contributions on these subjects are welcome.

Please contact the Editor at EMAIL: ed@ifatca.org

Copy Dates: July Issue - 1 S May 2003 September Issue - 1 S July

To advertise in The Controller contact: David Lancaster Group Advertisement Manager McMillan-Scott pie 10 Savoy Street London WC2E 7HR Tel: +44 (0)20 7878 2316 Fax: +44 (0)20 7379 7118 email: david@mcmslondon.co.uk

PUBLISHER IFATCA.InternationalFederationof Air Traffic Controllers'Associations.

EXECUTIVE BOARD OF IFATCA

THECONTROLLER JOURNAL

OF

AlR

TRAFFlC

CONTROL

Marc Baumgartner

Presidentand Chief ExecutiveOfficer Dr Gabriela Logatto

Deputy President

ln This lssue

United Kingdom, March 2003 Volume 42 No 1

Juan Perez Mafla

ExecutiveVice PresidentAmericas

Albert Taylor Execulive Vice-President Africa/

Middle East David K W Cheung

ExecutiveVice-PresidentAsia/Pacific

Safety Accountabilities and Responsibilities Albert Aidoo Taylor

Page 4

ATC Safety and You Brian J Fallon

Page 7

Surveillance Infrastructure • the German roadmap to cope with future demands Dr. Roland Mallwitz

Page 11

Conference 2003 Photographs

Page 16

Human Centred Automation Bert Ruitenberg

Page 18

Staying fit for future ATM Judith Rothaug, and Cordula Braedel-Kilhner

Page 22

Psychological Testing For Air Traffic Controllers Doug Churchill

Page 2S

A Succesful IFATCA/CANSO/ISASI to ICAO Bert Ruitenberg

Page 27

Nicolas Y Lyrakides

ExecutiveVice-PresidentEurope Dale Wright Executive Vice-President Finance

Doug Churchill ExecutiveVice-PresidentProfessional Andrew Beadle

ExecutiveVice-PresidentTechnical

Jack van Delft ExecutiveBoard Secretary/ConferenceManager

EDITOR

Chris Stock.

25 Springfieldlea, SouthQueensferry,West Lothian.Scotland.EH309XD. Umted Kingdom.

ATS WG Approach

Tel& Fax+44 (0) 1313 191975

email:ed@ifatca.org

Air Traffic Control Training in Argentina

Page 28

CMG CHAIRMAN AND ACCOUNTS

Maastricht UAC Gets aNew Operations Room Philippe Domogala

Page 29

Flying unusual manoeuvres in a Boeing 767 Simulator Philippe Domogala

Page 32

Charlie's Column

Page 34

EdgeGreenO.8.E. 4 The Rookery.

Peasemore.

RG207JY.United Kingdom.

Tel.+44 (011635247890 Fax.+44 (0) 1635 247891

email:cmg@ifatca.org

ADVERTISING SALES OFFICE

Advertisers in this issue: Schmid,Serco

McMillan Scottpie 10 SavoyStreet

Photographs: Philippe Domogala. Chris Stock, Phil ParkerAirbus. EugenioOrtega Alvarez. Tom Skaret ,PeerPhilipsen

London WC2E 7HR Tel: +44 (0)20 7878 2316 Fax: +44 (0)20 7379 7118

email: david@mcmslondon.co.uk

Copy Editors Maureen Clayson,Janet Hall, Lucy Leveson

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

PhilippeDomogata.

Merelsuaat5. NL 6176 EZSpaubeek.

The Netherlands.

Tel+31 (0)464433564 Fax+31(0)433661541

DESIGN & PRINTING

CreativeColour Bureau Unit4 230/2fl.JGarscubeRoad GlasgowG4 9RR Tel+44 (0)141353 3206 Fax+44 (0)141353 2267 ISDN+44 (01141353 0371

Emailinfo@ccb.co.uk

CONTROLLER MAGAZINE SUBSCRIPTION RATES Issuesare usuallypublishedat the end or March, June, Septemberand December.

Subscriptionrates for 2003 Volume42, four Issuesare USS24.00per annum,plus postage& packing.Order Form- page 21.

A reduced rate is availableon requestfor bona fide Air TrafficControllers Magazinesare dispatchedusing priority airmailworldwide UK delivery 2-5 days USS3.50 Europe delivery 2-5 days USS6.00 Restof World delivery 5-7 days USS7.00 Paymentcan be madeby chequeor banktransrerin US Dollars,or for individualsubscriptionsby visa/ma.stercard in pounds sterling.

Furtherinformationavailablefrom the SubscriptionManager: Steph Simmonds.58 Attwood Drive. Arborfield. Reading.BerkshireRG29FEUK Tel/Fax: +44(0)1189762697 • e•mail: subscribe@ifatca.org•website: www.ifatca.org IssuesAppear Beginningof April, July.August.November.ContributorsAre ExpressingTheir PersonalPointsof View and Opinions,Which May Not Necessarily CoincideWith Thoseof The InternationalFederationof Air TrafficControllers"Associations,IFATCA.IFATCADoesNot AssumeResponsibilityForStatementsMade and OpinionsExpressed.it AcceptsResponsibilityForPublishingTheseContributions.Cont<ibutions Arn WelcomeasAre Commentsand Criticism.No PaymentCan be Made For ManuscriptsSubmittedFor Publicationin The Controller.The Editor ReservesThe Right to Make Any EditorialChangesin Manuscripts.Which he BelievesWill ImproveThe MaterialWithout AlteringThe IntendedMeaning.Written Permissionby The Editoris NecessaryForReprintingAny Partof ThisJournal.

............................... ·----------------~

THE CONTROLLER

VISITTHEIFATCAWEBSITE:www.ifatca.org

3

r

r1

·,;;;;;;;.==;;;;;;;;;.••

..-------=----·······-·····-····•·

_______ .......-....................

-

........................................ _.._..

------------

............. ..

Safety Responsibilities and Accountabilities Albert Aidoo Taylor Executive Vice President AFM Some things never change. The need to create a total safety culture in Air Traffic Service (ATS) operations to protect public safety cannot change. So long as man continues to explore means of maximizing the potential of air transportation the need to develop a complementary safe air traffic management system will continue to preoccupy industry partners.

ATS provision is facing serious challenges worldwide. Europe, North America and some parts of Asia faces the challenge to increase capacity. This need has facilitated the introduction of concepts such as Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) and Land and Hold Short (LASHO) operations in Air Traffic Control (ATC) provision. It should be anticipated that unless adequate measures are introduced, an increase in capacity automatically impinges on current safety levels. The question is what control measures have we introduced in ATC operations that will forestall any safety risks that are posed by increased capacity?

The challenge for economic operation of commercial flights continues to sway discussions against the cost of creating safety. The world economic downturn has undoubtedly posed serious challenges to governments concerning allocation of resources to ATC operations. In fact most research programmes have been put on hold.

Additionally, the search for a suitable administrative structure to manage ATC operations goes on without any clear understanding of ATC and the need for public safety. It is very surprising to learn that the USA government is contemplating the removal of special category public service status ATC enjoys.

The experiment with NAVCANADA has yielded many positive results. However, the current arrangement still has many flaws that need to be addressed. The UK NATS experiment is almost a disaster. It has, however, taught many lessons to the world regarding the need for

governments and national administrations to continue supporting safety critical industries such as rail transportation and ATS, to protect public safety. Some countries in Africa, the Middle East, South America, the Caribbean, Asia, central and eastern Europe still have undue military influence and civil service constraints that impede efforts to improve safety in ATS delivery.

The impact of ATC operations on the environment is attracting public concern, especially in Europe. The need to safeguard the environmental interest was cited as a contributing factor to an aircraft accident in Switzerland a couple of years ago.

....... governments cannot shun their responsibility for providing a safe ATS service just by delegating such responsibility to profitoriented entities

Post September 11 challenges have introduced security dimensions to ATC operations. There is a paradigm shift to ensure security in ATC operations to prevent the abuse of ATS systems by terrorist groups.

The introduction of many concepts to ATS operations including Safety Management, Quality Control or Quality Assurance, the plan to extend the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit programme to ATS, Risk Assessment and the requirement to provide a safety case for any new facility or service, provides an opportunity to address most of the safety issues that have bedeviled the industry for a long time.

If ATS provision is an international public service, then governments cannot shun their responsibility for providing a safe ATS service just by delegating such responsibility to profit ..oriented entities. If

____ 4

those business interests dwindle and commercial ATS providers are unable to continue safe operations, governments will have the responsibility to ensure continuous safe ATS operations to support social services.

The obligation for Air Traffic Service Providers to ensure acceptable safety levels must be enshrined in national legislation which must clearly empower an independent and well-resourced Safety Regulator to provide an effective framework to regulate ATS operations.

The functions of the safety regulation must include: Setting of minimum safety standards by means of goal-based regulatory objectives and requirements; Approval of individuals, organisations and safety significant Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems; Surveillance of continued competence and performance.

safety

It is now necessary to put in place a credible system to enforce compliance of approved safety activities and enhance the role of the economic regulator especially in a commercialized ATS environment.

Whatever new concepts or challenges that come will have to support the need to create a total safety culture in ATS provision. The time is ripe for all industry partners and the public to focus our minds and channel resources towards the creation of an internationally acceptable safety culture in ATC operations. The safety management systems in ATC and extension of ICAO Safety Oversight Audit to cover Annex 11 shall be implemented by humans. The need for safety in ATS will never change; what we need to change is the attitude of all those who bear the mantle for creating a safety culture in the industry.

.......................... ·-·-------·------------

THECONTROLLER

~Chris ~Editor

Stock

Conference 2003 Another annual conference is over leaving us time time to reflect on the conclusions. My impressions were very much of a mature organisation that goes about its business in a professional and efficient manner; the policies that were adopted were not revolutionary but rather evolutionary. Tidying up the edges and firming up the weaker statements to enable the Federation to go about its business in a positive and meaningful manner.

Prior to conference, there were concerns about the stability of Argentina as result of it's ongoing economic crisis. If there were difficulties, these were certainly not apparent to the delegates and accompanying visitors. Everyone was made to feel welcome and the pervading atmosphere of Buenos Aires was one of friendship. To put the icing on the cake, the Organising Committee did a superb LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Article concerning the mid-air collision at Lake Constance Dear Editor With reference to an article published by Philippe Domagala in issue 03/02 (The Controller) concerning the mid-air collision at Lake Constance (Germany), I would like to comment on the article as fol lows: The author made the following statement in the second paragraph on page 13: But there was nothing I could find in the German AIP etc? ..that refers specifically to what Pilots should precisely do when an ATC instruction is conflicting with an RA. I have enclosed an extract from the German AIP which renders the following information: If a decision is made not to follow a Resolution Advisory a manoeuvre should never be made in a direction opposite to the one indicated by the Resolution Advisory. This is particularly important as the system may coordinate, unknown to the pilot, with another equipped aircraft.

The German AIP continues as follows: On being notified that an aircraft under Air Traffic Control is manoeuvring in accordance with a Resolution Advisory,

THE CONTROLLER

job making this conference one of the best organised and happiest IFATCA gatherings. Congratulations to Cesar.Gabriela and their team.

Controller Changes It has been no secret that this journal has problems of its own caused by falling revenues. CMG and the Executive Board have been in discussions over the past 12 months to identify the way forward. It has been decided that, in future, all advertising and journal layout will be handled by an agency - McMillan-Scott pie - to improve our advertising income and make the journal more attractive to a wider audience. Editorally, the contents and policy will remain firmly with IFATCA. The aim is to return to our former self financing status, independent of Federation funding. The first issue under the new arrangements will be distributed on 1 July 2003.

Editorial Policy It has always been policy to allow articles from other sources than IFATCA to be published in this journal. When this happens, authors are responsibility for the accuracy of their information and for any opinions they state. The Editor and IFATCA are absolved from any responsibility for misrepresentations and inaccuracies. However, we always try to ensure that MAs are appraised of articles which may affect them directly for any comments and response. A recent article dealing with fatigue management in Australia contained some contradictory comments which were not in accordance with Civil Air's negotiations at the time of writing. In this instance, I failed to establish the views of the MA because of a lack of procedure. For this, I apologise and will ensure our procedures are tightened to avoid future embarassment.

a controller should not issue instructions to that aircraft which are contrary to the Resolution Advisory as communicated by the pilot.

I would be very grateful if you would clarify this matter and publish this information in one of the next issues of your magazine.

RA because it could make things worse (e.g. due to visual acquisition ), or in doing so may endanger the flight ( e.g. in high ground ) There is no text on conflicting ATC instructions. The second quote refers to what controllers should do, not pilots.

