IFATCA The Controller - 1st Quarter 1983

JOtJRNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS' ASSOCIATIONS

1/83 BERN. SWITZERLAND

1 ST QUARTER 1983

VOLUME 22

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IFATCA JOURNAL OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

THE CONTROLLER Bern, Switzerland, March 1983

Volume 22 • No. 1

Publisher: International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers· Associations. P.0.8. 196. CH-1215 Geneva 15 Airport. Switzerland Officers of IFATCA: HH. Henschler. President. Lex Hendriks. Vice-President (Technical). E. Sermijn. VicePresident (Professional}. Pat o·ooherty. Vice-President (Administration). B. Grezet. Treasurer Editor: A. Avgoustis 5 Athens Str. Ayios Ohometios Nicosia. Cyprus Telefon (021) 4 87 86 Publishing Company and Production Service: ·oer Sund·. Verlag und Oruckerei AG 3001 Bern. Effingerstrasse 1. Switzerland Telephone (031) 25 66 55 Printed by: ·oer Bund·. Verlag und Druckerei AG. Bern. Switzerland Advertising Sales Office: THE CONTROLLER 5 Athens st. Ayios Dhometios. Nicosia. Cyprus Telephone (021} 4 87 86 THE CONTROLLER."Der Sund·. Verlag und Druckerei AG (Address as for Publishing Co.) Subscriptions and Advertising Payments to: IFATCA/The Controller. Union de Banques Suisses PO Box 237 CH-1 21 5 Geneva Airpert Switzerland Acc. No. 602 254.MO L

Subscription Rate: SFrs. 8.- per annum for members of IFATCA; SFrs 20.- per annum for non-members ( Postage will be charged extra).

Contributors are expressing their personal points of view and opinions. which may not necessarily coincide with those of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers· Association (IFATCA}.

IFATCA does not assume responsibility for statements made and opinions expressed. it does only accept responsibility for publishing these contributions.

Contributions are welcome as are comments and criticism. No payment can be made for manuscripts submitted for publication in "The Controller. The Editor reserves the right to make any editorial changes in manuscripts. which he believes will improve the material without altering the intended meaning.

Written permission by the Editor is necessary for reprinting any part of this Journal.

Advertisers in this issue: Sabena, Ferranti, Philips, Selenia Photos: AA, Archives Cartoons: Martin Germans

CONTENTS International Aspects of ATC Liability (R. Bootsma) 3 EGATSFuel Economy Forum 8 Operation of ILS During Snow and Ice Conditions (J. A. Stendstadvolden) 10 China Airlines 14 Legal Responsibilities of ATC (R. Weston) 16 Optical Parking System for Aircraft 20 Third Level Airline Operation: The UK Dilemma (J. Levesley) 22 Hawkeyes for Egypt 26 Newsbriefs 31 The Achilles· Heel of the Big Jets 33 What about MoroccoAirTraffic Controllers? (Ph. Domagala) 34 Moscow ATC-A Professional Visit (P. Gugnoni, P. Meledandri) 35 Big Brother's Hot Breath 36 8th Europe-West Regional Meeting 38 Air Florida 90 Accident 40

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etteryouareatco ecti isptayi_n.g.(;lata, · he ~learer~the ATCpie u~. need thecapability of: we';e used our experience both of rranti. s\f • •,,, . . • 1: :,.'· ' • • ATC and air defence, . . .

Wi,,are not m,the data.

If the data 1snot available, we quisi~i.onbµsiness butwe vyill.t e • can S}'Ilthesizedisplay infonnat_ion t~ h:?;?,:,\ih9eyer_has~t:..... fromcivi\ , frqm.fligllt'plans and position . • pJiilitqiy or from .the country riext. ';;.;, reports.

•,., . . oor if.need be. Dafa doesn't hav.eto -,.•. • We can'also do ~heother"kind of e.on~f'spo_t'.It can.b~exti.-acte4and , • simul~tion -)ortr~ining,_.Y-alidation '. d qver larg~ dis~~rn;es~d then . and evaluatiqh .!:;•somethingwe haye, 6;ordin;it~witli ~he_datafrom your , been d.9ing~ormany years. , • , . . ··sensors., • ·~ . • • , . If you are-in the airtraffic_ • ,de.signingequipment for Fen-anti can I management busine§>s • • ' and &splaying the data ,7 ' help. And the p~ople who ,. pay,your .;

route charges will almost ce;tainly appreciate y9ur usµ1g \IS, •.

Ask }'.Ourself,are you using the data· availaoJ-etq_th_ebes·t~dvant~ge?

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:-Co_mpute"r Systems CS02/37 /052 !m)

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL LIABILITY

BY R. BOOTSMA

Part I

Rob Bootsma Born in Soerabaja (Indonesia) on August 7. 7948. and came permanently to the Netherlands in 7958. After finishing secondary school. he attended a one-year course at a nautical college in Amsterdam and started his career as mate in the merchant service. were he had responsibility for the navigation and the loading and discharging of general cargo. In 1910 he was called up to do his National Service and received a training as navigator on the Breguet Atlantic. This was the first time that he came in touch with air navigation and his interest in aviation matters was aroused. He was educated as an air traffic controller at the training schools of Eurocontrol in Luxemburg in 197 3 and started his practical training at Maastricht in September. In 19 76 he had the opportunity to start a study in law at Rotterdam University. This article on air traffic control liability has been written in the final stage of that study. which he concluded in September 1982.

Preface From 1962 until 1967 !CAO had been dealing with the liability of air traffic control agencies. Consensus existed that it would be useful if there were international rules for regulation of the liability of air traffic control agencies 1 . The answers to a questionnaire gave more insight in the difficulties associated with the formulation of such rules 2 . Examination of the possibilities was discontinued and the subject was left pending.

Recently the matter was raised again. But the scene has changed and this means that other problems have arisen. In this paper I would like to look into some of these problems.

Chapter one will primarily give an outline of the legal basis of air traffic control. The conclusion is justified that there is a problem of delimitation of jurisdiction of ATC and the authority of the aircraft commander. The introduction and development of automation leads to the question: What

are the effects of a computer failure on liability questions? Chapter two will explain how questions of civil liability are dealt with in the Netherlands. 1he Federal Republic of Germany. the United Kingdom. Australia and the United States. I shall only raise the question for situations where an accident occurs and close attention will be given to case-law. I will go into problems related to strike; they are of a different nature compared to the acts of an air traffic controller within the sphere of his competence.

Comparative law offers the possibility to locate new developments and tendencies. From this it can be deduced to what extent international regulation is desirable.

In chapter three I will mention some of the problems to be solved and draw conclusions from the observed developments in this area. As ICAO is engaged in air traffic control liability questions again. it can take the opportunity to limit the financial liability of the air traffic controller. as his legal position in this respect is not clear.

1

!CAO doc. 8582 - LCI 153-2 p. 32 and !CAO Doc. 8 78 7 - LCI 156-1 p. 133.

2 !CAO doc. 8582 - LCI 153-2 p. 35-121.

3

1. Air Traffic Control; Its Legal Basis 1.1 Demand for Regulation For decades people were faced with the question: should the use of airspace be based upon sovereignty of the States or should freedom of the air be recognized as a rule similar to the principle that the high seas are open to all countries? Acceptation of freedom of the air would open magnificent prospects for the progress of air transportation. However, most states require protection of their security and also of their economic interests.

In the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation the principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty of the States over the airspace above their territory was recognized 3 . Requirements of national safety and the avoidance of dangers to which the inhabitants of an overflown country and their property might be exposed, by unrestricted use of the airspace, underlie this theory.

Recognition of sovereignty involves the acknowledgement of the right of each State to set up regulations for air traffic, i.e. impose differeht conditions and restrictions on foreign aircraft. including the possibility of prohibiting them to navigate at all over its territory 4 .

1.2 Rules of the Air From art. 28.a of the Chicago Convention it follows that each contracting state undertakes, so far as it may find practicable, to provide, in its territory, airports, radio and meteorological services and other air navigation facilities to facilitate international air navigation in accordance with the standards and practices recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this Convention. It can be assumed that each contracting State, in virtue of art. 28.a has the obligation to render air traffic services.

According to art. 3 7 of the Chicago Convention the ICA0 shall adapt and amend from time to time, as may be necessary, international Standards

and Recommended Practices (SARP's) dealing with among other things the rules of the air and air traffic control practices. In order to secure the highest. practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, each contracting state undertakes to keep its own regulations to the greatest possible extent uniform with these SARP's 5 .

For air traffic controllers it is essential to determine which rules constitute the law for them. In this respect Annex 2 (Rules of the Air) and Annex 11 (Air Traffic Services) are of great importance. Annex 2 contains only standards which are defined as any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as necessary for navigation and to which contracting states will conform in accordance with the Convention.

Under art. 38 of the Convention it is compulsory to notify the ICA0 if any state finds it impracticable to comply with any such standard. Recommended Practices are defined as any specification for physical characteristics, configuration. material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as desirable in the interests of safety, regularity or efficiency of national air navigation, and to which contracting states will endeavour to conform in accordance with the Convention.

1.3 Procedures to Be Applied by the Air Traffic Controller From the preceding paragraph it will be clear that the contracting States can deviate from the SARP's.

There is one exception: by virtue of art.

1 2 of the Chicago Convention the rules contained in the annexes have to be applied directly over the high seas.

Air traffic controllers have to take extreme care that they apply the cor:-ect rules as they may vary dependent on the position of the aircraft. The annexes are not coercive, unless the SARP' s have been incorporated in

national law. When providing air traffic services over the territory or the territorial waters of a country the air traffic controller should follow the procedures laid down in the national law of that country and when he is giving air traffic services in delegated airspace, he may have to follow different procedures which form part of the law of the delegating State 6 .

The way in which the rules of Annex 2 and 11 should be applied are laid down in the •Procedures for Air Navigation Services· (Doc. 4444, RAC/ 501 / 11 ), supplemented by the •Regional Supplementary Procedures· (Doc. 7030) which give subsidiary procedures of regional application. As the PANS do not have the same status as the SARP's, we will have to look into national law in order to determine which rules are the legal procedures 7.

The procedures which have to be applied by the air traffic controller are given in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), which is itself a legal document 8 .

1.4 Air Traffic Services and Its Objectives To decide if there is a need to provide air traffic services one has to consider the types of aircraft involved, the density of air traffic, the meteorological conditions and such other factors as may be relevant 9 . After having established which service will be provided 1°, the airspace shall be designated in relation to the air traffic services that are to be provided. We have to distinguish between controlled airspace and uncontrolled airspace; the responsibility of the air traffic controller depends on the type of service that he will render.

In general the objectives of air traffic services shall be to 11 : 1 . Prevent collisions between aircraft.

2. Prevent collisions between aircraft on the maneuvering area and obstructions on that area.

3. Expedite and maintain an orderly flow of air traffic.

4. Provide advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights.

7 of the Chicago Convention of December 7, 7944: already in 79 79 this principle was recognized in the Paris Convention on International Civil Aviation.

4 Art. 9, 7 7 and 72 of the Chicago Convention.

5 Art. 72 of the Chicago Convention.

6 Annex 7 7, eh. 2, art. 2. 1. 7 gives a State the legal authority to delegate to another State the responsibility for the provision of air traffic services over its territory.

7 E. McCluskey: Law of the Air (7) 'The Controller' 2 I 1g 79, p. 23.

8 Art. 745 RTL. 9 Annex 7 7. eh. 2, art. 2.2.

10 The air traffic services comprise air traffic control service, flight information service and alerting service.

11 Annex 11, eh. 2, art. 2. 2.

3 Art.

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5. Notify appropriate organizations regarding aircraft in need of search and rescue aid. and assist such organizations as required.

When providing air traffic control service in controlled airspace the air traffic controller will pursue objectives (all above mentioned objectives) which differ from the aims that he will pursue when giving air traffic advisory service in advisory airspace 12 .

A second distinction to be made is that a pilot may choose to fly in accordance with visual flight rules (VFR) or instrument flight rules (IFR).

Visual flight rules are those regulations followed by pilots when they execute a flight in conditions of visibility and distance from clouds equal to or greater than those specified in chapter 4 of Annex 2 (we can think of them as good weather conditions).

When a flight takes place in weather conditions below these minima, the pilot has to fly in accordance with IFR. An !FR-flight in controlled airspace has the obligation to obtain an air traffic control clearance.

The air traffic controller will apply specified separation minima when issuing clearances to provide separation between aircraft. Under certain circumstances the air traffic controller must communicate instructions to the pilot to make sure that the required separation is maintained (we can think here of vectoring of aircraft. speed control, etc.). UnderVFR it is the pilot who will see to it that his aircraft is separated from other aircraft. except when operating within a control zone.

1.5 Responsibility of the Pilot Annex 2, chapter 2, art. 2.3.1 states: 'The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall, whether manipulating the controls or not, be responsible for the operation of the aircraft in accordance with the rules of the air, except that he may depart from these rules in circumstances that render such departure absolutely necessary in the interests of safety', and Annex 2, chapter 2. art. 2.4: 'The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall have final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft while he is in command.'

So. the ultimate responsibility for the safety of an aircraft rests with the pilot-in-command, but, with the increasing complexity of air traffic. he must often rely completely on those who provide air traffic services. The prescription 'the pilot-in-command' of an aircraft shall be responsible for compliance with air traffic control instructions or clearances received' is no longer contained in Annex 2. Does this mean that a pilot may deviate from the instruction that he has to continue on his present heading? In my opinion he may not. except when an emergency arises. Air traffic control would be of no use and result in chaos. if pilots could deviate at their convenience. In most national laws we still find a regulation that air traffic control clearances are to be complied with 13 . The problem we are here concerned with is one of delimitation of jurisdiction of air traffic control and the authority of the aircraft commander. I will come back to this in chapter 3.

1.6 Automation in Air Traffic Control The primary objective of air traffic control is the avoidance of collisions, in other words the provision of safety; only after this objective has been attained expedition of air traffic can be seen as a secondary objective. These objectives are achieved consequent on the interaction of three elements: equipment. procedures and people.

The problems posed to the air traffic controller are often complex because of such factors as: a. Widely different performances of different aircraft types. b. Some aircraft flying in accordance with VFR and others with IFR. c. Weather conditions affecting different aircraft to different degrees. d. Civil and military units sharing the same airspace 14 .

The last 24 years we have seen an immense increase of air traffic. Considerable improvements have been achieved in aeronautical technology; aircraft fly at higher speeds and are able to navigate directly to destinations with the help of inertial navigation systems; the development of high performance propeller aircraft leads to situations where both slow

and fast moving aircraft can operate at the same heights.

There is a need for the airlines to replace older aircraft by more advanced types to be able to compete commercially with other air carriers.

This process of growth implies that improved ATC-systems are required or that different procedures have to be applied; the ATC-systems should be as advanced in development as the traffic that they must handle 1 5 . However, some national administrations seem reluctant to spend money on new ATC-systems; other countries make use of high technology equipment with all its advantages. Then we have the human factor: after all people are essential to the functioning of a system; this entails consequences in the field of ATC liability and I will go further into this in chapter 3.

2. Liability of ATC for Negligent Acts 2.1 The Netherlands The authority responsible for civil aviation is the Department for Civil Aviation of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works 16 . Under art. 76.1 b LVW (Aviation Act) further regulations can be laid down for the furtherance of the safety and the regularity of air navigation. The Air Traffic Regulations ( LVR) provide for this, but as they are of a public nature, they do not contain regulations of civil liability. The air traffic services are provided by the Government and no specific legislation applies to the civil liability for damage resulting from the provision of such services. Therefore the question, whether ATC can be held liable for the effects of its instructions has to be answered on the basis of common law.

2.1.1 Tort; First Principles In regard to art. 1401 BW (Civil Code) the tortfeasor is under an obligation to make good the damage caused by his wrongful act. To determine whether liability exists. several conditions have to be fulfilled and the plaintiff has to prove this. He has to

12

That part of a flight information region (FIR) where air traffic advisory service is available: see also the comment of Mr. Outers of Eurocontrol on the 75th session of the Legal Committee, !CAO Doc. 8582-LCI 753- 7.

13 Art. 4 7.4 Jo art. 3 7. 4 6VR-Air traffic control clearances and instructions are to be complied with, except in circumstances that render departure necessary in the interest of safety: Canada, Air Regulations, part 5 section 505 - The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall comply with all air traffic control clearances or instructions received by him.

14 B. Adderley: Measuring and improving ATC capacity, 'The Controller·, 79 79, p. 7.

15 See M. Lewis: Area control, who needs it? 'Input·. spring 79 7 7 -magazine of the Eurocontrol Guild of Air Traffic Controllers.

16 AIP Netherlands. GEN 7. 7. 7.

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show that the defendant has committed a wrongful act, that the defendant was at fault and that the unlawful act (or omission) has caused the damage.

The tortfeasor will be liable for the damage. both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss. only if the unlawful act and the damage can be imputed to him. A causal connection between the act and the damage exists if the defendant could reasonably foresee the damage. To establish this we have to take into account the common knowledge and experience and the particular knowledge of a person of normal education who finds himself in an equal situation as the tortfeasor 17 .

When it is a question of contributory negligence. the tortfeasor has to make good only a part of the damage. The liability of both defendant and plaintiff will be proportional to the degree of negligence 18 . Since 1928 the Supreme Court applies one restriction: the 'Schutznorm •-theory requires that the purport of the infringed rule is to protect the interests of the plaintiff which have been damaged 19 .

2. 1 .2 Direct Liability of the Government The air traffic controller is a public servant and he has been set a well defined task by the law. The state is a corporate body and by virtue of the law the air traffic controller is authorized to render air traffic services for which the State is reponsible. Such a person can be described as an organ. A corporation acts by means of its organs. so far as the organ acts within the sphere of its competence. i.e. the organ as such performs the instructed task.

This is also the case if the organ acts in defiance of instructions given to him or in defiance of the law 20 . The act of the organ will be identified with the act of the corporate body; the corporation can commit a tort and can be held responsible by virtue of art. 1401 BW 21 .

17

So, when an air traffic controller acts negligently, the government will be directly liable. The government has a right of recourse. but this is a disciplinary measure. which will not be dealt with in this paper.

2. 1 .3 Competence of the Civil Judge; Unlawful Act of the Government A claim based on a tort of the government can be brought in civil court (art. 2 R.O.). The right which is to be protected. the object of the dispute. determines whether the civil judge is competent 22 . When it concerns a specific coporate act. the Government can be held liable by virtue of art. 1401 BW 23 . In principle the Government is subject to the same liability as a private person. The provision of air traffic control services is a public task and while discharging its obligations the government has a certain discretion. which differentiates the acts of the government from those of a private person. On the other hand limits have to be set to this freedom of action. This implies that the judge will apply other standards when he judges the unlawfulness of the act. Originally only two standards were applied; acts of the government could be declared unlawful if the act was: a. conflicting with a statutory regulation: b. conflicting with a right of someone else.

Confliction with the unwritten law could be used as a yardstick 24 .

The jurisprudence after 1940 justifies the conclusion that the judge applies the standard of due care 25 . however. the old doctrine has never been revoked explicitly. Next to the above mentioned measures the Supreme Court applies the following standards: a. Detournement de pouvoir: the government is only allowed to use

its power for a purpose for which that power has been given 2 6 . b. Arbitrariness: the issue at stake has to be weighed reasonably 2 7 .

The civil judge has to refrain from judgement of those acts where the government may use discretion: outside the circle of •pouvoir discretionnaire· the judge may express his opinion with two restrictions 28 : i. A distinction is made between statutory provisions which have no other purpose than to give internal instructions and regulations which warrant protection of the interests of the plaintiff. This is the public counterpart of the civil •Schutznorm· -theory and liability of the Government is only assumed if the regulation intends to protect the interests of the plaintiff.

11. If the government has discretion. no judgement can be given of the appropriateness of the act 29 .

2. 1 .4 Liability of the Air Traffic Controller Dependent on the circumstances there are two cases where the air traffic controller can be held liable personally. We have seen that. in principle. the government is liable by virtue of art. 1401 BW 30 . but this does not preclude the liability of the organ. At first the organ may be liable personally 31 : the air traffic controller may be liable. but only if he personally acted negligently towards the plaintiff 32 . Secondly. the air traffic controller is liable if he acts outside the sphere of his competence. In that case art. 1403. 3 BW. which creates liability of the employer for negligent acts of his employees can be of interest. The tenor is to give more security that the plaintiff will be indemnified for the unlawful inflicted damages 33 . The government will be vicariously liable for a tort committed by an official. if

Asser-Rutten 4 - Ill. p. 99.

Asser-Rutten 4 - Ill. p. 706.

19 HR 25-05- 7928. W. 7 7885. NJ 7928 - p. 7688; HR 24-0 7-7930. NJ 7930. p. 299.

20 Asser-Rutten 4 - Ill. p. 706.

21 HR 70-06- 7955. NJ 7955 no. 552.

22 HR 37-72-7975. W. 9947.

23 HR 20-7 7-7924, W. 7 7293. NJ 7925, p. 89.

24 HR 29-06- 7928, W. 7 7864. NJ 7928. p. 7 738.

25 HR 79-03- 7943, NJ 7943, no. 3 72.

26 HR 74-07-7949, NJ 7949, no. 557.

27 Marginal test; HR 25-02- 7949. NJ 7949. no. 558.

28 Asser-Rutten 4 - Ill. p. 2 74.

29 HR 29-03- 7940. NJ 7940, p. 7 728.

30 See 2. 7.2.

31 HR 06-07-7933. W. 72559.

32 Compare HR 37-07-7958 and HR 22-72-7967.

33 Asser-Rutten 4 - Ill. p. 724.

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the duties of the official are connected with the unlawful act: a judgement about this is dependent on the appreciation of the facts. To illustrate both possibilities I would like to investigate in what position the air traffic controller would find himself in case of a strike.

2.1.5 Strike and Similar Actions Some public tasks are of such importance that it cannot be permitted that the continuity of the provision of service degenerates to a dangerous level. The air traffic controller has an official duty to provide air traffic services. He violates his duty if he decides to go on strike. By means of a strike or similar actions. such as go-slow or gosick actions, the air traffic controller tries to put pressure on the government in order to attain economical and/ or technical improvements of his working conditions. As case law is lacking. it is not certain how the judge will construe a strike action.

Firstly, he may decide that the air traffic controller acted as an organ 34 and that he personally acted negligently towards the plaintiff. The plaintiff has the choice to sue the government or the air traffic controller. Especially in the case of a go-slow action the judge may reason that the air traffic controller acted as an organ.

Though he is still rendering air traffic services, he does not use his power for a purpose for which that power has been given 35 .

Secondly, the judge may have the opinion that the air traffic controller

did not act within the sphere of his competence; that he did not act as an organ. In this view the air traffic controller does not fulfil his duty of care and because of the close relationship between the duty of the air traffic controller and the unlawful act, he will be personally liable for tort. The government is vicariously liable in virtue of art. 1403.3 BW. In general the air traffic controller is potentially insolvent; in such cases the plaintiff will try to sue the government.

Who ultimately bears the responsibility and the costs depends on the relationship employer-employee. This being a question of disciplinary nature it will not be dealt within this paper.

2.1.6 Situation With Respect to Air Traffic Control The authority responsible for civil aviation has the point of view that the air traffic controller is merely giving advice. which the pilot-in-command of an aircraft is free to follow or not. Air traffic control does not accept any responsibility for the consequences of its instructions. This conception implies that there is no ground for an action in virtue of art. 1401 BW, when an air traffic controller has given a wrong instruction 36 .

The Netherlands' Aviation Board has the same opinion with regard to instructions. This appears from the finding concerning the accident with a KLM-aircraft on July 1 2, 1949 near Bombay. The board considers: 'The pilot-in-command was under the influence of a dangerous advice of

air traffic control to climb to 800 ft'. and •Air traffic control had provided advice, which was not attuned to the situation and that on the one hand compliance with incorrect advice may present negligence of the pilot-incommand, but on the other under certain circumstances the pilot-incommand is not to be blamed.'

There is no case law available. which gives more insight in the matter. but in my opinion it remains to be seen whether the civil judge will reject a claim for damages sustained by a negligent act of air traffic control. The idea that the air traffic controller is giving advice is wrong. The air traffic controller is not providing an air traffic advisory service 3 7 . but an air traffic control service 38 . Moreover. the jurisprudence gives rise to the belief that a claim, based on tort, will be awarded. I will return to this in chapter 3.

2.2 Federal Republic of Germany The air traffic control task has been assigned to the BFS (Bundesanstalt tor Flugsicherung) under authority of the BMV (Bundesminister tor Verkehr).

Is it noteworthy that in the German juridical literature much attention has been paid to automation in air traffic control and the effects of failure of an automated system.

The given opinions may be of special interest for the modification and further development of the liability system.

(Part II - in next issue)

34

See 2. 7.2.

Detournement de pouvoir: see also D. E. v.d. Heuvel: Aansprakelijkheid van overheid en verkeersleiders bij akties van verkeers!eiders.

36 J. P. Honig: Overheidsaansprakelijkheid en luchtvaart. NJB 795 7 p. 76 7: /. H Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor: /nleiding tot het luchtrecht, 79 73, p. 32.

37 See 7.4.

38 AIP-Netherlands: Rax. 014. 7.

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EGATS Fuel Economy Forum Organization and Participation

Nearly 200 international participants attended a Pilot/Controller Forum on Fuel Economy at Maastricht (The Netherlands) on Thursday 25th November. 1982. The forum was the highlight of several activities conducted by the Eurocontrol Guild of Air Traffic Services (EGATS) on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of that European Association of Air Traffic 8

Controllers. The attendance of so many high-level civil and military international experts is indicative of the magnitude of the fuel problem and of our great mutual concern.

Aims and Objectives Following presentations with guided tours of the highly advanced Eurocontrol Upper Area Control Center at

Maastricht airport and an anniversary luncheon, the forum was opened by EGATS President Jan Gordts. in the early afternoon at the Hotel Maastricht. There could probably not have been a more appropriate venue since the summit conference of the European Heads of State had also taken place here earlier.

Jan Gordts outlined the objectives of the forum as a platform for pilots and controllers to discuss the practical and most efficient application of fuel economy measures.

In this context, the forum was considered supplementary to an international seminar which had been held at the Eurocontrol Institute of Air Traffic Services in Luxembourg from 2628 October. 1982. Under the chairmanship of Walter Endlich. Deputy Head of Operations of the Maastricht Upper Area Control Center. pilots and controllers from 10 states. associated with various civil and military companies/ organizations, engaged themselves in highly professional and extremely lively deliberations for 6 hours.

The chairman of the forum panel had introduced the panel members: Chairman: W. Endlich.Eurocontrol Maastricht;Miss L. Austin, UK Guild of Air Traffic Control; R. Bootsma. Eurocontrol Maastricht; Lt. Col. W. Ehrhardt. German Air Force; Capt. W. Jennes. VNV (& Europilote);Major W. Lynd. USAF; J. Marx. LTU; Capt.

Rasmussen. DALPA; A. Scheers,Belgian Guild; J. Velenturf BAA (& Philips).

The main aims of the forum were to increase fuel economy consciousness and to elaborate how scarce and increasingly dear aviation fuel could be saved.

In matters beyond the immediate responsibility of air traffic controllers.

EGATS had sought professional advice of experts. At the appropriate phases of the discussion, they provided informative contributions, illustrated by visual aids: Management System in Air Transport. A.G.L.M. Weijts, Hollandse Signaalaparaten B.V. Development of jet fuel prices and the influence of jet fuel prices and availabilities. Marcel Duym, Petrofina.

Aircraft design with a view to fuel economy, H. Wickardt. Chief Performance Engineer. Fokker.

Aircraft engine influence or fuel conservation, M. Muir. Chief Engineer, Flight Operations, Rolls Royce.

Assistance to pilots by flight management/ performance computers, Dimitri Ivanoff, Manager

Flight and Support Directorate.

Airbus lndstrie.

Following these presentations discussion turned to how air traffic control can assist in saving fuel.

Aircrah operators and controller associations had previously expressed views on the various phases of flight in a questionnaire distributed by EGATS. Start-up, taxiing and take-off; Climb, cruise and descent; Approach and landing.

The determined approach to the problem displayed during the discussion by both the panel members and the audience gave an impression of an attempt to •squeeze the last drop of fuel out of the system.· Follow-up Action The important areas of potential fuel saving which have evolved will be published for wider dissemination by EGATSin the beginning of 1983. thus maximizing the benefit of today· s findings. The participants will be encouraged to make further efforts to exchange data relating to improved economic operations. and perhaps to pool resources.

Significance That such a wide spectrum of the aviation industry should be present in Maastricht is indicative of the central location at the junction of 3 major European countries. The presence of Eurocontrol and the resultant activities will inject further stimulus to business in a wide area. Derived reduction in fuel cosumption has universal benefit both for the locally based aviation business and for the travelling public. An improved cost-effectiveness in aviation operations, however slight, could bring about the much-needed upswing in the travel and freight industries.

Changes It was apparent from the discussion which took place that, following the exchange of informative material between pilots and air traffic controllers. a more enlightened attitude and increased awareness of the impact of aviation operations on fuel consumption is under way. Pilots will communicate their requirements to ATC. with considerable help from airborne flight management systems.

This in turn will enable the ATC personnel to provide a more economic flight profile, with less fuel consumed.

The need for further improvements in provision of more widespread use of advanced technology in certain air

traffic control locations was also emphasised.

An evaluation of potential fuel savings which could be expected from ATC measures in Europe is in the vicinity of 1 5% of the total consumption by air transport in Western Europe.

Other Areas Specific areas, however, considered to contain most potential for fuel economy and - to a certain extent already put forward by other parties, e.g. IATA - were re-identified by the forum: Realistic start-up procedures Undelayed taxiing Minimum gate holding Least restrictions (e.g. for noise abatement) after take-off On-course uninterrupted climb Optimum rate-of-climb Optimum flight level Optimum routing, with due con-

Temporary Change to Controller Maximum Age Approved With encouragement and support from aviation organizations. the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has concurred with the Secretary of Transportation's proposal to raise temporarily the maximum entry age limitation from age 30 to 35 for air traffic controllers. The temporary change would be effective through December 1 984 in order to assist in restoring the air traffic system capacity.

The maximum entry age limitation provision for controller positions in en route (center) and terminal (tower) facilities was established by Congress in Public Law 92-297, enacted in May 1972. which authorized the Secretary of Transportation to establish the age limitation with the concurrence of the OPM. The maximum entry age limit of 30 was set at the time. precluding the consideration of individuals who reached their 31 st birthday.

The temporary change raising the age limitation to 35 years of age applies only to individuals with high quality aviation experience: in flight service station operations, in air traffic control under instrument flight rules who have received air traffic control specialist certification, or

sideration of the prevailing and forecast weather situation Need for precision flying (speed, horizontal/vertical flight profile).

Absorption of any arrival delay by means of 'linear holding· Precise definition of 'Top of descent' and start of descent right there Continuous descent Straight-in approach, without delay Appropriate facilities at destination to permit approach and landing under minimum conditions High-speed turnoff from runway Undelayed taxiing Practical Application of short-term measures for fuel economies being the key-note of the forum - rather than longer-term projects such as. for instance, the reduction of vertical separation above 29,000 ft - a wide range of quite specific problems were also put forward and discussed in deta ii.

as a pilot with 100 hours of instrument flight time and either an airport transport rating or a commercial licence with an instrument rating.

In addition, individual exceptions are allowed without regard to a specific age limitation only for certain military air traffic control positions in FM facilities.

It was recommended to the DOT and OPM that the maximum entry age limitation be increased to age 40 and that the mandatory retirement age of 56 be waived to make use of experienced air traffic controllers during the rebuilding phase. However, OPM and DOT said that P.L. 92-297 provides for mandatory retirement of air traffic controllers at age 56. and applicants hired between ages 31 and 35 would still be able to acquire 20 years of service for retirement eligibility before reaching the mandatory retirement age.

Controller Register Opens The register for air traffic control specialists will reopen November 8 with applications for positions at GS-7 and GS-9 in towers and centers being accepted through November 30. Applications from individuals between ages 31 and 35 with prior experience in certain air traffic control facilities or air traffic control related functions will be accepted.

9

Operation of ILS During Snovv and Ice Conditions JA. Stenstadvolden, chief engineer. Aeronautical Services Office. Norwegian Telecommunications Administration

General Weather conditions with precIpItation of snow and rain introduce various problems to civil aviation. Aircraft operations are impeded by difficulties such as reduced visibility and reduced friction coefficient on runways.

Occasionally also the Instrument Landing System (ILS) is out of order due to weather effects.

This article will deal with the operation of ILS under snow conditions and will describe means to reduce the susceptibility of I LS to weather effects in order to facilitate all weather operations.

It is especially the glide slope part of I LS which is susceptible to accumulation of snow. The ILS localizer is far less susceptible. and the ILS Marker Beacons are rarely disturbed by weather effects. The various parts of ILS are therefore dealt with in the above mentioned order.

It is assumed that the glide slope and localizer facilities have external course line monitoring. while dis-

Weather effects like snow. slush or icing conditions present various difficulties to civil aviation operations. Factors like adhesion of slush to the aircraft body, reduced visibility and reduced runway friction coefficient make the landing more critical.

In addition such weather effects may cause outages of the Instrument Landing System (ILS).

However. precautions may be taken to combat the above mentioned weather effects on ILS. This article. which is written on the request of the All Weather Operations Panel (AWOP) in the Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) deals with the techniques developed in Norway to make the ILS more resistant to weather effects.

10

placement and clearance monitoring are provided on integrated basis.

Snow Effects on ILS Glide Slope In figure 1 is indicated the general concept of glide slope radiation. Vital for the formation of the signal structure in space are signal reflections from a plane stable ground area in front of the glide slope antenna mast.

For conventional glide slopes. this area may extend to a length of 500 m.

changes in the radiated glide slope signal structure affecting both the external monitor indications as well as the indicated far field signal structure.

Qualities of Snow In the case of snow on the ground a situation as indicated in figure 2 occurs. The glide slope effective transmitter antenna heights are reduced by the height of the snow layer H 1 .

This corresponds to the case of wet snow which has a high coefficient of reflection. a situation which may exist in the air temperature interval - 2 to

+3°C.

JA. Stenstadvolden The structure and quality of this area plays an important role for the structure of radiated signal field.

For special Wide Aperture glide slope antenna systems the near field ground reflected signals are not required for the formation of the far field signal structure. and the radiation from the antennas towards the ground is kept at a minimum. This radiation. though. is not negligible. and changes in the nearby ground plane may cause changes affecting both the external monitor and the far field signals.

In figure 1 are also indicated both the primary ground reflection areas for the external monitoring signal field area A-as well as the primary ground reflection area for the far field signals which are employed by the aircraft during landing - area B. One of the most important factors for the formation of a correct glide slope signal structure in space are correct transmitting antenna heights above the effective ground reflection plane. Any change in the antenna heights will result in corresponding

In conditions under lower temperatures the snow may act as a more transparent material. and the reflection of radiated signals from the surface may be reduced. Only part of the signal is reflected from the surface. while part of the signal penetrates the snow and is reflected from a layer of snow with higher conductivity and thus higher coefficient of reflection. or from the ground surface. The electrical rays penetrating the snow are subject to additional phase shift due to the dielectric constant of snow which is higher than for air by a figure typically in the range 1-2.0 relatively.

The electrical properties of snow will vary over a wide range as a function of ground and air temperature. air humidity and water content in the snow. snow density and pollution content and also other factors such as wind. sunshine and rain.

A layer of snow on the ground will change its electrical properties according to the changing meteorological environment. The snow therefore represents a variable and unpredictable medium. Only a few qualities can be stated as a general guidance: 1 . Dry snow of light structure with low density which has fallen during a cold period. air temperature of - 5 ° C or below. appears like a transparent medium. and will in most cases have no noticeable effect on the radiated glide-slope signal as long as the temperature

stays constant. The radio rays are reflected from the conductive ground plane and the propagation through snow introduces no extraneous phase shift.

2. Wet snow falling during air temperatures of - 5 ° C or higher will have an effect like raising the ground plane level. The radio electric rays are now mainly reflected from the surface of the snow. This has the effect of raising the glideslope angle and changing the displacement sensitivity below and above the glide path.

8 Oire:t end gro~nd ref!ect£d radlot,on signals

Effects of Snow

A = monitor signal reflection area 6 = far field signal reflectio!l are a

In figure 2 is indicated the situation experienced during conditions of wet snow on the ground in front of the ILS glide-slope. The height of the snow layer is H 1 . This has the effect of increasing the glide-slope angle V1 by an amount dV. Radiated glide slope angle V is now V = V1 + dV

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nominal angle V1 = arc tg HL2 The aircraft in the far field will notice the increased glide-slope angle dV during descent and also an increased crossing height over the runway threshold increased by H 1.

In normal cases the glide-slope angle will increase roughly by about 0.25 degrees per 0.6 m of snow depth. This figure may vary according to glide-slope antenna system and nominal glide-slope angle.

In figure 2 it is noticed that the glide-slope now passes a height H3 above the course line monitor probe.

H3 is the result of the increase H 1 in the height of reference plane and the increase in glide slope angle dV. H3 = H 1 + L tg dV The monitor will indicate any angle changes referenced to the nominal ground reflection plane. The course line monitor now ·sees· a glide slopeangle corresponding to V2 = arc tg

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Protective and Preventive Action Snow Removal The removal of snow from the critical glide-slope area. marked as area B in figures 1. 2 and_3. should be given the highest possible priority. In figure 3 is shown the size of the critical area. from which the snow should be removed when the snow height in front of the glide-slope exceeds 40 cm. The superfluous snow should be spread out evenly distributed along the rim far from the runway. avoiding accumulation of snow piles higher than 1.5 m.

As mentioned earlier. the monitor will exaggerate the angle changes caused by the snow.

It is therefore advisable to clean the monitor area A for snow as soon as the snow depth is more than 8-10 cm.

However. it must be noticed that the snow depth in area B should not exceed 40 cm in any case.

Wide aperture glide-slope systems can tolerate snow depth up to 1 m, both in area A and area B. Generally, it will be an advantage when areas A and B are surfaced with asphalt.

Monitor Counterpoise In many cases it may be difficult for the airport maintenance service to provide expeditious snow removal.

Also the plane-area in front of the glide-path may suffer from inadequate surface weight supporting ability to carry snow removing vehicles.

A solution which is employed to alleviate the glide-slope monitoring problem and to make it less dependent on snow removal. is to construct a

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metal counterpoise to provide a stable reflection plane for the monitor only.

The counterpoise consists of a metal reflection plane with wire meshes with dimension 6 X 6 cm. which ensures that the snow passes through and accumulates on the ground below the counterpoise.

The height of the counterpoise is about 60 cm. corresponding to the maximum permissible height for snow which may lead to a glide-slope angle change beyond monitor tolerances.

The length and the width of the counterpoise are adequate to cover a major part of the Fresnel Zone for the reflected field monitor signal. In addition care must be taken that the glide slope signal within the azimuth and elevation coverage area is not disturbed.

A typical example of a monitor counterpoise is shown in figure 4.

Since field monitor stability is now ensured. a field monitor position in the 3 60 ° monitor distance can now be employed.

Monitor counterpoises based on this principle have been in use in Norway at 8 glide-slope sites for 20 years.

A monitor counterpoise will also stabilize the glide-slope during cases of flooding.

In cases when snow depths of more than 60 cm may accumulate an electric-wire heating system has been installed on the ground beneath the counterpoise for snow removal.

Snow Effects on ILS Localizer The ILS localizer is far less susceptible to outages due to snow on the ground when snow is evenly distributed. A localizer antenna array of height one wavelength (2. 7 m) may tolerate up to 1 m of snow.

The critical factor will be the field monitoring, which will indicate reduced field strength due to the shift in the height of the reflection-plane as described for the glide-slope - figure 2.

Also. electrical coupling to ground of the transmitter and monitor antenna elements will increase. which will affect the antenna impedance.

A more difficult case to deal with is unevenly distributed snow. This case may arise due to local wind conditions. The construction of the antenna array support structure and the location of the equipment shelter may be factors which influence the uneven distribution of snow in front of the localizer .

When snow accumulates in such a manner as to result in a slope transverse to the direction of the course line. a shift in the far-field course-line

Norwegian !LS localizer antennas subject to snow trials

may result. Depending on the location and size of this slope area. this shift in the position of the course-line may not always be detected by the field monitor. In such cases a far-field monitor has proved a valuable tool.

Corrective Action In figure 5 is indicated the size of the localizer snow sensitive area. from which the snow should be removed when exceeding 0.9 m of height. The edges of the area should have sloping rims. and snow heaps higher than 1.5 m should be avoided.

From the area in front of the field monitor-area A-the snow should be removed if higher than 0.5 m.

In the table below are given the figures for maximum permissible snow depth before snow removal must be initiated.

Localizer Glide-slope A B A B Maximum snow depth in m 0.10 0.40 0.50 0,9 Table 1. Maximum snow depth limits for ILS. The numbers allow a margin before facility shut-down occurs.

Accumulation of Snow on Antennas General Another factor disturbing ILS operation is the adhesion of snow and slush on antenna elements.

The higher dielectric constant of snow or slush will cause several effects: a) when adhering to the antenna feeding point the antenna input impedance is greatly affected and

the radiated signal consequently reduced; b) the electrical length of the dipole is altered due to the different dielectric constant of the snow material.

This alters both the antenna impedance and the element radiation diagram.

In an antenna array with multiple elements varying layers of slush or snow may change the different antenna elements differently due to local wind conditions throughout the array. This leads to changes of the radiated signal in ILS antenna systems.

Method of Protection Modern antennas are of broadband construction which is more resistant to detuning effects caused by snow adhesion.

The most efficient means of protection is to include the vital parts of the antenna in a protective radome.

This should cover both the antenna signal feeding point and the major part of the dipoles.

The radome should be given a smooth and suitably formed surface to reduce the adherence of snow and slush. A major part of ILS localizer and glide slope antennae; in Norway have been adequately protected by this method.

When deemed necessary. also ILS marker antennas can be protected by this method.

For smaller ILS localizer antenna systems a wooden roof of light construction has also proved efficient.

Antenna Heating Systems In some case ILS localizer and glide-slope antennas have been provided with heating elements inside the

radiating metal tube structure. This technique will give a high degree of protection from detuning effects of snow or slush. On the other hand the heating capacity may be inadequate during conditions with high amounts of precipitation and wind. This solution is also vulnerable to technical faults and power failures.

Conclusion The precipitation of snow and slush has often severely disturbed the operation of ILS. However. techniques exist to improve the weather resistance of ILS and with careful application of these techniques it is possible to obtain stable operation of ILS also during these critical weather conditions for the benefit of aircraft operations.

Acknowledgement The author wishes to thank Mr. Tor Breien. senior engineer at Norsk Marconi. for the use of photos showing snow experiments with the Norwegian logperiodic !LS localizer antenna.

References Readers who want to familiarize themselves with the principles of ILS and ILS antennas may use the following articles: Svein 0. Andreassen: Aeronautical ground navigation systems - the situation in Norway. Telektronikk no. 3, 7978 J. A. Stenstadvolden: Norwegian antennas for civil aviation, Telektronikk no. 3, 79 78.

J. A. Stenstadvolden: Antenner for luftfahrt, (in Norwegian), Telektronikk no. 4, 7987.

13

China Airlines: A Brief Introduction

China Airlines. Ltd. (CAL). the flag October 1962. which was indeed a route -was later extended to Hong carrier of the Republic of China. was demonstration of CAL's enthusiastic Kong, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. founded December 10. 1 959 by a support to the needs of the country. making CAL the first airline to operate score of well trained and experienced This entirely Chinese funded and scheduled and direct all cargo flights aviators who had retired from the Air operated civil aviation enterprise, now in the area. Its fast and dependable Force. Their purpose was to promote with its groundwork firmly established. services are appreciated by all custhe civil aviation industry in the Re- set out -to procure jetliners and oper- tomers. public of China in response to govern- ate international flights. First the TaiIn order to offer better facilities, ment policies. Their guidelines. which pei-Saigon scheduled flight was in- CAL launched its first Boeing 74 7 have been sincerely followed by all augurated in December 1 966. Then. jumbo jetliner into service on the CAL members. were •Flying Safety' CAL routes to Tokyo. Osaka and Hong trans-Pacific route from Taipei through and •Best Service·.

Kong were opened in April 1967. In Honolulu to Los Angeles in June It all started with a total of twenty October of the same year. these 1975. On July 9, a non-governmental six air ·and ground personnel, two PBY routes were extended to Seoul, agreement on civil air transportation amphibious aircraft. and some simple Manila. Bangkok. Singapore and was signed between the Republic of maintenance facilities. But they were Kuala Lumpur. In January 1969, the China and Japan. As a result. the air not discouraged by these stark con- Taipei-Okinawa-Osaka route was link between the two countries was ditions. With a pioneer spirit they reestablished on August 10. and the added. In August 1971 the Taipeiworked hard to find ways and means Jakarta route was inaugurated. With CAL' s trans-Pacific flights were again for expansion. First. more capital all these expansions. the CAL network rerouted through Tokyo to the west funds were accumulated to procure now linked all major cities in East and coast of the United States. additional aircraft. Then charter flights Southeast Asia. for group passengers were set in opIn keeping with CAL's principle of Expansion eration; air freight services were extended to all major cities in Southeast rapid expansion, a trans-Pacific flight The year 197 6 saw more improveAsia. Furthermore. CAL undertook to was inaugurated in February 1970 ment and expansion. In order to do such public services as sea rescue, with services along the line from Hong modernize its fleet. CAL bought three air observation for fishery and irri- Kong through Taipei and Tokyo to San Boeing 737's to replace the Caravelgation, insecticide-spraying and aerial Francisco in both directions. thus les in domestic services. They started photographing. opening a new age in the history of the operating on May 1. In addition a new country's civil aviation. Then in April route between Taipei and Chiayi was 1971, a central Pacific route linking inaugurated on May 1 9 to meet the Public Programs Tokyo and Los Angeles through needs of the domestic market. In DeBecause of its extensive public Honolulu was added. With the open- cember of the same year. this route service programs and because of the ing of Taiwan's new international air- was extended from Chiayi to Makung, tireless working spirit on the part of its port at Kaohsiung. CAL started the and another route from Taichung to employees. CAL began to win recog- scheduled passenger service between Kaohsiung was inaugurated. nition and support from all quarters. Kaoshiung and Hongkong.

In the international operations, a On April 20, 1974. however, second Boeing 74 7 joined the CAL Permits were successively granted to CAL to operate scheduled flights from CAL's flights to Japan and Korea were fleetonJuly4, 1976toflyfromTaipei with through Tokyo to San Francisco. thus Taipei to Hualien and from Taipei to suspended in compliance Taichung. Tainan. Makung. and government decisions, and the trans- making CAL's trans-Pacific routes all Kaohsiung. thus completing the flying Pacific flights were rerouted through served by Boeing 7 4 7 jumbo jetliners. circle around the island. To assist the Guam. To make it up. CAL started its Furthermore, the Taipei-Fukuoka government in developing the remote Boeing 707 all cargo flight across the and Taipei-Fukuoka-Seoul routes areas along the eastern coast of the Pacific carrying freight along the route were reopened on July 14, 1976. island. CAL opened up the difficult and from Taipei and Kaohsiung through With the opening of the Taipei-Seoul unprofitable Taipei-Taitung route in Honolulu to Los Angeles. This cargo direct route in January 1978, CAL's 14

once suspended flights to Japan and Korea were now entirely restored. In another direction a new route from Taipei through Hong Kong. Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to Saudi Arabia was opened on October 3 1 . 1 9 7 6.

In April 1977 CAL inaugurated its direct flight between the Republic of China and the United States by a new Boeing 74 7SP. thus opening up the fastest and most time-saving services for its customers travelling between the two countries. In April 1978. a Boeing 7 4 7 was added on the Republic of China-US route. To replace the old with new ones. CAL retired its first Boeing 7 4 7 in May of the same year. In July 1979 still a not her 7 4 7 was procured. As a resuIt the scheduled flights on the trans-Pacific route have been increased by one flight each week since August 1979. and Boeing 74 7 planes are also used on the Taipei-Hong Kong-Singapore - Saudi Arabia route. On February 2 2.

1 980, the flight on the Taipei-Okinawa route was again resumed.

Cargo In a further effort to strengthen its services. CAL bought a Boeing 7 4 7SP in April 1 980. which joined in the direct flight between the Republic of China and the United States. In July of the same year a Boeing 74 7F was purchased for use in the all cargo flights along the route from Singapore through Kuala Lumpur and Hong Kong to Taipei. and from Taipei through Seoul and Fairbanks to Los Angeles.

In January 1 9 81 this cargo-route was further extended from Fairbanks to New York. In August the cargo-flight was rerouted through Anchorage to New York. Earlier in April a Boeing 7 4 7 was procured, and in October another Boeing 74 7SP was added.

Captain Y.S. Liu Director Operations Division, China Airlines Furthermore, new planes already ordered or to be leased include 1 Boeing 7 4 7SP, 1 Boeing 74 7. 4 Airbuses. and 2 Boeing 767's. They were scheduled for delivery respectively in March. June. July, October. December 1982. and July and November 1983 to join CAL's fleet.

Today China Airlines has a personnel strength of some 4.900 men and women working in country and abroad and operates a fleet of 1 9 planes including 4 Boeing 74 7SP's, 5 Boeing 74 7's. 1 Boeing 74 7F. 4 Boeing 707's. 2 A300's and 3 Boeing 737's.

In order to modernize its operations. CAL has, since August 19 7 4, computerized passenger reservation and other data processing procedures. In its 24-houroperation. CAL is the first one in this country to use 'real time on line· in data processing.

China Airlines· maintenance shop at Sungshan Airport. Taipei. with an area of some hundred thousand

square feet. is responsible for maintenance and repair work on planes serving CAL's international and domestic routes. Included in its facilities are an engine overhaul plant and jetengine test cell. Another CAL maintenance hangar. the largest so far in the Far East. has been established at Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport. occupying an area of 20,000 square feet.

Equipped with up-to-date facilities and staffed with trained technicians and skilled workers. these shops yield a monthly output of 200.000 man/hours. Licences to repair electronic communication systems, aircraft body, and engine meters and accessories were issued to CAL shops by FAA of the United States in 1968 and 1972. respectively. The aeronautical authorities of the United Kingdom. the Philippines. and Indonesia have also issued licences to CAL shops. Singapore and Malaysia have authorized CAL shops to serve the passenger liners of their respective countries in transit through Taipei. So. besides serving the company's own aircraft. CAL shops do maintenance and repair jobs on planes of many other airlines. international and domestic. as well as on military airplanes. Their quality products and reliable services have won the confidence and high praise of all customers.

For future development China Airlines in agreement with authorities in South Africa, Luxemburg. the Netherlands and France. is planning to operate flights into these countries.

Continuous efforts will be made to offer ever better passenger and cargo services and open up new routes into other areas of the world.

China Airlines Headquarters 15

Legal Responsibilities of ATC

by Richard Weston

This is the text of an address by Mr. Richard Weston to the 2nd Biennial Convention of the Civil Air Operations Officers· Association of Australia in Melbourne on November 7. 7982.

Mr. Weston is well known to air traffic controllers worldwide for his successful defense of the controllers involved in the Zagreb mid-air collision. He has since written a book about that experience and is routinely involved in aviation litigation as a result of his position as a principal consultant at Aviation Consultants International.

It is an inescapable fact that contributory factors to a large number of the worst accidents in recent years have included misunderstood communications. I worded that sentence very carefully and particularly in such a way as not to impute blame to anyone. Let us simply look at the record. we do not have to examine it because the mere mention of the names is sufficient in itself to chill the air of any ATC Conference.

Zagreb. San Diego. Tenerife with Pan American and KLM. and Tenerife again with Dan Air. to mention but a few. The requirement for clear and precise communication in aviation stretches from the drawing board through just about every phase of the industry. The classic case. which simply boiled down to communication. was the Paris DC-1 0. The manufacturer. the FAA. the airlines. everybody that was anybody. knew about the problems with the doorlocking mechanism of the rear baggage door. Everybody that is. except the man who had to close the door. The poor baggage loader - nobody thought of telling him. It was not a massive error. it was a little mistake. In fact it was only in relative terms. considering the size of the DC-10. a small locking bolt. but it killed 346 people.

Now in the ATC branch of the aviation industry. without putting an exact percentage on it. it is fair to say that a large part of air traffic control responsibility is in the field of communications. In the broad sense during the planning stages of flight and in the more direct sense in the control of flight. When one looks at the scope for error. no pun intended. it is nothing short of astonishing that the system works as well as it does. It is this breeding ground for errors that I want to examine today.

Let me say right away. that I view air traffic control as a service industry and the service can only be effective with the full cooperation of the people on the other end. the flight crews. It is of no consequence to a dead passenger's family how much gold braid may have been present on

16

the flight deck. what their total cumulative flying hours were. what the result of their recent medicals and proficiency checks were. Without the ability to communicate properly and clearly in an environment where their airborne colleagues are doing likewise. the world's best aircrew are simply a menacing liability to each other.

Communication is a two-way business with the onus on all those in the 'loop· to play their part. In essence communication can be defined simply as the passing of intelligence from one person or body to another. In few areas does the failure to communicate adequately have such dramatic effect as in aviation. If understanding the message is the key to effective communication there is clearly a responsibility on the part of the communicator and the communicatee to ensure that the understanding is correct.

In air traffic control terms this is accomplished by requiring pilots to 'readback' certain instructions in order that the controller may be satisfied that the message has been received correctly by the pilot. The cirumstances in which a full readback is required include. level instructions. heading instructions. airways or route clearances. clearance to enter or cross an active runway. SSR operating instructions. altimeter settings. VDF information and frequency changes. This requirement which reflects ICAO practice is laid down in the United Kingdom AIP. Many other countries similarly detail the requirement. In doing so the instruction clearly places an obligation on the pilot to readback these items and also by inference on the controller to ensure that they are readback. In practical terms this may pose great problems on a busy frequency where the over worked controller probably feels he has something more important to do than to enforce a readback from a recalcitrant pilot. There is a clear obligation on both parties to ensure that the procedure is complied with. Let us look at some examples.

An aircraft is given a clearance by departure control ·10 flight level 140'. because of inbound traffic descending to flight level 1 50 and is later requested to report 'through 90'.

The controller. wondering why the aircraft has taken so long to reach flight level 90 requests the aircraft's level and to his consternation discovers the aircraft is at flight level 170 climbing.

On investigating the incident it was ascertained that the pilot was under the impression that he had been recleared to 'flight level 290'.

Instructions were immediately issued

that aircraft would in future be asked to report 'passing flight level 90'.

The use of the word •clear' in taxi and holding instructions should be avoided if misunderstanding could arise should a pilot miss a word or two.

For example. the following clearance is passed.

Cleared into Position 'Cleared into position for takeoff' or •cleared into position. standby for takeoff.

If the message was not clearly received and the pilot understood the message as •cleared into position and takeoff. one shudders to think of the possible implications. It was demonstrated with appalling clarity in Tenerife.

The safer phraseology would be.

•cleared into position and hold' and thereafter specific takeoff clearance should be given. It has been said that in aviation we must learn from the mistakes of others. We do not have time to make them all ourselves: we must put our hindsight where our foresight should be.

The words· do not' or· don't' can easily be misunderstood or even missed altogether. For example. a pilot is given the following clearance. •cleared to taxi to the holding position runway 21. don't cross runway 15·.

The pilot could receive the clearance as. •cleared to taxi to the holding position runway 21 . cross runway 1 5 •. The safer phraseology would be. •cleared to taxi to the holding position runway 21. hold short of runway 15'.

The pilot would immediately know that there would be a very good reason for holding prior to crossing 21 .

•1 have got you on radar'. this phraseology does not define whether the aircraft is under radar control. radar identified or what.

There are a number of other expressions which are improperly used by both controllers and pilots. Here are some unusual terms used when controllers and pilots are well known to each other.

'Top of drop·. for top of descent. when it would be preferable to say. 'request descent clearance at ... • and if not received timely the pilot could give the reminder. ·standing by for descent clearance·.

Here is another as the aircraft commences descent. ·we are coming down now· or •on our way down·. instead of out of flight level blank for flight level blank or blank feet.

What about. ·we are there now·. meaning we have reached the cleared flight level by saying. •level at flight level·.

'This time:. instead of giving the accurate time over a reporting point. How about. 'hello Joe. two minutes to go·. instead of request descent at. For separation purposes one cannot stress too strongly the need for accurate reporting. There have been instances where position estimates have been as much as seven minutes out. quite serious when a ten minute procedural separation is being applied.

The expression. 'flight level' or 'thousands' is often omitted.

Air traffic problems are increased by the neglect to follow good airmanship rules.

The following are some examples.

I believe that however familiar many professional controllers may be with some of the pitfalls listed above that complacency can be a very grave danger and that it is up to management and controllers alike and to training captains and line captains to ensure that these pitfalls receive the widest possible circulation. Forewarned is forearmed.

On so many occasions we. and by that I mean the industry and the travelling public. get away with it. We report a near miss.

We categorize it and we file it. But. don't we all know that when there is an accident the knives are out. the fingers are pointing and charges. counter charges and writs are flying.

In particular, we find increasingly. particularly in the Tenerife accidents. that whereas the flight crews are happy with the gold braid. the prestige and the high salaries which go with being the final authority in respect of their aircraft, suddenly there is a great clamour to shift the responsibility into the control center or tower.

Well. this is a time for reflection. a time for a controller to say to himself, or herself. ·what are my responsibilities?'

Richard Weston (first from right) at the Convegno su: « L 'Assistenza Al Volo in Italia: Problematiche Giuridiche», in Rome, December 798 7.

An aircraft is given a STAR and while monitored on radar is observed to have moved off the STAR .heading for another NAV AID. when ATC queries the intention he is advised that the VOR is scaloping.

Entering a holding pattern at a high air speed and as a result overshooting the safe limits of the pattern: failure to report any problem with the aircraft· sown navigation or communication equipment which might lead to a total communications failure or effect navigational capability of an IFR flight in congested terminal areas or control zones: switching over to the company frequency without the permission of ATC: accepting a clearance which is not clear and/ or not reading it back or clarifying it before complying: deviating from a flight plan route and thus possibly interfering with adjacent routes: diverting around thunder storms or very bad weather without notifiying ATC. Reports Here are a variety of other comments which could affect safety. ATC has often been heard to request •report approaching a flight level·. For example. an aircraft is given descent clearance from flight level 350 to flight level 1 50 and told to report approaching flight level 200. What is intended here? Is it to confirm that the aircraft has passed through a level. or required to level out at some level?

Whatever the intention. surely when an

aircraft leaves flight level 350 he is already approaching flight level 200 or at what level would he be considered approaching flight level 200.

Neglecting to use call signs. or improper use of call signs can easily lead to confusion and even accidents. An example of this is where only the flight number is used and the company identification is omitted.

Some years ago there were two South African Airways aircraft with RT call signs.

SA-803 and SA-308. which often arrived at Jan Smuts within two or three minutes of each other and often the wrong aircraft would acknowledge an instruction necessitating the controllers to be especially vigilent.

In this case even when using the full call sign the danger existed of errors occurring.

The use of the word 'OK' and clicking of the microphone button as acknowledgement should be banned.

Another word. reference Tenerife and Dan Air. which is often misused is 'Roger· - which is sometimes thought to mean affirmative. I think we can do without it.

Bad enunciation and speaking too quickly. especially by controllers working in a high density area. tends to delay rather than expedite matters if pilots have to request repeats.

And. of course. one must not lose sight of the fact where international operations take place there is a far greater risk of misunderstanding due to the different nationalities involved.

Happily. I think we can dispense with the criminal law in this context quite briefly. Generally speaking a person can be guilty of a criminal offence if he acts contrary to the statute law of the land which makes his action a criminal offence. Or if he behaves by commission or omission with such a degree of negligence. or recklessness. as to have been totally unreasonable in assessing. or failing to assess the consequences of his action or inaction.

As far as air traffic controllers are concerned. just as the legal authority for the service you provide is well spelled out in legislation. so too may be other provisions against which you may be held to have transgressed in certain circumstances. For instance. in the United Kingdom the air navigation order includes the following provision: ·a person shall not wilfully or negligently act in a manner likely to endanger an aircraft or any person therein'. And a right and proper provision it is as I am sure you will agree. but although it has not happened (yet) it would seem that a controller could be held to be in breach of the order if he acted negligently.

I trust we can ignore any possibility of a controller willfully hazarding an aircraft.

What the legislation does not say is how negligent he must be to be considered in breach of the law. In the absence of case law it is probable that the common law definition would apply. that for a criminal offence to be committed the negligence must be gross negligence. This was established by the House of Lords in the United Kingdom in 1937 in the following terms. 'simple lack of care of such as will constitute civil liability is not enough: for the purpose of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established·.

In practical terms. what does this mean to controllers? It means that simple errors of judgement however serious the conse17

quences do not constitute a criminal offence. but gross dereliction of duty. such as playing cards instead of looking at the radar screen. or being drunk on duty. could well incur criminal liability whether or not this results in an incident or an accident.

Of course. in order to assess the degree of culpability of a controller a court would need to examine the intricacies of the ATC system and the controller's role therein in some detail.

The facets of everyday operations which are second nature to a controller may be anything but clear to a court.

Imagine. for instance. trying to explain how you. 'lost the picture· under pressure.

A clear enough concept for fellow controllers to understand but not so easy to explain in the cold analytical atmosphere of a court of law. I do not have to tell you that whereas it is impossible to cover the wide variations in legal practice which may affect controllers internationally. recent events have shown that in certain countries a controller making an error under severe operational pressure has not been proof against conviction against a criminal court. But if the chances of a criminal charge being levelled against a controller are hopefully small the same cannot be said of questions of civil liability. In terms of the anglo-saxon understanding of the word negligence. reduced to its simplest form. we are talking about the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. a breach by the defendant of that duty and damage resulting almost directly therefrom.

Taking the existence of the duty for granted. how do you prove breach of duty?

This raises the question of what standard of skill is required in-the first place? In law the standard required is that of a reasonable man. in ATC terms. of an averagely competent and proficient controller.

Thus. the fact that your colleague is well known as the •ace of the base· and could have handled the situation. whereas you. an averagely proficient controller. became overloaded and made a mistake does not mean that you were negligent.

However. should you find yourself unable to cope with the traffic situation which a reasonably proficient controller should be able to handle safely you are certainly not proof against a charge of negligence if you make a mistake however conscienciously you are attending to your task.

Courts have never accepted that a person doing his incompetent best could not be held liable. Proficiency checking systems notwithstanding. this is a fact which should be borne in mind by all controllers who find their control abilities in anyway impaired. perhaps by domestic. financial or familiy worries. or simply by advancing years.

There is a further fact here that I would like to emphasize. The requirement to exercise due care applies not only to airspace in which compliance with ATC instructions is mandatory. but also to the passing of any advice or information to aircraft. The standard legal work on the subject. Shawcross and Beaumont puts it this way: 18

1. Persons exercising air traffic control are under a duty to take reasonable care in giving instructions. permission or advice. which the person to whom they are given is legally bound to obey or obtain and that they. and those responsible as their employers. would be liable for any damage caused by a breach of this duty.

2. They are probably under a similar duty and liability in respect of any instructions or advice issued with the intention that they should be acted on even if not falling within the categories of instruction which the recipient is legally bound to obey.

3. They are probably also under a duty to take reasonable care to give all such instructions and advice as may be necessary to promote the safety of aircraft within their area of responsibility and would therefore be liable for negligently omitting to give such instructions as well as for negligently giving incorrect instructions and advice.

And if that strikes you as being pretty all embracing it is!

Is rigid adherence to ATC manuals and instructions the answer? Well. not exactly.

It is a framework within which to operate. they are neither all embracing nor totally exclusive. The opening paragraph of the UK Manual of Air Traffic Services states. 'the MATS contains instructions and guidance to controllers providing air traffic services. However. nothing in the manual prevents a qualified controller from using his or her discretion and initiative in any particular circumstance.· In a number of cases in the United States. courts have held that controllers· obligations to flight safety extends beyond mere adherence to instructions. So if you have already worked it out that they get you both ways. you are right! You are damned if you do and damned if you do not. In fact we are back to the concept of a reasonable man. Abide by the ATC manuals and instructions whenever possible and depart from. or go beyond such procedures only when you as a reasonable controller believe it is necessary to do so for reasons of flight safety.

If it were not such a tragic situation it could have been funny. I did not come here to sell books but listen to what the judge in Yugoslavia said to Tasic in his closing remarks. this is quoted from my own translation of the judgement in the Zagreb case and appears in Zagreb One Four at page 166.

'The accused could have refused the co-ordination in accordance with Annex 11. Article 3.5.2 and Article 3.5.2.2 of the same Annex .

Further. he could have asked the middle sector for the Mode Code of his own sector to confirm the identity of the plane and its height ... But the main mistake was made at the moment when Tasic gave the DC-9 permission to climb: that clearance was not in accordance with Annex 11. Chapter 3.

Articles 3.3. 1.3 and 3.3.3 and contained none of the separation minima stipulated in Annex 11. Chapter 3. Articles 3.3.4 1 / and 2/a/ and b/.'

It was quite astonishing. I thought how selectively these departures from the rules were being used. The administration's own forbearance towards its ramshackle structure and precarious operation had been dressed up in rationalizations such as the 'shortage of trained manpower· and the 'stringencies imposed by economic reality': but if this judgement was about to offer any kind of comparable extenuation for Tasic there was certainly no sign of it yet. There was. at this point. only the unanswerable charge that Tasic had not done what the rules said he ought to have done: it was a redoubtable cudgel which now belaboured him and it stirred enough dust quite to obscure such peripherals as the need to make life or death decisions in seconds. or trauma amounting to nearpsychological collapse or any of the happenings which had brought Tasic to that pass.

It was all laid down. ... if Tasic wanted to apply longitudinal separation he had only to remember PKL. Chapter 4. Section 3. Article 402b which dealt with this situation thus: 'When JP550 reports overflying VOR Zagreb in the direction of Graz at 310 and BE 4 76 crosses VOR Zagreb in the direction of Nasice ... and when both aircraft (are following) separate radials of VOR Zagreb. then the clearance will be given to JP550 to leave flight level 31 0 and climb to 350. • It was laid down and it was a tidy solution to the problem of separation and Tasic - with all of 38 seconds in hand in which to conduct his dialogue with the imperilled JP550 - had not given any consideration whatsoever to PKL. Chapter 4, Section 3. Article 402b - or. for that matter. to the conditions of DOC 4444, Section 3. Article 3.1 which, of course. also laid down the correct vertical separation he should have imposed- 1 000 feet for aircraft flying below 29 000 feet and 2000 feet for those flying above that level.

He had been equally remiss in the matter of lateral separation since the correct procedure was covered by DOC 4444, Section 3. Article 7.2.1.3 and. for good measure. in PKL 4 10 (a) and (c). But Tasic had failed in this. too: according to those rules he could have said that 'JP550 can climb to flight level 350 immediate. but it must cross flight level 330 before Kostajinica·. He would also. of course. have had to ask the middle sector assistant whether JP550 would reach 330 before Kostajinica and this would all have been in accordance with DOC 4444. Section 3, Article 5 .4 which stated that an •aircraft could be cleared to change its flight level at a specific time. place and speed'.

But Tasic. who could have said this and who should have done that had not. in fact. said or done any of these things; and whatever he had done had been quite contrary to the provisions of PKL. Chapter 4. quite apart from his default in the matter of the aforesaid Annex. Chapters and Articles. Profusely studded as it was with equally mind-deadening references to DOC4444, Chapter 10. 1.4.1.2./ 1.5.1.1 /2/ and 3. the judgement contained its relentless catalogue of all the

alternatives which had. seemingly. been open to the upper sector controller. He could have sent JP550 to flight level 320 and left himself with the option of giving further instructions as the traffic dictated.

And. in any case. his clearance should have been precise. so that the middle sector controller could also have passed on a precise instruction.

Despite the often awesome responsibilities of ATC. it is unusual to find ATC negligence cited as the sole reason for an accident. The complimentary role of pilot and controller means that frequently the responsibility is shared. the precise apportionment of blame being for the courts to decide. I know that this fact will not have been lost on you in Australia in recent years. Indeed. the interaction of the pilot's and the controller's responsibilities can often be complex for. whilst the aircraft captain is in command of the aircraft and is therefore responsible for the safe conduct of the flight. he may be required to follow ATC instructions. In such circumstances. he may deviate from those instructions only to the extent necessary to avoid immediate danger; it is incumbent upon him to inform ATC of his actions. in order that the safety of his own or other aircraft is not compromised.

Although. in theory. the pilot's responsibilities for the safe conduct of the flight require him to satisfy himself of the safety of any ATC clearance. you hardly need me to tell you that in practice this may be quite impossible. There are many things the pilot cannot know. such as the whereabouts of other traffic in a busy enroute or terminal environment. Equally. there are other factors of which he can. and should. be aware. such as the proximity of high ground. although of course ATC takes on additional responsibilities in his regard when issuing radar vectors. So. what principles govern this interaction between pilot and controller? How does this overlap of responsibilities affect their legal positions?

In 1 968. the question was considered by a court in the USA. and two important principles were laid down. Firstly. it decreed that whilst the pilot remained the final authority for the safe operation of an aircraft. he could only be held to be legally liable if he knew. or should have known. all the facts relevant to its safe operation.

Secondly. the court held that controllers have a responsibility to go beyond the requirement of their manuals in warning pilots of dangers apparent to the controller but not reasonably apparent to the pilot.

What this means in practice is that the pilot must keep a look-out. he must have read the relevant Notams. studied the instrument approach charts. be aware of his safety altitude and so on. Thus. if the runway threshold is temporarily displaced. and has been duly notified as such. the pilot should be aware of it; if there are mountains adjacent to the approach pattern. the pilot should be aware of their existence. But other factors. such as the presence of unforecast severe turbulence. temporary works adjacent to a taxiway. etc .. may be known to a controller but not to the pilot. If such factors have any bear-

ing on the safe operation of the aircraft. it is not merely good ATC practice to advise the pilot. it's your legal responsibility to do so. If you do not. you may be held to be negligent in any subsequent court action.

In view of the number of accidents which occur due to mountains claiming perfectly good and expensive aircraft perhaps I should dwell for a moment on the question of terrain clearance. Basically. the responsibility for maintaining adequate terrain clearance is the pilot's. There is only one exception to this rule recognized

by ICAO. and that is when aircraft are proceeding under radar vectors from ATC. So. as a radar controller. the responsibility is yours when vectoring an aircraft; at all other times it is the pilot's responsibility. In other words. a procedural ATC clearance to descend is permissive in nature: it means that there is no traffic to prevent descent to the specified level. Whilst the pilot is responsible for the navigation of the aircraft. it is his responsibility to adjust the descent profile if necessary to ensure he does not infringe his minimum safety altitude. Of course. good ATC practice demands that normal procedures take terrain clearance requirements into account. and minimum levels on airways and in holding patterns are calculated accordingly. But, in the final analysis, the responsibility for maintaining adequate terrain clearance is the pilot's.

I think you will agree that the additional responsibility carried by controllers whilst radar vectoring aircraft are fair and reasonable; there is little opportunity for a pilot. even with modern navigational systems, to be absolutely sure of his minimum safety altitude in such circumstances. But. if the introduction of radar marked the first •great leap forward' in air traffic control technology, so computerization surely marks the second. And in conversation with controllers. I frequently hear doubts expressed as to the controller's precise responsibility and liabilities when operating in an increasingly automated environment.

Of course, controllers are not alone in their mistrust of computers. The excuse of •computer error'. is rapidly becoming one of the bones of modern life. But reduced to its basics. a computer or any form of automation, is only an electronic means of providing data or processing information either more quickly, more efficiently or in a different manner to that which would otherwise be necessary. Exactly the same can be said of radar itself, or even the use of radiotelephone or the Aldis Lamp.

Essentially, I can see no difference between the legal situation of controllers in automated and nonautomated systems.

Of course, there may be specific requirements peculiar to the automated system. just as you have setting-up checks for a radar console. But when used in the laiddown manner. there is no reason why controllers should feel themselves vulnerable when relying upon automated systems for the display of radar of flight data. conflict prediction or any other function. If you use the equipment provided for you in the specified manner. and have no real reason to doubt that it is functioning car-

rectly, then you cannot be held to be liable for a failure of the system. Of course. a major failure in a crucial traffic situation could result in the controller being faced with a situation which he cannot resolve immediately, but so too can a simple radar failure. So. by all means continue to treat automated systems with a healthy degree of mistrust but do not be scared of them there is no need for a permanent microchip on the shoulder!

Before I tinish. there is one final aspect of the controller's legal position I would like to mention - that of security of employment. Of course. employment legislation is a specialized subject. and there are considerable variations from country to country. Nevertheless. there is one particular point of principle which relates to what I have said about negligence. If you make a mistake, however slight. can you be dismissed?

A few years ago in the U.K .. a pilot with a small airline landed his Viscount rather heavily, causing the undercarriage nose leg to collapse. This occurred ten days after he had been assessed as •above average· by the training captains. The airline dismissed him. The pilot took this case to an Employment Appeal Tribunal. but he lost, the judge ruling as fo 1Iows: 'In our judgement. there are activities in which the degree of professional skill which must be required is so high and the potential consequences of the smallest departure from that high standard are so serious. that one failure to perform in accordance with those standards is enough to justify dismissal.'

It so happens that the case in question concerned an airline pilot. However. I do not need to draw for you parallels with the situation facing air traffic controllers. It is perhaps a sombre note on which to end.

New Manager for lntelect lntelect. Inc. announced appointment of James Bland as purchasing manager and addition of two positions to the purchasing department.

Bland was previously associated with Intel Corp., Amdahl, and Zilog Corp. in California in purchasing and material planning.

Also joining the department are Scott Gumm, fabrications buyer, formerly with General Electric in Cincinnati. Ohio, and Gerald Larkin, electronics parts buyer. Larkin, from Pasadena, California, was previously a stock clerk at lntelect.

Intelect is an American-owned.

Hawaii-based company specializing in the manufacture of microprocessorcontrolled integrated voice communications systems for use in air traffic control and other transport and business applications.

19

Optical Parking-System for Aircraft Unmanned Guidance System Chosen for Stockholm Succesfully Tested at Geneva A new and very simple optical guidance system which enables pilots to park aircraft accurately without human aids has been introduced by lnogon International AB of Gothenburg, Sweden.

The system was developed in close collaboration with the Swedish Board of Civil Aviation and the Swedish Pilots' Association, and is currently in use at Stockholm's international airport at Arlanda (4 units) and at Ornsk6Idsvik Airport in northern Sweden (2 units). Eight units have recently been specified for another Swedish airport, and Geneva and Frankfurt Airports have shown serious interest.

Arrows Show Correction to Be Made The lnogon Air Park System makes use of the moire interference patterns produced when light passes through two superimposed gratings ruled with lines. The pattern seen depends critically on the angle of viewing (see illustrations).

Practical systems normally employ two beacons, which project light through moire gratings. One is a center-line beacon, at which the pilot aims. So long as he remains on-line, he sees a single black vertical line in the center of the beacon. If he strays off-line, he sees a pattern of arrows pointing in the direction he should steer in. The density of the arrow pattern indicates how large a correction should be made.

The second beacon - a stop-beacon - is offset to one side of the center-li ne. As the aircraft taxis down the center-line, the pilot sees on this beacon a pattern of arrows which becomes progressively less dense, When he reaches the required stopping point the pattern turns to a vertical black line. There is a unique position from which the black line is seen on both beacons.

The angle between the two beacons is then about 1 2-1 5 °, so that the pilot can always see both patterns at a glance without turning his head.

Clearly Visible The beacons contain no moving parts, and the prime advantage of the 20

.

-..✓ MU

Fig. 1. lnogon guidance system installed at Arlanda Airport, Stockholm. The camera was just to the right of the center-line (indicated by left-pointing arrow on the center-line beacon) and some distance short of the stop-line (indicated by dense arrow-pattern on the stop beacon).

Fig. 2. Journey's end. Pilot's view from the cockpit. He is exactly on the stopline and fractionally to the left of the center-line.

system is that it depends solely on a passive optical interaction between the pilot's line of vision and the moire patterns produced by the beacons.

The sensitivity of the gratings can be selected at the time of installation to achieve any desired combination of visibility range (up to 350 m practical maximum) and accuracy.

Each beacon contains two lowpressure sodium lamps which give a distinctive orange light. The moire patterns are clearly visible in conditions ranging from total darkness to bright sunlight or even mist.

The beacons are easy to install, requiring only a single-phase mains electricity supply. Routine maintenance is limited to a lamp change once a year. Heating elements regulated by thermostat provide automatic defrosting in cold weather. The beacons measure 974 mm (38.3 in) high.

506 mm ( 19.9 in) wide and a maximum of 950 mm (3 7.4 in)deep.

Stop beacon

' '

Stop beacon

Centerline beacon

\

\

\

\

'

\

\

\ \ I

,,

\ I

Pos.4

Pos.4

Pos.3

Approved for Safety Fo_llowinga year's trials at Arlanda and Ornskoldsvik. the lnogon Air Park system has been approved for safety by the Swedish authorities.

In further trials conducted at Geneva Airport during March and April. the system proved popular with pilots. 95% classing it as 'good' or 'very good'. The trials also confirmed that the beacon patterns are clearly visible in varying light conditions. As regards accuracy. for aircraft of the Airbus type the double-beacon system was found to be essential, but smaller aircraft could park accurately with the aid of the center-line beacon only, plus stop-line markings on the ground.

Further information from: lnogon International AB Kungsportsavenyen 41, Box 53232 S-400 1 6 Goteborg, Sweden Telephone: +46 31 81 07 40 Telex: 27805 INOGON S

Centerline beacon

Pos.3

NS 2451

Pos.2

Pos.2

Fig 3

+Pos.1

Pos.I

The Wake of the 747 A DC-10 was cleared for takeoff behind a 7 4 7. At approximately 500 ft severe turbulence was encountered and full aileron was required to maintain control. To improve control and avoid further turbulence the aircraft was levelled off. When the turbulence stopped. the climb was resumed.

They again encountered turbulence this time less severe.

The captain was informed that separation from the 7 4 7 was 8 miles.

Fig. 3. A typical parking sequence aided by the lnogon optical guidance system:

Position 7 Aircraft approaches. The few right-pointing arrows on center-line beacon show that aircraft has reached a position just to left of center-line. Pilot turns left and aims at beacon.

Position 2 Left-pointing arrow on center-line beacon shows that aircraft is too far right and should steer to left.

Position 3 Right-pointing arrow on center-line becon shows that aircraft should steer slightly right. Stop beacon now shows very few arrows: stop-line is therefore near, so aircraft should move forward slowly.

Position 4

Vertical line on both beacons - the perfect stopping position.

21

Third Level Airline Operation: The United Kingdom Dilemma John Levesley, Editor 'Transmit·.

UK Guild of Air Traffic Controllers

In recent months there has been much discussion. debate and speculation on the future development of Third Level Airline Operations in Europe. Perhaps more correctly I should say mainland EEC countries in Western Europe, as the United Kingdom practice varies somewhat from the European. The debate in Europe has reached the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the European Commission in Brussels, the EEC Council of Ministers and the European Civil Aviation Council.

At the heart of the debate is that notorious word ·Deregulation·. In the United States of America, deregulation has done much for commuter airlines (rather less for volume US operators). The United Kingdom has pursued a policy of liberal route allocation and deregulation of scheduling bringing unprecedented benefits and growth to Third Level commuter airlines. The same policy has brought

mixed blessings to the major airports and some severe problems to their ATC units and the associated terminal area controllers.

Existing European policy can be summarised as follows. Within the EEC, unrestricted Third Level operations between Third Level airports. between Third and Second Level airports. and between Second Level airports. The provision of feeder services to major airports is discouraged, to put it mildly; but this policy is under attack from the European Regional Airlines and the UK Government.

I will not enter the debate of Rail or Road Transport versus Third Level airlines. but the European Regional Airlines Organization has some doubts as to the motives of some European Transport Ministries. It should be noted. however, that in the United Kingdom (a relatively small geographical area) some very successful Third Level

services are operated into major airports despite intense competition from good road and rail links over those same routes.

Where. then. is the UK dilemma mentioned in the title? The dilemma is the creation of new and. perhaps in the distant past. unforseen A TC problems relating to the control of low level, slow traffic. In the early years of jet transport. it was felt that the low. slow IFR service was doomed. If my memory serves me correctly, this was one of the precepts of the designers when planning the new ATC system for England and Wales. based on London and Preston (now Manchester) Air Traffic Control Centres.

Unfortunately, this premise, twenty-five years on. has proved incorrect.

Every duty seems to bring new routes. new operators. new aircraft, operating passenger, freight. parcel and mail services. These services teem through our terminal control areas, in and out of. and over. our busiest airports at all hours of the day and night. Most fly at flight level 100 or below. at speeds rarely exceeding 200 kn, and often much less. The never-ending stream of Bandeirantes. Jetstreams. SD 330's, Twin Otters and Islanders buzzes merrily across our radar screens. joined by a succession of Friendships.

Heralds. 748's and even the occasional Viscount, as passenger traffic grows. At night they are (sometimes) a welcome diversion. At medium and small airfields, they are a welcome provider of services and revenue. In the morning, midday and evening rush hours. to quote our American friends. they can become a 'pain in the butt'.

The Author John Levesley is a serving controller with the National Air Traffic Services of the UK. and is employed at London Air Traffic Control Centre. Entering the ATC profession in 7966, he has worked previously at Belfast airport and the College of Air Traffic Control in Bournemouth as an instructor in Aerodrome Studies. John is the Editor ofTransmit. the UK Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers· quarterly magazine.

• The article is a personal viewpoint and should not be taken to indicate the policy of either the UK Civil Aviation Authority or the UK Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers.

Photo: Kit Townend 22

New Air Administrator Appointed

The Dornier family of third level airliners

Imagine the lower levels of the London Terminal Control Area at 0800 hrs, as the regular volume services are peaking, jets streaking out low and fast, looking for climb. The first European jet services are arriving at the Heathrow and Gatwick holding stacks, when sailing into the middle of the maelstrom cruise a gaggle of aircraft all at flight levels 80 and 90, 180 kn, all gaily bound for the major London airports from all points of the compass, and eager to offload their passengers so they can catch the 091 5 flight to Paris, Rome or Oslo.

The weather isn't too good, and the airspace is mandatory IFR, so visual approaches are not available, Can you imagine what two or three twin Otters on I LS approach do to an approach radar sequence, bearing in mind overtaking and vortex wake separations. in the middle of the morning rush? How about the IFR Standard Instrument Departure for a 747SP behind an Islander. or indeed vice versa, allowing for turbulent wake?

The above scenario (to use an ugly but fashionable word) is not imagined, but occurs every weekday all over the United Kingdom, though its worst effects seem most keenly felt in the busy London Area complex. It is in this environment that the ATC Dilemma exists. Without growth in airline operations, there will be no growth in the ATC service. Increased revenue at airports, or from en route charges, is the life-blood (literally) of both our UK airport operators and the UK ATC services. Even the British National Agencies, the British Airports Authority and the Civil Aviation Authority, are directed to pay their own way (and pay us).

ATC needs airline growth, and that

Photo: J. Levesley

growth is most noticeable in commuter operations. Even major British airlines have subsidiaries, routes or services which are, in essence, third level operations. The United Kingdom is a major supplier of commuter airliners worldwide. The problem that besets us is, how do we cope with an ATC problem unforseen 25 years ago, in an ATC environment not designed for this type of traffic?

The answer at the moment is the same as always - the controller makes it work. The importance of the problem is recognized by the UK Guild and is the theme for its next Convex, in September 1983. Perhaps if and when the rest of Europe deregulates third level operations, our experiences in the UK will save our colleagues in Europe the headaches we experience now.

Effective September 30, 1982 Mr. Walter Mcleish was replaced as the Administrator of the Canadian Air Transportation Administration by Mr. Gordon M. Sinclair. Mr. Sinclair is presently the Marine Administrator at the Department of Transport.

Mr. Sinclair was born in Ottawa and graduated from Carleton University in 1952 with a Bachelor of Commerce degree. He earned his C. A. with Price Waterhouse and later became executive assistant to the vicepresident, finance, of Massey-Ferguson in Toronto. Mr. Sinclair joined Pargas Inc. of Waldorf, Maryland, USA. initially as vice-president in charge of Canadian operations and latterly as treasurer and controller of the parent company.

In 1967 Mr. Sinclair was named director of financial management, Department of Fisheries, and joined the Canada Post Office in 1969 as assistant deputy postmaster general.

He was responsible for national operations and transportation policies. quality assurance, the postal code and mechanization, engineering, technical services. security and investigation. In 1976 Mr. Sinclair was appointed deputy administrator, and in 1977 administrator of the Canadian Marine Transportation Administration, with responsibility for the overall direction of the marine progam including the Canadian Coast Guard.

National Harbours Board, Harbour Commissions, Public Harbours, the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, four Pilotage Authorities and Canarctic Shipping Company Limited.

De Ha vii/and Canada are one of an increasing number of manufactures of third level aircraft Photo: J. Levesley

23

IMPROVING AVIATION SAFE Britain'snewair trafficcontrol matedunattendedoperation.Remote short-rangefunctionsand 70,000feet real-timemonitoringof radarinforma- forlong-rangesurveillance. radarnetwork,due to becomefully In selectinga technicalpartner operationalin 1983,isintendedto serve tion as wellas systemperformance willbe carriedout forthis complexnationwideATCprothe combinedciviland militaryneeds and serviceability ject,Britain'sCivilAviationAuthority ofthe U.K.NationalAirTrafficServices bythe LondonAirTrafficControl Centreat WestDrayton.Eachstation chosePhilips'specialistradarcompany up to the tum of the century. operational willhandledata forup to 800aircraft - Signaal.Thetechnology, England,Walesand mostof andsystemreliabilityoftheir Scotlandwillbe coveredby fivedual- withinits coverage,whileoperational efficiency purposeprimary/secondary radarsta- rangesof the completeradarnetwork advancedradarequipmentare already tions,eachfullyduplicatedformaxi- willvarybetween80 and 250NM,with provenby similarATCinstallations Paraguay, mumreliabilityand equippedforauto- heightcoverageup to 26,000feetfor suppliedto Eurocontrol, Singaporeand TheNetherlands.

ATCradaris one exampleof how Philipstechnologyis improvingaviationsafetyand efficiency.

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Unsurpassedforreliability,the Dynavision500joinsthe widerangeof Philips securityscreeningsystemsalreadyin use in airportsthe worldover.

PHILIPS

NDEFFICIENCY

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TheGreekCivilAviationAuthority has chosenPhilips'4th-generationmultichannelvoiceloggingsystemsfortheir air trafficcontrolnetwork;two44-channel versionsfor the airportsof Athens and Salonicaand six 11-channel versions forvariousotherairports.The newvoice loggingsystems,whichare availablein 11,22,33 and 44-channeL versions, providecontinuous24-houroperationfolINTEGRATED lowedby automaticchange-over with TELECOMMUNICATION ' ampleoverlapto ensurecontinuity.

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Philipsvoiceloggingsystemsare usedat morethan 150majorairportsaroundthe Theoutdoorlightingat Singapore's world;the latestversionsbeingalready AEROPP, Philipsdata switching ChangiInternationalAirportis the and data handling systemforaeronautiin servicein France,Germany,Italy, world'slargestinstallationof its kind.In Luxemburg, cal operation, permits gradualeconomic Malaysia,Sudan,Switzerland the terminalarea Philipsprovided650 growth from a small installation, routing and Yugoslavia. antiglarefloodlightsto illuminate53 lowvolumesofAFTNtraffic,to a powerful parkingapronsto the standardsof the multi-usercentreprovidinga complete InternationalCivilAviation rangeofaeronauticaltelecommunications Organization.

Morethan halfoftheseare services.Asthe requirementsofthe AFTN antiglaretypeSNF011floodlightsfitted centreexpand,AEROPP can be enhanced with400WSON/fhigh-pressure sodium accordinglyto provideCommon!CAO lampsto the specificationof the Visual DataInterchange_ Networkswitching, AFTN/CIDIN interfacing,flight-plan AidsPanelof the ICAO. Antiglarefloodlightsare also storageand processingfacilitiesand mountedon highmastsat mainroad inradarsub-systeminterfaces- together,the tersectionsaroundthe airportso as to backboneofan integratedAirNavigation avoidupwardglarein the path ofapSystem. proachingaircraft.Securityillumination ofthe airport'sperimeteris by meansof SOXlow-pressure sodiumlighting.

Thesearejust a fewexamplesof Philipshigh-technology in aviation.

Outdoorlighting,however,was Ifyouwouldlikemoreinformation,contactyourPhilipsorganizationor PhilipsCorporate onlya part of Philipstotalcontributionto Planningand MarketingSupport,VOA-0217, 5600MD Eindhoven,theNetherlands. thisambitiousairportproject.Wealso Telex:35000PHTCNL Pleaseindicatethe subjectsyouare interestedin: suppliedand installedthe long-range 0 Airtrafficcontrolradar O Aeropp radarand displaysystem,LORADS, and 0 Navigational aids the AirportSurfaceDetectionEquipmeni 0 Baggagesecurityscreening ASDE,and equippedthe terminalbuil- 0 Airportlighting 0 Securityequipment dingswiththe world'slargest(7500loud0 Voiceloggingsystems 0 Communication systems speakers),electronically-controlled, 335 publicaddresssystem. l ·-

SURE SIGNOFHIGH-TECHNOLOGY FORAVIATION

Hawkeyes For Egypt The third international sale of Grumman·s E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft was initiated in early October when the Government of Egypt signed contracts with the company totalling$ 3 .5 million for procurement of critical items and engineering development in preparation for the delivery of four aircraft. the first of which will be delivered in September of 1985. The remaining three will be delivered in 1986.

Grumman previously sold four E-2C's to Israel and will complete delivery of four of the eight aircraft ordered by Japan before the end of the current year.

The sale to Egypt. which has been given formal US Government approval. carried a value - as described by the Department of Defense - of $ 689 million covering procurement of four aircraft. training. spares and support equipment. as well as required modifications to the planes and their systems to ensure compatibility with Egyptian requirements.

The sale will produce approximately $450 million in revenue for Grumman.

According to Michael Pelehach. president of Grumman International. Inc .. 'The E-2C's electronic systems protect against surprise. and having it in the air over troubled parts of the world can reduce tensions. I think the E-2C is an ideal export product for the United States-and for Grumman·.

Final details of the program will be defined by the US and Egyptian governments over the next several months.

The Hawkeye, with its 24-foot radome and 12.000 pounds of sophisticated electronic equipment. can monitor three million cubic miles of air space and track multiple targets simultaneously at long range. The warning. command and control capabilities of the Hawkeye also act as a force multiplier for defensive forces. reducing the requirements for large numbers of costly and potentially aggressive systems such as fighter aircraft.

26

·In addition to this very important sale to Egypt. there are bright prospects for additional procurements by several other foreign nations over the next few years·. Mr. Pelehach predicts.

•Over twenty years of development stand behind today· s Hawkeye. and that development will continue in order to keep its systems ahead of whatever threat may emerge. It appears assured of on going success in operations with both the US Navy and allied forces well into the next century·. he observed.

Age 60 Rule FAA is reviewing its regulation requiring airline pilots to retire at age 60. The agency has issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making asking the public to help design a program tor gathering medical and performance data on older pilots that may support a change in the 'Age 60' rule.

The FAA proposal is in part a response to the report of a special panel of the National Institute on Aging which studied the Age 60 rule at the request of Congress. The panel recommended that the existing age limit should be retained but said that FAA or some other appropriate federal agency should start a systematic program to collect the medical and performance data necessary to consider relaxing the rule.

FAA also is seeking comments on such questions as What is the appropriate federal agency to conduct the study recommended by the panel?

Can flight simulators be used or modified to get information on the effects of aging on performance?

To what extent would allowing pilots to fly after 60 in any test program compromise safety?

Cabin Interior Design Improved for A310 and A300-600 Airbus lndustrie has refined the design of the cabin interior for the new A310 which enters service next year and the updated version of the A300. the A300-600. entering service in 1984. (see photo) Dado panels. window panels and baggage racks have been restyled. developing the style used for the successful A300 casette-type ceiling panels. and cabin lighting has been further improved.

The roomy overhead stowage compartments are outstandingly practical. The two-door modules are visually unified by handrails and dividing ribs. They are stressed to carry 50 kg/ 110 lb and can easily take garment bags and other long items.

Passengers travelling light will have no problem avoiding baggage check-in and claim delays.

In the all-tourist layout. 1. 22 cu ft of overhead stowage is available for each passenger and the usable volume very nearly matches the theoretical volume unlike on some aircraft where the stowage compartments' shape means much of the space is unusable.

There is plenty of head clearance for passengers standing in the aisles when the doors are opened while the integrated hand-rail adds to the safety and convenience of both passengers and crew members. Internal ·stoppers· ensure that articles are safely retained even when the compartments are nearly empty.

The center baggage rack is an option providing maximum fexibility for the operator. With their reshaped fixed-floor and outwards and upwards opening doors. this center rack is the safest and most practical way of gaining more cabin stowage space.

In all-tourist layout the central stowage provides an extra 1 .05 cu ft of space per passenger with each twin compartment module able to take 40 kg/ 88 lb of baggage. Passenger service units. within easy reach of seated passengers. are incorporated in the overhead stowage structure which also has a hand-rail similar to those on the side stowage.

New materials have been used: the new generation window panels are self-supporting lightweight phenolic honeycomb structures which can be decorated to customers· specifications using vacuum-applied decorative film.

This process replaces the classic build-up based on thermoformed decor materials thus making repairs easier and allowing repeated redecoration. An injection-moulded adapter cone provides support for the inner scratch pane. ensures a tight fit of the panel to the inner structural window and carries a newly designed window blind.

The adaptable interior concept also gives customer airlines greater flexibility for the installation of galleys and lavatories throughout the cabin.

Both the A31 0 and the A300600 have the proven Airbus lndustrie cross section which gives operators a unique choice of seating arrangements - genuine first class comfort with six-abreast seating. sevenabreast business class equivalent to most manufacturers· 'first' class. eight-abreast in economy with no triple seats and no passenger more than one seat from the aisle and a nine-abreast high density layout for minimum seat-mile costs.

Lufthansa A3 10 in flight followed by an Eastern Air Lines A300.

Advanced A300 Version Work is progressing on the production of the next version of the A300 - the A300-600.

The center section upper shell of the first A300-600 - Airbus lndustrie' s aircraft serial number 252 - has already been manufactured at MBB's Hamburg plant and sent to Aerospatiale' s factory at St-Nazaire where it will be joined to the center box.

The aircraft's wing box has been completed at British Aerospace· s Chester plant and was transferred to MBB in Bremen early this month.

Progress with the wings has been so smooth that delivery dates for the wings of the first four aircraft were brought forward and preparations to equip the wing installations in Bremen are well in hand. Final assembly of the first A300-600 will begin at Aerospatiale in Toulouse next January.

The first aircraft will be equipped with Pratt & Whitney JT9 D-7 R4 HI engines and here too the program is developing rapidly - the engine gained FAA certification in July. five and a half months ahead of schedule.

The first A300-600. which will be purely a test aircraft. is due to be handed over to Airbus lndustrie' s Flight Test Division next June and will make its maiden flight in July. The second aircraft will also be the first delivered to launching airline Saudia. the Saudi Arabian Airline. which has ordered eleven A300-600s.

Certification will be achieved at the end of March 1 984 after which deliveries will commence.

Available from 1984. the 600 represents another step in Airbus Industrie' s process of constant product improvement. It will offer increased

A mock-up of the A3 10 interior showing the nine abreast economy seating and the side and cen"ter baggage racks with the safety handrails.

27

seating and payload capacity for the same maximum takeoff weight of 165 tonnes, greater range and new engines. The introduction of the redesigned A3 10 rear fuselage is balanced by a weight reduction program including the application of composite materials in secondary structure.

The A300-600 will also have the benefit of the technological advances incorporated in the A310, notably the forward facing cockpit featuring digital and push button equipment, systems and warnings displays and flight instrument CRT displays in place of electro-mechanical instruments.

A310 Flight Simulator The A31 0 simulator became operational right on schedule on 1 5 November. Various specialists have been working on the simulator as it was readied for the transition training of the first A310 crews.

The Aeroformation technicians are still carrying out acceptance tests and updating the systems with the cooperation of the manufacture, Thomson-CSF (aerodynamic systems, powerplant, flight system).

The Aeroformation flight instructors are familiarizing themselves with the A31 0 cockpit by following almost the same training program as that intended for the crews.

The Aeroformation ground instructors are using it as a ground cockpit system simulator.

During this phase, flight crews will receive approximately ten hours of static cockpit familiarization as an integral part of the 11-day A31 0 ground school.

The Airbus Industrie flight test department has drawn up a flight test pilot program to meet the DGAC airworthiness requirements.

Their purpose is to check that this simulator is homogeneous and representative of the aircraft. For the first time two-man crew aircraft certification will be partly analyzed on a simulator. Four airworthiness authorities, four operators, two Airbus lndustrie pilots and two Aeroformation instructors will contribute so that the most complete and accurate result possible is achieved.

Increase in Maximum Entry Age for Controllers Urged The Air Traffic Control Association joined with AOPA GAMA NBAA and NATA to urge Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis to increase the 28

maximum entry age for air traffic controllers from 30 years of age to 40 years of age for those applicants with recent air traffic control experience.

The joint letter said this would include former military air traffic controllers, flight service station specialists, and furloughed airline transport pilots acting as flight data aids.

The aviation organizations also recommended that the on-the-job training program at operational facilities be stepped up by using increased staffing afforded by hiring personnel over ep years of age with recent air traffic control experience, and that the mandatory retirement age of 56 years be temporarily waived to retain personnel for supervisory and training positions.

The letter went on to say, •Hiring ex-military controllers over age 30 would provide the experienced, mature controllers needed to fill the void between the older controllers who did not strike and the new younger con-

The Visual Approach What's in it for you?

Though the visual approach may seem like the easiest and most efficient arrival procedure, there are times when this may not be so. More than a few pilots have thought twice before accepting a visual approach in poor visibility and in heavy traffic. We've summed up the requirements for pilots and air traffic controllers who wish to use visual approaches, to help you make up your mind.

The pilot: may request a visual approach at airports having a published instrument approach procedure when operating clear of cloud and visibility is reported to be at least 1 statute mile. will comply with the controller's instructions for vectors toward the airport or to a visual position behind another aircraft. after being cleared for a visual approach, will proceed to the airport or to a visual position behind another aircraft. after being cleared for a visual approach, will proceed to the airport by visual reference to the ground, completing all or part of the approach or following designated traffic, remaining clear of cloud. visually follows a preceding aircraft to establish a safe landing interval (if so cleared), and accepts

trollers being hired and trained. In these days of budgetary constraints, this would result in large monetary savings when considering the cost of training new controllers versus hiring people who are already trained, qualified, and current in air traffic control.

In addition, experienced FSS specialists and flight data aides over age 30 who could qualify would provide additional aviation-oriented people as controllers who could be trained in minimum time. By waiving the mandatory retirement age for active controllers, you would retain a resource of experience to provide training for the new controllers. Relief would be provided to allow staff and senior supervisors to return to their normal ATC functions at the facilities.

Our recommendations are submitted for your consideration to help expedite the return of the ATC system to 'full capacity' and to proceed with the monumental task of developing the future National Airspace System.'

responsibility for wake turbulence separation. informs ATC immediately if unable to follow a designated aircraft or encounters less than basic visual weather conditions. is aware that there may be other aircraft in the traffic pattern and that the landing sequence may differ from the traffic sequences assigned by the approach control.

The air traffic controller: may vector an aircraft for a visual approach unless the reported ceiling at the airport is less than 500 ft above the minimum vectoring altitude, or visibility is less than 5 statute miles. will vector an aircraft for a visual approach to an airport without weather reporting service only after the pilot reports that descent and flight to the airport can be made in visual flight conditions. will clear an aircraft for a visual approach only when the aircraft is, and can remain, in visual flight conditions and the clearance is acceptable to the pilot. will issue a visual approach clearance when the pilot reports sighting the airport or a preceding aircraft which is to be followed. will continue flight following traffic information until the pilot is instructed to contact the tower.

Adapted from FSF

Roll-Out of the SF340 .-.-r

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~-"'· The SAAB-Fairchild 340 rolled out of its brand-new assembly building precisely on schedule on Wednesday 27 October. in the presence of His Majesty. King Carl Gustaf XVI of Sweden. Mr Thage G. Peterson, Swedish Minister of Industry and more than 500 guests including executives of SAAB-Scania, Fairchild Industries and SAABFairchild Joint Venture and a representative section of the workforce.

An aircraft roll out generates its own particular emotion - this occasion was no exception. The fanfare, the somewhat solemn tones in which the audience was briefed before the ceremony began, the polite applause for the speakers and the final moment all were waiting for - each stage followed the time-honoured pattern. But as Mr. Moritz Suter of Crossair of Switzerland, the launch customer, described the aircraft, 'This lovely child, our new born baby', it was abundantly clear that the audience regarded the aircraft with the same warmth of affection.

Following speeches by the representatives of the two governments and the companies, His Majesty the King was invited to unveil the aircraft. For a moment there was a pause, nothing appeared to happen, then the huge pale green hangar divider began to wind upward, gradually the highly polished floor came into view, the spotlights blazed and at last the aeroplane was revealed, glistening in the livery of Crossair on one side and Air Midwest of Arkansas on the other, its scarlet warning lights pulsing happily.

Seldom have so many good wishes for success been voiced by those attendant at the birth of the offspring of industrial collaboration.

Recalling that it was in 1783 that the first commercial links between Sweden and the US were forged. the US Ambassador emphasized that the greatest link between the two countries was that of industry. That the roll out took place only 2 months on from full scale design and development indicated the cooperation which exist between SAAB-Scania and Fairchild Industries in their joint venture.

The next major step will be joint certification, involving 10 countries. The aircraft is considered to be American but participation in certification by the parent countries of those companies involved in its production will ensure is certification in those countries. The flight test program will involve three test aircraft and seven Swedish and American test pilots. First engine run was scheduled for Sunday 31 October and ground vibration tests were to start on 1 November. First flight is expected to take place in the latter half of January 1 983. followed by that of the second test aircraft in May 1983 and the third in August 1983. The program is expected to run until February 1 984.

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A world-wide product support system is in course of development with clearly defined responsibilities and comprehensive resources. Support bases will be set up in Linkoping and San Antonio, Texas. Pilot and group crew training will take place both in Sweden and the US, provided by Scandinavian Airlines System and Flight Safety Inc. respectively. Pilot training will include the use of a specially designed SAAB-Fairchild simulator.

Also announced at the roll out was the formation of SAAB-Fairchild Finance Company which will facilitate the financing of purchases via lines of credit with international banks. SAAB-Fairchild believes that the SF340 is one of the most competitively priced aeroplanes of its size and range. Costing$ 5 million ( 1981 dollar value) for the airline configuration and $ 5 ½-6 million ( 1981 dollar value) for the executive version, this is not least because of its General Electric CT-7 engines which are the most fuel effective of this capacity at present produced. An advanced avionics system. sophisticated fuel management and multi-function display enabling the pilot to call up 100 pages of technical information all make for operator gains in cost savings.

To date. firm orders for the SF340 total 46. orders including options totalling 1 00. According to the company the break-even figure is 200. a figure it aims to achieve by the time the first aircraft is delivered to Crossair in April 1984. The first US delivery is scheduled for July 1984. The latest order. announced on roll out day. is for three aircraft. from Trans Colorado. Although the only cancellations. nine. have all occurred in the US. the company is confident that the present order situation which, following an initial spate, is now of a 'holding· nature. will resume its initial trend. Stillwell Airways in Australia has expressed interest and bearing in mind that the SF340 can transport 12 people for 1000 miles. operate from a 4000 ft length of strip. and span Kansas City-Dodge City or Zurich-Paris in 70 minutes. SAAB-Fairchild is confident of the support this aircraft merits. A production rate of six aircraft per month is envisaged. employing a workforce of 1000.

The company in Linkoping is greatly aware that with success of the SF340 confidence in a diversity of manufacture will be ensured and maintain an ideal balance of output in the future. By the early l 990's the MRCA JAS39 will replace the SAAB Viggen in operation with the Swedish Air Force: development of a new missile for the Swedish Navy has just been announced and there is already an active space programme in production.

Linkoping, a city renowned in Swedish history. looks set fair to carry the banner forward.

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City Council to the extent of£ 400.000. has been designed by the City Architect's Department. It is due to open to the public at Easter 1984. Readers will remember that it was a Sunderland flying boat which recently spent several weeks moored on the River Thames near Tower Bridge.

New Airplane Artist's conception of Beechcraft 1900. 19-passenger jetprop airline. powered by twin P&W PT6A-65B displayed at recent National Business Aircraft Association (NBAA) convention. on its first cross-country flight. Exhibit area featured a 1900 executive model interior mockup. Company announced new 3-year customer protection plan at show. featuring 1.000 flight-hour or one-year warranty. no part excluded.

Sandringham ·southern Cross·

Sandringham for Southampton It has now been agreed that the Short Sandringham flying boat Southern Cross. which was purchased by the Science Museum in November 1981. will be lent to the R. J. Mitchell Museum in Southampton for exhibition in a new museum building under construction there. The Sandringham is currently beached at the RN Air Station at Lee-on-Solent. where it was taken from Calshot Spit. It will be moved to Southampton in the next few months. Members of the Sandringham Flying Boat Society will continue to support the aircraft.

The Sandringham will join the Supermarine S.6A seaplane and the Spitfire in the R. J. Mitchell Museum's new premises. The building. supported by Southampton

The Royal Aeronautical Society Awards 1982 The President of the Royal Aeronautical Society.

Captain E. M. Brown. CBE. DSC. AFC. MA. FRAeS. RN (Ret'd) presented the Society's awards for 1982. on Thursday, 16 December 1982. in London. prior to the Wilbur and Orville Wright Memorial Lecture.

The following were the recipients: Handel Davies. CB. MSc. FEng. FAIAA. FRAeS elected an Honorary Fellow of the Society. for his long and distinguished contribution to aviation both in the public service and in industry.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Lowe. GCB. DFC. AFC. ADC elected a Companion. in recognition of his distinguished contribution to military aviation over many years and. in particular. his outstanding leadership in the field of military aircraft procurement.

The Society's Medals Gold Medal: Ronald Hills. BA. CEng, FRAeS. was awarded the Gold Medal for his outstanding contribution to aerodynamics research over many years. and for his leadership in the development of wind tunnel test facilities in the United Kingdom.

30

Silver Medal: Kenneth Sumner Lawson. BSc(Eng). DLC. CEng. MRAeS was awarded the Silver Medal for his valuable contributions and dedicated work in the field of aerodynamic design and his leadership in the definition of aircraft projects.

Bronze Medal: Philip Brotherhood.

DLC was awarded the Bronze Medal for his considerable contribution in the field of helicopter flight research work.

The Amulree Committee Awards British Gold Medal: Basil Davenport Blackwell. MA (Cantab). BSc (Eng). FEng. FIMechE. CBIM. FRAeS was awarded the British Gold Medal for an oustanding contribution over many years to British aviation and in particular for his leadership in the helicopter section of the industry.

British Silver Medal: Cyril Forrester Bethwaite, BSc. CEng. FRAeS was awarded the Silver Medal in recognition of his oustanding work in the aircraft design and development field over a long period, culminating in leadership of the BAe 146 project.

Wakefield Gold Medal: John William Neville Yeomans. MBE was awarded the Wakefied Gold Medal for

his leadership in the field of flight simulators.

R. P. Alston Medal: Michael Spencer Goodfellow, M RAeS was awarded the R. P. Alston Medal in recognition of his distinguished contribution as a test pilot. including his particular contribution of the flight testing of the BAe 1 25 and BAe 146 aircraft.

Alan Marsh Medal: Lt. Cdr. N. Arnall-Culliford. RN was awarded the Alan Marsh Medal for his work at the Royal Aircraft Establishment as a helicopter test pilot and for his practical contribution to the advancement of helicopter operating techniques in poor visibility conditions.

N. E. Rowe Medal (21-25 years age group): Paul Kenneth Tyrer. BSc (Hons) was awarded the N. E. Rowe Medal for his paper on the 'Short History of the Empire Flying Boats. 193 6 -4 7'. presented to the Manchester Branch on 28th April 1982.

N. E. Rowe Medal (under 21 years of age group): Rex Frederick Mackrill was awarded the N. E. Rowe Medal for his paper •Laser Strike', presented to the Preston Branch on 4 November 1981.

Newsbriefs

Aircraft Insurers Besieged In year's first half. 11 fatal commercial airliner accidents plus two among non-scheduled carriers. three involving commuters and wide range of non-fatal losses. place aviation reinsurers in profitless underwriting position.

•Aviation market has been depressed for six years. which can't continue·. said official of Aviation Office of America Inc .. underwriter of aviation risks for large insurance company group. • People have to cut back or they· II get blown out of business by the losses·. he added in 'The Journal of Commerce·. Two more airlines suffered casualties recently. Eight were injured when Nansei Airlines 73 7 burst into flames after overshooting runway near Okinawa. Aerocondor Airlines turboprop crashed in Ecuadorian mountains. killing 4 1 people including pilot and principal owner of private carrier. Elsewhere. a bomb was discovered aboard a Pan American World Airways 74 7 at Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) by cleaning crew after passengers had disembarked (second bomb incident on board carrier's aircraft). Hijacking of CAAC (Civil Aviation Administration of China) was thwarted by pilot who used wrench to subdue miscreant. Polish 8irliner returned safely to Warsaw after two would-be hijackers wielding fake bomb were foiled. In related airline safety item. Japan Air Lines pilot. whose takeover attempt resulted in fatal crash of DC-8 into Tokyo Bay on February 9. will not be prosecuted because he was suffering from schizophrenia.

'Asahi Sambu11· reported.

ICAO acts on Volcanic Hazards International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). influenced by recent volcanic cloud incidents experienced

by British Airways and Singapore Airlines 74 7s. initiated program to alert pilots against eruptions that are ·no longer isolated. inconsequential'. ICAO ascertained Australia scientists-developed system offered promise in tracking volcanic ash clouds. Tracking stations receive data from US satellite which. coupled with intricate computer-based automated process. enables clouds of ash to be seen at high altitudes where they generally are invisible to weather satellites. Issuance of warnings will be handled by local authorities.

Laker Liquidator Claims Foul Bankrupt Laker Airways accused six airline rivals and McDonnel Douglas Corp. of conspiring to drive Britain's Skytrain airline out of business. according to suit filed in US court by Laker's liquidator. British Airways. British Caledonian Airways. Lufthansa German Airlines. Pan American World Airways. Swissair and Trans World Airlines (TWA) were charged in $ 1 .05 billion legal action of agreeing to undercut Laker's low-cost US-Britain fares by offering their own. dearer services below cost. Laker entered liquidation February 5 with liabilities estimated at$ 1 59 million. BA and BCal promptly dismissed the suit. the former for lack of· justification·. latter citing 'frivolous· action.

Bulk of any award would go to Laker's creditors. left with claims of over $ 500 million. Midland Bank of Britain which lent Laker $ 131 million for financing purchase of three A300s. labeled threatened action 'absurd and fanciful'. Meanwhile. Sir Freddie gained tentative British CAA approval to set up package tour operation December 13.

Freddie Laker Holidays Ltd .. backed by$ 1.3 million capital. will sell tours to Caribbean. Mediterranean. Mexico.

Spain and US. Laker put up bond of $ 1. 7 million to win Government approbation. reports 'The Wall Street Journal'

Cargo Milestone Heralded First and only scheduled all-cargo service between Hong Kong and Europe recently marked first anniversary of joint operation by Cathay Pacific Airways and Lufthansa German Airlines. Four times weekly 74 7 freighter links Hong Kong with Frankfurt (West Germany) via Middle East.

Cathay •Hong Kong Trader' nose-loading 7 4 7. with 100-ton cargo capacity. operates two of partners· weekly services.

In Your Ear A Toronto scientist has found that a person who drinks may still have enough of an alcohol concentration in the inner ears 18 hours later to cause disorientation. ·we now have firm evidence·. he said. 'that alcohol enters the inner ear and that it stays there after it has gone from the blood and the brain.· He said that because alcohol affects the density of the fluid in the ear canals which monitor balance. the brain can receive conflicting information about the position of the head. This. in turn. can produce vertigo due to involuntary eye movements.

Based on this evidence. he advocates a 24-hr period between drinking and flying. (AIP Air 2-11) This research adds additional weight to that vital part of any pilot's training program that tells him that drinking and flying don't mix - and that any drinking is unacceptable within eight hours of flight.

Sherpa - A Medium Lift Freighter A civil freighter version of the Shorts 330 regional airliner- to be known as the Shorts Sherpa -was announced at the Farnborough Air Show. It will come on the international market early next year and has been designed specifically to provide commercial carriers with an economical aircraft for multi-role. medium-lift freighting over ranges of up to 900 nautical miles.

Like the Shorts 3301200. the Sherpa benefits from its widebody hold geometry. a 6 ½ ft square section of unimpeded 29 ft length. In this it can accommodate a variety of bulky or awkward loads as well as standard air freight containers up to LD3 size. three of which can be carried. The forward freight door of the standard 3 30 is retained but the Sherpa has. in addition. a full width rearloading facility together with a roller conveyor system. This 31

arrangement makes 'straight-in and thru' loading possible with attendant benefits in turn round time and costs.

The Sherpa is powered by two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-45R turboprops, the same as those of the all-passenger aircraft. Many of its systems are the same as well and have thus been already proven under varying operational and climatic conditions. Its structure derives from that of the STOL Skyvan as does that of the big brother of the family, the Shorts 360.

Cruising speed will range from 160 kn to 190 kn at around 10 000 ft and the maximum take-off weight of the Sherpa will be 22 900 lb with 7500 lb payload. Typically, it is designed to carry 4500 lb of cargo over 750 nautical miles with reserves (900 n miles without reserves). The new freighter is expected to be useful for the installation of specialist-role equipment (and this is particularly appropriate for military operations). The Sherpa is currently being offered to the US Air Force for consideration under its European Distribution Supply Aircraft (EDSA) program. Full width rear loading permits the carriage of a wide variety of military stores. The hold could accommodate an engine as big as the Pratt & Whitney F. 100 which powers F-1 5 and F-1 6 combat aircraft. The Sherpa is already in production on the line at the Short Brothers factory in Belfast and the first is expected to roll off shortly.

Violent Incidents Continue to Plague Carriers Aggressive acts against airlines continue in the news with bombings on both sides of the Atlantic and another hijacking in Europa. Iran Air Frankfurt (West Germany) office was heavily damaged by an exploding bomb but no injuries occurred. Perpetrators are unknown. At Los Angeles International Airport. an American Airlines loading zone was target of large time bomb placed there by extortionist demanding $ 400 000. Bomb, due to be loaded aboard AA flight, was discovered by authorities and defused. Suspect was held on extortion charges. An Alitalia 727 was hijacked on Algiers-Rome flight by knifewielding, Sovietborn Australian who sought. unsuccessfu Ily, to divert aircraft to Libya or Malta. Suspect was seized by authorities when pilot landed aircraft with 109 passengers and crew at Catania (Sicily). Another hijacker who took over an Indonesian airliner last year was given death sentence. Captain and co-pilot of Aeroflot 11-62,that crashed on landing at Luxembourg, killing six and injuring 28 (four seriously). were arrested for declining to cooperate with accident probers.

British Airways in Fiscal Rebound Return to black 'sooner than expected' predicted by British Airways Chairman Sir John King following $ 925 million loss in 1981-82 fiscal year. BA, programmed by UK Government for eventual privatization, will be a 'very good buy. with very good profit prospects', Sir John added in a story in 'The British Airways News'. Carrier lists debts of $ 1. 7 billion, to be absorbed by British taxpayers in capital writeoft leading to privatization, noted 'The Times· of London. BA ·shows $ 127.5 million operating profit in current fiscal year's first half may end full year with small surplus. This FY's record deficit surpassed last year's, said to be largest ever incurred by any carrier. Both year's results were inflated by$ 255 million and $ 340 million, respectively, in severance pay for released employees, plus high interest charges on $ 1 billion debt. Another ray of sunshine for BA is its selection as Airline of the Year (transatlantic category) by Britain's 'Executive Travel' magazine. read largely by business travelers.

32

Normal ATC Operation in 1983 FAA Deputy Administrator Michael Fenello forecast ATC system in US would be back to normal in 1983 when 6000 replacements for striking controllers dismissed last year complete training. Force then will be 11 000, affording 100% work capacity, he said. Agency also hopes to have new anti-collision systems in regular airline operation by late 1984. Sophisticated device, labeled TCAS II (traffic alert and collision avoidance system). would serve as final backup if ground ATC system and pilot's vision range fail to keep aircraft safely separated. New system will be implemented on trial basis with up to 19 airliners and will be augmented with cockpit traffic display, favored by pilots.

Latter is opposed by airlines because of possible crew confusion and adding to command reaction time, according to Republic Airlines check pilot Robert Buley.

Wilbur and Orville Wright Memorial Lecture The 71 st Wilbur and Orville Wright Memorial Lecture was given by The Honourable J. Lynn Helms, Federal Aviation Administrator, on Thursday 16 December at 1800 hours in the Society's Lecture Theatre at Hamilton Place. Entitled· Air traffic control into the 21 st century'. the lecture confronted the vital problem facing US aviation today of how best to accommodate the growing demands for aviation services over the next 10-20 years. Expanding present systems without basic changes will only amplify today· s shortcomings. For reasons of safety, economy. efficiency and flexibility, modernization must proceed immediately. In modernizing the US system, the FAA is committed to the principle that the new systems be internationally acceptable and mesh smoothly with the activities now underway in the ICAO. The ultimate goal is an international flying environment that will be much improved in terms of simplicity and efficiency for both civil and military users, for both air carriers and general aviationand both domestic and international operators.

The lecture was preceded by the presentation of the Society's awards for 1982.

Grants for Women Graduates The Amelia Earhart Fellowship Awards are offered annually by Zonta International, a service organization of executive women in business and the professions, to women for graduate study in aerospace related sciences and engineering. Qualifications for the fellowship are a bachelor's degree in a science preparatory to advanced study and research in a suitable area of science or engineering; a superior academic record and evidence of potential; acceptance by a graduate school providing recognized courses in the particular field of study.

Anticipated application of graduate studies is of important concern.

Since 1 938. when the Amelia Earhart Fellowship Awards were established as a memorial to the aviation pioneer, 338 awards have been made to women scientists and engineers from 31 countries. The Fellowship, initially awarded to the first women to undertake graduate programs in aeronautical engineering, is now supporting women's studies in many fields including astrophysics, space medicine, environmental law, meteorology, astronomy, astronautics and biophysics. Applications for Fellowship for the following academic year must be completed and submitted before January 1. Further information and application forms may be requested from: Zonta International, 35 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60601, USA.

The Achilles' Heel of the Big Jets

In the morning of September 1980. 'Clipper gg· was rolling to takeoff at London's Heathrow airport with 237 passengers and crew on board.

Halfway across the runway. shortly before reaching takeoff speed one of the 1 2 tyres of the huge jet burst. The chain of events of that particular incident and the repeated tyre-bursts of large jets give us a picture of an increasing hazard of the jumbo-jet era.

In the particular case of the 'Clipper' flight. experts of the Accident Investigation Branch (Al B) of the British Department of Trade had no problem in tracing the cause of the burst tyre the tyre was six years old. it had been retreaded seven times and its ageing carcass had almost certainly been subjected to •overload' during landings.

In March 1978. a Continental Airlines DC-10 burst three tyres during takeoff at Los Angeles. The plane was just below its takeott speed and so in theory the pilot should have been able to stop it. Instead. part of the undercarriage collapsed and the plane finished up 600 ft beyond the edge of the runway. Two people died in the resulting fire.

Last September. in Malaga. a Spanish DC-10 captain elected to abandon takeoff after a tyre failure even though he was rolling. and far down the runway. In this case the book instructed the pilot not to abandon takeoff under such circumstances - it proved right. The ensued accident caused the deaths of 55 people.

Nothing more underlines the importance of safe tyres than the incident reported by a British Airways 74 7 when it lost a tyre on takeoff at Singapore airport. in April. 1982. The tyre debris punched a hole in the fuselage of the aircraft almost 2 ft square. The crew found out about it only after landing at Sydney airport.

It is a fact that three out of four airline tyres are retreads. and hidden imperfections even of a comparatively new tyre will not be discovered by routine inspection. Professor Geoffrey Scott of the Department of Chemistry

of the University of Birmingham has carried out research. which he claims. suggests that the airlines· use of retreads at a saving of about $ 700 a tyre is a •serious risk to passenger safety'.

Professor Scott believes that the •safe life' of a carcass is not much more than the life of the first tread.

This claim of course is disputed by the airlines and by the tyre manufacturers.

The British Civil Aviation Authority is planning to fund research into tyre safety at Aston.

The problem is that current tyre technology can barely cope with the huge weights and the comparatively high takeoff and landing speeds of the big jets. The tyres are built to withstand no more than one-and-a-half times the normal weight. but tests carried out in the United States have proved that if one tyre fails, then its ·mate' on the same axle is put under twice the normai strain and is likely to burst as well.

Meanwhile. the British AIB says that ·as a matter of urgency'. large jet pilots need a warning device in their cockpits to tell them when a tyre has burst.

33

What about Morocco Air Traffic Controllers?

Philippe Domagala

Since civil air traffic control started inside the Moroco airspace in 1961. six years after national independence. a lot seems to have been done or changed for the foreign visitor: new airports have been built, beautiful new terminal buildings for the passenger and tourist and even a new and attractive Area Control Center (ACC} building to cover the needs of the kingdom's FIR. But a closer look and immediately one can see that the 'paint is cracking· both literally and figuratively speaking.

If the radar antenna is still turning the first ever to be installed in the African continent - it is only to prevent it from rusting because it has ceased during the past few years from giving any information to the air traffic controller. Air traffic is still controlled procedurally and the orange-coloured radar scopes adorning the control room are only there to separate working sectors.

Workload on some sectors can be very high particularly those serving the coastal areas of the country where air traffic swarming from Spain and Portugal and the rest of Western Europe converge en route to the Canaries.

South America and West Africa.

The bad quality of the VHF equipment has been the constant headache of the controller. Despite the establishment of relay stations throughout the country one can hardly hear the pilots calling.

These technical deficiencies do very little towards keeping high standards of safety and are indeed most obvious to the visitor of the air traffic services establishments. Shortly before my visit to these establishments. a 65-knot wind originating from over the Atlantic had shaken a few antennas that resulted in the complete loss of two out of the four available frequencies.

One may suggest that this may happen elsewhere also. but the situation is very much different in Morocco than probably in any other case. Air traffic control is carried out procedurally here and the unexpected shifting of heavy traffic into an already busy

34

sector most naturally does not contribute towards high safety standards.

Visiting air traffic control facilities. I always make it my business to check on personnel working conditions. which in my opinion form an integral part of maintaining safety in the air.

Moroccan controllers morale is running very very low. Their working conditions have hardly changed since 1961 and the basic administrative ·reshuffle' carried out in 1967 classified all technical personnel into •agents et adjoints techniques· without distinguishing qualifications. In effect this evaluation classified all civil aviation personnel in any technical field to be of the same grade and status and therefore receive the same salary. which is ridiculously low in comparison to other aviation employees and the high cost of living in Casablanca (see tables below}.

The area control (ACC} building is some 1 2 km away from the airport.

which is already 35 km from the city of Casablanca and the nearest structure is 10 km away. This fact and the fact that controllers had to wait for more than nine years. after they moved into this luxurious and modern building. for canteen facilities made life more miserable and uncomfortable.

No refresher courses are available to the controllers: some of them have been acting as such for the past 20 years without anything new being shown to them. Motivation is therefore low and caused more than 25% of the controllers to seek better jobs in other fields with better prospects. The Ministry of Transport. it must be admitted. have realized the problem and suggested to the government improvements only to be turned down by the Ministries of Finance and Public Service.

We must also admit that the situation in Morocco may be a little brighter than that of colleagues elsewhere in some countries in Africa. but with Morocco. which is considered as one of the most developed countries in Africa. the situation should not be acceptable.

It is high time for the authorities to give the proper attention to the air traffic controller profession because aviation safety cannot be maintained with half-measures.

Salary Comparison Position

Monthly salary in OH

Equivalent in US$

Civil Controller Pilot B727 Royal Air Maroc Bus driver Air Maroc Bank clerk airport Check-in girl Air Maroc

2 000 20 000 2 500 4 500 3 000

320 3200 400 700 475

Cost of living in Casablanca Renting of 3 room Apt. Renting of a studio Price of gasoline

1500 OH 800 OH 4. 70 OH/ Liter

If the cost of living is constantly increasing, salaries are not. For the past 70 years only 2 increases of salary have been granted. One of 5 % in 7968 and one of 70% in 7987.

Moscovv ATC A Professional Visit P. Meledandri, P. Gugnoni

It was on a Sunday morning early in February when our plane, Aeroflot flight SU282 departed from Rome Fiumicino at a temperature of 15 ° C above freezing to land at Moscow's Sheremetievo airport three hours and forty minutes later at a temperature difference of 40 °C. i.e. -25 °C. The warm welcome by Andrei Ivanov. of the Civil Aviation Workers Union (CAWU) on step down made the atmosphere more pleasant and bearable. Andrei will be the man who will accompany us on our professional visits during our three day stay in Moscow to the ATC facilities or sightseeing tours of the town.

Before we enter into more details let us remind you of our previous experience on another professional visit. which you may recall from issue 4 / 81 of 'The Controller'. to Malta ATC facilities. This visit was made possible through the efforts of the Public Relations Officer of ANACNA (Associazione Nazionale Assistenti e Controllori Navigazione Aerea) and the kind cooperation of Air Malta. the island's national carrier. The objective of that visit was mainly to establish an exchange-of-visits program of both countries controllers. Indeed. the scheme has proved very successful and controllers from Malta have visited facilities in Italy. in return to Italian controllers' visit to Malta. and have attended IFATCA meetings held in Rome.

The Moscow Visit Thanks to Aeroflot and the invitation from the CAWU our visit to Moscow. on behalf of ANACNA. was made possible. Our two goals. not different from our visit to Malta. were basically to improve relationships in the professional field. between Italian and Russian controllers and to prepare for the visit of a larger ANACNA delegation led by its president, scheduled to precede a similar one by a delegation from the CAWU. After our arrival at Moscow airport. we were taken to our lodgings just outside the center of Moscow. owned

by the CAWU. and known as the 'House of the Tourists· The day after our arrival. we were met by another colleague. working with Ivanov on the same sector and also acting as the IFATCA Liaison. Yuri Sarapkin with whom we met Mr. Sherbak. president of the RIGA branch of the CAWU. Mr. Yuri Krassinovski. fluent in Italian. acted as our interpreter.

The meeting with Mr. Sherbak proved extremely profitable and an exchange-of-visits program has been agreed with him.

Following this meeting we met with Mr. Vladimir Zuev. senior pilot and the general secretary of the CAWU. Colleagues attending IFATCA conferences will recall Vladimir who has attended a number of such conferences. With him we have discussed matters related to IFATCA and IFALPA. The afternoon of the same day sees us visiting Moscows huge Civil Area Control Center with its numerous sectors and the hundreds of controllers and their assistants. The Center is situated about 30 km from the city center at the Vukovo airport.

Our shoes were exchanged for slippers in order not to make any noise. Though not a Moslem mosque. yet the silence and orderly conduct of personnel created an awesome atmosphere that we could not dare disturb.

The shift supervisor took us around the various sectors. showed us the equipment, Selenia and Datasaab radars. training facilities. etc. 'The Controller· has in the past hosted articles on the Moscow facilities and we consider it unnecessary to repeat what has already been said. The things which have impressed us most. were the feeling of professionalism among the Russian controllers. their excellent knowledge of the English language. the youth of the majority of the controllers and finally the high proportion of lady controllers.

Moscow controllers work a 5-day roster week; each controller assisted

by two equally qualified controllers; sufficient rest periods are enforced and their pay is considerably higher than the average civil servant in Russia.

The CAWU This note will be useless if we omit to say a few words on the CAWU which is made up of members from all the fields of civil aviation employees. such as air traffic controllers. pilots. airport directors. flight assistants. aeroclubs. etc. It has over one million members. that is a little more than 95% of the total number of people employed in Civil Aviation.

The CAWU includes a general assembly. that convenes every four years. an executive board and a standing ·direction·. Furthermore. the CAWU has regional and local departments and committees with representatives at every airport throughout the country.

Book Review The Delta Wing: History and Development. Alexander Lippisch. translated by Gertrude L. Lippisch.

Iowa State University Press. USA. 1981. 126pp. Illustrated.$ 15.95.

This is a translation by the author's wife of the book •Ein Dreieck fliegt'. originally published in 1976 just after the author's death. In translation this interesting book should now be accessible to a wider audience. The English title hints at a wider coverage. but in fact the book deals with Lippisch •s designs for tail-less aircraft.

From 1921. he pursued this concept with enthusiasm. designing gliders and light aircraft with various wing shapes. always believing that the tailless type was inherently superior to more conventional configurations. especially for high-speed flight. He also designed conventional types. but these are mentioned only briefly and summarised in an appendix. although it appears that on the whole they were better performers than his tail-less types.

New Contract for I ntelect lntelect. Inc. of Hawaii announced completion of a $ 2-million contract with the Ground Systems Group of Hughes Aircraft Co. to manufacture integrated type 3390A voice communications systems for use in air defense systems.

35

Big Brother's Hot Breath

Recently we received a letter from a pilot reader who had an unnerving encounter with the blast from the four engines of a large jet airliner and he wondered just how hazardous this could be.

The most common cause of trouble is parked light aircraft being damaged either when the engines of a large aircraft are started up or the large aircraft maneuvers on the ground at quite high or 'breakaway· power settings. Of course problems also can occur if you are sufficiently ill advised as to taxi behind a large aircraft which has its main engines running (auxiliary power units usually don't cause any problem as their exhausts normally are deflected upwards). and light aircraft have been known to have been affected in the final stages of an approach or while waiting to take off.

Of course the greatest damage usually is done when the light aircraft is actually blown over which happened on a number of occasions but considerable damage also can be caused by violent movements of the controls

which sometimes cannot be prevented either by control locks or the physical efforts of persons seated at the controls in the aircraft.

The following table of typical slipstream or blast speeds behind a large turbo-prop aeroplane shows the relative velocities (knots) that can be expected at various distances behind the aircraft while it is on the ground: Dist.

Leaving Taxiing behind parked props.(ft) area 60 80 100 120 140 180

59 47 47 36 36

45 36 36 28 28

as because you are wearing a headset. the blast from the engine is almost invisible. Further. tests have shown that wind direction and strength can have a very considerable effect on jet efflux velocities. Thus. if the aircraft is head into wind. the effect of the blast will be felt at distances greater than those shown in both the table above and in the illustration and. of course. crosswinds can deflect the blast towards you.

Sometimes it is possible to see the heat haze behind the jet pipes and. if the aircraft's anti-collision beacon is switched on. then you can be reasonably certain that its engines will be running or are about to be started. So give its behind a very wide berth because the crew could be pouring on the power in order to get something like 300 tons of happy holiday traffic on the move- and that can take quite a bit of power sometimes!

Takeoff

60-70 50-60 40-50 35-45 20-30

Of course the amount of blast from a turbojet engine is considerably greater than that generated by a turboprop engine as the illustration shows and. if you cannot hear the noise of a jet engine running for any reason such

Flight Safety Bulletin '82 See your Al P for Jet-Efflux Danger Areas

JUMBO JET SIZE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (ENGINE THRUSTS: 25.000 LBS UP TO 55.000 LBS) MEDIUM· SIZE JET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (ENGINE THRUSTS: 10,000 LBS UP TO 25,000 LBS)

0

iil

GROUND-IDLE BLAST DANGER AREA

0 0

GROUND-IDLE BLAST DANGER AREA

EXECUTIVE • JET AIRCRAFT (ENGINE THRUSTS UP TO 10.000 LBS)

GROUND-IDLE BLAST DANGER AREA

-g N

"'

.:: 0 0

"'

~--~---250

ft----+----'

TAKE-OFF THRUST BLAST DANGER l'.REA 27511-------

TAKE-OFF THRUST BLAST DANGER AREA

JET EFFLUX DANGER AREAS (NOT TO SCALEt

36

TAKE-OFF THRUST BLAST DANGER AREA 80 ft

0

0 N

New Appointments First United States President for the International Civil Airports Association (!CAA)

Tenenbaum Visits Eurocontrol Experimental Center at Bretigny-sur-Orge (France) Mr. Daniel Tenenbaum, Director General of Civil Aviation in France, visited the Eurocontrol Experimental Center at Bretigny-sur-Orge (France) on 19 November 1982. He was accompagnied by Mr. Louis Pailhas, Director of Air Navigation in France. and Mr. Jean Leveque. Director General of the Eurocontrol Agency.

After touring the center's various sophisticated installations. Mr. Tenenbaum watched a simulation of air traffic control in the Aix-en-Provence area designed inter alia for the evaluation of a new routing and sectorization structure in South-East France.

With the assistance of highlyqualified experts and advanced technological support. the Experimental Center can tackle the varied major tasks entrusted to it. which include radar evaluation, software development. ATC simulations. operational research. studies on navigational aids, air traffic control, and related activities.

During this information visit. Mr. Tenenbaum was particularly impressed by the esprit de corps demonstrated by the international teams working on the various important projects at the Experimental Center, and expressed his conviction that this was a splendid example of European cooperation in the aeronautical field.

At a meeting with staff representatives before his departure, Mr Tenenbaum voiced his keen satisfaction and best wishes for future success.

Mr. Clifton A. Moore, General member of the Airport Associations Manager, Los Angeles Department of Coordinating Council (AACC).

Airports, has been elected the next In January 1975, he received the President of the International Civil Air- Federal Aviation Administration's ports Association.

Award for Extraordinary Service,.

Mr. Moore (60), who has repre- highest honour accorded men and sented Los Angeles on the !CAA Board women not employed by the FAA. The since 19 79, will take over the office of award was presented to Mr. Moore for !CAA President for a three-year term his extensive efforts to alleviate airport after the General Assembly of the As- noise problems. He has participated in sociation to be held during the ICAA the Federal Aviation Administration 22nd Congress in New Delhi, India, Task Force on Airport Access.

6-10 December 1982.

Mr. Moore serves on the Board of Mr. Moore will become the first Directors of the Greater Los Angeles !CAA President from the United States Visitors and Convention Bureau, and of America and will take office in the Antelope Valley Board of Trade. the year in which the Association He serves on the Board of Directors of celebrates the 20th Anniversary of its the Aero Club of Southern California, foundation. and is a member of the National Aeronautics Association, and the AmeriHe succeeds Dr. Theodor Stauffer, Director, Basle-Mulhouse Airport, can Public Works Association.

Switzerland, who has held the office Mr. Moore is married. has a son since June 1980. and two daughters and six grandNamed to the post of general children, and makes his home in Culmanager of the Los Angeles Depart- ver City where he served on the Board ment of Airports on October 20, of Education (June 1961 to May 1968, Clifton A. Moore served as first 1967) twice as president. He is a deputy general manager of the De- charter member and past president of partment from 1966 until his present the Kiwanis Club in that city. appointment. He joined the department in 1959 and served as adminis- ------------------------------trator for the construction of the present-day Los Angeles International AirIFATCA Items For Sale port.

Moore is president-elect of the InItem Members Non-members Cost ternational Civil Airports Association Manual 50.not sold (!CAA), a professional organization of !.H.B. 50.50.200 members representing more than Conference Reports 25.25.450 airports in 85 nations and terriControllers' Concern 4.50 5.50 tories worldwide. Formed in 1962, Hijacking Policy 2.50 3.the association provide technical Automation 2.50 3.information, professional expertise, 4.50 Training 5.50 representation before international and regional bodies and other services Ties 15.not sold to members. Mr. Moore, who cur5.5.Label pins rently serves on the !CAA board of Stickers -.50 -.50 directors, is also a past President of the Airport Operators Council InterThe Controller 8.20.national (AOCI); a member and former director of the California Association Prices Valid From January 1st, 1 983 of Airport Executives (CAAE) which honoured him as 'Airport Manager of All prices indicated are in Swiss Francs and may be purchased from the the Year' for 1981-82; and former secretariat. Postage is charged in addition to indicated prices.

37

his support and words of encouragement.

8th Regional Meeting Europe-West Region of IFATCA

by A. Enright (Regional VP) and Claud Baum (President GLCCA)

Delegates from fifteen of the nineteen regional Member Associations met in Luxembourg from the 2 7 to 30 October 1 982. The Hotel Kons provided good conference facilities and special room rates were obtained for all participants.

The Luxembourg Guild. as organizers of the meeting. were able to offer maximum hospitality to everyone through the generous support and sponsorship of lcelandair. Crossair.

Luxavia. Tunisair. Air Portugal. Finnair. Luxair and Rank Xerox.

All the delegates gathered together on the evening of Wednesday, October 2 7 at a reception offered by the Minister of Transport. Mr. Claude Baum. President of the Luxembourg Guild. in his speech of welcome expressed his thanks to all those who had helped to organize the meeting and hoped that everyone would enjoy their brief stay in the ancient and beautiful city of Luxembourg.

On the Thursday morning. Mr. Josy Barthel. Minister of Transport for the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. addressed the meeting. In his opening speech the Minister pointed out that one item of the agenda - Air Traffic Flow Management- could be seen as

of special interest to the general public since many people had experienced delays to their flights and would welcome improvements to the situation.

He acknowledged the problems that faced the air traffic controller today and added that there would always be room for solutions and improvements.

On behalf of the Europe-West Region. the Regional Vice-President. Mr. Adrian Enright. thanked the minister for

Working Papers Some forty delegates were present at the meeting representing the Member Associations of Belgium.

Denmark.

Eurocontrol.

Germany, Greece. Iceland. Ireland. Italy. Luxembourg. The Netherlands. Norway.

Spain. Sweden. Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The Executive Board of IFATCA was represented by VicePresident Administration. Mr. P. 0•Doherty; Vice-President Professional.

Mr. E. Sermijn and Treasurer, Mr. B. Grezet. The meeting was chaired by the RVP. Mr. C. A. Enright. who was ably assisted by Mr. R. Neyens of the Luxembourg Guild acting as secretary.

Some late working papers .were submitted and accepted bringing the number of working papers to thirteen.

The revised agenda was as follows: Working Paper No.

1.

2.

3.

4.

4.1

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Introduction Acceptance of agenda Regional Vice-President's report Report of 7th Regional Meeting Outstanding action from 7th Regional Meeting Follow up action from 21st IFATCA Conference Report from Regional MAs Realignment of the European Regions of IFATCA Air Traffic Flow Management in Europe The status and the constitution of IFATCA Civil/ Military cooperation in ATC Legal liability of ATCO's Necessity of orientating IFATCA towards cases of impaired safety conditions in ATS Situation of the air traffic controller when faced with an air accident Venue for next Regional Meeting Any other business Closure of 8th Regional Meeting Europe-West

3 4 10

5 6 & 8 2

9 11 12 13

7

Agenda items 1 to 4 were quickly dealt with. Member Associations then gave brief details of the situations in their areas. There are some problems and MAs have promised to keep the RV-P advised of developments. V-P Administration informed the meeting of the situation in the United States. A new association had been formed (US ATCO) but little else was known about it. Information was difficult to obtain.

It would appear from reports that the many problems that existed before the PATCO action have yet to be resolved.

V-P Professional informed the meeting that only twenty two replies had so far

L. tor.: Mr. A. Enright (RVP), Mrs. L. Wurth-Polfer.

Lady Mayor of Luxembourg city and Mr. C. Baum, President of the Luxembourg Guild of A TC at the reception at the Town Hall.

38

been received from the questionnaire 'The Europe-West Region of concerning action in support of other IFATCA, acknowledging the skills and MAs. Only three MAs had said that experience of the air traffic controller, they were in a position to take indus- recommends that air traffic controllers trial action in support of other MAs. , participate in the planning, imThe discussion on the realignment plementation and operation of Air of the European Region occupied the Traffic Flow Management Units. The whole of the afternoon session. Some Europe-West Region of IFATCA (also) MAs, in particular the Nordic Group, recommends that only air traffic confavoured splitting the region into small trollers operate Flow Control Cells.· areas of from five to eight MAs. This The remainder of the agenda items was expected to result in more ef- were completed in the afternoon and ficiency. There was great difficulty in the meeting was closed at 1 700 deciding which MA should be in which hours. area. After several hours of discussion That evening all the delegates were the region voted by 9 votes to 5 to re- received by the Lady Mayor of the City tain the present alignment. There was of Luxembourg at a civic reception in one abstention. Following this result the Town Hall. In her address the Lady the Nordic Group proposed a vote on Mayor stated that such meetings are the formation of a Regional Executive. opportunities for the public to obtain which was accepted by 7 votes to 6 some understanding of the important with two abstentions. part played by air traffic controllers in aviation transport today. She went on to say that •airline passengers tend to Closing Agenda concentrate their interest on the airThe Friday morning session con- line companies and the services they centrated on developing regional offer. Young boys may dream of bepolicy for Air Traffic Flow Manage- coming pilots of big 74 7' s or DCment. After detailed and active dis- 1o·s; why, maybe even Concorde, but cussions the following policy was few of them however realize that without your technical assistance, agreed:

your behind-the-scenes presence. air traffic would be, if not downright impossible at least much riskier and that is not to say a word of airschedules that would turn out to be impossible to handle.· In reply the President of the Luxembourg Guild said that if. in comparison to what the situation was in the past, today the information about our profession is becoming more and more complete. it is due mainly to the efforts of the Federation.

Regional meetings, even if they do not apear to be of direct or particular advantage to the individual controller. may nevertheless be considered as tools to help achieve the aims of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers· Associations.

After the reception the delegates attended a dinner at the Sheraton Aerogolf Hotel hosted by lcelandair.

The end of two full days of intense debate plus an excellent meal created an almost carnival atmosphere and little thought could have been given to the morrow, when early planes and trains had to be caught, as delegates made the most of Luxembourg hospitality.

10th Anniversary of the Nordic Group The 10-year anniversary meeting of the Nordic Group of Air Traffic Controllers Associations - Iceland. Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway - was held at Sandefjord.

Norway from the 13-18 October, 1982.

The Nordic Group usually meets twice a year to study problems in the region and also IFATCA's policy to their countries.

This anniversary meeting covered a wide range of problems affecting controllers and their relationship to I FATCA. The full agenda covered the following: Exchange of ATCO's within the Nordic countries Exchange of information regarding data-based-radarsystems Status of ILO resolutions and their effect in the Nordic countries Information on affiliation to the ITF Nordic Policies on: a. Pension age b. 'PFT' for ATCO's c. ATCO participation at Accident Investigation Boards d. Loss of licence insurance Follow-up of Nordic 1 / 82 Follow-up EUM '81 Follow-up IFATCA '82 The Group thought that it should now start being involved in technical subjects because so far it was involved mainly with items concerning salaries and working conditions of the controller.

The 10-year anniversary functions of the Group ended with a dinner sponsored by Datasaab and SAS. Among the guests were three of the founder-members of the Group, Kaare Leming, Norway, Haakan Westermark, Sweden and John Kalvik, Norway.

39

Air Florida 90 Accident

On January 73, 1982 Air Florida 90 crashed on takeoff at Washington National Airport. Within hours of the accident the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) denied any connection between the accident and the PA TCO strike. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has just released the repurt of its investigation into the accident. The following extracts from that report, which deal with ATC actions at Washington National. reflect the stresses and inadequacies we all knew would come about as a result of the surrogate operation of the US A TC System.

1.17 .11 Air Traffic Control Handling of Flight 90 7. 77. 7 7. 7 A TC Information to Pilots The FAA' s Air Traffic Control Handbook 7110.65B requires that runway visual range (RVR) or runway visibility value (RVV) be issued for runways in use when the prevailing visibility is 1 mile or less. regardless of the value indicated. or 'When RVR/ RVV indicates a reportable value regardless of the prevailing visibility' and 'to issue mid-rollout RVR when the value of either is less than 2.000 feet and less than the touchdown value.

Neither RVR nor RVV was issued by air traffic control to Flight 90. The RVR was. however. issued to landing aircraft as they were cleared to land.

The Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) is a continuous broadcast of recorded noncontrol information in selected terminal areas.

It is intended to improve controller effectiveness and to relieve frequency congestion by automating the repetitive transmission of essential, but routine information. such as weather conditions. runway conditions. temperatures. and altimeter settings.

Pilots are expected to monitor ATIS preliminary to departure from or arrival at an airport and to advise ATC of the code of the ATIS message. FAA's Facility Operation and Administration Manual 7110.3F. Section 3. para.

1230. requires that messages be brief and concise. and not exceed 30 seconds unless required for message content completeness. and that each message be identified by a phonetic alphabet letter code word at both the beginning and end of the message. A

40

new recording is to be made upon receipt of any new official weather regardless of whether there is or is not a change of values: a new recording is also to be made when there is a change in any other pertinent data. such as runway change. instrument approach in use. new or canceled Notams/ Sigmets/ Pireps. On the day of the accident. ATIS information was not updated with changes in braking action.

Atis Alpha was broadcast from 15.14 to 15.31. Braking action had been reported as fair by multiengine commuter aircraft. Ground control also received braking reports at 1 511 as Poor. especially at turnoff from a US Air BAC-11 1 and Fair to poor from an Eastern DC-9 aircraft. ATIS Bravo was broadcast from 15.32 to 15.37 and contained no braking report.

Subsequent Bravo broadcasts from 15.38-15.44 and from 15.4516.02 listed braking as Poor as reported by a B727 aircraft. (According to the requirements of the manual. the second and third Bravo broadcasts should have been Charlie and Delta. respectively.) Flight 90 did not tell clearance delivery or ground control that it was in receipt of ATIS. and clearance delivery or ground control did not ask the crew of Flight 90 if it was in receipt of ATIS.

7. 77. 7 7.2 Separation Criteria Criteria for the separation between departing and arriving aircraft are set forth in the FAA' s Air Traffic Control Handbook 7110.65B Section 6. paragraph 743 as follows: Departure and Arrival (terminal) Except as provided in 744. separate a departing aircraft from an arriving aircraft on final approach by a minimum of 2 miles if separation will increase to a minimum of 3 miles (5 miles when 40 miles or more from the antenna)within 1 minute aftertakeoff.

The FAA Air Traffic Control Handbook requires that the controller determine the position of an aircraft before issuing taxi information or takeoff clearances to it. Such position determination may be made visually by the controller. by pilot reports. or by the use of airport surface detection equipment radar equipment. With regard to Flight 90. because of limited visibility. the local controller could not

see the B737 when he cleared him 'into position and hold' and 'be ready for an immediate (takeoff)'. There is no airport surface detection equipment at the Washington National Control Tower.

Using the ATC tape. FOR readout from Eastern Flight 1451. radar data from Eastern 1451. radar performance data for Flight 90. the Safety Board calculated the distances between the landing aircraft. Eastern Flight 1451. and Flight 90 and found that there was between 1 . 500 ft and 4.000 ft. Discrepancies in the FOR on Flight 1451 precluded more precise calculations.

The FAA Air Traffic Control Handbook 7110. 75B. paragraph 743.

Traffic Training Program Lesson Plan stresses •not to clear a departure for takeoff when the arrival is 2 miles from the runway. it's too late then. Normally. departure action must be taken at 3 miles to realize 2 mile minimum.· Additionally. this provision is also contained in the written· Local Control Test No. 1• which was given to Washington National Airport controllers as part of their initial training.

7. 77. 7 7.3 Controller Experience On January 13. 1982. the local control. ground control. clearance delivery. and departure control positions were manned. This staffing represents a full complement. identical to that of July 1981. before the controllers strike. Ground control. clearance delivery. and departure control positions were manned by developmental controllers who had all been checked out in their respective positions.

The local controller handling Flight 90 at the time of the accident was a working controller and was also the team supervisor. He began his career as a military controller in 1959 and had worked at Washington National Airport since 1964. His training records at the time of the accident indicated that his last •over the shoulder' check was administered and completed satisfactorily on September 9. 1 9 7 7. The •over the shoulder' training review is required to be administered semiannually.

Testimony at the Safety Board's public hearing indicated that he had been given these required checks. but written documentation could not be provided.

7. 7 7. 7 7.4 Gate-Hold Procedures Washington National Tower did not use gate-hold procedures on the day of the accident. Gate-hold procedures were initially developed as a fuel conservation measure. FAA Air Traffic

Control Handbook 7210.3 F. Section 3. paragraph 1232. outlines these procedures as follows: Gate Hold Procedures a. The objective of gate hold procedures is to achieve departure delays of 5 minutes or less after engine start and taxi time. Facility chiefs shall ensure that gate hold procedures and departure delay information are made available to all pilots prior to engine start up.

Implement gate hold procedures whenever departure delays exceed or are expected to exceed five minutes. b. Facility chiefs shall meet with airport management and users to develop local gate hold procedures within the guidelines of 1 230 and •in accordance with limitations imposed by local conditions. Include the following general provisions in the procedures: (i) Pilots shall contact GC (ground control)/CD (clearance delivery) prior to starting engines to receive start time. The sequence for departure shall be maintained in accordance with initial callup unless modified by flow control restrictions. (ii) Develop notification procedures for aircraft unable to transmit without engine(s) running.

Note. - Inability to contact GC/ CD prior to engine start shall not be justification to alter departure sequence. (iii) The operator has the final authority to decide whether to absorb the delay at the gate. have the aircraft towed to another area. or taxi to a delay absorbing area. (iv) GC/CD frequency is to be monitored by the pilot and issued a new proposed engine start time if the delay changes.

The chief of the Washington National Tower stated that because of airport space limitations gate-hold procedures could not be implemented and that Washington Tower Letter to Airmen 79-1. subject: Departure Delay Procedures-Fuel Conservation. was in compliance with subsection b of paragraph 1232. The Washington Tower letter to Airmen 79-1. went into effect November 20. 1979. and expired November 20. 1981; it had not been renewed.

Between 15.17:13and 15.47:55. there were a total of 22 communications between ground control and aircraft on the ground at Washington National relative to flight crew·s concerns over departure information. The tower was unable to provide these departing flightcrews with reasonable

estimates of anticipated departure delays.

The Safety Board considered several factors in analyzing the flightcrew· s performance and judgment during the takeoff. The air traffic situation and the local controller· s instructions to takeoff with ·no delay· may have predisposed the crew to hurry. The CVR and FOR data show that the crew probably expedited their actions to the extent possible; they taxied to the runway and began the takeoff from the turn to runway heading without stopping. Consequently. they did not take the opportunity to advance engine power in a static situation to verify performance and instrument readings. Additionally. the slippery surface of the runway probably would have made a static engine power check before takeoff difficult.

Both the captain and the first officer detected the EPR overshoot when the throttles were advanced. That the target EPR indication was obtained at a throttle position other than normal probably prompted the initial awareness that something was 'not right'. It is not possible to determine to what extent either of the pilots crosschecked the other engine instruments at that time. The captain's comment 'real cold' could refer to his observation of the engine exhaust gas temperature which would have been lower than normal for the intended takeoff thrust though corresponding to the actual takeoff thrust; however. the Safety Board believes that it more probably reflected a belief that a higher-than-normal EPR resulted because of cold ambient temperatures.

Although the first officer advised the captain of his concerns several times. the captain apparently chose to ignore his comments and continue the takeoff. It is not necessary that a crew competely analyze a problem before rejecting a takeoff on the takeoff roll.

An observation that something is not right is sufficient reason to reject a takeoff without further analysis. The problem can then be analyzed before a second takeoff attempt. On a slippery runway. a decision to reject must be made as early as possible. An engineering analysis based on the FORindicated performance and theoretical performance of the B73 7 showed that the accident aircraft had traveled about 1. 250 ft before it reached 80 kn. Analysis also showed that the aircraft could have been brought to a stop from 80 kn in less than 2.000 ft even on an extremely slippery runway - one having a coefficient of braking of 0. 1 . In fact. the analysis showed that the flightcrew should have been able to stop the aircraft safely within the

runway length even if the action to reject had been delayed until the aircraft reached 1 20 kn. While the runway condition may have been an influencing factor at higher speeds. the Safety Board does not consider it a contributing factor to the captain's lack of action when the engine instrument anomaly was first called to his attention. The Safety Board also considered the possibility that the captain was aware of and concerned about the decreasing separation between his aircraft and the aircraft landing behind him. The Board believes that this would likely have become a factor only after the landing aircraft reported· over the lights·. This was 9 seconds after the first officer first observed. 'that don· t seem right'. and 1 second after Flight 90 had reached 80 kn. Further. there are no comments on the CVR to indicate that the captain ever considered rejecting the takeoff. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that there was sufficient doubt about instrument readings early in the takeoff roll to cause the captain to reject the takeoff while the aicraft was still at relatively low speeds; that the doubt was clearly expressed by the first officer; and that the failure of the captain to respond and reject the takeoff was a direct cause of the accident.

Washington National Airport. The ideal situation during periods of precipitation conducive to ice accretion or snow accumulation is to deice the aircraft immediately before taxi and to receive takeoff clearance without delay. Unfortunately. this same type of weather is most apt to produce significant air traffic delays.

In this context. the Safety Board examined the conditions at Washington National Airport. Although there was no attempt during this investigation to evaluate the airport's ability to cope with normal daily operations. it was evident that the airport's capacity affected the ground delays experienced on January 13. First. the airport operates with a single acceptable instrument runway. While most other major airports have multiple runways and snow can be removed from one runway while operations are conducted from another. at Washington National it is necessary to close the airport for snow removal. This necessarily produces a backlog of both arriving and departing traffic. Second. at many airports it is possible to implement a gate-hold procedure. permitting aircraft to remain at the gate where deicing equipment is accessible until takeoff can be made with minimum delay. At Washington National. however. both gate and ramp space are limited. On January 41

13. the imbalance between arriving and departing traffic resulted in more aircraft on the ground than the airport normally handles, making it necessary to clear aircraft for taxi in order to provide gate space and relieve the congestion of arriving traffic. Consequently, aircraft were lined up awaiting air traffic control's ability to fit them into the traffic flow. Third, the constrained taxi areas, particularly in periods of snowfall, provide for only limited movement and maneuvering of delayed aircraft. There is not sufficient room under most circumstances to get out of line and taxi to a designated area for deicing and then fall back in line for takeoff. The flight crew's options are limited to continued waiting until they are able to takeoff. or returning to their deicing areas where they will probably be exposed to more waiting for space at the ramp. Thus, while the Safety Board believes that professional flight crews must give paramount consideration to the hazards of takeoff with a contaminated aircraft. the practicality of returning to a deicing area only to encounter repeated delays awaiting takeoff might influence a flightcrew· s decision to take off with an accumulation of ice or snow on the aircraft which a flightcrew might view as nonthreatening.

The Safety Board also analyzed the conditions of the runway and taxiways as they might have influenced the performance of Flight 90. Pilots who had landed following the airport's snow removal operation and others who landed about the time of the accident stated that the runway was snow covered at the approach and departure ends and that it was patchy with areas of asphalt visible through the snow in the center. None of the pilots reported problems in stopping their aircraft within the runway length.

Indeed. most arriving aircraft turned off before the intersection with runway 33-15. The Safety Board's analysis of the takeoff performance of Flight 90 indicated that the actual acceleration of the aircraft during the takeoff roll correlated closely with the acceleration that a B737 at the accident aircraft's weight would attain at an EPR setting of 1. 70. Therefore. the Board concluded that the runway contaminant did not significantly affect the aircraft's takeoff performance. Undoubtedly, the braking coefficient which could have been achieved on the runway was less than that for a dry runway. However, the actual braking coefficient was not measured.

Therefore. the Board cannot precisely assess the extent to which ·the runway condition might have become a factor 42

if the takeoff had been rejected at high speed. However, assuming braking coefficients generally associated with icy runways. the aircraft should have stopped without difficulty if the takeoff had been rejected below 12 kn.

Therefore. the Safety Board believes that the runway condition should not have been a factor in any decision to reject the takeoff when the instrument anomaly was noted.

Pilots using the airport at the time of the accident stated that the taxiways were covered with about 3 inches of snow and slippery conditions were encountered during taxi. While there is no evidence that Flight 90 encountered problems taxiing. the snow on the taxiway might have contributed to the accumulation of contaminant on the aircraft. particularly because of its proximity to the preceding aircraft.

However. the Board believes it is likely that the continuing precipitation was the major source of wing contamination and that the snow on the taxiway contributed little to the contamination.

Although the Safety Board believes that the airport snow condition was a factor only insofar as it contributed to the flight's ground delay as it awaited takeoff clearance. the Board has been concerned about the problems of runway surface conditions as they affect aircraft, particularly air carrier operations. As a result of this accident and others. including a fatal accident which occurred only 10 days afterward. the Safety Board convened a 3-day public hearing on May 3. 1982. to receive evidence on the subject.

Witnesses from government and various segments of the aviation industry appeared to address five related issues: airport management requirements and maintenance procedures during inclement weather, the role of the airline. air traffic control, and the pilot in determining the operational adequacy of a runway, the effect of slippery runways on aircraft certification and operational regulations, the adequacy of present techniques for measuring runway friction and their value to a pilot, and the development of equipment or techniques to monitor aircraft acceleration. The findings of that hearing will be published by the Safety Board in a Special Investigation Report.

Runway 36 at Washington National Airport does not comply with current FAA design criteria for newly constructed airports for extended runway safety areas. While the Safety Board acknowledges that a longer safety area would have provided a greater margin of safety if Flight 90 had rejected its takeoff, it notes that

the length of the hard surface of runway 36 exceeded the runway length required by regulations for FIight 90' s takeoff. Furthermore, the total length afforded by runway 36 and its extended surface area exceeded the total which would have been provided if Flight 90 had been operating from a minimum length runway having a currently prescribed extended safety area. Consequently, the Safety Board does not consider the fact that the runway does not meet the current FAA design criteria for new airports to be a factor in this accident.

Regardless of the relevance to this accident, the Safety Board has had a long-standing concern with the adequacy of runway safety areas. On April 20, 1977, the Safety Board recommended that the FAA amend 14 CFR 139.45 to require that extended runway safety area criteria be applied retroactively to all certified airports. At those airports which cannot meet the full criteria, the extended runway safety area should be as close to the full 1,000-ft length as possible.

The FAA responded that the requirement for an extended runway safety area at all certificated airports would 'be unacceptable due to the unreasonable burden placed on airport operators·. However. the FAA is considering an amendment to 14 CFR 139 to require extended runway safety areas at new airports, or when new runways or major runway extentions are constructed at existing airports. The FAA has. however, rewritten Advisory Circular 15015335-4 to place more emphasis on the design criteria for extended runway safety areas.

In view of the FAA' s decision not to emphasize the construction of extended runway safety areas at certificated airports. the Safety Board urges voluntary action by airport owners and managers to upgrade those runways which fall short of the current design standards for extended runway safety areas.

Flow of Traffic Into Airport (Air Traffic Control). - The congestion of aircraft operations at Washington National Airport on January 13.

1 982. as the cause of takeoff delays after aircraft had been deiced has been discussed. Certainly. the ability to handle large numbers of aircraft without difficulty even in good conditions is a recognized limitation of the airport. Therefore. the Safety Board believes that the FAA should have used all available means to prevent saturation of the airport and the air traffic control system during the weather conditions which existed. The FAA could have provided stricter con-

trol of the number of aircraft inbound to Washington National Airport through their Central Flow Control Facility (CFCF).

It is an accepted procedure that airport management notify the Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and the CFCF when it anticipates closure of an airport. Such notification should be given at least 30 minutes before the airport is closed so that the affected ARTCC's and CFCF can take appropriate action to deal with aircraft destined for the airport. They must plan for holding or rerouting those aircraft which are airborne and scheduled to arrive during the period of closure. Action should also be taken to prevent an arrival backlog by notifying ARTCC's to hold those aircraft which are planning flights to the airport. but which have not yet taken off from their departure airports.

At 13.00 on January 13, 1982, Washington National Airport personnel advised the Washington ARTCC and CFCF that the airport would be closed for snow removal operations between 13 .30 and 14.30. The Washington ARTCC thus began to hold en route traffic inbound to the airport at 13.20. Concurrent action was not taken by CFCF to hold aircraft at departure airports. Thus, the backlog of arrival traffic being placed into holding increased. The situation was compounded further when Washington National Airport personnel notified the ARTCC at 14.25 that the airport would reopen at 14. 3 7, but then at 14.37 revised the expected time for reopening to 15.00. At that time, the Washington ARTCC was becoming saturated with holding inbound traffic and holding was extended to the adjacent ARTCC's. It was not until 14.55 that the adjacent ARTCC's began to delay departures of aircraft destined for Washington from airports within their respective areas.

The Safety Board believes that the CFCF should be capable of adjusting rapidly to changing weather conditions to enable the system to hold traffic at the departure airports. The failure or inability to do so resulted in a flow of arrival traffic immediately after the airport reopened which saturated the airport. The Safety Board concludes that the FAA's CFCF did not anticipate the developing situation and take action to prevent it. The Safety Board believes that its failure to act may have been the result of inadequate communications between facilities- either the lack of timeliness of essentia I information or inaccurate information, such as the closing of the airport for 30 minutes longer than anticipated. The Safety Board thus be-

lieves that the FAA should review ATC coordination practices and modify them as necessary to require that facilities provide CFCF with current and accurate information and that CFCF acts on that information in a positive manner to minimize airport saturation and extensive traffic delays.

Traffic Separation. - A witness' observation suggested and the Safety Board's evaluation of the ATC communications and radar data confirmed that Eastern Flight 1451 , a B72 7, touched down on the runway before Flight 90 became airborne from the same runway. The correlation of data showed that the minimum separation was no greater than 4,000 ft and might have been much less. The Safety Board concludes that the separation between Flight 1451 and Flight 90 was an unsafe condition which violated acceptable ATC procedures and established separation criteria.

As a result of the traffic backlog on the day of the accident. arrivals were being fed by approach control to the local controller in a continuous sequence and departures were being delayed. The local controller was placed under considerable pressure to expedite the traffic flow in order to reduce departure delays, and he was interspersing departure traffic between successive arrivals.

In this type of operation, the separation between departing and arriving aircraft depends upon the interval between successive arriving aircraft established by approach control. The local controller is responsible. however, for monitoring that interval so that he can provide the prescribed separation for departing traffic. He must decide whether the interval is sufficient to allow the departure. The controller's actions are guided by the limiting criteria set forth in FAA's Air Traffic Control Handbook 7110.65B - that is, under IFR conditions, a departing aircraft may be separated from an arriving aircraft on final approach by a minimum of 2 miles if separation will increase to a minimum of 3 miles within 1 minute after takeoff. The criteria are intended to assure that safe separation is maintained between departing and arriving aircraft in the event that an arriving aircraft executes a missed approach. However, both the local controller on duty at the time of the accident and the Washington National Airport Tower Chief stated at the Board's public hearing that the FAA's ATC Handbook criteria are widely interpreted to allow for the •accordion effect' of landing deceleration and takeoff acceleration. To the contrary. the ATC training manuals and

controller tests clearly indicate that no such allowance is intended.

In making his operational decisions regarding the insertion of departure traffic, the controller must consider factors, such as the time required for a landing aircraft to clear the runway, the time required for a departing aircraft to taxi to the takeoff position and initiate takeoff and the acceleration of the departing traffic and its relationship with the closure rate (ground speed) of the landing traffic.

Other factors. such as taxiway and runway conditions. must be considered as they affect the movement of aircraft. The assessment of these factors undoubtedly is more difficult on a day when aircraft holding for takeoff or those rolling out after landing cannot be seen from the tower. The controller must then base his judgment on radar displays. experience. and verbal communications with the aircraft. For example. based on all of the factors. the local controller might determine that h.eneeds a minimum spacing of 6 miles between arriving aircraft. If he notes a separation of less than 6 miles, he must realize that he cannot insert a departure. His logical action would then be to notify the approach controller to provide more spacing between arrivals in order to accommodate departures. Based on the evidence. the Safety Board concludes that the local controller handling the departure of Flight 90 used poor judgment of these factors, compromising the required separation criteria. That he realized that the spacing interval was right is evident by the ATC communications. Eastern 1451 reported 'by the marker' 30 seconds before Flight 90 was told to taxi into 'position and hold'. The earlier landing traffic was asked to expedite its turnoff from the runway, Eastern 1451 was asked to maintain reduced speed, and Flight 90 was told to takeoff without delay. The last two transmissions were particularly poor practices. Restricting speed on short final is a dangerous practice and is specifically prohibited by the Air Traffic Control Handbook when inside the final approach fix. Expecting Flight 90 to takeoff without delay was improper since the controller did not verbally and could not visually verify that Flight 90 had reached the takeoff position at the time. Until Flight 90 was cleared for takeoff. the controller had the option of holding Flight 90 and issuing a missed approach to Eastern 1451.

However. after Flight 90 was cleared. the situation became critical. The controller should have requested a rolling report from Flight 90 and continued to monitor the progress of 43

Eastern 1451. Failing to receive a rolling report from Flight 90 as Eastern 1451 closed to within 3 miles. the controller could have issued a missed approach and vectors. Instead. the 2-mile separation criterion was probably compromised when Flight 90 started rolling. and the abnormally slow acceleration of Flight 90 further reduced the expected separation.

Since the controller could not see the aircraft because of poor visibility. he could not monitor Flight 90' s takeoff progress visually and was completely dependent upon radar information and verbal communications in order to determine whether he should permit Eastern 1451 to continue its approach. Consequently. he may not have known if Flight 90 had rejected a takeoff in time to issue a missed approach clearance to Eastern 1451 which could be executed safely. Furthermore. action to issue a missed approach clearance to Eastern 1451 or even voluntary execution of a missed approach by Eastern 1451 after Flight 90 had commenced takeoff would have been equally hazardous since the two aircraft could have collided during departure.

The Safety Board has concluded that the proximity of Eastern 14 51 should not have been a factor in the takeoff decision of the captain of Flight 90. and there is no evidence that it did influence his decision.

Although the Safety Board does not believe that there is sufficient evidence to determine that the ATC' s handling of Flight 1451 was a causal factor in the crash of Flight 90. the Board concluded that the local controller's overeagerness to expedite the traffic flow to relieve the departure backlog was contrary to established procedures and jeopardized safety.

The Safety Board is concerned that no operational error was recorded although the local controller's handling of traffic in this case was clearly contrary to FAA procedure.

3. Conclusions

29. The local controller erred in judgment and violated ATC procedures when he cleared Flight 90 to take off ahead of arriving Eastern Flight 1451 with less than the required separation and jeopardizing it.

30. Eastern 1451 touched down on runway 36 before Flight 90 lifted off: the separation closed to less than 4.000 ft. in violation of the 2-mile separation requirement in the Air Traffic Control Handbook.

44

Letter to the Editor IFATCA's Future At the Opening Plenary of IFATCA '82. the State Secretary of Transport and Public Works. Mr. J.C. Vander Doef stated. 'You (IFATCA) have arrived at a crossroads and will have to decide on the road to be followed towards the attainment of your objectives.· This then was the challenge to IFATCA. and the main theme of IFATCA '82. the result of which should have been a decision. But where is that decision?

Before Conference the President stated in the Annual Report of the Executive Board. 'The Federation has gone through what can only be termed a period of deep soul searching. a period which will result in a more unified and coherent group of controllers organizations.· The ·soul searching· referred to was. on the part of some member associations. for a way out of a serious dilemma. The words ·unified' and ·coherent' are used very presumptuously and I believe come of a misguided ideal based on fantasy rather than fact. Again the President states. 'the Federation has shown that it can survive turbulance and remain a credible entity.' Well. survival means the ability to maintain life. it does not guarantee the quality of life maintained.

And so we come to Conference. with the Executive Board itself unsure of the way ahead. The Editor. commenting on the planned program of Committee A states ('The Controller· Nr. 3/82) ·some hot and extensive discussion was anticipated'. Further on he states when referring to closed sessions. 'all matters arising out of the PATCO issue were discussed'. and again. 'the PATCO case was one of the very many important items that necessitated a closed session·. During the closing Plenary. the Chairman of Committee A stated that the agenda had provoked considerable discussion both in the open and closed sessions.

But what came of all these heated discussions. these closed sessions. this challenge to IFATCA? Nothing.

The Federation remains at the crossroads.

And so to the future and what hope for IFATCA to continue as a credible organization. It seems that many member associations neither have the ability nor the will to face up to and overcome problems such as posed by the PATCO strike: That organization was given a quiet funeral by IFATCA (the member associations). and was then quickly forgotten. Until such time as all the members can be relied upon to speak with one voice. the ideals of

unity will never be attained.

And what of IFATCA '83: Will it be a social gathering of old friends or can we hope that there will be a more positive approach to the future. There may not be many more opportunities available for ·soul searching'.

Paul Humphreys, Member. Ireland 6 January 1983

'Peggy's Thanks' Dear Andreas, Through the pages of 'The Controller' I should like to express the sincere thanks of my daughter and myself for many letters. telegrams and cards we have received during the past days.

I especially wish to thank the Executive Board and the Yugoslav Association; without their help and support it would have been impossible to surmount all the difficulties. I am afraid I shall not be able to answer all the many letters in the near future. With the continued help of all my friends. I hope to complete the work that Ted did for the 1983 Conference.

I earnestly entreat all members to do their very best to make this Conference a success. it would have been Ted's wish. I was with him during the negotiations in Zagreb and can assure all that everything has been arranged for a perfect Conference.

• I look forward to meeting all our friends in Split.

Yours sincerely.

Peggy Bradshaw.

Dec. 10th. 1982

Vortices and the Little Guys The problem of vortices from larger aircraft isn't new. But it's all relative; a new twist has surfaced.

We have a plea for help from the ultralight/ microlight drivers. In many instances these pilots have moved their activities to out-of-the-way strips where they can do their own thing without interference with or by other aircraft. Unfortunately. collections of these interesting machines arouse the curiosity of other pilots. They can't resist having a close-up look.

If you fly near them at low altitudes someone's going to get hurt. Even the vortice from a 1 70 can knock one of these little putt-putts out of the air.

New Vice-President for McDonnell

Anglo-Italian Helicopter Funding May Delay Launch

Work on the joint Anglo-Italian Westland-Agusta EH-101 civil and military helicopter could be delayed if government funding for the venture is not forthcoming soon. Lord Aldington. chairman of the Westland Group. says in his review for shareholders.

In addition to Ministry of Defence funds. Westland has applied to the Department of Industry for launch aid expected to be roughly the amount of EH-101 costs that it will bear against its profits between now and 1ggo-or about £65m in 1982 moneyterms.

'But funds have been made available to us by our Ministry of Defence for necessary work and all critical path areas are being closely watched.· Lord Aldington said. ·we have done all we reasonably can in this joint Anglo-Italian program to ensure that the planned dates for prototype and of production deliveries do not have to be further postponed as a result of the delays caused by government procedures in Britain and in Italy,' he says. ·we cannot now expect to receive a full contract for the development stage from the two governments for the basic naval helicopter until well into 1983.

'Meanwhile. we need an early decision of our government about the funding of Britain's share. which is as important to the contingency planning as it is to the original program. ·1 have several times stressed to British Ministers that time is of the essence if this great joint venture project. defence and civilian. is to capture world markets. ·we have a great stake in this project. far in excess of the £2. 7 million we have already put into the first phase and the £65 million referred to above.· Westland foresees a market for over 1000 aircraft of the EH-101 type through the rest of this decade and into the 1990s.

British Airways Helicopters. which faces making between 40 and 60 of its 189 pilots redundant. is seeking alternative civil and military work for them.

BAH is offering to provide experienced pilots to civil aviation companies or military establishments in a bid to offset the temporary over-capacity of aircraft and crews in North Sea operations.

This is due to lower North Sea demand for helicopter services. and also the work-capacity of the 44-seat Boeing Vertol 234 has left smaller helicopters with less to do.

Thomas M. Gunn. a Marketing Executive at McDonnell Douglas Corporation. has been promoted to Staff Vice-President Washington. DC. Gunn. 39 years old. joined McDonnell Douglas in 1975 as a Marketing Manager after spending seven years in Washington as Counsel to US Senate Committees and an Attorney for the Federal Trade Commission.

He was promoted to Corporate Director-Government Affairs in 1978 and to Director-Marketing Operations and Strategic Planning at the McDonnell Aircraft Company division in 1982.

He is a 1967 Graduate of St. Louis University Law School and a member of the Missouri. St. Louis and American Bar Associations.

Racal Buys Megapulse in US

Racal Electronics has extended its interests in marine and airborne navigation systems by purchasing Megapulse. a US manufacturer of transmitters and receivers. for about $ 20m (£12.6m).

Racal has also settled its year-long dispute with Philips over sales by the Dutch electronics company of marine equipment designed to use the network which Racal operates for users of its Decca Navigator.

According to Racal. Megapulse is the leading supplier of Loran-C marine and airborne navigation transmiters to the US Coast Guard. It has also sold systems to the Canadian. Saudi Arabian and French governments.

The US company. at Bedford.

Massachusetts. reported a $4.8m pre-tax profit on turnover of $14.2m during its financial year ended September 30. Racal expects Megapulse·s turnover to be $20m in this financial year and to reach more than $1 OOm by 1987-88.

Sir Ernest Harrison. Racal's chairman. said that the acquisition would bring to the company Megapulse·s expertise in advanced technologies such as high-energy lasers. controlled fusion and electron-beam techniques.

This would take Racal into new potentially high-growth areas.

Under its settlement with Philips.

Racal will have exclusive rights in Britain and Ireland to market under its own name the AP navigation system made in Denmark by a Philips subsidiary.

In exchange the Dutch group will make an undisclosed payment toward the cost of maintaining the Decca Navigator network.

Racal. which supplies the Decca Navigator almost exclusively on rental. had complained that Philips was competing unfairly by selling similar equipment without contributing to the network's upkeep.

Recently Racal sued Delta Marine. a British company which has also supplied equipment designed to use the Navigator network. for infringement of copyright. Racal won the first round in court. but the judgment was overturned on appeal.

The Decca Navigator network provides coverage chiefly in the coastal waters of the UK and Western Europe. parts of Africa and the East Coast of North America.

Loran-C covers areas in the North Sea. the East and West Coasts of the US. and the Pacific basin.

45

DC Multi-Million Contract

Multi-year procurement of the KC10 will save an estimated $600 million over the 44-aircraft program.

The multi-year procurement proMcDonnell Douglas Corporation gram is designed to save money by alreceived a $ 2. 700 million multi-year lowing manufacturers and suppliers to contract for production of 44 KC-10 plan production on an uninterrupted advanced tanker/ cargo aircraft for the basis at an economical rate. The US Congress must still authorize the funds US Air Force.

The aircraft will be delivered from each year.

1983 through 1987.

McDonnell Douglas has delivered Fiscal Year 1983 funding under 1 2 KC-1Osto the air force, and 4 more the multi-year procurement program is are in production and scheduled for $867 million. Of that amount. $426 delivery in 1983. The current air force million will be for purchase of eight KC- schedule calls for the delivery of 4 ad1Os. and $441 million for advanced ditional planes in 1983, 8 in 1 984.

11 in 1985. 12 in 1986 and 9 in funding of long-lead items.

This advanced funding will allow 1987.

McDonnell Douglas to place orders In addition to the aircraft orders. with its suppliers for parts and equip- the air force also authorized $ 27 ment needed for production of aircraft million for logistic support of the KCin future years. Those suppliers can 10 for·fiscal year 1983. then produce the needed parts in The KC-1Os first entered the air economical quantities, cutting the force inventory in March, 1981. Since cost of the program to the taxpayer. the first delivery. the KC-10 has per-

formed well as both a cargo carrier and aerial refueller.

In a noteworthy mission in October, the KC-10 helped six F-1 5s fly nonstop from Okinawa in the Pacific to Florida, a distance of more than 8, 100 miles (13,033 km). During the 14. 7-hour mission, the KC-10 not only refuelled the fighters, but carried the fighters· support personnel and support equipment. It also acted as a pathfinder aircraft on the mission.

That mission was carried out with two KC-1Os and 4 KC-135s. Without the use of the KC-1Os, the same mission would have required the use of seven additional KC-135s, an EC135 for pathfinder use. and two C-14 1 B cargo aircraft.

The KC-10, a derivative of the DC-10 Series 30 CF (Convertible Freighter), is powered by three General Electric CF6-50C2 engines. It is manufactured at the Douglas Aircraft Company plant in Long Beach, California.

Lookout A private pilot relates his recent experience of an arrival at an uncontrolled aerodrome. ·we were established in a right downwind for the active runway. A C 1 50 who previously radioed that he was eight miles from the airport. joined the mid-downwind on the live side by making a left turn in front of us. This

was less than two minutes after the previous radio call. The VFR Supplement clearly states that the circuit is right-hand for this runway. Had we been in a high-performance single or a twin, the outcome could have been disastrous. Not only were we cut off, but another aircraft about to turn final was then cut off by the very short base

turn of the offending aircraft and was forced to leave the circuit and rejoin later.· A little time spent by the offending pilot reading rules of the air ( RAC) in his AIP would have saved his fellow fliers a lot of aggravation - the big sky theory isn't valid around aerodromes.

PWI_ND;SIDE:' •.

"

46

-·

Permanent Comission' s 61 st Session The Permanent Commission of Ministers of Eurocontrol, the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation. held its 61 st Session in Brussels on 23 November 1982. The session was presided over by Mr. Josy Barthel. Minister of Transport, Energy and the Environment of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

The Permanent Commission took note of the Five-Year Program and longterm costing for the period 1983 -87 relating to the Organization's Central Services and Maastricht UAC. In connection with the examination of the feasibility study relating to the Maastricht center extension, the Permanent Commission acting upon the proposals made by the four States directly concerned in the operation of the Center. viz. the Federal Republic of Germany. Belgium. Luxembourg and the Netherlands. decided that. for the future, the Maastricht UAC would be entrusted with the area control function for the Benelux/ Northern Germany area above flight level 300 and invited the Eurocontrol Agency to cooperate with the national administrations concerned when elaborating the implementation plan. In addition the ministers wished to ascertain that future developments of air traffic control in this area will be part of a common plan and will be in line with future European common system concepts now being developed by the Eurocontrol Member States. Also they wish to ascertain that these developments will be realized under the immediate responsibility of the Ministers of the Four States. They have therefore decided to establish a common Benelux/ Federal Republic of Germany air traffic control planning staff in which Eurocontrol will also participate. One of the aims of this is to find ways and means - in the future - to realize Concept I. which will further integrate en-route air traffic control at the Maastricht center.

Budgets ments. including one with Portugal relating to the provision of advisory The Permanent Commission apservices after the entry into force of proved the organization· s investment the Protocol amending the Convenand operating budgets for 1983. The tion, another with the Federal Repubcredits for payment appearing in the lic of Germany concerning the proviseven member states' common sion of support services to Karlsruhe operating budget amount to UAC by Eurocontrol. as well as a 44 761 390 ECU. while the correspecial agreement relating to the sponding credits entered in the training and familiarization of new BFS operating budget financed by the four fur Flugsicherung) states of the Benelux/ Federal Re- (Bundesanstalt staff to be employed at Karlsruhe UAC public of Germany Region total after the center·s transfer to BFS. 54 359 620 ECU, including.

Mme N. Smit-Kroes. Netherland's 19 603 000 ECU in respect of reMinister of Transport and Public imbursements relating to indirect Works will assume the Presidency of operating costs in the region. the Permanent Commission from 1 The figures in the seven member January 1983 until 31 December states· common operating budget in1983. The vice-presidency during the clude an amount of 3 106 960 ECU same period will be entrusted to the in credits for payment in respect of representative of Ireland. further development of a central data The Permanent Commission bank, trial operation of which is appointed 7 July 1983 as the date for planned by the member states in the autumn of 1983. This project was • its next meeting at the organization's headquarters in Brussels. definded as part of a work program adopted in 1980 in cooperation with ICAO relating to the implementation of an international system of air traffic flow management.

The credits for payment entered in Signature of Two Major Contracts by Eurocontrol the investment budget amount to 26 015 091 ECU including Institute 6 167 991 ECU in respect of the orEurocontrol. the European Organiganization·s direct investments and zation for the Safety of Air Navigation.

1 9 84 7 100 ECU in respect of recently concluded two major conreimbursements payable to the member states in respect of indirect invest- tracts with Digital-Equipment and CALOMP for the supply and instalments in air traffic services for the lation of equipment for a new simulaupper airspace.

The minister's. acting in their dual tor system designed to enable the Eurocontrol Institute in Luxembourg capacities as national authorities and Members of the Permanent Com- to pursue effectively in the years mission. adopted the unit rates in ahead its controller and ATC technical respect of route charges and trans- training assignment. as well as its atlantic tariffs applicable in the air- research into specialized ATC-related teaching methods and aids. space of the states participating in the The new system. designated Eurocontrol route charges system for lnstilux 2. will comprise: the period from 1 April to 31 Decema main computer complex built ber 1983. They also requested that round a VAX 11 /780 computer special effort be made for a better 14 controller and pilot working harmonization of methods of calcupositions. lations.

Each working position will be The Permanent Commission is equipped with a Sanders Graphic 7 issuing a directive to the Agency for graphic screen for the display of radar the conclusion of contracts to extend information and a tabular screen with until 13 December 1983 the Bilateral touch input device; the input/ output Agreements and related agreements facilities of each position will be driven currently in force until the date on by a PDPl 1-23 PLUS mini-computer which the protocol amending the 1960 Eurocontrol Convention, signed linked to the central computer by an Ethernet network. at Brussels on 12 February 1981.

Additional contracts will be let becomes effective. The commission subsequently for the supply of the hoped nevertheless that the ratifitelecommunications system. concation process in all the signatory soles and associated equipment. states would be completed by 1 July Application software will be pro1983. duced by the Eurocontrol Institute Special Agreement with the help of contract staff.

Further, the Permanent CommisOperational commissioning is sion approved several special agree- scheduled for 1986.

47

Membership

Benefits

List of hotels granting discounts to IFATCA members upon production of their valid membership card AUSTRIA Parkhotel. Graz Hotel Maria Theresia. Innsbruck Hotel Europa. Innsbruck Hotel Tyrol. Innsbruck Hotel Touringhaus. Innsbruck Holiday Inn. Innsbruck Tourotel. Linz Hotel Sportklause. Niederau-Wildschonau. Tirol CYPRUS Amathus Beach Hotel. Limassol Appolonia Beach Hotel. Limassol Paphos Beach Hotel. Paphos Dionyssos Hotel. Paphos Nissi Beach Hotel. Ayia Napa CANADA Seaway Hotels: Montreal. Toronto. Ottawa. Halifax. Kingston Hyatt Regency: Montreal. Vancouver. Vancouver Airport Hilton Canada: The Queen Elizabeth Montreal. Montreal Aeroport Hilton at Dorval Airport. Toronto Airport. Harbour Castle Hilton Toronto. Quebec Hilton. Vancouver Hilton Hotel Loews La Cite. Montreal DENMARK Hotel Mercur. Copenhagen Hotel Richmond. Copenhagen Hotel Du Nord Greena. Greena ENGLAND The Churchill. London The London Ryan Hotel FIJI Fiji Mocambo Hotel. Nadi lnt'I Airport FRANCE Holiday Inns: Paris Orly Airport. RoissyAirport. Avignon. Lille Lesquin. Lille Macq en Baroeul. Strasbourg GERMANY Holiday Inn. Munich HOLLAND Hotel Krasnapolsky. Amsterdam Hotel Ibis. Amsterdam Airport HONG KONG The Empress Hotel. Kowloon ICELAND Loftleidir Hotel. Reykjavik IRELAND International Airport Hotel. Dublin The Gresham Hotel. Dublin Blooms Hotel. Dublin The Killarney Ryan Hotel The Limerick Ryan Hotel The Galway Ryan Hotel The Yeats Country Ryan Hotel The Westport Ryan Hotel ITALY Etap Hotel Boston. Roma Etap Hotel Astoria. Firenze Etap Hotel Bologna. Bologna Etap Hotel Club Paestum. Salerno KENYA Hotels & Lodges of African Tours and Hotels Ltd. South Coast Hotels Two Fishes & Trade Winds North Coast Hotels Mombasa Beach. Mnarani Hotel.

Whispering Palms Safari Lodges Kilaguni. Ngulia. Voi. Meru Mulika.

Mountain Lodge. Marsabit. Hunters Lodge Milimani Hotel. Nairobi

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INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATIONS

MEMBERSHIP-CARD VALID UNTIL

JUNE

1983

THE HOLDEROFTHIS CARD IS AN INDIVIDUALMEMBEROF IFATCA

Grosvenor Hotel. Nairobi Sunset Hotel. Lake Victoria Tea Hotel. Kericho Mt. Elgon Lodge LUXEMBOURG Holiday Inn. Luxembourg Hotel Empire. Luxembourg MEXICO Hotel Las Hamacas. Acapulco Acapulco Imperial NETHERLANDS ANTILLES Holiday Beach Hotel. Curacao NEW CALEDONIA Hotel le Nouvata. Noumea Noumea Hotel. Noumea NEW ZEALAND Hotel Chateaux Commodore. Christchurch Colonial Inn Motel. Christchurch Ambassador Travel Hotel. Wellington South Pacific Motor Inn. Lower Hutt The City Hotel. Dunedin Angus Inn Motor Hotel. Hastings Bungalow Tourist Hotel. Rotorua Travelodge Australia Ltd.: all Travelodges and Parkroyals throughout the South Pacific PERU Hotel Crillon. Lima PORTUGAL Lisboa Penta Hotel. Lisboa Balaia Penta Hotel. Albufeira. Algarve SEYCHELLES Reff Hotel. Mahe SPAIN Penta Club. Ibiza Sun Club Bungalows. Playa del Ingles & Maspalomas SRI LANKA Hotel Lanka. Oberoi. Colombo SWITZERLAND Hotel d'Auteuil. Geneva Holiday Inn. Zurich-Regensdorf Movenpick-Hotel. Zurich-Airport TUNISIA Hotel Les Orangers. Hammamet TOGO Hotel De la Paix. Lome USA International 6 Motel. Disneyland. Anaheim VENEZUELA Dora! Beach Villas & Hotel. Puerto La Cruz YUGOSLAVIA Hotel Lav. Split HERTZ car rental in several countries Detailed information as to rates and hotel addresses are available at the IFATCA Secretariat and will be provided to interested members on request.

Corporate Members of IFATCA AEG-Telefunken, Ulm, West Germany AMECON Division, Litton Systems Inc., Maryland, USA ANSA Advisory Group Air Navigation, West Germany Cardion Electronics, Woodbury, USA Cossor Radar & Electronics Ltd., Harlow, UK Dictaphone Corporation. New York, USA Eaton Corporation, Al L Division, Deer Park, USA Ferranti Limited, Bracknell, UK Goodwood Data, Systems Ltd., Carleton Place, Canada Jeppesen & Co. GmbH, Frankfurt, West Germany Lockheed Electronics Co Inc., Piainfield, USA Lockheed Aircraft Service Company, Ontario, USA Marconi Radar System, Chelmsford, England M.B.L.E., Brussels, Belgium The Mitre Corporation, McLean, USA N .V. Hollandse Signaalapparaten, Hengelo, Netherlands N .V. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken, Eindhoven, Netherlands PhilipsTelecommunicatie lndustrie B.V., Hilversum, Netherlands Plessey Company Ltd., Waterloo, Canada Racal Decca Systems Ltd., London, England Racal Recorders Ltd., Southampton, England Raytheon Canada Ltd., Waterloo, Canada Rediffusion Simulation Inc., Arlington, USA SandersAssociates, Inc., Nashua, USA Schmid Telecommunication, Zurich, Switzerland Selenia lndustrie Elettroniche, Rome, Italy SEL-Standard Elektrik Lorenz, Stuttgart 70, Germany Societe d' Etude et d' Entreprises electriques, France Sofreavia, Paris, France Software Sciences Ltd., Farnborough, England Sperry Univac, Sulzbach, West Germany SRA Communications AB (Ericsson), Stockholm, Sweden TERM A Elektronik AS, Lystrup, Denmark Thomson, CSF, Paris, France Ulmer Aeronautique, Clichy, France VWK-Ryborsch GmbH, Obertshausen, West Germany Westinghouse Electric Corp., Maryland, USA

The International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers· Associations would like to invite all corporations, organizations, and institutions interested in and concerned with the maintenance and promotion of safety in air traffic to join their organization as Corporate Members.

Corporate Members support the aims of the Federation by supplying the Federation with technical information and by means of an annual subscription. The Federation· s international journal 'The Controller' is offered as a platform for the discussion of technical and procedural developments in the field of air traffic control.

Scanning electron microscope picture of etch sputtered structures in In Sb

Output power amplifier module, used in SIRSSR

solid-state ssr The SIR-SELENIA SOLID-STATE Secondary Surveillance Radar is now in operation in a number of countries.

The radar is fully solid state, including the output stages, and includes a number of innovations aimed to reduce problems of reflections and fruit.

The equipment has-built-in test equipment and an extremely high MTBF.

INDUSTRIE ELETTRONICHE ASSOCIATE S.p.A. CIVIL RADAR AND SYSTEMS DIVISION Via Tiburtina Km 12.400, 00131 ROME, ITALY Telex 613690 SELROM I. Phone 06•43601

SELENIA IS EXPERIEN-CE IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL