IFATCA The Controller - 4th Quarter 1983

ISSN 0010-8073

JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS' ASSOCIATIONS

4/83 BERN. SWITZERLAND

4TH QUARTER 1983

VOLUME 22

SFrs 5.-

IFATCA '84 23rd ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS' ASSOCIATIONS

ESTORIL -

PORTUGAL -

MARCH 26/30 -

1984

IFATCA JOURNAL OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

THE CONTROLLER Volume 22 • No. 4

Bern, Switzerland, December 1983

Publisher: International Federation of Air Traff,c Controllers· Associations. P.O. Box 196. CH- 1 21 5 Geneva 15 Airport. Switzerland Officers of IFATCA: HH. Henschler. President. Lex Hendriks. Vice-President (Technical). E. Sermijn. VicePresident (Professional}. I. Finlay. Vice-President (Administration). B. Grezet. Treasurer. P. O'Doherty, Executive Secretary Editor: A. Avgouslis 5 Athens Str. Ayios Dhometios Nicosia. Cyprus Telephone (021) 4 87 86 Management and Advertising Sales Office: The Controller. P.O. Box 196.

CH-1 215 Geneva 15 Airport. Switzerland H.U. Heim. Subscriptions and Publicity.

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Telephone (031) 25 66 55 Subscriptions and Advertising Payments to: IFATCA/The Controller, Union de Banques Suisses P.O. Box 237 CH-121 5 Geneva Airport, Switzerland Acc. No. 602 254.MD L Subscription Rate: SFrs. 8.- per annum for members of IFATCA: SFrs 20.- per annum for non-members (P & P will be charged extra).

The Maastricht system for air traffic control. called 'Maastricht Automatic Data Processing· (MA OAP)

Contributors are expressing their personal points of view and opinions. which may not necessarily coincide with those of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Association (IFATCA).

I FATCA does not assume responsibility for statements made and opinions expressed, it does only accept responsibility for publishing these contributions.

Contributions are welcome as are comments and criticism. No payment can be made for manuscripts submitted for publication in 'The Controller'. The Editor reserves the right to make any editorial changes in manuscripts. which he believ.eswill improve the material without altering the intended meaning.

Written permission by the Editor is necessary for reprinting any part of this Journal.

Contents Advertisers in this issue: IFATCA '84. Ferranti, Philips. Selenia Photos: AA, Archives. Hiro Tade Cartoons: Martin Germans

Increasing Airlines· Responsibilities- by A. Avgoustis International Aspects of ATC Liability-by R. Bootsma Newsbriefs The Choice ofTechnology in ATC Radars-by H.W. Cole Things Do Break or: Life-Cycle Cost- by P. Jorgensen ASR-9-byK.J. HawmanandG.G. Clark

2 5 10 21 24

28

Increasing Airlines' Liabilities

by A. Avgoustis

Air travel has become a most important. if not the most important. means of transportation today. No one can imagine the world without air travel let alone the catastrophic consequences that may develop to the international community. should such an eventuality materialize.

It is beyond my purpose to examine in any detail or touch upon the advantages or disadvantages which air travel may have on the economy or otherwise of any particular state. but rather. to examine the increased responsibilities of the aircraft carrier towards its passengers.

Because of the great number of industry-related cases and space limitations. I do not intend to explore all such cases and enter into the ramifications of court decisions. but will focus my attention upon two areas which deal with responsibilities of the air carrier beyond the confines of the aircraft. - The effects of overbooking of flights and of accidents that occur before passengers board or after they leave the aircraft.

I am positive that there is no one reading this article who has not travelled by air either on business or for pleasure. I wonder however how many had bothered to look at the conditions of contract printed on the inside pages of the ticket purchased for the purpose. Despite the limitations that are printed in this contract I shall explain to you instances by which air carriers have been found to be liable and give you some further examples of the increased liabilities under the Warsaw Convention.

With this I would like first to examine overbookings made by air carriers on their aircraft.

We have all become aware during the past few years. and in particular during the summer months of airline overbooking reservations.

There seems to be some freedom on passengers in making. changing and honoring their airline reservations.

This flexibility has created the problem 2

of 'no-shows·. that is people who failed to cancel or honor their reservations. What ·overbooking· attempts to do is to neutralize the no-shows by accepting a surplus of reservations to replace the vacancies created by this flexible system of reservations. But what happens if more reservations turn up at the check-in counter at the airport terminal? Naturally some people will have to be refused boarding or will be 'bumped'. Such bump-

I

ing obviously irritates and inconveniences the air traveller.

Despite this. overbooking has been determined by the air carriers to be the only practical method of combating no-shows. while preserving the flexible reservation system without any financial obligations on the passenger and assuring economic stability of the earner.

The legality. however. of overbooking has to be examined before we

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come up with the obligations of the carrier towards the passenger.

The American Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the American courts have concluded that overbooking benefits the public and does not constitute a deceptive trade practice. If the carrier could not replace the vacancies created by the no-shows then the passenger would be required to pay higher fares or pay penalty for not honoring the reservation.

Because of the fact that in most countries no rules have been established we are to assume that existing principles in other countries will also apply in our case. The American CAB requires carriers to establish priorities for boarding passengers. Such priorities may be considered in accordance with the time and date of the booking or arrival at the check-in counter. Once a passenger has been bumped. the airline must offer adequate alternatives (another convenient flight or tender the passenger compensation) referred to as Denied Boarding Compensation.

The passenger may not be eligible for compensation if the airline offers him alternative air transportation which will take him to destination (for internal flights) not later than 2 hours from original time and 4 hours for international flights.

In order to entitle such a passenger for any such compensation. he must have fulfilled all the requirements of the airline. that is ticketing. check-in and reconfirmation procedures. Despite the fact that courts have held that overbooking is not a deceptive trade practice passengers may refuse denied boardif")g compensation and claim on the cause of discrimination ·or infringement of the priority rules.

In the American case of Nader vs.

Allegheny Airlines. Nader was entitled to claim both for denied boarding compensation and also for punitive damages. A charitable organization was also permitted punitive damages for losses in charities as a result of the inability of Nader to attend their meeting. In another case. Mason vs. Belieu. the wife of a bumped passenger was entitled to receive compensation for emotional distress when she was not given an explanation of her husband's non-arrival by the expected flight.

These and other cases indicate that the rights of the passengers to claim compensation for being bumped do not arise as a result of breach of contract by the carrier but as a result of the tort of discrimination. We have also seen that in some cases the carriers are liable to third parties even though they are not ticket holders.

4

Accidents It is. I believe. now time to come to the responsibilities of the carriers towards its passengers in cases of accidents where they are not even near the aircraft and how the provisions of the Warsaw Convention are interpreted by the courts.

The interpretation of this article is best illustrated by the recent case of Kalliopi Evangelinos vs. TWA. In this case Mrs. Evangelinos received injuries while standing in line for a security check (bag and physical search) in the Athens International Airport transit lounge before going through to the tarmac and entering a bus to take her to the aircraft. One may recall the case when a few years ago two terrorists threw hand grenades and fired bulletshots into the crowd. It was held by the courts that she could recover damages under Article 1 7 of the Convention. The courts ruled that passengers at an airport transit lounge assemble to undergo a search are considered to be •in the operation of embarking.· In Upton vs. Iran National airlines. though passengers checked In. weighed their luggage and received seat tags they were not in the process of embarking while in the public waiting area of the airport. In this case the passengers were injured when the roof of the terminal building collapsed on them.

In Hussel vs. Swiss Air Transport. hijacking was considered by the courts as an accident coming under the Convention. In conclusion to this latter area. it must however be emphasised that the air carrier owes to the passenger a higher degree of care than other means of transport. This does not mean that the carrier is an insurer of the passenger's welfare.

Recovery can only be made on the basis of negligence.

In the former area. on the other hand. overbooking seems to be the only solution to the problem of noshows. Several other methods have been tried unsuccessfully like the Leisure Class of Eastern Airlines or conditional reservation holders.

Businessmen would like to travel on a flight on which there is some form of guaranteed seating. but airlines on the other hand would not dare lose money on vacant seats. It appears that the majority fav9r the present system yet the fears of being bumped unexpectedly and jeopardized plans are always there. It is imperative that the carriers should come up with a system by which passengers would be guaranteed boarding and of course. for their sake. avoid the risk of no-shows.

Ian M.S. Finlay, the new V.P. Administration of IFATCA Joined the UK National Air Traffic Services in 7965 as an A TCO Cadet.

Completed training in 7968 having gained an A TC licence with ratings for aerodrome. approach, approach radar, area and area radar. During the training period, as well as courses at the College of A TC Bournemouth, was posted to Heathrow, Stanstead, Gatwick. Prestwick. London and Preston Area Centres and associated radar units.

Following completion of training was posted to Heathrow until 79 76.

From 79 76 to present date works at London Area Centre as a terminal and sector radar controller as well as flow control duties. During the latter years at Heathrow and presently at London Centre is one of a number of watch training instructors, which involves the 'on-the-job· validation training of newly rated and experienced A TCOs. For the past three years. in addition to the operational tasks. has been a member of a small team of operational controllers who are involved in the initial selection interviewing of air traffic control officer cadets for the UK Civil Aviation Authority.

Joined the UK Guild in 796 7 and in 79 72 became secretary of the London Region. Since that time has held the following posts within the Guild.

President - London Region. membership secretary. assistant treasurer. regional councillor and director administration. Was also the conference manager for Convex 76 and Convex 80 (the UK Guild's Biennial Conference/ Technical Forum/ Exhibition).

Has been a member of IFA TCA SC I for the past seven years and has represented IFATCA on the IFALPA Air Traffic Services Study Group and at various International Conferences.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL LIABILITY

BY R. BOOTSMA

Part IV (Final) 2.5.5 Shift of Responsibility?

In 1975 the District Court for the Middle District of Florida gave a decision which constituted a departure from the fourth standard of American Airlines v. United States. Todd was flying in accordance with an IFR clearance to cruise at 4000 ft over mountainous terrain. which clearance allowed him to descend from that altitude at any convenient time. ATC failed to inform Todd that the mountains were obscured by weather. The aircraft collided with the mountains at 21 00 ft. while descending on a direct course to the alternative destination.

In Todd v. United States 77 the court concluded that the clearance constituted negligence on the part of ATC because it was not reasonably designed to ensure the aircraft's safety. The court found this liability without answering the question whether the pilot was aware or in the exercise of reasonable care should

75

15 77

78

79

80 81

have been aware of the weather-obscured mountains and by adding a fifth standard of duty to the four delineated in American Airlines v. United States: 'Determined by the facts of the case. due care requires an air traffic controller to issue clearances in accordance with FAA manuals and over and beyond the requirements of the manual the clearances issued must be reasonably designed to ensure the safety of aircraft flight.· Some authors contend that this standard definitely takes the primary responsibility for the operation of the aircraft away from the pilot and places it on ATC78 . Yet. I doubt whether this inference may be drawn. Both Todd v.

United States and American Airlines v.

United States were IFR cases and in both decisions the pilot was held directly responsible for the operation of the aircraft and in establishing the standards of duty no distinction was made between IFR and VFR situations. One has to interrelate the fifth standard with the duties imposed upon the pilot by the first and second

standard. Doing this I come to the conclusion that the fifth standard does not take away the primary responsibility from the pilot. but places a more accurately delineated responsibility on the air traffic controller. The fifth standard allows for the departure of the fourth standard and does extend air traffic controllers· liability; even when the danger is apparent to the pilot. the air traffic controller has to see to it that clearances are reasonably designed to ensure the safety of aircraft flight. That the application of the fifth standard will lead to a different result can be illustrated by applying the Toddstandard to two recent VFR cases.

In Coatney v. Berkshire 79 the court reasoned that under VF R conditions the primary responsibility rests with the pilot. regardless of the traffic clearance and that both pilots could have avoided the accident by maintaining a proper look-out. In Hamilton v. United States 80 the court found no liability on the part of ATC and considered that the pilot flying in accordance with VFR is often in a better position to view other aircraft than the air traffic controller. Applying the fifth standard to the factual situations of both cases a court might reason that the clearance was not reasonably designed to ensure the safety of aircraft flight and hold ATC liable. despite the fact that the pilot was aware of the danger and could have avoided the collision. The fact that Todd. in the exercise of reasonable care. should have been aware of the proximity of the mountains constituted contributory negligence and precluded recovery. as contributory negligence is a complete defence in the State of Alabama. However. if the Todd case had taken place in a State that applies the doctrine of comparative negligence. the survivors would have been able to recover a portion of the loss81 .

3 International

Regulation?

The air traffic control system is designed to ensure the safe operation of aircraft flight. The ultimate aim of ATC

333F.Supp. 327(£.0. La. 7977).

333 F.Supp. 870(N.D. Tex. 7977).

384 F.Supp. 7284 (MD. Fla. 7975).

M.A. Grossman: ATC liability. Journal of Air Law and Commerce. 79 75. p. 54 7. and M. Horwitz: Who is in charge: ATC or the Pilot? Aviation Research Journal. 79 78. p. 6 7.

500 F. 2d 290 (8th Cir. 79 74).

497 F2d 370 (9th Cir. 7974).

Application of the comparative negligence rule is illustrated in Mattschei v. United States. 600 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 79 79). where the court apportioned liability and held ATC 30% liable. In Rude/son v. United States. 602 F.2d 7326 (9th Cir. 79 79) the court reasoned that ATC was 20% liable for the accident because the controller failed to scan a particular area of the traffic during the two minutes immediately before the collision.

