IFATCA The Controller - 4th Quarter 1982

JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS' ASSOCIATIONS

4 / 82 BERN. SW ITZERLAND

4 TH QUA RTER 1982

VOLUME 2 1

SFrs 5 -

Fly the fuel-efficientskiesof Fokker.

Two totally different aircraft . Two totall y different propu lsio n system s. But the same high standard of proven fuel efficiency. That's what makes the Fokke r F28 and F27 the first choices of short-haul operators around the wor ld .

The Fokker F28 is the on ly short- haul jet offer ing jet speed and co mfort to passengers and cost-e fficie nt opera tion to airlines It is the on ly jet specifically designed to fly short sectors , w here flights average 30-45 minute s with quick turn -arou nd tim es , and do it profitably .

With the lowest investment cost of any jet flying today , the F28 further economizes with the lowest fue l consumptio n of any jet airliner .

Over a stage length of 250 nautical miles , the F28 , w ith its two Rolls-Royce RB183 engi nes, burns up to 35 % less fuel than the nearest compe titor in ope ratio n .

Dutch. Dedicated.

Dependable.

The Fokker F27, with its wide-body look interior and pressurized cabin , is used by major airlines all over the world as feeder aircraft on their short-haul networks and to generate traffic on low density routes . Its remarkabl e energ y efficiency is the result of exceptionally low drag qualities , low structure weight and efficient Rolls-Royce Dart 7 turb oprop engines These factor s combine to assure fuel consumption that is less than any of the F27's compe titors The F28 Fellowship and the F27 Friendship-setti ng new standards of fuel-efficien cy and comfort for the airlines of the world.

Fokke r PO . Box1065 1000 BB Ams terdam . Holland Phone #31 20 544 9111 Telex 11526

IFATCA JOURNAL OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

THE CONTROLLER Volume 21 · No. 4

Bern, Switzerland, December 1982

Publisher: International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers· Associations. P.O.B. 196 . CH-1215 Geneva 1 5 Airport. Switzerland Officers of IFATCA: HH . Henschler . President. Lex Hendriks. Vice-President (Technical). E. Sermijn. VicePresident (Professional). Pat O"Doherty . Vice-President (Administration). B. Grezet. Treasurer Editor: A. Avgoustis 5 Athens Str. Ayios Dhometios Nicosia. Cyprus Telefon (021) 4 87 86 Publishing Company and Production Service: · Der Bund ". Verlag und Druckerei AG 3001 Bern. Effingerstrasse 1. Switzerland Telephone (031) 25 66 55 Printed by: "Der Bund ". Verlag und Druckerei AG. Bern. Switzerland Advertising Sales Office: THE CONTROLLER 5 Athens st. Ayios Dhometios . Nicosia. Cyprus Telephone (021) 4 87 86 THE CONTROLLER. · Der Bund ". Verlag und Druckerei AG (Address as for Publishing Co.) Subscriptions and Advertising Payments to: Account No: PK 72 892-9 . Swiss Credit Bank Balexert Agency. av. Louis Casai 27 CH-1 211 Geneva 28. Switzerland Subscription Rate : SFrs. 8.- per annum for members of IFATCA; SFrs 20.- per annum for non-members (Postage will be charged extra).

Contributors are expressing their persona_l points _of view and opinions. which may not necessarily co1nc1de with those of the Internati onal Federation of Air Traff ic Controllers· Association (IFATCA).

Sto ck ho lm A CC

IFATCA does not assume responsibility for stateme nts made and opinions expressed. it does only accept responsi bility for publishing these contributions.

Contributions are welcome as are comme nts and criticism. No payment can be made for manuscripts submitted for publi cation in "The Controller". The Editor reserves the right to make any editorial changes in manuscript s. which he believes will improve the material w ith out altering the intended meaning.

Written permission by the Editor is necessary for reprinting any part of this Journal.

Advertisers in this issue: Fokker. Ferranti. Philips . Selenia , Aer Lingus, !FA TCA '83 Photos: M, Archives Cartoons: Martin Germans

CONTENTS Editorial Technical Pane l, IFATCA ' 82 Civil Aviation in New Zealand an Alternative Model News from Corporate Members Newsbriefs Air Traffi c Contingency Measures McDonnell Douglas News ICAOVFOP Book Review From Farnboroug h ' 82 Accident Review 1980-Ca nada Air Traffic Controllers Studied to Death Sleep and Work -rest Cycles

3

4 13 17 18 20

26 29 31

32 36 41

44

The better youareat collecting,processing anddisplayingdata, the clearertheATCpicture.

You need th e capability of Ferranti.

We are not in the data acquisit -ion business but we will take data £rom whoever has it~ from civil or military or fro·m the count ry riext door if need be. Data doesn 't h ave to be on the spot. It can be extracted and fed over large distances and then co-ordinateo with the data from your own sensors .

In designing equipment for processing and displaying the data

we'~e used our experience both of A TC and air defence.

If th e data is not available, we can synthesize display i.nfonnatic:m from flight 'plan s and posmon reports. · . .

We can also do the oth er kind of sim ul ation - fortraining , yalidation and evalu ation - some thin g we have been doing for many years. .

If you are in th e air traffic management business Ferranti can h elp. And the people who pay your

route c_harges will ~lmost certainly appreciate your usmg u s.

Ask yourself, are you using the data available to the best advantage?

Contact: Ferranti Comp.uter Systems · Sales Department Ty Coch Way Cwmbran Gwent NP44 7XXTel:Cwmbran (06333)7lll1Tel ex:4 97636

.FERRANTI

ComputerSystems CS02 t 371052

Im!

Editorial

Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes If it is true. as psychological researchers claim. that a stereotype affixed to individuals or a group of people may alter their behavior to conform more closely with that expected of the stereotype. then the continuance of the often selfless and committed contributions of air traffic controllers may be in question.

For years this Federation has maintained that those air traffic controllers employed by their governments are civil servants by accident- it is the only avenue open to being an air traffic controller.

Governments. however. and some substantial voices in the aviation industry. both airline and general. insist that controllers. by virtue solely of their employment by government, must behave as the traditional groups of bureaucrats; behave in this way in all aspects except oneefficiency. .

Where typical government employees, in many or most parts of the world, are expecte~ to d~fer, study, delay decisions, and commit errors. air traffic controllers are expected to consistently perform at a peak. both in the safety and efficiency aspects. Indeed. the consequence of error of a controller, taking into account today's court settlements. could financially ruin a small country.

How else can we explain the paradox of expectations docile civil servants on the one hand, operational pressurecooker performers on the other; Joint Conclusions of the ILO Meeting of Experts on Air Traffic Control, the subsequent non-acceptance of these by most governments; refusal by IATA to provide free or reduced-fare transport to officers of IFATCA on Federation business, expectations of continued contributions by IFATCA towards increased aircraft operational efficiency ~nd ~r?c_ed~res. _Many ai~lines do not even provide cockp1tfamil1an_zat1on:lights to air traffic controllers; how they expect their requirements of optimal performance profil_esto be know~ or u_nd~rstood by the operational controller 1sbeyond my 1maginat1on; most governments certainly are not too interested or even informed regarding these subjects. . . .

Paradoxes, indeed, wherever one looks 1nthe air traffic control world. As controllers, however, we must fight the theory of the 'Self-Fulfilling Stereotype'. ~egardless of h?":' often certain governments and other parties tell us how c1v1I servants are expected to beha_ve, we will continue to uphold the pride in ou_r pr_ofess10~~nd to ~ork towards achieving IFATCA's obJe~t1ves. This 1s ?ne instance. ce~tainly, where we will continue to work with and for the aviation industry, to spe~d money on. that activity, despite their and governments apparent desire to make controllers fit into the pre-conceived mold of the 'typical' civil servant.

HHH.

PATCO's Epitaph It is known by now to all that PATCO no longer exists.

Unfortunately the circumstances under which it was disbanded were most unorthodox. On its legal demise, PATCO president Gary Eads said: ' ... for almost fourteen years PATCO has virtually been the only group that was able to effectively monitor the FAA, insure that Congress was informed about FAA operations, and keep the public educated on matters pertaining to the country's air traffic control system. If one were to examine the strides and gains made by the FAA with respect to equipment, manpower, procedures and other improvements to the ATC system. a direct line can be traced back to PATCO and the dedicated air traffic controllers that comprise its membership. Unfortunately, PATCO's watchful eye will now be gone'. Eads asked that the media recognize the fact that the important story was not about the destruction of a labor union but rather a story about the dedicated people involved. 'These people are the air traffic controllers, both fired and working, and their families and the tens and thousands of working men and women in associated industries and their families who have been so adversely affected by this labor dispute.

'It is over for PATCO. The union is gone. President Reagan has proven his point to everyone. Labor has responded, and we have all witnessed that response. It is logical to ask, what more can be gained by a policy which lacks understanding and flexibility and appears to be designed only to prove a point? And how much is it worth to prove that point? Millions have been spent, and billions will be spent, to rebuild the air traffic control system. Most of this expense is unnecessary.

'There is a tremendous pool of talented people available to help with the rebuilding process. If the dismissed controllers were reinstated, this nation's air traffic control system would be operating at full capacity in a matter of weeks. instead of years, and at a much reduced cost. If this administration is truly concerned about the cost of operating the government and about government waste. obviously reinstatement would be the most logical course of action they could take.'

As for the dismissed controllers. Eads stated,· ... this is a very talented and energetic group of people and they will do well at whatever they pursue, and as time passes fewer of these individuals are going to be willing to return when offered the opportunity. In fact about twenty percent have already made their decision not to return.· Eads continued. ' ... this is indeed a sad situation when you consider how badly the system needs their numbers and expertise.· AA 3

The Technical Panel - IFATCA '82 The ATC equi pment manufacturers ' forum. Undoubtedly a unique opportunity for both the manufacturer and the user to exchange views objectively on modern technology and th rough discussion di sc over the requirements of the user, i.e. the air traffic c ontroller .

The Tech nical Panel of the Corporate Members of IFATCA meets during the per iod of the annual conference.

This panel met on the third day of the conference in Amsterdam . early May this yea r.

Despite the fact that there was no fixed subject for discussion previou sly, yet. through perhaps sheer coincidence, t he majority of the panel speakers conce ntra t ed on Secondary Radar and Fligh t Data.

In all there were six panel speakers. namely, Anton Weijts . Arnold Field .

Henry Cole . Pete r Jorgen sen . Walter Vonk and R.N . Harrison. The meeting was chaired by John Saker of the UK Gui ld. cha irman of Standing Committee I. Attendance was as always satis-

The Techni cal Panel 4

factory despite the fact that Committee A (administration) was continuing with the routine business .

Considerable discussion was generated at the conclusion of the speeches from the panelists with particular attention being paid to the monopulse radar system .

Basil Hakiamis of the Greek Association opened the discussion by putting two general questions to the panel. one on civil radar and their possible use for military purposes and the second. concerning the time required for a radar simulator to be installed and function . Obviously, Basil was concerned with such time because of his country's plans for modernization of the Greek air traffic services and equipment .

To the second question, Peter Jorgensen answered that a simulator will normally take the same time as that of a proper radar because the hardware is exactly the same. It was agreed by the other panelists that it would normally take 18 to 24 months .

The discussion then entered into a comprehensive explanation by Henry Cole on what Mode radar system means.

Mode S. Henry said. is no secret but contains a specific address and only the aircraft to which it is addressed will reply to the call . With ordinary secondary radar. it will choke if you put too many questions to it.

Mode S system has numerous advantages over secondary, it was stated. in that it gives better tracking, turn detection is done quicker as it does not have to track the target as it goes along and also gives fewer false alarms.

Peter Jorgensen clarified further by saying that monopulse is still under considerable discussion by all interested parties while I FALPA is still studying what they would like from Mode S and what not.

Controllers, Peter added , may do the same . They will have to tell the manufacturer what they want .

Henry Cole gave more technical information as to how the system works.

Previous to the discussion each panelist spoke for six minutes on a technical subject of his own choosing .

What follows are extracts of the speeches in the order they were delivered .

¡s¡

Communication Control

and

Speech by W Vonk of Philip's Telecommunicatie lndustrie B. V. I will recall a few phrases used by his Royal Highness Prince Bernhard during the opening ceremony of your conference.

Aviation is in trouble, airline companies and aircraft manufacturers alike.

For reasons of fuel consumption there is a need for optimum flight levels, direct routes and reduction of holdings. So a need for more economic operations.

Yet there is a growing discrepancy between airborne and ground-based equipment.

Aviation has many contrasts. Every new big aircraft will be equipped with a sophisticated Flight Management system, while on many parts of the globe we cannot even get the Flight Plan through, let alone a meteorological warning. What about safety here I We could implement an adequate Fixed Telecommunications Network for a complete continent for the money some airline companies lose on delays during one year. (2000 aircraft hours - 25 million Dutch florins).

In the European environment some airline companies encounter delays of over 20% of their flights during summertime. To use a frequently heard slogan: Will there be chaos or control?

Controllers, for a large part can contribute to a solution, when they are timely provided with conclusive information. What are the bottlenecks in the provision of information? There can be control when the major air navigation subsystems are available and are balanced.

Processing

Major Air Navigation Subsystems

1 . The quality and quantity of this equipment is relative to a number of factors like the traffic flow. In all cases however they should form one balanced system.

Today the information part is almost always underdeveloped or neglected. . A reason for this might be that the implementation is more complex than the other parts. . 2. The units forming together the information subsystem have different tasks and mostly separate budgets.

Yet over 1 7 5 different types of aerona utica I information must be handled.

A simplified picture of this information distribution is given by the next foil.

3. To provide preflight and inflight information. service units need to communicate between each other. A 5

selection of these units as well as the possible communication means are displayed.

The picture is still too optimistic, as it assumes that all these means are available.

Today the distribution of data is generally inadequate and constitutes time consuming procedures which are disproportionate to the speed of todays flights.

The structure can be improved by adopting the following philosophy.

4. All subsystems and units are connected here by one communication means. Distribution and correlation of aeronautical information can be effected by what is called here the ¡communication motor'. To give some more explanation I will show my last foil.

5. In the conventional way the communication system acts as a postman delivering the letters to the front door of the various units.

It is also possible to open the letters and to sort, process and store the information. In this way it can be presented when needed in an optional way. Controllers, by means of their professional organisation IFATCA are in a position to bring forward their requirements. Which and how do they need data before their duty as well as during their duty. If you don't want to be pushed by technology or don't want to be a keyboard operator put down requirements on the way you must have data presented to you. I invite you to have a demonstration at our stand and to discuss the possibilities available nowadays.

Finally I would like to indicate to Committee B the importance of Working Paper 1 6 towards this subject.

MSc

onAir

NATIONAL------•------

Transport

A full-time course of study for an MSc degree in airport planning and management was introduced by Loughborough University of Technology. UK, in October.

It will complement an existing part-time course for the degree which was introduced in 1 980. the first students of which are now approaching graduation.

The degree course at Loughborough is believed to be the only one of its kind outside the US. The program was developed with the approval of the International Civil Airports Association and the UK's air transport and Travel Industry Training Board (the latter now defunct. a victim of government cutbacks).

6

LOCAL

AEROPPCONCEPT

Read in next issue of The Controller part II of H.W. Cole's article on 4

The Choice of Technology for ATC Radars'

- part I appeared in the 3 / 82 issue.

Distributed

Processing

Speech by Mr . R. N. Harrison - Ferranti Computer Systems Yesterday. in Committee B. our chairman asked for something to be put in terms a layman could understand.

I do not think of any of you as laymen. but your specializations lie in a different field from those of a good many people in the electronics industry. So this paper today is by way of interpretation rather than all brand-new information.

Processing is what you do to a film.

You put it through chemicals to produce an image. which you either project or print. That image is a picture of a situation . In radar processing you do not use chemicals but from primary and secondary radar you produce a picture of a situation. A picture. which can be annotated and enhanced with extra data. Some of the extra data is present in the radar returns. some is additional. and makes the information more understandable.

The processing of radar data takes place in a processor . You may have a processor which does the work for a whole system , or you may have additional processors which spread the load between them . Leaving aside simple duplication of processing. where there are parallel systems to reduce the risk of failure. the most common distribution of processing power is to use micro-processors at each display.

As its name implies. a micro-processor is quite small. typically 5 mm square. but contains 7000 components within the area. This microprocessor forms part of the display drive . The display drive accepts and stores in its Random Access Memory (RAM) and graphics memories all data and all plots in the system. This might amount to two hundred plots of which up to 50 carry labels.

Having received this data from the central processor. the function of the display drive and its micro-processor is to control the information on the display with which it is associated.

Having received this data from the central processor, the function of the display drive and its micro-processor is to control the information on the display with which it is associated. This is done through firmware. a programable read-only memory . In a display drive such as I am describing. one of the Ferranti ' Dragon ¡ series. the fun ct ions of this firmware are: The generation of synthetics The filtering of synthetics Display of aircraft positions

(L to r) A. Field, W. Vonk, P. Jorgensen , J. Saker, R. Harrison , H. Cole

(L tor) W. Vonk, P. Jorgensen , J. Saker

(L to r) A. We1jts. A. Field, W. Vonk 7

Keyboard operations Generation of minitab displays The display of raw primary radar. video. together with the generation of range rings and a north marker This last item is omitted if the display is handling synthetics only.

For the synthetic picture-and here I should say when we talk of synthetics we don't mean anything ersatz. but something which is synthesized. something which is put together for the display of synthetics - the display drive controls the positioning of data on the screen. Data on the screen can be positioned either geographically or in relation to the Cathode Ray Tube face. Data positioned geographically includes: Plots (comprising plot symbols. plaques. velocity leaders; history trails) Inter-console markers Rollball marker Electronic bearing and range marker (EBRM) DF strobe Runway extended center-lines and range markers Area Filter delineators Video maps.

The items which are positioned in terms of screen coordinates are: Minitab lines Fault data displayed as part of the minitab Roll ball marker when used to move the minitab to a new position.

So basically on the display. everything is in terms of geographical coordinates except the position of the minitab and the things associated with It.

Operator control of the picture includes: Picture-management functions lnterconsole communication Plot synthetics control Plot synthetics filtering.

The picture management is carried out by means of a keyboard. which communicates both with the central processor (also known as the Host processor) and the local micro processor in the display drive. The local processor is responsible entirely for such functions as the raw and synthe~ic selection. range scale. offcentenng. minitab. and video map selec~ion and for a range of other functions from filtering to quick look. It shares responsibility with the host processor for tracking. DF. interconsole marking. non-verbal handoffs and the minitab displays.

Minitabs are tabular displays of data on the face of the screen. The data can include a large number of 8

items from the time at that moment to the sources of the data used. They also serve to show a fault occurring in the system and also to record keyboard inputs before these are entered into the system. The sharing of functions, between the local processor and the host processor includes time. filtering and keyboard input as responsibilities of the local processor; primary and SSR sources. QFE/QNH and transition level as part of the responsibilities of the host processor.

Relationship between the host and local processors includes a series of checks. For instance the local processor will perform PROM, RAM and graphics memory checks. and any failure will cause an error message to be sent to the host processor and also output to the system fault line on the minitab. Data received from the host processor considered to be in error by the local processor. will also cause output to the system fault line and an error warning to be sent to the host.

Let me end by quoting on Benchmark picture using a 'Dragon¡ display drive. It will consist of: 200 plots. each with a plot symbol.

50 of these with three line plaques and 5-dot history trails 30 full screen diameter lines 300 10% screen diameter lines 50 single character symbols 5 circles (20% screen diameter) 2 minitabs.

Choice of Technology in ATC Radars Speech by Mr. H. W Cole - Marconi Radar Systems ATC authorities who have to procure a radar system are faced with the problem - How to get the required performance over a specified lifetime at a high level of system availability for the minimum overall cost?

Engineers keep coming up with 'bright ideas¡ and the choice must be made among competing technologies.

The user is forced to rely upon technical advisers or authorities for this choice. The user cares about performance - the procurement executive cares about the cost of providing the performance.

Simple Treatment:

1 . The users and planners have operational requirements - and users have expertise in the use of equipment furnished to meet them. The procurement executives have to interpret the operational requirements in technical terms by using their expertise in physics and technology.

2. Thus there are two areas of expertise in two differing disciplines. The ideal situation is when: a) The user knows modern technology. b) The procurement executive knows modern ATC practices and requirements.

All administrations aspire to this ideal. but this ideal is not always reached, I believe, because of the need for detailed knowledge in these two complex areas.

3. One result of this leads me to believe that too often the user is led to accept or assume that partial truth is the whole truth by technical authorities.

4. I take. as an example. an APP/ TMS radar. and consider two aspects: Transmitter Technology and Signal Processing 5. Transmitter: The 'in' thing is a fully coherent system - but the ATC world has been using this for decades.

No MTI system as we know it can work without coherence - it is not new.

6. How do you achieve Coherent Transmitter? Two ways: Power Amplifiers - TWT I Klystron/ Solid State Transmitters varying from complex to very complex; Cross field oscillators usually of classic simple design.

7. Cross Field Oscillators. Have you heard of them? Probably not. If you ask your technical advisers about Cross Field Oscillators - after a while they will say, 'Oh yes. you mean a Magnetron,¡ and immediately a whole set of old prejudices will come flooding back.

Myth: The magnetron is oldfashioned - outdated.

Fact: Power amplifiers were the first technology used in radar transmitters and predate magnetrons.

Myth: All magnetrons have short life.

Fact: Modern designs properly executed give long life - above 10,000 hours making them very cost-effective devices.

Myth: You can't get good enough transmitter stability for MTI from magnetrons.

Fact: At pulse lengths used for TAR/ASR. bettertransmitter stability can be achieved than with Klystrons. Mathematics and physics not proper to present here, have shown this. Also. published papers (not by MRSL) have not been challenged.

8. Magnetrons have been given a bad name because many designs in

former years did not consider the output device and its modulator as an entity. When this is done the result is: Better spectral purity and hence good MTI Longer life .

9 . Development of Magnetrons Coaxial magnetrons less costly than equivalent power amps have been developed - their life is comparable to 1WT / Klystron O / P devices. -w ithout the need for mollycoddling. Make no mistake . my company has - like most others in the radar field - all of the technology for these transmitters in their armory . I make no appeal out of weakness in this regard - I only want to show that there are no absolute Bests in the technical realm when seen from other than academic viewpoints . Other considerations. e .g .: Life cycle costs Training/maintenance costs Reduction of complexity High reliability Availability All these govern what for the user and his procurement executive are best for them in their circumstances .

Signal Processing The 'in ' thing is MTD - Moving Target Detector - again we are in the game of playing with words.

- What you have come to know as MTI (Moving Target Indicator) is also an MTD - if it were not. you would have complained long ago!

- What is implicit in this new set of words is that MTD is something

frighteningly new and difficult to understand - it is not really .

MTD (as now used) describes a set of fixed Doppler filters. Don 't be afraid of the term ' Doppler filters¡ - Normal MTI is a Doppler filter - it rejects signals which have zero Doppler e.g.

PE's and targets moving tangentially. and accepts those signals whose Doppler component is non-zero i.e . moving . Inferences are made that MTD because it is new . is the only way for you to go - not so .

An alternative is a zero-Doppler filter plus an automatically steered filter.

It produces the same result as far as the user is concerned - but cheaper and more significantly, more simply than MTD .

