IFATCA The Controller - 3rd quarter 2002

The Next Issue The January issue of The Controller will feature articles on the prospects for 2003 and the views of experts within the industry on the critical safety areas within ATM Also, in the same issue, reports from the IFATCA Regional meetings focussing on the main talking points within each region.

We welcome contributions from readers on these, and any other subjects dealing with the many facets of ATM. For the photographic enthusiasts, please contact the Editor if you would like to display your talents in the Photo Gallery.

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PUBLISHER

IFATCA,InternationalFederationof Air Traffic Controllers'Associations

EXECUTIVE BOARD OF IFATCA

Marc Baumgartner Presidentand Chief ExecutiveOfficer James Ferguson

DeputyPresident

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k--_-.. ·, ~r.ri

JOURNAL

OF

AIR

ln This lssue

TRAFFIC

CONTROL

United Kingdom, October 2002 Volume 41 No J

Juan Perez Mafia

ExecutiveVice PresidentAmericas Albert Taylor

Uekerlingen - Foreword - Marc Baumgartner

Page 4

Mid Air Collison - The Facts

Page 6

Reactions to the Collision So Far Regarding TCAS - Philippe Domogala

Page 8

ExecutiveVice-PresidentAfrica/

Middle East Phlllp Parker

ExecutiveVice-President Asia/Pacific Nicolas Y Lyrakldes

ExecutiveVice-PresidentEurope Steph Simmonds ExecutiveVice-PresidentFinance

TCAS: Its History and its Flaws - Philippe Domogala

Page 11

Meeting the Air Force Challenge Gary Pearson / Neil Asbil

Page 17

Training for a Safer World Martin Thomas / Francis Lucas

Page 19

Datalink Pre Departure Clearance Systems

Page 24

ATC Training: What is your Role - Ray Curry

Page 27

SATSA ATC Training and Simulation - Clas Folin

Page 29

Smallest Airports - Post Norway - Philippe Domogala

Page 32

Charlie's Column

Page 34

Doug Churchill ExecutiveVice-PresidentProfessional Andrew Beadle

ExecutiveVice-PresidenlTechnical Jack van Delft

ExecutiveBoardSecretary/ConferenceManager

EDITOR

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Foreword Ueberlingen - an air traffic controller's nightmare became reality Marc Baumgartner, President and CEO President and Chief Executive Officer The author is a working A TCO at Geneva ACC, Switzerland.

It happened again! 30 years after Zagreb, 7 years after India and 6 years after Nambia. A mid-air collision between two civil airliners. This time the fatal accident occurred on the 1st of July 2002 shortly before midnight MEZ, on the shores of Lake Constance, in southern Germany,.

Every air traffic controller's nightmare became reality. A human tragedy for the 71 victims and their families. IFATCA wishes to express its deep sympathy to the families of the passengers and crew members of both aircraft, and to assure them, that our thoughts are with them.

This mid-air collision is terrible for our members of the Swiss Association and in particular the air traffic controller on duty this fatal night. Also for the German Associations and the controllers working in the adjacent centres who tried in vain to warn the Zurich controller of the imminent conflict. The EB wishes to express its sympathy to all controllers involved.

Why did it happen? Many air traffic controllers will have asked themselves this question when they heard the news. It is still too early to draw any conclusions and it would certainly not be appropriate for IFATCA to make statements which are premature and speculative. The investigation is still ongoing and the final report should be published in the first half of next year. Lengthy judicial battles are likely to follow, attempting to determine who is responsible for what, and to what extent.

In the initial aftermath, a lot of different aspects surrounding the accident have been twisted, turned around and assumptions have been made by various media groups. The authors of the following articles will consider aspects of what actually happened and analyse what has to be done, in order to avoid such tragedies in the future.

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Statistically speaking, aviation is the safest means of transport. However, other statistics indicate that this mid-air may well have occurred (in Europe) as early as the year 2000.

An aviation accident does not just happen. There is a chain of events which lead to it. In the very complex environment of a high-tech industry like ATC, where Human, Machine and Procedures have to interact in an efficient and optimal way, it is important that safety barriers / nets are put in place. James Reason used a model to identify what elements can lead to accidents. This model has recently been used by IFATCA to show the potential risk of having to work with mixed operations and highlight the need to make a deeper analysis of the possible sources for the breakdown of safety nets. The following articles will look at various safety barriers that did not work during the fatal night of the of July1st. On the equipment side, the interaction between ATC and the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), certainly played an important part in the collision.

IFATCA has always advocated the appropriate use of ACAS systems in Air Traffic Control. We have policies which clearly outline what is necessary so that TCAS does not become a source of an accident. The two aircraft in this case were equipped with the latest version of TCAS II (Version 7) and this equipment worked correctly, according to provisional investigation reports.

IFATCA's policies on TCAS cover the legal aspects by recommending that an ATCO ceases to be responsible for separation once a TCAS Resolution Advisory has been reported on the frequency. National legislation shall absolve the controller from any responsibility or liability when a TCAS RA is followed by a pilot. Hence the responsibility for separation shifts from the ATCO to the pilot. Air traffic controllers have to be trained how to behave appropriately in a TCAS environment Only this guarantees the correct functioning of this airborne "last-

ditch" device. From a human factor point of view, this is quite challenging because at the very moment you do not wish lose control, you have to give it away. Further, since the mandatory introduction of TCAS II equipment in European airspace, all ATCOs expect pilots to follow their RA, regardless of ATC. This however, is not the case for all airlines/states. Therefore IFATCA urges the appropriate authorities to take action on the standardisation of procedures, with regard to TCAS. According to Sydney Dekker (a human factors specialist in aviation) , there is no such thing as 'the root' or 'primary cause' of an accident. An accident, as previously mentioned, is the result of multiple factors - each necessary and only jointly sufficient.1 It is the role of the German accident investigators to highlight the chain of events, and what the elements were that contributed to the accident.

IFATCA has observed that the recent wave of commercialisation of Air Traffic Service Providers (ATSPs) has led to some wrong and dangerous applications of this new concept. Some sources over-reacted by citing 'the concept of commercialisation in ATC' to blame for this accident. Commercialisation has brought a lot of changes to our working environment. From salary increases, to . longer working hours and less investment into the future of ATC. It is time that the commercialised ATSPs, IFATCA and its Member Associations agree on safety enhancement measures and do away with cost-cutting programmes. There is an urgent need to re-invest in safety enhancing measures. Only this will guarantee the survival of the aviation industry. Under the leadership of ICAO, the contracting States will also have to review some of the outcome of the commercialisation of ATC, in order to reinforce the role of Safety Regulators.

The ILO recently confirmed that ATC is 'a general service of public interest' and therefore it should come under the responsibility of the State, particularly with regard to financing and control of

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Foreword ATSPs. On the psychological side, there is an urgent need for all the Member Associations to have a Critical Incident Stress Management programme (CISM) introduced. Not only has it been proven to help in disaster scenarios, but it also assists staff to return more quickly to operational duties following a disaster/incident. It has even been shown that staff remain operational for longer, following CISM intervention, effectively prolonging an ATCO's career. It is essential that ATCOs receive this psychological help after a serious incident or accident. IFATCA is very grateful to the Danish ATCA and our former President, Preben Lauridsen, who provided psychological (CISM) assistance to the ATCO concerned in Zurich, within 15 hours of the accident. Also to the DFS (Deutsche Flugsicherungs GmbH) CISM Team who provided CISM debriefings to more than 100 persons at Zurich ACC. CISM has often been introduced following

a disaster and evidence shows this to be too late. Therefore it is essential that all Member Associations push for the introduction of CISM at their units (see attached article).

Responsibility: yes, in our daily work we are responsible for the lives of the flying public, the crews as well as the population living under flight paths. This is a heavy responsibility which should at no time be forgotten. There is no room for compromise - nor complacency - when it comes to safety. The recent accidents, where ATC has been held responsible, show to various degrees that there is an absolute obligation to stop any unsafe application of rules and regulations which are based on internationally agreed standards. Consider that air traffic levels in 2020 are forecast to be double the 1997 figures. If we want the same (or better) level of safety as today, our profession has to defend SAFETY! Regulators - at national and international

level - have to guarantee that rules and regulations are respected at all times.

Governments have to be sure that they spend sufficient resources on Regulatory Bodies. Only this will guarantee that safety is enhanced through rigorously applied Safety Management Systems, and that safety barriers work correctly, at all times.

Finally, a word of thanks to Tom Laursen, Christoph Gilgen and the Swiss ATCA, Aerocontrol, for all they have done and continue to do for the profession, since the 1st of July. Swiss ATCA has received many letters of support from other associations around the world and also from individual controllers. THANK YOU! 1 Sydney Dekker, The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations, Ashgate, London, 2002 (ReviewedController

01/02)

CriticalIncidentStressManagement IFATCA recognises the importance of stress management for air traffic controllers and recommends that, at regular intervals, air traffic controllers be provided with up-to-date information on stress management techniques. Comprehensive and confidential support services should be available at all times for air traffic controllers, support staff and their families.

The Federation endorses the use of professionally trained peers in the provision of critical incident stress management (CISM) to colleagues experiencing critical incident stress (CIS), and that support services should also be made available to controllers involved in ATC incidents/accidents if the controllers so choose.

CISM management is a wide range of programmes and intervention strategies which have been designed to mitigate the impact of stress in personnel and to assist them in managing and recovering from significant stress.

A "critical incident" can be described as any high-stress work situation that causes employees to experience unusually strong physical or emotional reactions. These reactions can impair ability to function either at the time, or later. Some examples are situations involving loss of life or serious injury, near collision or operating irregularities/investigations to which the controller was a party. The very nature of our work means that controllers could be affected by CIS at some point in their careers. Therefore we need to know how to manage it. .. but first we need to recognize it! People who are faced with critical incidents often respond very differently emotionally and/or physically, which is both predictable and normal.

The matter of "stress management" training for air traffic controllers was first discussed in 1985. The problems of stress generated by extra-ordinary circumstances at work and at home were raised, and following debate, resolutions were passed : 1) recommending IFATCA adopt as professional policy the need to have available psychological counselling service for air traffic controllers involved in any incident/accident(s); 2) counselling be made available to controllers suffering from any other problems, preferably from colleagues trained in the subject; 3) these issues should be brought to the attention of the administrations of MA's and should express the importance of counselling, and 4) stressing the need for air traffic controllers to receive at regular intervals, refresher courses/lectures on the advances in "stress management" techniques. Proper provision of such services would ensure that controllers re-enter the work force as early as possible and in the best health In 1996 Critical Incident Stress Management was placed on IFATCA's professional work programme, charging the Committee with updating policy on stress and to investigate the extent to which IFATCA should be involved in the standardisation of a CISM programme for Air Traffic Control.

Updated policy on stress addresses the following: a) recognition that critical incident (occupational) stress is a global phenomenon not restricted to any particular profession; b) expansion of the list of stressors particular to Air Traffic Control; c) recognition that Critical Incident Stress is a separate and distinct phenomenon from occupational stress. Our policy on Stress Management recognises that Critical Incident Stress can be specifically dealt with by Critical Incident Stress Management.

The new knowledge and experience gained by MAs about stress in general will not only guarantee the prolonging of various ATC careers (in the ops room) but it will help in situations of disaster with aircraft t!,at ATCOs are getting professional help in order to be able to continue to live a normal life long after..

•

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ZurichDisaster The mid-aircollisionitself: The facts Edited by Philippe Domogala, Be_rtRuitenberg and Chris Stock In the night of July 1st 2002, two aircraft, a Boeing 757 and a Tupolev 154 collided in the air near the Swiss - German border, close to Lake Constance.

The skies were clear with only a few thin clouds.

day shift, including the last centre supervisor, had already left the operations room. Zurich air traffic controllers A and B were working normally on their night shift, due to end at 05.30 the next morning.

With only a few aircraft in contact, and with a prediction of far fewer later, air traffic controller B, after co-ordination with colleague A, took his agreed rest time and left the operation room. Flight assistant C was assisting the ATCO with

DHX611

BTC2937

K rlsruhe Reims

Munich AirTraffic Services Delegated from Austria to Switzerland

Vienna

AlrTraffic Services Delegated from France to Switzerland

Padua

Marseille Map 1

Both aircraft were controlled by Zurich ACC despite the fact that the area in which the collision occurred is situated over Germany. This portion of airspace is delegated from Germany to Switzerland for the provision of ATS. In fact, Zurich ACC has several similar airspace delegations, as it abuts with 7 other ACCs : 2 in Italy, one in Austria, 2 in Germany, one in France and to Geneva ACC, the other Swiss centre (see Map 1).

At around 23.00 local time (21.00 UTC), all was routine as the last controllers of the

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For many years it has been normal that the night shift in Zurich is manned by two air traffic controllers. They are assisted by two Controller Assistants (CA) tasked to handle and transmit flight plan data and co-ordination messages. Under normal conditions the working arrangement at night, with low traffic, is as follows: one controller works in team with one controller assistant whereas the other team is on break and standing by. This mode of operation is routine and it is up to the two controllers assigned on night shift to arrange their break periods between themselves according to the traffic.

the reception and handling of estimates, activation of flight data and transmission of revisions to neighbouring sectors and centres. Traffic on frequency 128.05 MHz was handled with ease and no particular problems were reported.