Yours sincerely Axel Raab

This lack of clear guidance in most AIPs (Germany is no exception ) has since been recognised by ICAO and in their last State letter dated October 2002, one of the main proposals for change deals with this issue: ICAO State Letter AN11/19 Proposal (b) says : "follow the RA, even if there is a conflict between the RA and an A TC instruction to manoeuvre "

DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH Axel Raab Head of Public Relations Am DFS Campus 10 D-63225 Langen Tel.: +49-6103-707 4160 Fax.: +49 6103 707 4196 axeI.raab@dfs.de REPLY FROM PHILIPPE DOMOGALA

Dear Axel My original text referred to what pilots should precisely do in case of contradictions between an ATC clearance and an RA. The two quotes Axel mentions in his letter are not clearly telling pilots what to do in this situation.

The first one refers to not manoeuvring in the opposite sense on an RA, but this is there for pilots electing not to follow an

IFATCA in its response to the ICAO State letter fully supports this proposal for change (among other things). Hopefully, it will be accepted and will make its way into all AIPs and training manuals, thus making, in our opinion, the matter clearer and safer.

Finally, I would like to say that I did not single out the German AIP in particular.

As far as I am aware, most, if not all, AIPs were lacking in precise guidance to pilots on this issue, as well as the ICAO Doc 4444 and Eurocontrol Manual on ACAS.

5

New Executive Board Members EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT ASIA PACIFIC

DAVID K W CHEUNG HONG KONG

Dr. GABRIELA LOGATTO

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

ARGENTINA

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FINANCE

DALE WRIGHT USA

6

THE CONTROLLER

ATC Safety and You Professional Responsibility in a Culture of Blame Brian J. Fallon, NATCA There are many issues facing controllers the world over today - technological changes, nationalization vs privatization, geopolitical turmoil and security. Many controllers from around the globe are working tirelessly on these issues in special workgroups and committees, be it locally, nationally, and/or internationally.

But through it all, our core mission remains unchanged: we are to strap on the headset and keep the skies safe, no matter what.

Workload Transition. These are issues that affect everyone, but due to our unique career field, the importance of understanding the impact these factors can have on your personal performance cannot be understated.

Controllers understand that aviation accidents and incidents are seldom attributable to a single cause, and that there are many links in an "event chain", but most controllers do not realize how long that chain can be, nor how far back in time it started. Air traffic control is an exacting science; the smallest errors can blossom into enormous events. It seems it is only in brain surgery and air traffic control that mixing up your left with your right can land you on international news broadcasts. And there always appears to be a manager or a reporter nearby who is all too ready and willing to point the finger at the last person in that event chain as the "cause" of the event. How can you ensure that you are not the one getting unfairly blamed?

It seems it is only in brain surgery and air traffic control that mixing up your left with your right can land you on international news

Circadian rhythms are bodily rhythms that

fluctuate on a 24-hour basis. These rhythms form the internal 'clock' that we all have that tell us when it's time to wake up and when it's time to sleep. But these rhythms are both more stubborn and more fragile than most understand, and upsetting the circadian metronome can cause physical and mental distress. Some scientists argue that prolonged disruptions of circadian rhythms, as in the span of a career, can have serious, debilitating and possibly permanent health consequences.

why it's usually easier to go a little longer than normal in a day than it is to wake up earlier than usual. So where's the danger in all of this?

The following is an explanation of Circadian Rhythms by Dr. Mark R. Rosekind, Director of the Fatigue Countermeasures Program at NASA Ames Research Center, taken from his presentation Physiological Considerations of Fatigue, during the NTSB/NASA Fatigue Symposium Proceedings, November 1-2, 1995: "What can create physiological problems is when you take the [circadian] clock and put it on a new shift schedule, it does not adjust immediately. It can take from a few days to weeks for the internal clock to adjust to a new schedule or new environmental time zone. Shiftwork can involve any schedule when you are awake, active, working, at a time when your brain says you should be asleep. That situation requires that you override the biological process which has you programmed to be awake during the day and sleeping at night.

One obvious conflict is trying to work during the night when you are biologically programmed to be asleep. Conversely, There is an old adage that says if you put a there is difficulty of trying to sleep during frog into a pot of hot water, he'll jump the day when you are biologically right out. But. if you put that same frog Scientists have determined that circadian programmed to be awake. This creates a into a pot of cool water, and then conflict between the environmental slowly turn up the heat, the frog cues and internal circadian rhythms. will sit there until it boils to One difficulty is that many situations death. Controllers can get involve continually shifting the clock boiled, too. In other words, it is around. For example, shift workers the air traffic controller's that go back and forth between Shiftwork can involve any schedule when you are renowned ability to adapt that is schedules, or revert to day time awake, active, working, at a time when your brain also among the controller's schedules on their days off. says you should be asleep. greatest safety threats. Are you really aware of the "temperature" Some believe that the longer one of the pot you're in? stays on a night shift that eventually the body will "adapt." The available Here are but a few issues which scientific data indicates that being on controllers need to be aware of an altered shift schedule, like nights, before they enter the operational rhythms are "set" primarily by sunlight. If for a prolonged period of time does not environment: Circadian Rhythms and the you were to go and live in a cave, without lead to an adjusted internal circadian detrimental effects of Shiftwork; access to any light whatsoever, your pattern. And why not? When a night Vigilance, Sustained Attention, and circadian rhythms would actually adjust to shift worker leaves the job, the individual Fatigue, and a phenomenon known as a 25-hour day pattern. This is partially might get in the car to go home and drive

THECONTROLLER

7

ATC S;:i f Pty in human biology, and despite all efforts to the contrary, once fatigue has set in, performance erodes. Once the biological pressure for sleepiness is resident in a person, it's a mugger in waiting. Activities that require relatively passive vigilance, such as very light traffic periods common during the overnight hours, are the As a normal part of the aging alleyways that make the attack process, not only does your sleep possible. But even if these activities change, but your internal circadian require minimal attention, they still clock's ability to adjust to schedule require sustained attention. and time zone changes also slows .... part of the aging process, not only does your Sustained attention is a key down with age. sleep change, but your internal circadian clock's performance demand in air traffic ability to adjust to schedule and time zone changes control; it refers to the ability of the Both the quantity and quality of individual to maintain their focus of also slows down with age sleep can be affected by the attention and to remain alert for direction in which the internal prolonged periods of time. The task circadian clock is moved. of monitoring is one for which Understanding the basic circadian humans are not well suited, physiology can help quantify, in an particularly after periods of sleep operational sense, what might be length can have a pronounced effect on disruption. expected in the quantity and quality of the shift worker's subjective state, sleep obtained during a particular including fatigue and awareness.

Early sleep deprivation research discovered schedule." that serious failures of performance were Historically. on-the-job fatigue has been associated with changes in brain waves.

As Dr. Rosekind suggests, despite an These brain waves tend to match the viewed as a simple variable that is strongly individual's personal opinion as to their correlated with time-on-task in the patterns of repose. In other words, the particular adaptability to working at night, brain appears to be "microsleeping" during workplace. In other words, most believe it is virtually impossible to re-orientate that fatigue is a condition produced mainly these performance lapses. As sleepiness 40,000 years of biological adaptation away increases, so do these microsleep episodes from an inherent daylight circadian by physical activity. Hours of service regulations, used to regulate rest periods and attendant performance problems. orientation. The modern phenomenon of Research reveals that as fatigue increases, shiftwork has proven to be fertile ground of transportation workers, are good the brain will "fall asleep," even while the examples of this perspective, yet they for Human Factors studies. An ever eyes are open, despite efforts by the increasing body of research has suggested highlight the shortcomings of this "Urban individual to stay focused. The sleepier the Legend." These regulations assume that that shiftwork - night work in particular all hours of the day are equal and person, the more pronounced and may have serious adverse consequences frequent these micro-sleep for health and well-being and increase work stress. Shift workers, intrusions will occur. You need look no further than an auto particularly rotating shift workers, accident caused by the driver are known to have higher sick leave falling asleep behind the wheel to usage, more frequent visits to health recognize how serious this can be. care facilities, and generally have recognize that the effects of fatigue are based in more health-related complaints than brain function, it is equally important to note that As important as it is to recognize day workers. Individuals who fatigue cannot be prevented by personality, that the effects of fatigue are frequently work the overnight hours intelligence, education, training, skill, motivation based in brain function, it is have higher incidences of or professionalism. equally important to note that gastrointestinal disorders, from general stomach discomfort to ulcers fatigue cannot be prevented by personality, intelligence, and other related chronic illnesses.

These problems are believed to education, training, skill, motivation or professionalism. result from several factors, ranging interchangeable. Thus, they attempt to Certainly being educated about fatigue from circadian desynchronosis to the increased domestic and social stresses that minimize accident risk due to fatigue by and how it effects performance may help you recognize it when it occurs. However, often accompany shift work. governing the numbers of hours personnel must work, and attempt to allow for the fundamental problem of what causes adequate periods of rest. The accident the brain to fatigue and performance to Working through the night involves record reveals that this simplistic approach fail, is not lack of physical strength or behaviours that are for the most part endurance, a lack of intelligence, or lack irregular, and as such make adaptation has not proven to be an adequate safety control; in 1990, the U.S. National of professionalism. Rather, it is a difficult. For instance, the human body is not 'programmed' to have lunch at Transportation Safety Board called for a neurobiological process directly related to review of these regulations in all modes of the circadian pacemaker in the brain and 3:00am. Among the major consequences of shiftwork, especially working at night, is transportation. to the biological need for sleep. reduced sleep length. Various studies The fact of the matter is, fatigue originates So we know who the mugger is, and have reported differences in sleep in the sunlight. The sunlight tells the internal circadian clock that it is morning time and works to reset it on a day-light schedule. The sun provides mixed cues to the internal circadian clock and prevents physiological adjustment to the night shift.

8

quantity and in sleep quality as related to the type of shift worked. These studies have shown that on average, workers on the afternoon/evening shifts tend to sleep longest, while workers on the day shift sleep slightly less, and the night shift workers sleep least. The changes in sleep

THE CONTROLLER

NOW THERE'SA COMPACT VOICESWITCHINGSYSTEM WITH BIG CAPABILITIES.

PLUS ROOM TO GROW.

ICS Compactis the answerto the marketsdemandfor a smart,economical VoiceCommunication SwitchingSystem for ATC Tower and Tower/Approach applications.The system is based on the field proven best-introduced Integrated Communications SystemICS200/60.

Off-the-shelf hardware, a comfortable integrated distribution frame(IDF)andpre-scaled configurations result in a short project time. The integrationof telephony, intercomand radio voicecontrolthrougha singlepanel savesworkspace, whichbecomesfree for newflight data equipment.

Its inherentmodularitylets the systemgrowaccordingto the customer'sneed. An expansioneven to a large, distributedICS 200/60 can be doneany time by adding furtherhardwareandsoftwarelicenses.

Findout moreaboutICSCompacttoday.Andfinda whole freedomof communication.

For further information,call +41 1 456 11 11 or visit www.schmid-telecom.com.

52 Schmid Intelligent by design

www.schmid-telecom.com SchmidTelecomAG,Binzstrasse 35, CH-8045Zurich,Switzerland

THE CONTROLLER

Ff{EEDOM

OF

COMMUNICATION

9

where the attack can take place. But when? This is where the phenomena of workload transition comes in to play.

Workload transition is simply the movement from one level of workload to another. But the issues involved with these transitions are anything but simple.

Most research has concentrated with the issues surrounding suddenly going from a routine work pattern to overload - very busy or complex situations, such as an emergency. These are events with which every air traffic controller is familiar. But an examination of ATC Operational Errors (OEs) reveal a counter-intuitive reality; it is not overload that is the major danger for controllers, but underload.

Especially when it follows on the heels of an overload transition.

accomplished, time pressures, an increase in coordination, and occasionally incongruous or conflicting data, which usually includes a fair amount of uncertainty as to what course of action to take. History shows that on a whole, we do very well with these types of situations.

But when the action dies down, and things begin to return to normal, this is when the mugger begins to move out of the shadows.

So how do we judo-flip the mugger? In my opinion, the single most important action a controller can engage in to prevent lapses is to remain engaged in teamwork activities. Teamwork by definition is a complementary relationship of interdependence.

Teamwork empowers behaviour that provides proven error countermeasures: briefings, workload distribution, plans stated, contingency planning, monitor and cross check, workload management, As the work levels return to normal, or vigilance, automation management, especially if workload moves from busy inquiry, assertiveness, evaluation of plans, and complex to very light, blood pressure adaptability, and conflict resolution. normalizes and the heart rate slows.

Effective teamwork influences outcomes through a system of checks and balances, and has a positive effect on situations with the potential for errors, on errors, In an overload situation, there are many well known and responses to errors. And, most importantly for our physical reactions that occur: an adrenalin rush, discussion, a team member will increased blood pressure and heart rate, rapid and most likely notice your drowsiness shallow breathing. before you do.

Humans need stress to operate. It's the quality of that stress, as well as the quantity, that is the issue. Too much stress, or high levels of stress for too long, and we burn-out. But if there's too little stress, we become bored and complacent. Either of these situations is undesirable. But as any controller knows, ATC is not a static environment; air traffic does not move at a constant, dependable rate throughout the day. It's feast or famine - the morning departure push; the lunch rush; the late afternoon arrival crunch. Weather can create its own rushes and voids.

In an overload situation, there are many well known physical reactions that occur: an adrenalin rush, increased blood pressure and heart rate, rapid and shallow breathing. This is matched by an increase in technical activities that have to be

10

Breathing deepens and slows. Actions and responses become more automatic.

The adrenal response ceases. But when the adrenal response ends, the body responds with more glandular and hormonal changes, designed to counteract the massive power draw that the adrenal rush demanded. These chemical changes are centred on a single concept - the danger has past. It's now time to rest.

But the danger is not past. The mugger is about to strike.

Teamwork is critical for safety.

Surgeons do not operate in a room by themselves. Firemen do not enter a burning building alone.

Airlines have been perfecting the concepts of Crew Resource Management for over 20 years. Research has shown that changes in attitudes through improved teamwork, changed behaviours for a new aviation culture that improved safety.

From childhood we have been told to never go swimming without a partner.

And we all know how 'hot' situations in ATC can get. So to avoid getting boiled, don't enter the operational waters alone.

THE CONTROLLER

Future Surveillance Surveillance infrastructure - the German roadmap to cope with future demands Dr. Roland Mallwitz The task of German DFS, Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH, as for any Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) is to ensure the safe, expeditious and economical performance of air traffic control. The challenge for DFS is to cope with one of the most crowded air spaces in the world. This places the highest demand on people and technology.

Some principles have been set to address the issues: •

Safety first

•

Provide capacity according to

•

Technology follows application

•

Technologies are not implemented to provide the same service, but to improve the capabilities to provide additional service or support new applications

•

New implementations (technology as well as procedures) shall be harmonised with ICAO requirements and the Eurocontrol Surveillance Strategy

Primary Surveillance Radars (PSR) to support independent surveillance on the airport and movement areas. A stepwise implementation of digital systems (Advanced Surface Movement Radar) has started to allow for automatic conflict detection and labelling in conjunction with flight data processing systems.

Due to operational requirements, DFS provides independent surveillance with PSRfor all major TMAs. In addition, DFS is obliged to provide independent surveillance for German en route

Targets:

Safety

Maintain Level of Safety

A TC Capacity

Step 3

Step 2 Step 1

J

Step 4

_.=------.---,

•

ATM 2000+ Improve ,,Quality"

and tor Risin9 oern A1C user capaci\'i b'J

Cost I Flight Reduce ATC-Costs I Flight Figure 1: Targets for ATC systems modernisation

airspace user demand •

Actions are based on a benefit driven approach

•

Various people understand this in different ways. For DFS, benefit covers several issues amongst which the most common approach, a business case, is one.

Another important subject falling under this headline is a safety case. And last but not least, benefits are also discussed with respect to strategic decisions, e.g. where initial applications may not provide early benefits, but are regarded as necessary to enable long term benefits

THE CONTROLLER

Figure 1 displays the match of those principles and goals with DFS modernisation along the four steps of the ATM 2000+ strategy. Surveillance systems provide the basis as technical means for increased capacity and maintained safety.

But to realise the expected benefits, optimisation of airspace structure and procedures supported by improved ATM systems is necessary as well. This article discusses surveillance infrastructure in particular, providing a sound basis for future developments.

airspace above 4000 ft MSL. This was agreed for national security between civil and military authorities, but became more important after September 2001 . Despite the limited information (position only, no identification, no altitude) no other technology than PSRis available for completely independent surveillance.

Therefore, DFS will continue to maintain and operate an adequate PSR infrastructure. As this infrastructure is available it will also be used to obtain weather data.

Considerations on surveillance infrastructure

Most conventional civil radar systems operating in European Airspace combine PSRwith Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR). In this combination, the

At all major airports DFS provides

11

Future Surveillance radar system provides independent surveillance on co-operative and non-cooperative targets. DFS today operates 23 combined PSR/SSRplus 7 SSR-only radars. Co-operative aircraft are equipped with an SSRtransponder. This device replies to interrogations either with altitude (Mode C) or with (limited) identification information (Mode A). The radar reply processing determines the position of the aircraft using antenna direction and distance. DFS provides for whole German airspace at least double SSRcoverage.

There are some limitations in the conventional system, even after the implementation of monopulse systems.

These limitations are: •

12

•

Mode A code shortage The number of available Mode A codes is at its limit, and for certain flights, the available code stack is already not sufficient.

Mode S elementary surveillance is required from: •

March 2004: for all new IFR aircraft

•

March 2005: for all IFR and new VFR aircraft

•

March 2008: all aircraft

These limitations require the upgrade to Mode Sin German airspace urgently.

Mode S provides selective addressing of aircraft by using a world wide unique aircraft address (out of more than 16 million). Even in its elementary form it delivers additional advantages like:

While the above dates are published for aircraft implementation, DFS is in the process of upgrading ground sensors, communication networks and data processing systems to be able to use these data as they become available.

•

automatic acquisition of "call sign used in flight";

New technologies

•

altitude data in 25 ft increments instead of today's 100 ft, if supported by the installed altimeter;

The enemy of "the good" is "the better".

The improvements mentioned above were foreseen to become operational in the early 90's. But further steps were identified as useful to cope with operational requirements, leading to enhancements but causing delay in the standardisation process.

The mandates published originally required inherent communication capabilities.

• for a transition period backward RF load compatibility is ensured by "system Although DFS is operating just 30 design": radar systems, due to historical developments German 1200 -r----------------airspace was covered by 1000 nearly four In the mid 90's new times as many systems received 800 stationary <I> attention and there were □ FIR radars located "C "' 0 511 early discussions on what ■ Domestic u 600 in Germany. c:: □ Tmnsit'Supertr.insit was to be called later (/) While the (/) ADS-B. Three candidate number of 400 technologies are under 649 ground based evaluation now, VHF 529 radars has 450 200 Datalink Mode 4 (VDL4), 346 been 1090 MHz Mode S decreased 0 +-....L..--'---,--'--...,__--,-__,__....L..---,--L--'---, Extended Squitter and since the mid veriligbar 1997 2000 2005 the Universal Access 90's, the Transceiver (UAT). "ADSnumber of B out" (from an aircraft airborne point of view) will be interrogators Figure 2: Allocation and available in the near have increased use of Mode A codes in future based on 1090 due to ACAS MHz Mode S Extended (Airborne MODES S transponders are required also Squitter.

Transponder units already Collision Avoidance System) mandates for those aircraft which have to be fitted compliant with the Mode S Enhanced at the same time. Version 7 of TCAS II with ACAS. The benefits of this Surveillance requirements, agreed for the (Threat Alert & Collision Avoidance implementation are: European core area, are expected to be System) is the current implementation prepared for this operation without any • a higher probability of detection than according to ICAO ACAS standards. additional on-board upgrades.

SSReven under difficult Amongst other reasons, Europeans circumstances and therefore It is acknowledged by ANSPs that ADS-B insisted on the mandate of version 7 improved safety; is an enabler for future ATM concepts. It due to its reduced RF pollution. will serve air-air, air-ground and ground• it solves SSRMode A code shortage Nevertheless, even TCAS II version 7 ground applications. Improved situational for improved capacity. violates the imposed limits in the awareness for all partners involved and vicinity of major airports. At a certain In addition, the use of Mode S reduces based on the same data set forms the traffic density this may lead to target the SSRchannel load (1090 MHz) major advantage. However, the drops in the approach phase at providing more capacity for ADS-B with dependence of data and the integrated airports using conventional SSR. 1090 MHz Extended Squ itter. An implementation of navigation, surveillance Investigations reveal that even under implementation of Mode S is in line with and communication is a matter of severe conditions selective Mode S international developments. The concern. While the system can support interrogations ensure continuously implementation is supported by all five early applications where just procedural required target detection and DFS principles for implementation. In surveillance was in place in the past, it still identification. accordance with the European strategy has to prove that it will also support

THE CONTROLLER

uture Surveillance applications in high-density airspace. This supports the view that early and most beneficial implementations will happen for air-ground- and air-air-applications in remote and transition airspace.

There are still open issues with ADS-B in general. The combination of the three independent piles of air traffic management (communication, navigation and surveillance) may require more effort and money than is expected now.

Therefore, the current infrastructure has to stay in place for some years yet to cope with the high air traffic densities, particularly in the European core area. To be prepared for the future, additional ADS-B sensors will be implemented where cost beneficial or complementary, but not required to provide the same performance levels (e.g. accuracy, integrity) as the existing infrastructure.

In some regions ADS-Chas been implemented successfully. However, ADSC as implemented using satellite channels is not applicable to high-density areas.

The implementation of multilateration systems is under review. The expected benefits using these systems are improved target detection (e.g. position, identification, update rate), which leads to an improved situational awareness and improved conflict detection, in particular under low visibility conditions. In addition, automatic identification and labelling for all transponder equipped vehicles, not only aircraft would be possible. Due to physical signal characteristics, multilateration systems will be based on SSRMode S technology.

Multilateration systems will take advantage of the available Mode S transponder equipage and may be the ideal backup for ADS-B implementation.

installed on new aircraft within a limited installation program (LIP)

+ Discussions start on alternative technologies, operational experience is re-allocated

+ Operational requirements and procedures trigger technical adaptation,

+ 3rd generation equipment is developed and ready for operational use, full implementation may start, but

+ New ideas have started discussion for technical solutions (generally not changing the operational requirements) The duration of this cycle and successful implementation afterwards depends on the active involvement of all stakeholders (Airlines, Military and General Aviation, ANSPs, certification authorities, avionics industry, airframe manufacturers,) and their interests during all phases. There are various examples for being successful or not: •

MLS was developed and standardised when the discussions on GPS started.

The benefits of GPS/GNSS have been demonstrated, implementation moves on - but slower than expected and ILS has still to be maintained and improved to cope with traffic demand

•

ACAS implementation went quite smoothly due to system complexity

concepts

There were long discussions on further enhancements supported by ADS-B rather than by the foreseen Mode S Enhanced Surveillance implementation. In general, all technologies downlink airborne derived parameters (e.g. heading, speed, and selected vertical intention). On board the aircraft the installations (incl. data sources, wiring) have to support the downlink of those parameters.

To be realistic: although ADS-B is promising, an operational implementation in the European high density airspace will not happen prior to 2015 at the earliest.

Fortunately, the traffic grows again, new forecasts meet elder analyses at similar time scales. Therefore, decisions on necessary improvements are required now to be prepared for the next 10 years. The implementation of Mode S Enhanced Surveillance paves the way for these improvements: no changes to existing Mode S radars are necessary to downlink aircraft parameters. minimum ATM system upgrade are necessary nearly the same data sets are used for Enhanced Surveillance and any ADS-B medium. Providing the data by the same box on board, the Mode 5 transponder, allows for the same wiring of data sources to the transponder and an early implementation of ADS-B. Loading one or the other of about 250 available

applications

enabler

®

autonomous flight operation

air-air-surveillance, delegation of separation

co-operative ATM

trajectory negotiation air-ground

data link & ADS-B In/out

+ Developments lead to prototypes, trials and (if successful) to first generation of industrial equipment production

+ 1st generation does not meet

data link & ADS-B In/out

.-----==========:

Future concepts and applications In general, there appears to be something like a development cycle taking into account specifics of the aviation industry: + Operational requirements trigger discussion for technical solutions

--------........................ ·-··-·· and missing alternatives but also the active involvement of all stakeholders during critical phases

+ 2nd generation equipment is being

SSR Mode S or ADS-Bout (short-term) improvement of ATM functions

technical and operational requirements, euphoria moves to normal

(j)

downlink of aircraft state parameters

SSR Mode S

time

+ Industry is improving equipment, standards are written or amended

THE CONTROLLER

Figure 3:

Future ATM concepts, applications and enablers

13

Future Surveillance supported data exchange. Unfortunately, TCPs are not available in current aircraft installations. This shows that there are still

transponder data registers requires just the appropriate programming.

The benefit of these modifications in existing infrastructure are: •

•

reduced controller workload leading to improved capacity; improved awareness of the air situation on ground (and with ADS-B in the air as well) for improved safety;

•

build on available Mode S aircraft and ground infrastructure plus incremental upgrades This approach exploits existing infrastructure on the ground while allowing to take advantage in the air as well as soon as the aircraft are prepared.

In accordance with the European surveillance strategy and with clear commitments from three states (UK, France, Germany - other European states plan to follow) Mode S Enhanced Surveillance is required from March 2005 in Mode S airspace for all IFR aircraft with MTOW of more than 5.700 kg. The harmonised mandates allow for a transition period, which ends March 2007.

Of courses, nothing is implemented on its own. Any technology to be implemented should provide the appropriate growth potential or pave the way to the future. There seems to be a consensus about future concepts and even about highlevel applications. Figure 3 gives an overview.

~

Step4

I-

z

w <f) w

C

,Q

ro

ro

Step2

0 Q,) Q,)

...

0) Q,)

A) Enhance ATC decision support by aircraft derived clata B) Automated support for 1) Aircraft derlveclclata for Integrated arrival. grouncl-baseclsafety nets departure and surface 2) Automatic provision of management alrliorne data to enhance ground system functions C) Alrcran derived data for arrival. departure. surface 3) Provide AT SAW (ATC management 10) D) Delegate separation 4) Dynamically sized sectors service (AOl\/112) E) Facilitate user-preferred 4D-Trajectory (ATC 11) F) Empower autonomous aircraft operation

Step3

0:: CL

E ~

0

operation is an even more demanding concept.

ADS-B package 1 is defined now covering

A) Autornateclsupport for conflict detection B) Automated support for conmct resolution C) Automateclsupport for trafflc cornplexlty reduction 1) Irnpro·1egroundbase(! safety nets D) Automated support for arrival management (ATC (AT':<'.12) 07) and cleparture rngrnt.

2) Irnpro,,_ Quality of Sury'?lll811Ce (SUR E) Consistent fllgt1tclata (ATC 03, DPS 02) 01-0~, (ATC 05, 09) F) Data Link (ATC 06, 08)

Step1

e

2007

Delivers benefits: 2004

2020

2011

Step4

1-

z

w (/) w

Step3

a:

D) Delegateseparationservice: R&O-ProjectNUP Phase2

1) DAPs1SAPS (Z.B. Mode-S Ext.Squltter)for groundbasedsafetynets In P1.

0 VAFORIT Q) ~--------◄ 2) Improvedsurveillance ~ {trajectoryprediction)by Ol A) ConflictdetectionIn Q) nightIntentparametersIn VAFORIT(MTCD) 0 VAFORITHEC B) -----2) FLIPCYservice:no planned activitiesyet 3) ADS-B/TIS-Bno planned activitiesyet LCIP 2002: 4) Supportby VAFORIT 1) srqx + APW ready,

CL

Step2

8tep1

MS1'>': Implement. plar~1,;· 2) CO O , Mode-S ELS I\IOde-SEHS (DAP\ 4D-P.laner

Short-term improvements are agreed and necessary in Europe ➔ to improve ATM functions thus 2020 2007 2011 providing capacity while Delivers benefits: 2004 reducing delays. Aircraft state parameters are available on Figure 4: Mapping of DFS system implementation with board the aircraft and can be the Eurocontrol strategy ATM2000+ downlinked providing additional information for the ground to issues to be solved. But problem areas specific applications out of steps 2 and 3. ensure safe operations in a more dense have been identified - and solutions are Bearing in mind the development cycle environment. under discussion or under preparation to mentioned above, it will take some time Intent-based ATM requires the downlink support the foreseen applications. until equipment for operational use will be of aircraft intent parameters. For this available. Since improvements are The concepts of co-operative separation application "Trajectory change points" assurance and co-operative ATM are necessary now, appropriate measures (TCP) are the most efficient way to handle have been taken by ANSPs. They led to under discussion in various committees; information exchange. One of the implementations may be available by end the decision for Enhanced Surveillance following steps will be trajectory provided by Mode S. However, of this decade. And, autonomous flight negotiation requiring efficient system

14

THE CONTROLLER

Future Surveillance consideration should be given by airlines to implement as a first ADS-Blink, 1090 Extended Squitter, at the same time for no additional costs. This will be the building block for further steps, which still will require step 1 as a safety baseline.

safety shall be maintained.

With the implementation of Mode S Enhanced Surveillance DFS supports the Eurocontrol ATM 2000+ strategy, which can be displayed as in Figure 3. Figure 4 compares the generic but more detailed table generated by Eurocontrol with the implementations underway within DFS.

DFS has no implementation programme funded and started yet. Nevertheless, the Eurocontrol ADS-B link recommendation provides an optimum migration path from Mode 5 to ADSB.

DFS is supporting the ongoing R&D activities (e.g. NEAN Update Program) with respect to ADS-B. Close coordination on all CNS issues is maintained

Technology development follows certain principles. After a period of development and a slow start, follows implementation

fu netion aIity

ADS-B Mode S E~xtended SquitterVDL M 4 ,:-

Air-AirSurveillanc

t--

Trajectory

zw

Datalink

<J)

(ADS-C & A TN)

Mode S

w

negotiation

·····••••

,

f:l.v."' ~""' f

,

c§' ci''

-+-----:0::1-----.......,-'--··----------,f----'-§'-'-.

a..

IntentParameter

aviation industry faces critical financial problems. In particular, the political support needs to be matched by adequate financial resources.

To fulfil the task DFS will continue to maintain and operate an adequate PSR infrastructure. The current SSR infrastructure is being upgraded from Mode A/C to Mode 5. This programme is fully funded, established and on track. It covers Mode 5 Elementary as well as Enhanced Surveillance.

,

-+-

Enhanced Surveillance ..costs for ADS-8 (ground & air) will be higher than for l11lo<leS EHS. but c1 •..vayto t11efuture wit11new potentials will be paved:·

Elementary Surveillance-+----

SSR

~ • With

rotating antennas

time

Figure S: Technology development

Summary The implementation of all systems follows the modernisation targets displayed as shown in figure 1. With the rising demand for capacity by airspace users DFS provides the appropriate capacity. In parallel, system improvements should also aim for a reduction of costs per flight. But even under these conditions the level of

with the major customers. To be prepared in time for the future, DFS supports the Eurocontrol ADS program. "ADS package 1" is a good starting point, but still major work has to be done. The aggressive schedule requires significant human and financial resources, which are hard to obtain in the current situation where the

and excessive use, prior to the phase out when the limits become apparent. As the curves in figure 5 display the German situation, they also show the "window of opportunity" moving from one technology to the other without reaching the upper limits.

The Author Dr. Roland Mallwitz joined DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH, Research and Development in 1993.

He is project manager for ATM/CNS projects. As German member of the Surveillance and Conflict Resolution Systems Panel (SCRSP)of the ICAO he was rapporteur of WG A (Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems / Airborne Separation Assurance Systems) from 1998 to 2001 and Panel Chairman in 2000.

He was DFS programme manager for Mode S surveillance and datalink evaluation and involved in investigations on compatibility of civil and military surveillance radar and IFF systems. Managing national and multinational projects, his principle area of current activity include ground based and airborne surveillance systems and applications, systems architecture and performance.

THE CONTROLLER

15

Conference (

16

THE CONTROLLER

Conf rence

0

......

.... ,...

•a•• .... .......

•••• •••• ....

••••

■ :a1 I

..,

,.II

I

/

••ro1

11

t.\•·1

I

~

'

I Ill'

·••11

I II I

••

···~ ....,,~,, ... ' .. , ... , •••• •••• l;•tltJ

ea,•

;

I 11111

.... ....

•••• ••••

'·••1:1

r I 11;:i I Urt

t11, I fllt

l■ l!Q

111 I

, ••r-, 111 I

"••· :-:,,a •••• ,,,, ■11:.11

lilltt

I ■ la

•••

!I

••••

•••• ••••

•• Orgarnsmg • • c'o.:m.

The . mitte.e receiving the applause of Final Plenary for a superb conference

\

················-··············-------------------------------------THE CONTROLLER

17

Human Factors Human Centred Automation Bert Ruitenberg IFATCA Human Factors Specialist Introduction

Hardly anyone working in a radar environment would want to return to the days prior to the introduction of radar in ATC. There is no question that the display of radar targets eases the burden on the controller of remembering aircraft positions and projecting those positions in relationship to each other. Similarly, despite the uncertainties associated with increased automation, it is beyond argument that additional automation is needed to enhance controllers' abilities to handle increased traffic demands. What is at issue is the specific design of new automated tools and their capabilities.

Automated aids can be designed from a technology-centred perspective or from a human centred perspective. A technologycentred approach automates whatever functions it is possible to automate and leavesthe human to do the rest. This places the operator in the role of custodian to the automation: the human becomes responsible for the "care and feeding" of the computer. In contrast, a human centred approach provides the operator with automated assistance that saves time and effort; the operator's task performance is supported, not managed, by computing machinery.

The ICAO Human Factors Training Manual (Doc. 9683-AN/950), Part 1, Chapter 3 introduces the principles of human centred automation as developed by Dr. Charles Billings. This section applies these general principles to the aviation domain, and in particular to the ATC domain.

Principles of Human Automation

Centred

Aviation

Basic Assumptions •The pilot bears the responsibility for safety of flight •Controllers bear the responsibility for traffic separation and safe traffic flow Fundamental Principles • Pilots must remain in command of their flights •Controllers must remain in command of air traffic

18

Consequences •The pilot and controller must be actively involved.

• Both human operators must be adequately informed.

•The operators must be able to monitor the automation assisting them.

• The automated systems must therefore be predictable.

•The automated systems must also monitor the human operators.

• Every intelligent system element must know the intent of other intelligent system elements.

products. Such an evaluation benefits controllers by ensuring that the tools and capabilities provided by the computer system are in fact the ones needed by controllers to do their jobs.

.... additional automation is needed to enhance controllers' abilities to handle increased traffic demands. What is at issue is the specific design of new automated tools and their capabilities

• Humans must remain in command of flight and air traffic operations.

Possible ways in which human centred automation can support controllers have been suggested in an analysis of aircraft automation and its effects on flight crews ("Human-centered aircraft automation: a concept and guidelines". C. E. Billings, 1991, NASA Technical Memorandum 103885. NASA-Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA., USA). The following recommendations are based on the conclusions of that report:

•Automation can assist by providing a range of planning and control options.

• Human operators must remain involved in the task.

• Automation can assist by providing better integrated and more timely information.

Applied ATC

Human Centred Automation

in

In a technology-centred approach, whatever automated functions that can be provided to the controller to assist in managing aircraft and increasing capacity are provided. This is different from a human centred approach that aims to provide only those functions that the controller needs, based on information and task requirements. While the goals of the automation remain the same, i.e., to assist the controller in managing aircraft and improve system performance, the approach taken to automation will determine which functions are automated and how the controller will use these automated functions.

A human centred approach is applied by systematically mapping user requirements to technical solutions (e.g., hardware and software that will satisfy requirements). A human centred approach also requires attention to evaluating the usability, suitability, and acceptability of the design

• Human operators must be fully informed about the purposes and functioning of automated processes. At no time should the controller be wondering, "What is the automation doing or why is it doing that?".

• Automation can be designed on the basis of a coherent model of its use, which can be explicitly communicated to users; automation should assist users by providing explanations of its intentions, recommendations, and actions.

• Human operators must have the information needed to anticipate and resolve problems. Automation can assist by monitoring trends, providing decision support, and making required information accessible when it is needed.

The specification of requirements and review of design products based upon considerations such as those outlined above contributes to ensure that ATC automation remains human centred.

THE CONTROLLER

Human Factors High level objectives

There are three higher-level objectives for ATC automation: usability, operational suitability, and workforce acceptance.

Usability is a function of measurable easeof-use outcomes, such as the ease of navigating through a menu structure, ease of remembering data-entry requirements (e.g., command formats and sequences), and ease of locating specific items on a visual display. Overall usability depends on several interdependent factors, such as the reliability of system performance, the organisation of the user interface, and maintainability in the field. Establishing usability goals and evaluating design products against these goals is a key system development activity in which controllers, as end-users, should participate.

set of objectives for automation that should be considered during requirements and development follows: • Transparency of underlying software operations so that the controller does not need to be aware of the inner workings of the computer, but perceives a smooth, responsive operation.

• Error-tolerance and recoverability.

• Consistency with controllers' expectations.

• Compatibility with human capabilities and limitations.

• Ease of reversion to lower levels of automation and of returning to higher levels of automation.

• Ease of handling abnormal situations and emergencies.

• Easeof use and learning.

For any specific design, these objectives In order for a design to be operationally will need to be further specified in terms of suitable, it must support the controller's individual system functions and operational effective and efficient planning, objectives. maintenance of situational awareness, separation of aircraft, and performance of other ATC tasks. Support is provided to the controller by the design primarily in the form of information about the ATC Software operations will be transparent to the controller if ATC tasks can be situation and the status of ATC equipment performed naturally or intuitively and facilities. A design can be usable but operationally unsuitable if it does not without needing to pay conscious meet the controller's requirements for attention to underlying computational appropriate and timely information. Early structures indications of operational suitability can surface in systematic field evaluations.

The ultimate tests of operational suitability occur later during rigorous siteTransparency of underlying implementation evaluations. operations. Internal software operations will not be apparent to the controller if Workforce acceptance derives, in part, design meets the high-level objective of from a design's reliability, usability, and usability. For example, if it is difficult for operational suitability. Acceptance also the controller to maintain a sense of depends on the impact that new ATC orientation within a user-interface menu technology has on controller job structure, it is probably the case that satisfaction, and in particular to the intrinsic programming convenience has taken motivation the job holds for the controller. priority over usability goals.

It may be the case that sources of job satisfaction in the current system are Software operations will be transparent to disrupted or removed by the new the controller if ATC tasks can be technology, including fewer opportunities performed naturally or intuitively without for individual recognition by one's peers needing to pay conscious attention to and managers. underlying computational structures. Thus, transparency also relates to operational Human Factors objectives for A TC suitability. On the other hand, a nonautomation transparent (or opaque) user interface is likely to have adverse consequences for job As a basis for ensuring that the design is satisfaction because it will be difficult to usable, operationally suitable, and understand and use. It will add complexity acceptable to the workforce, it is useful to for operating the system and distract from specify Human Factors objectives for the the real task at hand, i.e. controlling new ATC automation and its operation. A aircraft. It will foster negative attitudes,

THE CONTROLLER

such as frustration and resentment. These questions should be dealt with early in design development so that systems deployed in the field for early field evaluation and later site testing will be more usable, operationally suitable, and acceptable.

Error tolerance and recoverability. The objectives of error tolerance and recoverability fall primarily under operational suitability, but they are related to the other goals as well. Error-tolerant designs allow for the conceptual equivalence of different commands (e.g., Exit and Quit) and will accept any of the pre-defined equivalents. Further, errortolerant designs anticipate possible user errors in data entry and include capabilities to trap errors before they propagate through the system. Error-tolerant designs routinely query the user at critical choice points (e.g., "Are you sure you want to delete this flight plan?"). Under such design, recovery from error is simple and usability is enhanced.

Consistency with controllers' expectations. Automation that does not assess a situation in the same way a controller would, or does not take the same actions a controller would, is likely to elicit scepticism or inappropriate actions from the controller. Controllers will be more likely to accept, trust, and use automated functions that handle situations in the same ways a controller would. To be most useful to the controller, the design of automated functions should take into account air traffic procedures and operations (e.g., airspace and traffic management restrictions, rules for assignment of flight levels, etc.), so that the automation does not violate common practices.

Compatibility with human capabilities and limitations. People are, by nature, poor monitors of automated processes.

Controllers cannot be put in the position of passively monitoring the automation and then be expected to be able to detect a failure, determine the problem, and take appropriate action. On the other hand, people are good at analysing novel or unforeseen situations and selecting strategies to cope with these. Automated functions must be compatible with human capabilities and limitations.

Ease of reversion to lower levels of automation. After operating with a highly automated system for some time, returning to lower levels of automation (e.g., as in the case of system degradation or failure) may

19

Human l C 0 "Although humans are far from perfect be problematic for several reasons. First, sensors, decision-makers, and controllers, controllers may experience a loss of A TC automation philosophy they possess three invaluable attributes. proficiency. For example, if an automatic They are excellent detectors of signals in Before evaluating automated systems, it is conflict-resolution function is used the midst of noise, they can reason useful to think in terms of a human centred extensively, controllers may rarely have to effectively in the face of uncertainty, and philosophy of ATC automation. Such resolve potential conflicts between aircraft. they are capable of abstraction and philosophy considers the automation as Their problem-solving skills and strategies conceptual organisation. Humans thus assisting, not replacing, the controller. It are not likely to be as finely tuned as when provide to the aviation system a degree of they had to prevent and solve the problems recognises that there is more overlap than flexibility that cannot be attained by ever in the capabilities of the human and with only basic support from automation. computers. Human experts can cope with Complex skills suffer from disuse. the computer. It does not divide tasks failures not envisioned by aircraft and between controller and computer Provisions for maintaining these skills (such aviation system designers. They are as recurrent training) must be considered according to simplistic approaches intelligent: they possess the ability to learn depicting computers as "better-than-thein these circumstances.

Second, a from experience and thus the ability to human" at some tasks and humans as controller's ability to respond may be respond adaptively to new situations. "better-than-the-computer" at other tasks. affected by a loss of situational awareness.

Computers cannot do this except in This philosophy advocates a synergistic Controllers who are left "out of the loop" narrowly defined, completely understood will lose their situational awareness and task-allocation strategy that benefits from domains and situations. the best of controller and computer possibly become bored and inattentive.

This will increase the time required The ability of humans to recognise for the controller to take over from and bound the expected, to cope with the automation and will be the unexpected, to innovate, and to ...... human centred ATC automation emphasises detrimental to the quality of the reason by analogy when previous the need for allocating functions in such a way controller's response. Automated experience does not cover a new that the controller's situational awareness is systems have to include an active, problem, are what has made the involved role for the controller, so continually maintained and updated, and that aviation system robust, for there are that the controller always retains the controller's expertise and creativity are still many circumstances, especially in enough situational awareness to exercised regularly. the weather domain, that are neither handle whatever problems arise. controllable nor fully predictable.

Finally, the controller will not be able Each of these uniquely human to recover from an automation attributes is a compelling reason to failure if the number and complexity of capabilities, rather than leaving to the retain human operators in a central position controller only those tasks (or bits of tasks) operations being managed by the in aircraft and in the aviation system. These automation exceeds basic human that the designer finds difficult to humans can function effectively, however, automate. capabilities. only if the system is designed and

Ease of handling abnormal situations and emergencies. Controllers need to have the information and the means that are required to intervene in emergencies or abnormal situations. Controllers should not be denied access to controls or critical information that they may need to respond in these situations. For example, a system designed to automatically handle all communications with aircraft would be unacceptable unless alternative provisions were available for the controller to communicate with aircraft as necessary.

Such design should also provide direct controller access to critical flight information regarding all aircraft in the sector.

Ease of use and learning. Automated functions should be easy to learn and use.

The implications of the use of automated functions on training requirements should be examined. Complex systems may require extensive training on the various operational modes and limitations.

Recurrent training may need to address problems that are possible but rare.

20

The philosophy of human centred ATC automation emphasises the need for allocating functions in such a way that the controller's situational awareness is continually maintained and updated, and that the controller's expertise and creativity are exercised regularly. It suggests that dynamic or adaptive function allocation be considered as a technical solution. Under adaptive function allocation, the controller can prepare for periods of heavy traffic by allocating normally manual functions to the computer; and the controller can prepare for lighter traffic periods by taking on some functions (or portions of functions) normally accomplished by the computer.

Under a static allocation policy, flexibility of assigning functions is not possible.

Human Centred Automation - Summary The following excerpt from the book "Aviation Automation - The Search for a Human-Centered Approach"

by Dr. Charles E. Billings (1997) provides an appropriate concluding summary to the concept of Human Centred Automation as discussed in this section.

structured to assist them to accomplish the required tasks. As technology continues to advance, it will become increasingly urgent that its applications on the flight deck be designed specifically around the human who must command them; in short, future aviation automation must be humancentred if it is to be a maximally effective tool.

At the same time, many machines today are capable of tasks that unaided humans simply cannot accomplish. This is true in both the perceptual and cognitive realms.

An example today is the calculation of optimal orbital trajectories for systems such as the Space Shuttle; another is the determination of a Great Circle navigation route. For these tasks, computers and automated systems are an absolute requirement. Competitive pressures in aviation being what they are, it is likely that still more complex automation will be offered in the marketplace, and there will be a tendency to accept it. If this tendency toward greater complexity is to be countered, it must be by the customers: airlines and other operators must decide whether the potential gains are worth the certain costs."

THE CONTROLLER

...

serco Serco Aerospace SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The International Civil Aviation Organisation requires that a Safety Management System (SMS) be put in place at every airport with ATC during 2003 and within Airport Operations by November 2005. As far back as 1999, Serco commenced the development of a corporate-wide SMS to support its interests in the management of safety critical operations. This covers the nuclear and rail industries, as well as world-wide aviation services, and has led to the development of an aviation-specific SMS, which we are now spearheading across our global aviation business.

Serco Aerospace is responsible for Serco Group's Air Traffic Control and Aerodrome Operations in the European Union.

Serco Aerospace is working towards having their Safety Management System implemented at all UK & European units - military & civil - by July 2003.

During the implementation phase, the Aviation Safety Managers from each Serco geographical region have been working with their respective National Aviation Safety Regulators to seek approval of their individual Aviation Safety Management System. All Aviation Safety Management Systems derive from the Serco Group Aviation Standard.

For more information, please contact Lynette O'Connor Operations Co-Ordinator Serco Aerospace Serco House 11 Bartley Wood Business Park Bartley Way Hook Hants RG27 9XB

Safety Matters

CONTROLLER MAGAZINE - SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM (Rates on Page 3)

Please Return to: Steph Simmonds, Controller Magazine Subscription, 58 Attwood Drive, Arborfield, Reading, Berkshire RG2 9FE United Kingdom Tel/Fax: +44 (0) 118 976 2697 e.mail: subscribe@ifatca.org BLOCK LETTERS PLEASE

Family Name First Name(s) Address Country Number of copies required: Method of Payment:

(please indicate) Cheque enclosed

visa/mastercard

request invoice

Cheques to be made payable to "The Controller" in US Dollars If paying by visa/ mastercard Card Number:

expiry date

Signature of cardholder Name of cardholder Address of cardholder (if different from above)

The transaction will appear on statement as a sale to GATCO in£ sterling

THE CONTROLLER

21

Human Factors Staying fit for future ATM Judith Rothaug, Dipl .-Psych Cordula Braedel-Ki.ihner, Dipl. Wi. -Ing The challenge of change Modern Air Traffic Management faces the challenge to cope with the ever increasing demand of growing traffic loads and nevertheless to maintain a high level of safety. Today's Air Traffic Management (ATM) has more support by sophisticated technology than ever before. Adaptations in working procedures also contribute to the overall objectives of safety and efficiency. Substantial reorganization of air spaceairspace structures such as currently still going on in Europe adds to the list of changes controllers are dealing with. It is an additional demand on controllers to find their way in this changing working environment, a challenge for controllers of all age groups. However, controllers beyond the age of 45 may have to struggle more to cope with the demand.

The role of experience and age for controller's skills has been an issue for human factors research since some years.

There have been remarkable gains due to experience in some skills areas, and there are also areas where we can find a decline of skills due to ageing. Most people tend to focus on the negative side of ageing and forget about the positive developments due to experience.

However, it would be extremely shortsighted management to force older controllers out of the ops room. This would mean losing valuable human resources. Both for safety and efficiency reasons, ATM can not do without experienced controllers in their late forties, fifties and sometimes even sixties.

This articles aims to raise awareness about the issues of experience and ageing in ATC. In the first part it will outline the research findings available in this area.

The second part provides a number of suggestions how to deal with these issues in the future to enable the individual controller and the air navigation service providers to perform a job on a daily basis which is becoming more and more demanding.

Two sides of a coin To gain more experience unavoidably means that we grow older by doing so.

Many people show a tendency to focus only on the negative side of ageing. There

22

is. indeed, no doubt that some functions show a decline with increasing age.

However, this is only half of the truth.

Experience is a strong counterbalancing factor and it even has the power to compensate partly for declines due to age.

The trade-offbetweenage and experience

Figure 1: The counterbalancing effect of ageing and experience.

In 2000 EUROCONTROLconducted an interview study with 76 controllers from five European countries on the topic of ageing and experience in ATM 1 . The controllers displayed an amazing agreement in many areas and almost all of their statements find confirmation in scientific publications.

The controllers in this survey were, on average, 49 years of age, ranging from 39 to 64 years. Their average job experience was 26 years, ranging from 13 to 38 years.

When asked about their concerns regarding ageing on the job, most controllers mentioned the difficulty of dealing with change. Especially the rate of change and the amount of new information make it hard for many controllers to cope. Second, most mentioned was the increase in job demand. Particularly, night shifts become more demanding. Also the increases in workload and complexity contribute to the higher general job demand. Finally, health issues become more and more of a problem with increased age.

Impacts on job performance are recognisable in two directions, both to the negative due to ageing and to the positive due to experience. The negative impacts of ageing are in particular the following: Slowing down in the speed of working,

Increased job demand, Learning gets harder, Multi-tasking and complexity become harder to deal with, and Self-perception changes to the negative.

All these points are confirmed in various scientific studies, most of which are not conducted in the area of ATC. This shows that most of the impacts of ageing are universal, which can be found in all individuals. They are by no means limited to controllers.

The positive experience-related impacts are: • A broad memory bank for situations and resolutions, • Better anticipation of the traffic development.

• Better resource management • Less risk-taking, • Social aspects (for example higher competency when dealing with team issues, etc.), • Better handling of unusual situations, • Better prioritisation, and • High motivation for the job.

Research on expertise with highly experienced professionals points to the same results as found in the interviews with air traffic controllers. Some aspects are, of course, of special importance for the world of ATM, for example the reduced risk-taking of older employees.

Despite the general gains due to experience a number of active compensation strategies were found. They are applied by controllers to compensate the loss in speed or to minimise the mental effort and limit the demand of a task.

These strategies are Improved anticipation and planning, The development of routines, which is in psychological terms the mental automation of information processing, The application of simple solutions to traffic problems, and Better prioritization.

Many concerns were raised regarding the transition to a new technical system. For many controllers it appears to be difficult to accept new concepts. This is even more the case if they cannot see the possible benefit of a new system. In this context, interface issues are of high importance.

THE CONTROLLER

Human Factors A well developed interface can part of the workshop is the one that deals substantially contribute to the acceptance with understanding and awareness of of a new system. Still, the transition might one's own ageing. In this way, managers be more difficult for these controllers who developed a personal interest in the are not computer-literate. They will working conditions of older employees. potentially suffer more from an increase in Developing lines of action for their daily workload. Nevertheless, the positive aspects of an Ergonomics advanced technical system Action fields are highly appreciated by most controllers.

Age

Stepping stones into the future

awareness

leadership

Hoallh

~

Working

tlmo

lnformotlon auollflcatlon This section provides Communication Co-oporallon recommendations on how to deal with these issues in the future. Four levels of action are Figure 2: Action fields to create age available: society, management, the awareness. working process and the individual.

Obviously, these four levels are not work is another very important activity. equally easy to influence. The emphasis of The growing part played by older workers this article is laid on management because among the active population and the this is the most powerful approach for looming lack of specialists has been potential improvements. Nevertheless, forcing companies to take steps to society, work processes and the individual improve the innovative power of their staff must not be neglected when dealing with as a guarantee of future competitiveness. this complex topic.

All activities should aim first and foremost at alerting the management and the Management level: Age Awareness is the workforce to the excellent skills of older key workers. Only then, as the RESPECT Research has shown that adequate research project shows, can other leadership and good supervision is the activities be successful, including most significant factor improving work professional development, ability in older workers (llmarinen, 1999). communication, cooperation, or workplace Therefore, it is important to sensitise design. managers to the abilities, attitudes, and characteristics of older employees, and to Society level: make recommendations as to how older The most important means a society has workers should be led. In the context of available to deal with a certain subject is 2 the power of legislation. In the context of RESPECT , a one-day workshop for ageing in ATM, a number of legislative managers and supervisors was developed. steps are conceivable.

The workshop starts with a reflection of Firstly, the adjustment of retirement ages managers on their own ageing process is a strong instrument to deal with ageing and their attitudes towards older workers. and work. This article does not In a subsequent lecture, they are informed recommend a certain retirement age. It about the physical, mental and social would not only require much more incharacteristics and attitudes of older depth research before doing so, but it workers. This makes them recognise that would require a broad public discussion not only negative but also positive and a consensual decision by all parties changes take place as one ages, and to involved, taking into account all social and develop a realistic attitude towards financial implications of such a decision. ageing. In the second part of the Secondly, legislation provides minimal workshop, ways and means of improving standards with regard to working hours, the working conditions of older workers is breaks, work place design etc. now. proposed. These recommendations relate However, they should be carefully to the organisation of the work, revisited and adjusted to the needs of communication and cooperation, older employees wherever necessary. professional competence and experience

sharing, workplace design, and the health of the older worker. Finally, managers develop strategies for their own teams together with experts.

In feedback discussions with participants, it became clear that the most important

THE CONTROLLER

Working process level Working night shifts has the power to compound ageing impairments. Shift work is a very sensitive issue with regard to ageing. In a profession like air traffic

control, doing night shifts it is unavoidable. However, the accumulated risks for older employees should not be neglected3. From a certain age onwards, which still needs to be determined by medical experts, the number of night shifts should be reduced to the achievable minimum.

Some researchers favour a change in break patterns for older employees. It appears that older colleagues benefit more from more frequent, but shorter breaks.

Well-developed technical equipment is one of the most powerful ways to defeat the downsides of ageing. Generally, new technical tools should provide a support for working memory, as this is a very vulnerable mental function. Simple little helpers like acoustic or visual reminders would equally contribute to this requirement as more sophisticated characteristics of new systems, like the automation of complex mental processes.

Another way to support the ageing controller would be to develop equipment in a way that it helps to compensate for the decline in speed. This would include that all input features are as simple and timesaving as possible (for example dropdown menus on the screen should be intelligent and simple). Regarding input tools, the use of the mouse has to be questioned. Both speed and precision of input are more difficult to achieve for older controllers when they have to make the inputs via mouse.

Individual level Mental skills: Cognition, that is mental functions, is the most important part of a controller's job. It is mainly a mental task they have to do every day. Some of the cognitive skills of controllers will decrease with ageing; some of the skills will improve due to the benefits of experience.

One thing that is absolutely sure from research is the big individual difference between people with regard to ageing.

Therefore, the individual patterns of decline and improvement in cognitive skills may also vary.

Ageing is a basic process of life. Little is known so far on how to influence cognitive ageing effectively. Regular mental exercise seems to be important to avoid or minimise the loss of skills.

However, equally important is the realistic view of one's own skills. The decline of skills in one area is accompanied by the gain of skills in other areas. It is a sign of maturity and responsibility to recognise the personal limits and act accordingly.

23

Human Factors all controllers, irrespective of their age. technological developments. A positive Fitness: Physical fitness is another very However, older controller will probably attitude can help to stay curious and important factor. Management can only benefit most from them. Older employees motivated to be able tackle the challenge provide incentives for healthy behaviour: are the most valuable resource of a and to persist even when the new however, it is up to the individual to make company. If older controllers use of such options like healthy food in stopped passing on their experience the canteen or sports facilities. It Levels of analysis and action to their younger colleagues, the remains the responsibility of every overall level of performance in an employee to actually do something for operations room would necessarily his or her wellbeing. Taking care of a society suffer. On the other hand, each healthy life style will not stop ageing, controller has to be aware of his or but it can contribute to softening the her personal limits. The objective is impact of ageing or to delay the onset to create a cooperative climate in the management of ageing impairments. operations rooms where it is possible to admit individuals' limits.

Qualification: Controllers are well working trained people. As well as their process Ageing provides a challenge for professional training, there are ATM. This challenge will not be additional requirements they have to tackled by ignoring it. The young fulfil to remain in the loop. Primarily, individual controllers of today are the older they have to keep pace with controllers of tomorrow. The service technological development. Lifelong Figure 3: Levels of analysis and action providers will have to face the same learning is not only a slogan, it is a problems in relation to ageing, again and basic requirement of modern society. A again, as people grow older on the job. equipment turns out to be more tricky controller who manages to up to date with Acting now and optimising the situation of than expected. An open-minded approach the latest developments of her or his job, older controllers is the best investment in will support the learning process. will find it much easier to adjust to the future. It will ultimately provide However, this does not imply ignoring all changes in the operations room when they economic benefits to the air navigation shortcomings of a new system. Rather, it happen. means an open, critical and constructive service providers. The development of awareness is the first and most necessary dialogue about change and development Motivation and job attitudes: The step. personal attitude towards change may be Conclusion of crucial importance to master the The recommendations above will support challenges provided by the latest

Endnotes 1 Rothaug, J. (2002). Age, Experience and Automation in European Air Traffic Control. (HRS-HSP-005-REP-02).Brussels: EUROCONTROL. 2 RESPECTis a European research action for improving older workers safety, productivity, efficiency and competence towards the new working environment.

3 An elaboration on this issue can be found in Rothaug, J. (2002). Age, Experience and Automation in European Air Traffic Control. (HRS-HSP-005-REP02). For more details on shift work see Knauth, P. The design of shift systems, ergonomics, Vol.36, NOS1-3,15-28, (1993) References

Heil, M. C. (1999). An investigation of the relationship between chronological age and job performance for incumbent Air Traffic Control Specialists.

Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration Report DOT/FAA/ AM-99/18. Springfield, Virginia: National Technical Information Service. llmarinen, J. (1999). Aging Workers in the European Union - Status and promotion of work ability, employability and employment. Helsinki: Ministry of Labour Knauth, P.; Braedel-Kiihner, C.; Karl, D. (2002): Strategien und Mode/le zur Verbesserung der Beschaftigungssituation alterer Erwerbspersonen (Strategies and models for the improvement of the job situation of older employees). Hohenheimer Protokolle, Akademie der Diozese, RottenburgStuttgart Rothaug, J. (2002). Age, Experience and Automation in European Air Traffic Control. (HRS-HSP-00S-REP-02).Brussels: EUROCONTROL.

The Authors: Judith Rothaug, Dipl.-Psych., worked for four years for the Human Factors and Manpower Unit of EUROCONTROL, Brussels and is currently working as independent Human Factors Expert in Berlin (Germany).

Cordula Braedel-Kuhner, Dipl. Wi. -Ing, is working at the university of Karlsruhe (Germany), Institute for Industrial Production, Department of Ergonomics in the European research project RESPECT.Aim of this project is the promotion of health and working ability of ageing workers.

24

THE CONTROLLER

Human Factors Psychological Testing For Air Traffic Controllers Doug Churchil Executive Vice President, Professional This article is intended as an overview of the requirements for the medical provisions for licensing of ATCOs, with reference to the issue of "psychological" testing - both prior to, and after successful selection for ATC training.

Initial Hiring: First of all, if we look at the ICAO Annex 1- Personnel Licensing Document, Chapter 6: under "general requirements", it says that air traffic control applicants will undergo a medical examination based on the following: physical and mental visual and color perception hearing It also states that the applicant will provide the medical examiner with a personally certified statement of medical facts concerning personal, familial and hereditary history.

6.5.2 ( Class 3 licence) Physical and Mental Requirements, it states: " medical examinations are based on the following requirements: 6.5.2.1 The applicant shall not suffer from any disease or disability which could render that applicant likely to become suddenly unable to perform duties safely.

The applicant shall have no established medical history or clinical diagnosis of •a psychosis •alcoholism •drug dependence •any personality disorder, particularly if severe enough to have repeatedly resulted in overt acts •a mental abnormality, or neurosis of a significant degree, such as might render the applicant unable to safely exercise the privileges of the licence.

These standards are internationally recognized and are accepted by IFATCA. Of course it goes without saying that any kind of mental or psychological disorder is not suitable to the job of an air traffic controller. IFATCA recognizes the fact that some sort of evaluation must exist in order

THE CONTROLLER

to recognize any such conditions prior to an individual being considered for employment in ATC. We strive to ensure all ATCO training conforms to these standards at all times.

• We are required to provide the physician, at initial examination, with a certifiable medical history ... we can assume that any history of a psychological disorder may preclude hiring.

Now if we look at our own IFATCA Policy: Manual 43-A-3 ... in summary, IFATCA policy says that: "Applicants must pass the selection standards. They should also pass

a thorough understanding of the criteria required to perform the task of the Air Traffic Controller.

"The final selection of prospective controllers should be made by trained ATC personnel together with professional assessors."

"Member Associations should co-operate with those responsible for the selection of air traffic controllers in their country and obtain agreement on: a) the composition of the selection board, including representation by the M. A. where appropriate; b) on a definite list of criteria which would be sought by the selection board; c) the procedures of the selection process."

"Aptitude tests specifically designed for

These job criteria have to be carefully and Air Traffic Controllers shall be included objectively determined if the psychologist is in the selection process for Air Traffic Controllers." to successfully design suitable tests and correctly analyze the responses of the "In consultation with the Administration applicants for Air Traffic Control.

the development of suitable static and dynamic aptitude tests for the selection of Air Traffic Controllers shall be encouraged."

psychological and aptitude tests for which ICAO should co-ordinate certain elements with visual or oral criteria. Such testing should be provided for where it is available and has been validated."

"The Selection Board shall include a psychologist trained in, or familiar with, all aspects of Air Traffic Control, and an Air Traffic Controller trained in selection methods and procedures."

It must be emphasized that only selection by qualified people who have received suitable training in interview and assessment skills, assisted by experts, will ensure that the candidates, thus selected, stand the best chance of successfully completing the training programme and substantially contribute to the maintenance of the high standards of the Air Traffic Control Service and air safety.

Obviously the psychologist involved in selection for Air Traffic Control must have

The results of these tests are followed, in some administrations, by an interview with the psychologist whose responsibility it is to evaluate the test scores and to integrate all the information at hand into a comprehensive personality description followed by a rating of the applicant's suitability for ATC training.

Key factors emphasized in the personality assessment are: • personal maturity • degree of personal resource utilization • emotional stability • communication abilities • goal directedness • interests, motivation and level of aspiration • social skills and interaction patterns • stress resistance.

25

Human Factors Generally the final stage of the selection process is for the so far successful candidate to pass the medical examination. Nearly all countries accept the ICAO recommendations as detailed in ICAO Annex 1 "Personnel Licensing and Training".

"The ICAO medical requirements shall apply to all candidates for selection and other tests considered appropriate by respective Governments should be employed."

IFATCA policy under Medical Requirements also says:

I think we could agree that a "psychological problem" could be an undesirable trait in an ATCO. The problem then becomes ...how do we deal with the prospect of psychological testing on fully licenced and qualified controllers? This type of testing is not mentioned specifically anywhere in any of the ICAO or IFATCA manuals. However, our policy is that the medical system should detect fil1Y_.deteriorationin a

To perform psychological tests on controllers after qualification is, in my mind, not something we should endorse unless, of course, there is some evidence of psychological disturbance as determined by a medical examination.

it in some form or other to try and recruit the best possible employees. ATC is no different ... in fact it is probably more interested in "psychology" than most other professions. We always say that to do this job requires a "certain type of individual".

We are never going to eliminate this testing. What we need to do is become involved as much as possible in the determination of its application(s). That is, we need to ensure psychological testing is used strictly for reasons involving initial medical qualification, of health maintenance, and to ensure it is never used as anything else. To perform psychological tests on controllers after qualification is, in my mind, not something we should endorse unless, of course, there is some evidence of psychological disturbance as determined by a medical examination.

"The medical system should be geared to selection, and be capable of detecting any medical deficiencies in controllers before their ab initio training .....

How do we become involved? It is difficult to do that these days in most MAs , but The medical system should be detecting any especially so in those cases where the deterioration in the controllers' health as controller's health as early as possible.

Provider has chosen to contract the hiring Also, it states that controllers should be of its controllers to private firms. These early as possible and preventing such deterioration wherever possible .... subjected to thorough and regular companies develop all the strategies, tests monitoring throughout their careers.

The medical system should be providing and other criteria, do all the interviewing for thorough and regular monitoring of the Given the medical requirements and our and make recommendations to the Service controllers' health throughout their own policy regarding them, it would seem Provider as to who fits the hiring "profile". careers.... logical that this ongoing The process is entirely separated from the In the interest of safety, a system of initial testing/monitoring (annual medicals) employer until the very last stage... the and regular follow-up medical could include psychological testing, in actual hiring. examinations specifically for controllers is addition to the regular medical testing we essential.... are used to.

What we can do is promote our own The medical requirements for ATC IFATCA policy by demanding a say in the employment must be stated by the So, what can we do about development of the criteria for all medical appropriate psychological testing? testing, including psychological testing, in ATC authorities and should be based on co-operation with the employer. We have the criteria laid down in Annex 1 to taken great pains over the years to the come up with what we think is ICAO Convention. (as above) appropriate for controllers, and have Air traffic controllers should be subject developed it into IFATCA policy. we can do is promote our own IFATCA policy to medical examination, both prior to (Manual 43-A 1-21 ). We need to by demanding a say in the development of the employment in the profession and on emphasize this to our Employers!! criteria for all medical testing, including a regular basis during their career. psychological testing, in co-operation with the Such examinations should be capable The Employer will always maintain the employer of detecting any medical deficiencies right to "manage". That includes prior to or during ab initio training and setting any and all criteria it deems provide for a thorough monitoring of .... We have taken great pains over the years to essential to its goals and objectives. If the air traffic controller's health that includes on-going regular come up with what we think is appropriate for throughout his career. "(ILO psychological testing, it has the right to controllers, Conclusions 1979, adopted Split do that. IFATCA policy recognizes this 1983). fact.

We need to emphasize this to our Employers!!

It is up to us as employees to protect As we can see from the above, ( the our rights in this regard and to ensure ICAO Licensing Requirements, and our this process is used for good and not own IFATCA policy). we agree that the alternative. psychological testing is necessary at the Psychological testing is nothing new. From initial stages of the selection process. the beginning, employers have been using

26

THE CONTROLLER

L

n

A Succesful IFATCA/CANSO/ISASI Approach to ICAO

ATS WG

Bert Ruitenberg IFATCA Human Factors Specialist Background As of the latest amendments, ICAO Annex 11 and Doc. 4444 (PANS/ATM) contain provisions on safety management programmes for ATS. Through its regional representatives the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA) has become aware that many States and/or ATS Providers are in need of guidance on the implementation of such safety management programmes.

The ATS Working Group of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI) has identified a similar need when it comes to guidance on how to conduct safety investigations in ATS. Since safety investigations comprise an integral part of systemic safety management programmes, IFATCA and the ISASI ATS WG have been considering a joint approach to address these needs. It was agreed that the best approach would be to invite ICAO to consider the feasibility of conducting a series of Regional Seminars on the Implementation of Safety Management Programmes. These seminars could be modelled after the successful series of ICAO Regional Seminars on Flight Safety and Human Factors held over the last decade.

The FS/HF seminar series were inter alia supported by the International Air Transport Association (IATA). In order to try and obtain a similar kind of support for the safety management seminars, IFATCA approached the Secretary General of the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO). The CANSO Secretary General agreed with the proposed approach to ICAO, and, indeed, confirmed his organisation's support for the seminars.

This meant that the proposal to ICAO would formally be made by IFATCA, with the support of CANSO and the ISASI ATS WG. (The latter two organisations provided letters for ICAO to confirm their support.)

Meeting with ICAO On Monday 13 January 2003 an IFATCA delegation, comprising the President and Chief Executive Officer, the Executive

THE CONTROLLER

Vice-President Professional, the Executive Vice-President Technical, the Executive Vice-Presidents for the Africa & Middle East and the Americas Regions, and the Human Factors Specialist, met in Montreal with Mr. Vince Galotti, Chief of the ICAO ATM Section, and two of his Technical Officers.

After listening to the presentation of the proposal, Mr. Galetti expressed his appreciation for the initiative that he thought a very timely one. He explained that his section also was aware that although the provisions are in place in the ICAO documents now, many States and/or ATS providers would seem not to have completed the implementation of their safety management programmes yet.

Actions are already underway to produce an ICAO Manual with guidelines on the implementation of safety management programmes.

He also agreed with the view expressed by the IFATCA delegation that there may be good grounds for linking the subject of safety management programme implementation with that of runway incursion prevention, a subject for which ICAO already is planning to conduct a series of seminars as well as developing a toolkit.

In fact, here is a quote from an e-mail that Mr. Galetti sent after the meeting to the Chairman of the ISASI ATS WG: "As a result of our discussions with IFATCA, we have decided to extend the length of the runway safety seminars by one day each, and to include safety management systems in the programme. We will also include the subject in the runway safety tool kit. This is very appropriate because, as you know, addressing runway incursions is only addressing the tip of the iceberg. To rectify the problem at the root, we must address safety across the whole system."

Since preparations for a first runway incursion prevention seminar were already underway, it looks like the first safety management programme implementation seminar may now be held as early as November this year. Venue for this seminar will be Singapore.

Outline of seminar programme Just to provide an idea of what the seminars eventually may look like, here are some of the options that were discussed in the meeting with ICAO. The seminars will last for four or possibly five days. The organisation would be coordinated through the relevant regional ICAO Office, but it is recognised that also the CANSO members potentially can play a role in this respect.

Speakers will be invited from ICAO, IFATCA, CANSO, the ISASI ATS WG and other organisations such as Eurocontrol, the UK CAA, CASA Australia, and the FAA. The programme will start with a generic description of a safety management programme, after which more specialised modules will follow. Topics for these modules or workshops could include Safety Case Preparation, Runway Incursion Prevention, Reporting and Investigation of Safety Occurrences, Safety Oversight, as well as other topics.

The target audience will be the safety managers of ATS/ Airports Regulators, ATS Providers and Airport Authorities. Where no safety manager exists in an organisation, the highest person(s) responsible for Operations may be invited.

It seems realistic to plan two such seminars every year. With 7 ICAO regions in the world, this means the series will run for a minimum of four years (including 2003).

It should be understood at this stage that these are just options. The definitive format and content of the seminars will be developed by the ICAO ATM section over the next few months.

Conclusion The joint approach to ICAO by IFATCA/CANSO and the ISASI ATS WG has resulted in a direct adjustment of ICAO's plans. There will be a series of seminars on the implementation of safety management programmes for ATS, possibly already starting this year. The support for the seminars from IFATCA, CANSO and the ISASI ATS WG is highly appreciated by ICAO, and all three organisations will have the possibility of contributing to the seminar programmes.

27

ATC Training

-----==-----------

AIR TRAFFIC ARGENTINA

CONTROL

Another related activity is ATC research, which adds the required amount of satisfaction once experience, creativity, imagination and intelligence are analyzed, and situations that are part of control to improve controller's performance, by lightening his workload and favoring his training to achieve the desired professional degree, is solved.

The same drive and boldness our predecessors had at the end of the 50s and beginning of the 60s is still around; but today it has grown, for each of CIPE's members accepts the permanent challenge to improve and go on the adequate path towards quality training for the Air Traffic Controller.

Not only knowledge, but capabilities, attitudes and skills related to this important profession are "shared" in classrooms and simulators.

As can be imagined, our main actor is the student. Everything is geared around him

and the remaining components are set up in such a way that he is immersed in an environment so close to reality, that sometimes it is even difficult to tell that the exercises are just simulated.

In the simulators one finds experience and inquisitiveness together with instructors and students, thus originating a genuine coordination that favors the teaching -

28

IN

technical operative procedures that favor the controller's task.

For over forty years the Centro de lnstruccion, Perfeccionamiento y Experimentacion -CIPE( Training, Improvement and Experimentation Center) has devoted itself to training, improvement and research in the safety and flight protection field).

It is not just with statistical graphics how we can show the effort put into this training, but with the degree of professionalism, will and enthusiasm that teachers and technicians, display and have always put into it, in classrooms and in air traffic control flight simulation labs.

TRAINING

learning process in this particular field of aeronautical specialization.

Our main goal, is undoubtedly, to help and guide those who wish to be trained in Air Traffic Control, alwayswith teamwork spirit in mind. This cannot be understood nor implemented any other way, since to reach that golden rule of safety, regularity and efficiency in air traffic, all participants have to understand their function within the complex activity and know how to coordinate with all the other participants so

as to make harmoniously.

the

whole

function

The rapid technological advance of our times demands a great effort, so that no time can be wasted nor any detail overlooked and the program has to be permanently updated to always be state of the art, not only from the technical point but also continuously adapted to new

Today, CIPE is ready to present a curricular project for controllers and other safety and flight protection specialist's studies to get an academical certification approved by the Ministerio de Educaci6n de la Nacion (National Ministry of Education), plus the chance to link their achievements with other university studies in the field.

Since the end of 1999 Cl PEhas become an Academic Unit Associated to the lnstituto Universitario Aeronautico (Aeronautic University Institute), and since April 2001 the Ministry of Education has approved the profession by granting a Degree en Air Traffic Management. There are presently 22 students in 1st year and 14 in 2nd -

Presently, the Air Traffic Controller course (No radar) takes up a full academic year and the Air Traffic Controller course Radar has a 2 and half months duration.

Since its beginning in 1960, CIPE never stopped, regardless of circumstances, to give its courses.

THE CONTROLLER

ATC Development MAASTRICHT UAC GETS NEW OPERATION ROOM.

By Philippe Domagala European Editor.

Last November, after many years of painful gestation, Maastricht UAC finally moved into their new operations room, equipped with the latest display

equipment. On 22 January 2003, there was a successful inauguration party involving 250 guests, including Ministers from the 4 states involved namely Belgium, Luxembourg Germany and the Netherlands. The controllers are really at ease with the new environment and, despite some nostalgia, left the old ops room without too many regrets. Our old Centre became operational in 1972, and some of the equipment inside that room was 30 years old.

The new Operations room is located in a new building, adjacent to the old one, and is much bigger; 1 .100 square metres to be

exact, with, at present, 96 working positions but space for up to another 25 sectors. Currently Maastricht UAC

THECONTROLLER

operates the upper airspace (above FL245) over the Benelux States, the whole of Northern Germany, parts of the North sea and a small area of Northern France. This covers 260,000 square km and the centre controls 1.2 millions flights a , year in 14 civil sectors.

The German military (under the DFS) also occupy some sectors in the same Operations room.

There are currently about 600 people from 24 different nations working at the centre, of which just over 200 are active controllers. On the technical side, the new Operations room's equipment offers the latest technology. First, the radar screens are BARCO TFTs 2000 x 2000 multicolour screens, of much better definition and quality than the old Sony 2000 x 2000 screens. The latest Frequentis colour touch-input panels are replacing our old touch-input devices made of copper wires. These are used for the telephone, R/T frequencies, all settings and even keyboard inputs. No strips, of course, (the centre has not used strips since 1990) but the main innovation comes from the mouse. All inputs are now made using a mouse with 3 buttons, requiring some agility. A very easy transfer for the younger generation who have been raised with computers and Windows alongwith their teddy bears, a little more complex for the older generation who have learned to distrust machines. However, the end result is quite positive, as the early restrictions on sector capacities which were imposed at the introduction, were lifted after a few

weeks. By late February, staff were becoming more confident with the new capabilities of the system and an attempt to raise the capacities of between 5 and 10% on some sectors was made as handling traffic became slightly easier compared with the previous equipment.

One of the things that the new system will make possible is the introduction of a better man machine interface (MMI) for the operation of datalink. Maastricht UAC was involved in the preliminary trials for datalin k ( called PETAl) and one of the major shortcoming identified was the MMI. From next April, datalink will be offered to the very few aircraft equipped in trying to validate this extra mean of communication. Things like frequency changes will be available and it will be interesting to see what kind of R/T workload reduction that brings.

What about the costs? Well, the system itself cost 32 million Euro (approxUS$30 million) if you include the cost of the building, (10 million Euro) and other costs such as outsourcing, LAN upgrades, training of staff, re-organisation and decommissioning bringing the total price tag close to 70 million Euro (over a few years of course). This seems expensive but after all, it is less than the price of a Tornado or an F15, and far less than a single Eurofighter. And we please more people with it and make less noise ...

29

UNDER CONTROL The story of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations Under Control - the story of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations is written by a thirty two year veteran air traffic controller Neil Vidler. This book is dedicated to the air traffic controllers of the world detailing the chronological history of the four decades of the Federation, its developing maturity and international involvement, some of the key personalities who shaped the Federation and their, and its, commitment to the profession of air traffic control. It examines the lowlights as well as the highlights, some of the more contentious internal disputes and the continuing financial struggles over four decades.

This book is complementary to the goals of the professional air traffic controller or an informed air traffic management provider agency.

"Under Control" contains more than 300 pages of facts and figures, information invaluable to every IFATCA member and of interest to the general reader.

BOOK

ORDER

FORM

UNDER CONTROL

by Neil Vidler, price USO 12.SO TO ORDER WORLD-WIDE, PLEASE RETURN TO:

TO ORDER IN CANADA AND USA, PLEASE RETURN TO:

IFATCA 1255 University Street, Suite 408 Montreal, QC Canada H3B 3B6 Tel: +1514866-7040 Fax: +1514866-7612 Email: office@ifatca.org

Steph Simmonds 58 Attwood Drive, Arborfield, Reading, BerkshireRG29FE UK Tel/Fax: +44 (0) 118 976 2697 Email:subscribe@ifatca.org

BLOCK LETTERS PLEASE Address to be sent________________________

_

Country ___________

.Zip/post code ____________

Number of copies required ____

_

_

Method of Payment (Please indicate): Cheque enclosed Request Invoice

D D

□

Visa / MasterCard

Cheque payableto /FA TCA If paying by Visa I MasterCard

Card number ___________

_

Expiry date ____

; ___

Signature of Cardholder _______________________

_ _

Name of cardholder _________________________

_

Address of cardholder ________________________

_

POSTAGE CHARGES FOR EUROPE S USD

CANADA & USA 6 USD

REST OF WORLD 8.S0 USD

___ 30

............................................ .

TI I[ CONTROLLER

AGENDA 2003 June Executive Board Meeting - Geneva Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia 21 - 23 IFALPA Huper Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia

September 22 - 3 Oct ICAO 11th ANC - Montreal Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia

October 4 - 6 Executive Board Meeting - Montreal Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia 17 - 19 European Regional Meeting - Porto Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia 21 - 23 IFALPA ATS - Washington Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia 25 -27 Africa Middle East Regional Meeting -Amman Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia TBD Americas Regional Meeting - Dominican Republic Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia

THECONTROLLER

Simulato1 Flying unusual manoeuvres in a Boeing 767 Simulator Philippe Domogala European Editor Last month, a training pilot friend on the Condor 767 invited me, to accompany him on one of his sessions in a brand new B767-300ER sim. This simulator is the latest THALES 3D technology and is nicknamed "Star Trek" due to the position of the 'Checker" behind the pilots, with large futuristic touch input panels on either side of the seat. It is located in the Lufthansa Flight Training Centre at Frankfurt airport.

The simulator itself looks like a big plastic box on hydraulic legs. So far, nothing new. Inside is very spacious, but once seated on the pilot seat, it feels (and, in fact it is) exactly like being in a real aircraft. The sounds, down to the smallest noises and the colour graphics of the outside environment are quite stunning.

This machine can do normal procedures of course, but also abnormal situations and emergencies in the most realistic way. This was exactly what we simulated today.

First, we did two fire and loss of power emergencies on one of the two engines during take off, one failure before V1, then one at V1. Then we did high-speed stalls

32

and stalls in steep turns at low altitude.

The most dramatic was a loss of power on one engine after V1 (you then have to take off regardless, as there will be not enough runway left to stop on) at maximum take off weight (184 tons in our case). You not only have to assessthe situation, prevent the aircraft from veering off the runway to the side of the power loss, but have to climb as well, which the 767 in

that configuration does not do well at all.

Finding yourself at 150 feet above the ground with a rate of climb of 100 to 200 feet a minute maxis quite an experience!

But it works.

As a controller, the last thing that you should do is try to talk to pilots in that situation because, on top of all this, they also have to try to extinguish the fire, and carry out a lot of checks.

Stalls are interesting. A clean ( no flaps or slats) 8767 near to the ground will stall at 160 Kts indicated. The stick shaker (a warning system that makes the control stick vibrate) activates at 170 Kts but the actual stall will only come at around 140 Kts. At FL 150 the stick shaker will

activate at 220 Kts indicated, the actual stall would occur at around 180 Kts IAS and the aircraft typically loses 3000 feet in the process. You actually do not feel the stall, the whole aircraft vibrates and shakes during the whole process but the nose does not drop down, you just lose a lot of altitude - you actually notice the stall on watching the altimeter and VSI. Fuel dumping is also interesting to

understand: the dumps clear 1200 Kg per minute.

The maximum landing weight is some 40 tons below max take off weight so you need about 30 minutes to dump the good quantity. And 30 minutes can be very long if you are in an emergency and/or on one engine only.

Another interesting fact that I did not know is the recent change in phraseology.

On take off pilots do not use the old word "V1" and followed by "Rotate, V2" etc.

V1 is now replaced by "GO!" to indicate clearly that you have to take off beyond that point.

Turns are possible with maximum 45 degrees bank. However an audio warning

TH[

CONTROLlER

s lulll\an',;l Flmh\l r:11nirYJ

shouting "BANK ANGLE! "warns you if you attempt to bank more than 35 degrees, which is very easy to do as the aircraft responds well on ailerons. I guess it will be easy to roll, but we did not attempt it as I was told the simulator itself does not like it.

Something else of interest to controllers is the new oxygen masks available on some new aircraft. They now include glasses (against smoke) and look like early astronaut masks. The trouble is that the microphone technology has not matched the same advance so the transmissions are blocked when the pilot breathes (you hear a loud noise instead). During an emergency, essential transmissions could be lost especially on reception. You might need to have to repeat essential information twice or more to make sure the pilots get it. (Remember if you are stressed pilots are likely to breath faster ! )

The last thing we simulated was TCAS encounters. The thing that I remarked on immediately was that after a RA was issued, both pilots looked out for the threat aircraft as soon as the controllers had passed the traffic information. Especially if it was close. This is, I believe a normal human reaction and will be difficult to force one pilot (flying) to look down at the TCAS display during the RA. Also, it is very difficult to assessthe position of the intruder aircraft. In one of our cases, the intruder traffic was 200 feet above us, (+02 on the

•

TCAS display) but it looked it was going to pass us much higher because, amongst other reasons, of our nose down attitude following the RA. Had we elected to reduce our rate of descent based on that visual acquisition, it would have made the encounter much more critical. Follow the RA as prescribed is definitely the only way to go with TCAS. Mixing human reactions with fast computers do not go well.

our careers, but awareness in case it does is essential. If the opportunity arises, I would highly recommend that controllers take advantage of such simulator rides. ATS employers and airlines (the owners of the simulators) have a common interest in ensuring that controllers learn about aircraft emergencies and feel it from the pilots' viewpoint.

The costs of carrying someone in a simulator is nil.

All in all, a very interesting few hours where I learned a lot about emergency procedures on large jets. Fortunately we do not have many of those in

Many thanks to my friend for taking this initiative, as well as Condor (and Lufthansa) for this experience.

I also learned that 99 % of the engine fire alarms are so called "hot air bleed "alarms which indicates that things are getting very hot somewhere in the engine but nothing actually burns. Shutting down the engine usually solve the problem.

THE CONTROLLER

33

Charlie'sColumn THIS MONTH SPECIAL NEWS FROM THE AIRLINES PR DEPARTMENT Or what are you going to do to get people on your aeroplanes?

SOUTHWEST PENGUINS First, Southwest Airlines in the US is planning to carry a couple of real penguins on some of their flights to San Diego, San Antonio and Orlando, in order to promote the Sea World attraction parks in those cities. The penguins are tame and used to travel says the airline. Only the FAA has a problem with security. However, unlike kangaroos, they do not have pockets to be inspected so the problem should be solved.

HOOTERS AIR AGAIN You may remember from last Charlie the fact that Hooters restaurants wanted to start an airline. They have finalised the details now. They have now announced what everyone was waiting to hear: what will their cabin staff look like?

They say staff on their Boeing 737s will initially be three certified, gender-neutral flight attendants (to tell you what to do in an emergency) and two real Hooters Girls in the same outfit that they wear in their restaurants (to motivate you to fly with them). It is definitively better than carrying penguins, I think.

BARE FLIGHT Next May, a Boeing 727 will depart Miami and make history. Shortly after takeoff, all 170 passengers will be invited to take all their clothes off for the duration of the flight to a nudist resort in Cancun. We are told that the crew will remain dressed.

Towels will be available to sit on as a courtesy for the next passenger...! guess.

34

OVERHEARD ON THE FREQUENCY : Control Tower to someone lined up, but taking his or her time, with someone already arriving, having passed the Outer marker: TWR: Cessna 172, cleared for immediate take off or get out of the aeroplane!

Ground Control: US Air 292, taxi to runway 23, altimeter 2997.

Pilot: Ground, are you sure you gave us the right altimeter setting? 2997 puts us 200 feet underground.

Ground control : OK, put up the periscope and continue to taxi, I'll check ....

B2 TANKS, Just read recently that the B2 have a problem with fuel temperature. Apparently they fly so high that the kerosene they use sometimes freezes and they have to add chemical additives to the fuel to keep it liquid.

One researcher found out that ureic acid ( found naturally in human urine ) is the most effective additive and would retard freezing point by 12 degrees. I really wonder how they found this out? Did some B2 pilot relieve himself in the main tank one day and the flight went better? I can easily imagine the success this simple method will have if it was implemented .

MORE COW STORIES Cows are the very popular animals that disrupt airline operations. After the one falling from a Russian cargo flight and the one that was hit and killed by a Fokker 100 in that cow field, now the Vietnamese are complaining that on some domestic airports, loose cows are blocking the runway.

The cows, kept around airports to eat the grass and provide food supplements for military officials, often break loose from their hangars and wander around the apron unsupervised. Time to start a new profession: Cow controller!

TI l[ CONTROLLER

lFATCAMember Assoc1 tion Africa & Middle East Region Algeria Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Cape Verde Cameroon Chad Congo, D.R. Congo Brazzaville Cote D' lvoire Djibouti Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea-Bissau Jordan Kenya Mali Mauritanie Mauritius Morocco Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda United Arab Emirates Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

THE CONTROLLER

Asia Pacific Region Australia Fiji Hong Kong Indonesia Japan Macau Malaysia Mongolia Nepal New Zealand Singapore Sri Lanka Taiwan ROC Thailand

European Region Albania Austria Belarus Belgium Bosnia & Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark EGATS Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Kazakhstan Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia Malta

Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia Slovakia Slovenia Sweden Switzerland Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom Yugoslavia

Americas Antigua & Barbuda Argentina Aruba Bahamas Barbados Bermuda Bolivia Brazil Canada Chile Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana Haiti Jamaica Mexico Netherlands Antilles Panama Paraguay Peru St Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago United States Of America Uraguay

35

I 111,,,

. ..