5

is to prevent damages. But damages do occur and a great deal of them have been ascribed to 'human error' 82 . The damages resulting from a collision have to be compensated for and the question arises to what extent ATC will be liable and whether unification of rules in this area of law is desirable.

3.1 Expansion of the Responsibilities of ATC Methods of aircraft operations have changed. High closing speeds and the limited vision obtainable from the window of modern jet aircraft restrict severely the ability of the pilot to keep a look-out 83 . A pilot needs at least 25 seconds to see and react so as to avoid a collision. This time is no longer available and therefore it is not practical to fly in accordance with VFR. Traffic levels have increased immensely; speed of operations and the variety in performances of aircraft operating in relatively small areas make it more difficult for the pilot to assess the situation. It was inevitable that control methods and procedures had to be modified so as to permit more aircraft to operate within the same area.

Technological improvements allowed an increase of the functions performed by ATC. The air traffic controller is provided with more information at an earlier time and this information is more accurate than ever before 8~.

The duty of the air traffic controller is to assist the pilot to effect a safe conduct of flight and in order to maintain safety levels the pilot must rely to a larger extent on the instructions given by the air traffic controller.

Consequently, the air traffic controller has to accept more reponsibilities when the pilot is more dependent on ATC.

82

83 84

85 86

87 88 89 90 91

92 93

6

3.2 The Essential Link Between Pilot and ATC ATC provides instructions, advice or information to pilots through the medium of radiotelephony. The use of radar has increased the capacity of the ATC system and offers the possibility to reduce the separation between aircraft. As a direct consequence in high density areas safe separation can only be ensured for a relatively short period of time and consequently any break in the radio communication can be potentially serious. Any deviation from standard phraseology may entail misinterpretation and the use of languages other than English may impair safety 85 . In the interests of safety both pilots and controllers have to adhere to standard phraseology to preclude ambiguity 86 .

3.3 Delimitation of Responsibilities In 1967 Winn concluded that there would possibly be a need for complete revision of the doctrine that the primary responsibility for the operation of the aircraft is on the shoulders of the pilot and to date it has become a burning question 87 . The regulation of most national laws that air traffic control clearances are to be complied with seems to be inconsistent with the directions of Annex 2 88 which place the ultimate responsibility for the safety of an aircraft on the pilot-incommand. The term 'primary responsibility' gives cause for error and there is a need to delimit the duties of pilots and air traffic controllers by means of international regulation. In 2 .4. 2. I rei'lsoned that very few accidents happen from a single cause; almost invariably they result from the interaction of a multiplicity of causes. In my view there is no place for a 'primary responsibility'; rather each party has to accept certain responsibilities,

which vary relative to the particular fact situation. Both the pilot and the air traffic controller have a duty toward each other and they have to rely on each other; the relationship between pilot and ATC is characterized by dependency. In Neff v. United States 89 the court had a similar point of view and reasoned that • ... the captain has the final and ultimate responsibility.

He is, however, in constant contact with ground and guided by the Governmental control facilities ...

There is a close working relationship between the Governmental operated tower. control centres and weather facilities on the one hand. and the crew on the other. The responsibility is mutual and coordinated at all times.

Each however. has superior knowledge in some respects over the other.

The crew knows the condition of the aircraft, its capabilities and must deal with the unexpected in flight. The tower. in this age of electronics, has the superior knowledge and capability where questions of air traffic control ... are involved ... • From this it follows that. dependent on the circumstances. the standard of care expected from the air traffic controller could be more onerous than for the pilot-in-command. It is recommendable to amend Annex 2 and to delineate the responsibilities of the pilot and the air traffic controller.

When doing so the standards of duty as defined in American Airlines v.

United States 90 and Todd v. United States 91 can serve as a rule of conduct. The pilot-in-command will have the final authority and the air traffic controller has a duty to take reasonable care to give all such instructions and advice as may be necessary to promote the safety of aircraft 92 . It leaves the possibility to reach a just and equitable apportionment of responsibility 93 .

That A TC might be involved becomes evident from the preliminary investigation concerning the mid-air collision over Nantes on March 5, 79 73, where an air traffic controller gave an instruction to the Coronado pilot, which could not possibly be carried out (the aircraft had to lose 6 minutes over a distance which would take 76 minutes flying time at normal speed).

R. Hurst: Pilot error, 79 76, p. 748.

P. P. Flynn: Air traffic control. technology and law, Transportation Law Journal, 79 70, p. 26 7.

A.A. van Wijk: McGill Proceedings, November 7 7- 79, 79 76, Thesis No. 3. p. 74 7.

Two examples by way of illustration. The Tenerife disaster in 79 7 7 shows that an instruction can be misunderstood by using ambiguous terminology. From the preliminary investigation concerning the collision between a DC-9 and a Coronado over Nantes on March 5, 79 73 it appears that the military controller had not used the right terms when transferring the Coronado to another frequency and the instructions were not understood.

J. T. Winn: Government liability, air traffic controllers, duty of care, Journal of Air Law and Commerce, 796 7, p. 790.

See 7.5.

420 F.2d 7 75 (D. C. Cir. 7968).

4 78 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 7969).

384 F.Supp. 7284 (MD. Fla. 7975).

See 2. 3. 2 under c.

See 2.4.2.

3.4 Instructions, Are They Merely Advice?

The Netherlands' Aviation Board conceives instructions as advice 94 .

This conception is incorrect and contradictory to the regulation that air traffic control clearances are to be complied with 95 . In addition, it has to be recognized that the pilot has no possibility to verify the instructions or information received and that he has to rely on the services provided by ATC. Moreover, even when merely providing advice, the air traffic controller has a duty to take reasonable care 96 .

The Aviation Board does not preclude that the pilot-in-command is not to be blamed, when complying with incorrect instructions. In my opinion this may involve liability of ATC. as ATC undertakes to do something on which another person relies97 . In 1940 the Dutch Supreme Court gave a decision in which it was established that the Government in discharging its obligations may use discretion dependent on the nature of the task and the circumstances under which that task has to be accomplished 98 . In regard to air traffic control one may reason that the decision to provide air traffic control services is discretionary, but when it has been decided to render these services, ATC may not exercise the same discretion in giving instructions to the pilot 99 .

Under certain circumstances air traffic control will be held liable for its negligent acts and from the finding of the Supreme Court in the Miletic case one may conclude that the judge will apply the standard of due care and award a claim, based on tort 100 .

3.5 Influence of the Computer The growth of air traffic necessitated the installation and utilization of automated equipment, so as to increase the capacity of the ATC system and to improve the service available and the reliability of that service. The air traffic controller has to make effici-

The Board~s.

Viewpoint:

and the possibility exists that he has to apply other procedures 102 and/or impose restrictions, as he should not accept conditions which may impair safety. The controller should be highly suspicious and reject information if necessary. In this context it may be argued that the air traffic controller. in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been aware of the fact that the information was incorrect and ATC may be held at fault. However. frequently it may be impossible to determine that the information is incorrect. which is a motive for lawyers to propose a system of absolute liability.

The Executive 'Board.of the Feder,ation has issued the following . staterrJent regarding, R, Bootsma 's ariicJe on 'International Aspects of Air T,raffic.Contr.olLiability': The Executive Board of IFATCA having studied the thesis on the •• "International Aspects oM'ir Traffic ' .Control Liability", _by R. Bootsma whilst a student at law. finds that a . number· of statements contained :therein are in dir_ecteonflict with various /FA TCA polic,ies and possibly in some cases maybe viewed 3.6 Strike to be in conflict with .the laws of On August 3. 1981. approximately concerned states. • 12 000 air traffic controllers in the · Any conclusions drawn from or ; United States went on strike and thus 1 imimated by the· a.rticle must be H aimed to put pressure on the Govern·consi0ered • to b~ , tbe personal ment in order to achieve a salary inviews of Mr. Boots,mamade during ~ crease and improved working conthe preparation an& research of his ditions. All controllers were dismissed .thesis whilst a student at law. at once. Damage was done, among 'Any statements and co_nclusions others, to the international air carriers . . Jn the article do not necessarily,cowhich shows that the question. incide with t~e .views or haye the whether a Government can be held endorsement of the Federation.· liable for damages resulting from a strike or similar actions, is of current interest. From art. 28a of the Chicago ent use of the information provided by Convention it follows that each conthe machine and arrive at correct de- tracting State has the obligation to cisions so as to facilitate aviation and render air traffic services. The provision of safety to air traffic is a public maximize safety 101 .

In doing so. it should be borne in task, characterized by continuity and regularity, and in addition ATC has a mind that the equipment of which the controller avails himself, including the duty to protect the financial and computer, is designed to assist the air economic interests of the internation103 traffic controller in the performance of al airlines . It is not justified to fight out labour conflicts with means which his tasks. The machine will not relieve the air traffic controller of his respon- interfere with these obligations 104 . Air sibilities, but provides ATC with more traffic control is provided in the public accurate information at more regular interest and does not aim at profit; intervals. We can now think of a situ- therefore it should not be subject to ation where the computer fails to pro- sudden stoppages or any interruption. vide the controller with the correct information. This potentially leads to a 3. 7 Unification of Rules Relating to degradation of safety as capacity has ATC Liability decreased. The air traffic controller. in In 1967 a substantial majority of his decision-making role. should be States had expressed themselves in aware of the limitations of the system favour of the establishment of inter-

94

See 2. 7.6.

Art. 4 7.4 LVR 7980.

See 3.3 97 Compare with the 'Good Samaritan· doctrine: if A TC undertakes a practice that engenders reliance. it has the duty to continue that practice with due care (2. 5. 3).

98 HR 29-03- 7940. NJ 7940, No. 7 728.

99 Compare Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co.. 227 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 7955).

100 HR 2 7-03- 79 75. NJ 79 75. No. 4 70: The Court considered that 'the nature of the activities entailed that one had to take into account the interests of the parties concerned, within the limits of reasonableness. • 101 P.P. Flynn: Air traffic control, technology and law. Transportation Law Journal. 79 70. p. 26 7.

102 The type of A TC-service. procedural or radar, is related to the volume of traffic.

103 See 2. 7.5 and 2.2.3; BGH 76-06-7977.

NJW 7977. p. 7875.

104 BGH 31-0 7-79 78, NJW 79 78, p. 8 76.

95 96

7

national rules relating to the liability of ATC agencies 105. It was recognized that a relationship existed between such rules and the existing private air law conventions and it was concluded that the system of liability should be based on proof of fault. The question can be posed whether it is still desirable to unify the rules in this area of air law.

3. 7.1 Connection with Other Conventions on Civil Aviation Liability

The outstanding progress in aviation necessarily entails that the rules of law have to be adapted to the permanent changes in the field of air navigation. A good example of this need is the Warsaw Convention of October 1 2. 1929. which was modified several times 106. The developments with regard to the air carrier's liability implied a shift from a liability based on fault to a strict liability and a remarkable increase in the ceiling of the indemnities to be paid by the carrier. The Guatemala Protocol and the 4th Additional Protocol of Montreal. which would introduce this strict liability of the air carrier. have not yet entered into force. mainly as a result of the divergence of interests between the industrial states and the developing countries.

Presently ICAO is working on draft conventions related to aerial collisions and liability of air traffic control agencies. However, it can be doubted whether the coexistence of various systems of liability regarding air carriage is desirable and one can also be in doubt as to the desirability of a separate convention related to the liability of air traffic control agencies. From the material covered in chapter 2 it appears that Governments may be held liable for negligent acts of the air traffic controller. This liability is based on fault and the noted developments give rise to conclude that one can arrive at just decisions with a flexible judicial system which has the possibility to apportion responsibility. according to each party· s relative departure from his duty of care and dependent on the factual situation. It is worthwhile to explore an alternative as proposed by Guldimann in 1980 107. It was suggested to consolidate all relevant liability relations into one convention which would channel them exclusively on the operator of the aircraft. the latter being entitled to bring recourse actions against others who contributed to the cause of the accident (manufacturers. air traffic control agencies. airport operators, etc.).

Such a system would be in the interest of claimants. as they would not have

to seek out other potential defendants and the plaintiff would not be faced with a potentially insolvent defendant in those cases where third parties contributed to the accident.

The question concerning limitation of ATC liability needs no further consideration if such a system would apply1oa_The liability of the operator is limited and in a recourse action against air traffic control. the operator can only claim a compensation. which may not exceed the indemnification paid.

3. 7 .2 Protection of the Air Traffic Controller against Excessive Liability

It has been mentioned already that in general the air traffic controller is potentially insolvent. In most jurisdictions he may be held liable under civil law, but the controller cannot insure aginst an accident, as he will not be able to pay the required premiums. In addition.

Governments have the possibility to take disciplinary measures against the individual controller.

From this it is clear that the air traffic controller stands out from other individuals and it is recommendable to protect the air traffic controller against excessive liability; this can be attained by international regulation of the legal status of the air traffic controller.

105

Doc. 8787 - LC/ 156. 7,, p. 133.

By the Hague Protocol of September 28, 7955; the Protocol of Guatemala City of March 8, 79 7 7 and the four Additional Protocols signed at Montreal on September 25, 79 75.

101 W. Guldimann: Air transport in international law, possibilities and limits of international unification. Paper presented at the 'First Netherlands Colloquium on International Air Transport.' August 25-29, 1980.

108 There is much diversity as to the question whether or not A TC-liability should be subject to limitation. Some consider that Governmental resources are not limited and that the costs of air navigation facilities are partly recovered by user charges: with these ideas in mind they advocate A TC-liability without limitation.

106

Belfast Airport

IFATCA Items For Sale

Belfast Airport has announced a standstill. at present levels. for all basic landing fees and charges which they directly control and the ending of the •Intercontinental Surcharge· of 80% of the basic (weight based) landing fee. The standstill is initially guaranteed until 30 September.

1983. At the same time they announce new rates for the Passenger Load Supplement (PLS) taking into account the cost of obligatory security measures. The responsibility for the cost of these has now been transferred from the government to the airport. The new PLS rates are: Domestic passenger: £4.12: International:

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50.50.25.2.50 2.50 4.50

not sold 50.25.-

Ties Label pins Stickers

15.4.1.-

not sold not sold 1.-

The Controller

8.-

20.-

£7.72.

8

3.3.5.50

Prices Valid From January 1st. 1 983 All prices indicated are in Swiss Francs and items may be purchased from the secretariat. Postage is charged in addition to indicated prices.

IFATCA Secretariat: 26, Carrickhill Close. Portmarnock. Co. Dublin, Ireland.

9

This announcement was made by the airline's chairman.

Sir Adam Thomson during a press conference at the Press Club in London.

The A320. a brand-new single-aisle twinjet. has been designed to meet the international air transport system's most pressing equipment need: a genuine. long-term replacement for the 3.000-plus ageing. fuel thirsty. narrow bodied aircraft now in service. Airbus lndustrie and its partner companies - Aerospatiale of France. British Aerospace. CASA of Spain and Germany's Deutsche Airbus/ MBB - are now doing extensive pre-industrial launch work on this new generation aircraft.

The Airbus A320 will offer airlines enormous cost savings in fuel and direct operating costs compared with the aircraft it will replace - both those now approaching the end of their service lives and derivative types which have been proposed as interim solutions.

On a 500 NM/925 km flight, the A320 will require 43 percent less fuel per seat than today· s narrow body trijets and between 18 and 32 percent less than the derivative twin jets. Its direct operating costs will be up to 2 7 percent lower per seat than those of the narrow body trijets and up to 1 9 percent lower than those of the twins.

Newsbriefs

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World Land Speed Record Thrust 2. driven by Richard Noble and sponsored by Plessey and other leading British companies. has gained a new World Land Speed Record of 633.468 mph.

The record run. 1 1 .64 mph faster than the existing record held by American Gary Gabelich. was achieved by Richard Noble in Nevada's Black Rock Desert on Wednesday, 5 October. 1983.

The run. over the measured mile. is a significant increase over the old record set in October 1970.

Plessey Chairman. Sir John Clark. commenting on the record breaking triumph. said. 'It is a magnificent achievement for Britain and for everyone involved in the project. I am delighted that Plessey was able to play such a valuable role in Richard Noble· s tremendous success.· As well as being one of the leading sponsors of the project for the last two years. Plessey also provided technicians and a high level of technical support.

Four Plessey companies were heavily involved in the project. They were: High speed digital facsimile equipment from Plessey Communication Systems Ltd. was used between the Black Rock Desert and Project Thrust's UK operations base to pass vital graphics and technical information.

The special connector devices used in Thrust 2· s cockpit linking the avionics. instrumentation and communications equipment as well as the connectors for fuel management and the engine itself were designed and supplied by Plessey Connectors Ltd. Another Plessey company. Plessey Aerospace Ltd. provided technical support in refurbishing the re-heat system on the car's jet engine.

The car's speed was checked by a special microwave speed meter. originally designed by technicians at Plessey Microwave Ltd. for use in tractors and locomotives.

British Caledonian Orders the A320 The independent UK airline British Caledonian Airways annouced an order for ten Airbus lndustrie A320s (seven firm orders and three options) on Tuesday 11 th October.

10

New DC Vice-President David A. Conlon has been named Vice-President.

Assistant to the President of the Douglas Aircraft Company division of McDonnell Douglas Corporation.

Conlon. 53. will assist Douglas President Jim Worsham and other Douglas executives in several areas of marketing including planning. strategy, presentations and proposals. as well as on special assignments.

Conlans joins McDonnell Douglas after more than 25 years with General Electric Company. He began his career there as an applications engineer in the aircraft engine group in 19 5 7. and served in a variety of engineering. project management. planning and marketing positions.

Just prior to joining Douglas. -he was manager. group marketing and sales support operations.

A former US Air Force pilot. Conlon received a Bachelor's Degree in Mechanical Engineering from Ohio State University in 1957. and has taken Graduate Studies at Xavier University in Cincinnati. Ohio. He is married and has four children.

DC goes MD Aircraft in the McDonnell Douglas Super 80 twinjet family are being redesignated as MD-80s. it was announced by the Douglas Aircraft Company division of McDonnell Douglas Corporation.

The name change provides a consistent family identification for the company's present and future commercial airliners. using the letters MD for McDonnell Douglas with numerals to designate different series of aircraft and model variations in each series.

The Super 81. Super 82 and Super 83 will become MD81. MD-82. MD-83. All are variants of the original MD-80 (or Super 80) design. with each distinguished by differences in gross weight. engine thrust and range. Future versions of the same basic 150-passenger class airframe will carry successive numeral designators in the 80 series. The Super 80 series evolved out of the successful DC-g line of twin jets.

A new 100-125 passenger twinjet now being offered to airlines as the Super 90 will become the MD-go series. with successive numbers identifying variants as they are developed.

Use of the MD- designation for commercial aircraft was introduced by Douglas last year in connection with the MD100 advanced wide-cabin tri-jetliner which is now in advanced design and on offer to airlines around the world.

•Airline reaction to the MD- 100 has been so positive we decided to apply that identity across today· s whole commercial product line.' said Douglas President Jim Worsham. •It will give us. our airline customers and their passengers a consistent family identity reflecting the strength of McDonnell Douglas today.· With more than 100 Super 81 and Super 82 twin jets already in service with more than 20 airlines. the company anticipates continued use of the Super 80 nomenclature.

'Customers always identify their aircraft as they choose.'

Worsham said. ·we expect the change to be gradual.· ·we are launching a new series of names in commercial aviation that will carry on the traditional quality of the 50year series of the Douglas Commercial line. from the DC-1 through the DC-10. The MD-80. MD-90. MD-100 and their successors will become just as famous as our other aircraft.·

Aircraft Altimeters Revue Thommen AG first introduced altimeters with dual barometric presentation at the 1983 International Aviation Space exhibition in Paris. The innovation is based on the fact that altimeters with altitude ranges in feet can be equipped with barometric presentation in mbar and mmHg and those with metric altitude in mbar and mmHg. The dual digital drum displays of measuring units dispenses with the need for the pilot to perform conversion calculations.

Best known as 'the quietest airliner in service· the first production model of the 146. painted in Dan-Air's livery was set to fly low over Central London that afternoon. challenging Londoners to hear it passing overhead.

Dan-Air is BAe's first customer for the new feederliner which will be operating on their London-Bern route. which is presently using Fokker F28s. For Dan-Air the 146's quietness was an important consideration for this route as the environment conscious Bernese burghers are particularly concerned to preserve their city from noise pollution. It is of course not only the Bernese who are concerned and BAe has found quietness the most potent selling point of the 146. The introduction of turbofan engines. the Avco Lycoming ALF 502. plays a major part in this achievement.

The exceptional short field performance was also an important selling point with regard to flying into Bern Airport where a short runway is surrounded by high mountains. A BAe 146-200. for example. will need a take-off field length of 3800 ft. taking off from an airfield at SL in ISA conditions and flying a sector distance of 500 nautical miles. A notable aspect of the 146 •s proving tour was its ability to fly into several airfields where airliners of a similar size had never attempted entry. In fuel efficiency the 146 compares extremely well with its competitors with a low break-even load factor. The 146 was particularly congratulated on its almost perfect combustion - the absence of heat emitting from the engines and the absence of the usual reek of kerosene was noticable. It is also likely that the 146 will prove to be one of the most rust-free airliners thanks to the fact that its joints have been wet assembled thereby reducing the chances of corrosion and aircraft fatigue.

At present BAe has received contracts for 1 7 and options on 1g aircraft; its bankers. Barclays International. anticipates that approximately 300 will need to be sold before a return on investment will be seen - however. running before the race begins is a familiar state of affairs in the aviation industry.

Agreement Finalized between ICAO and France

Dan-Air Gets the 146 Five months after Dan-Air signed the contract with British Aerospace (at 19.00 hrs on Christmas Eve) to take delivery of the BAe 146 feederliner. the first production model was handed over to Dan-Air at Hatfield. The aircraft's log book was presented to Dan-Air's Chairman. Mr. F.E.F. Newman by BAe's Managing Director. Sir Raymond Lygo. who described the day as 'the culmination of many years work by dedicated people.·

Early last June. Council President Dr. Assad Kotaite was in Paris at the invitation of the Government of France to attend the 35th International Aeronautical and Space Exhibition (Paris Air Show) at Le Bourget Airport and for the signing on behalf of ICAO of an agreement between France and the Organization concerning the diplomatic status of its European Regional Office. which is located in Paris.

Charles Fiterman. Minister of Transport of France. signed the document for the Government.

The agreement finalized the privileges and immunities accorded to the ICAO European Office by the Government of France. It is of interest to note that the ICAO Regional Office was established in Paris in 1 946 and that a provisional agreement on facilities. privileges and immunities which entered into force in March 1947 was concluded only by an exchange of letters between the two Parties.

Prior to the recent signing. it was pointed out by ICAO Secretary General Yves Lambert that during the 3 6 years of the existence of the Office in Paris. relations between the Government of France and ICAO had always been excellent and that the cooperation tendered by the Government had been most appreciated by the ICAO Council.

While in Paris. the Council President had discussions with the Minister of Transport. the Director General of Civil Aviation and high officials of the Ministry of External Relations on matters related to civil aviation. mainly concerning the European Region and the forthcoming ICAO Assembly.

11

Dr. Kotaite visited the Paris Air Show. at which ICAO had a stand. and he addressed the closing dinner of the Symposium of the lnstitut de Formation Universitaire et de Recherche du Transport Aerien.

Throughout the visit. Dr. Kotaite was accompanied by Mr. J.-P. Ghuysen. Representative of France on the ICAO Council. who participated in all the discussions. and by Mr. D. Bartkowski. ICAO Representative. European Office.

States for a convention or guidance material. such as model laws. The Committee requested the Secretariat to prepare material on the subject. including a list of problems focusing on those of practical importance.

With respect to the 'Study of the instruments of the Warsaw System.· the Committee agreed that the priority of this item would be determined by the entry into force of the Montreal Protocols of 1975. The Committee believed that support for the Warsaw System should be reaffirmed and that the integrity of that system should be preserved.

The Meeting. attended by 53 Contracting States. one non-contracting State and five international organizations. was under the Chairmanship of A.W. Kean (United Kingdom). The Legal Committee elected a new slate of officers: Chairman. Dr. A. Sciolla-Lagrange (Italy). and Vice-Chairmen - 1st. G.H. Kaunda (Tanzania); 2nd. Dr. M. Tirado (Venezuela); 3rd. Z. Zsemes (Hungary); 4th. S.N. Anwar (Pakistan).

Saudi Arabia Contracts In the foreground. France ·s Minister of Transport. Charles Fiterman (right) and Council President. Dr. Assad Kotaite shake hands following the signing of privileges-immunities agreement for the !CAO European Regional Office in Paris.

Witnessing the event(/. to r .. background) were /CAO European Office Representative D. Bartkowski: A. M. Pierret.

Director of United Nations and International Organizations for the French Ministry of External Relations: and /CAO Council Representative of France. J.-P. Ghuysen.

Legal Committee Work Program Established At the recent 25th Session of the Legal Committee of ICAO (Montreal. 1 2 to 25 April 1983). the main subject for consideration was a review of its general work program; the Committee. in establishing this program. had in mind the decision of the 23rd Session of the ICAO Assembly ( 1980) that only problems of sufficient magnitude and practical importance requiring an urgent international action should be included.

As a result. the program that evolved contains only three items. in this order of priority: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Implications. if any. for the application of the Chicago Corwention. its annexes and other international air law instruments; Liability of air traffic control agencies; and Study of the instruments of the Warsaw System.

The Law-of-the-Sea Convention was given the highest priority. It will be recalled that the Convention was open for signature on 10 December 1982 at Montego Bay (Jamaica) and. so far. has been signed by 125 States. The Committee noted that the Convention on International Civil Aviation. the Annexes thereto and other international air law instruments in numerous instances referred to or were applicable to the different areas of the sea. Consequently. the Committee instructed the Secretariat to make. as soon as possible. a detailed study of the subject. paying attention in particular to its multi-disciplinary aspects.

As second item of priority. •Liability of air traffic control agencies.· the Committee believed that this subject needed to be further studied with a view to determining (a) the need for a convention or guidance material, such as model laws. and (b) the possibility of sufficient consensus among 12

At the en·d of March. this year. the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia awarded a turnkey contract for the supply and installation of a complete air traffic control system to Signaal. The radar employed is of the same successful design as used in Singapore. Portugal and in the CAA radar network in the United Kingdom.

The system will include secondary radar from Cossor. a display system with mixed monochrome displays as well as radar data and flight plan processing. Fiber-optic signal transmission will be used between radar site and the air traffic control center. The radar is to be installed at the new •King Khaled' international airport near Riyadh.

In addition. the existing ATC center at the 'King Abdul Aziz' airport of Jeddah will be extended with an automatic flight-plan processing system. This strip printing system will be installed in the control tower and will be used for Approach and Air Center Control (ACC).

These major contracts will be completed in 1986.

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AIRKZ S\X'"

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C,ONTAcrWITH TTlAFFIC Ai 3 o·c~?

More Gear Trouble It was a beautiful weekend - ideal for a fishing trip- but they never got there. Enroute the pilot found that he couldn't lower his gear by normal or emergency methods.

After several attempts. and reference to the emergency checklist. he elected to return to his point of departure at a major airport. On the return flight he made several more unsuccessful attempts to lower the gear. then made a wheels-up landing (photo).

A section of the wheelwell liner had broken off and wedged itself between the wheel frame and the tire. thereby preventing the gear from extending either by normal or emergency methods. It was also found that the landing gear motor release handle was incorrectly adjusted and did not permit motor disengagement.

The main accident causal factor attributed was improper maintenance.

operating as Plessey Avionics and Communications Limited).

Managing Director of the Communications Systems Division will be Mr. Kenneth Bacon.

ASDE for Safety and Efficiency on Airports ASDE. Signaal's Airport Surface Detection Equipment. can be described as a system which monitors all the ground traffic on an airport. from small vehicles to giant 74 7 aircraft. under all weather conditions.

The equipment comprises a J-band transmitter/ receiver with matching antenna, a Daylight Mixed Display (DMD) unit with digital scan converter, and one or more raster scan displays.

The J-band radar system ensures an excellent resolution. The DMD unit converts the radar video into analog video without affecting the resolution or the information.

The analog video is suitable for presentation on a 768-line display ( 1024 dots/ line).

Effective use of ASDE is enhanced by the display of a map of the airport. This map- consisting of lines and symbols - can be generated and modified by the controller through keyboard and rolling ball inputs. ASDE is very easy to operate. Its high performance makes this equipment a tool for the operator through which the safety and efficiency of air traffic are improved considerably.

New Plessey Communications Systems Division The Plessey Company has announced changes within its Plessey Electronic Systems Limited organization.

Mr. Gordon Patterson. Managing Director of Plessey Systems Limited. has been appointed Director of Strategic Planning for PELS. Plessey Defence Systems becomes part of a new division known as Plessey Communications (C3I) Division.

This division will include Plessey Radio Systems and the two newly formed companies Plessey Avionics. and Plessey Military Communications (previously combined and

Caracas-Maiquetia The new domestic terminal of 'Simon Bolivar· Airport. Maiquetia.

Venezuela was opened in March. It will have a capacity of 8 million passengers per year and be capable of dealing with peak loads of up to 2800 passengers per hour.

The new building. costing an estimated $ 53 million is situated some 800 meters from the international terminal opened in July 1978. These two achievements conform to the Master Plan set out by the Venezuelan Government in 1966 with the aim of providing Caracas with an airport to meet the increasing demands of air transport.

The floor area of the new domestic terminal is 4 7 000 m 2 . Like the international terminal it is of modular design to allow for expansion. There are three floors in the new terminal. The ground floor is for baggage and freight and also provides accommodation for airline company offices. security and operations as well as rest rooms for airline crews.

The second level has airline counters. baggage claim. gate rooms and eight telescopic air bridges. On the third level are shops. a cafeteria. restaurants. other services and a public gallery. There are 1 6 remote aircraft parking positions with special buses for carrying passengers to and from the terminal.

PATCO strike • Tucson. Arizona. In October 1981.

USATCO's public relations man Taylor. and Billy Florence. chapter vice-president, were tried and convic:ed of violating 1 8 USC 1918. They were sentenced to a year in jail. suspended in lieu of active probation. Taylor claims that he and Florence were the first persons prosecuted for violations of the no-strike law in the history of the statute. despite the fact that more than 100 documented federal job actions leading to work interruptions have taken place in the US Postal Service. Tennessee Valley Authority, and other agencies over the years.

• Washington, D.C. Robert E. Poli. national president of PATCO at the start of the strike. was fined S2.000 for civil contempt of court.

13

Retired since 1971, this venerable flying boat has been renovated and will be employed as a flight testing vehicle for well over a year ...

Data provided by Dornier GmbH (Fed. Rep. of Germany) A successful first flight by our Do 24 TT experimental amphibian from the company airport at Oberpfaffenhofen (near Munich) was completed on 25 April 1983. This was the beginning of an extended flight test programme to be carried out over the next two years to prove out the application of new technology to amphibious aircraft.

Various systems and project studies relating to flying boats have . been made by Dornier over the past 14

years. This work has been based on the experience of earlier Dornier designs. in particular on the Do 24.

Originally developed for The Netherlands Government. the Do 24 searchand-rescue aircraft demonstrated its outstanding seaworthiness on countless missions during World War 11.Do 24 flying boats were also operated by ·the Spanish Government on sea rescue services up until 1971 .

The current Do 24 TT experimental programme is designed to test new technologies in the field of amphibian aircraft and is being undertaken with

funding from the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology. The Technology Test bed is strictly an experimenta I amphibian.

Project Aims and Objectives

The Do 24 Technology Testbed, designed and built by Dornier. is to be used for investigation directed toward a number of developmental goals: improved high-seas capability for the Do 24 TT. compared with presently known seaplanes: operational flexibility. deriving from the amphibian configuration;

improved STOL characteristics; improvements to performance and economy. compared with earlier amphibians; testing of an advanced technology wing of simple construction to reduce manufacturing costs; and testing of up-to-date turbo-prop engines for operations at sea.

The overall objective of the project funded by the Ministry, under the General Aeronautical Research and Technology Programme. is to study the effect of new technologies on the seaworthiness. operational flexibility. performance and economy of flying boats by means of flight tests. The definition phase for the Do 24 TT began in April 1979 and was completed in June 1980. It was followed by the present Phase II for construction and testing.

The results of extensive design studies and of knowledge gained during construction of the Technology Testbed (e.g., the need for new sponsons and an increase in the height of the cockpit section) led to the present configuration. With the exception of the hull and the tail surfaces taken from a Do 24 that was retired from service in 1971. the Technology Testbed is built up of new parts.

The Do 24 TT design comprises five major features: a strutted cabane-type high-wing monoplane. with a rectangular wing and triangular wing tips similar to the Dornier New Technology Wing (TNT): propulsion. consisting of three turbo-prop engines; stabilization on the water by means of sponsons; a flat hull underside with two steps; and a twin tail unit.

Aerodynamics and Performance Unlike the right-angled trapezoidal New Technology Wing on our TNT testbed. the Do 24 TT' s wing has a rectangular planform from the wing root out to the beginning of the wing tip and a Do A-5 airfoil throughout.

(This airfoil and the landing flap were developed under the New Technology Wing programme. also funded by the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology). The design was first used on our Do 228 utility and commuter aircraft. Compared with conventional airfoils. the new wing features significantly reduced drag and higher lift.

Do24 TT: Summary of technical data.

Powerplants (turbo-prop) Span Length Heightfrom keel Overallheight Wingarea Aspectratio Overallwidth with sponsons Landinggeartrack Wheelbase Max.take-offweight/land Max.take-off weight/water

Three P&W PT6A-45Bs (1125sph each) 30.0 m 21.95 m 5.65 m 6.68 m 100.0 m 2 9.0 8.0 m 6.9 m 6.55 m 14000kg 12 000 kg

The triangular wing tip. as on the Do 228 wing. was chosen as a result of wind tunnel tests. because it produces a reduction in induced drag. compared with a traditional straight wing tip.

The Do 24 TT was completed at the end of March 1983 and handed over to the flight test department. Thereafter followed careful preparations and a series of taxiing tests prior to the Continues on page 78

Dornier's Do 24 TT, an amphibian testbed for new technology, passed its first test flight successfully last April. Further tests will be carried out over the next 74- 76 months.

15

MEETING THE TECHNOLOG BasedonSignaal's LAR-11 longrange firstin ATC. Portugal'sdevelopment as a major centrefor tradeand tourismis expectedto radar system,alreadywell-proven in TheATCproject-designated NAV-1 dramatically increaseair trafficby the mid- Paraguay,Singapore,the Netherlands and - comprisesequallyadvancedsub-systems flightinquiry eighties.Itsair trafficcontrolsystem,whilst theUnitedKingdom,theprojectinvolves the for: flightplanprocessing, beingadequatefor the present,willbe equippingof a newATC centreat Lisbon and recording,distributionand switching, International Airport,as wellas unmanned, closedcircuittelevision, unableto meetthe heavydemandsof the PABX,intercom, future.So Portugal'saviationauthority, remote-controlled, stationsat Montejunto, timing,voicelogging,as wellas microwave Aeroportose Navega~ao Aerea(ANA), Foiaand Lousa. linksand integratedmaintenance data Allinformationand data willbe developeda challenging modernisation transferand analysis. programmefor its nationwideair traffic processed bycomputers; radardatafromthe Hereare somemoreexamplesof controlnetwork. differentsitesbeingautomatically correlated howPhilipsmulti-product capabilityis And Signaal,Philipsspecialistradar to presenteachair trafficcontrollerwithan meetingthe technological challengeof company,is supplyingand installingallthe optimalpicture.Thistechnique,called modernaviation. high-technology equipmentand systems. 'multi-radardata processing',is a world's LOUSA 260 NM (radio)

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Parent of today's Technology Testbed is this Do 24 flying boat. operated until 79 7 7 by the Spanish Government as a search-and-rescue aircraft. from page 75 first flight at Oberpfaffenhofen last April.

The first flight, lasting more than an hour. was performed without problem

by Dornier Chief Test Pilot Dieter Thomas and his co-pilot Meinhard Feuersenger. Post flight comments by the crew were very favourable.

The flight test data are now being evaluated. The results of this first flight by the Do 24 TT form a good basis for continuation of the test programme.

The Technology Testbed is now to be tested in detail over the next 14 to 1 6 months. The schedule calls for approximately 85 hours of landing tests, about 20 hours of inland seas testing and some 1 5 hours of testing over the high seas.

Sea testing is scheduled to begin in the Baltic in the third quarter of 1983 and will continue with high seas testing before the end of the year. The overall test programme is scheduled to run into 1 984.

(From ICAO Newsbulletin)

C==:J Modifications The amphibious Technology Testbed is a greatly modified version of the World War 11· vintage Do 24 flying boat. It includes an oversize New Technology Wing, three Pratt & Whitney PT6A-45B turbo-prop engines, main gear from a Do 31 helicopter and an F27 nosewheel. The five-blade propellers also are of advanced design.

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Your advertisement in 'The Controller' reaches 107 countries and more than 20,000 air traffic controllers

18

New Air Traffic Controllers' Union Being Built by Veterans from PATCO A new union of air traffic controllers is being built alongside the wreckage of the old, with many familiar names in leadership roles.

The new union. the United States Air Traffic Controllers Organization (USATCO). is headed by Bary W. Eads. Eads was the last president of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization before that organization went out of business last year.

Domenic V. Torchia. PATCO's last executive vice president. is USATCO'svice president for the West Coast. David Siegel.

PATCO' s vice president for the Southeast, holds a similar position in the USATCO organization. Bill Taylor. who handles public relations for USATCO, was president of the PATCO local at Tucson, Arizona.

USATCO was chartered by Eads and several other ex-members of PATCO as a non-profit corporation in the District of Columbia just one week after the old union was liquidated last year. However, the new union says it is being careful to avoid any action that would open it to charges of being a legal 'alter ego· for PATCO. Amisstep could subject USATCO to liability for the estimated $35 million in damages and criminal fines assessed against PATCO for its conduct of the August 1981 strike of controllers against Federal Aviation Administration facilities nationwide.

Goals, Short- and Long-Term USATCO says its long-term goal is to organize and represent air traffic controllers in collective bargaining, just as PATCO did for more than a decade before its striking members were fired and the union decertified for violating the ban on striking in federal criminal and personnel statutes.

The new organization says it has tentative plans for a national meeting to be held in Washington late in the summer at which a constitution establishing USATCO as a labor union will be presented for adoption.

If this is accomplished, USATCO hopes to be ready to petition the Federal Labor Relations Authority for bargaining rights for controllers at ·several' FAA facilities. not now identified.

In the meantime. USATCO says it hopes to survive on a shoestring as an information network for fired controllers and their families. It also hopes to give some financial aid to controllers now appealing their removals to the Merit Systems Protection Board and the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. USATCO leaders believe the organization would take a major step toward achievement of representative status if the removal proceedings ended soon with MSPB orders or

an FAA agreement for the reinstatement of a significant number of controllers.

At present. neither appears likely.

USATCO reports that MSPB presiding officials have ordered reinstatements in only 2 9 5 cases. for a reversal rate of 2. 7 percent of the nearly 11 .000 controller firings appealed to the Board. This reversal rate is far below that in other removal cases.

USATCO acknowledges. Meanwhile. FAA agreed on its own to take back only 1 24 other controllers.

MSPB Precedents Represent Setback Recently.

MSPB issued seven precedent-setting decisions in numerous consolidated controller appeals. The decisions represents a setback to controller hopes that the Board would order a wholesale reinstatement of many of the fired workers. Defenses that FAA 'locked out" its employees. that public statements

by President Reagan and other top officials prejudiced controllers· rights. and that numerous procedural violations were committed failed to persuade the Board.

21 GERR 935;967 (May 2. 1983).

USATCO says it started up with 1.100 members and now claims 1.900. with a growth rate of about 75 per month. Most are fired strikers. but several dozen are working controllers. USATCO says. With no formal dues structure or dues checkoff. it seeks income through mailings. ·suggested' dues are $ 20 per month. and 50 percent of the members pay something.

Taylor said.

The union also says it is receiving continuing help from other labor organizations. It gives particular credit to the American Postal Workers Union for helping with its newsletter and fundraising mailings. The office of AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland and the AFL-CIO Public Employee Department ( executive director John F. Layden is a former PATCO president) have been helping with legislative liaison. Taylor said.

Prospects for Bargaining Rights USATCO's dream of someday obtaining bargaining rights is not necessarily impossible. Despite strong demands that it do so. the Authority explicitly refused to go beyond a onetime decertification for the 1981 strike and issue a permanent bar against PATCO's ever again obtaining recognition. Thus. whether a new organization led by former PATCO adherents would be permitted to participate in the

federal labor relations program remains a wide-open question.

In this discussion of the FLRA General Counsel's request for a permanent bar.

John H. Fenton. the Authority's chief administrative law judge. said. 'The request for a permanent revocation is. as noted. unprecedented ... I know of no authority for such an irreversible remedy, one which sounds in punishment" (GERR 926: 10;50).

In his decision for the FLRA majority.

Member Henry B. Frazier Ill said. in a footnote: • 11is wholly unnecessary to address the question of whether. at some unspecified time in the future. PATCO or some successor organization may meet the definition of a labor organization and thereby acquire the rights and obligations of a labor organization under the Statute. This is a speculative question which should be addressed only in the context of a case which appropriately raises the issue. e.g .. a representation case wherein certification as an exclusive bargaining representative is sought and the issue of whether at that time the union involved meets the exacting qualifications of a "labor organization" under Section 7103(a)(4) is litigated. It is thus unnecessary to decide in the present case whether PATCO at any time in the future can satisfy these statutory requirements. Consequently. the exceptions of the General Counsel and FAA relating to permanent disqualification of PATCO are rejected. Accordingly, in agreement with the Chief AU. the Authority should adopt a remedy in this case which is silent with respect to such matters.'

Frazier' s comment is significant because. of the three Authority members. he took the most conservative view as to the powers of the Authority in strike situations.

In Frazier's view. once the Authority has found that a strike occured and the union took no affirmative action to stop it. the Statute mandates decertification; colleagues Leon B. Applewhaite and Ronald W. Haughton said the Authority has broader discretion to fashion remedies tailored to particular strike situations (GERR 935:5;50). On appeal. the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit tilted toward the Haughton-Applewhaite view of FLRA discretion in strike cases (GERR 968:5).

Tracking Individual Cases In addition to the tens of millions of dollars in damages. awards and fines levied against PATCO and its locals. USATCO says that a total of $54.139.50 in personal fines has been levied by various courts against numerous PATCO members and local leaders. In many cases. the fines were imposed on defendants who were found or pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of criminal contempt of court rather than go to trial on charges of violation of the criminal no-strike statute. 18 USC 1918.

Capsule dispositions of many of these proceedings, based largely on material supplied by USATCO. follow: • Alexandria, Virginia. Three controllers were fined $1 .000 each and served 10 days in prison each. One was fined 19

/

RRDRR

$3,000. and another served 10 days in prison.

• Atlanta. A total of 3 7 controllers were sentenced to one year probation (six months suspended). and ordered to perform 48 hours of community service.

Twenty-five were fined $500. five were fined $400. six were fined S300. and one was fined $ 200.

• Boston. Three controllers were fined amounts ranging from $ 500 to $ 1 .000 for criminal contempt. Another. Robert Belanger. was fined $3,000. but USATCO says the conviction was overturned on appeal. Belanger and another controller.

Marcia Hamilton. were arrested and charged with disturbing the peace and resisting arrest for alleged picket line misconduct. They were convicted and sentenced to 30 days in jail. The sentence has been stayed pending appeal.

• Burlington. Vermont. Four control20

lers were fined $ 1.000 each for criminal contempt of court.

• Chicago. Four controllers were fined $ 250 each for criminal contempt.

• Dallas. Three controllers were found guilty of criminal contempt following their plea of no contest. They were fined $ 7 50 each.

Prison Likely Controllers Gary Greene. Lee Grant. and Ron May were indicted and tried for violation of the criminal no-strike statute.

All three were convicted. in November 1981. They were sentenced to a year and a day in jail (all but 90 days suspended). fined$ 750 each. and ordered to serve 18 months' probation.

In February. the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the convictions. rejecting the claim that the controllers were impermissibly selected for pros-

ecution. 21 GERR 492 (Mar. 7. 1983).

Last month. the appeals court instructed the district court to carry out the sentence. To date. the facility at which the three are to serve the sentences has not been determined.

Grant has asked for a stay of the punishment. but Greene and May have decided to abandon the fight and serve the 90 days. According to May. he and Greene lack the money to continue to appeal. and further do not believe they can obtain a favorable outcome.

• Denver. Indictments of John Haggerty and Gary Shields. PATCO local leaders. were dismissed on grounds of selective prosecution by Judge John L. Kane. Jr .. of the US District Court for Colorado. Kane found that the two had been targeted by the Justice Department and FAA because of their prominence in the union. not for strike activity. Kane also found double jeopardy in that Haggerty and Shields had been found guilty of criminal contempt of court. essentially for the same events (GERR 944:10;38).

For the criminal contempt. Haggerty and Shields were sentenced to 18 months' probation and 18 months' community service work at a local Veterans Administration hospital.

• Houston. On May 4. Richard M. Hoover. former president of a PATCO local. was convicted by a federal court jury of violating 18 USC 1918. USATCO says the jury deliberated for 45 minutes. Sentencing has been scheduled for June 20.

USATCO says.

In January. the US District Court for Southern Texas (Houston Division) dismissed an indictment against James K. McDonald. president of another PATCO local in the Houston area. on grounds of improper selective prosecution. The court found evidence that McDonald was targeted because of his union office. not strike activity. 21 GERR 162 (Jan. 24.

198·3).

• Indianapolis. Four controllers were fined S500 each for criminal contempt.

• Little Rock. Arkansas. Two controllers were sentenced to six months' imprisonment (suspended). and fined S 1.000 each.

• Los Angeles. Two controllers were fined S500 each.

• Memphis. Five controllers were fined $287.50 each for criminal contempt.

• Miami. Eight controllers were sentenced to 100 hours· community service. and two years· probation (terminable upon completion of the community service).

• Mobile. Alabama. Two controllers were fined S250 each for criminal contempt.

• New Orleans. Six controllers were sentenced to six months imprisonment (suspended. but with active probation). and ordered to perform 31 2 hours of public service at a minimum of 1 2 hours per week. e New York City. Paul Amato. a PATCO local president. and Anthony J. Maimone. a past president. were indicted for violating 18 USC 1918. Judge Thomas C. Platt. of the US District Court for Eastern New York. refused to dismiss the indictments

Continues on page 2 7

The Choice of Technology in ATC Radar Part 11(b) (Final)

by H.W Cole

Removing the Residue

by Temporal Threshold Integration (TTI) No permanent echo canceller is perfect and there will always be residual unwanted signals left in the output. These can sometimes appear very like aircraft and represent 'false alarms· to the user or a target extractor. Naturally an operator would soon spot that such signals have no movement and would discount them as aircraft after a few revolutions of the antenna. Suitable logic in an extractor can also do this. Nevertheless these false alarms should be removed. A technique for doing this is to divide the surveillance area into a mass of cells very small in area and to examine and store the amplitude of signals in them.

Now. if the amplitude found for each cell is used to set a detection threshold it is possible to give output only when a signal exceeds this. Provided a margin is included to account for clutter fluctuation. residues will not be output. Such systems are now well proven and result in complete suppression of cancellation residue. The thresholds are automatically set and continually up-dated as successive antenna revolutions explore the area so that any unwanted signals such as from slowly moving weather and angels are also automatically removed from the MTI output. The threshold's time constant is very long. i.e. reaction time to changes of amplitude in any cell is of the order of a number of antenna revolutions. Thus an aircraft signal in any cell causes no significant change to the cell's threshold and provided it is greater, will be given as output. The net result is to produce a completely 'black and white' PPI screen showing only the moving targets. The same technique can be used to suppress permanent echo signal. without coherent MTI detection. Here the full linear video. unprocessed. is

used as input. The virtue of this is that any aircraft targets not obscured by clutter are clearly visible. irrespective of the Doppler frequency exhibited by them. This is very useful as a means of combatting tangential fades.

Multiple Filter Doppler Processing Using the same technology as in Digital Summation MTI Cancellers (Fig. 4) it is possible to construct a pass-band filter of the form shown in Fig. 5.

Altering the phase of the reference oscillation of its associated phase detector will cause the center frequency of the filter to move. It is thus possible to construct a bank of such filters across the Doppler band of interest. although the center frequency shift

effect is engineered differently. Such a set is shown in Fig. 6, each filter having its own phase detector and circuits equivalent to a summation canceller.

However a major difference is that all samples in a filter have to be present before an output can be given. When each sequential delayed output is put to the summing circuits it is stored until the latest is present. The summation is done and a single pulse given out to represent the train of samples· response to the filter· s passband. This is also called the 'integrate and dump' technique. The effect can be readily appreciated: Signals from ground clutter appear in the zeroDoppler filter but not the others. so selection of signals from these achieves permanent echo rejection.

Sub-clutter visibility of targets moving over ground clutter is also achievable

Signal Amplitude Sidelobes

// ..,__ a-Doppler Frequency

Fig 5. A Single.Zero Doppler Filter 21

'Alias' because the moving target's Doppler frequency is non-zero and its time-cot 7 /of t0 incident enemy, the fixed echoes. have zero Doppler frequency.

So far the multiple Doppler filter All Filters Have These Sidelobes seems to be superior to the MTI •s zero Doppler filter since the former has true selectivity in the Doppler domain. But all is not well. for a number of reasons.

Because each filter is formed by 0 --Doppler Freq= PRF Doppler Freq= Radial Vel. operating on the output of phase detectors. each is nonambiguous for radial velocities equivalent to only one half-wavelength in space. Put another way. phase changes between samples which are in excess of 180° will Coherent be registered as only the excess. This Input has the effect of making the filter passband repeat itself at Doppler positions other than that designed. That is. it produces 'phantom· pass-bands or ·aliases.· For example the zero Doppler filter has by this effect an •alias· at Filter Selection Logic a Doppler frequency equivalent to the PRF. So any aircraft moving an integral number of half-wavelengths be- Fig. 6. A Bank of 8 Doppler Filters tween samples is lost in any ground clutter present. This effect. analogous to 'blind speed' in classical MTI. can be overcome by use of staggered PRF. However. in such filters the pulse intervals must not be changed until all the samples required are gathered into Signal pulses the system - remember they have to Clutter from aircraft be summed together and be spaced Area regularly in time. For optimum performance there have to be as many samples as filters in the system: Thus Ai reraft 1 beam width for a bank of 8 filters. the PRF must be Track fixed for 8 sample periods and any change thereafter must be to another time interval. or sample rate. held for Single pulse O/p's another 8 periods. These blocks of from filter bank time are called Correlation Processing Intervals or CPls. This is a distinct drawback. as can be seen from Fig. 7.

There is obvious danger of track quality being seriously impaired. for if the -Aircraft could be 'blind' to CPI 1 or CPI 2 radar system has even as many as 1 6 samples per beamwidth (it may well -Aircraft could be 'blind' for 1 CPI and not detected be less) and the target travels at the on the other because of clutter pollution. 'blind speed' of one of the CPls. it is lost for half the beamwidth and gives azimuth jitter to a smooth track.

Fig. 7. Multi-Filter & Track Wander Equally if in this condition the signals from the second CPI are weak. total loss can occur. The specifications for multi-filter processors or Moving Target Detectors (MTD) require partial follow the filter by a Threshold DetecMT! MTD track processors to be included in an tion system. We see. then. a great Simplicity and Complexity attempt to overcome these draw- deal of complexity in such MTD proDoppler and Doppler Discretion backs. Note also that only a single cessing. A further noteworthy point is Acceptance pulse is output for each CPI period. that each filter has 'sidelobes.' much This is totally unsuitable for real-time as do antennas (and for the same Fortunately the issue need not redisplay and an MTD has to generate mathematical reason). These. tomain as restrictive as that. It is now pulses in between the CPI outputs to gether with filter pass-band overlap. possible to have a processor which simulate a real-time train of pulses. cause cross-filter pollution. combines the best of both worlds in a Comparing the Zero-Doppler Filter Also it is possible for moving clutter degree which is eminently suitable for to appear in filters together with and Multiple Doppler Filter techniques TMA radars - Adaptive Signal Prowanted targets and it is necessary to above shows a trade-off between: cessing.

t

I

22

Adaptive Signal Processing (ASP) The main drawback to the MTI zero-Doppler filter is its lack of ability to reject moving clutter by Doppler frequency selectivity. In the ASP. this selectivity is given by a separate MTI filter whose pass-band is automatically 'steered' to the Doppler frequency generated by moving clutter.

The ·steerable filter' or 'notch' is formed by cancellation circuits identical to that of the zero-Doppler filter plus some clever but simple trigonometry problem-solving circuits.

The ASP in basic block diagram form is shown in Fig. 8 and operates as follows: The zero-Doppler filter is formed by a staggered PRF 4-pulse Canceller with Time Varied Weighting. This gives super and sub-clutter visibility to targets over ground clutter. It will output any weather clutter signals strong enough to remain after circular polarizing rejection and thus these will be passed with wanted targets to the 'steerable' filter as input.

As in the Temporal Threshold Integration system. the surveillance area is divided into cells but this time of greater size. typically about 5 ° in azimuth and 2 n mls in range. Each cell is continually examined and the mean Doppler frequency of its moving clutter contents is measured. This value is converted into an equivalent phase shift required of a phase detector reference oscillation to put the notch of the ·steerable' filter at the measured Doppler frequency. The measured Doppler values are rounded to the nearest of 32 set values(± 16 about zero) and embrace all weather speeds normally encountered. The measurements are continually and automatically up-dated at successive antenna revolutions and each cell is addressed in real-time so that it is continually adaptive to moving clutter amplitude and velocity. Because aircraft signals contribute so little to the calculation of mean Doppler frequency in any cell. the system avoids reacting to them.

The third simultaneous process is a straightforward TTI stage operating on linear video input. As described above. it automatically suppresses all fixed clutter and gives output of aircraft signals 'in the clear' and those exhibiting super-clutter visibility i.e. having amplitude greater than coincident clutter. Each filter stage is also followed by TTI to ensure all clutter residue is removed. Now comes the bonus to the user. for each channel is passed to a gating system which delivers any available signal to the output. For example. suppose a target is

Zero Doppler q Filter

4 pulse mti with TVW Stagger

-- TTI

'Steerable Notch'

~

----

Input Auto- Doppler c:::) Filter

L+

L_.

Non-coherent f--Log Detector

TTI i--,

Combine To c:::::::)PPI Gating

TT!

,.... ...

I

\ ..,....r"'.......__ __

I 1

I 'Steerable ;,---Notch'

\

/ Q-¥--_;,.,'----------

0

_j__

Doppler Freq.

Fig. 8. Adaptive Signal Processor moving tangentially: no output would even more difficult. The author would be obtained from the zero-Doppler wish to see moves made to prevent channel. However. the linear TTI this 'information gap· widening and to channel is not Doppler-conscious and avoid users being given to understand any signals from the tangentially mov- that only one technique is available ing target detected by TTI would be and. per se. the best for them in all passed for output. Also any target situations. There is always choice moving at velocity different from ask about it! weather in any particular cell.--------------although perhaps obscured in the zero-Doppler output. would be Airport Radar on delivered from the 'steerable' filter Singapore Stamp channel.

Thus the ASP combines the Doppler discretion (when necessary) of the MTD. avoids complexity. the need for harmful block stagger. produces an output suitable for both real-time display and plot extraction and overcomes the MTI tangential fade effect.

Epilogue The processing techniques described above have been developed during the past 10 to 1 2 years; not very long in radar history. The emergence of yet more advanced systems will doubtless be faster as solid state technology ·advances. It is very probable that in the foreseeable future signal processing and associated data processing will be done within one engine and that further complexities will deepen the user's confusion.

Understanding such systems will be

A new series of stamps issued by the Republic of Singapore depicts Changi Airport. On the 10 et issue. the well-known slender control tower is shown. crowned by the radome of the Signaal airport radar.

23

Things Do Breal< or: Life-cycle Cost

by Peter A. Jorgensen (Selenia) (Speech delivered at the Technical Panel of the 22nd Annual Conference of IFATCA)

During the last decade. a great number of ATC systems and ATC radars have been acquired by the Civil Aviation Authorities around the world.

Due to the sophisticated. professional nature of these systems. we can take for granted that the manufacturers have almost always been of the highest professional standard. It would have been against the supplier's interest, given the very competitive market. to supply any material with a low quality standard.

Nevertheless. complaints are sometimes heard about non-operational status of ATC systems.

The aim of this paper is to help understanding of what happens during the lifetime of any system.

The end user. the air traffic controller. is concerned about the availability of the system. By availability is meant the percentage of time the system can perform its function without failure. An operational availability A 0 of 0.98 means that the system is working correctly 98 hours out of 100.

Several factors must be investigated to arrive at a given availability.

Obviously, the quality of the equipment is important. but also the spare parts situation. the skill of the maintenance personnel. the quality of the electric power. the ambient conditions. etc.

The intrinsic availability of a system is defined as the number of hours per hundred hours the system could be working if all necessary spare parts are available on the spot. and if skilled field engineers are ready to perform servicing. This factor A,. is the one factor which is attributable to the manufacturer.

The intrinsic availability depends on the number of failures expected. and on the time it takes to restore the system ,o full use. The number of expected failures are either shown as number 24

of failures per million hours. A. or as the MTBF. mean-time-between-failures. counted over a very long time.

The time to repair the system is shown as the MTTR. mean-time-torepaIr. The intrinsic MTBF for a system depends on the system quality. ambient temperature. quality of the mains power supply. etc .. and follows the socalled bathtub curve during the lifetime of a system: see fig. 1. During the early life of a system you expect what is called 'infant mortality.· Then the number of failures stabilizes. and for a well-made system. the MTBF during this period should be a random phenomena. At the end of the system· s life. the failure rate is expected to increase. until it is not economically sound to keep the system working.

In the modern ATC system. where virtually almost all components are solid-state. the wear out phenomena is limited to a few tubes and some

mechanical parts. and the MTBF has become extremely high.

In most cases we can expect an MTBF 1.5 to 2-times better than the one calculated from the supplier.

However. environmental factors may lower these figures.

The MTBF is normally calculated with an ambient temperature of 25 ° C. If the temperature increases. the number of failures increases. and unfortunately the increase in failures follows a formula where the temperature is an exponent.

Likewise, experience ·has shown that solid-state devices are quite sensitive to noise and spikes on the mains, and unfortunately, the mains on an airport are normally full of spikes.

Misalignment and poor repair work also influence the MTBF. The other important factor for the system availability is the mean-timeto-repair. This figure expresses how long, as an average. it will take a skilled. factory trained field engineer to repair the fault. provided all the required spare parts are available.

However. experience shows that after some time. neither the skilled field engineer. nor the spare parts are available. on the site.

Some ;years ago the equipment was simpler. but of lower quality (i.e. with tubes) and thus presented many more failures. The field engineers were therefore apparently better. and more were available. The high MTBF of the modern equipment creates the paradox that you do not have enough failures to ensure adequate training. It must therefore be considered an absolute requirement that all new equipment is provided with built-intest-equipment, BITE. which auto-

NUMBER OF FAILURES

TIME

Figure 1 - Bathtub curve

matically performs most of the fault location.

The repair work on site must also be reduced. in most cases. to substitution of replacement units. and not repair on component level.

The intrinsic availability. A,. was defined as a quality factor for the equipment.

The formula for calculating it is:

A= '

MTBF MTTR + MTBF

Figures for dual channel systems are often in the order of 0.9999-

0.999999.

However. the operational availability depends also on the other factors mentioned namely As (availability of spare parts) and AL (availability of skilled logistic support).

We can write: A 0 = A, X As X AL The operational availability is the factor the controller sees. and the intrinsic availability is the one the manufacturer can control.

As and AL are entirely up to the authorities of the buying country.

The capital investment for a new system is almost always the only factor by which a purchase is adjudicated. Very few times do you see attempts to estimate the life-cycle cost of a system. Admittedly. it is much more difficult to estimate. and to hold anybody responsible for this cost. The life-cycle cost estimates are based on the system MTBF. the required skill of maintenance personnel. the amount of spare units required. and commonalities between spare units. the possibility for a central workshop in major systems for repair of the spare units. the cost of using the original manufacturer for repairs. etc.

Unfortunately. it is often found that the life-cycle cost was not estimated during the purchase. but also that a far too low budget is planned for the maintenance of the systems.

It is not realistic to think that a single training course held during the equipment installation. and the purchase of spare parts equivalent to 10% of the system value will ensure the life of the system for say 1 5 years.

Too often we find that field engineers trained have all left or have been promoted out of the job after a few years.

Their substitutes are very seldom trained at the factory. It is also quite common to send a failed unit to repair when the spare unit is also broken.

When this happens. the As and AL fall dramatically and the intrinsic availability becomes a figure without significance.

'

Selenia radar assembly line

Selenia training center

Frankfurt Main Airport Erich Becker has been reappointed for his third 5 year term as President of the Frankfurt/Main Airport Authority.

In looking forward to the next five years he noted the tendency for German traffic to become more concentrated on Frankfurt Airport under the influence of the present economic situation. He anticipated this trend would continue. particularly in respect of business travellers.

He emphasized the vital need for the new runway in order to meet peakhour traffic demands as well as to pro-

vide for future increases in traffic. He also reported that the Authority had made an estimated net profit of DM 20 million for 1982. The Authority will invest DM525 million of self finance funds up to 1984 including expenditure on the new runway 18 West.

DM5 million will also be spent on rehabilitating the forest areas adjacent to the airport and a further OM 1 5 million set aside for a voluntary scheme for soundproofing housing in the area.

25

The safety record tor civil aviation in 1 982 appears to be mixed: passenger fatalities in scheduled operations increased and in non-scheduled operations and general aviation activities the totals decreased.

Preliminary information on pasBut the 798 7safety figure for scheduled services was the best ever recordedsenger fatalities tor ICAO Contracting and 7982 was close overall ...

States, excluding the USSR, shows that the safety record achieved in scheduled passenger services in 1982 was not as good as in 1981, which was the best year ever.

Table 7. Aircraft accidents involving passenger fatalities on scheduled air serAccording to these initial data. there vices. 7963- 7982'. were 23 fatal aircraft accidents in ( 7982 data are preliminary estimates) 1982 involving 732 passenger Year Aircraft Passengers Passengerfatalities Fatal accidents fatalities in scheduled services (see per 100 million accidents killed Tables 1 and 2 and the accompanying per 100 million per 100 000 graphs). The corresponding figures tor Pass.- Pass.Km Miles Aircraft Aircraft km mile flown flown hours landings 1 981 were 18 fatal accidents and 350 passenger fatalities.

715 1963 31 0.49 0.78 1.46 0.90 0.39 0.46 It may be noted that tor 1982. as 1964 26 0.39 0.63 0.70 1. 13 0.32 668 0.37 for earlier years. the ICAO record of 1965 25 684 0.34 0.56 0.61 0.98 0.29 0.33 accidents and fatalities is probably in1966 31' 1 001 0.44 0.70 1.11 0.69 0.33 0.40 complete in reference to smaller 1967 30 678 0.25 0.40 0.57 0.91 0.29 0.35 aircraft in air-taxi types of operations.

1968 35 912 0.29 0.46 0.57 0.92 0.31 0.38 1969 32 946 0.27 0.43 0.48 0.77 0.27 0.34 both scheduled and non-scheduled.

1970 28 687 0.18 0.29 0.40 1.64 0.23 0.30 This short-coming is believed to be in1971 31 867 0.21 0.34 0.44 0. 71 0.26 0.32 significant in the over-all safety picture 1972 42 3 1 210 0.26 0.42 0.58 0.94 0.34 0.44 of commercial air transport.

1973 36 0.1 7 862 0.27 0.48 0.77 0.28 0.36 Relating passenger fatalities to the 1974 29 1 299 0.24 0.38 0.39 0.63 0.23 0.30 volume of traffic, the number of pas1975 20 443 0.08 0.12 0.27 0.43 0.16 0.21 senger fatalities per 100 million pas1976 20 2 734 0.12 0.19 0.25 0.41 0.15 0.20 senger-kilometres increased from 1977 24 516 0.07 0.12 0.30 0.48 0.18 0.24 0.04 in 1981 to 0.08 in 1982. The 1978 25 755 0.09 0.15 0.29 0.47 0.18 0.24 1979 31 878 0.10 0.16 0.34 0.55 0.21 0.29 number of fatal aircraft accidents per 1980 21 812 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.36 0.14 0.20 100.000 aircraft hours flown 1981 18 0.04 350 0.06 0.20 0.32 0.12 0.18 increased to 0.1 7 in 1982 from 0.12 1982 23 732 0.08 0.12 0.27 0.43 0.17 0.26 in 1981, and the number of fatal ' Owing to incomplete data. the USSR is not included. aircraft accidents per 100,000 land2 Includes one mid-air collision. shown here as one accident. ings also increased to 0.26 in 1982 3 Includes two mid-air collisions, shown here as two accidents. from O. 18 in 19 81 .

As has been noted in the past.

Table 2. Number of fatal accidents. passenger fatalities and survivors by aircraft safety levels are significantly different type in scheduled air services. 79 75-7 982'. for the various types of aircraft oper(Total international and domestic: 7982 data are preliminary estimates) ated on scheduled passenger services. In turbo-jet aircraft operations.

Classification 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total for which account for about 95 per cent 8 years of the total volume of scheduled traffic Fatal passenger (i.e., passenger-kilometres performaccidents ed), there were 11 accidents in 1 982 72 Turbo-jet 7 1l3 8 8 10 6 11 68 with 507 passenger fatalities (see Turbo-propeller 6 8 10 4 9 10 9 10 66 Piston-engine Table 2): in turbo-propeller and piston7 5 6 5 13 7 3 2 48 engine aircraft services. there were 12 Total 20 20 24 25 31 21 18 23 182 accidents with 225 passenger Passengerskilled fatalities.

Turbo-jet 332 434 324 553 642 698 194 507 3 684 The fatality rate for turbo-jet aircraft Turbo-propeller 67 241 133 154 174 1 79 1 1 77 86 143 operations is always tar lower than for Piston-engine 44 59 59 48 62 28 13 46 359 propeller-driven aircraft. This differ443 734 516 755 878 812 350 Total 732 5 220 ence may be explained in part by the Passengerssurviving route patterns and the general Turbo-jet 162 95 125 658 153 595 30 1 094 2 912 operating environments of the two Turbo-propeller 21 37 63 65 50 11 71 74 392 categories of aircraft, as well as by the Piston-engine 7 7 6 8 36 3 9 76 superior reliability of the turbo-jet enTotal 232 122 169 731 239 609 110 1 168 3 380 gine.

Data available on the safety of non' Owing to incomplete data. the USSR is not included.

2 Includes one mid-air collision between two turbo-jet aircraft, one non-scheduled scheduled passenger operations show that in 1982 there were 26 fatal acci(counted as one accident in the total).

3 Includes one mid-air collision between a turbo-jet aircraft and a small piston-engine dents with 1 66 passenger fatalities. aircraft on a training flight (counted as one accident in the total). compared to 23 fatal accidents with

1 982 Aviation Safety Performance Not Quite As Good As in 1981

26

269 passenger fatalities in 1981.

Non-scheduled commercial operations include both the non-scheduled flights of scheduled airlines and the flights of all types of non-scheduled commercial operators.

In non-scheduled operations performed with aircraft of more than 9. 000-kg take-off mass. whether by scheduled airlines or non-scheduled operators. there were two accidents involving 49 passenger fatalities in 1982 compared with six accidents involving 201 passenger fatalities in 1981 . The rate of fatalities per 100 million passenger-kilometres flown for these operations is estimated at 0.04 in 1982. a significant decrease from the 0 1 9 recorded in 1 981.

Complete statistical information on safety in general aviation operations (flying other than scheduled and nonscheduled air transport) is not available on a world-wide basis. In 1981. it is estimated that general aviation aircraft were involved in some 1.000 fatal accidents and the number of fatalities in these accidents was about 1. 9 50. The number of fatal accidents per 100.000 aircraft hours flown was about 1.9 in 1981.

In the United States. which accounts for over 70 per cent of all general aviation activity in the world, excluding China and the USSR. there were 574 fatal accidents in 1982 resulting in 1. 1 64 fatalities. according to preliminary information. The corresponding numbers for 1981 were 657 fatal accidents and 1.288 fatalities. For the United States. therefore. the rate of fatal general aviation accidents per 100.000 aircraft hours flown was about 1 .6 in 1982. a slight improvement from 1.8 a year ago.

(From ICAO Newsbulletin)

PATCO

from page 20

on the ground that the defendants were targeted because of their union office (GERR 955:5:31 ). Amato and Maimone later were found guilty of the lesser charge of criminal contempt. sentended to one year in prison (suspended). and fined S 1 .000 each.

• Oklahoma City. Five controllers were sentenced to 30 days in prison for criminal contempt. The sentence has been stayed pending appeal. In January. one of the defendants died of a heart attack. USATCO reports.

• Peoria. Illinois. Eight controllers who formerly worked at various locations in central Illinois were found guilty of criminal contempt. and fined $3.000 each. Their locals also were fined a total of$ 30.000.

1

400 1963 64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81 1982

I 1 200

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/

/ ~

-~

I/

Number of Passengers killed on scheduledservices

;"

I I\.

\

'\V

400 I

200

I

I

I

I

I

j

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I

0.7 0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

" \ /

Passenger Fatalities per l 00 million pass.-km.

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0.1

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0.0

1.0 -l---l-+------1--4-----11---4---1---+-L--L-"----L-_J____J_

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Fatal Accidents per 100 million aircraft-km,

0.4

0.2

Fatal Accidents per 100 000 landings

0.0 --'---'---L---'-...J---''----'--'---'--L---L-"----L--'-----'---'--_J_--'--_..l.----" 1963 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81 1982

Fatal accident rates for passengers on world scheduled services. 7963- 7982.

(Rates refer to traffic of /CAO Contracting States. excluding the USSR)

• Philadelphia. Five controllers were found guilty of criminal contempt of court.

Two were fined $500 each. two were fined $ 200 each. and one was fined $ 1.

• Pittsburgh. Ed Restor and two colleagues who were PATCO local leaders in Western Pennsylvania were convicted of criminal contempt. They were sentenced to six months in prison. three years probation. and eight hours of community service work per week for three years. They also were fined $1.000 each. The prison term was suspended on condition that the community service be performed.

When the three questioned the community service. Judge Gustave Diamond. of the US District Court for Western Pennsylvania. discussed the appropriateness of the requirement. Diamond concluded that the sentence would serve a rehabilitative

function as well as convey judicial displeasure with the PATCO leaders· disobedience of anti-strike injunctions (GERR

947:6).

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. declaring in a per curiam opinion that community service is •reasonably related' to the twin goals of rehabilitation and deterrence (GERR 972:11).

• Puerto Rico. Eight controllers were sentenced to five months in prison (all but four hours suspended). and fined $ 100 each. for criminal contempt.

• San Francisco. Five controllers pied no contest to reduced charges of criminal contempt. Each was ordered to perform 100 hours of community service.

• Tampa. Florida. Two controllers were fined $1 .000 for criminal contempt.

27

ASR-9 - A New Radar in an Old, Established Family

by K.J. Hawman and G. G. Clark This paper was presented at the Technical Panel of the 2 2nd /FA TCAAnnual Conference

Westinghouse has done it again.

Following closely on the heels of the ARSR-3 Enroute Surveillance Radar and the ASR-30 Airport Surveillance Radar. the ASR-9 will replace the ASR-4. 5 and 6 radars in the U.S ..

FAA inventory. The ASR-9 is also a new reliable ATC radar for growing international air traffic in airports where old vacuum-tube radars are becoming unreliable, non-supportable, and manpower-intensive.

The FAA Is committed to more reliable. unmanned, low or no-maintenance systems.

The ASR-9 is a giant step toward

achieving present and future FAA objectives. Westinghouse has added a space-age ability to ·see' better than any other ATC radar in use today.

Building on more than 40 years experience in radar technology, the company that has built more radars than any other company in the free world will provide the ASR-9, the future standard for air traffic control systems. This radar will use the latest high technologies to solve the two greatest problems facing busy airports today: heavy weather and heavy traffic at the same time with the same radar.

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28

Filling a Universal Need The air traffic controller all over the world has the same basic needs. A need to visually track all aircraft on his display. large and small. slow or fast, in clouds. in rain, in snow. or in heavy ground clutter. They all have a need to ·see· only aircraft and not ground clutter or false targets. They cannot lose the aircraft in the clutter. They all have a need to ·see· the heavy weather coming in and a need not to have false alarms. A need to know everything that's going on in his area of air traffic control. These needs are the same in Singapore as they are in Casablanca. or London. or New York, or Riyadh, or Caracas. The amount of air traffic compounds the problems; so does a sudden storm. These needs are universal; the ASR-9 will fill these needs.

What Makes It Better?

What makes the ASR-g better than the existing ASR systems? The new system is the first airport surveillance radar that uses sophisticated spaceage digital data processing. Within the past 10 years, Westinghouse has made tremendous advances in integrated circuit technology, also experimenting in Gallium Arsenide and moving close to the 500,000-bit chip. Westinghouse is also the leader in Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC) for the US Department of Defense. Applying the high-speed high-throughput signal and data processing work to civilian radar systems has enabled Westinghouse to make a quantum leap forward. In a field where vacuum tube technology is still quite common, digital data radar processing permits very high system reliability at a very reasonable cost. A unique addition within the ASR-9 is called the 'Moving Target Detector' (MTD). first developed by the Lincoln laboratories of MIT and tested and evaluated by FAA experts.

Reliability Plus Availability All air traffic controllers desire an air traffic control radar that will provide faultless performance 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. The FAA tests on the ASR-9 will ensure close to 100 percent availability. The ASR-9 meets that goal because it is actually a dualchannel system, with one channel operating with the antenna while the other channel is on standby. In case of a failure, the standby channel is switched into the antenna. This redundancy gives the air controller an amazing availability of 99.9 percent!

That is less than 10 hours of downtime per year!

Redundancy has been carried into the antenna subsystem in the form of dual drive motors and dual aximuth pulse generators. The antenna, the pedestal. and the rotary joint are carefully designed to achieve a very low mean-time-to-repair.

Solid-state experience gained in other Westinghouse radars has been incorporated into the RF/ IF receiver, which is fully solid-state. The front end has a very low noise transistor amplifier and a PIN diode sensitivity time control unit with a digitally generated STC control waveform. The transmitter is also solid-state, except for the proven air-cooled. long-life Klystron power amplifier.

The solid-state modulator has 1 2 parallel plug-in switching modules to give fail-safe, fail-soft operation. Full power is guaranteed even if two modules fail.

With additional module failure, reduced coverage is provided and the transmitter is still doing its job.

The dual-channel design, the advanced integrated circuit technology, the solid-state design of components. and the use of digital data processing add up to the most reliable and most available radar in the FAA inventory.

Solving the Maintenance Problem Westinghouse logistics experts often remark that radar maintenance costs come in two bills: the first bill is the initial purchase price and the second cost is never mentioned with the first. That is the hidden cost of maintaining the radar over many years of daily use. This cost often escalates because it includes the cost of power. and the salaries of maintenance personnel. field engineers, and logistics planners. Also. there are the costs of ~pares. training, technical data related to maintenance, modifications to update the equipment, etc. Westinghouse logisticians point with pride to the fact that all Westinghouse radars, including the ASR-9, are designed from the start with life-cycle costs added in as part of the equation. More attention has been given to low maintenance cost because that is one of the prime objectives of the FAA. Westinghouse has incorporated a Remote Maintenance Subsystem (RMS) to remotely monitor and control the operational status. performance parameters. the engine-generator power, and the radar site security. These monitored parameters will be transmitted over land telephone lines to an ATC Control Center. Electronic equipment monitoring is done

by BITE (Built-In Test Equipment), another innovation proven in other radars. Fault detection is presented in

ASR-9 borrows from other Westinghouse systems proven in the field real-time and fault isolation upon request. The RMS gives the airport administration completely unattended monitoring, and control and automatic warning. Thus, greatly reduced manpower costs are part of the system· s cost savings. Integrated circuit technology and the RMS Subsystem also give the user greatly reduced maintenance costs over the long lifecycle of this solid-state radar.

Typical Airport Scenario To give a typical scenario of this remote monitoring and control capability, consider a case where a failure occurs in the active channel. A remote alarm is given and the standby channel is switched into the antenna. This may be done by the supervisor at the ATC display/ control center. The indi-

vidual responsible for radar maintenance is notified and uses the remote monitor display (which may be located anywhere) to determine what has failed in the previously active channel or any other failure, such as a drive motor. The maintenance technician then goes to the radar site knowing which subsystem has failed and takes the required spare part(s) with him. (If it is not a critical failure, the visit may be delayed.) Once there, repair or replacement of the faulty solid-state unit can be quickly accomplished. As seen from this simple scenario, maintenance personnel required for any radar is greatly reduced as compared to many existing systems where three shifts of on-site maintenance personnel are normally required. And, special logistic planning has gone into the 29

design of the ASR-9 for rapidly changing such items as the pedestal main gear or drive motors when maintenance is required.

The Westinghouse ASR-9 is a new radar system for the next several decades to come, a design based on over 40 years experience in radar, from the world's leader in radar systems. It is a system that meets or exceeds all FAA operational requirements and all Westinghouse expectations. It is a radar system born from a universal need to ·see· everything in the air around an airport. In all kinds of weather ... in ground clutter ... in the heaviest air traffic.

The ASR-9 will fully solidify the vital FAA objectives for the revitalization and expansion of the USAs National Airspace System, and Westinghouse is offering the ASR-9 to a growing international air traffic control market in which vacuum-tube radars are common. The ASR-9 is truly a world-class radar system that satisfies the real needs of air traffic controllers all over the world.

...

TRANSMITTER

Kenneth J. Hawman, Marketing Communications, Defense International

RECEIVER/PROCESSOR

Guinn G. Clark, Marketing Manager A TC Systems, Surveillance Radar Division, Westinghouse Defense & Electronics Systems Center (US.A.)

30

ASR-9 is a completely new system of space-age modules

Followup Study of the United States Air Traffic Control System The National Transportation Safety Board has issued a series of recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration designed to improve the safety of the nation's air traffic control system.

The recommendations resulted from the Board's ·second look' at the air traffic control system since the August 1981 strike by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization. The strike led to the firing of more than 11.000 controllers. and the system is now operated by a small fraction of the original controller workforce and supervisory employees. newly trained controllers. and military controllers on loan to the FM. The four-month-long followup investigation raised concerns regarding controller training and proficiency. monitoring of controller stress and fatigue. and ATC management practices. including quality control measures and traffic flow control. which the Board believes must be resolved before the system can take on additional traffic and still be ·safe.'

For example. the Board said key 'system safety indicators· such as near midair collisions and pilot and controller deviations from air traffic rules are underreported. This fact was confirmed in personal interviews with controllers, and by data from questionnaires and by computer analyses. Without an accurate picture of these errors 'the margin of safety cannot accurately be measured and may not be as wide as it should be.· the Board said.

To help correct the problem, the Board urged the FM to utilize a computerized program which would identify. extract and store the data in its ATC computer regarding these types of errors for analysis by management personnel. In addition. the Board recommended that the FM adoptfor a specific period of time - an •error reporting' program for controllers and pilots which would include a provision barring punitive action aga·inst those who made reports.

The problem of inadequate monitoring of controller stress and fatigue - a safety issue the Board raised in its earlier appraisal of the ATC system - still is unresolved, the Board said. Investigators found that many controllers continue to work long hours. and are subject to stress.

But neither FM management nor its medical staff have acted to address the need for a program to forestall the effects of stress and fatigue. As a result. the Board reiterated its earlier concern that the agency act on the problem without delay.

The Board also called for improvements in the procedure used to monitor controller proficiency. The current procedure involv-

ing the direct oversight of controllers by a first-line supervisor and annual over-theshoulder proficiency checks. is inadequate at best. and does not provide a realistic measure of a controller's proficiency. the Board said. Moreover, the Board pointed out that first-line supervisors still are heavily engaged in performing controller duties which interfere with effective supervisory activities.

The Board also stated that many senior controllers are conducting on-the-job training for 5 to 7 hours per shift, which is stressful for the instructors and trainees in heavy workload situations and does not necessarily provide a meaningful learning situation for trainees.

Evidence gathered by the Board indicates that the FM has been successful in providing sufficient numbers of trainees to reach its stated goals for replacement controllers. However. the Board concluded that 'the lack of adequate quality control procedures and inadequate oversight of controller training and proficiency. without remedial action, could result in a lessening of the FAA' s ability to maintain the safety of ATC operations.'

The Board noted tlJat overall nationwide traffic volume handled by the ATC system has been allowed to increase to about 100 percent of the prestrike level with only about one half of prestrike work force. Return of the ATC system to 100 percent requires continued overtime and reduced vacation time for many controllers. The Board cautioned that further increases in traffic volumes before supervisors are released to their previous roles could have an adverse impact on the level of safety of ATC operations.

The Board found that all segments of the ATC system users have increased their operations since the initial cutbacks with no major strike-related safety problems emerging for commercial users. Nonscheduled users are experiencing difficulty obtaining service from the system. particularly in obtaining the services of Flight Services Stations.

The Board also noted that many pilots are flying under visual flight rules rather than within the ATC controlled environment because of the inability of difficulty in communicating with Flight Service Stations. The reason Flight Service Stations are not providing adequate services to users. according to the Board. is that reduced staff. antiquated equipment

and additional workload since the controller strike have led to an overload of its capacity.

• The Safety Board's followup report on air traffic control was approved unanimously. While concurring with the study in general. Board Members Donald D. Engen and Francis H. McAdams filed an additional statement. While stating that there is room for improvement in the current system. Board Members Engen and McAdams stated that any implication there is a lack of safety is not supported by •objective data of the day-to-day operation of the system.'

Early in its followup investigation. the Board issued additional recommendations to the FM on the subject of controller training. With the completion of the report. the following additional recommendations were made to the FAA. standardize and immediately disseminate guidelines on stress and fatigue detection to all ATC supervisors; expedite the development of the ATC Performance Assessment Program to assist ATC supervisors and managers to objectively evaluate controller performance; expedite the development and implementation of a computer program procedure which will aid in keeping track of possible unreported controller errors or pilot deviations; institute procedures to ensure adequate direct supervision by first-line supervisors to promote the detection and reporting of all controller errors and to control fatigue. stress or workload: revise ATC directives to reduce or eliminate. possibly by means of an immunity program. the punitive nature of the current reporting system: encourage ATC controllers to use the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Safety Reporting System to supplement existing reporting programs: improve equipment capability and adequately staff Flight Service Stations: restrict the increases in air traffic volumes and services until sufficient controllers are trained to allow first-line supervisors to return to their primary jobs; and staff all ATC radar facilities with data systems personnel. qualified to assure that the computer equipment will establish continuous recording and data retrieval.

South Korea Work is to start next spring on the expansion of Seoul-Kimpo International Airport to handle traffic for the 1986 Asian Games. It will involve the building of a new and considerably larger international terminal. expansion of the domestic terminal. and a new cargo terminal that is twice the size of the present one. Other developments include lengthening of the existing runway and setting up of a second parallel runway.

31

Membership

Benefits

SEEREVERSESIDE

NOTTRANSFERABLE ,

List of hotels granting discounts to IFATCA members upon production of their valid membership card

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC' CONTROlt:ERS • ~SSOCIATIONS

MEMBERSHIP-CARD AUSTRIA Parkhotel. Graz Hotel Maria Theresia. Innsbruck Hotel Europa. Innsbruck Hotel Tyrol. Innsbruck Hotel Touringhaus. Innsbruck Holiday Inn. Innsbruck Tourotel. Linz Hotel Sportklause. Niederau-Wildschbnau. Tirol CANADA Seaway Hotels: Montreal. Toronto. Ottawa. Halifax. Kingston Hyatt Regency: Montreal. Vancouver. Vancouver Airport Hilton Canada: The Queen Elizabeth Montreal. Montreal Aeroport Hilton at Dorval Airport. Toronto Airport, Harbour Castle Hilton Toronto. Quebec Hilton, Vancouver Hilton Hotel Loews La Cite, Montreal DENMARK Hotel Mercur. Copenhagen Hotel Richmond. Copenhagen Hotel Du Nord Greena. Greena ENGLAND The Churchill. London The London Ryan Hotel FIJI Fiji Mocambo Hotel. Nadi lnt'I Airport FRANCE Holiday Inns: Paris Orly Airport. Roissy Airport, Avignon. Lille Lesquin, Lille Macq en Baroeul, Strasbourg GERMANY Holiday Inn, Munich GREECE Chandris Hotels HOLLAND Hotel Krasnapolsky. Amsterdam Hotel Ibis. Amsterdam Airport HONG KONG The Empress Hotel. Kowloon HUNGARY Budapest Hilton Duna Intercontinental Atrium Hyatt Budapest Novotel Budapest Hotel Expo ICELAND Loftleidir Hotel. Reykjavik IRELAND International Airport Hotel. Dublin The Gresham Hotel. Dublin Blooms Hotel. Dublin The Killarney Ryan Hotel The Limerick Ryan Hotel The Galway Ryan Hotel The Yeats Country Ryan Hotel The Westport Ryan Hotel ISRAEL Country Club Hotel Israel Hiltons ITALY Etap Hotel Boston, Roma Etap Hotel Astoria, Firenze Etap Hotel Bologna. Bologna Etap Hotel Club Paestum. Salerno KENYA Hotels & Lodges of African Tours and Hotels Ltd. - South Coast Hotels Two Fishes & Trade Winds North Coast Hotels Mombasa Beach, Mnarani Hotel.

Whispering Palms - Safari Lodges Kilaguni. Ngulia. Voi. Meru Mulika, Mountain Lodge. Marsabit. Hunters Lodge - Milimani Hotel, Nairobi

32

VAUDUNTIL • l'

JUNE1983

THE HOLDEROF THISCARDIS AN INDIVIDUALMEMBEROF IFATCA

Grosvenor Hotel. Nairobi Sunset Hotel. Lake Victoria Tea Hotel, Kericho Mt. Elgon Lodge LUXEMBOURG Holiday Inn, Luxembourg Hotel Empire. Luxembourg MEXICO Hotel Las Hamacas. Acapulco Acapulco Imperial NETHERLANDS ANTILLES Holiday Beach Hotel, Curacao NEW CALEDONIA Hotel le Nouvata, Noumea Noumea Hotel. Noumea NEW ZEALAND Hotel Chateaux Commodore, Christchurch Colonial Inn Motel, Christchurch Ambassador Travel Hotel. Wellington South Pacific Motor Inn, Lower Hutt The City Hotel. Dunedin Angus Inn Motor Hotel, Hastings Bungalow Tourist Hotel. Rotorua Travelodge Australia Ltd.: all Travelodges and Parkroyals throughout the South Pacific PERU Hotel Crillon, Lima 'PORTUGAL Lisboa Penta Hotel, Lisboa Balaia Penta Hotel. Albufeira. Algarve SEYCHELLES Reff Hotel. Mahe SPAIN Penta Club, Ibiza Sun Club Bungalows, Playa del Ingles & Maspalomas SRI LANKA Hotel Lanka. Oberoi. Colombo SWITZERLAND Hotel d'Auteuil. Geneva Holiday Inn, Zurich-Regensdorf Mbvenpick-Hotel, Zurich-Airport TUNISIA Hotel Les Orangers, Hammamet TOGO Hotel De la Paix, Lome USA International 6 Motel, Disneyland, Anaheim VENEZUELA Doral Beach Villas & Hotel. Puerto La Cruz YUGOSLAVIA Hotel Lav. Split HERTZ car rental in several countries

Detailed information as to rates and hotel addresses are available at the IFATCA Secretariat and will be provided to interested members on request.

Corporate Members of I FATCA AEG-Telefunken. Ulm. West Germany Allcorn Data. Ltd .. Nepean. Canada AMECON Division. Litton Systems Inc .. Maryland. USA AN SA Advisory Group Air Navigation. West Germany Cardion Electronics. Woodbury. USA CAE Electronics Ltd .. Saint Laurent. Canada Cossor Radar & Electronics Ltd .. Harlow. UK Dictaphone Corporation. New York. USA Eaton Corporation. AIL Division. Farmingdale. USA Ericsson AB. SRA Communications. Stockholm. Sweden Ferranti Limited. Bracknell, UK Goodwood Data. Systems Ltd .. Carleton Place. Canada IKO Software Service. Stuttgart. West Germany Jeppesen & Co. GmbH. Frankfurt. West Germany Lockheed Aircraft Service Company. Ontario. USA Marconi Radar System. Chelmsford. England M.B.L.E .. Brussels. Belgium The Mitre Corporation. Mclean. USA N .V. Hollandse Signaalapparaten. Hengelo. Netherlands N .V. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken. Eindhoven. Netherlands Philips Telecommunicatie lndustrie B.V .. Hilversum. Netherlands Plessey Company Ltd .. Waterloo. Canada Racal Decca Systems Ltd .. London. England Racal Recorders Ltd .. Southampton. England Raytheon Canada Ltd .. Waterloo. Canada Rediffusion Simulation Inc .. Arlington. USA SandersAssociates. Inc .. Nashua. USA Schmid Telecommunication, Zurich. Switzerland Selenia lndustrie Elettroniche. Rome. Italy SEL-Standard Elektrik Lorenz, Stuttgart 70, Germany Societe d' Etude et d' Entreprises electriques, France Sofreavia. Paris, France Software Sciences Ltd., Farnborough. England Sperry Univac. Sulzbach. West Germany TERMA ElektronikAS. Lystrup. Denmark Thomson. CSF, Paris, France Ulmer Aeronautique. Clichy, France VWK- Ryborsch GmbH. Obertshausen, West Germany Westinghouse Electric Corp .. Maryland. USA

The International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers· Associations would like to invite all corporations. organizations. and institutions interested in and concerned with the maintenance and promotion of safety in air traffic to join their organization as Corporate Members.

Corporate Members support the aims of the Federation by supplying the Federation with technical information and by means of an annual subscription. The Federation· s international journal 'The Controller' is offered as a platform for the discussion of technical and procedural developments in the field of air traffic control.

Air Traffic Control SELENIA

SATCASSimulator I Controller under training

a ~.,;:ar~1J

I

To simulate ATC you must know ATC The SATCAS simulator is an advanced air traffic control simulator, used for training of Air Traffic Controllers in both basic and advanced techniques of the approach, terminal area or en-route phase.

Blip-Driver

The simulator uses the same basic equipment and modules as the SATCAS operational system. The simulator may therefore be either completely autonomous unit, or integrated in an operational system.

Selenia is experience in air traffic control systems.

ATCAS Rome Center

----------1 - - - -',

~-

!!/-JE::._JE:~■~ --------

Selema/DRSC Relaziom Esterne • Pubblicua '83

INDUSTRIEELETTRONICHEASSOCIATE S.p.A.

CIVIL RADAR AND SYSTEMS DIVISION Via Tiburtina Km I2,400,00131ROME, ITALY Telex 613690SELROMI. Phone 06-43601