Then, several technicians entered the OPS-room and informed the control crew that they were starting with a scheduled update of the radar system (a new software release had to be loaded). The only way of achieving this was to switch off the main chain used for RDPS (radar data processing system) and use the

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ZurichDisaster stand-by « fall-back » system as the main radar data source for ATC. The consequence is that in this degraded operation mode, several tools and features normally used are not available anymore. Track correlation (with FOPS) is lost and the STCA (Short Term Conflict Alert) is unavailable on the sector as well.

Only SSR code, altitude and speed remain available on the radar scopes. When operating in fall-back mode, controllers are required to apply a minimum of 7 NM separation instead of the normal 5 NM.

released the main telephone system to the technicians. From then on he had to work with a back-up telephone system that was considerably less performance.

After having instructed several aircraft to change frequency on the en-route sector, where some other routine R/T-messages were exchanged, he tried for the first time to contact Friedrichshafen Tower by phone in order to confirm the runway in use and to co-ordinate the A320's approach. The telephone recording later showed that the stored number on the back up emergency phone was not the correct one (a recording was heard inviting the caller to check the number dialled. For more information check

Several minutes later, controller A received an ACT (activation) message via On Line Data Interchange (automatic flight plan activation system, used between two 2 ACCs) from Munich ACC activating a delayed Airbus 320 charter flight in the N system. The flight departed from ;g 0 I Heraklion, Greece, inbound to the -27••--f--------=4~3:1._~2 German regional airport of Friedrichshafen (EDNY), situated close to the Swiss-German border. This airport site is just below the airspace delegated from Germany to Switzerland and therefore approach and departure services are tasked to Zurich ACC (handled on the over-flight 1 sector). It is unusual to have aircraft inand outbound this airport that late, except for emergency or hospital f.8757DHL 8GY·8RU flights, or the very occasional delayed flights.

.

Line-up and hand-over for Friedrichshafen must be made on a different working position, situated adjacent to the overflight working position used by the night shift. This is in order to have the proper range settings, the correct radar maps and also the appropriate frequency for this service (119.92 MHz). The delayed flight, coming from the east had to be descended and lined up by radar vectoring on ILS 24. This work was carried out additionally to the work of the overflight sector. Controller A, assisted by assistant C, now was working with a degraded radar system, switching between two different working positions with two different frequencies, with several over-flights and radar vectoring for Friedrichshafen increasing the workload.

The task of the controller was further complicated when a request by the technicians was made to deactivate! the main telephone system as wel for maintenance reasons. After several pertinent phone co-ordinations with adjacent sectors and units, controller A

THECONTROLLER

-!-f TU1S4 Bashkinan

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The controller assistant C left the sector moments later in order to look for the correct number for Friedrichshafen Tower at the FIS sector, in another part of the OPS-room some 20 metres away. In the meantime the controller continued to answer the calls from over-flights on frequency 128.05 MHz. Minutes before, a Boeing 757, flying for DHL (call-sign DHX611) had called in at time 23.20, established at FL 260. This Northbound flight, departed from the Italian town of Bergamo and bound for Brussels, was handed over by Italian ATC on its northbound track. ACC re-cleared it rapidly to FL 320 and finally, at time 23.26, clearance to climb to FL 360 (requested cruising level in European RVSM airspace) was given by Controller A. On the other frequency, 119.92 MHz, the radar vectoring of the Friedrichshafenbound A320 for ILS 24 continued. Verbal hand-over to TWR (as required in the

standard procedure and the LOA (Letter of Agreement)) was still not possible, as the emergency phone did not have the correct number. All other attempts to contact Friedrichshafen via alternate means had failed as the direct number couldn't be found.

At time 23.30.11 a Russian registered Tupolev 154M, call-sign BTC2937 (Bashkirian Airlines), flying on a westerly heading, called in at FL 360. Flight BTC 2937 was on a charter flight from Moscow to Barcelona. Transferred to frequency 128.05 (en-route sector) by Munich Control, the aircraft was instructed on initial call to change the squawk to A7520, a code change necessary due to the code allocation system used in Europe, called ORCAM. Read-back by the crew was immediate and correct. Despite the fact that the TU154 and the B-757 were on conflicting courses, no further communications took place between ATC and the aircraft for the next 4 minutes.

Controller assistant C had already prepared to hand over the TU154 at FL 350 to Geneva, the next centre on the way to Spain. This change of level was necessary due to the semi-circular flight rules of the airways system in that region requiring Zurich ACC to change those Westbound-aircraft from even to odd flight levels in their sector. At around 23.30 several further routine R/T exchanges with different aircraft took place. In the meantime around 5 aircraft were active in the over-flight sector.

Additionally to this, on the other frequency, the work of lining up the Airbus 320 to Friedrichshafen was in progress. Finally, at 23.34.08, after having tried without success to reach Friedrichshafen Tower, the German Airbus was asked by Zurich to use its second radio set to "autotransfer" (self transfer) himself on to the EDNY-tower frequency.

About forty seconds later (on the other working position), the danger of the conflict at FL 360 was detected by the controller, and at 23.34.49 the controller instructed flight BTC 2937 to start its descent: « BTC2937, descendFL350, expedite,I have crossingtraffic». No response was heard from the Russian aircraft and no descent was visible on the radar (Mode C remained at FL 360 and 361).

At 23.35.03, about 10 seconds later, the

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ZurichDisaster controller called again the TU 154: « BTC2937, descend flight 350, expedite descent». This time, the Tu154 pilots acknowledged the clearance, it was 23 35.07 now, and replied: «expedite descentlevel350, BTC 2937 ». At the end of the transmission the radar read-out showed the beginning of the descent of the Tupolev.

Northbound UK charter flight, established at FL 360, called Zurich at time 23.35.31.

Boeing757

A few seconds later, (at 23.35.19) a call was heard on 128.05 MHz: « ..... six hundred...ah.. TCASdescent«, part of the message was garbled (it is now believed, according the official ATC-transcript, that the voice, with a British or Canadian accent, came from the DHL Boeing 757).

At 23.35.32, during that transmission, the TU 154 and 8757 collided near the city of Ueberlingen in Germany at around FL 350.

Both aircraft broke up in flight and crashed on the ground killing all 71 souls on board, but nobody came to harm on ground.

Simultaneously, the A320 called again on the other frequency (at 23.35.21) informing that the.hand-over was accepted and the controller replied to it by sending it off to Friedrichshafen TWR for final approach and landing. Immediately after the end of this transmission, a

Immediately afterwards, the controller tried twice to call the Russian crew of BTC2937, but got no reply. It was found out later that the controller at Rhein control, the adjacent ACC expecting the DHX flight, saw the developing conflict for quite some time as the STCA had

triggered a collision alert on the sector. He repeatedly tried to call his Zurich colleague two minutes prior to the collision. But he could not get through since the main phone system was not available in Zurich.

Detailed information of the ongoing inquiry can be found on website of German accident inquiry board (BFU):

www.bfu.web.de

THE REACTIONS TO THE COLLISION SO FAR REGARDING TCAS Philippe DOMOGALA European Editor followed at all times. It reminds that visual The EUROCONTROLAGENCY put out a acquisition does not provide any press release on 8 July stating that the information about the intentions of the Provisional Council has decided to place other traffic, and that possibly the aircraft safety issues at the top of their agenda at identified might not be the (only) one its next meeting with a view to: "examine triggering the RA. existing safety procedures and standards with a view to improving ~,,...--......~----------""""....-~ them."

Victor Aguado Director General of Eurocontrol stated: "No effort will be spared in the review and reform of any aspect of air safety which might have played a role, no mater how slight in the chain of events leading to [this collision].

The safety flash bulletin is available at :www.eurocontrol.int/ acas/ TheEUROCONTROLACAS PROGRAMME issued a Safety Flash bulletin on 28.August with a red banner THE UK: On 9th August, the UK CAA 'FOLLOW THE RA! "The bulletin explain issued an ATS Information Notice on the reasoning reciting recent incidents as ACAS: They mention the fact that: "RAs examples as to why RAs should be may be disregarded only when the flight

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crew visually identify the potential conflicting traffic and decide that no deviation from the current flight path is needed'. It emphases the fact that should crew receive simultaneous instructions for ACAS and ATC, the advice given by ACAS should be followed, but when a decision is made not to follow an RA, no change in vertical speed must be made in a direction opposite to the RA sense. " On 12 August the UK NATS Safety Regulation Group issued a Flight Operations Department Communication Note to airlines.

Named: Action to be taken following an RA warning .. Its main points: "RAs may be disregarded only when pilots visually identify the potentially conflicting traffic and decide that no deviation from the current flight path is needed " and : "If pilots receive simultaneously an instruction to manoeuvre from ATC and a RA, and they conflict, the advice given by

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A4AA

ZurichDisaster ACAS should be followed. " An additional note is added which is interesting: "It should be noted that in all the above instructions the word "should" is used rather than "shall". The reason for this is to allow for Commander's discretion to cater for those very limited cases where use of such discretion avoids an incident where following of ACAS advice may make matter worse.

Ladkin, and they issued a technical note on 22 August titled 'ACAS and the-South German Mid air " .

THE USA: ARINC (responsible for the TCAS Transition Program or TTP in the USA) issued an Industry Alert bulletin on 12 August. It says that all TCAS operators should review the previously published guidelines related to responding to RAs. It reminds that for TCAS to work as designed, immediate and correct crew response to RAs is essential. But addding, as the UK says; Follow the RAs "unless [ ...] the crew can assure separation with the help of definitive visual acquisition of the aircraft causing the RA. In choosing to do so, the bulletin goes on listing some cautions to be considered. Emphasis is done on not moving in the opposite direction of the RA. It concludes by saying that it is possible for ATC to unknowingly issue instructions that are contrary to the TCAS RA indications. The advice given by the bulletin in that case is: "During an RA do not manoeuvre contrary to the RA based solely upon ATC instructions."

in one crew." The note concludes ; "[ ... ]it is illusory to imagine that better or more uniform training will resolve ACAS operability problems.

The complete note is available at: www.rvs.unibielefeld.de/pu blications/ reports/ acasmidair-www. html

The University of Bielefeld ( Germany) has a well known Research group in Aviation Computer networks problems.

This group is led by Professor Peter

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The 17 paged note is rather complex. It argues that: "[it is .. impossible to devise uniform procedures for crew to react to RAs. It goes on saying that this particular collision "highlight a flaw in ACAS, in that one mistake by a non-participant in the RA engenders an irresoluble cognitive model

ICAO issued a State letter on 30 August 2002 on TCAS. The highlighted action required was: "To ensure that National Aviation Documents and aircraft operators highlight the critical importance of following ACAS RA and not manoeuvring against the sense of an RA even if ATC issues conflicting information".

To motivate this recommendation the State letter refers to the text of an attachment to a previous State letter dated 8 August 1997 on "Performance based training objectives for pilots training on ACAS " In this attachment one can read: [ ... When possible an ATC clearance is complied with while responding to a RA.. ] and also: [ .. if pilots simultaneously receive instructions to manoeuvre from ATC and an RA which are in conflict, the

pilot should follow the RA .. ] This is an important step forward.

IFALPA issued a Statement dated Sept 2002 supporting ICAO latest State letter recommendation .

The Russian State Research Institute "Air Navigation "published in Sept 2002 an analysis on the interaction between ATC and crews using ACAS. They reviewed all

ICAO and Russian documentation to produce guidelines and recommendations for changes. The proposed changes include amongst others: Defining areas in Russiawhere ACAS would be mandatory.

Forbidding non SSRequipped aircraft or with unserviceable SSRsto operate in certain Areas where ACAS is mandatory, Use of TA mode only in certain uncontrolled areas, The inclusion of clear procedures for crew to follow in case of ACAS RAs and ATC clearances are conflicting ..

So far it would appear that the Russian Aviation administration expect uniform Standards from ICAO, and therefore will propose changes to ICAO. We also hear that, until now, Russian ATC (and many Russian Pilots) point of view was that, the crew should follow ATC clearances and ACAS is only auxiliary equipment.

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TCASUpdate 11

TCAS: its history and its flaws

Philippe Domogala European Editor Editor'snote : Philippe was the /FATCA representive in the late 7980's, beginning 1990's in the various /CAO and Eurocontrol working groups dealing, among others, with the introduction of TCAS ( i.e. FEATS, FANS-I/, EATMS, etc .. ) and as such comments on the technical and historical aspects of TCAS.

been and probably never will be. It is also not "transparent to ATC " as it was claimed. Its hasty introduction by the FAA in the USA was motivated by political reasons following a series of collisions. It is a very complex system.

Early indications from the official investigation are that TCAS was a factor in the Zurich (Ueberlingen) collision. This article discusses how and why TCAS was implemented and what the known strengths and weaknesses of TCAS are, particularly in relationship to ATC."

It took more than 37 years to develop.