I do not wish to argue the rights and wrongs of these statements for the issues are complex.

Again . my own company and many others. have designed . built and supplied both types of processor (MTD and adaptive SP) so it is not a defensive argument I put. I merely want to reinforce a former point - namely that there are alternative technologies of which you need to be aware to save the risk in belief that because a particular technology is the latest thing - it must be best.

Conclusion How does the user ensure that he gets the full story? It is not up to me to say. Perhaps measures already exist. I have seen the lat est ASR 9 specification from the FAA and it seems

written by and for technologists - not users.

This kind of specification is coming increasingly into use and has prompted me to present this paper in the hope that the user will resist being taken out of the decision loop when choices are made for him.

ATC and Simulators Speech by Mr . P. Jorgen sen - Selen ia Electronics The word 'simulators ' when used in the context of air traffic contro l refers usually to two different subjects.

One of course. is the well-known ATC simulator as you know for training of air traffic controllers in their professional task .

The other simulator is the system used to verify studies. to compute new procedures and to test the new procedures in a realistic environment before introducing them in the on-line system .

The traditional simulator as used by most ATC authorities . is the system of the first type. which serves to give first training for a controller and it has been common to use relativel y low-price d equipment . However . many factors po int towards use of systems identical to the operational ATC system which you will actually use in your work .

On the other hand. in many different fields of scientific research . the use of computers to create realistic scenario. to run fast simulation of a dynamic system such as ATC has

General view of the meeting 9

more references which you are not demonstrated to be an indispensable tool in creating new ATC systems and normally using. like line-printers and plotters. whereas the second type is new and more effective procedures.

An example here is the Italian ATC what you are actually using as hardinfrastructure simulator developed by ware. Many of the operational probSelenia in collaboration with the Ita- lems you have today which you try to lian National Research Council. This solve by automation, can only be solved to some degree by the manusimulator is really a set of interacting facturer; that is. we are able to give computer programs - software you software pages. We are able to which is able to simulate the entire Italian airspace and to put a lot of sec- calculate for you the value average to be used but we are not able to interondary things such as siting of radars. pret your actual system parameters as compensation of sectorization. flow a follow-up. because that is a thing control studies. etc. which is the responsibility of the local Having such a simulator of that kind. you can introduce stimulus to authorities. An example of course is the betamatics. which we can give the simulator in form of traffic. system failure. delays, etc.. to show the you the means to do. but you have to provide them yourself. shortcomings of a real life ATC system This becomes much more the case before it is implemented. a thing when we are coming into systems like which is of extreme importance when safety nets. terminal area manageyou are contemplating new systems. ment system. which is the manageThe two different uses of simulators have to a large degree been separ- ment system compatible to the flight management system. ated. Today. however. we are getting So. this type of ATC simulator a simulator of the first type with a large which uses the same hardware. the degree of computing power available. which allows you to implement simu- same software procedures as your operational system and which is also lators of the second type with the same equipment and here the con- to be used to simulate and to generate siderable distributed intelligence pro- the operational software pages is. we vides a very promising solution to feel. the way to go in the future. solve these problems. using the same standard hardware/software type as already applied in the ATC system Modern ATC and which of course gives you a lot of economical advantages. However, as Defence Systems we said before. when the simulator as

by Mr. A. Field - Plessey a training instrument is only part of the Mr. Arnold Field. on behalf of Plesrequirement you must put in a modern sey Radar. took as the theme for his simulator. the environment in which presentation, the advantages. both an ATC system operates is very dynamic. You have changes of traffic pat- economic and operational. which could be gained by the use of shared tern. new Nav-aids to be introduced. facilities and systems technology, by procedures to be changed. etc.

If an administration has such a civil and military air traffic control simulator available. they can project a authorities.

He referred to the fact that the term very high degree of probability of suc¡ air traffic control' had a strangely civil cess of the new plans and developconnotation, whereas the task of desments and they can try out all new patch and recovery of military aircraft ideas before they are actually implemented by the system. to and from exercises. operational missions and general flying. was priIn particular. the simulator provides marily a military air traffic control rea means of computing and simulating sponsibility. Also. that invariably. in the development of a series of softmany of the world's airspaces. a large ware modules for the analysis of the proportion of the flight paths followed geom~try of the airspace. calculation by these military aircraft could involve of optimum trajectories. calculation of either the avoidance or penetration of radar and navigation aids coverage. controlled airspace. Therefore. to enThe capacity by means of our software sure the safety and flexibility of civil modules to use the same operational hardware again. such as radar disand military air traffic operations it was plays, keyboard displays. etc .. is used essential to carry out coordination to to develop, evaluate and define new enable this to be achieved with the and advanced operational procedures minimum interference to both types of such as the safety net. terminal area flying. management system and test these ICAO. Mr. Field said. had recogon line. nized that such a problem would arise The first type of analysis of radar with the rapid expansion of civil and coverage, etc., may require some military air traffic and had advised 10

that air traffic services authorities should establish and maintain close cooperation with military authorities responsible for activities that may affect flights of civil aircraft. He added, that quite wisely, ICAO had not recommended how this should be done, but had left it to individual states to decide upon procedures best suited to their own environment. He was aware that the subject had received considerable debate within IFATCA but that whatever system of coordination was adopted it made economic and operational sense. for civil and military ATC authorities to share facilities wherever geographical and operational considerations permitted this to be practical.

He felt this to be of particular importance in those states where aviation and ATC systems were still in the development stage and where the opportunity existed to implement this type of cooperation at the planning stage of the definition of equipments and systems. As an example Mr. Field said he was of the opinion that it was becoming increasingly difficult to justify on cost grounds alone. the provision of duplicated civil/ military long range primary cover of the same geographical area. It was understandable however that from a military viewpoint long-range primary radar was a necessity and whilst the use of secondary radar to provide extended radar cover would be used increasingly for civil traffic. the shared use of military long-range primary radar, where this existed. would be of considerable benefit to both organizations. One immediate advantage would be that where coordination was a requirement within the area of cover, a shared facility would have the benefit of providing both controllers with the same source of radar data.

Excluding the defence. control and command aspects of military systems there was also, he considered. considerable advantage in ensuring a degree of compatibility between military and civil air traffic operations systems technology. If a common data base of aircraft movements was possible then not only could the civil/ military air traffic control coordination task be more effectively accomplished but as the efficient operation of an air defence system demands a close liaison between military and civil air traffic control agencies the success of this coordination not only assists in the safe operation of both types of flying but also enables the military agencies to more easily isolate. identify and intercept possible hostile targets.

Finally, Mr. Field said that as he was now approaching the limit set for

presentations by the chairman, he regretted time would not permit further development of his theme; he did, however, wish to close by adding that the company he represented on this occasion possessed the essential overall capability to comply with the equipments and systems philosophy he had endeavoured to outline.

1

The Brick Wall'

Speech by Mr. A. Weljts - Hollandse Signaalapparaten B. V.

I have heard again and again during this conference, one word. indeed. almost all the speakers, my dear colleagues, have used it many times . It is the word 'system'.

What please , do we mean by the word ·system· . May I ask you to take out your pen and a notebook and write down what I suggest to be a possible definition of the word system. and we take it implicitly that we talk about the air traffic service and air traffic control systems .

I present to you the following explanation . I would be very grateful if you would kindly note it down to have it available for the discussion hour.

A proficiently arranged coherent whole of constituent elements. and please underline the words proficiently, coherent and constituent.

Let us look at some categories of what I think are elements in the system .

The Services System Elements It's the people working in air traffic control , you , the operational people , your colleagues in the technical division. the engineers and the technicians , your management. are . all elements - they have to be constituents. Your organization should be an element of the system . Your organization on the operational side. the organization of your technical counter part s. th e organization of your management.

Your procedures of work , your air traffic control procedure s are undoubtedly elements of the system .

Also the procedures t he technical people have for location. reporting of faults. remedy of faults , systems monitoring and control , updating and modernization of the system .

And th en. of course. you do have your technical tool s and unfortun ately, all too often the word ' system · only seems to conc lude . to include and stop at your radars . your displays , your proces sors - what have you. I think thi s cover s t he elemen ts of the syste m .

How ever. there have been many, many countri es talking to many peopl e

Basil Hakiamis of Greece

Mr. H.W. Cole. of Marco ni, offere d about their controllers, engineers and to give a short presentation on Mo de management . From your own mouths S. as follows: I have still another perception of what a system unfortunately very often I would like to give a few wo rds on Mode S as the air traff ic control ler will looks like . With some hesitance I will show you the next slide. know and see it.

This. in my view , if I close my eyes There' s nothing magic abou t it . It is and listen . is what some of your re- the commonly agreed name fo r A dsel spective technical colleagues say DABS which started life in the UK about the air traffic controller . I quote some years ago as Ad sel, th e Add ress - 'Air traffic controllers are only the Selective version of sec ondary radar dummy loads to my radar .· That does and in th e United State s, th e Direct Addres s Beacon system. As you not sound very nice. If I, however. believe my highly respected friend s, know , seco nda ry radar is a radar syssome of you have referred to the tem with a commu nicat ions capapeople in the technical department as bility. Mod e S really only increases - I quote - 'they are ju st a bunch of that communi cation s ab ility autonuts and bolt s' . matically using SSR tec hniqu es. So We are human , we do shout at you won 't have anyt hing new to learn each other sometimes , and that's not about th e w ay in wh ich it operates. all too bad . I would like to point out There are inte rrogat ions as in secondthat dummy load s are wor ker ary radar fro m th e gro und to tranconstituent elements in a techn ical sponder s in t he air. which will then radar system . Without it the radar make repli es. The inter rogation in would blow itself up . I should like to Mode S now contains, or can contain point out that nuts tend to hold thing s specifi c address es of specif ic aircraft . together and bolts are required to Second ary radar as we know it now is make things go round , so they are a broa dcast system . that is, t hroughconstituent elements in the system . out the surveill ance area all aircraft are There ' s nothing wrong really. On thi s asked the same question - 'W hat is picture there is one element tha t your identit y? - Wh at is your identity? ' shou ld not be there . That is the bric k contin ually, and 'What is your altiwall of mistru st . misunder standing , t ude ?' cont inua lly, and each and every unfriendlin ess, that unfortunately all one of t he transponde rs rece iving that too often separates the department s. inte rrogat ion w ill make its own rep ly .

May I kindly invite you from your side. Secondary rada r has an inbu ilt tendas a person , as an individual , t o do ency to choke itse lf to death if it is your share in try ing to break dow n and overused . remov e th e · Bric k W all' . Thank you.

M ode S, by using uniqu e addresses and coming away from the broadcast system will now conta in interrogations M ode 1 S' of the form sha ll we say ' KL 127 .

Durin g qu esti on ti me. M r. J . Saker Where are you?' and only that aircraft (chairman) int rodu ced M ode S, and specifically addressed will reply . All asked if anyone was wi lling to speak the other aircraft will remain silent in Mode S . on the subj ect .

11

Philips Extends Its Range of Aeronautical Message Switches Following up the success of its AEROPP I and II aeronautical communications facilities, Philips has extended the range to include the AEROPP 0.

The AEROPP 0 is a low-cost, extremely reliable, small configuration multi-micro message processing system. It is particularly suited for AFTN users with one or two international circuits who do not handle international transit traffic during normal operations, and for use as a local and/ or national collection and distribution system at national airports and in offices such as the Airline Operation Center, the Briefing Office and others Lex Hendriks (V-P Tech) and Captain Sansaloni, IFALPA of a similar nature.

The AEROPP 0 can be used as a The interrogation will contain spe- ability of what will happen to the target subcenter for AFTN users, connecting the next time the radar sees it. cific address and only the addressed a group of AFTN stations to a distant aircraft will reply. The interragation itBut with this increased information AFTN switching center via a bundle of on turn rate, and heading, better self, because of a new modulation technique applied by the secondary tracking routines can be designed for circuits, thereby saving on-line costs. radar system can contain other re- you. You will be given less false alarms When justified by traffic volume, it can as to when a turn is going to take also be used to connect a number of quests and interrogations such as: place , and changes of speed can different points within an organization 'What is your speed?' therefore be signalled directly instead remote to the main AFTN switching 'What is your turn rate?' of inferred from the history of the plots center.

'What is your fuel state?'

In addition to its international links, laid down .

'What is your heading?' etc.

I hope this has given you a little run- the AEROPP 0 can accommodate up This increased information capacidown on what Mode S will mean to to 30 subscribers via teleprinters or VDU 's. There is also capacity for an ty is brought about by the longer time the controller on the ground . additional 64 telex subscribers, each given to the interrogation. .with a unique AFTN addressee indiWhat we are talking of now is a cator. Telex messages are automatisystem that has got a much greater cally handled by the system, which automat ic information gathering sysoffers the dual benefits of a back-up tem and of course, the interrogations Computerized Voice System facility as well as a service for subwil l result by modified transponders First for South America scribers whose needs do not warrant with transducers on the aircraft that the expense of a leased line.

Honolulu -A Hawaiian electronics will sense airspeed, turn rate , headImportant features of the AEROPP company is making the first computering, etc. , as well as the normal altitude 0 include dual 6 MByte discs which controlled voice communications encoding. Replies would contain this are used for storage of all message ininformation reque sted and would go equipment to be installed with air trafputs to the system, enabling shortfic control systems in South America . back into the cont roll ed system on the term retrieval capabilities of about ground, or say it had to be computer lntelect of Hawaii is providing some 5000 messages, and extensive $1 .8-million worth of state-of-the-art based , so that it could make use of this supervisory facilities, such as manual extra information, so this is where the voice communications systems in two contracts for three airports in Vene- assistance in correcting message forbenefits to you the users will come in . mat errors, system control and comWhat it really will result in for you is zuela . mand input, message retrieval plus the ability fo r us designers to build tor For Ferrostaal-Venezuela, the cornyou better track ing algorithms, so that , pany will manufacture and install a statistics and status reporting. Message security and accountability are the track ing would be able to be much system to service the air traffic control guaranteed by an acknowledgement more soph isticated than it is at the center, control tower, radar approach, procedure as well as a numbering moment. At the moment, tracking is and support facilities at Maiquetia scheme for all input and output mesdone on the basis of measuring dis- International Airport at Caracas, the sages. All sequence numbers are log placement of ta rgets of succe ssive country's major air facility. The system ged in the system and written onto will be in place late this year. samp les as the radar sees it . But now disc before processing. enabling any w ith Mode S. w ith this extra infor Under a second contract, with message in the system to be recovermation , turn detection for example Texas Instuments , Inc., Intelect also ed should a failure occur . can be made much more sw ift than it equipped two regional Venezuelan The system can also be configured is at th e momen t. At the moment turn terminals at Barquisimeto and Porwith an additional floppy disc drive for dete ct ion is, as it were. ¡sat upon ¡ by lamar . Both are in operation. long-term storage and retrie va l At a tr ac king . Trac king routine of necessity frequency dictated by traffic volume, has to look at the history of targets and the on-line retrieval file is dumped t hen proje ct to the future . the prob12

Continued on page 35

Civil Aviation in New Zealand an Alternative Model

-

Dean A. Dalzell, (speech delivered at ATC ' 81 , Auckland, N .Z.)

Introduction Prior to 1968 , Civil Aviation in New Zealand was regulated by an autonomous government department, known as the Civil Aviation Department . This department, with its own Permanent Head. had direct and unfettered access to the Minister of Civil Aviation and was responsible for the various branches of aviation (operations , air traffic control and so on).

However the government of the day was persuaded to merge this department with the other governmental transport agencies (road transport and marine but excluding railways) into a new Ministry of Transport.

This merger (takeover?) undoubtedly strengthened the control and influence of some senior public servants who assumed control of a large and influential infrastructure at the expense, I believe. of the necessary autonomy and initiative of the various special ist groups so merged.

Whil st administrative advantages may have resulted it is my belief tha t the various specia list aviation branches with which I am associated (who are not in the 'ad min ' business!) have suffered generally and significantly from the ' levelling ' and 'b urying ¡ action of the Behemoth . Significantly this amalgamation in New Zealand came at a time when other nations (notably Britain. to whom we owe much of our development. expertise and manpower) were recogn izing that Civil Avi ation sho uld be

outside the normal public service infrastructure. as an independent authority quite the reverse of the trend in New Zealand. This notion of an independent authority to regulate civil aviation was widely discussed and found much support at a Meeting of Expe rts on Problems Concerning Air Traffic Controllers convened by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva (1979).

I consider that a necessary and urgent step towards reorganizing and rationalizing Civil Aviation in New Zealand is the establishment of an independent Civil Avi ation Authority. responsible directly to a Minister of the Crown and built substantially on the UK model. This authority should receive directly all income derived from civil aviation charges of various kinds together with additional government monies as may be appropriate or necessary in the initial stages. It should be the objective of this Authority to be self-supportive from user charges.

As in Fiji , I wo uld envisage tha t employees of this new authority wo uld not be members of the public service and thereby: a) Would not be employed by the State Services Commission . b) Would not be bound by the State Services Act 1962 and Public Service Regulation s 1964 (and other associated regulations).

c) The employees would be regulated by the establishing 'Civi l Aviation Author ity Act' w hich would provide for the fixing or determination of employment/wor king conditions. salar ies, retirement policy. etc. which would be appropriate to Civil Aviation personnel. There is a clear precedent and powerful argument for distingu ishing these personnel from the regu lar public service employees (see ILO report ). d) Provision would be made for an inde pendent employee representative bod y (since I propose that the State Services Act which officially recognizes the New Zealand Public Service Association would no long er apply to these emp loyees ). Thi s new body should, in the normal course of events. have independent status on the CSU group (as do teachers , railways , etc .).

Later, I will propose structural and operational changes which would resul t in larg e staff reductions. Where this result s in redundancies I propose that the em powering Civil Aviation Authority Ac t make specific provision for the resolution of such matter s (not the present rules ) - for example. special government superannuation retirement rights of adjustments where appropriate. This wou ld be coincident w ith a compulsory retirement age of 55 years for all ' operational ' staff (60 years ' other ' staff incorporating 40 year Publi c Service maximum) but with a fractional service formula representative of the special dem ands of eac h branch , lead ing to a vo luntary retir ement-age progressively less than the 55 year maximum . Whe re excess staff still remain at the changeover.

I envisage a gratuit y/ disbursemen t sc heme (similar to that adopted by the services in the past) and reaching down in age to t he necessary level .

Regional Offices I propose that t here should be no regional off ice as we now know it but rat her the management and planning function they now have to be partly cen tral ized and otherwise (and whe re possib le) to be made the responsibili ty of the appropriate Senior Supervisor (Ops . or Plan) at the ACC encompassing the area . or where more practical de leg ated to the relevan t OIC Cat II (Ohakea or Welling ton) .

Dean Dalzell (left) talking to Editor A. Avg oustis

Other Divi sions I envisage a similar rationaliza tion of the other Divisions but since my experien ce and knowledge is princ ipal ly related to air

13

Proposed CAA Structure

Director CAA

Asst. Dir. CAA

Divisional Dir. MET Services

-

as now

Div. Dir. ATS

Div. Dir. Ground Ser.

for detail ATS see next Section

engineering. technicians. airports planning & management.

RFS liaison MFS

Div. Dir. Operations

licensing. airline ops .. flight testing. gen. aviation.

Legal

Proposed ATS Divisional Structure

Div. Dir. ATS

I

Supt. Stds.

I

Asst. Supt.

Stds.

I

Region ACC Stds. (2)

I

Supt. Ops.

I

Asst. Supt.

Ops.

I

Sen. Supv. Ops. (2)

I

I

Supt. Planning

I

Asst. Supt.

Plan.

I

Supt. Training & Recruitment

I

Chief Inst.

College

Sen. Supv. Plan.

(2)

Supervisors or OIC Cat II

I Sen. ATCO or OIC Cat Ill

traffic control and communications I will proceed with more detail in this area only.

No doubt the general principles I am advocating would have an impact on these other divisions but would be better the subject of a more comprehensive and representative study group.

Airspace Division and Control/ Communications Complex I propose that ATC and Communications (Flight Service) be fully merged into one integrated service with one career structure. All recruits would be suitable for full progression/training. The ATC Assistant (currently renamed FSO) would in effect become the direct input communicator for the system with a keyboard and VDU an integral part of the ATC/ ASST work console (based on the existing computer switched comm. system). Where hard copy is required. and in my view this 14

would be a rarity (for SAR. etc.) an adjacent annex to be provided but without constant manning. The existing system of a remote communications center to receive and redistribute messages is an anachronism and completely negates the installation of automatic preprogrammed message switching equipment. The input of the messages should be located right at the principal origin - the pilot/ controller interface. This would enable instant controller/ controller/ FSO comms. between any points (with suitable priority ratings) enabling less reliance on outmoded and time consuming two-way speech circuits (which would become the secondary backup mode).

The Flight Information Service should be fully integrated into the ACC environment.

The AIS/NOTAM service should be rationalized into a single office for receipt

of all data for NOTAM action. etc .. which would be recorded/ coded for automatic despatch (time/location function) to all users and/ or held in passive computer storage for extraction at any location serviced by the AFTN upon demand. International NOTAMs would be similarly transcribed/ coded and despatched/ stored for extraction directly by the airlines and others who would have. or would be. provided with access to the system.

The current division of airspace responsibility derived basically from the limitations of technology to provide reliable long range pilot/ controller and unit/ unit communications and radar coverage. plus a decision to decentralize administrative management. It should be recognized that modern technology has progressively overcome the former. and experience shown the futility and wastage of the latter.

Therefore I propose that New Zealand be served by three types of manned ATS units as follows: Cat I -Area Control Centre (2 only. Auckland and Christchurch) Cat II - Tower/ Approach Unit (2 only.

Ohakea and Wellington) Cat 111-TowerControl/PRA(RO. NR. NS. NV. PM. WP. AR. HN. SM. WG. DN).

Note: Units of lower traffic activity/ density would. under the present system. be staffed by Flight Service Officers who do not provide any executive control. They amount only to a repeater (which can be better carried out directly) and a communications terminal. I consider there should be only one service operated by RTF which is consistent and deliberate positive control. Otherwise the operating company could just as easily provide its own staff for information on weather. etc.

-as is already done in some cases. What is more. the differential in cost in providing say 4 controllers vs. 4 flight service is minimal and the latter is clearly not a cost effective option. If however a company was insistent on staff being provided at certain airports. then it would be provided on a user-pays basisl That a responsibility quotient system (as is currently under study by the NZATCA) be established around all personnel (i.e. grading/ salary adjusted to workload and complexity).

Christchurch ACC to have an area of responibility the same as the present but Auckland ACC to cover the combined present Auckland and Wellington FIRs. This would require that CH ACC have RTF coverage (by repeater. land-line or combination) to cover airways and approach control to CH. NV. ON. WG. Similarly AK ACC would require airways RTF coverage over the current AK and WN FIRs together with approach control coverage to KT. KK. KO. WR. WP. AA. AR. HN. RO. TG. AP. GS. NA. The feasibility of sharing location I aerial facilities (including national links) with NZ Broadcasting should be investigated.

Wellington and Ohakea Approach units would have a suitably extensive TMA area up to a transition level of FL 130 and include SM. NS, PP and WU. PM respectively. In addition OH would necessarily re-

Oceanic Control Center (N.Z.)

tain a designated area for high level mili tary activity.