Work on anti collision systems started back in 1956 after a TWA Constellation and a United DC? collided over the Grand Canyon killing all passengers on board (70 in the constellation and 58 in the DC?).

The aircraft were flying VFR at 21.000 ft.

This was a shock in the USA and precipitated the creation of the FAA.

172 also VFR near San Diego, California, killing 135 on board. Again, Congress pressed the FAA who had to speed up their research. By 1980 the FAA had awarded contracts to Bendix and the Mitre corporation to develop what was then known as BCAS ( for Beacon Coll.

Avoid, sys) In 1981, BCAS was renamed TCAS. In Nov 1985, a DA50 collided with a Piper PA28, also VFR, over New Jersey.which was followed in August 1986 by an Aeromexico DC9 colliding with another Piper Pa28 , also VFR near Los Angeles killing all 64 board the DC9, 3 on board the Piper and 15 on the ground.

TCAS is definitively not the wonderful machine that some claim it is. It has never

Then in 1978, another collision, this time a PSA Boeing 727 collided with a Cessna

(In this case the controller was later held partially responsible in a court case

HOW AND WHY EUROPE GOT TCAS We know the reasons why the USA had to mandate TCAS in such a hurry, but why did Europe followed suit so soon after as they did not have the same numbers of collisions in their airspace.?

In 1987, when the first US act to mandate TCAS by Dec 1993 for all aircraft of more than 30 seats flying in US airspace was enacted, it applied to foreign aircraft operating to the USA as well. That meant that European registered aircraft flying to the US would have to be fitted with the device by that date, but they would also be operating in European airspace.

Eurocontrol at the time decided that TCAS fitted aircraft could use the device in European airspace but on a trial basis only. The UK was the first European country to conduct a trial, using a prototype TCAS II unit loaned from a manufacturer and fitted in a British Airways Boeing 737-200 in Dec 1988 to examine technical and flight operational issues. The trial took place in early 1989, and showed no real adverse problems. The possible safety benefits of TCAS were said, on paper, at least, to be considerable.

France also conducted similar tests with Air France.

Later, one of the TCAS manufacturers, u~ing two of their aircraft, made a tour in Europe demonstrating TCAS II operation.

The UK CAA legal advice was that there would need to be clear evidence of adverse safety [caused by TCAS] in order to instruct pilots to switch off a device such as TCAS while in UK airspace. In parallel with this activity, ICAO started work to establish SARPs for airborne collision avoidance systems in the early 1980s. This work was undertaken in the SSR Improvements and Collision Avoidance Systems Panel (SICASP). In the course of this work, the scope and the results of very extensive safety studies of TCAS operation, carried out in more than one State, were taken into account. In addition, in 1989, ICAO decided to carry out a worldwide operational evaluation ofTCAS 11,to determine system performance and to identify any problems. The two main evaluations started in the United States in June 1990, and in Europe in March 1991. The system improvements identified, as a result of this evaluation, led to the development and release of a new version of TCAS II (6.04A) in 1993. Meanwhile the performance SARPs for ACAS II were agreed in 1993 and adopted in 1995.

In the ICAO European office, the FEATS( Future ATS System Concept Group) studied the trials and came to the conclusion that while TCAS did not give real ATM benefits (eg in terms of capacity), it was an important component of the safety of the system that could not be ignored.

Some European States came to the conclusion that should a collision occur in their airspace and TCAS, being available, had not been mandated, they could be held liable.

Following a call from the Ministers for Air Traffic Services in Europe, in 1993, ECAC requested EUROCONTROLto develop a European policy for ACAS. This was agreed by all the ECAC States in late 1995, mandating the carriage and operation an airborne collision avoidance system, compliant with ICAO ACAS II SARPs in two phases ,the first phase starting on 1 January 2000. This affected all civil fixed wing turbine engined aircraft having a maximum take off weight exceeding 15 tons or with 30 seats or more flying through European airspace. So in Europe today TCAS is mandatory, but with version 7, which is a much more mature and stable version than the original ones.

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11

TC although he clearly could not help to prevent it)

in the USA, to operate on TA ( traffic advisory) mode only.

Those 2 last events meant, that although the TCAS logic was not fully ready, (as many scientific publications at the time testify) tremendous pressure was put on the FAA to mandate TCAS. Congress pressed the FAA and some lawyers argued that if such a machine was available and another collision was to happen, the FAA could be held liable.

That the TCAS logic was not perfect was not relevant.Neither was the fact that all the collisions in the USA that had influenced the call for the introduction of TCAS, had been caused by VFR traffic.

All this proves that the system was not ready at the time of its introduction, and that, worse. It was tested with live traffic , even in areas where it was not intended : i.e. outside US airspace. IFATCA took the lead in the various ICAO and Eurocontrol meetings and working groups, by warning about the deficiencies and limitations that it thought TCAS carried. It passed numerous IFATCA Policies on TCAS/ ACAS.

In 1987, President Reagan signed a law requiring that: By Dec 31 1991, all turbine powered aircraft with more than 30 seats flying in the US airspace must be equipped with TCAS II. Later, as this proved unrealistic , the FAA got approval from Congress to phased in implementation from Dec 1990 (where 20% of aircraft should be equipped ) to 31 Dec 1993 where all aircraft should be equipped . Work on the software was intensified and the first sets started to arrive on the market around 1988/89.

By 1990 it became obvious, especially to the US controllers having worked with it, that there were problems with the interface between ATC and the Resolutions Advisories (RAs).

Disruptive RAs reduced legal separations, crossing RAs (the so called "Dallas Bumps") ghost targets, etc required modifications. Various software upgrades were introduced, ending with version 6.02, which was the one used at the time the system was mandated in the USA (1991/1993) .After the system was mandated, more 'glitches occurred and tremendous pressure was applied, especially coming from Europe, to modify 6.02 and to make it more "ATC compatible ". Then another "final" version called 6.04A was introduced at the end of 1994. (later it was even followed by version 6.04A Enhanced).

Only the USA had mandated it, but all US aircraft and foreign aircraft operating to the US had to be fitted, and these also flew globally. That is how Controllers from all around the world had their first TCAS experience! Training was poor or nonexistent. Each airline had its own interpretation on how to use it outside the USA from turn it off, to follow the RA like

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were made in the USA showing that percentage. But they were made with tests pilots on a test aircraft. Those pilots were perfectly trained and more importantly, EXPECTEDa TCAS RA at a given moment. The daily operational reality is totally different.

Recent studies made in 1995 in the USA and in 1997, 98 and 99 in Europe show a very different picture. In the USA, the study shows that just over 50% of pilots follow the RAs as prescribed (Lincoln Laboratory, MIT, Washington ) and in Europe a recent study made over 2 • years( 1998 and 2000) of ATC recordings ( ACAS study published in Jan 2002 by Eurocontrol ) show that reaction to corrective RAs is only 45% ( in other words 55% of the corrective RAs issued were not followed by pilots ) These low percentages could be explained by inadequate training.

Some of the pilot's reactions to RAs are in fact disrupting the automatism created within TCAS to prevent collisions and significantly decrease the benefits .

It was also recognised at that time that the TCAS logic could induce collisions that would normally not have happened had TCAS not been there. The manufacturers call these , "TCAS limitations" The RCTA and ARINC in the USA call these "induced collision risk " It was known from the outset that TCAS , by its conception had the potential to cause collisions. The percentage was identified.

Nevertheless the risk was taken. Studies were made showing those risks. They rarely appeared in the operations rooms, or the cockpits.

The scientific TCAS papers produced at the time (1990) talked about the one in 50 or the famous 2% i.e. that for every 50 collisions TCAS would prevent, it would induce (or cause) one. This statistic is however based on the assumption that pilots will follow the resolutions advisories in more than 90% of the cases.

Indeed, the first tests to validate TCAS

It looks as if in the introduction of TCAS the human factors issues have been conveniently put aside.

But the fact remains that pilots in command are still today the only body responsible for anti-collision ( i.e. also with TCAS mandated in USA and in Europe among others) This is still written in the Aviation laws of the States involved and re-inforced in the latest ICAO SARPsdealing with ACAS. Therefore TCAS issues ADVISORIES and not commands. For the Regulators, it is still up to the pilots to decide if they follow TCAS RAs or not, and this despite the ACAS technical training manuals that say that a pilot should (but not shall ) follow RAs in all cases.

To complicate things even further, some State laws have a proviso that Pilots should alwaysfollow ATC instructions . In the case of Germany ,(since our collision occurred above its territory) it is stated in their AIP ( ENR1.1-19) that pilots are not permitted to deviate from ATC clearances unless[ ...] in emergency". But Germany, like all other European states, enforced the TCAS European mandate as of January 2000. It did not define a RA as an emergency. The ACAS training manual issued by Eurocontrol states that pilots should (but not shall) follow RAs. But the

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document also states that when following a RA, the deviation from the ATC clearance shall be the minimum required.The German AIP (ENR 1.8-23) says that": "All RAs should be followed unless the pilot can visually identify the conflicting traffic etc ...

But there was nothing I could find in the German AIP , or in the available ICAO Documents or Eurocontrol ACAS II training manual that refers specifically to what pilots should precisely do when an ATC instruction is conflicting with an RA..

This void was recognised at a very early stage by IFATCA and IFALPA and warnings were issued. But the mood at the tiri-ie was such that the introduction of TCAS worldwide could not be stopped.

ICAO was working in parallel to the USA in defining ACAS specifications that would be mandated worldwide. Europe was actively pushing for an ICAO solution.But this took time. TCAS was a US system and it was available before ACAS. The Europeans also had to mandate TCAS for legal reasons; they would have been held legally responsible if a collision had occurred that could have been avoided if TCAS had been mandated. ( see previous

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article on how and why Europe mandated ACAS) The fact that the original TCAS was developed in the USA for the US airspace was not a real issue. Later, in 1998, a study made by the chief Scientist of the MITRE Corporation, [ the designers of the TCAS software ] concluded that : 'European airspace has close encounters at higher altitude than in the USA , and that consequently, TCAS does worse with European data in the model.

Nevertheless in 1995 Eurocontrol proposed that from 1 Jan 2000, all Jet a/c of more than 15 tons or 30 seats be equipped with an ACAS system However, Europe wanted to introduce RVSM as well . In the USA , the TCAS version mandated at the time (6.04.A) could not sustain RVSM operations. ICAO also was looking at TCAS but called it ACAS II (as TCAS is a brand name ). After a collision between a Kazakh 1176and a Saudia 747 over New Delhi in 1996, ICAO proposed that ACAS be made mandatory for all aircraft world wide between 2003 and 2005. The new TCAS version that sustained RVSM operations and cured many of the previous problems was called version 7.0 . Version 7.0 is also compatible with the ICAO ACAS II specifications, ( in fact one can say TCAS version 7 and ACAS II are

the same thing) but in order to eliminate most ( but not all ) the problems caused

by RVSM, version 7 , among many other things, delayed some warnings in order to be able to detect the intention to level off.

This delayed warning meant faster reaction from pilots was required. This meant the system was now more difficult to operate.

Interestingly enough, the Eurocontrol Training manual on ACAS II says clearly ( page 17) that "TCAS might itself induce a risk of collision " ACASII

To function in an optimum way ( i.e. to prevent a collision ) with version 7, pilots should follow the first RA within 5 seconds and any subsequent corrective never manoeuvre in the opposite direction from a RA. You can find this in the Honeywell ACAS II users manual ( the model used by the 2 aircraft involved in the Zurich collision ),and the Eurocontrol training manual, but strangely enough not in the ICAO documents that set the regulations. (PANS-ATM and OPS) But also, some important changes in the TCAS collision logic were made with version 7 Before the Zurich collision, many ( including me) believed that in a coordinated TCAS encounter, if one of the

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TCASUpda e aircraft did not follow its RA, the other TCAS would monitor the other altitude report , detect the non compliance, and at one stage or another would issue a (reversal) corrective RA in order to prevent the collision. But , as the German BFU reports showed, it did not. Putting the Zurich collision model into a TCAS simulator confirms this.

To understand why this detection of non compliance did not change the original RAs, one has to look into the RTCA( Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) MOPS for version 7 It is a very large and complex document that lists all possible situations and TCAS reactions. One can read there that if the threat aircraft is also equipped with ACAS II and is making an unexpected vertical manoeuvre ( such as moving in the opposite direction to the RA received ) this will be handled by the other TCAS by an increased rate RA . Apparently sense-reversal RA are not permitted in that case.

15.6.3.3 Once an aircraft departs from its clearance in compliance with a resolution advisory, the controller ceasesto be responsible for providing separation between that aircraft and any other aircraft affected as a direct consequence of the manoeuvre induced by the resolution advisory. " In Europe provisions in ICAO DOC 7030 ( RAC 16.3) also apply . They tell controllers a slightly different story : .. "On being notified that an aircraft under ATC is [following an RAJ a controller should not issue instructions to aircraft which are contrary to the RA as communicated by

This is very probably the reason why so many documents mention the fact that pilots should never manoeuvre against the sense of an RA, but it also can be seen as a shortcoming ( or flaw ) in the TCAS logic.