Radar Equipment All radar facilities to be SSR equipped.

Radar equipment should be installed to provide SRE coverage of the RO and Bay of Plenty area. The radar data (including SSR coding) to be transferred to AK ACC by plot extraction technique.

Radar equipment to be re-sited (elevated site) in the Dunedi n area to provide SRE coverage of the southern area of the South Island and the radar data tran sferred to CH ACC .

Plot extraction equipment to be fitted to existing WN and OH SR Es and transferred to AK ACC for composite airways overlay .

CH, WN , OH , AK radar control facilities should be equipped to permit automatic transfer of radar identification/ control without the requirement of 2-way speech .

General Procedures Clearance delivery frequencies should be established where appropr iate (otherwise c learance by control frequency where the stat ion is remote and low vo lume traffic the norm) and a suitab le procedure developed utilizing the AFTN for aircraft departure/ release from Cat 111 units .

Entering the departure time of the aircraft into the AFTN either at departure point or ACC would automatically initiate print-out of enroute fl ight progress strips at relevant units on strip printers .

Computerized flight plans shou ld become standard practice . both IFR and VFR

where practicable. The method I propose is that the aircraft type and intended trac k/ destination and desired flight rules/ level are supplied to an AFTN terminal. The AFTN would have automatic access to the main MET computer which would automatically process the basic details to route data. Once activated , the network wo uld automatically dispense fl ig ht progress strips as above. The computer plan would be available at input point for confirmation by the pilot / company. I believe we already have the hardware for a system of this type -all it requires is the will to go ahead and a sufficient software program written.

I envisage that th e only communications staff per se required would be those manning the computer switching centers (3 ). probably an extra 1 5 staff. The additional sta ff would be at the pilot/ controller interface . (This group is the combined ATC assistant and flight service group presently merging) .

Oceanic Control I propose shift ing the area of responsibility for traffic between Australia and New Zealand to the NZ Dome stic FIR boundary (adjusted if necessary in some instances ) and the establishmen t of standard departure/ arrival transfer procedures between AK ACC and ASSY ACC d irect.

I propose th at the Pacif ic/ Oceanic area wil l commence between AK-ABBN and V HHH tracks and remain as is. This would result in the necessity for one Oceani c control ler and one air / ground HF opera tor .

Rescue Fire Service I am of the view th at the RFS should be absorbed by the Metropoli tan Fire Service (M FS) and that where RFS is requ ired or requested at Cat Ill units (or unmanned unit s) that the local MF board provide a detail as necessary to man appliances stationed at the units.

Conclusion It is my view that an autonomous Civil Aviation Direc tora t e or A uthority free of the normal Publi c Service infrastructure is the desirable . if not necessary , mode of organization.

There have been significant developmen ts in technology and automation wh ich , if they could be introduced into the NZ ATC system. would streamline and simp lify the syste m and rationalize material and manpower reso urces to the economic advantage of the users .

It is widely recognized that the specia lized employees of Civil Aviation do not fit well within the co nstraints and methods of Public Service administrations . The establishment of the Authorit y proposed would provide the mechan ism to make the necessary workforce changes and implement more suitable conditions of em ployment without the normal constraints and prejudices encountered at present .

There are obvious ind icators throughout the world and in NZ of the necessity to rationalize the aviation system to remain viable and buoyant . Whilst safety can not be compromised , without a competiti ve and flourishing industry , we are all in Jeop-

15

Auckland Airport Terminal Buildings ardy. The proposition that we share the existing work among more people working less but for the same 'slice of the cake' is untenable in a competitive world. especiall y when automation or time-saving procedures and methods are suppressed to sustain this premise.

I therefore seek the endorsement of this conference and the NZATCA Exec utive of th e genera l principles of this paper and that the NZA TCA seek the establishment of a joint investigative study group of government representatives . Civil Aviation emp loyees and industry personnel to formulat e a comp rehen sive proposal to go vernm ent to reform and rationalize the Civil Aviation structure. system and manning req uirements. Whilst some members will be surprised if not asto unded at some of the more detailed proposals I have aired. I urge yo u to put aside pa roc hial interests and lend your sup port to suc h an investi gative study.

Appendix

Summary of Estimated Staffing Situation/Requirement

Location

Facility Function

Ardmore Whenuapai Kaitaia Whangarei Auckland Hamilton Tauranga Whakatane Rotorua Taupo Region

TWR TWR/PRA FSS FSS ACC TWR/APP TWR/FSS FSS TWR / APP/ Area FSS

?

Sub / Total Ohakea Paraparaumu Napier Palme rston New Plymouth Wanganui Nelson Woodbourne Wellington Kelburn Met. Gisbo rne Region

ACC FSS TWR / APP TWR TWR / APP TWR / FSS TWR / APP TWR / APP ACC Comms TWR

?

Sub/Total

Is Age-60 Retir ement 'R easonably Necessary?'

A federal appeals court has overt urne d a ruling by a lowe r co urt that had reje cted t he age discrimination co mplain t of a co rporate pilot who had been forced to ret ire at age 60 . The US Court of Appeals for the Sixt h Circ uit state d in its op ini on t hat the decision of t he US Dist rict Court. Sout hern Division aga inst the pilot . Jero me Touh y. was im prope r because the issue in ques t ion was whether safety consid erations render an age60 ret irement rule for pilots ¡ reaso nabl y necessary ¡ Accord ing to the appeals court . Touhy 's employer. t he Ford Moto r Comp any . was not entitled to judgmen t on th is m aterial issue as a matter of law as the lower co urt had ru led . The _Touh y case has been remanded fo r further procee dings . and the NBAA expects that the case w ill result in a jury t rial at some future date .

Chri stchurch Wigram Westport Hokitika Milford lnvercargill Dunedin Oueenstown Oama ru Tim aru Reg ion

Head Office Head Off. Comm.

Pac if ic Is. College Total

7 11

3 1 2 2 62 63 8 3 2 3 2 8 3 3 2 1

Admin Comm TWR / APP / FSS Instructors

Proposed FAG Function

Staff ATC

FS

TWR TWR / PRA

7

3

10

1

ACC TWR

63 4

TWR

4

100

86

25

5 3

TWR/APP

5 6

3 2

TWR TWR

4 4

6

2

3 6 6

2 3 4

4 4

52

45 3

TWR TWR TWR / APP Comms

5 1

1

115

73

52 6

37

40

88

44

20

5

38

24

3

74

32

ACC TWR

46

26

TWR

4 4

6

2 2

6 9

2 3 6 3 2 3 1

?

Sub/Tota l

Sub/Tota l

16

ACC TWR FSS FSS FSS TWR / APP SUB/ACC TWR/APP FSS FSS FSS

Staff A TC FS

74

61

10

6

1

3

2

6

2

19

11

308 23 1

Admin Comm TWR / APP / FS Inst ructo rs

60

26

10

6 1

3

2

6

1

19

10

241 11 2 ( 22 %)( 51 %) (Redu ction )

News from Corporate Members

£6 Million Contract for Plessey Plessey Airports Limited has won a contract valued at approximately £6 million to develop a new airport with a 2860 meter runway capable of handling international flights at Mmabatho, capital of the African Republic of Bophuthatswana.

The airport will be developed at a greenfield site and the contract calls for Plessey to provide the complete design and overall project management. Plessey will supervise the civil engineering and building works program, supply navigational aids, HF and VHF communications , equipment for air traffic control, airport lighting and vehicles, passenger, baggage and freight handling equipment . It will also be responsible for personnel training .

The construction program is planned for completion in two years.

The Republic of Bophuthatswana shares borders with Botswana and the Republic of South Africa . It achieved independence in 1977 . Geographical area is 40,355 square kilometres , about the same as Switzerland . Population is approximately 1,500,000.

Principal economic activity is mining, the country being a major world source of platinum. Although there are three small existing airports plus a number of gravel airstrips. the n_ ew airport at the capital will for the first time give Bophuthatswana an independent facility for medium range flights . It will make a major contribution to the country ' s increasing pace of economic development.

Plessey Radar ACR 430 Top Fifty Plessey Radar has won yet another order for the ACR 430 which brings the total sales for this compact, costeffective airfield control radar to 50 .

The fiftieth is to be supplied to British Aerospace (Hatfield) for installation at the company ' s private airfield.

Installation began early this year and the system is now operational . It will be used in connection with the

•

8

The 146 Feederliner seen at Hatfield over the new Plessey ACR 430 airf ield control radar. flight testing program of the new HS 146 Feederliner, as well as providing accurate approach guidance and general radar surveillance for the high level of executive business traffic handled at Hatfield .

Among the outstanding feature s of this precision X-band equipment are the ease and speed w ith whi ch it can be installed and the simpl ic ity of

mai nte nance and servici ng .

This order foll ow s closely the com missioning into service of two ot her ACR 43 0 's. The fi rst, at Den Helder in Holland , is used by the Dutch Navy for bot h fixed wing and helicopter oper ations . The ot her has rep laced the Plessey ACR 424 at the busy Rolls Royce Leavesden Airport in Hertfor dshire .

17

Newsbriefs

Windshear Unpredictable

as Accident Force

A Chicago University authority told the National Science Foundation that · microbursts', often cloaked in fleecy white clouds. not dark ominous ones, exert intense down-and-out air movements producing windshear severe enough to down an airliner. Dr. Theodore Fujita noted that human judgment cannot reliably determine wh ether a particular cloud harbors hazardous winds. He added that dangerous windshear conditions last only two-to-ten min utes , cover areas under four kilometers in diameter, and so could be confined entirely inside an airport . Quoted in 'The Times· of London , he said this means one aircraft can pass through an area safely w hile another flying in the same area may encounter dangerous microbursts. FAA has studied proposals for on-board equipment to detect sudden shifts in wind direction or speed for several years and have come up with specifications for windshea r detection equipment that airlines may be required to install. The agency pointed out that these proposals had no link to the recent New Orleans Pan American World Airways 727 crash.

Carrier's insurer in that accident is being sued by two Louisiana couples whose homes were damaged . In related matter, US Congressional Senate / House conferees approved legislation to bar release for two month s of transcripts of comments made by pilots before airliner crashes. Also approved was requirement that three of five National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) membe rs be 'tec hnicall y qualified ' for crash investigations. NTSB recommended FAA effect measures to prevent airliners from taking off with dangerous wing icing.

ICAO Conclave Produces New Weather Forecast System Internat iona l Civil Aviat ion Organization concluded four-week review of global aeronautical co mmunications . weather reporting methods with positive results. Montreal parley , attended by 285 experts representing 84 governments. ten international organizatio ns, developed worldwide area weather forecast system based on central ized production of foreca sts for aviation in digital form at two cent ers, London and Washington (DC). System also calls for regional area forecast centers to meet regional users· needs. A group w ill plan the uniform implementation of the system. whose convent ional concept is intended to bridge the gap unt il a global forecast system based on sate llite broadcasts becomes operat ional.

Carrier Sues over Alleged Controller Negligence Air Florida filed suit against the U.S. Government, alleging that neg ligence by air t raff ic controllers at Wa shington 's National Airport ca used Janua ry crash that killed 7 8 people, reports the Ass_ociated Press. Carrier contends government should be held liab le for damage awards resulting from 32 suits brought against Air Florida in afte rm at h of Potomac River accident . Airline denied liabi lity for crash . blam es FAA . which suit says is charged with insuring ·safe movement of aircraft in and abo ut' the airport. Accident probe by National Transportation Safety Board is incom plete NTSB co incidental ly held three -day hearings on airport runwa y safety, large ly as outgrowth of World Airways January accident at Bosto n·s Logan Internat ional Airport. ( DC- 10 skidded off runway in icy weather with two fatalit ies.) Testimony by various airport aut horit ies indicates determination of safe runwa y c ond it ions in bad weather is often moot .

18

Fort Huachuca Gets New Tower This new standard air traffic control tower (background) Is shown next to the original at Libby Army Airfield, Fort Huachuca , Al . The new tower is prefabricated and is an Army standard.

Towers identical to this are under construction or in use at Polk, LA; Wheeler Air Force Base, HI; Fort Leonard Wood, MO ; Fort Knox, KY, and Ansbach, Germany. (US Army photo)

Aviation Groups Support 20-Year FAA ATC Plan The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) both told Congress they support FAA' s propo sed 20-year program which is designed to bring complete modernization to the air traffic control system. ALPA President J.J. O'Donnell called it an ·excellent plan which reflects extraordinary vision and reasonable goals. · While supporting the plan.

AOPA told Congress it opposes methods FAA plans to use to finance it. It claims cost 'would fall disproportionately ' on general aviation. Meanwhile. FAA is trying this month to recruit air traffic specialists with starting salaries of $15,922 annually . Those chosen will work in six flight service stations providing pre-flight and in-flight services to pilots, including weather briefings .

Aircraft Losses Drop British Insurance Association notes significant impro vement in losses of Western-built jets. Write-offs in 1981 totaled about $1 24 million for 1 2 jets. In 1980 . 23 Jets we re written off at almost $222 million . In 1981 , only jumbo lost was Pakistan International Airlines DC- 10-30 destroyed in hangar fire . Fm first two months this year, three jet aircraft were lost at $ 68 5 million .

However , BIA is concerned losses can rise significantly with many aircraft operating today costing $49 million and over . ' British Airway s News· reports. Six fatal accidents last year resulted in 35 5 passenger death s, nine the year before took 7 44 lives. Inter national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recently issued report

calling 1981 best ever as far as level of safety in scheduled passenger services is concerned . Passenger fatalities per 100 million passenger kilometers decreased from 0 .09 in 1980 to 0.04 last year. Number of fatal aircrah accidents per 1 00 .000 aircrah hours flown went from 0 . 14 to 0 . 1 2. fatal aircraft accidents per 100.000 landings decreased from 0. 20 to 0 . 1 7 . Rates were lowest since such data have been recorded by ICAO.

losses on the aircrah . Manufacturer says it still expects to sell a 'few more · TriStars at$ 50-$ 60 million each. stretch production in to 1984 . Aviation industry fiscal problems. strength of used jet market . are contributory factors in L-1011 cancellations as well as for the cancellation. previously reported . of some Boeing orders . Airlines dropping L-1011 include Air Canada . Delta. Pan American and Trans World Airways . Latter has fleet of 35 L-1011 s that it rates as ·excellent' .

FAA Approves Slot Swaps

Chicago's O'Hare Still World's Busiest Airport

Airlines will be allowed to make deals to exchange landing rights under new FAA policy described as a measure designed to deregulate access to major US airports. Slots can be swapped among carriers from one airport to another; airlines can transfer or trade future slot allocations. Agency reserves right to approve exchanges at Chicago . Cleveland. Indianapolis and New York. areas that are operating at capacity or close to it. Goal is to move toward removing slot allocations entirely . FAA notes. Traffic operations overall are currently at 83 % of prestrike levels. with a 4. 8% rise in first half passenger volume over same 1981 period.

Administration is predicting return to 100% operations by next February. FAA announced end of 'slotteries·; will hold one more drawing August 20 for bulk of slots to be allocated November 1 . and for all future distributions . Latter will be doled out in order of names drawn.

O' Hare International Airport handled 37.9 million passengers in 1981.13%fewerthanin 1980 . butrepeatedasglobe's No .1 outpointing Atlanta's Hartsfield International in total passenger traffic . Latter processed 3 7 .5 million travelers . London ( Heathrow) Airport came in third. Top cargo haru:!l-ingairport was New York's Kennedy International with 1.2 million tons of freight and mail. with Los Angeles International Airport runner-up. Stand ings were revealed in report by Airport Operators Council International (AOCI).

US Clamps Down on Cuba Travel

US. foreign flag carriers have cancelled about $ 2 billion worth of L-1011 purchases . according to The Wall Street Journal. wip ing out all 40 options on Lockheed 's books . Company . which built 2 28 of aircraft for 1 5 carriers. still has backlog of 1 6. Phaseout of L-1011 program already has been announced after 13 years of

Restrictions on American citizen travel to Cuba was renewed

by US Treasury Department after five-year lapse. New limitations underscore Government's displeasure with Cuban support of El Salvador guerillas. other Central American leftist movements. notes The Wall Street Journal . Citizens disobe ying rules subject to prosecution under Trading with the Enemies Act with potential ten-year jail term . $10.000 fine . Ameri can Airways Charters . controlled by Cuban Government. barred from Havana-M iami operations, severing last US-Cuba commercial air lin k. Carter Administration lifted Cuban travel restrictions in 197 7 in bid to improve relations between two countries .

International

Aircraft of the Future?

$2 Billion L-1011 Cancellations Rock Lockheed

Passengers Expedited

Miami International Airport. which report s logging more inter national flights than any in US ( 100 foreign cities served by 1 .OOO non stops). launched innovation to expedite clearance of inter national passengers. On April 3 record 1 7. 787 passengers arrived from abroad and were cleared. plane to curbside. in average 45 minutes. airport authorities said. Under experimental system customs and immigration inspecto rs. who work at building shown above , are cross-trained to share duties at inspection point prior to baggage claim. Aim is to give foreign visitors pleasant. quick entry procedure . to afford protection US requires and to save time of inspe cto rs.

Multibody aircraft. such as t hat shown in illustration . wi ll be cheape r to operate (by 11 % on direc t operating costs) than single body . Fly-away cost is calculated to be 9-1 5% less. These two points were made by Lockheed-Geo rgia Staff Specialist J .W . Moore at recent conference sponsored by American Insti tute of Aeronautics and Astronautics . Fuel economy . through lower drag levels, is another importan t fact discovered in joint study made by aircra ft manufacturer and NASA Langel y Research Center .

19

Air Traffic Contingency Measures The following is a Working Paper submitted on the 2 8 May. 1982. by the /CAO Director of Air Navigation Bureau to the Air Navigation Commission.

This paper discusses measures to be taken in response to Assembly Resolution A23-1 2 and principles on which such measures should be based. It outlines the role it is felt that states. !CAO and other international organizations concerned could usefully play in future air traffic contingency planning and invites the Commission to endorse the approach and agree to the further work proposed.

Action by the Air Navigation Commission is at paragraph 3 7.

Introduction 1. The 23rd Session of the Assembly.

Montreal. 16 September-7 October 1980 adopted Resolution A23-12: Contingency measures for application in the event of disruptions of air traffic services and related supporting services. Resolution A23-1 2 is reproduced at the Appendix.

2. On 10 October 1980 ( 101 /1 ). the Council referred the resolution to the Air Navigation Commission for study and formulation of recommendations to the Council. This paper is in response to the Commission's request that the matter be studied by the Secretariat and a report be presented for its consideration.

3. Circumstances before and during events causing disruptions of air traffic services to international civil aviation. and of related supporting services. vary widely.

Contingency measures in response to specific events and circumstances must be adapted to these circumstances. General guidelines for contingency planning by States and ICAO must. therefore. be sufficiently flexible to provide for such adaptation requirements. while at the same time providing unambiguous guidance on the responsibility of states and !CAO in formulating. promulgating and applying contingency measures and on the arsenal of technical/ operational and administrative tools and machinery available for the purpose. To that end this paper attempts to analyze. in the light of experience already gained. the responsibility for developing. promulgating and implementing contingency plans.

20

the status of contingency plans in relation to the facilities and services nor-. mally to be provided in accordance with the !CAO Air Navigation Plan in the area concerned; the types of events that may cause disruption of air navigation services and. consequently. require contingency planning; the effect on State/ !CAO responsibility of the type of airspace affected or potentially affected by service disruption. the responsibility for notification of potential service disruption. service disruption. intended contingency measures or for requesting assistance in formulating contingency plans; types of administrative machinery available for formulating contingency plans and for monitoring events; coordination requirements in formulating. completing. introducing and terminating contingency plans; technical/ operational elements that may be considered for inclusion in contingency plans.

4. It is well known that individual Contracting States have in the past developed and applied contingency plans for the airspaces within which they normally provide air traffic services. It is also known that !CAO has taken the initiative for developing such plans or has acceded to requests for so doing. As the main coordinator !CAO has been instrumental in obtaining agreement on such plans from providers and users and has assisted in their promulgation and implementation. These activities have been conducted on an ad hoe basis in response to particular circumstances requiring contingency planning.

Where ICAO has been involved the action has been taken under the authority of the President of the Council. acting on behalf of the Council as envisaged in Assembly Resolution A21-21 (now A23-11 ). Appendix N. Associated Practice 3. adopted October 1974. and has particularly focused on air traffic services over the high seas. Some of the more important conclusions reached on the basis of these experiences. and which will be further elaborated upon later. are that: the effects of disruption of air traffic services in particular airspaces. more often than not. spill over into adjacent airspaces and. therefore. result in a

requirement for international coordination; where the effects are widespread or involve a fair number of States. an international coordinating agency is required if timely action is to be taken; !CAO. being an organization of governments. is the obvious choice for assuming the coordinating role; limitation of !CAO-sponsored contingency planning to airspaces over_the high seas and areas of undetermined sovereignty does not satisfy the requirement for preserving the availability of major world air routes within the air transportation system; and that IATA and IFALPA are invaluable sources of information on situations potentially or actually requiring contingency action and valuable advisors on the practicability of overall plans and elements of such plans.

Discussion Responsibility for Developing. Promulgating and Implementing Contingency Plans 5. In accordance with Article 28 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. a Contracting State has undertaken. insofar as it may find practicable. to provide. in its territory. air navigation facilities and services necessary to facilitate air navigation. The provision of such facilities and services is. therefore. clearly a State responsibility.

6. Assembly Resolution A23-11: Consolidated statement of continuing policies and associated practices related specifically to air navigation. Apppendix K. first 'Whereas Clause¡. recognizes that regional plans. as established by Council. set forth the facilities. services and regional supplementary procedures to be provided or employed by the Contracting States pursuant to Article 28 of the Convention. It appears reasonable. therefore. that the provision of alternative means or the institution of measures reJ:luired to avoid hazard to international air navigation. is also the responsibility of the State concerned. when facilities and services of the regional plan pertaining to its territory temporarily will not be available.

7. Services provided in accordance with the regional plans are not confined to the territories and territorial airspaces of Contracting States. but also pertain to airspaces over the high seas. In such cases

the plans specify the States which have accepted the responsibility to provide air traffic services in defined portions of airspace over the high seas. The regional plans would similarly list Contracting States having accepted the responsibility for providing air traffic services in airspace over areas of undetermined sovereignty. if and when requirements for such assignment would arise.

8. The responsibility for providing services over the high seas remains with the designated state until that State has formally indicated that it no longer accepts that responsibility or until it has been reassigned. In case of temporary inability to. provide. in whole or in part. the services required by the regional plan. the State concerned should be responsible for providing alternative services or instituting measures which would prevent hazard to international air navigation. It should also be responsible for notifying ICAO of the degree to which the services in question might be eroded [capacity. type (quality) of service. etc.] so that reassignment of the responsibility for providing service in the airspace. temporarily or otherwise. might be considered.

9. There remains the question of responsibility for contingency action/ measures in the case where one State has delegated to another State the responsibility for providing air traffic services over the whole or parts of its territory. Ability to act timely would indicate that the responsibility should rest with the providing State in consultation with the delegating State.

tinues to be taken under the authority of the President of the Council.

13. The analysis in the preceding paragraphs 5-1 2 and that which follows in paragraphs 1 8-24 has been made in recognition of the fact that effective and efficient handling of the situation in the event of disruption of air traffic services requires a clear. common understanding of the responsibility and authority of individual Contracting States and ICAO. That having been said. it must also be recognized that there may be circumstances in which the ATS authority. or even the government of the State concerned. does not function (e.g. severe civil disorder. revolution). or where. for other reasons. the authorities cannot live up to their responsibilities. It is submitted that it is essential. in such circumstances. that ICAO assume the responsibility for initiating and coordinating contingency action with neighbouring States. IATA and IFALPA. Such contingency action would fully respect the sovereignty of the State(s) concerned.

The Types of Events 14. Some of the events that lead to a requirement for contingency action can clearly be foreseen. to the extent that timely action can be taken and adequate advance notice of the disruption and of alternative means and measures can be given. Labour unrest and potential industrial action belong to this category.

1 5. However. disruption of the normal services due to civil disorder. revolution. armed conflict. sabotage. etc .. cannot normally be accurately determined in adStatus of Contingency Plans vance and publicized in good time before 1O. Contingency arrangements are in- the disruption occurs. The same applies to tended to provide alternative means to natural disasters. However. close monthose provided for in the air navigation plan itoring of events, with the exception of and represent temporary deviations/ modnatural disasters. will normally provide ifications to that plan for the purpose of resufficient information on potential requiresponding effectively to unu_sual circumments for contingency planning to allow timely action to be taken. stances. They are temporary in nature and the intention is to restore the air navigation 16. In the circumstances described in plan services as soon as circumstances paragraph 14. the determination that permit. It follows that the 'Procedure for contingency planning is necessary should the Amendment of Approved Regional normally be made by the State(s) conPlans¡. approved by Council on 7 March cerned. which may call for ICAO assist1975. need not be invoked for the develance at its (their) discretion. Strict adheropment and application of conti_ngen_cy ence to predetermined adequate time limits for notification of the application of arrangements. This is in conformity with contingency arrangements should be the spirit of paragraph 2.2 of that pro?bligat~ry. in the interest of the safety of cedure. international civil aviation operations.

11 . It is submitted. therefore. that the changes involved in specific contingency 1 7. The d~termination that contingency planning Is necessary in the circumarrangements do not constitute a proposal stances described in paragraph 15 should for amendment of the air navigation plan. also normally be made by the State(s) It does not have the status as such and concerned. However. the risk that the need not be subjected to the associated State(s) will be unable to live up to such time-consuming procedure. If it had been responsibility in these circumstances. is accorded such status. it would have been considerable. The likelihood of such necessary to find procedural means by events should therefore be actively moniwhich it could be revoked. Timely response tored by ICAO. including its regional orto contingencies would otherwise not gani~ation. with the assistance of neighhave been possible. . bouring States. IATA and IFALPA. Contin12. Accordingly, contingency argency arrangements should be developed rangements do not per se require action by on the initiative of ICAO and procedures the Council and may be developed and for their implementation and application applied by Contracting States. if necessary agreed among the parties concerned. in consultation with adjacent States. whenever monitoring activities indicate However. it appears practical and natural the likelihood that events described in that, when ICAO is involved, action con-

paragraph 1 5 are imminent. The contingency arrangements should preferably be developed in coordination with the State(s) in whose airspace service disruption is expected. but inability to do so should not absolve ICAO from developing appropriate contingency arrangements in the absence of such cooperation. In such circumstances the contingency arrangements would include avoidance of the territorial airspace(s) affected by service disruption. unless there was positive indication by the State(s) concerned that flight in such airspace(s) was permitted.

The Types of Airspace Affected 18. Annex 11. paragraph 2.1 .3 stipulates that: 'When it has been determined that air traffic services will be provided. the States concerned shall designate the authority responsible for providing such services.¡ Notes to this provision indicate that: 7. 'The authority responsible for establishing and providing the services may be a State or a suitable agency'. and describe: 2. The situations which arise in respect of the establishment and provision of air traffic services to either part or whole of an international flight. These are: Situation 7: A route. or portion of a route. contained within airspace under the sovereignty of a State establishing and providing its own air traffic services.

Situation 2: A route. or portion of a route. contained within airspace under the sovereignty of a State which has. by mutual agreement. delegated to another State. responsibility for the establishment and provision of air traffic services.

Situation 3: A portion of a route contained within airspace over the high seas or in airspace of undetermined sovereignty for which a State has accepted the responsibility for the establishment and provision of air traffic services.

The latter note goes on to say that for the purpose of the Annex. 'the State which designates the authority responsible for establishing and providing the air traffic services is: in Situation 1 : the State having sovereignty over the relevant portion of the airspace; in Situation 2: the State to whom responsibility for the establishment and provision of air traffic services has been delegated; in Situation 3: the State which has accepted the responsibility for the establishment and provision of air traffic services.'

19. The material in Annex 11 referred to in paragraph 18 above forms. together with the Article of the Convention and Assembly Resolution referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6. the main basis for the allocation of responsibility among States suggested in paragraphs 5 to 9. inclusive, and 1 2 and 13 of this paper for initiating. developing. promulgating and implementing contingency plans. However. this needs to be elaborated upon in respect of the situations referred to in paragraph 18.

21

20. In Situation 1 the responsibility rests squarely upon and will continue to rest upon the sovereign State concerned.

Contingency arrangements involving the use of sovereign airspace can be applied only on the initiative of. or with the agreement or consent of the authorities of the sovereign State concerned regarding such use. If one of these conditions does not exist the airspace affected by service disruption must be avoided by international flights and contingency arrangements involving bypassing the airspace. must be developed by adjacent States or by ICAO in cooperation with such adjacent States.

The only conceivable case where ICAO might consider contingency plans for sovereign airspace without any of the above conditions prevailing. might be one where no effective government is being exercised in the State concerned and where a response is required to a United Nations resolution calling for mercy and/ or evacuation flights to be undertaken.

21 . In Situation 2 the initial responsibility is that of the State to whom responsibility for the establishment and provision of air traffic services has been delegated. It is submitted in paragraph 9 that the responsibility in respect of contingency measures should be exercised in consultation with the delegating State. The latter State may. at its discretion. terminate the agreement on delegation of responsibility for provision of air traffic services in the airspace concerned. In such a case it follows that it assumes responsibility in relation to that airspace as described in paragraph 20 above and that the situation should be handled in accordance with the alternatives described there. _ 22. In the context of contingency action there Is some form of parallelism between Situation 2 and Situation 3. The initial responsibility in Situation 3 rests with t~e _State(s)having accepted the respons1b1htyfor providing air traffic services over _thehigh seas or in airspace of undetermined sovereignty. However. ICAO may. of course. reassign or reallocate the responsibility for providing air traffic services in such airspace to one or more other States. willing to accept it. Such reassignment formed part of the contingency arrangements introduced in April 1975 over the South China Sea and continues to apply in the modified arrangements still in force.

2 3 - Paragraph 14 refers to the fact that some of the events that lead to a requirement for contingency action can be foreseen - Labour unrest and potential industrial . action by _personnel engaged in prov1dmg air traffic services and supporting services belong to this category. It can be argued that disagreement between such personnel and national authorities on remu_neratio_nand conditions of service. etc .. 1sa national matter that should not be allowed to affect international civil aviation operati_ons in _non-sovereign airspace (S1tuat1on 3). since the world aviation community at large is not party to the dispute. Acceptance of this principle would obviate _the need for reassignment of the respons1b1hty for providing services in S1tuat1on3 airspace due to contingencies 22

arising from industrial action. Otherwise such reassignment is one of the more effective tools in preserving the continued availability of major world air routes.

24. Much the same argument can be advanced in favour of international civil aviation operations in transit through Situation 1 airspace. so long as landing or take-off in the State affected by industrial action is not involved. This also applies to Situation 2 airspace. and more so if the delegating State is not party to the dispute.

The Responsibility for Notification 25. Notification by NOTAM to users of air navigation services of nonforeseeable service disruption and of foreseeable disruption and associated contingency measures. is a requirement of the ICAO aeronautical information services provisions.

As much advance notice as possible should be given and. in case of foreseeable events. no less than 48 hours advance notice should be given by NOTAM Class 1.

The earliest possible notification of ICAO. preferably the ICAO representative accredited to the State(s) concerned. and to States whose services might be affected should be made obligatory.

26. Time is essential in contingency planning if hazards to air navigation are to be reasonably prevented. It follows that provision should also be made for States to notify ICAO in cases of potential service disruption. together with intended associated contingency measures or a request for assistance in formulating contingency plans. This would permit timely action on the basis of situation monitoring and coordination with prospective participating States if service disruption should materialize and introduction of contingency arrangements therefore become necessary.

2 7. Paragraphs 13 and 17 indicate circumstances and events which would prevent States from living up to their obligations for notification of service disruption and for development and notification of associated contingency arrangements.

They also suggest that it is essential that ICAO assume this responsibility in such circumstances. The need for ICAO to monitor events. in coordination with States. IATA and IFALPA. for such purposes. is dealt with below.

28. Timely introduction of contingency arrangements requires decisive initiative and action. which again presupposes that contingency plans have been completed and agreed among the parties concerned before the occurrence of the event requiring contingency action. including the manner and timing of promulgating such arrangements. The responsibility of individual States for taking such action has been explored in earlier parts of this paper.

However. it is clear that if contingencies occur without such action having been taken. international civil aviation in the area is likely to encounter severe hazards to safety. Since it is acknowledged that circumstances may develop which will prevent individual States from living up to their obligations for contingency planning in the event of disruption of their services. some other authority must be designated

to execute these functions for the purpose of safeguarding the safety of international civil aviation and preserve its ability to continue operating. It is submitted that this authority. in general terms. should rest with ICAO, in view of its status as a government organization in the field of civil aviation. its objectives and its regional organization. Valuable experience has already been gained and further experience will enhance ICAO's ability to efficiently serve as a catalyst for contingency planning activities.

29. It follows that ICAO must accept responsibility for monitoring of events of the types described to enable it to take effective action in the face of developments and in the absence of formal notification from the State whose services are likely to be disrupted. The ICAO initiative and subsequent action should be taken in consultation with States likely to be affected and with IATA and IFALPA. Administrative Machinery 30. States should do as much preplanning as possible in respect of foreseeable events like industrial action. etc. The administrative machinery to be employed will depend upon circumstances and organization of civil aviation functions in individual States. However. a State faced with disruption of part or all of its air navigation services should designate/ establish a central agency capable of providing. during the 24-hours of the day. up-to-date information on the situation and associated contingency measures until the system has returned to normal operation.

31. Where ICAO is involved in contingency monitoring and development of contingency measures. the main task of providing the necessary information should rest with the regional office(s) concerned. Arrangements should be made for constant monitoring of news media. receipt of up-to-date information from States directly concerned and States which are potential participants in contingency arrangements. from the regional organizations of IATA and IFALPA and for constant tapping of information received by the State AIS service at the location of the regional office.

32. Experience indicates that. when a crisis is emerging and for the duration of the crisis a Coordinating Team should be established at HQ together with a similar team in the regional office(s) concerned.

Depending on circumstances. arrangements should be made for competent staff to be available or reachable throughout the 24-hours of the day. for the designation of a focal point for receipt and analysis of incoming messages and for obtaining authority for and initiating the action required in the circumstances.

Communications with States. IATA and IFALPA have improved considerably following the installation of telex facilities at HQ and in all regional offices. but the adequacy of these and alternative means must be reviewed in each case.

Coordination Requirements 33. A contingency plan must be acceptable to providers and users of contin-

gency services alike, i.e. in terms of the ability of the providers to discharge the functions assigned to them and in terms of safety of operation and traffic handling capacity provided by the plan in the circumstances. Detailed coordination leading to formal agreement of the emerging plan must therefore be undertaken with each State. which is to participate. Detailed coordination must also be undertaken with those States whose services will be significantly affected by rerouting of traffic and with IATA and IFALPA representing user interests and invaluable operational insight and experience. It is assumed that the executive bodies of the two organizations will have or will be given authority for effecting the required coordination, in order to reserve the integrity of the planning operation and avoid unacceptable delay inherent in a requirement for reference to association members.

34. The coordination referred to in paragraph 33 should include agreement on a detailed common NOTAMtext to be promulgated at a time to be notified by a special agreed message. whenever this is necessary to ensure orderly transition to contingency arrangements. Orderly transition to restored normal services is equally important and should be effected through promulgation of an agreed NOTAMtext. taking effect from a prearranged time.

Technical/ Operational Elements 35. Development of a sound contingency plan is dependent upon circumstances. including the availability or not of the airspace where services have been disrupted for use by international civil aviation operations. It presupposes as much information as possible on current and alternative routes. navigational capability of aircraft and availability or partial availability of navigational guidance from ground based aids. communications capability of adjacent air traffic services units. volume and types of aircraft to be accommodated and the actual status of the air traffic services communications. meteorological and aeronautical !nformation services. Following are the main elements to be considered for contingency planning depending upon circumstances: - rerouting of traffic to avoid the whole or part of the airspace concerned. normally involving establishment of additional routes with associated conditions for their use; establishment of a simplified route network through the airspace con~erned. if it is available. together with a flight level allocation scheme to ensure lateral and vertical separation and a procedure for adjacent area control centers to establish longitudinal separation at entry point and to maintain such separation through the airspace; _ .. reassignment of respons1b1htyfor providing air traffic servI_ces_in airspace over the high seas (S1tuat1on3) or in delegated (Situation 2) airspace; installation and operation of additional air-ground communications, AFTN and ATS direct speech links, including reassignment to adjacent States of the responsibility for providing meteorol-

ogical information and information on navigation aids; special arrangements for making, collecting and disseminating in-flight and post-flight reports from aircraft; a requirement for aircraft to maintain continuous listening watch on a specified pilot-pilot VHF frequency in specified areas where air-ground communications are uncertain or nonexistent and to broadcast position information and estimates on that frequency, including start and completion of climb and descent; a requirement for all aircraft in specified areas to display navigation and anticollision lights at all times; a requirement for aircraft to maintain their own longitudinal separation from preceding aircraft at the same cruising level; a requirement for climbing and descending well to the right of the center line of specifically identified routes.

Guidelines on how to combine these elements in order to tailor them into¡ contingency plans responsive to various sets of events and circumstances can be developed, based on experience, if the Air Navigation Commission endorses the approach advocated in this paper.

Conclusion 3 6. In the light of experience referred to in paragraph 4, it is concluded that an adequate response to Assembly Resolution A23-1 2 would require allocation of responsibility to be made. measures to be taken and contingency planning to be conducted along the lines set forth in paragraphs 5-35 of this paper.

Action by the Air Navigation Commission 3 7. The Air Navigation Commission is invited to: a) endorse the conclusion in paragraph

36;

b) request the Secretary to prepare a draft Report to Council. setting forth the responsibility allocation, other measures and guidelines for the conduct of contingency planning by Contracting States and ICAO developed on the basis of paragraphs 5-35 of this paper, in a form suitable to serve as a basis for consultation with States (A23-1 2, Resolving Clause 3 refers) and for an eventual working paper to the 24th Session of the Assembly.

Appendix A23-12: Contingency measures for application in the event of disruptions of air traffic services and related supporting services: Whereas air traffic services and related supporting services may be disrupted from time to time in particular portions of airspace due to civil disorders, conflicts of various types or natural disasters; and Whereas ICAO can perform a useful role in coordinating or assisting in the coordinated development and application of contingency measures designed to provide for a safe and orderly flow of international air traffic in the circumstances;

The Assembly directs the Council. in order to ensure timely and efficient responses to disruptions of normal international air traffic services: 1 . To study the feasibility of developing basic planning principles and criteria for application in. or adaptation to, particular situations; 2. To study the role which ICAO should perform in the coordinated development and application of suitable contingency measures in given circumstances; and 3. To develop, in consultation with States and concerned international organizations, appropriate guidelines covering the aspects mentioned in 1 and 2 above.

1 6th Annual Workshop on Human Factors in Transportation The 1 6th Annual Workshop on Human Factors in Transportation is scheduled for Sunday, January 1 6th.

1983, at the Transportation Research Board's Headquarters at 21 02 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, in Washington, D.C. The workshop has been scheduled for the Sunday preceding the Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board.

The workshop is designed to facilitate communication between persons responsible for transportation system and subsystem design and operation and research and development personnel engaged in studies of the Human Factors aspects of the systems.

Ten concurrent sessions will be held, with a luncheon and post-workshop reception for all participants. The workshop topics are: Driver Characteristics Affecting Design and Operations Vehicle Characteristics Affecting Design and Operations The Older Driver Performance Specifications for Train Handling Conspicuity of Traffic Control Devices Driver Information Processing Innovative Approaches to Program and Project Evaluation New Technology for Visual Simulation Human Factors in Air Traffic Control Rebuilding the System High Technology Driver Aids Interested persons should contact Mr. James K. Williams. Transportation Research Board, 2101 Constitution Avenue. Washington. DC. 204 1 8; (202) 334-2960.

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IMPROVING AVIATION SAFET Britain'snew air trafficcontrol radar network,due to becomefully operationalin 1983,is intendedto serve the combinedciviland militaryneeds ofthe UK.NationalAirTrafficServices up to the tum of the century.

England,Walesand most of Scotland will be coveredby fivedualpurposeprimary/secondaryradar stations, each fullyduplicatedfor maximum reliabilityand equippedforauto-

mated unattendedoperation.Remote real-timemonitoringof radar information as wellas systemperformance and serviceabilitywillbe carriedout by the LondonAirTrafficControl Centreat WestDrayton.Eachstation will handle data for up to 800 aircraft within its coverage,whileoperational ranges of the completeradar network willvarybetween80 and 250NM,with height coverageup to 26,000feetfor

short-rangefunctionsand 70,000feet forlong-rangesurveillance.

In selectinga technicalpartner forthis complexnationwideATCproject,Britain'sCivilAviationAuthority chosePhilips'specialistradar company - Signaal.The technology,operational efficiencyand systemreliabilityoftheir advancedradar equipmentare already provenby similarATCinstallations suppliedto Eurocontrol,Paraguay, Singaporeand The Netherlands.

ATCradar is one exampleof how Philipstechnologyis improvingaviation safetyand efficiency.Hereare some more.

BAGGAGE SECURITY SCREENING The new PhilipsDynavision500 X-rayscreeningsystem employsadvanced digitalimagingtechnologyto providea clear, sharp image when screening passengerhand baggage. The high-speed imagingis complementedby ergonomic designfeaturesto enable the operator to see more ... more rapidly,a vital considerationduring peak boarding periods.

Unsurpassed for reliability, the Dynavision500 joins the wide range of Philips securityscreeningsystems already in use in airportsthe worldover.

PHILIPS

--

;ANDEFFICIENCY LOGGING SYSTEM

:

¡

The GreekCivilAviationAuthority has chosen Philips' 4th-generationmultichannel voice logging systems for their air trafficcontrolnetwork; two 44-channel versions for the airports of Athens and Salonica and six 11-channel versions for various other airports. The new voice loggingsystems,which are availablein 11,22, 33 and 44-channel versions, providecontinuous 24-houroperation folINTEGRATED lowedby automatic change-overwith TELECOMMUNICATION ample overlap to ensure continuity.

SERVICES Philipsvoice logging systems are used at more than 150major airportsaround the The outdoorlighting at Singapore's world;the latest versionsbeing already AEROPP , Philips data switching and data handling system foraeronautiChangi International Airportis the in servicein France,Germany,Italy, cal operation, permits gradual economic world'slargest installationof its kind.

Luxemburg, Malaysia, Sudan,Switzerland growt h from a small installation, routing Jn the terminal area Philipsprovided and Yugoslavia. low volumes of AFTNtraffic, to a powerful 650 floodlightsto illuminate 53 parking multi-use, centre providinga complete aprons to the standards of the Interrangeof aeronauticaltelecommunications national CivilAviationOrganization. services. As the requirementsof the AFTN Morethan half of these are antiglare type centre expand, AEROPP can be enhanced SNF 011floodlightsfitted with 400W accordingly to provide Common!CAO SON/f high-pressure sodium lamps to Data Interchange Networkswitching, the specification of the Visual Aids Panel AFTN/CIDIN interfacing, flight-plan of the !CAO. storage and processingfacilitiesand Antiglare floodlightsare also radar sub-systeminterfaces- together,the mounted on high masts at main road inbackbone of an integrated Air Navigation tersectionsaround the airportso as to System. avoid upwardglare in the path of approaching aircraft. Securityillumination of the airport's perimeter is by means of Theseare just a fewexamples ofPhilips contributionto high-techno logyin aviation.If you SOXlow-pressure sodium lighting. wouldlike moreinformation, contactyourPhilipsorganizationor Philips Concern Marketing Outdoorlighting, however, was Support Department , VOA-0225 , 5600MDEindhoven, the Netherlands.(Telex 35000PHTCNL). only a part of Philipstotal contributionto Please indicate in whichofthe abovesubjectsyouare interested. this ambitious airport project. Wealso 0 -----------------------supplied and installed the long-range 0 ------ ----- ---------radar and display system, LORADS , and the AirportSurfaceDetection Equipment O _____ _____________________ _ ASDE,and equipped the tem1inalbuildings with the world's largest (7500loud- 0 ------------------------speakers),electronically-controlled, ))1 0 Brochure 'Philipsin Aviation¡ publicaddress system.

SURE SIGNOFHIGH-TECHNOLOGY FORAVIATION

News

From CORPORATION

first DC Still Flies The first aircraft produced in each of the DC jetliner series 'DC-8, DC-9.

DC-1 is still flying. demonstrating that outstanding performance with reliability has been a prime characteristic of the McDonnell Douglas 2000aircraft jet transport fleet.

Individual aircraft have established notable performance-milestones since 1959, when the first DC-8 was delivered to United Airlines.

DC-8 fuselage 1 . the first Douglas jet transport to leave the assembly line. is still in service after nearly 61 OOOhours and more than 34 OOO flights.

One DC-8 has compiled more than 76 OOO flight hours and well over 80 OOO hours of block time. more than any other single jetliner in the world.

Among DC-9s. fuselage 1 has compiled more than 4 1 OOO hours and 54 OOO flights since being delivered to Texas International Airlines.

The high time DC-9 fuselage 1 25. with more than 45 800 hours. belongs to Aeromexico. while Republic Airlines - DC-9 fuselage 1 2 has completed the most flights-over 71 OOO. DC-10 fuselage 1 has flown more than 26 600 hours for American Airlines since delivery. The high-time DC10. fuselage 5 7. belongs to Swissair and has completed nearly 39 OOO hours. Fuselage 14. a DC-1 O belonging to Pan American World Airways. has completed the most flights nearly 1 5 OOO. All three fuselage 1s in the DC-jet series were used in flight test programs by McDonnell Douglas prior to entering airline service. Each was involved in stability control development and analysis and stall evaluation.

DC-Bs. DC-9s and DC-1Os have carried more than 2500 million passengers a total of 22 400 million miles. That's the equivalent of transporting well over half the population of the earth a distance equal to 3 24 times the journey to Mars and back.

In doing so. these aircraft have been flown by nearly 350 operators

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over the years. Fleetwide today they average more than 75 OOO flights daily - one every 11 seconds. The 2000 aircraft have accumulated more than 55 million flight hours. If a single airplane could remain aloft for that number of hours it would not land for 6278 years.

Fokker and McDonnell Douglas Split McDonnell Douglas Corporation and Fokker of the Netherlands announced the termination of the agreement under which the two aerospace firms have been working together to design and explore possible production of a new airliner in the 1 50passenger class.

The decision to terminate the agreement was announced jointly by Sanford N. McDonnell. chairman and chief executive officer of McDonnell Douglas. and Frans Swarttouw. chairman of Fokker.

The two men said the present condition of the worldwide commercialaircraft market was the fundamental reason for cancellation of the Memorandum of Understanding under which the two firms have been working since May last year on a proposed MDF100 airliner. The current economic problems of airlines around the world have severely curtailed demand for new aircraft.

Swarttouw said that Fokker will concentrate its resources on its present products. the F-27 and F-28. and will continue to study advanced transport designs.

Sanford McDonnell said his corporation will continue design work on a 1 50-passenger airliner and will continue to discuss joint venture possibilities with potential partners.

McDonnell Douglas remains interested in eventually launching a new jetliner program in the 150-passenger class when the market is ready for such a product. he said.

McDonnell Douglas will also continue to work on possible new derivatives of its DC-9 and DC-10 airliners.

McDonnell said.

Air Force Awards C-17 Contract The Air Force has awarded a $ 31 . 6 million contract to Douglas Aircraft Company, Long Beach. California, a division of McDonnell Douglas Corporation, for a modestly placed research and development program on the C-17 transport design.

The program being funded will include those C-1 7 technologies that would benefit other airlift programs as well. Technologies to be investigated in this effort include: flaps on a swept supercritical (unique airfoil-shaped) wing, winglets tailored to supercritical wing design, and an engine core thrust reverser.

While no decision has been made to proceed beyond this technology effort to full-scale engineering development for the C-1 7, the contract does preserve this option if it is later deemed appropriate as part of the Air Force's long-term airlift acquistion plan.

The fixed-price incentive firm-contract will be managed by Aeronautical Systems Division. deputy for Airlift and Trainer Systems at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

The 2000th DC-Jetliner McDonnell Douglas Corporation delivered in Septemberits 2000th jet transport. a DC-10 built for United Airlines. The deliveryof the 2000th jet transport came 24 years after the first flight of the DC-8 jetliner on May 30. 1958. The DC-8 began commercialservicethe following year.

Thedeliverywas markedby a ceremony at the Douglas Aircraft Company facility there. Special guests were more than 3 700 employeeswho have been with the companyfrom the time the first DC-8 was delivered to the present. John C. Brizendine. president of Douglas. presented a plaque to James Hartigan. president of UnitedAirlines. markingthe deliveryof the 2000th jet transport. United's 4 7th DC-10.

During 19 71. United received one of the first DC-1Os built. and is the largest operatorof both the DC-8 and the DC-10.

In all. United has operated more than 150 DC jetliners.

The 2000th Douglas jetliner also is the first new aircraft built for use in the US Air Force's civil reserve air fleet. The DC10CF, a convertible freighter model capable of being changed from passenger to cargo operations, can be used by the Air Force to carry military supplies during a national emergency.

Brizendine told the audience that the DC jet fleet has carried more than 2500 million passengers - equivalent to more than half the population of the earth - and has travelled a total distance of more than 22 OOO million miles.

He said the DC-8 was one of the most rugged aircraft ever built, noting that one DC-8 has logged more than 80 OOOhours of block time. The DC-8 fleet has compiled more than 23 million flight hours for nearly 200 operators. A total of 556 DC-8s were produced before production ended in 1972.

The tradition of ruggedness continues into the DC-9 program. Brizendine said. noting that the twin-jet saved the local service airline industry by providing easy maintenance and outstanding reliability.

Only one DC-9 has been voluntarily retired from airline service. and that one was purchased by Douglas for testing of long-term reliability. Now being produced in its sixth version. the Super 80. the DC-9 has accounted for more than 1060 of the 2000 jet transports delivered.

The DC-10 tri-jet gave airlines greater passenger capacity. quieter operation and improved performance efficiency when it went into service in 1971. Brizendine said that it too had grown. from a transcontinental aircraft into an intercontinental aircraft with a range of more than 6000 miles.

Using space-age technology. the DC1Q became the most modern of the widecabin aircraft. · Pilots will tell you today. the DC-1 0 cockpit is the standard of the industry.· Brizendine said.

The more than 370 DC-10 aircraft have flown more than 7 million hours. including a million hours by United's fleet. It is the most widely used wide-cabin airliner in the United States. and is flown by more than 4 7 operators around the world.

Brizendine said each of the commercial DC-jetliner models have put on uniforms.

The DC-8 is used by several foreign Air Forces. while the DC-9 is being used by the United States Air Force. Navy and Marines as transports designated the C-9.

The DC-10 has evolved into the KC-10. the Air Force· s newest aircraft. Brizendine said the KC-10 advanced tanker I cargo aircraft 'is multiplying many-fold Air Force capability to support world-wide deployment of troops and equipment from the continental United States.'

Two of the 2000 jet transports were military prototypes. the YC-15s. The technology proven on those airplanes in the late 1970's was used in the successful proposal for the C-1 7 transport to the Air Force and is now in a research and development program at Long Beach.

The ceremony for the 2000th jet transport delivery came within a week of

',.

·-

---Ar I/IIIE the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the Douglas Commercial. or 'DC'. line.

The contract for development of the DC-1 was signed in September. 1932.

Brizendine concluded his remarks by saying that, despite the current uncertainties in the industry. McDonnell Douglas and its employees will 'continue to produce the finest aircraft in the world'. and invited the audience to ·return to this place when we convene the McDonnell Douglas clan again for the delivery of the 4000th jet transport.·

Same Prices Douglas Aircraft Company has notified its customers there was no increase in its spare parts catalogue prices for its family of DC-8. DC-9 and DC-1 0 jetliners in 1982. According to E. F. Dubil. vicepresident of Product Support. the freeze was adopted to assist customers during this current period of declining airline revenues.

'We have taken this action in a sincere endeavour to help our valued airline customers control their material costs during these difficult times.' Dubil said.

'This price extension is our way of saying we value your business and understand the effect on your business of high costs and diminished revenues.· he added in a letter to operators.

Current industry practice has been to adjust prices yearly to compensate for inflation and other factors. Douglas parts

sales average between $ 200 million $300 million annually. The company delivered more than 1950 jetliners more than 1 5 500 transports since famous Douglas Commercial was launched in 1932.

·oc·-

and has and the line

New Orders Aero Lloyd. the West German charter airline. has announced the purchase of three McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Series 30 jetliners for service between Germany and Mediterranean resort locations.

The DC-9s have been reconfigured to Aero Lloyd specifications following service with another airline. They carry 119 passengers in seats as wide as those now used in wide-cabin jetliners. The DC-9 is the world's most popular twin-jet. with more than 1OOO aircraft delivered since the aircraft first entered service in 1965.

Along with improved comfort and seating capacity. Aero Lloyd will be getting greater reliability with the DC-9. The twinjet has set reliability records since its introduction with 99 per cent of all flights leaving without mechanical delays.

The DC-9s began service last week for Aero Lloyd. which flies its charters for a number of leading German tour companies contracted by Air Charter Market. The Aero Lloyd DC-9s are the first to fly under German registry since 1972, although many other European Airlines serve Germany with DC-9s on flights each day.

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ICAO Visual Flight Operations Panel (VFOP)

by D. Martin *

The Air Navigation Commission on 3rd April 1980 agreed to establish a panel of experts to be known as the Visual Flight Rules Operations Panel to undertake a review of the concepts. rules and practices pertaining to visual flight.

A preliminary study by the secretariat of ICAO with a study group confirmed that many of the current provisions relating to visual flights are in need of review. and that such a review should entail an examination of basic and fundamental proposals relating to VFR flight.

Following the report of the study group the ANC concluded that the depth and complexity of the review was such that it could only be dealt with adequately by a panel of experts constituted for that purpose. IFATCA was invited to nominate a member of the panel. as were IFALPA. IATA. IAOPA. FAI and eleven member states.

The first meeting of the panel was held in Montreal in August 1981.

During this meeting the panel attempted to assess th~ depth of its task and decided upon its future work.

Further meetings are envisaged. the next being in early 1983.

Agenda During the first meeting the panel considered an agenda consisting of six items: Agenda Item 1 . 1 . Preliminary review of current and intended practices concerning VFR airspaces and associated matters.

Agenda Item 1.2. P~eliminaryreview of visual flight and flight under VFR. Agenda Item 1.3. Preliminary review of types of traffic _and p~rformance characteristics of aircraft rn VFR and VFR/IFR environments.

Agen·da Item 1.4. ~r~liminary review of the ·see and avoid concept.

Agenda Item 1.5. Preliminary review of the effectiveness of complementary

• D. Martin of the UK Guild represents /FA TCA at the /CAO VFO Panel. The article is based on his paper to the 21 st Annual Conference of /FA TCA.

ground-based or airborne collision avoidance information.

Agenda Item 2. Future work.

Agenda item 1 . 1 .

The panel had before it information on VFR and airspace structure from several sources. not least the information provided by I FATCA Member Associations in response to the questionnaire issued by SC I during 1980.

It was apparent from a study of this material that changes to the provisions for airspace structure contained in the relevant ICAO documents may be necessary. since several states were introducing new types of airspace to accommodate IFR and VFR traffic. Additionally several states had introduced new types of air traffic services to VFR aircraft designed to enhance the safety of aircraft operating under both the visual and instrument flight rules.

The panel examined the airspace structure of the United Kingdom and the recently introduced airspace structure in Canada. The French trial of an extended Flight Information Service in the Toulouse FIR was discussed. and the panel noted that it had been considered by the French authorities to have been successful enough to warrant the establishment of a permanent service in two areas.

The panel agreed that there was a real need in several states for an additional service to VFR flights in the form of an increased traffic information service. although there were dangers that pilots might become complacent and not maintain a constant lookout. or might think that they were being provided with a separation service.

As well as the French trial already referred to. the panel was informed of the United Kingdom Lower Airspace Radar Service and the services provided to VFR flights in the USSR. The panel then considered the problems of integrating civil VFR flights with military low level flights.

Two different practical solutions were made known to the panel; the Civil Aircraft Notification Procedure (CANP) in the United Kingdom, and

the Special Use Airspace areas in the USA. The panel noted the large number of differences to the provisions in Annex 2 relating to the general and visual flight rules which have been notified to ICAO. Apart from changes already referred to. there is little evidence to show that states are contemplating other changes to the visual flight rules in future. However. it is apparent that in some areas of the world there is considerable support for flight under VFR at night and it is thought that the present provisions in Annex 2. while not prohibiting such operations. do not encourage them. The panel was unable to reach a consensus on the desirability of VFR flights at night. the members from IFALPA and IATA pointed out the difficulties of estimating distance from cloud. forward visibility. lack of horizon. etc .. while the members from IAOPA and FAI maintained that such objections were simply not found to be of any great moment in countries such as the USA and Canada which did permit VFR at night.

It was clear to the panel that the increased activity of helicopters. ultra light aircraft, hang gliders and possibly dirigibles, was such that consideration will have to be given to these operations as the panel's work proceeds.

The panel concluded that no further progress was possible on agenda item 1 _1 _Further studies were best carried out by one or more working groups in accordance with the following terms of reference: To examine the information supplied by member states to ICAO concerning airspaces and the type of air traffic services provided therein, and. if appropriate, to make general proposals to the panel concerning: a) a revised division of ATS airspace. b) the air traffic services provided in each airspace c) the equipment to be carried by aircraft operating in such airspace. d) pilot qualifications for flight in portions of each airspace. e) provisions concerning VFR flight by night f) the table of cruising levels contained in Annex 2, Appendix C.

Agenda item 'II.2.

As a consequence of its work on Agenda Item 1 . 1 , the panel was very much aware of the problems associated with visual flight and flight under VFR. They included indications that there was not worldwide standardization on the terms and procedures associated with 'visual approach', 'visual flight.· 'proceed visu-

29

ally', 'visual contact' and 'contact', all of which were used to describe various forms of flight under VFR. The panel thought that further study of the basic visual flight environments was necessary.

The provisions for night VFR were briefly reviewed under Agenda Item 1. 1. However, as this aspect of VFR flight was very contentious, it was discussed more fully under this agenda item. The panel had previously noted that while VFR flight at night was permitted, the relevant provisions were formulated in such a way that such flights were actually discouraged. The question was really one of principle- if VFR flights at night were unsafe, they should be prohibited. if they were safe then the ICAO provisions should be formulated in a positive rather than a negative manner.

The panel were of the opinion that the review of the visual flight rules showed that the rules were unduly complicated and difficult for a pilot to remember. They should therefore be simplified and precise measurements of distance avoided if possible, as these were difficult, under some conditions, to assess.

The work done in the Visual Flight Rules Group of the European Air Navigation Planning Group was noted. but the panel felt that in some respects its specifications complicated rather than simplified the provisions for VFR flight.

The panel considered that further work was required on all matters raised under Agenda Item 1.2 .. and that this work could be best carried out by a working group with the following terms of reference: a) What are the basic reasons for establishing VFR rules? b) What factors are involved in formulating visual flight rules minimum flight conditions? c) Examine aspects of flight visibility. d) Should the establishment of visual flight rules be related to a predetermined safety level? e) Sh_ouldthe rules be expressed in narrative or tabular form? f) Is one visibility value for visual flight rules desirable and practicable? g) Review implications of 路 clear of cloud and in sight of the surface路 in relation to requirements for 'flight visibility'. h) Should visual flight rules be related to pilot qualifications and/ or experience? i) Is there a requirement to develop guidance material to assist pilots in judging visibility values and the associated _ pilot tasks and respons1b1'1t1es in operations in accordance with visual flight rules?

30

j) Develop proposals on VMC clearances. visual approaches. etc. k) Examine the merits of 路 contact approaches路 and any other form of approach not currently in ICAO documents and determine whether they should be accommodated.

I) Examine any additional items arising and determine if they should be referred to the panel.

Agenda Item 1.3.

The panel examined the types of traffic and performance characteristics of aircraft in VFR and IFR environments. and found that these covered almost the whole range of aircraft types flying. The main area of concern arose from the activities of military aircraft and their impact on civil VFR flights. and the need to ensure that high performance civil traffic operating in the lower airspace did so at a speed which would permit the application of the 'see and avoid' concept of collision avoidance, bearing in mind that the majority of VFR traffic operated in that airspace.

Again. the panel felt that further work was best carried out by a working group with the following terms of reference: a) Determine if the wide range of performance characteristics warrants consideration of different minima, giving special consideration to helicopter operations. b) Determine if the figure of 250 knots indicated air speed which is widely accepted as a reasonable speed restriction for mixed IFR/VFR traffic is justified and can be supported by scientific evidence. c) Provide answers, including the rationale for arriving at them to the following (i) is the idea of a single speed limit logical? (ii) should there be several speed limits, varying with the circumstances? (iii) if several speed limits are recommended, describe the circumstances under which they should be applied. (iv) should visibility requirements vary with the speed of aeroplanes and helicopters? (v) is a speed limit necessary in an airspace where all aircraft are subject to control? d) Any other aspects relating to aircraft type which should be considered.

Agenda Item 1 .4.

The panel recognized that the 'see and avoid' method of collision avoid-

ance was not the preferred method under certain circumstances, i.e. inside controlled airspace, although under present ICAO provisions it was the primary method. Alternative methods frequently involve additional costs to the pilot and are therefore not suited to the vast majority of pilots flying unsophisticated aircraft in VMC. The panel considered the material provided to it concerning pilot workload, aircraft and cockpit design, and the psychological and physiological problems of perception. Material relating to the conspicuity of aircraft was also discussed. From this material the panel concluded that study was required to define the categories of users of the 'see and avoid' concept and the various alternatives and circumstances under which the 'see and avoid' concept should be applied. The panel also noted that the purpose of a flight and the kind of air traffic services provided had a bearing on the validity of the 'see and avoid' concept as the primary means of collision avoidance.

The terms of reference for the working group were: a) From the results of studies available, determine: (i) what role the 'see and avoid' concept should play in each type of airspace; (ii) what means can be adopted to improve aircraft conspicuity.

Agenda Item 1.5.

The panel limited its review of the effectiveness of ground based or airborne collison avoidance information to an exchange of views on the various systems currently under development in several states and the effect these would have on the various ICAO provisions dealing with VFR and IFR flight. It concluded that these systems appeared to offer significant improvements in flight safety in the future and that further study should be carried out. To this end the panel directed a working group to carry out a study of the effectiveness of these systems.

Agenda Item 2.

The panel agreed that further progress could best be made by the formation of working groups which would develop specific proposals for the amendment of ICAO documents. The panel therefore formed two groups, Group A to cover Agenda Items 1. 1, 1 .4 and 1 .5, Group 8 to cover items 1.1. 1.2 and 1.3. Item 1.1 was included in both work programs because of its scope and importance.

The IFATCA nominee to the panel serves on Working Group A.

Book Review

Yet this book is not only the story of that crash, it is a statement about an imperfect system devised by and for human beings: and for the case that its improvement shou ld rest on the honest admission of deficiency rather than on the ritual sacrifice of whoever stands in the glare of a massive technological failure.

The Authors Richard C. W . Weston is an honorary member of both the Guild of Air Traffic Controllers and the Canadian Air Traffic Control Associa tion . a member of the Flight Safety Foundation and a Council Member of the Association of British Aviation Consultants. He is also an English solicitor .

Ronald Hurst is an Associate Member of the Royal Aeronautical Society. His extensive background in aviation has included wartime flying with the Royal Air Force and many years of design work on civil and military aircraft projects . Since 197 5 he has served with an international aviation administration. His specia l interest in the human problems of the air transport indust ry led him to initiate two stimulating studie s of this subject - · Pilot Error: A Professional Study of Contributory Factors,' published 197 6 now out of print and (w ith his son. Leslie R. Hurst)' Pilot Error: The Human Factors ,' published in 1982.

Special Features Subject of book networked on Granada Television February 1979 . Received international publicity. Focuses on the problems of air traffic control. Price: £8.95

RICHARD WESTON & RGNALD HURST FOREWORD

BY SIRPETER MASEFIELD

Pilot Error: The Human Factors Edited by Ronald and Leslie Hurst . Foreword by Brian E. Trubshaw.

Zagreb One Four: Cleared to Collide?

An examination of the world's worst mid-air collision over Zagreb

by Richard C. W . Weston and Ronald Hurst Synopsis The wor ld 's worst mid-air collision occurred over the Zagreb beacon on September 10th 1976 and in the aftermath, eight air traffic controllers were arraigned on charges of criminal neglect.

All but one were acquitted: t hat individual was sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment.

Thi s book deals with those events, with the effect of that judgement on the safety of international aviation and with the moral and practical cha llenge s which soc iety faces as a result. In these pages the reader is asked to make his or her own judgement: first , as to the nature and extent of the alleged crimes and second ly, as to what ends have been usefully served by the institution of criminal proceedings and the legal destruction of a single person. In making these evaluations the reader w ill fol low the development of the disaster from three sources : the respect ive flight decks of the British Trident and the Yugoslav DC-9 aircraft and the contro llers· conso les of the Zagreb Regional Flight Control Center. In each of these situations men performed their tasks and responded to extern al pressures in accordance with their own personalities: and some of these happenings coa lesced at length to determine the fatal outcome.

It is a grim axiom of the aviation community that the pilo t is the first person to arrive at the scene of an air accident . The fac t that subsequent enquiries lay the responsibility for more than 55 % of these accidents squarely on the shoulders of these rigorously selected, highly trained and dedicated men - usual ly dead - is bitterly resented by their colleagues .

They argue that ·pilot error' often repre sents a dubious verdict which masks the true cause of the accident; a label sometimes amounting to victimisation and one which, in man y cases , is later overturned.

Thi s book deals with many spectacular plane crashes in which the human faqor is prominent . But it is far from a catalogue of disasters. Rather than scapegoats, the authors seek answers- to the problem of· contro lled fligh t into terrain ', to the deficienc ies of cockpit design , to the malfunction of automated systems, to such neglected factors in aviation training as the way the eye judges shapes. sizes and distances .

Vital Subjects In ten engrossing chapters these vital subject s are examined by one of the most distingui shed teams of experts ever assembled - flyers. scientists. psychologists . researchers ... from such for midable backgrounds as The International Federat ion of Airlin e Pilots ' Associations , The Guild of Air Traffic Contro llers. The Aviation Research Laboratory , NASA, and the Army Air Corps Ac c ident and Simu lation Researc h Team .

Gripping Atmosphere The boo k begins with the pilot's view ; ana lyzes t he elements of pilot cu lpabi lity; looks at crew fitness and behaviour ; discusses work loads and fatigue , multiple take-off and landings ... and proceeds , not in a blind-you-with-s c ience style but und erstandab ly, readab ly ; so that as you turn the fasc inat ing pages you are gripped by the whole atmosphere of professional flying and beg in to understand a great deal more about aeroplanes . the pilot's job . the st resses and st rains to which he is subject and t he unexpected predicaments he has t o deal w ith . often in an instant.

Objective . deeply professional . but , above all , projecting a common -sense approach . Pilot Error invites you to join the co nt inuing discussion on a problem which involves us all. as passen ger air traffic co ntinues to expand . Price £8.95

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From Farnborough '82

The A320 the 150-Seater of the Future Sensit ivity to market demand is an essential element in commercial success, particularly in civil aviation. It was this attrib ute which led to Airbus lndustrie's introduction of the 'twin-aisle-twin' and gained Europe a ten-year lead over competitors who had neglected the gap in the market.

Today the market's most immediate need is a replacement for the large fleets of two and three-engined, single-aisle, short to medium range aircraft. These aircraft were built with 1960 ' s technology , before the industry was forced to become acutely conscio us of either fuel consumption or noise levels. Thus the replacement of t hese aircraft in an environment dominated by fuel consumption statistics and soon to be curtailed by noise regulations is the industry's most pressing need-there is an estimated demand for about 3 .600 of such aircraft between now and the end of the century - and once again Airbus lndustrie's response has been the swiftest.

Airbus lndustrie 's solution is the A320. an advanced technology, single-aisle aircraft now under development which will provi de user airlines w ith co nsiderably lower fuel co nsumption and seat-mile costs tha n any other comparable aircraft in existence or on offer.

The short to medium range A320 will seat 1 50 passenge rs in a typical mixed

class configuration of twelve seats - fourabreast with 36 in pitch in first class and 138 - six-abreast at 32 in pitch in economy. Alternative lay-outs could feature 156 seats with 24 six-abreast at 36 in pitch in business class and 132 at 32in in economy or up to 179 in a single class high-density 30 in pitch configuration .

The A320 will be powered by two underwing-mounted engines in the 25,000 lb ( 11 .3 tonnes) thrust category and will come in two versions. The lighter version, the A320-100. will have a ma ximum take-off weight of 66 .9 tonnes/ 147 ,500 lbs and a range of 1,600 NM/ 2.950 km carrying a load of 162 passengers . With the addition of center tankage, the A320-200 (MTOW 71.9 tonnes/ 158 ,500 lbs) will have a range of 2,400 NM / 4,450 km with 162 passengers on board.