THE ICAO REGULATION REGARDINGACAS What a controller should do is defined in ICAO PANS-ATM Doc 4444 (15.6.3.) : in the paragraph defining the responsibilities of controllers providing a service to ACAS equipped aircraft one can read : "15.6.3.1 The procedures to be applied for the provision of air traffic services to aircraft equipped with ACAS shall be identical to those applicable to non-ACAS equipped aircraft. In particular, the prevention of collisions, the establishment of appropriate separation and the information which might be provided in relation to conflicting traffic and to possible avoiding action shall conform with the normal ATS procedures and shall exclude consideration of aircraft capabilities dependent on ACAS equipment.

15.6.3.2 When a pilot reports a manoeuvre induced by an ACAS resolution advisory (RA), the controller shall not attempt to modify the aircraft flight path until the pilot reports returning to the terms of the current air traffic control instruction or clearance but shall provide traffic information as appropriate.

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the pilot. Once the a/c departs from the current ATC clearance in compliance with a RA, the controller ceases to be responsible for providing separation[ .... ] However when circumstances permit, the controller should endeavour to provide traffic information to aircraft affected by the manoeuvre.... " This difference between the 2 ICAO documents had been noticed earlier and was raised by IFATCA. Eurocontrol had also noted the discrepancy and notified ICAO, but at the time of the collision both documents were still in force not yet amended. ( NOTE : in the case of the collision in Zurich , according to the German BFU Status report, the first (unanswered )ATC instruction to descend was given before any RA was followed and before the controller was advised that any RA was taking place.)

The use of ACAS by pilots is defined in

ICAO PANS-OPSDoc 8168: "nothing[ ...] shall prevent pilots in command from exercising their best judgement and full authority in the choice of the best course of action to resolve a conflict. The pilot shall use ACAS information in accordance with the following[ ...] The pilot shall not manoeuvre on the sole basis of a TA. During a RA the pilot SHALL visually monitor the airspace where the intruder is indicated. The deviation from ATC clearance shall be the minimum required. [ ....]

N9w this is not exactly what the ACAS User Manual and the Eurocontrol Training Manual say. Basically, pilots are requested in those manuals to "follow promptly " RAs . No mention of anything else, no mention of ATC clearances conflicting with RAs. In the Honeywell ACAS II manual, under Warnings and Limitations, it states that the ACAS logic is based on the expectation that the crew will comply within 5 seconds . This could mean that should the crew choose to delay, or refuse to follow the RA, that the TCAS logic will become invalid . This option to delay or to choose not to follow a RA is clearly envisaged in the ICAO Documents. . After the Zurich collision the UK and the USA for instance have issued guidelines to pilots who choose not to follow RAs ( see separate article on REACTIONSafter the collision elsewhere in this issue ) The discrepancy between what ICAO says and what the training manuals say is in fact highlighting one of the major flaws of TCAS : that of the incompatibility between positive ATC and airborne automated systems.

The very same discussion is taking place today within the ASAS/CDTI, Free.flight, Data link working groups.

Telling pilots to follow RAs in all circumstances would solve the problem but would have legal implications. Should a collision occur while following TCAS RAs, then the regulator and the manufacturer of the equipment could be held liable. Knowing that there is an induced risk of collision within the system, and that there are cases where following RAs would make matters worse, both the regulators and the manufacturers have a vested interest in making sure the system is giving ADVICE and not ORDERS.

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TCASU odate Expecting pilots in command to follow RAs within 5 seconds taking into account . everything (e.g.: visual acquisition, [conflicting]ATC clearances, etc.) in all cases is possibly over-optimistic.

Basing optimum collision avoidance to both aircraft following co-ordinated RAs within 5 seconds is stretching the odds even further.

THE WARNINGS : The main area of concern at the beginning of the 1990,s was in the altitude detection.

As TCAS relies on altitude reports ( Mode C or S ) returns to issue RAs, fear existed that errors in altitude reports would cause false RAs.

What is often forgotten is that humans will interfere into highly automated systems. With TCAS the logic relies on a minimum of one human (the single pilot of a (small ) aircraft following a RA against an aircraft not TCAS equipped) to a maximum of 10 humans or so in case of a multiple aircraft encounter.

The other known problem is the visual acquisition. Pilots identifying another aircraft as the one triggering the RA was a fear. This is a real possibility since TCAS is very poor in azimuth

In the Zurich collision case at least 5 humans were involved ; 2 pilots in each aircraft and the controller on the ground. It is still not known if there was a difference between the pilot in command and the pilot flying in any of the aircraft. In the TU 154, this is of major importance as Russian regulations place the pilot in command responsible for deciding to follow a RA or not.

Before this fatal day in July there were incidents that could have served as warnings that the fears of several people involved in TCAS implementation were not unfounded.

altitude. The KAL TCAS believing it was 400 ft above the BAW, issued a climb RA. The KAL pilot followed the RA and that put the 2 aircraft at the same altitude within 200 m laterally. The BAW TCAS only issued a descent RA 10 seconds before the pilot saw the other 747 at the same altitude. Collision was avoided because of the lateral difference in tracks.

Since this incident, the problem that caused this case has been identified and rectified

The most dramatic of those occurred above China in June 1999. between a KAL Boeing 747 cruising at 31500 ft ( Chinese Flight level metric system ) and a BAW 747 cruising at 33500ft. A fault within the KAL SSRencoding box suddenly put it 2400 ft above its actual

Detection and the bearing of the intruder on the TCAS display might be totally different in reality. But also the attitude ( pitch ) of the aircraft when following a RA will have a great potential for error when determining whether an aircraft is above or below.

This can be illustrated by the recently mediatised JAL/JAL TCAS near collision that occurred over Japan in January 2001. A B747 and a DC1O of JAL had a TCAS encounter. Following an STCA alert from ATC, the 747 was instructed to descend by ATC. While descending he had a climb RA , but the pilot followed the instruction and

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TCASUpaate disregarded the RA as per Japanese procedures in force at the time. The DC10 had a descent RA, and the pilot followed the RA. Both pilots had each other in sight. The 747 pilot felt a possible collision could occur and decided to increase its descent. The DC10 pilot seeing the 747 diving ,feared he will pass below him and decided to stop follow the RA and reversed its course and climbed .

Both aircraft passed within 100 m of each other.

(taking on average 10 seconds ) The information will be ending in a display, It will take more precious seconds to be read or decoded ,and understood by the controller. During that time the situation would have changed dynamically. What should the controller do with that information ?

The fact remains that when following an RA the pilot takes over responsibility for

This case bears some similarities with the Zurich collision case. But both show basically the li_mitsof the incompatibilities between ATC based separation , visual airborne separation, and TCAS procedures. This incident, combined with the Zurich collision should make regulators review TCAS totally, (and especially the interface between ATC clearances and RAs) (Note: in the meantime ICAO issued a State letter on the matter. See more under the separate article on REACTIONS)

To my fellow pilots: whatever you decide to do, NEVERmanoeuvre in the opposite direction from a RA. To my fellow controllers, if you spot a conflict late nowadays, knowing there is TCAS around, if you can, add a TURN to provide lateral separation to your eventual climb/descent instruction .

The Japaneseauthorities, following their incident above, have written to ICAO and are pushing for a technical solution, i.e. the downlinking of RAs to ATC.

collision avoidance. Controller intervention after the RA has started is therefore irrelevant.

In the Zurich case, should the downlink facility have been available, it would not have changed anything, since the main ATC system was unserviceable, and therefore data link would also have been disconnected, as the STCA ( Short Term Conflict Alert )was.

Controllers in general, and IFATCA in particular, are strictly opposed to this for numerous reasons, the main one being responsibility. It would be difficult to argue that if a RA is downlinked and received by the ground system, why did the controller did not react accordingly?

The problem is time. RAs occur within 35 sec before the closest point of approach (CPA) between 2 aircraft. Data transmission if using Mode S data link takes an antenna rotation to be processed

There is, in my opinion, no "quick technical fix "for the TCAS problems as described in this article. I doubt there is even a procedural one. TCAS is operational with all its flaws and limitations, and it will be extremely difficult to put it back into the bottle. Merely because, in many other cases, it has probably already saved some collisions. In areas where there is no positive radar ATC, TCAS remains a very good tool to have, as a last resort.

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Is there really something flawed with TCAS ?: TCAS is, like any automated system, not 100% safe. Nothing in life really is. But the major flaws I see are in the disregarding of Human Factor issues surrounding RA reaction by pilots, its incompatibility with ATC and the limitations of its logic.

The official reactions made after this collision ( see separate article on this elsewhere in this issue ) are confirming that not everything was perfect. What happened in Ueberlingen could have happened, and can still happen anywhere. I would like to use this opportunity to give some advice:

DOWN LINKING OF RAs as the ULTIMATE SOLUTION. Engineers and management love technical solutions.

Unfortunately for them, aviation safety (and ATC is no exception) is 20 % technical and 80% human. But there again, I can assure you that technical solutions will be put forward.

CONCLUSION: In my opinion, after the Ueberlingen collision, the procedures for the use of TCAS require a review.

To my fellows in ATC management: have the courage to ask the right questions about TCAS. But also learn the Zurich lessons: safety is not merely a nice word to place here and there in a conversation or a report. It needs dedication and actions , even if some of them are not popular to take. Causing extra delays to airlines for genuine safety concerns is not bad management. It is in my eyes a mark of courage and professionalism.

This accident should serve as the starting point for changes . We owe this to everyone that suffered dearly from this tragedy.

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ATCS1tn Meeting the Air Force Challenge Gary M. Pearson - Product Manager , Adacel Simulation Division Neil Asbil - Director, Standards -Adacel's Learning Network Division Overview In spring 2001 the United States Air Force released a request for proposal for its program to install and maintain 3D tower simulation systems (TSS) at up to 94 of its airbases worldwide. In spring 2002 after an exhaustive selection process the Air Force awarded the contract to Adacel Systems Inc, a company situated in Dallas

TX. Adacel won the competition with its MaxSim TSS, a proven tower simulator that has evolved over time and is currently being used by a large number of international clients.

Each of the 94 tower systems installed by Adacel will be based on and identical equipment set and will fill the same physical footprint. Due to the exacting demands set by the USAF, the latest in state-of-the art computer equipment and

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simulation software is required to achieve the requirements. This is not a case of technology for technology's sake-the requirements that drove the selection of technological components were carefully developed by the USAF to bring additional teaching benefits and capability to the simulator.

The Challenge Although presented with many unique challenges by the Air Force, one factor alone dictated the approach that Adacel took when deciding upon the final simulator configuration.

Each TSS installation is intended to have its

The USAF's TSS would not be used in a typical schoolhouse environment, where

own site-specific, very realistic airbase, modelled in a full 36000. The controllers being trained in the simulator view the replica airbase on 6 seamless, high fidelity projection display systems that make up a physical horizontal field of view of 27000.

The TSS is designed to accommodate 4 training positions: a tower controller, a ground controller, a flight data positions and a tower coordinator. The TSS simulations are controlled from a single exercise supervisor/instructor station.

ATC students are taught the basic ATC skills and techniques using strict FAA 7110.65 phraseology. Following this level of training in a historical perspective, successful trainees would then be sent to a base to receive their final training on-thejob, which was completed with their facility check-out. Following the successful completion of a facility checkout, controllers would then have periodic on-the-job training and refresher training when and as required. The USAF's TSS on

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ATC

or

the other hand - is intended for use by the widest range of skill levels - from Airmen newly arrived from the school, to the Chief Master Sergeant with 25 years controlling experience. With such a range of experience in the target user it was imperative that Adacel provide a system capable of producing true-to-life scenarios that would foster an almost total immersion of the trainee in the virtual environment. Of course this entails the use of non-standard phraseology, a wide range of scenario complexity and extreme site-specificity. Without that sense of realism, the simulator would be in danger of being considered another high tech toy with little practical value.

positioned according to the time of day and year and the location (latitude/longitude) of the airbase being simulated in the TSS. The TSS also displays advanced weather simulation effects including: rain, fog, snow, snow squalls, dust storms, multiple lightning effects and a wide range of realistic cloud formations, variable ceiling heights and models.

The Solution In order to promote the required level of immersion necessary to fully engage the trainee, Adacel focused on the enhancement of three key areas: Visual Capability, Voice Recognition and Aircraft Behaviour.

Visual Capability

By the nature of the task, the tower cab controllers rely mainly upon visual cues to effectively execute their task. Although provided with additional stimuli such as flight progress strips and a tower radar display, the controllers must be able to see the traffic that they are controlling. Cost effective, real world 20/20 vision is still some way off in simulation due to the prohibitive costs of the technology required to achieve it. In addition the equipment needed to produce such display could not currently be integrated and installed in the 18 x 15 x 8 foot room size mandated by the Air Force program.

In order to achieve an acceptable level of visual acuity, Adacel used the many years of experience of its aircraft-modelling department. Adacel created and evolved its proprietary modelling and simulation techniques that enable the simulator to display aircraft and vehicles at close to real-world fidelity but at a fraction of the cost. By using these techniques, the simulation users are be able to detect, identify and manage traffic in the virtual tower scene at the same distances as they would expect to see in an real-world operational tower.

To further enhance the sense of immersion in the simulation scenario the TSS is capable of depicting advanced environmental effects. For example, the • sun, moon and stars are all accurately

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Voice Recognition/Synthesis

In order to reduce the human resources required to operate the simulator, the Air Force dictated that voice recognition would be used to replace the traditional simulation pseudo pilot. Voice recognition removes the need for pseudo pilots to translate the commands of the controllers and input them into the simulation via a computer keyboard. This feature presented the biggest challenge to Adacel as traditionally, voice recognition in the extremely complex world of air traffic control has not been able to attain the level of accuracy and consistency required to effectively run an ATC training scenario. In addition, most voice recognition systems were designed for use in static environments where phraseology is clearly defined and users are forced to be disciplined. The USAF TSS is intended for deployment to 94 sites - each with their own local procedures and approved deviations from 7110.65 phraseology so not only does the TSS have to correctly interpret commands and account for the myriad of regional accents of its users, it also must cope with "relaxed" terminology not found in any ATC text book. Finally, most voice recognitions systems of the past were 'speaker dependent' requiring the user to "train" the system by reading a script of 15 to 30 minutes. After the training, if the system failed to capture the voice, the user had to re-train the system.

Adacel's approach to this complex challenge was to discard everything that it had done previously in this field and to start with a clean sheet. This ambitious approach resulted in a voice recognition and speech synthesis system that truly works. The system delivers a 98% recognition rate (in controlled testing), which studies have shown to be a greater level of accuracy than that measured in actual controller-to-pilot transmissions.

The system is able to effectively recognize native English speakers from all parts of the world and performs remarkably well with non-native English speakers. Voice recognition has finally reached the stage where it is reliable and its accuracy

exceeds that of traditional pseudo-pilots.

Finally, the Adacel voice recognition solution is 'speaker independent', meaning no "training" is required - saving significant time and effort on the part of the users.

Aircraft Movement and Behaviour

The final area of focus for the TSS was aircraft behaviour. Adacel's MaxSim software has proven to be capable of highly realistic aircraft performance and behaviour. The system is used by respected research and teaching establishments such as NASA FutureFlight and the NavCanada Training Institute to name two. Once again, the USAF TSS presented unique challenges owing to special procedures. How would the TSS allow such a procedure as the "Whifferdrill" used at Little Rock A.F.B.?

The "Whifferdrill" is a manoeuvre by aircraft on go-around whereby a Left 9000 turn is followed immediately by a right 27000turn to bring the aircraft back onto a late downwind position. It rapidly became apparent from Adacel's research that the TSS would require a level of flexibility not necessary in previous simulators. Each of the 94 bases may have its own challenges but Adacel extended the capability of the Maxsim scenario preparation tools to allow new procedures to be created without the need for site-specific software changes.

Another challenge loomed however.

Previously, many of the limitations of simulator capability could be overcome by creative and experienced pseudo-pilots who would manually 'fly' aircraft in a manner that resembled the procedure. As previously discussed though, the TSS has no dedicated pseudo pilots so all aircraft manoeuvres must be managed via voice control. The voice recognition is not only responsible for 'understanding' the controller commands but it also possesses a high level of intelligence allowing it to filter verbal inputs and produce appropriate pilot responses. This intelligence module is capable of determining that a taxi instruction to an airborne aircraft is invalid so in response the module will ask for clarification from the controller. Additionally the aircraft and vehicles within the TSS scenario each have their own level of 'intelligence'.

MaxSim TSS has been designed so that a simulated aircraft makes decisions similar to those that a real pilot would make. This ensures that aircraft will not blindly accept instructions from a controller when they

Continued on page 18

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ATCTraining Training for a Safer World Setting up ATC Training at Rudloe College Martin Thomas and Francis Lucas Air Traffic Control training began at Rudloe College in the Autumn of 2001.

How we came to open the College and how we gained UK Civil Aviation Authority approval to conduct our training is the subject of this article.

The decision to open Rudloe College was taken in the wake of the announcement, in the spring of 2001, that UK's premier ATC training facility at Bailbrook College in Bath was to close. A number of senior managers and instructional staff felt strongly that there was a continuing need for ATC training of the type provided by Bailbrook and decided to open a new facility in the area that would cater to the needs of both UK and overseas Air Traffic Control trainees.

An ideal location was available at Rudloe Manor, some four miles up the road from Bath, on a site once owned by the RAF and the former headquarters of 10 Fighter Group. The owner of the site, who was enthusiastic about the College and keen to ensure that the historic link with aviation was maintained, gave invaluable help and support to the new venture.

In the event, however, starting up a new ATC College involved a lot more than we had bargained for. As long-serving ATC instructors, we had been used to teaching in a working college which operated under the umbrella of a large commercial organisation and in which the only contacts with the CM were the occasional moderation visit from Inspectors and the triennial college audit.

It was an eye-opener to discover just how much work a submission for CM approval entailed.

Our starting point was the relevant CM documentation, in particular CAP 584, which lays down the conditions for CM approved ATC Colleges, and CAP 624, which specifies the standards and objectives for approved CM courses. Our submission would need to address all the points raised in CAP 584, including the CM requirements for staff offices, classroom facilities, simulator facilities, student study rooms and library, technical support library, document centre and

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residential facilities.

We also had to detail the qualifications and job descriptions of instructional staff, to set out our plans for staff development and for the training of input staff and to define our methodology for the assessment of trainees and courses.

SRG ( Safety Regulation Group ) was helpful and cooperative throughout.

The college submission was discussed with SRG members at intervals during its preparation and we benefited greatly from their experience and advice. A preliminary audit was carried out when the draft college submission was completed, and the few minor modifications that were required were implemented at this stage for example, changing the weather presentation on the simulator to a more acceptable format, and repositioning classroom accessories!

The college was now ready.

However, before approval could be granted, the courses themselves had to be approved, delivered and audited. This, again, proved to be a time-consuming task involving the meticulous preparation of detailed learning objectives, lesson plans, exercises and references for each lesson.

In addition, the slides for each of the 150 lessons that make up the Aerodrome and Approach courses had to be formatted and entered into the classroom electronic whiteboard system as we had decided that all lessons would be presented in Power Point.

A formal submission document was then prepared for each course. This comprised the detailed course timetable, the breakdown of classroom and practical training, the references to documentation used and the Local Air Traffic Control Instructions for the simulated airspace.

Exercises for the practical training had to be designed, entered into the simulators and thoroughly checked by instructors and input staff for viability. Flight progress strips had to be prepared for mass printing, and input guidance sheets produced for the aircraft operators.

Again, SRG was consulted every step of the way, and after four months' work, the preliminary audit was carried out in December 2001 and the courses were approved subject to CM observation during their actual delivery.

The hard work had now been done, and the task of delivering the courses.even under the watchful eye of the SRG audit team, was a pleasant respite from all the preparatory labour. Thanks to the help and advice given by SRG along the way, the audits for the Aerodrome and Approach courses identified only a few minor points that needed correction. And so, almost a year to the day after the doors of Bailbrook College closed for the last time, the CM granted recognition to Rudloe College and approval to run our courses!

While our CM instructors were intent on gaining formal CM approval, a parallel effort was being made by the ICAO, Aviation English and Management departments of the College to develop their courses. Although CM approval is not required to run ICAO or Aviation English courses, the approval will contribute to the College's credibility internationally. Indeed, it is often a prerequisite for overseas ATC authorities who seek to place their training with us.

We all feel that we have come a long way.

After only one year we have a CMapproved College, with thriving departments offering ICAO, Aviation English and Management Training.

Courses are well under way, both here at Rudloe and on overseas contracts. It has been an arduous and challenging journey for all of us. And it has been well worth the effort.

We now look forward to strengthening and building on the foundation of the College.

Martin Thomas is Chief Instructor A TC (UK) Training at ASTAC Rudloe Colfege Francis Lucas is Director of English and Teacher training at ASTAC Rudloe Colfege.

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20

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IFATCA 2003 in Buenos Aires

HOSTING ASSOCIATION: ACTA ARGENTINA Bruzone 498 - P.B. Depto A (B1842DSS) Monte Grande. Buenos Aires, Argentina Phone/Fax: (+54 11) 4281-7729 E-mail: actaargenti na@escape.corn. ar

Dear Fellow Controllers and Aviation Professionals, The Argentina Air Traffic Controllers Association (A.C.T.A.), is very pleased and proud to host, for the first time in Argentina, the 42nd Annual Conference and Technical Exhibition of IFATCA, to be held in Buenos Aires, from March 17th to 21st, 2003.

We cordially invite you to join us in Buenos Aires, to exchange knowledge and experiences for the enhancement of our Profession and the promotion and improvement of safety efficiency in air navigation around the world.

All members of the Organizing Committee are working very hard planning the Conference activities, social events, excursions and tours that will enhance the whole program and assure a successful and efficient event. You will find below, the highlights of the event and our web site (www.acta-argentina.com.ar) will be updated as more details become available. Please, note that we have renegotiated a better room rate with the Conference Hotel; therefore, many of the delegates will be able to stay at the prestigious Sheraton Hotel.

We hope that, in addition to attending the Conference, you will have the chance to explore and enjoy Buenos Aires, and its environs, and if you can take a couple of extra days before or after the Conference, don't miss the opportunity to visit any of the wonderful touristic destinations in Argentina, called "The Land of the Six Continents". Exchange rate, due to our currency devaluation, is now extremely favourable for foreign tourists, who find prices of meals, shopping, entertainments, transportation, tours and excursions, very accessible.

Take advantage of this benefit and plan some vacations together with IFATCA 2003!

As the Conference will be attended by a large number of ATC and aviation professionals from around the world, IFATCA 2003 is also an excellent opportunity for interested companies to advertise and promote their products and services related to air traffic control or aviation in general. These Companies are welcome to participate in IFATCA 2003 as Exhibitors or Sponsors.

We look forward to seeing all of you in Buenos Aires!

With Warmest Regard

Dr Gabriela Logatto President Organizing Committee IFATCA 2003

Cesar Salas President ACTA ARGENTINA

IFATCA 2003 SECRETARIAT:MC CONGRESOSY EXPOSICIONES (Conference information, Registration, Hotel & Tourism Reservationsand Exhibiting& SponsorshipInformation): Chile 417- (C1098MI) Buenos Aires, Argentina Phone/Fax: (+54 11) 4342 7763 or 43427976 E-mail: mc2sminter.com.ar Web site: www.acta-argentina.com.ar Contact persons: Mrs Gabriela Ceconi or Mr Gustavo Carullo Bedia

HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS: VENUEHOTEL:Sheraton Buenos Aires Hotel & Convention Centre, San Martin 1225 - (C1104AKC) Buenos Aires. This 5• hotel offers one of the largest hotel meeting and incentive facilities available in Buenos Aires. It enjoys a privileged location in the heart of the main business district, close to the shopping and entertainment areas, easily accessible by public transportation. We have re-negotiated a special reduced rate for IFATCA 2003 participants of USO 110 + VAT (SGL or OBL Room), including buffet breakfast.

ALTERNATE HOTELS: You could also choose one of the alternate hotels or apparts -most of them located close to the Conference Venuewhich offer lower special rates for IFATCA 2003 participants, (ranging from around USO 50 to 75 + VAT for 4* or superior class hotels or USO 20 to 40 + VAT for 3* hotels. There are many choices available; just contact us, and we will offer you the best ones according your needs and travel budget.

CONFERENCEREGISTRATION: If you want to take advantage of early registration fees, please, submit your Registration Form and Payment as soon as possible (Deadline for advance registration Payment is January 31, 2003).

Your early registration will also help IFATCA 2003 Organizing Committee to have an adequate information of the number of members attending the Meeting, and therefore, will allow a more efficient organization

RegistrationFees:according to the function at Conference:

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21

Before January 31, 2003

Category a) IFATCA Officers/ Conference Officers/ Directors/ Deputy Directors/ Invited Advisors

After February 1, 2003

U$S 100

U$S 130

b) Delegates / Individual Members

U$S 120

U$S 150

c) Corporate Members (1) / Observers/ Panel Speakers / Accompanying Persons (2)

U$S 150

U$S 200

NOTES: (1) Lower fees applicable for registrations received and paid by or before February 1st . 2003 (2) Children: less than 6 years old: free of charge; from 6 up to 12 years old: 50% of the fee; 12 years or older: full registration fee.

VISA REQUIREMENTS: A valid passport, with or without visa depending on your nationality, is required to enter Argentina. The IFATCA 2003 Organizing Committee will ask Embassiesand Consulates of Argentina in foreign countries for assistance regarding visa issuing in due time. Please, check with your nearest Argentina representative office for visa regulations, and check our web site for contact information.

AIR TRAVEL CONCESSIONS: AEROLINEASARGENTINAS (AR), has been appointed as IFATCA 2003 OFFICIAL CARRIER,and therefore will offer special discounts on available air fares for all participants and accompanying persons. For further information on air routes and fares, contact Aerolineas Argentinas Congress Department via E-mail: congress@aerolineas.com.ar , AR Offices Abroad, and visit the web site: http://www.aerolineas.com.ar We are still in discussion with other Airlines, in order to get the most convenient discounts on air fares. Updated information will be posted on our website (www.acta-argentina.com.ar).

TECHNICAL EXHIBITION (March 17 to 19, 2003): A professional Exhibition will be held concurrently with the Conference. The exhibition area is located adjacent to the meetings rooms to

AEROl/NEAS ARtlENTINAS OfficialCarrier promote participants interaction.

As IFATCA 2003 will be attended by a large number of ATC and aviation professionals from around the world, is therefore an excellent opportunity for interested companies to advertise and promote their products and services related to air traffic control or aviation in general. The IFATCA 2003 Organizing Committee cordially invite all companies and institutions with an interest in aviation security to participate at this important in IFATCA 2003 as Exhibitorsor Sponsors.

ExhibitSpaces: The Standard Booth Size is 9 Sqm (unless otherwise specified).

RentalFee: Corporate Members: USO 1200 per 9 Sqm booth (including 21% VAT) Non-Corporate Members: USO 2500 per 9 Sqm booth (including 21% VAT) Included in exhibit rental fee is: carpeting, dividing panels, lighting, front fascia with Company's name, standard furniture 2 Conference Registrations Corporate members have priority in selecting the position of their stands on first come, first served basis.

A Non Corporate Member will be considered, upon Exhibiting, and with its agreement, to become a new Corporate Member with effect from the new financial year.

SPONSORSHIPOPPORTUNITIES: Maximize visibility of your Company, and optimize your investment while supporting the aims of IFATCA. A variety of Sponsorship opportunities are available for small as well as for large organizations. Let us know how you would like to participate

If you are interested in EXHIBITING OR SPONSORSHIP OPPORTUNITIES.please check our web site for further information and contact Mrs Gabriela Ceconi at /FA TCA 2003 Secretariat. either by email to mc@sminter.com.ar or fax to (+5411) 4342-7763 or 4342-7976.

22

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ACCOMPANYING PERSONS'PROGRAM: The IFATCA 2003 Organizing Committee will be assisted by an Official Travel Agency to set up and coordinate the Accompanying Persons Program, including a variety of group activities and visits for each day (City Tour, Shopping Tour, Tigre with Coastal train ride and catamaran trip through the Delta of the Parana River, TANGO Show and Dinner, Visit to Museums, A whole day countryside enjoying typical argentine food and wines, traditional music and dancing p,..-rformances,etc) Buenos Aires, the most cosmopolitan and elegant city in South America, charms visitors with its typical neighbourhoods, the wide selection of its cultural, recreational and commercial opportunities and the hospitality of its inhabitants. Buenos Aires is a destination in itself. Don't miss the opportunity to discover the beauties and wonders of the city and its surroundings; therefore, allow a minimum of 2 or 3 days and choose any of the different suggested itineraries depending on your free time.

PRE/ POST CONFERENCETOURS:

AGENDA 2002 October 4 - 6. Executive Board meeting Hong Kong Contact: IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia Phone + 1 514 866 7040 Fax +15148667612 Email: office@ifatca.org 7 - 9 Asia Pacific Regional meeting M Hotel Singapore Contact: IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia Phone +1 514 866 7040 Fax +1 514 866 7612 Email: office@ifatca.org 22 - 24 Africa Middle East Regional meeting Abuja, Nigeria Contact: IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia Phone+ 1 514 866 7040 Fax +15148667612 Email: office@ifatca.org

Argentina is the world's eighth largest country, covering an area of almost 3.8 million SKm. Its North-South extension of 3800 Km, goes from latitude 22° to 55 2 ; and gives Argentina a great variety of climates and landscapes, that's why it is called "the Land of the Six Continents". Argentina is a fascinating place to visit, and the long journey is more than rewarded by what you find upon arrival. Plan now to take some extra days and enjoy the country's natural wonders, like the spectacular lgliazu Falls, Bariloche and the Nahuel Huapi National Park, the Andes mountains and the foothill vineyards in Mendoza, the famous Perito Moreno Galcier, Usuahia the southernmost city in the world, arid many others. Check the National Tourism Secretariat web site to learn more about the different destinations (www.turismo.gov .ar) More Information and Reservations on ACCOMPANYING PERSONS' PROGRAM and PRE/ POST CONFERENCETOURS will be available and updated at /FATCA 2003 web site {www.acta-argentina.com.ar J

25 - 25 Americas Regional meeting Niagara Falls,Canada Contact: IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia Phone+ 1 514 866 7040 Fax + 1 514 866 7612 Email: office@ifatca.org November 1 - 3 European Regional meeting LesmesosCyprus Contact: IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia Phone +1514866 7040 Fax +15148667612 Email: office@ifatca.org 15 - 17 SO Meeting London UK Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia 29 - 01 Dec SC1 Meeting Prestwick, Scotland Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia

2003 January 10 -13 Executive Board Meeting Montreal Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia February 18 -20 ATC Maastrihct March 14 -15 Pre-conference Executive Board meeting Buones Aires 17 -21 Annual Conference Buones Aires 22 Post conference Executive Board meeting Buones Aires Contact:IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana lavorskaia

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23

Focus on CorporateMembers Datalink pre-departure clearance systems: Fewer errors, enhanced safety and operational quality with datalink procedures Copenhagen Airport's Naviair ATC controllers express great satisfaction with the performance of their datalink-based Departure Clearance1 system (DCL), operational since September 2001: "The system greatly reduces stress among

transmitted through radio communication, can now be transmitted via datalink for display or print-out in the cockpit to reduce pilots' workload", said Mr Albert Lam, Director-General of Hong Kong Civil Aviation, at the inauguration ceremony.

the peak period where there are 20 departures within an hour and if 5 to 10 pilots are requesting ATC Clearance from our controller at the same time - which is very likely, there will be serious frequency congestion problems. The use of PDC not

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Th:piotm1dsd&Jrarm ICQIBil aoo recevei Olirclla! inftrrmtm aid01tlff'flfrooghACAHS ACAJfS controllers, and generates a situational overview which is in itself a major asset," says S0ren Beck, Air Traffic Controller at Naviair, and former Head of Tower Operations, at Copenhagen Airport.

Similar evidence emerges from Hong Kong which implemented Terma Datalink Pre-Departure Clearance2 (D-PDC) in December 2001 : "With the implementation of clearance datalink service, the provision of pre-departure clearance information in respect of the departure routes, altitude restrictions, and cruising levels etc., which used to be

24

These and many other testimonials agree that given today's civil aviation huband-spoke structure inducing high peak traffic loads and congestion, the stress on ATC controllers and pilots can be effectively managed and reduced by relieving them of monotonous procedures immediately suited for automation.

One year after implementation of the DPDC at Hong Kong, Raymond Tse, Senior Operations Officer, sums up the experience so far gathered: "Indeed, the time saved with regard to the use of PDC via datalink is not significant for one individual aircraft. However, imagine in

only serves to alleviate frequency congestion problems during peak hours, it also helps in reducing errors when ATC Clearance is passed to the pilot, and readback is received from the pilots. The gross result will be a reduction in number of errors and workload on both ATC and pilots, and enhanced flight safety."

Adds Dr Tse, "There is significant improvement in the frequency congestion problems during festive seasons since Hong Kong has implemented the PDC system. With more and more airlines participating in the scheme, the improvements are becoming increasingly

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apparent."

Why DCL via ACARS? The Swedish civil aviation authority, Luftfartsverket (LFV), which has also endorsed DCL, sums up the main arguments like this: "First of all we opted for DCL as most of the Eurocontrol member states have already agreed to install D-ATIS and DCL in accordance with the recommendations of the European Convergence and Implementation Plan, ECIP. Secondly, we wanted to reap the immediate benefits from a fully operational, rather than a trial datalink communication within an ATS environment.

Finally, the decision was prompted by airline demands as well, notably from SAS, which is of course our largest operator", says Johan Arvik, Project Manager at LFV, adding that a further crucial impetus was the wish to reduce workloads during peak hours, and minimize delays due to congestion on the VHF frequencies.

On a global scale, air traffic control centres currently deal with up to 100,000 flights per day with a growing need for additional capacity. Europe's major challenge is to develop an efficient transport system to handle three times as many flights in the next 20 years safely and securely whilst reducing delays to less than 15 minutes for 99 percent of all flights, as outlined in the EC-sponsored report "European Aeronautics: A vision for 2020."

Clearly, the need for automation of recurrent procedures, including clearance delivery and predeparture clearance, is poised to grow exponentially - or stress loads on ATC controller and aircraft pilots will climb to new heights, detrimental to all endeavours to enhance safety.

OptimisedDeparture Clearance/Pre-Departure Clearanceprocedurewith datalink Non-datalink departure clearance or pre-departure

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clearance procedures rely on radio-transmitted voice communication, comprising several read and read-back transmissions between airport ATC tower and aircraft to verify correct perception of the data, and eventual controller confirmation of the message. This lengthy process may be further delayed by e.g. radio frequency congestion jamming VHF communication.

With datalink, the pilot may enter his departure clearance request from 25 minutes prior to departure on Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) with flight plan, call sign, gate position, destination, and ATIS letter.

In response, the system automatically verifies the data for compliance between the flight plan and the data received from the aircraft.

Once this compliance has been established, an automated clearance message including all essential information such as Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and current ATIS letter is generated and transmitted to the cockpit. The pilot can read this information on his ACARS monitor screen or print it out for reference. This entire process, including pilot's read-back, and controller's confirmation, is fully automated, requiring no manual interference once the data match. If the system detects any discrepancy, however, the controller will automatically be alerted to take over the communication with the aircraft via radio frequency.

AJISNOLMET Datalink& Voice Forairportsof all sizes

Datalink& Voice Pre-Departure Clearance & DepartureClearance

lnfo11mation Support System ATC*ISS Forcentresandtowers

Systemarchitecture Ideally, a datalink predeparture clearance or a departure clearance (DPDC/DCL) solution comprises a main server and a hotstandby server. It interfaces with external data input and output sources including Flight Data Processing System (FDPS), Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM), ATIS input, strip printer, human machine interface (HMI), remote control and

25

Focus on CorporateMembers

monitoring (RCM), and datalink connection provided by datalink service providers such as SITA and ARINC. Based on COTS and an open-architecture, a DPDC/DCL solution can integrate seamlesslywith any third-party products without requiring an overhaul of the existing ATM infrastructure, and without any disruption to sustained operations.

The HMI is customisable to suit individual needs. An operator HMI may be configured to present both voice and datalink requests, allowing the controller to handle both types of clearance requests from a single screen. During the design phase, the user can define how the requests should be sorted out and presented on screen.

The D-PDC/DCL system serves aircraft which are in compliant with ACARS 623.

The latter provides the protocol to implement a datalink pre-departure clearance and departure clearance procedures.

A visibleoverview- evenduringtraffic peaks In daily operations at the airport tower, the D·PDC/DCL systematically presents the flight plans on, possibly, a touch-screen monitor with symbols to indicate when pilots request their flight plans via datalink. Another symbol will prove that the pilot has acknowledged the receipt of his flight plan. The clearance strip may be

automatically printed out once the pilot has acknowledged the receipt of the flight plan or by a touch on the screen by the controller as confirmation that the process has been successful. The strip then serves as the basis for the ATC controller's next step towards dispatching the aircraft.

Further automation may be achieved through 'e-strips' which eliminate printing of flight strips altogether. Either way, the D-PDC/DCL generates a visible overview.

The system can also be configured to automate flight table handling, thus further reducing the workload of the controller. As is customary in most cases, controllers have to manage the flight table manually, arranging the flight strips in order of departure schedule and status.

With D-PDC/DCL, it is possible to automatically sort out flight departure requests and present them in an orderly overview on-screen, such as classifying them into Requested List, Pending List, and/or Cleared Flight List. This saves the manual work and improves efficiency. The system can also be configured to automatically calculate Standard Instrument Departure (SID), and handle Calculated Take Off Time (CTOT) and ReClearance. Moreover, it maintains a log file, registering all event transactions. For utility control purposes, the system enables password accessto registered and authorised parties.

Cooperatingwith usersto granteasyand

fastimplementation While D-PDC/DCL systems implemented at airports are of course customised to suit individual customers' needs and preferences, the total project time does not necessarily reflect the level of sophistication. The premium products in the market build on COTS (commercial Automation via datalink offers significant benefits to customary clearancedelivery and pre-departure clearance procedures ( I)(' on VHF voice frequency

off-the-shelf) components also warranting well-tested performance, low procurement costs, and extensive track records.

Drawing on rich experience by the supplier of the system, implementing a D· PDC/DCL system at an airport does not entail an R&D effort, which should reflect positively in procurement costs.

According to Mr. Beck at Copenhagen Airport, the smooth implementation of D· PDC/DCL owed much to the fact that representatives of the ATC controllers were included, right from the outset, in the Danish Civil Aviation Authority's Naviair project team, which together with the provider designed its functionalities and layout, and made decisions on a range of issues in the process.

"The controllers felt at ease with the new system right from the start, and after a very short period of familiarisation, everyone was convinced of its inherent benefits. Its basic functionalities are so self-explaining that the basic introduction was actually provided by email to the controllers!" Mr. Beck said.

In total, less than one year was spent on the project, which took the form of a joint venture between the Danish Civil Aviation Authority, now Naviair, and its provider, Terma. Basically, the Naviair representatives formulated the systems requirements and specifications, while Terma undertook to develop the software needed, including securing the data link facilities comprising both ARINC and SITA communication facilities. In this process Terma optimised existing software by drawing on the experience from similar implementations performed in other international airports.

Since the mid-90s, Terma has implemented OPDC/DCL systems at many national and international airports all over the world.

Terma's O-PDC/DCL solutions are based on the recommendations and standards endorsed by /CAO and have been implemented, along with D-A TIS/VOLMET facilities, at major international airports in Europe and Asia.

Note 1 Departure Clearance (DCL) refers to the automated service through datalink for requesting and delivering departure information and clearance that follows ICAO's recommendation on read-back procedures. It provides a point-to-point communication between the aircrew and the ATC. The pilot sends the clearance request and receives the clearance information and delivery via ACARS, with the possibility to print the message out in the cockpit.

Note 2 Pre-Departure Clearance (PDC) refers to the way of giving the clearance via an airline host. An Air Traffic Service (ATS) issues a PDC and sends it to an airline host before departure. The airline host then sends the PDC to the aircraft when the latter is ready to receive it.

26

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ATCTraining Opinion ATC TRAINING: WHAT'S YOUR ROLE? Ray Curry Okay, call me an overzealous advocate of quality training, if you like. But I stand firm in my conviction that unless we in the ATC profession employ the best possible training practices and programs, we are endangering our customers just as effectively as if we haphazardly and randomly apply approved separation standards between aircraft.

Why? Think about it. Our skills, knowledge and attitudes begin and evolve through an ATC training program. The end result - our individual abilities and combined success - relies on the effectiveness of our initial and recurring training.

One of our fellow controllers in Oman recently e-mailed me and asked for advice regarding recurring training content for operational controllers. From the details he provided, they appear to have a very comprehensive and well thought out program. I did, however, suggest he look into the possibility of incorporating a lesson on effective training - from a trainer and trainee perspective. As I explained to him, it seems that the subject of training, though vital to every profession, suffers from a lack of exposure in operational settings.

I can't think of any other profession that requires more ongoing proficiency training than ATC. It seems that while we are not actively controlling aircraft or training others, we are undergoing additional training ourselves. Some of us have spent almost as much time controlling air traffic as we have training others to do so.

Others may be new to this under appreciated but vitally important aspect of ATC. Regardless of your personal experience within an ATC training program, as professionals we must remain active in and proficient with this critical facet of our career field.

As an ATC trainer we fulfil certain roles in the training process, each with its own responsibilities. These roles and responsibilities vary somewhat depending on where we teach-whether in the traditional classroom setting or in an operational setting.

TRADITIONALCLASSROOM In a traditional classroom we have at least

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six roles to fulfil. We are planners, instructors, leaders, counsellors, evaluators, and managers. While you review these roles separately, keep in mind that the effective trainer plays all of these roles during a single day. Together, these roles make up the ideal ATC trainer.

Planner.As a planner, we plan for various learning task accomplishments by our trainees and find out what the traineecentered objectives are for the lesson at hand. This aids us when we prepare questions and activities to guide the trainees' learning. Pay particular attention to the level of learning required of the trainees. If trainees must attain a basic knowledge level, a simple explanation may be in order. If, however, we expect trainees to learn and perform a skill, we might employ a demonstration followed by hands-on practice.

Consider the abilities and experiences of your trainees when planning a lesson. Try to foresee problems that might arise due to a trainee's lack of experience and plan to provide those trainees with extra help.

On the other hand, if you know that trainee is knowledgeable in an area you are about to teach, try to make use of that trainee's expertise.

Personalizing your lesson plan by adding notes of interest, voicing relevant anecdotes and questions spark student interest and encourages participation.

Remember, as planners, it is our responsibility to be fully prepared to instruct.

Instructor.As an ATC instructor, we are responsible for our trainees' learning. We must know our subject well. In addition to remaining familiar with relevant manuals, regulations, and trainee instructional materials, read the latest ATC journals and aviation trade magazines to stay current with changes in our career field.

Instructors present instruction through lectures, demonstrations, discussions, leading small groups, scheduling guest speakers, and assisting trainees.

Questioning your trainees helps determine how well they understand the lesson.

Through carefully planned questions, you can involve your trainees and encourage them to think about the subject. Respond

directly to your trainees' questions, either on the spot or in private. In our role as an instructor, we constantly interact with our trainees.

Leader.The leader role entails three important responsibilities. First, be a role model for your trainees. Many will consider your words and actions as examples to follow. Some may even try to emulate you. Thus, as a role model, you should always maintain a high standard of professional integrity in all of you undertakings. Second, guide your trainees through the instruction by managing discussions, providing exemplary demonstrations of techniques or equipment use, and showing them how to accomplish a task efficiently and effectively. Third, provide a positive atmosphere in which your trainees can learn. Your effective leadership promotes in your trainees a positive attitude toward their training.

Counsellor.As a counsellor, we help our trainees make adjustments to the learning environment. Advise trainees and refer them to an appropriate agency when necessary. To be an effective counsellor, observe your trainees' attitude and behaviour. The effective trainer understands their trainees, and the trainees understand their trainer.

Establish a helping relationship with each trainee. A helping relationship is one formed to help another individual. Make it a point to greet each trainee personally and offer your assistance frequently. If you suspect a problem, conduct a brief interview to determine if there is a problem, the source of the problem, and if needed, refer the trainee to an appropriate source of assistance.

Evaluator.In our role as an evaluator, we are responsible for determining whether our trainees have successfully achieved the objectives. Provide frequent feedback to your trainees to keep them informed of their progress throughout their training.

Areas of difficulty should be of particular conceri:, to you as an evaluator. Assist your trainees in correcting areas where they are experiencing difficulty and compliment them on things done well. Always encourage your trainees toward excellence!

You may be required to write test items.

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ATCTraining Opinion These should be constructed to duplicate the conditions, behaviour and standards called for by the objectives. When you administer tests or appraisals, thoroughly explain the testing procedures and make sure that all trainees have an equal opportunity to complete the test within an optimal testing environment. When you score tests, examine the results for high miss items and try to determine why those items were missed more than others.

Once the tests are scored and analysed, inform your trainees of their grades without delay and critique appropriate items. In your role as evaluator, you assess and inform your trainees of their progress in the training program.

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Manager. One of the functions of a manager is to monitor environmental factors such as temperature, lighting, equipment, and supplies to ensure an optimal learning environment. Another function is to maintain training records.

This includes progress checks, test results, and recording any counselling interviews on the appropriate forms. You must also manage your time to ensure the lessons move according to the training plan.

OPERATIONALTRAINING In the non-traditional classroom or operational environment, the instructor is not the primary source of information.

These are usually self-paced lessons where the primary source of information may be reading materials, computer-based instruction, training simulations or live training environments. Our role as a trainer changes somewhat in the nontraditional or operational classroom as we assume the roles of manager, counsellor, tutor, and evaluator rather than that of information-giver. These responsibilities are interrelated.

Manager. As in any classroom, the manager of a non-traditional learning environment must ensure that the physical facilities are adequate, enough supplies are available, equipment is operational, and records and reports are up-to-date.

The manager is challenged by the tasks associated with keeping track of the trainees' progress and assigning them appropriate learning objectives and materials. Managers make it all happen.

As a manager, you must focus your attention on the needs and progress of

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each individual trainee as well as on the "big picture" of the training environment as a whole.

Many trainers get discouraged with their management role. They think of themselves as paper-pushers and babysitters rather than trainers. This degrades their effectiveness. However, without skillful managers, your training program will not succeed in its goal of providing well-trained operational controllers.

Evaluator.By knowing each trainee's needs and progress, you ensure efficient progression and thorough learning.

Keeping up-to-date on your trainees' progress requires evaluation. Lesson appraisals and/or progress checks can help. Also, consider using pretexts to help you understand each trainee's strengths or weaknesses before assigning any learning tasks.

In addition to these measures, you need to intervene in the learning process to see how well each trainee is doing on a continuous basis. Some trainers hesitate at interrupting a trainee who is moving along well. Unless you involve yourself with each trainee's learning, you can't detect incomplete understanding. Ask questions frequently. Don't wait for the trainee to ask a question-some may be shy and fear ridicule.

Ask meaningful and purposeful questions-not just, "How's it going?"

Socrates taught by asking his pupils questions and then discussing their answers. Your questions and interest increases your trainees' motivation to learn and causes them to want to do just a little bit extra.

Your training program or plan may provide for alternate versions of various lessons.

Careful evaluation helps you choose which is most suitable for a particular trainee.

However, research indicates that trainees can comprehend very difficult material, given the time and motivation. So, direct your evaluations toward the time and amount of extra help each individual trainee might need.

Tutor. Try to understand each trainee's strengths and weaknesses and provide the necessary help to achieve success. Help them understand difficult concepts and

connections between various objectives.

You must play an active part in each trainee's learning experience. If a trainee asks you a question, don't simply send that trainee back to restudy the material.

Show some interest! Explain the material, point out the answer or connection, and show that you really care. Then, prescribe further readings, practice or whatever is necessary to achieve full understanding.

One of the major benefits of the nontraditional learning environment is that it offers the instructor more time with each individual trainee. Use that time efficiently and effectively!

Counsellor.Non-traditional instruction works best with self-motivated trainees.

Those who don't bring their own drive and initiative with .them must be encouraged. Many bright trainees work best independently. Some with lesser ability depend more on group identity and external motivation for achievement. Nontraditional learning environments lack a definite class of other trainees doing the same tasks at the same time and pace.

Some trainees in this setting may get overwhelmed and feel isolated.

Show your trainees the importance of the material they're studying or the tasks they're practicing. Point out how their success in training will lead to success in an operational setting. lnstill pride in our career field and its part in the overall aviation industry and global economy.

Challenge your trainees to succeed.

Above all, show that you care about them, that you expect 100 percent effort, and show that you have an interest in their success. Motivation is vital to success in any training environment but even more so in the operational setting.

To be an effective trainer you must understand and fulfil the various roles inherent to each learning environment. To be a professional, by definition, you must subscribe to a code of ethical behaviour and exemplify the highest standards of your profession. As air traffic controllers with the power and authority to make life and death decisions, we owe it to our customers to subscribe to the highest possible standards and safest practices. As professionals, we owe it to ourselves to be just as methodical with our training.

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ATCT1ai11 SATSA ATC Training and Simulation Clas Folin, Senior Adviser, Luftfartsverket, SATSA Recently, SATSA had two 270° visual aerodrome simulators installed. With these, the range of simulators is complete, and SATSA has modern simulators for all purposes necessary for the foreseeable

option is that consoles, panels, etc have to be changed as the operational environment changes, or the simulators will appear out-of-date. Operational equipment may also differ from unit to

equipment room was needed.

future. All simulators are PC-based, which facilitates upgrading and/or replacement, to keep the systems modern throughout their lifespan. Great care has been taken when designing the space in which the simulators are housed, thus providing instructors and students with not only state-of-the-art technical equipment, but also a pleasant learning environment.

Sufficient light, natural whenever possible, wooden floors and light colours all contribute to the airy feeling in the simulators.

unit, so the result will still be semi-real.

SATSA has chosen the second option, and experiences have shown that it has very little impact on the quality of training or the duration of on-the-job training, whether the simulator environment resembles the operational environment or not.

shortly be introduced in the training. Apart from the obvious use as aerodrome control trainers (2D or 3D), the simulators can also be used for training in radar approach control, simultaneously or separately. Great flexibility and easy preparation of new exercises and scenarios means that not only will the simulators be used for standard exercises in the standard fictitious aerodrome and airspace environment, but adaptation to any environment requested by a customer is a distinct possibility. It is estimated that, given the necessary background data, a new environment can be created in 2-4 man/weeks.

When installing new simulators, a choice that always has to be made is whether to design consoles and environment to look like their operational counterparts, or to focus on only the functionality and save money by using more or less standard office furniture. A problem with the first

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The range of simulators include the following:

TOR and TORA (TOwer and Radar simulator) The new 270° 3D visual TWR simulators have been christened TOR and TORA. They are housed in a part of the building that was originally occupied by equipment for the radar simulator then in use. With the new generation of simulators this area was available for other purposes, since no

The simulators were delivered by C-ITS (former CELL ITS), during the first half of 2002. They are now operational and will

The primary use of TOR and TORA will be for basic and advanced aerodrome control training, with or without the approach control function. Basic aerodrome control

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ATCTraining training is normally preceded by CBT training in phraseology and strip marking, to allow training in the TWR simulators to focus on handling traffic, not performing routine tasks.

The new simulators will also provide greatly improved possibilities for emergency training. The chain of events leading up to the final emergency situation can easily be included in an exercise and presented in a realistic way, thus allowing careful preparations for a situation known in detail to the instructors.

In addition to the use as trainers, TOR and TORA are designed with validation exercises in mind. Testing e.g. the effects of a new taxiway layout will be fully possible and all the necessary data can be recorded for analysis.

BERT(Basic Ethernet Radar Trainer) Occupying the space where once our original radar simulator was housed, BERT is a radar trainer mostly used for standalone basic radar training, even though networked, advanced APP/TMC and ACC training is fully possible. BERT has 20 student positions, each supported by 1-2 pseudo pilot/dummy positions. Normally the fictitious SATSA airspace is used, but again, it is fully feasible to use any other airspace a customer might prefer. This has been done e.g. for Ghana, with the entire FIR radar map created in BERT. A number of stand alone BERTsimulators are placed at Swedish ATC units for transition and refresher training, maintained with support from SATSA.

SMART (Simulator Multi role ATM Research and Training) The most advanced of the SATSA simulators, SMART, was delivered by Alenia-Marconi during 1999. It is housed in a new wing of the SATSA premises, partly because additional space was needed, partly because the old simulator had to remain operational while SMART was installed.

SMART comprises 28 multi role work stations, each of which can easily be configured as e.g. a pseudo pilot, student or supervisor position. Any combination is possible, from 13 students - 13 pseudo pilots in separate exercises, to complex situations where several sectors cooperate, supported by sufficient numbers of pseudo pilots and dummies.

All changes in the configuration,

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including communications, are easily performed from a supervisor position.

SMART is mainly used for APP/TMC and ACC training, following the basic radar training in BERT. An exercise can be displayed on a big screen (2 x 2 m) in an adjacent briefing room, either live or recorded, for feedback and discussions.

In addition to training of air traffic controllers, SMART is used for validation exercises as well. Facilities for review and analysis are excellent, allowing simulations of almost any type. Changes in airspace structure, sectorization, routes and even preferred taxi routes have been successfully tested, providing instant data indicating factors such as individual workload, flying time and fuel spent, thus enabling selection of the safest and most economical solution before implementation in a live environment.

Normally a full-scale, real-time simulation is preceded by a fast-time simulation in RAMS (Reorganized ATC Mathematical Simulator), to identify the most viable solutions before spending time and efforts on a full-scale simulation.

SMART can act as a stimulator to any other platform, capable of processing data in the ASTERIX format. Applications may include generation of a traffic flow displayed by e.g. PROVE and/or flight deck equipment, such as CDTI (Cockpit Display of Traffic Information) for delegation of ASAS (Airborne Separation Assurance System) tasks.

Validation exercises may include not only equipment available today, i.e. radar, but also that of tomorrow. Scenarios can be created where future applications of e.g.

ADS-B, ADS-C, or any combinations of these and radar, is simulated to provide the input. Such a validation exercise is planned for Mongolia, later this year. The goal of the simulation is to identify the best combination in this specific case, and in addition provide the basis for the development of necessary new rules and regulations.

Modesof instruction CBT is widely used to prepare students for especially basic exercises, in the early stages of training. Simulator and instructor time is too valuable to spend on learning routine tasks, such as strip marking, standard phraseology and procedures. Usually these tasks are first taught in the classroom, next students will practice in the CBT studio until they feel confident and only after this the actual training in simulators will commence. This will allow students to focus on solving problems and handling the traffic situation, without being overly burdened with trying to remember how to say and write the necessary instructions.

During exercises in the simulators, students are normally supervised by instructors on a 1 :1 ratio. However, during some stages of the radar training, it has been found that allowing students to practice without supervision approximately every third exercise creates a better understanding of the limits of the system and the student's own capability. The fact that the system saves instructor time as well, should be seen as a bonus and is not a primary goal in itself.

THECONTROLLER

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A SMALLEST AIRPORTS (2) ROST, NORWAY Philippe Domogala European Editor

Rost, Norway (ENRS) Maybe not the smallest in size but one of the most remote and atypical airports, Rost is an isolated island in the far south of the Lofoten group in Norway. It has 600 inhabitants, mostly fishermen and an 800m runway.

The place is roughly 80 Km from mainland and 80 Km from the closest island to the north. The place is extremely and totally

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flat (max altitude overall is 12 m) and surrounded by 360 smaller islands with no people on them but full of birds.

The island lives for fish. It is all about fishing, and if you do not like fish, avoid the place, as millions of cod are filleted and dried on wooden racks almost everywhere. The smell is as bad as you would expect!.

Rost is famous in Italy and in Norway for

what happened here over 600 years ago.

A Venetian explorer named Pietro Querini on a trip from Crete to Brugge in Belgium, met a storm along the way that broke its rudder and after drifting in mid-Atlantic for 2 months, ended up crashing on one of the small deserted islands around Rost.

The survivors were found and taken to Rost where they spent the winter of 1432 in the care of the local people. When Spring came they went to Trondheim and made their journey back to Italy. This Italian "encounter of the third kind" left some (genetic) marks on the Island and the encounter is at least today economically and touristically exploited.

Most of the dry cod fillets caught in Rost end up in Italy . ( That the fish heads are sent to Nigeria to be processed as "fish soup" is not so well advertised!)

For years the only way to reach this remote island was by ship during the summer months. Then came the helicopter from around 1970, which changed the life of the people there. But in 1986 a landing strip was built and Rost got its own airport. Two scheduled flights a day, using a Dash8, linking them with the mainland and the rest of the Lofoten Islands followed. Sometimes, because of the bad weather around, (the wind here is on average 15 Kts , the worst noted was 70 Kts ) some days are without flights. Other than these, only about 60 flights visit the island every year, mostly ambulance flights. Last year the grand

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Air orts total was just over 600 flights for the whole year.

The place is not really a tourist attraction as average temperature in the Summer is between 10 and 12 degrees C and the other islands in the North offer much more dramatic landscape than Rost.

Why go there then? Well, just because I like small, funny, airports.

This one also has some nice features; for instance the garbage dump is located on the far side of the runway, and every morning a queue of garbage trucks waits to cross the runway. Why, when there are no aeroplanes coming for the next 10 hours anyway ? Because the location of the VOR/DME is also close to the dump.

As the access road passes less than 100 metres from the antennas, whena truck passesso close to it, the automatic monitoring system detects an error and automatically shuts down the VOR. The half-·technician ( see below) has then to go to the site, run some tests and starts the VOR again. This is the reason why

they all wait in a queue and go to the dump all together.

A nice caution note is also printed on the Jeppersen APP chart: "Caution : there might be vehicles, sheep or birds on the Runway ". In fact most of the sheep run freely around but so far have managed to avoid aeroplanes. To run this airport there are 2 AFIS operators and one half AFIS/halfTechnician. the airport is open 12 hours a day. Rest on PPR.

2 aircraft per day keep the doctor away, as I remember my old radar instructor saying in the good old days!

If your area has a similar very small airport, let me know: we can talk about it!

One of the AFIS operators is British.

Steven, a biologist who 'discovered' the island while doing a project. He was sent there years ago by his university, he loved the place and decided to stay. His first job was on the fisheries before working on the helipad . When the runway was built and the local airline Wideroe started to fly there he became their handling agent.

Later, when the TWR was built and AFIS started, he applied for it and became the first AFIS operator in Rost.

In his free time he studies birds and goes... fishing.

Continued from page 18 do not make sense. For example, an aircraft given a clearance to land when the pilot requested a low approach will question the controller and ask for confirmation.

While focusing on the major challenges, Adacel did not forget the details that, when combined with state-of-the-art visuals and voice recognition, produce that sense of total immersion in the virtual world. The TSS is equipped with environmental sound effects such as aircraft sounds, howling winds, thunder and explosions. Multiple synthesized pilot voices represent the latest in synthetic speech technology and when they are combined with Adacel's ability to mix synthetic voice transmissions with varying levels and types of cockpit background noise (all cued to the type of aircraft), the result is a truly immersive and engaging simulation environment. Pilot speech accelerates as the traffic levels increase and the contents of the transmission are automatically abbreviated. The voices for fast jets talk faster than those associated with a Cessna 172. Finally, the tower environment itself contains all of the tools familiar to the USAF controller, e.g., tower radar, light guns, and crash phones, etc.

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Summary

The TSS program will have a major impact upon controller training within the Air Force. The TSSwill permit a newly arrived airman to complete facility training in a shorter timeframe since time will not pass waiting for necessary training conditions.

The TSS will also assist experienced controllers in retaining and refining skills even when overseas commitments reduce local traffic (due to base aircraft deployments) for many months.

Traditionally an airman arriving at a new base would spend many hours waiting for suitable traffic conditions to practice basic skills. During this time, a valuable, fully qualified controller monitored his or her every move. Ultimately it is impractical to wait for every possible traffic situation before qualifying a controller to "go it alone". The TSS gives each base the opportunity to maximize training time.

Traffic loads, situations and emergencies can be created and practiced until they become second nature. Complex air and ground traffic situations can be produced at will and the TSS produces a training environment so believable that the transition to "live traffic" becomes almost seamless.

All of this advanced capability would be of little use were the simulator not simple to use. Adacel has designed the system so that it can be operated by a single student working alone and with minimal training.

The system even has the capability to teach the student through its advanced text to speech event system. As the scenario is running the synthetic voice can provide guidance and solutions to the novice controller by talking the student through the scenario. When the student is comfortable the scenario can be re-run without assistance.

In what have become difficult times for the world's military forces, the USAF has taken a visionary step in addressing its manpower shortages and its readiness to defend its people. The TSS will take air traffic control training to the next level and ensure that it continues to provide safe and expeditious air traffic services 'to its pilots. '

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Charlie's Column ENGINEERSTORY: The optimist says the glass is half full.

The pessimist says it's half empty, The engineer says the size of the glass is not meeting the requirements to hold the specified amount of fluid and must have been designed by a real jerk but has a potential for optimisation.

flight to Miami. To close your seatbelt put one piece into the other. If you cannot do this you probably should not be here left on your own unsupervised. In case the pressure inside the cabin drops, Oxygen masks will drop as well. Pull one and try to breathe normally. If you have a small child travelling with you, attend the child first. If you travel with two children, decide now which one you love the most ..

BESTLOG BOOKENTRYOF THE YEAR: The following is a true entry into one of the Log Books in a major Air Traffic Control centre in Europe: "Time 1420. I have asked the military for approval to proceed with ABC123 from AAA direct to BBB. The answer was negative but due to unknown reasons I heard affirmative and the traffic was cleared direct. Now they are complaining. "

GONE ON HOLIDAYS This one is so good that I put in here verbatim from AvWeb: An SAS airliner arrived near its destination airport to find that no one was manning the tower. It turned out that the controller had failed to return from vacation, and no one had noticed that the tower was not staffed. The flight carrying 30 passengersfrom Stockholm was left to circle the airport last August at the Kristianstad airport while central traffic authorities called in another controller. Apparently, the originally scheduled controller was on vacation but mixed up his scheduled return date ...

HOOTERSAIR I read here that the founder of Hooter's restaurants in the US is thinking about buying Vanguard airlines ( a US company just bankrupt) to start his own. So far Hooter's restaurants are known for the size of the infant-feeding appendages and the tight Tshirts of their waiters. Normally one does not go to Hooter's for the food. I wonder if the same concept will go for the airline.

Travel agent: Where do you want to go Sir? Passenger: Don't care as long as it is with Hooter's airline !

The advertising slogan could be : With Hooter's, the flight will seem shorter !

AUTOMATION OF ATC Ever heard of Automatic air traffic control? or the old plans of the MITRE Corporation in the USA called AERA 37 or of those of the old professor/General Director in Eurocontrol Bretigny called ARC 20007 No controllers; only computers talking to each other. Well, they all failed miserably years ago for various reasons having to do with not increasing capacity if I remember rightly. Now the idea is apparently resurfacing in Norway where the following sign can be found near Tronheim airport ( see photo ) OK, it is only on the access road to the airport, and yes it only means the local policemen are now replaced by speed radars and traffic lights .. But I tell you, this is only the beginning of the global plan! ...

ONE MORECOW KILLED Once again, a poor cow has been the victim of an air strike. If you remember this incredible story some years ago, (described in a previous CHARLIE) where some Russian soldiers threw a wild cow off their aircraft above the sea at 10.000 ft, and by bad luck the poor animal landed on a Japanesefishing vessel, killing herself and a sailor. Well, this time another animal has been killed

by a Fokker 100, while the poor animal was eating on its own field.

The Brazilian TAM aircraft found itself without fuel some 60 nms short of its destination, and the pilot elected to make an emergency landing in a field (see photo) only minor injuries to the passengers, but unfortunately a poor cow was killed in the accident (and caused most of the damage to the F100.)

SOMETHINGNASTYAT THE BOTTOM OF THE GARDEN

OVERHEARDON THE PA : Ladies and Gentlemen welcome on board this Southwest airlines

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THE CONTROLLER

Airports Spotlight-Hong Kong

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