A 'Wide' Narrow Body The all-new A320 design meets both present and future passenger and freight requirements. The fuselage cross section is significantly larger than those of existing narrow-body aircraft - with a width of 155 .5 in/3.95 m , 7 .5in/ 19 cm wider than the narrow bodies most widely used today for instance . As a result wider - 62 in / 1 . 5 7 5 m - triple seats can be fitted to provide more passenger comfort. Alternatively with standard 59 .5 in triple seats. the aircraft has 24 in-wide aisle, making in-

flight service much easier and enabling faster turnarounds since boarding and leaving the aircraft can be done more quickly . Five-abreast business class seating would provide a similar standard of comfort to that offered as first class on DC9s and 8767s .

The 2 .0 cu .ft overhead stowage space is greater than that available on similarly sized existing aircraft and provides unrivalled carry-on luggage space . Improved seat design and positioning of the seat rails increases the extra space available under the seats .

The double -bubble form fuselage cross section is 163 in/ 4 . 14 m deep providing increased freight volume and working height as well as the ability to carry containers derived from the standard interline LD3 containers . As the base of these new containers is the same as that of the LD3, all existing wide body aircraft and ground handling equipment can accept them without modifications allowing them to be handled and interlined just like standard LD3's. Thus Airbus lndustrie's successful formula of interline cargo compatibility will be extended to another sector of the market.

New Design and Technology for Greater Fuel Efficiency The A320 has an overall fuselage length of 126 ft 1 in/ 38 .43 m and a span of 113 ft 6 in/34.59 m . The wing design will incorporate up-to-the-minute technology and build on the experience of the outstanding A310 wing. Featuring the most advanced systems and equipment, the A320 will be certificated for two-man crew operation and category lllb allweather landings . Where cost effective, and particularly on the flight-deck . it will have much in common with other Airbus lndustrie aircraft and the wide use of composite materials stemming from A300 and A310 experience will allow a lower structural weight for a given payload.

The A320 will require only half the fuel used per seat by today¡ s narrow-body trijets and more than 20 percent less than the narrow-body tw injets on a 500 NM/ 9 2 5 km flight, representing annual fuel savings per aircraft of up to two million dollars at today ¡s fuel prices . Its direct

AIIGCP 9182-5L Airbus lndustrie A320 32

in the early 1990's. The consortium foreoperating costs will be some 25 percent sees total demand for more than 3 .000 lower per seat than those of the tri-jets and up to 1 6 percent lower than those of the short to medium range wide-body aircraft through to the end of the century and beother twins.

Available from late 1986. the A320 lieves that when the market wants inwill be a truly economic replacement for . creased capacity . the TA9 will be seen to the obsolete , fuel thirsty . narrow-bodied offer unbeatable seat-mile costs . aircraft now in service and an attractive alternative to the short-term solutions provided by derivative updates of yesterday ·s technology.

The TA11 and TA12 Airbus lndustrie is also working on a medium-long and a long range 220- seat aircraft - the TA 12 and the TA 11 - to The TA9 would be a natural develop - provide direct connections over distances ment of the A300 . Its fuselage will be between 5 ,000 NM (9 ,200 km) and stretched by some 8 .48 m (27 ft 9 in) to 6 .830 NM (12 .650 km). give a further 29 percent seating capacity , The TA 12 and TA 11 are respecti vely capable of accommodating 326 mixed- two and four-engined derivatives of the class passengers or. 344 all _tourist and A300 and the A31 0 . They retain the 4 1O in a high density conf1gurat1on optimized fuselage cross-section providing rather more than the current wide-body trieight-abreast seating in economy and sixj~s . . . abreast in first class with cargo holds As a twin engined aircraft . its fuel ef- accommodating up to 1 7 standard interficiency and economics will be markedly line containers and / or pallettes . superior to today ' s tri-jets : the TA9 will Both aircraft will use the A31 0 fuselage consume up to 22 percent less fuel per with a new center section and . in common seat and its direct operating costs will be with the TA9. a new. larger span .

1 5 percent lower . advanced wing enabling them to take the The TA9 will have the same fuselage additional fuel necessary on longer range cross-section as the A300 and the A310 . operations . The TA 12 will be powered by allow ing comfortable eight-abreast seat- two engine s in the 62,000 lb / 28 tonnes ing with two aisles. no passenger more thrust category while the TA 11 ·s four than one seat away from an aisle and engines will be in the 30 .000 to genuine first class a_nd business class 34.000 lb / 13 to 14 tonnes category . comfort with respective six-abreast and Both will have a great deal in common seven-abreast seating . Cargo capacity will w ith the A300-600 . the A31 0 and the be increased with the forward com_part- A320 and benefit from the experience ment taking 16 standard LD3 containers gained with these aircraft . They w ill feature (two- abreast) or five pallettes . and the aft the late st technologcal advanc es in aeroompartment s 14 LD3s or four pallette s. dynamics. compo site materi als. systems ~his adds up to a strik_ingly better cargo and avionics giving them significant ly capa c ity th an today's wide bodies- nearly lower fuel consumption . operating and tw ice as much as current trI-Jet s and 1 8 maintenance co st s then curr ent long percent . more than a B 7 4 7 using LD3 range aircraft . For instance . the TA 12 's containers. . seat-mile cost s will be some 24 percent The TA9 will have a new and bigger less than those of toda y's t ri-jets and up to wing to enable _it to fly longer range full 35 percent less than those of the payload operations than _the A300B4 - 874 7SP .

200 . Two versions of the a1rcraft_are und er The TA 12 is designed for medium t o consideration: a shorter range aircraft op- long-rang e routes not affected by overtimized for about 1.500 _NM / 2. 780 _km. water regulations - for example Londonnd a medium range version for operation s Colombo . Frankfurt-Bangko k. the M iddl e ~f up to 3 .300 NM / 6 . 110 km which East to Japan and Sout h Am erica to th e could fly a full load of passengers out of USA . The init ial TA 11 w ill be able to f ly Denver to New York . . . distan ces of 6 .000 NM ( 11 .OOO km) wit h It will have an advanced flight deck w ith development inc reasing the airc raft's the most up-to-date d1sp_lay and managerange to nearly 7 .000 NM / 12 .600 km. ment tec hnolog y. fully d1g1talaircraft sys- Typical rout es w ould be Paris-Lo s A nt ems. a flight management comput _er and geles . Tokyo-Me xico or Sydney-S an a new. quieter and lighter APU prov1d1nga Francisco . Becau se of the current better specific fuel consumption . depre ssed state of the airline indust ry and the glut of long-range tri-j ets on the second Exten sive use w ill be ma_de of composite and impro ved metalli c materi als hand market. t he emerg ence of a strong market for the TA 12 and t he TA 11 has arising from research and development program s now under way at Airbu s lndu s- been pushed back to th e early 19 90 's. At th at tim e Airbu s lndu strie w ill be able t o trie and its partner companies . Developme nts of present engines from General offer - in the TA 11 - a replacement for obsolescent . narrow -bod ied. four engined Elect ric. Pratt and Whitn ey or Rolls Royce airc raft and t oday· s long range w ide-body w ill powe r the TA9 . providing 1_ncreased t ri-jet s and fou r-jets w hich cannot be thru st and bett er fuel consumpt ion repl aced by t he A3 008 4 and t he A3 10 .

Ai rbus lndus t rie sees a mar ket for the TA9 . as a short t o medium-r anQe replace- w hile th e TA 12 w ill be an extreme ly econment for today·s w ide-body t n-Jet s. open- omic propos it ion for non-tra nsoceanic. medi um to long-range routes. ing up towa rds t he end of thi s decade and

The TA9

AI/GCP 9 1 82 -6L Airbus lndustr ie 's future produc t lin e: the TA9. the TA 11 and the TA 12

Internationa l Se mi na r 1 9 82 Euro c ontrol (the Eur opean Organisation fo r the Safet y of Ai r Navigation) organized fr o m 26th t o 2_8 th O ctober 1982 at it s Inst it ut e of Ai r Nav 1gat1on Se rv ic es in Lu xembourg an Internation al Semi nar on ' Contr ibutions by Air Traffi c Co ntro l to Fuel Saving in Air Tr a nsport .· Th e M ini ster of Tra nsport . Energy an d Env iro nment of t he Grand-Duchy of Lu xem bo urg . M r. J. Barthel . who is al so Presiden t of t he Eurocontrol Perm a nent Co m miss io n fo r 1 982 . acc ept ed honorary chairmanship and del iver ed th e op en ing speech .

Th is se m inar was one of a series of hi gh ly success f ul internat ional seminars which t he Eurocontro l l nst 1tute In Lu xe mbou rg has organ ized annual ly si nce 197 2 as one of t he h ighlights of it s program of internat ional training se rv ices prov ided to world aviation spec ialists.

The 1982 Sem inar treated questio ns of extreme top icality and interest to all aviation c ircles.

Mo re than 20 speakers from the international air t ransport world . the ai r traffic services organ izations of many countries. including research and experimentation units . and of Eurocontrol exchanged the results of their studies and approaches to the problem of how to economize in f light operations.

33

Detecting Automated

Sources of Noise

Noise Measuring

Station

Mobile measuring equipment-weatherproof cycles - hourly calibration

With the automated microcompu ter-controlled noise measuring stat ion from Siemens, the various sound levels generated simultan eousl y at one location can be processed into an integrated measured value and evaluated - even if they originate from different sources of noise . Single sound events are recorded by the measuring equip-

Using a Microcomputer

design -three-minute

measuring

ment, in addition to continuous noise.

Furthermore, meteorological measured values such as wind direction, windspeed and rainfall are also recorded . The measured values are cyclically scanned and classified. The microcomputer also calculates the average and cumulative frequency levels of the last measuring cycle . All measurement results are stored together with date and time .

Noise often consists of different sounds which are generated at various locations . With emmission noise measurements, therefore, it is difficult to record in one measured value the levels of different sounds which simultaneously affect one location .

With the noise measuring station marketed by Siemens, the required measuring range is automatically adapted to the noise level to be measured . In addition, the sound level meter is cyclically checked by means of a calibration unit, during continuous measurements. The measured wind data are also grouped into corresponding time averages and classified.

An additional rain measurement is taken to establish whether the sounds of rain contribute to the overall noise level.

The sensors for wind direction , windspeed and rainfall are mounted on a mast of aproximately 10 meters

Microcomputer-controlled noise measuring station from Siemens, with which various sound levels, which occur simultaneously at one location, can be processed into an integrated measured value and evaluated- even if they originate from different noise sources. All measurement results are stored together with date and time.

Siemens Press Photograph

34

in height, together with the weatherproof microphone for recording the noise . All other units and additional equipment, such as amplifier, weighting filter and RMS detector for the sound measurement, microcomputer with floppy-disc drive or magnetic-tape cassette recorder and radio clock are installed in a mobile, weatherproof instrument cabinet . . All measurement results are logged with respect to time. The date and time are derived from the clock generator of the microcomputer, after entering the starting time. Since the radio clo~k receives the time signals from radio transmitter DCF77 the time can be updated for starti~g or restarting after a temporary power failure, at all times.

Each _measu_rement begins with an automatic calibration . A reference sign~I of 1OOO Hz and 90 dB is injected via the microphone for one minute and classified over the range 88 to 9 2 dB at a bandwidth of 1 dB. The result of this classification is stored as additional information for the measurement results . During continuous measurements calibration takes place at hourly intervals.

A measuring cycle lasts three minutes ; during this period the instanta~eous values of the sound level, the raindrop pulses of the rain meter and the status signals are scanned at a clock rate of 100 ms. The clock rate for recording wind direction and speed is_ 1 -~ s. A ~ew measuring cycle begins 1mmed1ately after the previous cycle has been completed. Whilst the instantaneous values of the next measuring cycle are being recorded, the microcomputer calculates the average and cumulative frequency levels from the classified contents of the previous measuring cycle.

The noise measuring station is of modular design which is so flexible as to allow equipping with the various instruments. The station can be directly connected to the 2 20 V AC line or can be_ operated_ independently at 24 V using batteries . The buffer batteries are arranged so that power failures of up to 24-hours can be tolerated .

The computed results of the individual measuring cycles are grouped hourly into data blocks, including the relevant meteorological measurement results and identification of the measuring range, and stored on magnetic-tape cassettes or diskettes (flexible magnetic discs) . A data block also contains the station identification , classification of the calibration signal as well as date and time. This allows the clearly determined measured values to be evaluated later in detail or in batches.

Philips from page 12 onto the floppy disc. Each disc has a capacity of about 200 AFTN messages. Once a disc is full. or when all messages have been copied, an index is automatically generated.

A feature of special importance is the unattended mode facility.

The Permanent Commission of Eurocontrol. the European Organisation for the Although the system is designed for Safety of Air Navigation held its 60th session in Brussels on 29 June 1 982. The operation under supervisory control. it session was presided over by Mr. Josy Barthel. Minister of Transport of the can also be left unattended and will Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. automatically deliver correctly addressed messages. Messages requiring supervisory attention can be either queued in the system or forwarded to another subscriber, as necessary.

Of particular interest to Airline Operating Centers is the system's The Permanent Commission took try into force of the protocol. after its' application to ATA/ IATA message ratification. would now be 1 st July note of the progress which had been 1983. In this connection the Perma- handling as a separate capability. An made by the Agency in respect of the installation of a Central Data Bank nent Commission adopted various interface to the ATA/IATA network (COB) of air traffic demand which is measures enabling the organization to can be supported via a bundle of up to being developed for air traffic flow provide certain support services for eight circuits.

Up to as many as eight Philips (sermanagement purposes. The COB is the Karlsruhe Upper Area Control ies 5002 / 5003) word processors expected to enter its operational Center following the assumption of phase in the autumn of next year. A responsibility for the Center by the can be connected via synchronous medium-speed circuits (2400 bps)-a number of European States. not Federal Republic of Germany. feature of particular interest for briefmembers of Eurocontrol. are particiThe Permanent Commission. in its ing offices, especially for the Notam pating in this activity. consideration of the Maastricht The ministers. acting in their dual extension feasibility study. which had office. Notams received can be storcapacity as members of the Perma- been prepared by the Agency¡ s Gen- ed. subsequently amended and then nent Commission and national eral Directorate. took note of the distributed as pre-flight bulletins. In authorities responsible for the ad- progresss made by the four States addition. the facility can generate plural Notams. ministration of the system of charges directly concerned with the operation A fall-back switch can be supplied. on airspace users for the use of en of the Center (Federal Republic of route facilities. adopted revised prin- Germany. Belgium. Luxembourg, the providing direct connection for four ciples for establishing the cost-base Netherlands) in their studies on the teleprinters to the four bundled cirfor route facility charges and calcu- future role of the Maastricht Upper cuits that connect the subcenter to Area Control Center (UAC) and noted the AFTN switch in the unlikely event lation of the unit rate. of the subcenter going out of service.

The ministers further decided. in the aim of these States to put forward TheAEROPPO has been developed view of the recent parity changes. to specific proposals on this matter at amend as at 1 October 1 982 the unit their next session.

by Philips to complement the existing AEROPP line of hardware and softrates in force by reference to the ware packages. and thus to provide a average exchange rates between full range of aeronautical communi1 January and 30 June 1982. cations services aimed at the specific The ministers also decided that. needs of both large and small users. with effect from 1st January 1984.

The AEROPP O system. based on the date of the commencement of the Alan S. Boyd New Chairman tried and proved MARC microproannual charging period would be of AINA cessor technology (which has already changedfrom 1stAprilto 1stJanuary.

Airbus lndustrie of North America The Permanent Commission. in the (AINA) announced that Alan S. Boyd found extensive application in the light of the provisions of the protocol became its new Chairman and Presi- AEROPP I and II systems). has been carefully designed with precisely this amending the Eurocontrol Inter- dent starting August 1 1982. Mr. national Convention of 1960. which Boyd, aged 59. was the first US consideration in mind.

AEROPP 0. as all AEROPP syswas signed on 12 February 1981.

Secretary of Transportation. He was agreed on practical arrangements to Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics tems. is not simply an adapted general-purpose computer; it is a combe made for consultation with air- Board. He led American negotiating space users in the formulati~n of long teams working on interriational air puterized facility specifically created term objectives and medium term services agreements. Since 1978 he to fulfil the specific functional requireplans in obtaining maximum efficiency had been Chairman and President of ments of the user and also provides a in the provision of air traffic services.

National Railways Passenger Corpor- basis for expansion into AERO PP I or II or elaboration into extended MARC The Permanent Commission took ation AMTRAK. systems currently in development. stock of the present ,position of the AINA is a wholly-owned subsidiary As a number of air traffic centers progress being made by the Member of Airbus lndustrie. responsible for throughout the world are discovering.

States in the ratification of the proto- stimulating interest in. and promoting col amending the Eurocontrol Con- the products of Airbus lndustrie in the it is this kind of virtually unlimited flexibility that makes investing in vention. Whilst expressing the hope North American market.

Philips telecommunications systems that the necessary procedures will be such a sound investment for the fucompleted as soon as possible. reture. cognized that the probable date of en-

60th Session of the Eurocontrol Permanent Commission of Ministers

35

Accident Review 1980Canada (From the Aviation Safety Letter, 5/82)

An aircraft accident is investigated and analyzed in an attempt to prevent recurrences - not for assigning blame. Hence, the investigator describes all_the factors which contributed to an accident. From the analysis of this information, the investigator works towards de_fi~ing t~e safety deficiencies (a safety def1c1ency Is a co_ndition or circumstance having the potential to induce an aircraft accident) which induced the accident. Often it is not possible to precisely deduce a safety deficiency or its severity from one occurrence. D_etaile? computer records of past accident In':'estIgations enable new insights to be ga!n_e_d.

In 1976, changes achieved compat1b1_l1ty with other countries under data-sharing guidelines established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) of the United Nations.

The aviation statistics center (Statistics Canada) collects supplementary details such as hours flown - the information used to produce 'rate' data which appears in this publication. (A 'rate' more _accurately shows trend data, e.g., accidents may diminish simply as a consequence of an overall reduction in flying hours.)

In 1980 there were 683 accidents to Canadian registered aircraft, a decrease of 42 from 1979. Similarly, the 75 fatal accidents in 1980 were 23 fewer than In 1979. These were the lowest numbers since 1974. Noteworthy was the decline in fatalities: 14 7 vs 24 7 in 1979 - the lowest since 1969.

Canada's civil aviation accident record continued to improve in 1 980. Chart 1 shows the trends in the number of Canadian aircraft vs accidents. Since then, the accident trend was only slightly upwards, interrupted by decreases in 1974, 1977 and 1980.

Total flying hours continued to grow through 1980 although this growth has been slower in the last 2-3 years(chart 2).

,....'

Specific Point. There were ten ac~idents in specific point - the same as in 1979, and one less than in 1978. One of the accidents killed six people. From 1976 -1980 there were nine fatal accidents with 51 fatalities. About 200 factors were assigned as contributing to these accidents in 1976-1980, the most frequent of which were: continued VFR flight into adverse weather did not see or avoid objects did not follow procedures. instructions. etc.

CompofllOn cl Canod.on

4 Numb., cl Auidtnh

,'o;,;;olt Au,deM1

=

36

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to lhoH Airum'I

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Charter-helicopter. The 21 accidents in 1980 were three fewer than 1979 but above the 1976-1980 average of 18.

The six fatal accidents in 1980 were half the total for 1976-1980.

18 people were killed.

Pilots who had accidents in 1980 had flown fewer total hours than those in 1976 -1979, e.g .. 20% of the accident pilots had flown less than 300 hours vs only 10% of the pilots who had accidents in 1976-1979.

Significantly. pilots who had accidents in 1980 had flown more hours in the previous 90 days than in other years. Almost 80% had flown over 1 20 hours in the previous 90 days. The remaining 20% had concentrated most of their flying in the previous 30 days.

The most frequent types of occurrence in 1976-1980: engine failure/ malfunction roll-over loss of control in flight dragged wing/rotor pod/float collision object/ other

IMO

Since the mid-1970's the activity among ATC licence classes has changed, e.g., scheduled flying in 1980 is_a smaller percentage than in 1974. Specialty training and recreation has also decreased, whereas charter flying, both in aeroplanes and helicopters - at 30+ % - is 5% more than in 1975. Aerial work, particularly in helicopters, has almost doubled its share since 1975.

Domestic and international scheduled services are provided by the two national and four regional air carriers. A second level of transportation - specific point- is offered on a regular or irregular basis on prescribed routes. The third level is charter flying, mostly under contract at a rat~ per mile or hour. About 25% of charter Is by helicopter. Not all activity under class 4 is for commercial transportation; some charters are more appropriately called aerial work, which is discussed elsewhere.

Scheduled. There was one acident in 1980 when a vehicle struck a B737.

There were no significant changes in 1980; engine failure/malfunction was most frequent in 1 980. Roll-over and loss of control in flight switched places in the top five after 19 7 9.

In 1980 the Machine factor was the sole contributor in 2 1 % of the accidents. compared to 12% in 1976-1979.

In 1 980 the most frequent pilot factors were continuing VFR into adverse weather and failing to see or avoid objects - both symptomatic of pressure to 'do the job'.

Charter-landplanes. There were 50 accidents in 1980, 17 more than in 1979 and 15 above the previous high in 1976.

On the other hand, there were four fatal accidents - a drop of three from 1979.

The 11 fatalities in 1980 were eight fewer than in 1979. and the lowest since 1976.

In 1980 accident pilots tended to be less experienced than in the previous four years. Accident pilots had flown less in the previous 90 days than in any year except 1978. The average age of accident pilots was two years lower than in 1979; 40% of the pilots were 2 5 or younger vs 2 5 % . The top five types of occurrence in 19761980: loss of control - ground/water engine failure/ malfunction overrun main gear collapsed loss of control in flight/ mush/ straight stall In 1980 the top two changed positions.

The top contributing factors in 19761980: inadequate preflight preparation or planning selected unsuitable takeoff. landing. taxiing area loss of directional control (takeoff. landing) inadequate maintenance/ inspection continuing VFR flight into adverse weather In 1980 maintenance/inspection was a factor in eight accidents- more than any other - whereas it contributed that many in the previous four years combined.

Charterlfloatplanes. The number of accidents has been increasing since 1 9 7 7, as has the fatal accidents. Accident pilots averaged more total hours than those in 1979, e.g., almost 40% had flown less than 700 hours in 1979 vs 20% in 1980. Over 80% of pilots had either flown over 1 20 hours in the previous 90 days or had concentrated up to 1 20 hours in the previous 30 days - a pattern similar to previous years. The average age of accident pilots is in a marked trend, e.g., in 1979 10% were 24 or younger, whereas that figure jumped to over half in 1980.

The top four types of occurrence in 1976-1980: engine failure/ malfunction overrun loss of control in flight/ spin dragged wing/float These four were the most frequent occurrences in 1980, except that the order of the first two was reversed.

The pilot factors which most frequently contributed to accidents in 1976-1980, were similar to those in 1 980: inadequate preflight preparation/ planning did not obtain/maintain flying speed selected unsuitable takeoff, landing. taxiing area incorrect inflight decision or planning continued VFR flight into adverse weather inadequate compensation for wind Charter-skiplanes. There were 1 2 accidents in 1980. a decrease of five from 1979. The number of accidents in 1980 was at the same level as in 1977 -1 978.

Most of the accidents in 1976 -1980 occurred in the Central and Quebec regions. Accident pilots h~d flown fewer total hours than in any previous year. e.g .. in 1 980 20% had flown 700 hours or less vs 12% in 1976- 1979.

The most frequent types of occurrence in 1976-1980: main gear collapsed loss of control - ground/water collision object/ snowbank Main gear collapse wa~ top by a wi~e margin - 30% of all accidents - but m 1980 it rocketed to 60%. The Man factors in 1976-1980: selected unsuitable takeoff. landing. taxiing area lost directional control inadequate maintenance I inspection The last factor was not among the top five in 1976-1979.

Aerial Work. This covers commercial aviation other than the tran_sportati_onof passengers and cargo. and instruction: aerial application, crop control fire control aerial survey aerial advertising aerial photography power or pipeline patrol construction (by rotorcraft) aerial ambulance Some aerial survey. patrol and construction is done by aircraft registered to private companies which are_not _otherwise involved commercially m avIatIon.

Accidents in these private operations have been included in this section.

Aerial Work - Aeroplanes. There were 22 accidents in 1980. 17 fewer than in 1979 - the lowest in any of the years 1976-1980.

There were four fatal accidents in 1980. down three from each of the years 1976-1979. The most frequent types of occurrence: - engine failure/malfunction - collision object/tree Engine failure/malfunction was top each year 1976-1980.

Collision object/ tree has been in the top five every year.

Loss of control in flight/ spin was second in 1976-1979butin 1980therewereno

accidents of this type. Every year, more accidents occurred to aircraft in crop control. ranging from 35% in 1976 to 61 % in 1978. Fire control accidents have been second highest every year, with an increasing percentage trend. See chart 3.

In 1980 a greater percentage of accident pilots had high total hours. That was matched by an increasing trend at the other end of the experience scale. The factors which most frequently contributed to accidents: inadequate preflight preparation/ planning did not obtain/maintain flying speed incorrect inflight decisions/ planning did not see or avoid objects

Crop Control

-----

41%.

Survey

• 5% Advertising

9%.

Fire Control

23% Ambulance·

• Photography

18%

4% Chart 3

Aerial Work - Helicopters. The 40 accidents in 1980 were more than in 1979. although there was no trend in 19761 980. The number of accidents per year ranged from a high of 49 in 1976 to a low of 29 in 1979. Similarly. there were no trends in fatalities. The top six types of occurrence: engine failure/malfunction loss of control in flight collision with objects roll-over collision with wire/pole collision with trees Engine failure/ malfunction was on top by a wide margin in four of the years 1 9 7 6 - 1980. Loss of control in flight was second and third each year. Collision with objects has not been in the top group before.

The most frequent accidents: lifting/ carrying slingload

normal cruise power-on landing vertical takeoff specific aerial work Lifting/ carrying slingload has been in the top five since 1977 with normal cruise second each year 1976-1980.

Power-on landing and vertical takeoff were among the top five in four of the five years. Worthy of note is the ironic fact that the aerial work itself is not the major hazard. Spraying. surveying. water bombing. etc .. although second in 1978 was not in the top five in 1976. 1977 or 1979.

The types of accidents have changed markedly over 1976-1980. e.g .. fire control increased from 3% in 1977. Aerial construction increased in 1977-1980 but aerial application dropped from 1015% in 1976-1978 to 2-3% in 19791980. Aerial survey dropped from 34% and 37% in 1978 and 1979 (chart 4).

Construction

30%.

Photography

5% • Ambulance

Line Patrol

3%

3% Survey

18% Fire Control

Crop Control

38%

3% Chart 4

37

Of significance. more of the pilots in 1 980 had flown more hours in the previous 90 days than in any of the previous four years. For example. half the accident pilots in 1980 had flown over 175 hours in the previous 90 days vs 27% in 1976.

Aerial Work - Private. There were five accidents in 1980. seven fewer than in 1979. There were no fatal accidents in 1980. Most of the accidents occurred in the southern prairies. Almost all the accidents in 1976-1980 were in aerial spraying.

Pleasure, Practice, Non-commercial business. More than one-fourth of the civil aviation activity is flown in privately-registered aircraft, including private companies not involved commercially in flying. flying clubs which rent to club members, and fixed base operators whose business may include renting aircraft. Most of the flying is done in aeroplanes but some pleasure and practice is in gliders. amateur built or ultralight aircraft. plus a small amount of helicopter flying.

Pleasure, Practice - Gliders. The ten glider accidents in 1980 were four more than in 1979. There have been as few as two glider accidents in 1976 and a high of 16 in 1977. In 1976-1980therewere five fatal accidents. four of which occurred in 1977. There was no fatality in 1980.

The sample size (43) is small, so the data will be given for the years 19761980. The top five, by type of occurrence (present in two thirds of the accidents): - loss of control in flight/ spin forced/ precautionary landing undershoot loss of control on ground dragged wingtip The top five. by phase of flight (present in ž of the accidents): initial climb from takeoff enroute / normal cruise final approach landing roll level-off/ touchdown In the man-machine-environment scheme. these factors most frequently contributed to accidents: did not obtain/maintain flying speed incorrect inflight decisions/ planning inadequate preflight preparation/ planning unfavourable wind

initial climb from takeoff enroute/ climb to cruise normal cruise level-off/ touchdown Flying Instruction. The less than onefifth of civil aviation activity for flight instruction accounts for under 10% of the accidents. However, training is more significant to aviation than the statistics may imply. It is the one environment a private pilot flying a Cessna 1 50 off a grass strip and a 74 7 captain have in common. Flight instruction provides a foundation for a pilot's future attitudes and habits. Instruction may be dual with an instructor as pilotin-command. or it may be solo with the student as pilot-in-command.

Dual Instruction -Aeroplanes. The 1 9 accidents in 1 980 were six fewer than in 1979. In 1980 there was only one fatal accident vs three in 19 79 and five in 1978. Thetopfive, bytypeofoccurrence: engine failure/ malfunction overrun loss of control - ground/water loss of control in flight/ spin Pleasure, Practice, Non-commercial hard landing Business - Aeroplanes. The 31 3 acciEngine failure/ malfunction was top dents in 1980 is down from 1979. and each year with the other four remaining among the top five in 1976-1980.

The continues the decline since 1976. The 33 fatal accidents in 1 980 is 14 fewer than in fatal accident in 1980 occurred after loss Pleasure, Practice - Amateur builtsl 1979. or 10% vs 14%. Accidents claimof control in flight - the most frequent ocUltralights. The 14 accidents in 1980 ed 58 lives, 45 fewer than in 1979. The were three fewer than in 1979 and 13 be- currence type for the 1 2 fatal accidents in 1976-1980. top five types of occurrence: low 1978. Two were fatal. There were 1 7 The top five by phase of flight: engine failure/ malfunction fatal accidents in 1976-1980. ranging level-off/ touchdown loss of control on ground/water from one in 1976 to nine in 1978. The top overrun takeoff run four types of occurrence: go-around nose-over - engine failure/malfunction landing roll loss of control in flight/spin loss of control on ground/water Engine failure/ malfunction and loss of takeoff / initial climb hard landing control on ground/water have been first All these were in the top five group loss of control in flight/ spin and second each year since 1976; the Engine failure/ malfunction was top ~Y 1976-1980. others have shifted little. These five aca wide margin each year. Loss of control in In 1980 inadequate supervision of count for half of the accidents in 1980. flight most freqently (6) contributed to acflight/spin was second in 1976-1979.

The top five phases of flight. representcidents. In 1976-1980 this factor was Over the five years these four were present ing 67% of accidents: present in 34 accidents. Although not in % of the accidents. landing roll The top three. by phase of flight: among the top five factors in 1976normal cruise 1979. supervisory pilot delaying initiation normal cruise level-off/ touchdown of missed approach/ overshoot was sec- initial climb from takeoff initial climb from takeoff ond in 1980. contributing to four acci- level-off/ touchdown takeoff The four top contributing factors for dents.

Landing roll was top each year 19761976-1980: 1 980 - and by a wide margin in the last did not obtain/maintain flying speed Solo Instruction - Aeroplane. The 29 two years. Normal cruise has been in the operation beyond experience/ ability accidents in 1980 were a drop from 38 in top five every year and second since level 1979 and the lowest in five years. There 1978. Further. level-off/touchdown and lack of familiarity with aircraft were no fatal accidents in 1980 - down initial climb from takeoff have been third or poor/ inadequate design from four in 1979 and one in 1977 and fourth each year. Takeoff run was fifth 1978. The top three. by type of occureach year 1978-1980.

In fatal accidents, Corporate/Executive Flying. This sec- rence: normal cruise was top by a wide margin in loss of control - ground/water tion covers the use of these aircraft for each year. and initial climb from takeoff transportation of passengers and cargo - engine failure/malfunction was second. Unauthorized low flying has (also. see aerial work). The six accidents in - hard landing usually been in the top five of fatal flights.

These three were also in the top group 1980 were two more than in 1979 but The top five factors: 1976-1979. equal to 1977 and 1978. qne of_the acselected area unsuitable for takeoff.

The top five. by phase of flight: cidents in 1980 was fatal. involving two landing. taxiing level-off/ touchdown inadequate preflight preparation/ deaths. landing roll The sample size (6) is small so the data planning final approach-VFR will be given for the years 1976-1980. operation beyond experience/ ability go-around ievel The top three. by type of occurrence: normal cruise loss of control on ground/water incorrect inflight decisions/planning In 1980 incorrect compensation for engine failure/ malfunction inadequate compensation for wind wind contributed to six accidents and unloss of control in flight/ mush/ straight Four of these were among the top five favourable wind conditions. to five. each year: however. incorrect inflight destall Neither had been among the top factors in The top five. by phase of flight: cisions/ planning 1sa newcomer to the top 1976-1979. five. landing roll

38

Dual Instruction - Helicopter. The three accidents in 1980 occurred with no fatalities. In 1980 simulatedenginefailure claimed two accidents. and a hard landing, the other. In 1976-1980 simulated engine failure induced nine accidents. and hard landings.four. The most frequent, by D. H. of Canada in A 320 phase of flight in 1976-1980 (80% of Program accidents): - normal cruise · - autorotation landing In 1976-1980 inadequatesupervision Airbus lndustrie and De Havilland of flight was a contributing factor in seven Canadaannouncedtodaythatthey accidents. Incorrect landing flare and have signed a Memorandum of simulated conditions each contributed six Understanding under which De accidents.

Havilland Canada will participate in the development and production Solo lnstructio.n - Helicopter. In 1980 there were two accidents. down from the work of the A320 aircraft program.

1976-1980 averageof four. There were no fatal accidents in 1980. The top four. by type of occurrence. in 1976-1980: De Havilland Canada will be seekroll-over ing a share of up to ten percent in the engine failure/ malfunction A320 program as an associate part- loss of control - ground/water ner of Airbus lndustrie. This follows - hard landing the Canadian Government's approval.

The most frequent. by phaseof flight. in given earlier in the month. for De 1976-1980: Havilland Canada to negotiate such a - power-on landing partnership.

- vertical takeoff This Memorandum was signed on The two accidents in 1980 occurred during vertical takeoff and hovering.

23rd July 1982 in Ottawa (Canada).

by Mr. John Sandford. De Havilland Canada's president. and Airbus lndustrie president.

Mr. Bernard Lathiere. Mr. Roger Chanut. viceTunis Air Receives the president in charge ofthe negotiations First A300FF for Airbus lndustrie. also attended the ceremony.

Tunis Air took delivery of its first 'This agreement represents a major A300FF also in June 1982. The step forward for De Havilland aircraft was officially handed over to Canada,' said Mr. Sandford. 'By beMr. Hassouna M'Nara. chairman of coming an actual partner of the Tunis Air. by Mr. Bernard Lathiere. European consortium. · which has president of Airbus lndustrie. during a produced the highly efficient and succeremony held in Toulouse. cessful A300 and A31 0 aircraft. our The aircraft. an A300B4-200. was company will take full responsibility for introduced on the airline's services to the design and manufacture of our the Middle-East. from Tunis to Cairo. part of the program and participate in Jeddah and Khartoum. and to Europe the business of large civil transport from Tunis to Paris. Nice. Marseilles aircraft produced for scheduled airand Rome. The A300. named Amilcar lines and charter operators around the after the famous Carthaginian gen- world.' eral. is powered by two General ElecUp till now De Havilland Canada tric CF6-50C2 (short nozzle) engines has produced commuter-type aircraft and will carry 265 passengers (of such as the Beaver. Otter. Twin Otter which 24 in first class). and the 50-passenger Dash 7. as well Moreover. the Tunisian airline has as military transports like the Caribou selected the advanced technology and the Buffalo. Soon to be added to Forward Facing (FF) cockpit which its aircraft family is the 32-passenger integrates both digital and push but- Dash 8 due to make its first flight in ton technologies. The cockpit allows mid-1983. the aircraft to be safely flown by a crew Under the agreement De Havilland of two as already demonstrated with Canada will be responsible for the dethe A300s in service with Garuda In- velopment. production and delivery of donesian Airways and now with the those parts of the A320 it will manufirst two A31 Os at present undergoing facture. It has not yet been finalized the flight test program. Tunis Air will which parts of the aircraft these will be also operate its A300 with a crew of two. as they already operate their present B737s.

and various alternatives are being studied.

'By being associates with Airbus lndustrie at a still very early stage of the program. we are in a much better position to select the elements most suitable for the Canadian industry,' said Mr. Sandford.

New investment and an additional plant may be needed in Canada as a result of the Memorandum of Understanding. he said. and various sites are under consideration. The participation would also involve many of the 900 Canadian firms now working closely with De Havilland Canada.

De Havilland Canada's early decision would enable Airbus to take its requirements into consideration from the outset said Mr. Lathiere. before a final decision was made on the shareout of production. This would allow ·a better integration of the Canadian industry's resources in the Airbus system and avoid among other things any production duplications.· ·we were already used to working transnationally,' said Mr. Lathiere.

'With this agreement the Airbus cooperation really becomes transatlantic. Distance no longer plays a role.· ·we are proud to benefit from the skills and expertise of De Havilland Canada,' he said. 'Not only will this agreement enhance the A320 program but it proves once more that today there is no such thing as a purely national product.· Airbus lndustrie's partners in the building of the A300 and the A31 0 of which over 500 have been sold to 46 airlines - are Aerospatiale in France. MBB through Deutsche Airbus in West Germany. British Aerospace in the UK and CASA in Spain.

Fokker in the Netherlands and Belairbus in Belgium are associate partners.

The Airbus A320 will be a brandnew. advanced technology. singleaisle. 1 50-seat. twin-engined aircraft optimized for short to medtum ranges.

It will offer up to 50 percent lower fuel consumption per seat than existing old generation two and three-engined narrow bodies and up to 25 percent lower operating costs. There is an estimated market for more than 3500 of this type of aircraft and Air France has already placed an order for 50 A320s with Airbus lndustrie.

39

For the

Controller-Traveller

Tripm aste r - the constant tra vel companio n at home and abroad , at work and playfrom Je ppesen & Co GmbH This uniquel y designed leather bag has almost 30 different compartments and can accomodate all personal and travel doc um ent s. The tra veler can insert credit, club, ID and membership cards as well as drivers and pilots licences into a special compartme nt . Covered by a clear plastic prot ector, the cards are alwa ys hand y . In add ition. tw o f ixed purses keep different cu rrenci es separate.

However, the special feature of this patented bag is the removable superflat billfolds. wallets, and change pursas which can be transported either with the Tripmaster or by the traveler on his person .

The traveler can leave the Tripmaster in the hotel while taking selected billfolds or purses on sightseeing trips.

This enables the traveler to keep checks stored separately from check cards, which can be put into a removable wallet and stored in a hotel safe, for example .

Tripmaster also has room and compartments for a pocket computer , tickets , stamps, calling cards , note pads, keys and

Controlled Flight Toward Terrain Studied During t he 19 3 0 ' s US Arm y aviation acc ident rates soare d , and a spec ial team wa s designated to invest igate t he prob lem . Afte r caref ul stud y, the committe e repo rte d that t he prima ry ca use of aviation ac cidents was airc raft striking the ground.

That concl usio n may seem w itles s to t he experience d aviator, but it can be int erpreted in a more int elligen t sen se. To o many aircraft acc ident s are t he result of contro lled flig ht into t errain . as t he ac c iden t investi gato rs cat ego rize it. CFiT invo lves an airp lane in norm al flight , w ith no emergenc ies and no w arning to the flight c rew of impe nding tro uble , st ri king the t erra in at some po int ot her t han the run w ay .

Recent ly, Batte lle Memorial Inst it ut e of Colu mb us, Ohi o , co mplet ed a st udy of Aviatio n Safety Reportin g Syst em report s t o ana lyze t hose w hic h invo lved co nt roll ed flight t oward te rrai n . CFiT incident s are pot ent ial CFiT acc idents .

A total of 258 ASRS report s w ere identif ied in w hich airc raft , under con t ro l, we re flown towa rd the ground, wate r or som e obst ruction on the ground . Severa l useful con c lusions we re drawn fro m this st ud y : • Hum an error is t he sing le, g reates t ide nt if iab le cause of CFiT inc idents and, presumab ly , CFiT acc ide nts . In 64 percent of all stu died CFiT occ urrences. someone ma d e an error or omi ssion .

40

• About two-thirds of those human erro rs w ere attributd to air traffic controllers . The mo st common discrepancy was a radar vector below the minimum vectoring altitude . Improper radar vectoring occurred in 46 of the cases studied, while only three incidents happened during standard instrum ent departure s. and none occurred on st andard instrument arrival routes , except w hen there w ere radar vectors off the rout e.

• Radar vectors in mountainous terrain particul arly are conducive to controller error .

• Errors by pilots were much more dive rse. including a few mistakes of gross altitude excur sion .

• A contributing factor in CFiT incident s may be that pilots do not have inform ation on minimum vectoring altitudes .

An y radar vector below published chart minimums mu st be accepted on faith by t he flight crew.

• The stud y concluded that ground pro ximit y w arning systems and minimum safe altitude w arning systems were responsible for averting at least six catast rophi c air carrier accident s. In 1 2 other case s tho se system s provided the first warn ing of danger . Unfortuna t ely, the st udy also co ncluded th at pilots w ho have experience w it h suc h system s often are skepti ca l of th em because they generate too many false alerts.

much more. There is even a special sheath for a pen. A compartment on the reverse side provides a handy place for maps and the like. By means of a retractable leather wrist loop (with inwoven steel safety wire) Tripmaster may be carried as a hand bag .

The brass lock underscores the texture of the fine black leather and the top quality workmanship.

Size: 23 X 15 cm; Tripmaster is available through Jeppesen & Co. GmbH, for years a name in the aviation community .

Price (including value added tax) - OM 452 .00 ; excl. OM 400 .00 .

Flight Information on Television Up-to-the-minute information on flight arrivals and departures at most major British airports is now available on television in homes and businesses in the UK. In the near future , European and North American airports could also be included .

Around 1 7 OOO subscribers to Prestel, the videote xt information system , will benefit from the new service which , say its promoters , will eliminate wasted journeys to the airport and cut congestion on airport telephone switchboards .

SkyGuide, as the system is called , w as developed under the leadership of American Express. The data gathering and dissemination system installed at indi vidual airports wa s specially designed for the project by Ja smin Electronics . UK .

Currently , most of the relati vely small number of Prestel users are businesses or travel agenc ies. but th e co mp any is co nfident that major inroads will be made into the dome sti c market w ithin the next five years. The system alread y offers infor mation on a comprehensi ve range of subject s and is available on a normal TV set with a special adaptor , avail able for around $400. Sets can be bought for about $900 , or rented for $40 a month .

Air Traffic Controllers Studied to Death*

In the past several months the working air traffic controllers have become the most observed, questioned, and analyzed species in our society. Immediately after the strike on August 3, 1981 the facilities were descended upon by a variety of instant experts in air traffic control intent upon demonstrating the safety or the danger in. the ~ystem, dependi~g upon their viewpoint and personal interest.

Some were turned away, others, such as congressmen and newspapermen, could not be denied.

Then, as the dust began to settle, the more formal studies began. First there was the National Transportation Safety Board study. Then there was the FAA-sponsored study by the Flight Safety Foundation. Both found the system to be working well, with some reservations. Next came the Jones Committee, which was charged to investigate the FAA's management practices and recommend ways to ensure that the conditions which led to the strike never arise again. Finally (for the moment) there is the Roper Report. commissioned by Congressman Levitas¡ Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight. Committee on Public Works and Transportation. on the attitude of working air traffic controllers towards the return of the dismissed controllers.

FAA' represents an interesting. provocative basic document on management practices in the FAA, and in particular, the Air Traffic Service and Airway Facilities Service. It is not the final, definitive word on those management practices. nor does it seem to justify those generally derogatory news stories which followed its public release. The following quote from the Preface to the Report should not be overlooked!

'The Task Force presents this report of its findings and recommendations with confidence and conviction. but its members are awed by a sense that there is yet much to discern. This report focuses on the FAA. but the story applies to every group of people attempting to find ways to work together productively and harmoniously ... and it hopes its work will be ~ound useful and effective in improving management and employee relationships within the FAA ... a deservedly proud and important agency of the U.S. government.'

The Jones Committee found that the _cause~ <;>fdeteriorating. people relations within the FAA include:

The Jones Report The Jones Report was delivered to Administrator Helms on March 1 7 and received a significant amount of media attention, generally derogatory to the FAA management.

The Report on 'Management and Employee Relationships Within the

2. Inadequate systems used to select. train, evaluate and promote people to supervisory and management positions from within the organization with both technical competence and skills in the effective management and leadership of people ...

* From the A TCA bulletin

3. Pervasive employee attitudes throughout all levels of the organi-

1 . Increasing variability in peaktime traffic activity compared to nonpe~k time as total traffic volume grew rapidly over the past 20 years. causing pressure and anxiety in the system during peaks and inefficiencies and dissatisfactions during the valleys ...

zation that the FAA had little concern for employees, poor upward communication sensitivity, and weak management support systems ...

4. Organization structure, supervisory systems, and management attitudes that were centralized, rigid, and insensitive, creating a mismatch with the people-intensive, variable, and fast-paced nature of air traffic control work ...

5. Escalating militancy from PATCO, exploiting dissatisfactions within the controller personnel, and pressuring a management group dispirited by the pay cap on federal employees and a perceived lack of support for field management from FAA regional offices and Washington headquarters.

Further. the report finds that. though most employees enjoy their work and share strong peer group relationships, current morale of most employees at almost all levels in the FAA is poor. The remaining employees responded to the challenge of the post-strike period with relief that the hassle with PATCO had ended and with a determination to recover the air traffic system successfully. but current employees remain unhappy with the working environment. Too. most factors that had caused problems in the past are reasserting themselves. and the FAA seems headed toward more people-related problems in the future.

Recommendations The Committee then developed 1 3 recommendations to correct these deficiencies: 1 . The FAA should place emphasis upon and be fully accountable to the Secretary of Transportation and Congress for a concern for the development of human resources as a legitimate and vital step in providing a safe. orderly. efficient. and accessible airways system.

2. The fulfillment of this responsibility requires managers and management systems capable of obtaining the commitment of talented employees to the goals of the organization and of providing to these employees a concern for their legitimate professional and personal needs. This is a demanding assignment on individual managers. but as well on the entire management system because of the interconnectedness of relationships in an organization. The need for managers capable of building teamwork within a complex and technical organization requires people with quality education and experience.

41

carefully selected. constantly trained and properly evaluated.

3. The management of air traffic to produce smoother workloads should be considered as a permanent policy. It would be preferable to persuade user groups to accomplish this objective with a form of market pricing rather than relying on FAA-mandated systems of flow control and general aviation reservations. Smoother traffic produces substantial benefits to FAA work skills. people planning. and working relationships; and greater efficiency in the use of airplanes. airways. airports. control equipment. facilities and human resources throughout the aviation community.

4. The adoption of a program of flexible staffing should facilitate a better match of people resources to the varying traffic and do so in a more cost-efficient manner.

5. The close communication between the FAA and user groups accomplished by Administrator Helms should be continued both at the national level and be extended as a responsibility of all field managers of the FAA. 6. The staff offices of Airway Facilities and Air Traffic based in Washington DC. should be delegated the task of designing the work to be done but should be limited in the making of operational decisions. Line or operating executives in the field should be fully responsible for getting the work done and should have clear authority to direct the facilities. equipment and people under their leadership.

7. The consolidation of facilities and personnel contemplated by the Administrator's Twenty-Year Plan should be adopted as both technically superior and advantageous to improved working relationships. Each maior change called for should be accompanied by a people plan detailing _thehandling of items such as relocation. retraining. restructuring. and other such human factors. It is important for the plan to be correct technically; it is even more important that _c_hangesimpacting people be 1dent1f1edand planned in such a way that the technical and structural revisions are handled knowledgeably and with confidence and enthusiasm. . 8. The FAA should immediately implement a program within Air Traffic Control to eliminate confusion resulting from the exodus of the union and the union contract: ( 1) A written set of employee rights and responsibilities should be developed as soon as pos42

sible. (2) Reporting to field management should be human resource specialists who can help employees resolve questions. help employees and supervisors open up blocked communication. help employees process their complaints through an orderly procedure. help facilities relate to communities in which they are located. and help organize employee and facility activities. (3) Management-employee committees should be organized to work together on matters of importance to the team.

(4) Management-employee meetings should be held at least monthly to keep employees informed and to solicit employee feedback.

Program The FAA should adopt a comprehensive program of managerr:ient d~velopment. Candidates for air traffic employment should be teste~ for management interest. and aptitude before being hired. Dunn~ or after the controller training period at the Academy. successful trainees with management potential should be given an ad~itional managementoriented curriculum.

These employees. pl~s oth~r controllers expressing an interest in managemen~ or evincing management P?tent1~I. should be provided managerial training experiences while functioning _in first-level jobs. Finally. all potential management talent should be tracked and appraised and a system should be in effect that utilizes this data to select the most qualified candidate for every management promotion.

1 O. In selecting and evaluating managers. the FAA should insist on managerial performance that emphasizes keeping_ all employees well informed. offering employees a chance to participate in appropriate decisions. and producing strong teamwork attitudes. To help evaluate the organizational strength at an~ ~nd all FAA locations. employee opinion and attitude surveys should be conducted at major facilities at least biannually with employees receiving not only feedback on the survey results. but also management's responses to any specific problems or suggestions.

based in part on the successful development of teamwork.

1 3. The FAA should strive to encourage the Administration and the Congress to develop a plan that relieves pay compression for management positions and provides premium pay equity and training time pay enhancement for first-level supervisors.

The study was conducted through questionnaires sent to all levels of the FAA and to striking controllers as well.

An interesting result is the correlation between working and nonworking controllers in their generally negative responses. These questionnaires were supplemented by visits to facilities and interviews of personnel.

There were actually two questionnaires. A standardized questionnaire called the 'Survey of Organizations¡ (SOO) supplemented by 46 tailormade questions which was administered to a sample of persons from 28 major facilities. A shorter form consisting of 20 marker items from the SOO. plus 18 supplementary questions. was given to all persons from all facilities not sampled with the longer form. A total of 3800 names was selected for the SOO form and 25.500 short forms were distributed in bulk to facilities. The long form was mailed November 1 2 to December 19. 1981 and the short form December 2-8. 1981.

The returns were lower than would be preferred. Of the 2154 targeted strikers. 11 77 (55%) were completed. For the in-facility survey 1 714 (45%) of the targeted 3800 returned the questionnaire. Twelve thousand one hundred twenty-nine (48%) of the 25.500 short form questionnaires were returned. In contrast. the Report also says: 'During the interviews and contacts. it became obvious that employees in the FAA had an intense desire. perhaps a need. to talk at length about their experiences. problems and suggestions.¡ The Report

The Report is 146 pages long. with a second volume containing supporting material. To attempt to summarize it in this small space would be fruitless and a disservice to the committee.

11 . The FAA should develop career However. we would venture to complans for nonsupervisory employees ment on several points. First. those we that allow controllers to move to jobs agree with: and to extend careers according to the 1 . The report in several places job pressure the employee feels he or notes the problem of motivating those she will be able to handle. in the FAA"s management corps due 1 2. The FAA should establish per- to pay compression and lack of incenformance appraisal and reward sys- tive for career progression. This is intems that are more objective. less ex- deed a serious problem. Over the last posed to favoritism. and for managers. 13 years controller benefits have in-

comments specifically name higher. political authority. Others might be referring to previous political appointees and their policies.

The Jones Committee discusses at length the perceived autocratic nature of FAA management: however. comment No. 6 above is an example ofthe perception that the union was able to manipulate management. The perception that management prerogatives were eroded by contract negotiations was not investigated by the Jones Committee. Yet it existed. worse. and it would seem to be contradictory One of the main reasons for the to the ·autocratic' finding. strike was the union's dissatisfaction To read the Jones Report one with management. This problem still would never know that there is a manexists and will continue to exist. agement training school in Lawton.

A survey we would be happy to re- Oklahoma. The Report goes to some spond to would be one that asks the length to describe Douglas Mcworking controllers their opinions on Gregor· s Theory X (bad) theory of how to prevent a repeat of last August. management and shows how it fits The reasons for the strike (and they FAA. It does not say that this excellent have nothing to do with money) are management work is part of the curstill evident in the system. riculum in Lawton. and that Theory Y Air traffic controllers make very (good) is also explained and enpoor management personnel. They couraged. This is not to say that it is are excellent rapid decision makers. indeed practiced. but the Jones Rebut very poor when given a week to port leaves open the question that if it make a decision. isn't. why isn't it?

I place the blame. in good part. on The Jones Report encourages an inept FAA management and the improved management selection proincreasing militancy of PATCO. PAT- cess. It does not indicate that since CO radicals repeatedly effectively 1970 repeated attempts have been ·used' FAA management inade- made to improve the management quacies to rally its members into be- selection process. Indeed. several lieving that by striking. management were done with the assistance of outThe Roper Report could be restructured and improved. side consultants. If this was not corNow before we go any further. let's The promises by the Administration rectly done. where did they go wrong? review the Roper Report .. The Roper The Jones Report does not address survey was based on a single ques- to help the controllers who remained tion: Should the fired controllers be at work were just 'lip service·. Nothing the problem of the political nature of been done. morale is deteriorat- the FAA's hierarchy. Since 1970 the rehired? The result was that 58% said has ing.

FAA has had six administrators. Each that they should not. 31 % said some It is a fact that the union was lying had his own ideas on how to run the of them should be hired back under certain conditions. and 10~ felt they to the controllers to strengthen the agency and how to deal with PATCO. union's cause. However. what is far Generally each began by trying to should be hired back uncond1t1onally.

The survey was conducted . by worse and was cleverly covered up. cooperate and found. to varying dewas the manner in which the FAA Ad- grees. that this wouldn't work. Viewed questionnaires sent to 897 working controllers. Of these 731 were ministrator and the head of the DOT from the top this is understandable. returned (3 were blank). whic~ repr~- deliberately lied to the media and the Viewed from the bottom it makes for American public during the deliber- unstable personnel policies and a persented ·a huge 82% re~urn_. It 1s ations in late June 1981. ception that the union was calling the interesting to contrast this with th~ This strike had nothing to do with shots. less than 50% return on the Jones pay. etc. It had everything to do with There are significant questions still questionnaires. T~ere are probably lousy labor I management relationship to be studied. not the least of which is two reasons for this: fostered by parochial. incompetent. whether or not the FAA should be 1 . The rehiring of controllers is a stone-age managers and supervisors. taken out of the political arena and significant issue to nonstrikin~ conmade a quasi-corporation. Isn't this trollers. while management issues the only way to free it from the Federal either may not generate. th~~ mu~h General budget policies that doom any longinterest (which would be_s1gnif1cant!n After reading the Jones and Roper term commitment to a ·concern for itself). or it may be considered a fruit- Reports it is clear that there is a probpeople' type management? We are lem out there and the problem is perless discussion. about to embark on a program to increase air traffic automation. The Re2. Mr. Roper went to some effort to ceived by controllers to be FAA manport clearly describes a work force that ensure confidentiality. The Jones agement. What is not yet clear is how is not attuned to being computer Committee· s. on the other hand. was FAA management is to be defined. operators. There are serious problems an FAA study. not Congressional. This, The Jones Committee insinuates they ahead. and the Jones Report will not might have limited the respons_esto are talking about the career civil servants. However. two of the preceding be the last work on the subject. only those with the strongest feelings. creased significantly without commensurate improvement toward managers. The pay cap. applicable to all civil service. is a problem which exceeds the sublime and approaches the ridiculous in the FAA. 2. The Report cites as one element the idle time controllers experience because of the 'peaks and valleys· nature of their work. It does not discuss the aggravated effect that the staffing policies have had on this situation: that is. controllers had too much time sitting around thinking about how bad off they were.

3. The Report supports the Administration· s plan to consolidate facilities (see the National Airspace System Plan). but points out that the human factors should be thoroughly studied prior to a final decision. We would point out that the proposal to consolidate the approach control facilities of Kennedy. La-Guardia and Newark into the Common IFR Room provided the psychological . basis for the discontent that resulted in the formation of PATCO. 4. The Report urges more concern for the human resources of the agency. This is its major thrust. but it is difficult to do when the agency is a part of the Federal Government and subject to the Administration's policies toward Federal workers.

There is another interesting correlation between the Roper and Jones Reports. Mr. Roper allowed space for comments by the respondents. A number of these comments are reproduced in his report to Congress.

Although they are not characterized as a scientific sampling. it is still significant how many comments noted dissatisfaction with FAA management.

The strike was a necessary occurrence. forced by the attitudes of the FAA. These attitudes have not only failed to improve. but have gotten

43

Sleep and Work-rest David Hopkin RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine,

Cycles*

Farnborough, Hampshire

Introduction The more sleep is studied, the less we seem to know about it. By now there must have been tens of thousands of studies of sleep. There are journals devoted to nothing else. Yet if we ask 'What is sleep, why do we sleep, and how much sleep do we need?' the answer to all these questions is still that we do not know. There are a great many theories about sleep, and many methods for measuring aspects of sleep in humans and in animals. The more we study it, the more

tability, which can be such a powerful influence as to compensate for, or cancel, many other effects.

Patterns of Sleep If people are cut off from their normal environment and completely isolated, with no knowledge of the passing of days, they tend to settle into one or other of two distinct sleep patterns. Either a 'day' contains a normal period of sleep and lasts for about 25 to 26 hours, or it lasts for

Table 1 Stage of Sleep

Characteristics

Brain Rhythms

0

Awake Light sleep - Transition 1-10 minutes Deeper sleep - about 10 minutes Deeper still - Transition about 5 minutes Deepest sleep

Alpha Decreasing Alpha Mixed Waves Theta Delta

1 2

3 4

complicated and mystifying it seems to become.

Sleep in Air Traffic Controllers There are two practical aspects of the study of sleep among controllers.

One concerns any propensity to go to sleep at work; the other concerns the effects of sleep patterns on work.

Sleep can be studied in terms of the conditions which may induce it - prolonged periods of work. fatigue. shifts, drugs. alcohol, etc. - and the effects of lack of sleep on work. particularly on safety. efficiency or health. Sleep is also studied in terms of human adap-

about 36 to 37 hours with a period of sleep which is longer than normal. The typical 24 hour day pattern therefore is imposed and does not appear to be natural.

Various lifestyles and patterns of work can disrupt the normal sleep pattern. Shift work is either regular. where people work many nights in succession as they do in much of industry. many services, and sometimes in hospitals, or irregular as in much of aviation including air traffic control.

Other sources of disruption of sleep patterns include social factors and pressures, some forms of mental illness especially senility. and some

'First published in 'Transmit'. June 1982

44

drugs. There are various stages, levels or phases of sleep. There is still some argument about how many there are but the following table gives a reasonable picture. Orthodox deep sleep is often distinguished from dream sleep, characterised by rapid eye movements.

Measurement of Sleep Sleep can be measured in numerous ways. The most general categories are: Physiological measures - heart rate and patterns, eye movements, body temperature. etc.

Biochemical measures - state of arousal, urine and blood samples. etc.

Neurological measures - brain rhythms.

Psychological measures - task performance, subjective states, etc.

If people complain of a loss of sleep or that their sleep is disrupted, an apparently simple step is to measure how much sleep they actually have.

This sounds simple but in fact is not.

The best way is by instrumentation, recording the patterns of brain rhythms. Subjective assessments are fallible - how accurate can you be in stating how much sleep you had last night? How long after you went to bed did you actually fall asleep? How long do you normally sleep? Is this length of sleep consistent? Would you sleep longer if you could? By how much?

Many people who claim insomnia in fact sleep far more than they think.

Lack of Sleep Most of the evidence about sleep has been obtained by restricting it or disrupting it. Some of the participants in sleep deprivation experiments have shown a remarkable and commendable tolerance. It is often believed that shift patterns reduce the amount of sleep but human adaptability tends to ensure that in the long term this does not occur.

A study of controllers in the United States compared a five day rotation (five evening shifts, two days, off. five day shifts, two days off. five mid shifts. two days off. etc.) with rotating schedules (two evening-shifts, two day-shifts, one mid-shift, two days off. etc.). It was believed by management that the two-two-one would be more fatiguing and would be reflected in more sick leave and more claims for compensation. In fact the opposite was found to be true. There was no other major difference between the two shift schedules nor were the

The Federation announces with deep regret the death of its Executive Secretary

Edvvard Bradshavv on 29th November 1982. Ted's dedication and efforts on behalf of our profession can never be overestimated and will never be forgotten.

The Federation extends sincerest sympathy to Peg and to his family. His spirit will be with us forever.

45

effects related to either age or experience. The controllers themselves often preferred the two-two-one shift.

There is also of course the possibility of discrepancies between the nominal hours worked and the actual hours worked. which it is important to measure in studies of sleep and work/ rest cycles.

For a long time there was a great deal of emphasis on circadian rhythms and their disruption and it was contended that. mainly on the basis of laboratory studies. the most important effect of disrupted work/ rest patterns was on sleep. Many of the earliest studies were not done in air traffic control but in industrial contexts where it was indeed found that for simple repetitive routine tasks work/ rest cycles such as those characteristic of air traffic control are not the optimum but are disruptive. It is only recently that properly controlled checks of this finding. on which recommendations were at one time ~~de. h~ve been conducted on cognitive. higher level tasks with a high memory load. typified by the tasks in air traffic control. It has been shown th~t those who perform these tasks adJust most quickly to shift changes. that the performance of the task is relatively unaffected by shifts and by sleep patterns and that the kind of rapidly rotating shifts and associated sleep patterns which are typical of air traffic control are probably the most safe. the most efficient and the most healthy.

A series of further findings which are currently tentative but much better t~an guesses has also emerged. Individuals who are used to shift work de~elop a very successful long term adJ~stn:,ent to it. although there re~ain differences between individuals in their ability to sleep at unusual times of day and in unusual places and to counteract drowsiness. The temporary lack of sleep associated with certain work/ rest cycles does not seem to impair efficiency in the performance of task~ of an air traffic control type.

More likely to be affected are certain peripheral aspects of the work. The 1n~ividual may become more absent minded. more careless. more clumsy. and more irritable. Whereas the ability to p_erf~rmtasks is not impaired. the motIvat1on to do so is gradually reduced.

Learning immediately after sleep is often poorer but learning followed by sleep can be the most effective.

There seems also some tentative but not strong evidence that reasonable physical exercise is beneficial for sleep. There is also of course an association between sex and sleep. This provides a nice demonstration of the distinction between a correlation and a cause: just because sex may precede sleep it does not follow that sex is essential for sleep and the hopes of those who seek scientific proof for this connection must be dashed. particularly since the prospects for obtaining funding to investigate it psychologically are poor!

Resume and Recommendations In the current state of knowledge. the scientific evidence. though tentative. suggests that the current pattern of work/ rest cycles and rostering in air traffic control is probably near optimum in relation to sleep and sleep patterns. given that air traffic control must provide a continuous service and therefore some controllers must work during the night. It is also clear that changes in rostering and work/rest cycles do not generally have major long term effects on the amount of sleep obtained. or on the safety and efficiency of task performance. In this context human adaptability is very great and the kinds of demanding mental work typical of air traffic control seem to be the most resistant of all to impairment by unusual sleep patterns. Subjective evidence about amounts of sleep is notoriously fallible and serious studies have to collect other information. especially neurological data. If there are any effects of sleep on work they are not likely to show in the performance of air traffic control tasks as such but rather in a certain clumsiness or irritability.

Where there is prolonged and serious loss of sleep this still tends not to affect efficiency directly but to do so indirectly by undermining motivation to perform well.

The following are recommended for further reading: Saldivar. J.T., Hoffmann. S. M. & Melton. C.E. Sleep in Air Traffic Controllers. US FAA Report FAA-AM-775. 1977.

Meddis. R. The Sleep Instinct. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

There is some support for the 1977. relationship between sleep and Folkard. S. & Monk. T.H. Shift Work memory. The idea that it is possible to and Performance. Human Factors. learn during sleep, though not totally 21. 583-492. 1979. discarded, seems impractical since at Walker. J. Human Aspects of Shift best a great deal of material has to be Work. London: Institute of Personnel presented with very little learning. Management. 1978.

46

China Airlines Buys First A300 The national carrier of the Republic of China. China Airlines. took delivery of its first Airbus A300 aircraft late June.

The occasion was marked by a ceremony in Toulouse the following day attended by Airbus lndustrie President. Mr. Bernard Lathiere and a group of VIPs from the Republic of China headed by the Vice-Minister of Communications. Mr S. H. Chen. and including General T. M. Liu. Director General of Civil Aviation Authority and General C. T. Shan. Vice-President of China Airlines.

The aircraft left Toulouse in July.

On its arrival in Taipei there was a welcoming ceremony at which many government and civil aviation authority officials. including China Airlines¡ Chairman. General Szeto Fu. were present. Airbus lndustrie was represented by its Executive Vice-President and General Manager Mr. Roger Beteille.

China Airlines will use its A30084200. equipped with Pratt & Whitney JT9D-59A engines. on its traditional South East Asian routes to Hong Kong. Bangkok. Seoul and Okinawa.

Eventually the airline will use A300sit has three more ordered for delivery next year - throughout its whole regional network.

STOP PRESS Due to the tragic death of the Executive Secretary of IFACTA this office has become vacant Persons interested in the position are invited to contact the Vice-President. Administration at 26 Carrickhill Close Portmarnock. Co. Dublin Ireland Applications should be submitted before 15 February. 1983

IFATCA '83

Hote l LAV-S plit

Officers and members of the Yugoslavian Air Traffic Control Association are looking forward to seeing you all in Split, Yugoslavia, Hotel Lav, 21-27 March

1983

Advance payment of at least two days accommodation is required for firm hotel reservation .

Registration to: IFATCA '83 Organizing Committee Mr. Aleksandar Stefanovic 65 / II Mutapova St. 11 OOOBeograd - Yugoslavia

Allthings considered,is it so remarkablethat Irelandalso runs a rather enjoyableairline?

Aerlingus 6

Corporate Members of IFATCA AEG-Telefunken. Frankfurt a. M .. Germany AM ECON Division. Litton Systems. College Park. USA ANSA. Advisory Group Air Navigation Services. Westerngrund. Germany CAE Electronics Ltd .. Montreal. Quebec. Canada Cardion Electronics. Woodbury. N.Y .. USA Computer Sciences Europe SA. Brussels. Belgium Cossor Radar and Electronics Ltd .. Harlow. England Decca Software Sciences Limited. London. England Dictaphone Corporation. USA ELECMA Divisions Electronique de la SNECMA. Suresnes. France Ferranti Limited. Bracknell. Berks .. England Goodwood Data. Systems Ltd .. Ontario. Canada Ground Aid Group. Esbjerg. Denmark Jeppesen & Co. GmbH .. Frankfurt. Germany Lockheed Aircraft Service Company. Ontario. California 91 761. USA The Marconi Radar Systems Ltd .. Chelmsford. England M.B.L.E .. Brussels. Belgium The Mitre Corporation. McLean. Virginia. USA N.V. Hollandse Signaalapparaten. Hengelo. Netherlands N.V. Philips Division ELA. Eindhoven. Netherlands Philips Telecommunicatie lndustrie B.V .. Hilversum. Netherlands The Plessey Company Limited. Weybridge. Surrey. England Racal Recorders Limited, Southampton, England Raytheon Canada Ltd .. Canada SandersAssociates. Inc., Nashua, USA Schmid Telecommunication, Switzerland Selenia- lndustrie Elettroniche Associate S.p.A., Rome. Italy SEL-Standard Elektrik Lorenz, Stuttgart 70, Germany Societe Artistique Fran<;aise, Paris. France Societe d' Etudes & d' Entreprises Electriques, lssy Les Moulineaux. France Sofreavia, Paris. France Software Sciences Ltd., Farnborough, England Sperry Univac, Sulzbach/Ts .. Germany & St. Paul. Minnesota. USA SRA Communications. Sweden TERMA ElektronikAS. Lystrup, Denmark Thomson-CSF. Paris. France Ulmer Aeronautique. Clichy, France VWK- Ryborsch GmbH / Aeronautical Maps & Charts Division. Germany Westinghouse Electric Corporation. USA

The International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers· Associations would like to invite all corporations. organizations. and institutions interested in and concerned with the maintenance and promotion of safety in air traffic to join their organization as Corporate Members.

Corporate Members support the aims of the Federation by supplying the Federation with technical information and by means of an annual subscription. The Federation· s international Journal 'The Controller· is offered as a platform for the discussion of technical and procedural developments in the field of air traffic control.

Scanning electron micros cope picture of etch sput tere d structures in In Sb

Output power amplifier module , use d in SIRSSR

sol id-state ssr Th e SIR-SELENIA SOLID-STATE Secondary Surveillance Radar is now in operat ion in a number of countries .

The radar is fully solid state, including the output stages, and includes a numb er of inno va tions aimed to reduce problems of ref lect ions and fruit.

The equ ipment has-built-in test equipment and an extremely high MTBF.

INDUSTRIE ELETTRONICHE ASSOCI ATE S.p.A. CIVIL RADAR AND SYSTEMS DIVISION Via Tiburtina Km 12.400 , 00131 ROM E, ITALY Telex 613690 SELROM 1.Phone 06-4360 1

SELENIA IS EXPERIENCE IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL