IFATCA The Controller - February 1975

JOURNAL

Corporation Members of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations AEG-Telefunken, Ulm/Donau, Germany Air Vision Industries, Inc., Montreal, Canada The Air Transport Association, Washington D. C., U.S.A. Wolfgang Assmann GmbH., Bad Homburg v. d. H., Germany Cossor Radar and Electronics Limited, Harlow, England Dansk lmpulsfysik A. S., Holte, Denmark Ferranti Limited, Bracknell, Berks., England Glen A. Gilbert & Associates, Washington D. C., U.S.A. Ground Aid Group, Esbjerg, Denmark International Air Carrier Association Geneva, Switzerland International Aeradio Limited, Southall, Middlesex, England Jeppesen & Co. GmbH., Frankfurt, Germany Lockheed Electronics Company, Inc., Plainfield, N. J., U.S.A. The Marconi Radar Systems Limited, Chelmsford, Essex, England N. V. Hollandse Signaalapparaten, Hengelo, Netherlands The Plessey Company Limited, Weybridge, Surrey, England Racal-Thermionic Limited, Southampton, England Selenia - lndustrie Elettroniche Associate S. p. A. Rome, Italy Software Sciences Ltd., Farnborough, Hampshire, England Space Research Corporation, Inc. Quebec, Canada The Solartron Electronic Group Limited, Farnborough, Hants., England Stansaab Elektronik AB, Jarfalla, Sweden Thomson - CSF, Paris, France The International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations would like to invite all corporations, organizations, and institutions interested in and concerned with the maintenance and promotion of safety in air traffic to join their organization as Corporation Members.

Corporation Members support the aims of the Federation by supplying the Federation with technical information and by means of an annual subscription. The Federation's international journal "The Controller" is offered as a platform for the discussion of technical and procedural developments in the field of air traffic control.

IFATCA

JOURNAL

OF

AIR

TRAFFIC CONTROL

THE CONTROllER Frankfurt am Main, February 1975

Volume 14 · No. 1

Publlsher: International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations, P. 0. B. 196, CH-1215 Geneva 15 Airport, Switzerland.

Officers of IFATCA: J-D. Monin, President, 0. H. J6nsson, Vice-President (Technical);· R. E. Meyer, VicePresident (Professional), H. Guddat, Vice-President (Administration), T. H. Harrison, Executive Secretary, J. Gubelmann, Treasurer.

Editor: G. J. de Boer, P. 0. B. 8071 Edleen, Kempton Park, Tvl., 1625 South Africa Telephone: 975-3521 Contributing Editor: V. D. Hopkin (Human Factors) Managing Edllor: Horst Guddat, D-6368 Bad Vilbel 2, Otto-Bussmann-StraBe 7 (Federal Republic of Germany).

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Subscription Rate: OM 6.- per annum for members of IFATCA OM 10.- per annum for non-members (Postage will be charged extra) Contributors are expressing their personal points of view and opinions, which must not necessarily coincide with those of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA).

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CONTENTS

The Air Traffic Controller's Legal Liabilities ......... · · · · · · ·

4

ATC and the Miniplane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

Air Traffic Control: The only sure way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

Incident Investigation Procedures

................... ·....

14

ATC Developments in the United States ............. · · · · · · ·

16

Air Traffic Control: Profession without Status ......... · · · · · · ·

19

The Case for Controllers to halt Traffic under adverse Weather Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

How not to combat Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation . . . . . .

27

News from the Federation .....•.................. · · · · · · . .

29

IFATCA's Standing Committee I

................ · · · · · · · · · ·

31

News from Member Associations ................. · · · · · · · . .

33

Plan Ahead

................................. · · · · · · · · · · .

35

Book Review ................................ · · · · · · · · · · . .

40

Aviation on Stamps .......................... · · · · · · ·.....

41

News from Corporation Members ......... · · · · · · · · · · · · · . . . .

42

Airports and their Control Towers .............. · · · . . . . . . . . .

45

To the Ladles .................... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · . . . . .

46

When a Pilot needs help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

The Piiot's Point of View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

Cover: Horst Guddat Advertisers In this Issue: Ferranti Limited (page 24/25) Civil Air Operations Officers' Association of Australia (Inside & Back Cover)

Editiorial A Matter of Priorities All of us, in our private lives, are faced at times with the necessity of having to cut our cloth according to our means. This also applies to institutions, national as well as international, and with the darkened world-wide economic outlook and rampant inflation, many organisations are carrying out the exercise of deciding where their priorities are. Our Federation is no exception. At the Autumn 1974 meeting of the Executive Board, it was decided to put our priorities as follows: (1) the secretariat to be maintained and funded as at present; (2) every effort will be made to cover the cost of the Federation's journal; (3) the budget for 1975 will be produced in accordance with the resolutions of Annual Conference as an estimated maximum.

It will be seen that IFATCA - in spite of constantly increasing difficulties in trying to make ends meet - has no intention of abdicating from its responsibilities. There is no let-up in its efforts to achieve its stated objectives: (1): to promote safety, efficiency and regularity in International Air Navigation; (2) to assist and advise in the development of safe and orderly systems of Air Traffic Control; (3) to promote and uphold a high standard of knowledge and professional efficiency among Air Traffic Controllers; (4) to protect and safeguard the interests of the Air Traffic Control Profession; (5) to make mutual benefit affiliations with other international organisations; (6) to strive for a world-wide Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations.

In most countries, air traffic controllers are nowhere near their ultimate goal of achieving true professional status. Many work in trying conditions in inadequate facilities with no hope of improvement in sight within their national environment. They have pinned their sole hopes for change on what can be done for them internationally, so that their own reluctant Administrations eventually have to follow suit. IFATCA is working ceasesly on an international level to help bring about those changes, and its officers are totally dedicated to that cause.

However, there are indications that one or two people, also faced with making economies, are thinking of reducing their organisation's involvement with the Federation's international activities. This would undoubtedly be the thin edge of the wedge. In this connection, following up just one way of thought, the fact must not be overlooked that in the highly sophisticated aviation safety environment in which pilots and controllers operate, professional and technical demands are forever increasing, and pilots nor controllers can afford to rely only on what a pure trade union can do for them. Trade union activity is, of course, important, but equally important, and perhaps even more so in our profession, is the development of the highest attainable skills in the ATC world. That can not be done by a pure trade union but only by a highly competent professional body such as IFALPA or IFATCA. You cannot, in the pilot/ controller field of operations, advance your cause by trade union activity only. Actually, in our sphere, it works the other way around: first, we must go after the highest possible standards of technical and professional achievement; second, we must - in doing this _ not overlook the material benefits which are so important in the human and environmental context of our working lives. Therefore, to get our point of view across to international institutions, much more is needed than simple union mentality, and it is through them that we hope to improve so many things which bother us at present.

Wake Turbulence: Where Do We Stand?

The installation at London's Heathrow of equipment on loan from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration for investigating the properties of trailing vortices has taken place at a time when airport authorities are becoming increasingly concerned about the limiting effect the wake of wide-bodied aircraft can have on runway utilization.

Attention has now repeatedly been drawn to the potential hazard created by the vortex wake of large aircraft. The accident to the DC-9 at Fort Worth, Texas, in May 1972, is an extreme exa":1ple of what might happen when a very h~avy j~t aircraft is followed too closely by a lighter aircraft. In the case of the DC-9 the separation distance between it and the oc-10 which was generating the wake was only about 2 1/4 n. m.

Air Marshall I. G. Broom, Controller of Britain's National Air Traffic Services, writes .

FLIGHT International: "At the time of the DC-9 accident at Fort Worth, the regulatio~: which existed in the U.K. calle~ for a minimum separation distance between a oc-10 and a following DC-9 of 5 n. m. or JUSt over two minutes (just over twice the separation which was applied at Fort Worth). For the past two-and-a-half years pilots and airlines h .

I A' T . . ave 1r raff1c Services in the recording of wake turbule co-operated with the Nat1ona . f th nee ose reports showed that with a planned separation distance of incidents. An analysis o

2

5 n. m. for a lighter aircraft behind a wide-bodied jet the vortex wake from the wide-bodied jets gave rise to an unacceptable number of "more severe" incidents. Since March 1974 the minimum separation distance in the U.K. for a lighter aircraft behind a wide-bodied jet on the approach to land phase has been increased to 6 n. m.; separation distance in most other cases was not changed. This distance correspondends to a separation of between two-and-a-half and three minutes at the usual approach speeds of transport aircraft.

Since the increase in spacing there has been a noticeable reduction in both the number and severity of reported incidents of disturbances when following wide-bodied jets.

The data sample since last March is still not large enough for positive deductions to be made, but there is every indication that our new separation distances, which some other countries are now starting to adopt, are about right."

Controllers in the U.K. and in those other countries can consider themselves lucky that their Administrations have given them guidelines to adopt, because in the overwhelming majority of member countries of IFATCA no such guidelines have been laid down and controllers are wondering what they must do. On the one hand, they are under pressure of both airport authorities and airlines to cut down delays in the landing rate to a minimum, and on the other hand they are informed by IFATCA's Legal Committee of at least one case where a controller has found himself in court accused of causing an accident by allowing a smaller aircraft to land behind a larger one with a disastrous result. It would appear that until ICAO comes up with some world-wide ruling, controllers throughout the world would be well advised to adopt the standards which Air Marshall Broom has outlined.

While on this topic, it is perhaps not well known that wingtip vortices can also create havoc on the ground. In the same issue, another correspondent writes: "My involvement with trailing vortex damage started on July 14, 1968, when three holes suddenly and noisily appeared in my roof. At that time, as Chairman of the Cranford Residents' Association, I was in a good position to start investigations into this and other cases. I have now investigated 31 cases of roof damage caused by trailing vortices which have damaged 41 roofs. The most serious one occurred 2.65 miles from touchdown at Heathrow. The damage comprised three large holes in the roof and 64 large tiles needed replacing, a total weight of around 2 1/2 cwt. There are approximately 5,000 people in approximately 1,975 homes at risk on the eastern side of the airport. On the western side, the numbers are approximately 250 people and 100 houses.

On July 1, 1972, Concorde 002 during an approach to runway 28 R passed over Cranford, caused the following damage to the roofs of two houses: two areas on one roof needed replacement of approximately 30 tiles, while on the other roof 15 tiles had to be replaced.

The tiles fell in the back gardens of the respective houses. A disturbance was also caused at a third house. After Concorde had flown over, people noticed a rotary washing line at the end of the garden start to rotate, followed by two deck chairs being blown over, one of these was then picked up and thrown against the back of the house. Cups and saucers under the deckchairs were broken. A written complaint was made to the British Airports Authority about the damage, and this was passed to the Ministry of Defence Claims Commission. Compensation was paid to both the owners of the affected houses with damaged roofs.''

One reassuring thought for controllers: We are unlikely to find ourselves in court accused GdB of causing damage to roof tiles, deckchairs or cups and saucers.

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3

The Air Traffic Controller's Legal Liabilities* Introduction The problem of the Air Traffic Controller's legal liabilities was clearly spotlighted by a court-case of some time ago, when a French Air Traffic Controller at Pointe-a-Pitre - Le Raizet (Guadeloupe), Mr. Jaques Edmond, had the distressing experience to be sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment (suspended) as the result of his involvement in an aircraft accident. Mr. Edmond was subsequently acquitted on appeal in March 1974. More recently, the Yugoslav Association hired the best lawyers available to defend the Air Traffic Controller involved in the Titograd accident where an airliner crashed into a mountain. The controller was put into jail and still awaits the Court's decision, but there are hopes that he will soon be freed and reinstated. At its Reykjavik 1973 Conference, IFATCA h~ esta~lished a permanent Legal Committee under the cha1rmansh1p of Mr. A. Avgoustis, LL. B. (London), of the Cy~rus Air Traffic C~n­ trollers' Association, and this Committee as presently examining a number of legal aspects which in one form or another may affect other controllers in the future. . .

At a Symposium organised by the Fren~h _Air }"r~fflc Controllers' Association in 1972, the Association mv1ted Maitre BOULLEZ, a Counsel of Law with the 'Conseil d'Etat', to present a paper on the Air Tra~ic Controller's legal liabilities, and this paper, together ~1th some qu7stions and answers which followed Ma1tre BOULLEZ s presentation illustrate the legal problems which may entangle a ~ember of the controllers' profession.

The establishment of the Legal Committee. reflects the ·s felt ·an IFATCA circles regarding. the legal . concern w h .1ch 1 Law, and at as hoped POSITion 0 f the controller in a Court of Z' dd . th"s that by reproducing Maitre BOULLE s . a res~ in . 1 issue, together with the current series of mformat1ve articles on International Law by Mr. E. McCluskey, B. A., D. P.A., A. F. R. AE. s., of the Eurocontrol Guild, Memb~re Associations may benefit to the extent that they wall have a clearer picture of our legal position than before.

Address by Maitre BOULLEZ The task of the Air Traffic Controller is a diffi.cult one, calling not only for technical skill, but als~ - I thank - for as well as a person w h o ·1s well - balanced both physically . emotionally and psychologically. There as the prob~em of adaptibility to the duties involved. If, for example, a fireman of esteem, su ff ers f rom ve rt ·go 1 - he may be a man worthy . liability is not at issue. . eman . Therefore, . b ut a very b a d f 1r ·1f errors are ma de due to permanent or passing physical . 1 ·inaptitude during the performance of. a or psycho Iog1ca , d contro II er s ut•1es , th"as does not come under the heading . . bi" h d ·in "CONTROL" (Journal of the French Air • Originally pu 1s e b • ociation) and translated from the French Y .

Traffic Controllers Ass .

• d cated In England graduating Angela Bessis Mme Bess1s was e u · · 't After her marriage to an Expert In the B. A. from Leeds Universi Y· . h worked for four years in . d Et des spat1ales, s e Centre Nat1onale es u t I Experimental Centre at the Simulations Division of the Eur~c:n ~o assisted greatly in the Bretigny sur Orge. Duri.ng. this peno s e trol Guild of Air Traffic drav.:ing up of the Const1tut1on of the Eurocon nt studies at the SorServ1ces. Having succesfully completed rece t . • • . b free-lance trans 1a or spec1a11sing in • onne, Mme Bess 1s is n?w a .

Member of the EuroAerospace subjects. She 1s the first Honorary control Guild.

4

of liability, at least not the controller's personal legal liability.

However. taking the kind of job into account and the possibility of error being dependent on the frailty of human nature, some degree not only of vigilance, but also of understanding, is called for on the part of superior Officers in charge of the Establishment. Evaluation of a controller's performance by his superior officers does not necessarily lead to either a legal or a disciplinary condemnation. If he is relegated to the 'side-lines' or moved to another position as a result of physical or emotional fatigue or any other kind of difficulty well-known to doctors and psychologists, this is not a sanction, but a measure taken with regard to organization. What is needed, on these points, is a deep and reciprocal understanding betweeen the controllers and their superior officers with regard to the duties involved.

Both must be fully aware of this situation.

These observations are meant to pinpoint the problem of the air traffic controllers's penal, financial and disciplinary liabilities. Obviously this problem has to be raised, since it is impossible to say that an Air Traffic Controller has no legal liability. It is, in fact, a threefold one: penal, financial or civil, and disciplinary. Of course we are working within a specific legal system - that of French Law and are therefore obliged to keep within its terms of reference. As yet, no one has yet come up with a legal system that deals with the liabilities of Air Traffic Controllers (Note: IFATCA's Legal Committee has now undertaken such studies - Ed.). There is a clear likelihood that one will eventually emerge similar to those at present In force dealing with the specific liabilities of teachers and judges.

But as it does not yet exist, Air Traffic Controllers' liabilities have to be seen in the general context of French Law, either administrative, penal or civil.

It must be pointed out that these three liabilities are entirely independent. That is to say that liability may be on three counts: penal, civil and disciplinary; all of which will be considered separately and according to different criteria. But don't get too alarmed; you are not all going to find yourselves dismissed, in debt or imprisoned!

Penal Liability Penal liability involves a certain number of infringements committed by Civil Servants, such as breach of duty, embezzlement, etc., I am not going to talk about these as I don't really see how you, in your job, could commit such infringements. In fact, taking into account the nature of your work, the liability to which you are most frequently subject, is that under Articles 319 and 320 of our Penal Code, that is, injury or manslaughter by an imprudent act.

Here, I am of course ruling out a controller who would deliberately give erroneous directions to a pilot with the express intention of causing a mid-air collision, so that he could witness such a disaster. That would be purely and simply murder, and is a charge answerable in the Assize Court. It is not necessarily a purely theoretical hypothesis, although I do not consider it to be a common problem, except where those responsible for the psychological and psychiatric screening of controllers let through a paranoic of the type found before the Assize Courts.

Therefore, the problem facing you would be that of liability for injury or manslaughter through an imprudent act, in the case where a collision occurs, either in the air or on the ground, as the result of negligence. To quote Article 319 of our Penal Code - "Whoever, by incompetence, imprudence, inattention, negligence or disregard of the rules has involuntarily committed manslaughter or has involuntarily been the cause of same, will be punished by imprisonment. . . etc." Article 320 deals with injuries, among other items.

When I talk about penal liability, I would like to make it clear that the Civil Servant found guilty of one of these offences receives punishment, as would any other person.

For the moment I am setting aside civil liability; in fact, the two are not connected. You may incur penal liability without having to pay an additional penny, apart of course - from the fine. Very often in the case of doctors' liabilities in state hospitals, a doctor is penally condemned if he should leave a swab inside a patient. He will be penally condemned, but if damages and compensation are awarded, it is the Public Service, that is the hospital service, which will be liable. So the doctor would be fined and may even receive a suspended prison sentence, in the case of a graver mistake, but that will be all. Civil liability will be met by the Public Service.

You can see, therefore, that when I talk about penal liability, I am talking about punishment - prison or a fine.

The two things must not be confused. As I said before, the three liabilities are independent from one another.

From this, you will appreciate that penal liability is rather vague, as it covers so many things - inattention, imprudence, negligence and misjudgement. I cannot list here all the errors which could possibly occur during the performance of your duties, as I am not sufficiently familiar with them. But all acts of negligence can involve penal liability, from the moment that there is reasonable certainty 1 ) of their existence. However, do not think that all acts of negligence or inattention entail penal liability, but only acts of negligence or inattention which have led to loss or damage, and the courts of law which in all instances pass judgment on such offences always take your duties, and the nature of your job, into account.

Undoubtedly there exists what we call the courts' powers of evaluation and assessment, which are quite impossible to define in my brief paper, especially as I don't think that they have yet had the opportunity to direct their attention to a problem of this kind. But the matter of penal liability is very real and Air Traffic Controllers are exposed to it.

I specifically mentioned non-observation of the rules. It is very common for the courts to apply Article 319 in cases involving road accidents. If you go through a red traffic light or ignore a stop-sign, or overtake on the wrong side of the road, or ignore a give-way sign, etc., this is nonobservation of the rules. If this results In a collision between two vehicles where there is injury or even loss of life, you are in the category of manslaughter by imprudence, through non-observation of the rules.

You, as Air Traffic Controllers, obviously have rules which must be respected. What are these rules? I believe there are a vast number, made up of orders, and decisions, some of which are not very precise, from what I have seen of them, and then above all, there are those called 'recom1

) Under Anglo-Saxon Law there Is no penal liability If there Is reasonable doubt.

mendations' concerning the traffic in general. Here you may correct me as I go along, since the file that was given to me was rather a thick one! The contents of this file of which you must all be aware - because if you are not, I for one, would never travel by air again - are regarded as rules.

Let us take, for example, what I have been told about the 10 or 5 nautical miles separation rule between aircraft, which appears clear enough to an outsider like myself. If a controller took it upon himself to lessen this separation to a little less than the 5 NM or 10 NM, whichever the case may be, and damage or loss results, this is undoubtedly a case of non-observation of the rules.

Of course, in non-observation of the rules there is some room for evaluation. There are rules which are inalterable, like the 10 or 5 NM or 1,000 feet vertical separation, etc., but in certain instances there is a margin of interpretation and it is not impossible that in the case of traffic saturation you receive instructions to make, shall we say, a looser interpretation. Here is the problem of illegal orders, which is of a very wide scope and which I dare not enter upon here, as it is an extremely delicate point in law. Must one obey an illegal order, that is to say, an order which is contrary to the rules?

I do not wish to compare you in any way with war criminals, that is not what I am getting at, but this same question was raised at the time of the Liberation when Civil Servants, and particularly the French police: had .performed certain illegal acts during the Occupation either under orders from the government in Vichy or from the occupying German authorities. The question was, as to what degree under the prevailing circumstances they should, or could, have obeyed or disobeyed. We all know that systematic disobedience presents grave problems and the caselaw which was used to evaluate their degree of liability had to incorporate a wide range of shades of meaning. Since then, the problem has not come up ~ery ofte~.

But in cour case it is theoretically not impossible that in order to deal with the traffic swiftly and with the minimum of delay, you are told to "reduce the 10 NM slightly" and thus there is conflict between the instructions that are regarded as regulations, and an order that you may be given by a superior officer. Here I am raising a problem to which I can offer no concrete solution at present, but what is certain is that the person who gives such an order would also be penally liable.

You are therefore likely to incur penal liab.ility f~r t~e reasons that I have just briefly dealt with. It is an indisputable fact that Air Traffic Controllers do not enjoy penal immunity and, considering the nature of your ~uties an_d working conditions, I acknowledge the heavy weight ~f .this liability. You have to use your initiative and make decisions very rapidly - distinguish left from right, etc.. - and co~­ fusion may arise with disastrous results. That is why I said earlier that the job of an Air Traffic Controller calls for a well-balanced person. As I don't know my right from my left - 1 always have to think about it - I would make a very bad one.

So much for penal liability.

Financial Liability Here 1 think that I can put your minds at rest because you are Civil Servants, and the case-law applied in the Conseil d'Etat and the courts dealing with such disputes is favourable to the Civil Servant. Incidentally, there is a question of expediency which comes into play. If there is 5

a collision as a result of controller-error, and loss and damage or loss of life will be of a high order, I don't think that there would be any point in the airline, the passengers, or the families of passengers suing the controller who allegedly caused the accident. The controller would obviously not be able to meet the damages awarded, and if I was advising an airline on this question, I would say, "Listen, that's no use, find some one who is capable of paying the damages awarded." So there is already this practical aspect of the situation, which is very important for us lawyers. Principles are fine, but you cannot disregard reality. Let us return to the purity of principles.

With regard to the liabilities of the Civil Servant, there is a fundamental distinction that has to be made between the offence committed during the performance of duty and a personal offence which can be separated from this. Why this distinction? It derives from a principle of French Law which dates back to the Revolution, called the separation of powers and which you have probably heard referred to in conversation. It means that the judge has no right to make any evaluation or assessment on the workings of the Public Service and it is a sancrosanct principle of our law 2 ). With the exception of assault and adultery, the judge's sphere of influence stops short at the doors of the Administration. Therefore, as soon as there is any evaluation to be made concerning the workings of a department, the judge's authority is superseded by that of the administrative judge.

The Civil Servant is not liable with regard to offences committed during the performance of his duty; he has absolutely no legal liability vis-a-vis the community in general, and this point has been re-affirmed in recent judgements. I am not going to give you a lesson in law, but am merely giving you some basic legal information and I want to make it clear that the offence during the performance of duty covers a very wide area.

I was talking earlier about penal liability. When a Civil Servant commits a punishable offence - punishable by a prison sentence or a fine - it does not automatically result that he is liable financially. A penal offence may well be an offence committed during the performance of duty and I can quote a very striking example of this, a decisive judgement passed in the Conseil d'Etat in 1924 in the Poursines case. Poursines was an army officer who had a certain number of people shot during the First World War because they were under suspicion. However, his suspicions had been aroused rather too hastily. The State was instructed to compensate the families of the victims, and the State - that is the Ministry of Defence - found that Poursines had pursued his initiative rather too far and proved himself rather lacking in judgement in having shot a number of people who were only under suspicion. Nevertheless, the Conseil d'Etat ruled that Poursines had ordered the executions during the performance of his duty and that therefore, he was not liable, financially.

From this you can see that you do have some latitude.

If, in the performance of your duty, you were induced to commit an involuntary penal offence - and, of course, involuntary in its consequences, from the point of view of claims for damages - it would be considered as an offence committed during the performance of duty. If you say "right", instead of "left", or "20 degrees" instead of "10 degrees", and there is a consequent collision; if it was 2 ) No such highly developed system of administrative law exists under any Anglo-Saxon Legal System.

6

not a voluntary fault but, for example, a slip of the tongue, it is regarded as an offence during the performance of duty from the point of view of damages etc., which means that you, as Civil Servants, would not have to accept any financial liability.

Of course, in certain cases there may be what is termed an accumulation of offences; it means that loss or damage is caused by a combination of an offence committed during the performance of duty on the one hand, and a personal offence on the other.

Liability of this type evolves from the 'colonel's chauffeur' situation. This is the simple hypothesis of the chauffeur trusted by the colonel and who therefore has access to his car and uses it for a trip out alone to see his parents or anybody else for that matter, and causes an accident during the detour or trip, whichever it was. This is a personal offence, as there is no relationship between the trip and the chauffeur's duties. It is a breach of duty, in that the chauffeur has gone beyond the bounds encompassing 'duty' as he has access to the car for chauffeuring the colonel, and not for other purposes. This is a personal offence committed by a Civil Servant, but there is also an offence committed during the performance of duty because the colonel did not exercise adequate supervision over his chauffeur, or the garage attendant let the car out without an order to do so. Therefore, it is a combination of offences and under this hypothesis, the victim of the accident has the choice between suing either the chauffeur personally, or his employer. In general, the victim sues the employer who will have to pay out damages on the grounds of an offence during the performance of duty. But when the employer (the State) has paid the damages, he will turn to the chauffeur and say: "You committed a personal offence for which the State has paid, so now you can reimburse the State."

You can see that in this case there was a personal offence committed. If the colonel's chauffeur had caused an accident whilst the colonel was travelling in the car it would have been an offence committed during the per~ formance of duty, because the chauffeur was performing his duty at the time of the accident.

You are performing your duties when you are in front of your radar screen, so there would probably be an offence during the performance of duty entailing the State's liability, but the Administration woud have no grounds for an action against the controller except in the case of a personal offence which could be isolated from his actual duties.

Some one has said to me: "Yes, alright, but shouldn't we be insured all the same?" Here I would immediately answer "No", because the insurance companies will not insure against voluntary offences, so under these conditions, the question does not arise. It also seems to me that in the case of a collision - taking into account the control operating conditions - the Administration's own liability would only be incurred under the heading of a grave offence.

Therefore, I think that Air Traffic Controllers risk virtually nothing as regards financial liability.

Disciplinary Liability This is the third liability which may be combined with the other two, or may function independently.

Disciplinary liability implies an offence in the exercise of a specific job or profession and it is therefore assessed

in relation to the professional obligations involved. What has to be determined is whether, in a given and often highly variable situation, and at a given time, the controller did or did not commit an offence in relation to what he should or could have done.

This is an offence in the exercise of a profession and it is obvious that the offence will be assessed differently if the controller has 25 aircraft under his control compared to only 4 or 5. If he is controlling 25 aircraft and reads his newspaper at the same time, this could be considered an offence in the exercise of the profession, but like the penal offence, it is difficult to give a precise example because evaluation of the professional offence depends upon the prevailing circumstances.

The disciplinary offence is dealt with by a disciplinary procedure and accompanied by the recommandations of a Commission composed aqually of representatives of the controllers and superior officers (in practice the Administration always abides by the recommendations of this Commission). Evaluation of a professional offence rests, of course, upon the understanding of the superior authorities and it is first presented before the Administrative judge in the Administrative Court and then to the judge of appeal in the Conseil d'Etat.

This then, is a brief resume of the disciplinary offence.

Penal liability is not entirely excluded, but things must not be forced out of proportion. In the cases concerning a professional offence with which I am familiar (not yours, of course), and dealing with questions of inattention, acts of imprudence etc., the courts order an enquiry to be conducted by people in the same profession so that they are thoroughly cognizant with the situation and they usually only penalize where the offence is a fairly obvious one.

Evaluation of an offence differs according to the nature of the job or profession, and obviously, in the case of an Air Traffic Controller, any assessment of whether certain behaviour constituted on offence, woud be exacting.

Excessive misgivings are therefore uncalled for and I should like to finish on that note. There is, of course, moral liability which depends upon the individual's conscience and falls outside my sphere.

Questions and Answers Here follow some of the questions, and answers, put to Maitre Boullez after his address.

Question: Would you Judge the controller's 'de Jure de facto' penal liability as being greater than that of his superior officers, or does the concept of llablllty exist at all levels?

Answer: First of all, there Is no 'de facto' liability, only legal liability if the conditions laid down In our Penal Code are fulfilled.

This being the case, what I have said concerning the controller Is equally applicable to his superior officers and If there Is a collision, for example, as we are working within this hypothesis, which Is caused by a combination of offences committed by the controller and his superior officer, or officers, whatever their grade, there may be a number of perpetrators In the dock and not just the controller only.

Question: What liability would a French controller have for an accident which occurred over territory outside French jurisdiction or over international waters?

Answer: If the accident occurred over land, it Is an international penal law Issue. Liability would be as set down under French law, that Is Articles 319 and 320 of the Penal Code, as I explained earller, except that there are specific procedural conditions. If I remember correctly, Article 691 defines the procedure for such an offence.

A complaint at law must be made by the injured party or the foreign Government and sent to the offices of the French Public Prosecutor where It can only be heard In the French courts. In other words, the victims will have no right of direct action, and French law will be applied.

I should also add that penal llabllity under French law is only applicable If the same offence would also be punishable in the foreign territory in question. In other words, if such an event occurred in Germany, for example, there must be similar dispositions under German law covering manslaughter and injury by an act of imprudence. There has to be parallel applicable legislation.

I had a case like this In the Appeal Court some time ago, where I obtained the reversal of a decision made in the Toulouse Court of Appeal. It concerned an offence of breach of trust committed in Morocco and proceedings were taken against my client in France.

I obtained a reversal because the Court of Appeal had not ascertained whether breach of trust was punishable or not in Morocco.

For an offence to be punishable in France, it must be similarly punishable in the foreign territory where It was committed. As the same is true of air space, in such a case French law woul~ be applied. 3) If the accident occurred over International waters, national law would not be applicable and there would be virtually no penal liability. I really don't know the answer. It would have to be s~p­ posed that Air Traffic Control was Jn effect exercised over the no man's land' of International waters.

Mr. LEVEQUE, Director of Air Navigation: If I may voice an opinion If the accident occurred over land, the problem could only arise where there is a discrepancy between territorial borders a~d the limits of the Flight Information Regions (FIRs), for example wrth the French territory which fa under the airspace delegated to Geneva Centre but such a possibility Is pretty rare. On the other hand, it could ~ccur when organisations of an international nature come into being, such as Eurocontrol and, here again, is anothe~ problem which should be solved by specific procedures. If the accident h~p­ pened over international waters Maltre eoullez Is right in saying that ATC was exercised over l~tematlonal waters. This Is, in fact, what happens where broadly speaking, each State has found Itself virtually invested with operational liablllty over International ~~ters, but I don't know whether this can be related to the legal llabrltty of a controller in the air space over his own country. and 0 .ut .to t~e 6 to 12 mile limit of territorial waters. This operational lta~rllty ~s contested particularly by maritime authorities, for examp e, w 0 consider the sea to be a 'no man's land' but Maritime Law and Air Law are not the same, at least not in their application, but the question is Indeed a valid one.

Question: Did you say, with regard to disciplinary liability, that disciplinary action is taken by the Law Courts?

Answer: No, that Is not exactly what I said. Disciplinary ~ow.er is in the hands of the administrative hierarchy, that Is the aut orrty holding the power of appointment. The drawing up of a full _rep~rt . . ede the sanction rton the affair and the relevant complaints prec t h.

1 self. The controller Is told why action is being taken aga ns. . rm and what the case is against him He appears before a Commrssron composed equally of members ~f the Administration and elected staff representatives. He may seek legal aid. . . on the existence of The Commission formulates an opinion "t 1 1 grounds for sanction and If it decides that these are proved, ~so . . sed The supervisor formulates an opinion on the punishment propo · di . rimand to smrssa 1 th puts this Into effect and It may range from a rep offence. 0 nee e an d the refusal of pension rights, for a grave b sanctions are put into effect by the Administration, they ,ar~ ~~ ; mitted to the Administrative Courts and If the Civil Serv~~t d~:t st a he was wrongly punished, he will appeal in the Consbe d ~f ~n 1 the grounds that the Commission went beyond the oun s s prerogatives.. facts and proof The Administrative Court will first check on the and then of their existence which usually presents no problems, t't t • . h ther they cons 1 u e a . supposing that they do exist ' examines w e ·11 superse de th at o1 eh 1 professional offence The judge•s assessment wr • t of Fran aw w 111 the supervisor 1 hope that these intricate po 1n s t t" · who are no na 1ona1s be understood by those of you listening to me f t b f hi the ac s e ore m of France. The judge will thus decide wheth er ff t• h . . the a Irma rve, e wr 11 constitute an offence and, If the answer 1s 1n If h d ·d confirm the Ministry's or the supervisor's decision. e ect es I to the contrary he over-rules the previous decision. . .

What you ~ust remember. above all, Is that admin1strat ve and disciplinary procedures do protect the rights of the Civil .servant. He has the right to be heard and has access to legal ard. and the Ministry's disciplinary powers are held In check by the courts.

Question: Is it possible that a controller's liabili~ ~ay result. in his ultimate dismissal without any additional discrplt~ary action being taken against him except for that within the confines of the Civil Service?

3)

Anglo-Saxon law attempts to apply the law applicable where the accident occurred.

7

An~wer:

That is what I was explaining earlier. The three liabilities independent. You may be punished on penal, financial and d1sc1plmary counts, or only on one of them.

Take an air-miss, for example, where there Is no resulting di~aster. There could be no penal sanctions as there was no loss of hfe. The requisite conditions for the application of such sanction are unfulfilled, since the Penal Code states: "Whoever shall have committed involuntary manslaughter or have involuntarily been the cause of same." If there is no disaster, no loss of life and no injury t~ere. can be no penal liability, as one of the conditions of appllca: t1on 1s absent. The air-miss could, however, engender a disciplinary procedure where it could be said that it constituted a professional offence. Sanctions would therefore only be of the disciplinary kind, although this could entail dismissal and loss of pension rights, in a really serious case. If the offence is a minor one, the result could be a reprimand or a mandatory change of sector or position. t am ~ot fully familiar with your scale of disciplinary measures, but t imagine them to be the same as for the Civil Service in general.

I should like, all the same, to say the following. We have discussed working conditions at some length and I think this problem has certain legal aspects. It Is obvious that due to the conditions under which Air Traffic Controllers work, and the liabilities entailed, that the Administration has, shall we say, an obligation to ensure that they are afforded the best possible working conditions In order to perform a difficult job. In considering liability, I think that these conditions would have to be taken into account in the event of an offence of any nature, either penal or disciplinary and both the judge and the disciplinary authority would undoubtedly do so.

An offence, or at least what appears objectively to be one, cannot be assessed by applying a rigid set of criteria. Questions such as: Is the controller over-loaded? Or Tired? Is he working under disgraceful working conditions? Is there adequate provision for medical check-ups? And does he have a permanently heavy volume of traffic under his control, are all vital, and no discussion on penal or disciplinary liability is conceivable without them. The Administration has a definite legal, If not moral, obligation to provide the best possible working conditions for their controllers, so that they carry out their duties correctly and perform, in as normal a way as possible, a job which we all know carries a certain number of liabilities and effects on health.

Question: t should like to raise the question of the radar controller's work-load, with regard to deviations from the reguiations and to know what you think about the practice at peak periods in all control centres of controllers taking charge of a number of aircraft which exceeds that set down in the regulations. a~e ~u~te

Answer: This is a problem that I wanted to leave aside, deliberately, during this brief session, but It ls quite understandable that it gives rise to concern. It should also give rise to concern to the Administration because - where working conditions make it necessary to ask ~ore of a controller than Is normally possible, taking Into account his faculties and capabilities - it is placing him in a situation where risks increase rapidly.

This being so, once again, from the point of view of llablllty (which ties up with what I was saying just before your question), It is impossible to assess it at such times. I would even go as far as to say that it no longer exists where the work-load is excessive and the controller finds It physically impossible to fulflll his duties.

This is not a mere theoretical hypothesis, and I would compare it with a fairly well known point in law with regard to the 'Securite Sociale' (French National Health Service) and which gives rise to a sizeable body of present day case-law. You may be aware that when you have an accident at work, there may be a case of what ls termed "unjustifiable offence concerning work, on the part of the employer."

The employer would then have to pay an annuity In addition to the one stipulated by law and it may also have repercussions in the field of penal law. I am thinking here of haulage contractors.

Many of them are subject to a certain number of very specific laws governing working conditions. A lorry driver must not drive for more than a certain number of hours a day, with rest periods etc.

Unfortunately, few of them observe these laws and thus the Inevitable often happens _ a lorry driver, having driven for sixteen hours, falls asleep at the wheel and the lorry swerves off the road, out of control and causes an accident. In these cases, there Is always an "unjustifiable offence on the part of the employer," who has forced his employee to accept a work-load which exceeds his capacities, and in the case of penal liability, It is the employer who will find himself in the dock. and not the lorry driver.

Question: Again on the matter of the radar controller's workload, for us the problem is particularly difficult. Officially, for each position, the controller has a set work-load, according to the equipment facilities. to the sector in question and to what has been stlpu-

8

fated. Normally, therefore, he should not accept more than a set nu~~er of. aircraft. In other words, the controller Is supposed to be familiar with this regulation and yet he must also systematically lnfr!nge i~. Th.is also works the other way round - a person performing his duties 1s supposed to know the rules and therefore to accept the risk of taking on more aircraft than the number envisaged.

Answer: To take the example of the lorry driver. When he has done his eight hours, all he has to do Is to stop and draw onto the sid~ of ~he ~oad. However, his employer generally badgers him by saying: You ve got to go here, then there, then there, etc."

Theoretically, the driver has the legal right to say: "I don't work more than eight hours and when my eight hours are up, I'm stopping at the next transport cafe."

Your situation is rather similar If you say: "My traffic toad is stipulated In the regulations as so much, I only accept that number of aircraft, and that's the end of It." But that cannot be done In your profession.

In the case of an air-miss, as I said earlier, the liability would definitely not be the controller's; it would perhaps be the supervisor's or the centre superintendent's, or purely and simply that of the Administration, but certainly not the controller's.

Brief News Items Initial Phase of ARTS-3 Program Completed The initial phase of the Federal Aviation Administration's automated radar terminal system (ARTS-3) program ha~ been ~ompleted with the installation of the SperryUnivac equipment at Oakland International Airport. A total of 61 high-to-medium-density airports in the U.S. have now been provided with ARTS-3 equipment, in addition to the three FAA facilities that use the system for research and training purposes.

First operational airport system was delivered to Chicago's O'Hare International Airport on Dec. 27, 1970. The Japanese Government has also purchased the system fo installation at Tokyo and Osaka. r

Air Traffic Activity in the U. s.

Air tra~ic activity at Federal Aviation Administration air route traffic control canters, airport control tower d ¡ . s an . ht fl 19 service stations increased by 60/o during 1973.

It was the largest increase at FAA towers since 1968 and followed three years of declining activity. The total number of 1973 operations at the 386 control towers operated by FAA was 56.5 million, compared with 53 3 ¡ir . 1972 Ch" , O' . m1 ion m .

1cago s Hare International Airport remained the nation's busiest airport, followed by Santa Ana California; Van Nuys, California; Long Beach, Californi~; and Atlanta, Ga. . The five busiest carrier-only airports in addition to ~ Hare were Atlanta International, Los Angeles International, ~ohn F. Kennedy International and San Francisco l~ternat1onal. .The number of aircraft handled by the 27 air route tra~1c control canters last year was 23.3 million compared with 22 million in 1972.

The High Cost of Flying The pres~nt high price of aviation fuel has put new i~p.etus beh1~d Air Traffic Control studies aimed at mini~msmg the d1~r~ptions which prohibited milita air s ace .

imposes on c1v1I services

ry

P

(FLIGHT International)

ATC and the Miniplane

by Tirey K. Vickers

When the lights and gas pumps went on again all over the world, the price of gasoline bore no resemblance to what it was before the energy crunch, and more in creases may be in the pipeline. Besides the present trend toward smaller automobiles, this factor could start a definite trend toward smaller general aviation aircraft for building up flight time and for personal transportation .

To get much smaller than present production models means going f rom 2-seaters to single-seaters, with corresponding reductions in aircraft size, weight and horsepower. In line with the sort of aircraft to which we refer is a type which made its appearance three years ago, first as a home-built, and now offered as a factory-built production model. It is the exquisite little Bede BD-5 "Micro'', which is very aptly named as it is only 13-1/3-feet long, with a 21-112 foot wingspan. Powered by an adaptation of a rugged little German engine which has had long experience in snowmobiles, the BD-5 is expected to average over 40 nautical miles per U.S. gallon of fuel, at a speed approaching 200 knots. Prior to the fuel c risis the company announced that over 4000 orders had been placed for this model. A ssuming that the company stays in busi ness and the aircraft lives up to its predicted performan ce, th e appeal of its fuel economy should become even more alluring as the price of gasoline goes up. In this case it would be logical to expect that the number of aircraft of this type would continue to grow, and that with a sufficiently attrac tive market, competitive models ultimately would enter the picture.

Suppose, for exampl e, that the total population of this category of aircraft reaches 15,000, a significant percentage of the aviation fleet. What new or unusual factors wi ll thei r operation bring to the ATC system? What problems should we be anticipating and solving ahead of time, to enable these tiny person al aircraft to fit safely and smoothly into our airspace system ?

First, we should preface the followi ng discussion by emphasizing that it is not our intention to dwell on the BD-5 pe r se, but on the general type of small, highly efficient s ingle seater which it represents. For want of a better word , we'll call it a miniplane.

The characteristic difference between miniplanes and other ai rplanes is their s mallness. How will this affect their operation in the ATC system?

Visual Illusions The obvious effect of smallness is that the aircraft will be more difficult to spot visually, particularly at greater ranges or under hazy co nditions. This points up t he need for efficient scanning. t ectiniques and a high deg ree of alertness among pilots as well as controllers. Perhaps less obvious, but just as important, will be the need to guard against two visual illusions: a) There will be a tendency for miniplanes to appear to be moving faster than they actually are. For example, at 150 knots ground speed, a Boeing 727 travels 1-2 /J times its own length each second ; but at the same speed, and during the same interval of time, a BD-5 wi ll travel 19 times its own length! b) Until the aircraft is visually perceived or identified as a min iplane, there will be a tendency for it to appear to be farther away than it actually is. This situation co uld be extremly disconcerting to the pilot of an overtaking ai rcraft!

Conspicuity Th e sma ller the aircraft, the more important it becomes to make it as conspicious as possi ble, to other pilots and to Tower controll ers. Several years ago the FAA spent a lot of money on the aircraft conspicuity problem. T hey

The BD-5 has been referred to by editorial writers and aviation enthusiasts as "miraculous" , "sensational", "I ncredible" , and a host of other superlatives. The speedy, build-it-yourself alrplane has fired the imagination and the hearts of aviation enthusiasts because it can be constructed by the Inexperienced builder, is easy to fly, and performs like a fighter plane.

9

The BD-SJ is the jet versi on of the BD-5.

found that fluorescent paint can increase conspicuity but only at comparatively short ranges, within three miles or so, where the co lour can sti ll be discerned. At longer ranges the really important factor in visual detectio n is the degree of contrast between an object and its backgrou nd ; the idea here is the exact opposite of camouflage. As a result of this program, the FAA made the following recommendations : 1. Th e upper surfaces of an aircraft should be painted a light, high-reflectance colour.

2. The lower surfaces should be painted a dark, lowreflectance colour.

3. As a clue to f light direction, the entire tail should be painted in a solid fluorescent red or orange.

However, the degree of visual improvement with this co lour scheme was not great enough for the FAA to require its adoption; instead, the belief was fostered that see-and-be-seen was no longer a valid concept for ATC. Although some experts have pooh-poo hed the idea of using aircraft lights in the daytime, they may have ove rlooked the very distinctive and psychologically alerting effects of strobe li ghts for this purpose. We wo uld recommend that the daytime use of strobe lights by such aircraft, in congested traffic areas, be thoroughly investigated. We believe that, in many instances, strobe lights could provide the best mean s for pilots and controllers to detect and keep track of the location of these tiny aircraft.

Radar Detection and Tracking FAA specifications for the ARSR and ASR se ries of radars require that they be able to detect and display a 2-square-meter aircraft target out to a range of 55 nautical miles. However, up until recently, radar checks were normally made against available twin-engine flight check aircraft which had reflecting areas considerab ly larg er than two square meters (approximately 21 square feet) . These aircraft gave considerab ly better range performance th an could be expected with a 2-square-meter target, so the tests never actually proved that the radars could meet the basic FAA spec ifi cation.

10

But let's assume that all FAA radars do just meet specifi cations, by displaying a 2-square-meter target out to 55 nautical miles. What range performan ce could be expected with miniplane targets?

The cross-sectional area of the BD-5 in either the headon or tail-on aspect (flying directly toward, or away from. the radar antenna) is only about one sq uare meter. Theoretically, the reduced reflecting area would redu ce the maximum detection range of such targets to about 46 nautical miles.

The BD-5's reflecting area, as seen from the side, is slightly less than 3-1 12 square meters, about one third that of a Beech Bonanza. So if you have trouble with MTI fadeouts of Bonanza targets when they are on courses tangential to the radar antenna, the possibilities of such fadeouts with miniplanes wi ll be considerably greater.

One answer to these problems would be to require transponders for all aircraft below some certain arbitrary size. This should not be too unreasonable a price for miniplane pil ots to pay for flying in congested airspace.

Actually, in view of their very low radar refl ecting area, the safety advantage of having a transponder shou ld be higher for miniplanes than for any other type of heavierthan-ai r ai rcraft.

Instrumentation A large amount of instrumentation and electronics is hardly compatible with the miniplane concept, for a number of reasons besides cost. The BD-5 cockpit is only 23-1 h inches w ide, which limits the width of the instrument panel.

Extending the panel downward could interfere with t he pilot's leg movements as well as his entry and egress from the cock pit. Extending the panel upward could seriously affect the pilot's forward visibility. These factors limit the available space fo r instrument disp lay.

Other reasons which limit the installation of additional instrumentation in a miniplane are the electrical power requirements, as well as weight and balance problems, al l of which tend to become more formidable as the size of the aircraft is reduced.

This photograph of the jet cockpit shows " deploy" and " jettison" hand les respectively. These were utilised fo r spin test purposes and are not, of course, found in the normal BD-5 J et. The spin tests, incidentally, proved most successful and encouraging.

Pilot Workload The lack of space for a co-pil ot o r observer means th at t here w ill be no one to share th e functions of aircraft contro l, navigation, co mmunications, and watchi ng out fo r other ai rcraft. Therefore, miniplane pilots can be expected to be quite busy when operating in congested traffic areas.

Because of the light weight and c lose-coupled design, t he consequently low moments of inertia wi ll tend to prod uce very quick reactions to g usts and to 1he pilot's movements of the controls. This lively characteristic wi ll tend to keep the pilot busier than he wo uld be in a larger, mo re stable or sluggish ai rc raft.

In pusher-type miniplanes, t he wings w ill not be immersed in the propeller slipst ream. Consequently, they wi ll not have the benefit of instant lift w hen the throttle is opened, for example, to correct an excessive sink rate in landing.

In this respect, pi lots w ill have to think farther ahead of the airplane in o rder to allow for the momentary lag.

The lack of space for an instru ctor means that the pi lot will have to know how to fly the ai rcraft the first time he opens th e throttle for take-off. We understand that t he Bede Company has conside red the development of a simulator to familiarise pilots with the control characteristics of the BD-5, before t urn ing them loose. This sounds like an excellent idea. At least one Bede dealer is offe ring dual instruction in the little Pitts S-2 A 2-seater (fully ac robatic) bi plane, prior to solo flight in the BD-5.

Vortex Vulnerability The shorter the wing span of a succeeding aircraft, in comparison with the span of t he p receding aircraft, the greater is the possibi lity of the succeeding aircraft becoming completely immersed in a sing le vortex generated by the preceding aircraft, and thus getting rolled upside down, out of control. Research in the U.K. ind icates that the maximum vu lnerability to th is haza rd is reached when the span of the succeed ing aircraft is 25 per cent or less of the span of the prec eding aircraft.

There is already considerable evidence that the present 2-minute or 5-mile separation standard behind heavy jet aircraft may not always be adeq uate, where small aircraft are invo lved. Because of the span-ratio effect described above, it may become necessary to increase this standard where mi niplanes are concerned. The results could be very detrimental to airport capacity, if arrivals or departures continue to be sequenced on a first-come first-served basis.

However, the use of a selective sequencing procedu re could eliminate much of th is loss.

Select ive sequencing is based on a higher degree of preplann ed runway management than is normally used in today's ATC system. With selective sequencing, runway ope rations are preplanned in order to batch aircraft of similar characteristics and thus minimize the number of occasions when the increased vortex separation standard must be used. Alternatively (because the vortices from departures normally never reach arrivals, and vice versa) . the long approach interval behind a heavy jet aircraft can be used to advantage by c learing off a departure.

Ground Operations The presence of a miniplane on the active taxiways of a major airport is analogous in some respects to th at of a go-cart on a busy street. This is not to say that the operation is inherently dangerous. However, it does call for extra care on the part of g round controllers to make sure that t he miniplane is never put into a posit ion where it could inadvertently be run over or blown over by a larger aircraft. In this regard, t hree factors s hould be kept in mind: a) Because of its small, low profile, the miniplane is more likely to occasionally be hidden from the controll er's view, behind other taxiing or parked aircraft. During busy periods, ground contro llers should be especially careful that out-of-sight d oesn't mean out-of-mind. b) The s mall, low profi le of the mini plane also increases the possibi lity that it can get into the b lind spot directly in front of a larger taxiing aircraft. For this reason it 11

is especially important to advise the pilots of the larger aircraft, regarding a miniplane ahead.

necting points located 50 per cent of the distance between runway end and runway intersection.

c) The low profile of the miniplane also implies that the eye-level of its pilot will also be low. For example, the eyes of a taxiing BD-5 pilot are only about 3-'h feet above the pavement. As a result, he may require more visual assistance as far as the ground controller is concerned, than the pilots of other aircraft.

The operation of large numbers of miniplanes, with taxiing eye-levels less than four feet above the runway surface, may require that the above listed 5-foot sight-line standards be lowered accordingly. From the standpoint of airport management, this factor could affect the choice of crops, and the allowable height of the vegetation that is grown between runways.

If the proposed Dept. of Transport cost-allocation user charges go into effect, pilots will be assessed at least $ 3.00 per landing at any airport with an FAA control tower. In this case, it is expected that many miniplane pilots will avoid the use of such airports wherever possible. With respect to miniplane operations, it is of interest to note that for non-tower airports {where pilots must provide their own separation) the FAA presently has the following visibility standards:

1. Any two points five feet above a runway centerline must be mutually visible, along the entire runway length.

2. To avoid collisions between aircraft using different runways, there must be an unobstructed line of sight from any point five feet above one runway centerline, to any point five feet above the centerline of any intersecting runway, both points being within the area of the runway visibility zone, which is defined by con-

Conclusion Can miniplanes be fitted into the ATC system? The answer is a qualified "yes", as extra care will be required on the part of all the individuals involved. Knowing what problems to watch out for can be a big help, and we hope that this article has uncovered some new thoughts along this line.

Years ago we used to talk about "controlmanship". but the word is seldom heard any more. One of the most useful attitudes in developing controlmanship is empathy the ability of the controller to put himself into the pilot's place. Then it will become Instinctive to know just what extra help would be desirable in certain situations. Miniplane operations in an environment of larger aircraft will require extra alertness by all concerned; and from time to time, extra help by the controller.

(Reprinted from the Journal of ATC)

Brief News Items Radio-Controlled Helicopters: More Headaches for ATC? An unusual Channel crossing has been completed - by a radio-controlled model helicopter. It was the first time a model aircraft crossed the Channel.

The helicopter was a scale model of a Bell 212 twin jet.

Its rotor is about five feet in diameter and its maximum forward speed is 70 miles an hour. The kit, including the engine, costs £ 190, and the radio-control equipment needed to fly it costs another £ 140. The model was controlled from a real helicopter which was hired for £ 50 to £ 60 an hour. The two helicopters flew within 100 yards of each other, the model slightly in front.

Model manufacturer Max Coote said before the flight: "When we go depends on the weather. And we have to clear up all the red tape with Air Traffic Control and with the Customs authorities. We may fly France-England or it could be England-France. In any case, we will be flying between Calais and Dover.

"The worst problem could be if we lose radio control or If the motor stops. But that's not likely to happen. The helicopter we shall be in will have floats so we could land and fish the model out of the sea."

(GATCO Bulletin}

Travelling English Language Laboratory to aid Controllers A contribution of US $ 52,000 to ICAO by the International Air Transport Association will be used to establish and support a Technical Assistance Mission for two years in Eastern Europe. The Mission will provide the necessary

12

facili.ti~s t~ help improve the English-language capabilities of c1v1I aviation personnel required to communicate with aircraft. . The transp.ortable language facility, which will operate in four countries, is the result of a determination by IATA that there w~s a requirement to improve the quality of the spoken English used by air traffic controllers in communicating with commercial transport aircraft in flight.

The project involves an English-language instructor, ~nd the language laboratory instructor, Mr. Laird o. Taylor, 1s a Can~dia~ with considerable experience in teaching.

Th_e first instruction assignment is in Poland and will last six mont~s. The mission will next proceed to Hungary for another. six months and the following six months will be spent m Czechoslovakia. The fourth assignment to co":'plete the two-year period is likely to be in either Bulgaria ~r Turkey. Two types of classes are anticipated.

Ap~rox1mately 75 to 100 air traffic controllers will have their use of the English language perfected _ if they already ~ave some working knowledge of that language.

Alter.natively, some 50 ATC students can be trained in English ab lnitio. ti ) (ICAO Bu 11 e n

International Air Traffic Control for the North Sea Oil Rigs?

B.ritish Airways Helicopters wants to see a unified Air Traffic Control Authority in the now very busy helicopter area of the North Sea oil rigs, of which there are nearly 37 between Aberdeen and sumburgh. Airmisses could become a problem. BA Helicopters believes that control should be international. Talks involving other operato~s In the area, including Bristow, the Dutch and Norweg1a~s, and operators in other off-shore oil explorations, are being held under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organisation.

Air Traffic Control: The Only Sure Way of Separating Aircraft

Collisions involving airliner deaths average one a year.

They are the ultimate failure of air traffic control. The majority of collisions occur in the United States, where about half the world's air transport movements take place, and where there is an extremely high volume of general aviation. Yet of more than five million U.S. airliner movements each year, an annual average over the years of between only two and three has ended in a mid-air collision.

In most cases the collision is with a general-aviation aircraft, and in the vicinity of ¡¡an airport.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has carried out a survey of collisions reported in the U.S.A. involving civil aircraft (not only airlines) over the eight-year period 1964-1971.

There were 271 collisions causing 556 fatalities. Of the 271 collisions only 17 involved airliners. The results, simplified and listed according to phase of flight, may be summed up as follows:

U.S.A., 1964-1971 Near and on airports With air traffic control On runway Mid-air Without air traffic control On runway Mid-air

Totals

Total reported "dangerous" near-colllslons Involving public-transport aircraft In the U.K.

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

2

7 3 9 5

(495,000) (522,000) (554,000) (605,000) (617,000)

1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

6 4 11 5 10

(612,000) (639,000) (706,000) (730,000) (772,000)

Figures in brackets denote total public-transport movements.

Collisions

Fatalities

31 0 31 147

178

54 0 54 95 2 93 149

77 25 52 2 1 1 14 10 4 93 271

150 30 120 86 82 4 171 114 57 407 556

47

100

En route and terminal areas Visual flight (VFR) Intentionally close flying Random collisions Instruments (IFR) Terminal area En route Mixed VFR/IFR Terminal area En route

Some countries require the filing of a full air miss report so that it can be investigated. Not all are reported perhaps because the pilot, who may have been at the wrong holding height over a beacon, or not where air traffic control had ordered him to be, did not want to get involved in the subsequent inquiry. But enough air miss reports are filed to allow the authorities to compile statistics and analyse trends which are invaluable in the planning of air traffic control. The United Kingdom air miss record over the .past ten years, published by the Civil Aviation Authority, is as follows:

The pattern of collisions outside the U.S.A. is not distinct, because statistics are not kept. According to a recent compilation, the number of collisions involving airliners in the whole of the world has averaged between two and three a year since 1946. The majority are in the U.S.A. The trend is towards near misses, or air misses as they are sometimes called, near airports. An air miss occurs when, in the judgment of the pilot - whether or not he had to take evasive action - the safety of his aircraft has been hazarded by another.

Although anti-collision devices were first proposed in the midfifties, it can be argued that air traffic control is the only sure way of separating aircraft. There is even a case to be made for the proposition that anti-collision devices blur responsibility for separation, and that avoiding action between one conflicting pair of "co-operatively" equipped aircraft may lead to a greater risk of collision with an unequipped - and thus undetected - aircraft.

Until every airspace user, including the jet fighter and the Sunny-Sunday pilot, has anti-collision devices, responsibility for airliner collision-avoidance rests squarely with air traffic control. This means not only radar, computers, transponders, and qualified controllers, but also rules which private and military pilots can understand and obey.

(FLIGHT International)

Happy Landings It happened In California (where all these things always seem to happen) when Lother van Stoeck attempted to land his Cessna 150 In pitch darkness In unknown territory, after he ran out of fuel and a fuse blew, putting out his landing lights and radio. Holding a flashlight out the side window, the pilot glided towards a field when a strange thing happened - the Cessna suddenly slowed and then gently settled to the ground, allowing the terrified pilot to climb out unhurt. He discovered a cow under his plane, which had most -likely saved his life, but was killed in the process. Van Stoeck speculated that the landing gear of his plan had hooked the cow's horns, which slowed down his plane somewhat like the restraining devices on an aircraft carrier.

(Airport News, Montreal) 13

Incident Investigation Procedures

A Study by IFATCA Standing Committee VII (Australia}, presented as a Working Paper at the 13th Annual Conference of the Federation, held at Tel Aviv, May 20-24, 1974.

Introduction This is an examination of Incident as opposed to Accident investigation procedures, and is related primarily to Air Traffic Control Services. A comprehensive recommendation of Accident Investigation procedures may be found in ICAO Annex 13.

Various principles are suggested, but may have limited application dependent on the Code of Law in the State involved.

In most States, laws on professional negligence apply to nearly all occupations. In the case of Air Traffic Control, however, the results of negligence, etc. can be far more serious than for most other occupations. There is therefore a necessity to establish an investigative system that will both maintain the safety and high standard of Air Traffic Control Services but will also protect the interests and integrity of Air Traffic Controllers.

Purpose of Inquiry An Air Safety Incident is an occurrence associated with the operation of aircraft, other than an accident, in which the safety of an aircraft has been jeopardised or is a situation which could have induced jeopardy except for the intervention of chance.

The fundamental purpose of inquiry into an incident shall be to determine the facts, conditions and circumstances pertaining to the incident in order that the probable cause may be established, so that appropriate steps may be taken to prevent a recurrence of the incident and the factors that led to it.

Nature of Inquiry The nature of an inquiry into an incident shall not be accusatory as the object is to take remedial rather than punitive action.

The assessment of blame or responsibility shall not be included in the scope of the investigating body. This is normally a prerogative of the judicial authorities of the State concerned.

Acts of omissions, by individual persons or organisations that are from time to time clearly revealed in the course of investigation should be reported upon. Any such report should not confuse the purpose of the inquiry which is to indicate what caused the incident rather than who caused it.

Aspects of safety totally unconnected with the circumstances or chain of events leading to the incident are often revealed during an investigation with a resultant benefit in terms of effective accident prevention. These aspects should be examined, reported on, and acted upon with a view to prevention and not to punitive action.

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Method of Inquiry The direct cause of an incident may be established by means already practised in most countries. ICAO Annex 13 recommends the various guidelines for Accident investigation, and few countries have disagreed with that contained therein. Compliance with Annex 13 should be a principle for IFATCA affiliates for both Accident and Incident investigation.

The basic cause of an incident and the remedial action necessary to ensure that it will not occur again, does not always emerge from the surface facts of the case. Experience has shown that the majority of aircraft accidents have been caused or compounded by human error or by circumstances which are conductive to human error.

Areas which may need to be investigated shall include:1. Equipment and facility design and performance; 2. Operational procedures and directives; 3. Organisation and Management; 4. Activities prior to and during the incident; 5. Controller histories.

Equipment and facilities available to Air Traffic Controllers can vary in standard and efficiency. Amongst other factors, cost and conditions in each State may tailor and limit the standard of equipment and facilities. That standard or pattern may not match the requirements or complexity of the traffic offering. This may have an indirect part in an incident which needs to be investigated and reported upon.

It has been previously stated that it should not be in the scope of an investigation to become involved in disciplinary aspects of an incident. It is, however, necessary to establish whether applicable directives were complied with. The directives which may be examined shall include: National legislation; ICAO Annexes; ICAO Procedures for Air Traffic Services· Airways Operations Instructions; ' Aeronautical Information Publications· Local Instructions; ' Aeronautical Information Circulars· ' NOTAMS; Standardization Instructions.

The directives shall be examined to establish whether, in the light of the incident, they were proper and adequate for ensuring safety of operations, and whether they were presented in a format easily understood. It shall be established as to which material has a mandatory effect and that which is advisory. There can frequently be a discrepancy between a procedure in one directive, which is an instruction, and advice in another directive.

Some aircraft accidents have resulted from organizational defects or weaknesses in management. Procedures may have been prescribed or condoned which are not comiserate with safe operating conditions in practice or which do not compare with accepted and tested ICAO standards. Inquiries shall take account of such conditions where relevant.

Ambiguous instructions and those capable of dual interpretation may be pertinent to an inquiry. This may well have stemmed in the first instance from uncritical scrutiny by regulating authority. Where deemed necessary inquiries shall look into the organizational and standardization bodies responsible for the overseeing of the personnel and activities more directly involved. The activities of personnel involved prior to and during the incident could be pertinent to an inquiry and shall be considered.

Before the incident the inquiry shall examine specifically: 1. Activities within the 24 or 48 hours prior to the incident with particular reference to psychological factors which might have a bearing on the performance of the personnel involved; 2. The physical condition in relation to established or required work/rest cycles and meal regularity of the personnel involved. Also any material deficiencies; 3. Circumstances and distance involved in the journey to the control facility before commencing duties; 4. The various activities required of the personnel in preparing for taking over an active control position.

During the incident the inquiry shall examine specifically: 1. The role and behaviour of the various members of the control team; 2. The contribution made by control layouts and facilities generally, i. e. support pillars in control tower cabs blocking view of movement area.

The operational history of personnel involved may also be pertinent and shall be examined. Specifically: 1. Duties being performed and licences or ratings held.

Recency requirements; 2. General record of control career Including initial training, subsequent training and specialized training. Sequence, conditions and validity of licences previously held; 3. Overall experience and experience in the particular control position. Amount of simulator training, emergency training, and last proficiency check.

Identification of the human factor element may be difficult. However, if human error appears as a possible cause or contribution to the cause of an incident, then all factors which may have influenced the actions should be examined.

It is not sufficient to establish that an error was made; the inquiry should endeavour to establish why the error occurred.

Written statements should be obtained from all personnel directly involved in the incident. Consideration shall be given to statements being taken from other uninvolved witnesses. Since these statements are fact finding it shall be made clear that they may be added to or amended at any time without prejudice.

Personnel involved in an incident shall have access to tape and video recordings as well as transcripts if so requested. Statements made prior to hearing or seeing such recordings may be added to or amended by the personnel making such statements. As a matter of principle it should be pointed out that since the object of the inquiry is to establish what occurred and why, then observing recordings prior to statements may have little value.

Where the personnel involved so request, an observer from the Association(s) involved may attend at any inter-

view that may take place between the investigating body and the personnel involved. The observer shall be present to ensure that the individual's rights are not overlooked, but not to represent sectional interest nor to obstruct the inquiry.

Investigation Organisation Incident investigation is a highly specialized task which should only be undertaken by trained personnel. Investigators must have a sound working knowledge of aviation and factors which effect operations as a whole. Experienced Air Traffic Controllers or Supervisors do not necessarily make good investigators.

It is sufficient to nominate, as the occasion arises, a person with specialist aviation knowledge as the investigator, since investigation is a specialist task itself. Therefore wherever possible an experienced investigator should be assigned to each inquiry. It is desirable that he should have appropriate experieitce in Air Traffic Control, aeronautical engineering, and other associated areas.

Each investigation should be approached with a view to applying a process of elimination. It should become possible at a reasonable early stage to eliminate certain areas from casual consideration, thereby avoiding detailed technical studies being performed to cover every aspect of the sphere of operations concerned. It should be recognised that the precise extent and depth of the investigation will be contingent upon the nature of the incident.

Conclusion The importance of Accident investigation is known and accepted. It is proposed that as much importance exists for a developed approach to Incident investigation.

Footnote. At the Conference, It was recommended that ICAO should be approached with a view to becoming the authority in the collection, correlation and dissemination of statistics and facts of incidents. It was decided that Member Associations should be asked to produce Incident Summaries and/or Safety Digests annually and forward them to Standing Committee VII by 31st December each year.

Unnamed Tower at a British provincial airport (names and numbers have been changed in case anyone reads this column): - 345 you are cleared to Birmingham via Tango, Green 29 and Amber 12, Flight Level 250. Clear to climb initially not above Flight Level 45. After take- off contact Pennine Radar on 112.2.

Long pause - We're going to Manchester Longer pause - 345 goes to Birmingham Very long pause indeed - Roger, will ask the passengers where they've got tickets for.

(FLIGHT International)

15

ATC Developments in the United States

by John F. Judge

UG3RD: The Upgraded Third Generation (Tomorrow's) ATC System Three 'Deceptively Simple' Objectives: To Increase System Capacity; Improve Safety; Hold Down Costs One of today's most complex tasks in the field of U.S. government research, development and engineering is the series of programs evolving at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Most people in aviation are aware that one of the Agency's primary tasks is to increase the capacity of the Air Traffic control system. The bulk of the effort is concentrated on what is known as the Upgraded Third Generation ATC System, or UG3RD for short.

The country is in its third generation of Air Traffic Control systems and technology. The first generation (1935 _ 1955) saw the use of electronic navigation and voice communication to effect procedural separations. The second generation (1950 -1970) saw the introduction of primary radar and beacon (SSR) to aid in real-time or tactical separation of aircraft. The third generation uses the digital computer in both tactical and strategic planning roles. Now a determined effort is being made to upgrade the present third generation.

David R. Israel, Director of the Office of Systems Engineering Management and acting Deputy Associate Administrator for engineering and development, states the deceptively simple objectives of the FAA effort. These are: 1) To increase system perfo_rm~nce throug~ inc~eased capacity decreased delays, continuity of operations, improved se~ices and greater geographical coverage.

2) To maintain or improve the safety of flight.

3) To hold down the cost. of the system in terms of investment, operations and maintenance, and costs to the system's users.

The problem begins with the fact that none of the three objectives is fully independent of each other. There are very few cases where steps to meet one goal will contribute towards achieving the others. The three ~oals are generally conflicting in nature and it is this situation that makes the FAA endeavour almost unique in government.

It is not the physical aspects of the task that pose the major problems. Theory, technology, hardware, procedu~es or engineering ability do not count as much as managing all of the elements to meet all of the objectives while meeting the needs of all the diverse users.

The Conflicts The conflicts seem endless. The users of t~~ ATC system _ air carriers, general aviation and the mrhtary have different objectives. The air carrier is willing to embrace positive control and pay the price if it's reasonable. General aviation wants little or no control from the ground. The military will pay the price in avionics but also

16

wants the minimal control required for tactical exercises and training missions.

Air-carrier acceptance of a new avionics system is primarily related to the service it provides and only secondarily to its costs. In general aviation, however, the tendency is to reverse the order. This is an important systems design consideration in view of the predicted growth of general aviation.

Israel brings strong credentials to his job. Before joining FAA in 1970, he served as Deputy Director of the Defense Communications Planning Group and was responsible for the systems engineering and ¡technical direction of a highpriority Southeast Asian effort to develop new sensor systems and their application to battlefield situations. Holding a master's degree in electrical engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Israel joined MIT's Digital Computer Laboratory in 1949 and became involved in the application of digital computers to future high-capacity terminal area military Air Traffic Control. Command and control, ATC and similar large systems work has occupied Israel since.

With all of this behind him, it is not surprising that Israel exhibits a cautious attitude toward what he calls the "growing mystique of systems engineering." On this subject Israel says to avoid the systems engineer who begins by defining the process of systems engineering and be especially wary of simplified bar charts and PERT networks.

"Systems engineering is nor the answer. System engineering is only common sense exercised with peripheral vision."

Israel believes that organizations can start working without a clear statement of requirements. "Requirements alone tend to incorporate the numbers of the future with the techniques of the past. But it is the techniques of the future that provide the solution."

Today's ATC system is largely based on previous military R & D but this trend may not continue. Exploratory and advanced air traffic research and development will be vital to future systems and "we should be sure that we give it some freedom of action. Some ao % to so O/o of the R & D effort should be in answer to, or supported by, the operators of the system; some 10 Ofo to 20 O/o should be permitted for areas in which an application or requirement is not fully understood.

In addition to the sacred cow of systems engineering, Israel is also skeptical of the current religion of "cost effectiveness". "For most new and complex systems, especially those with human operators, effectiveness is difficult to define and then equally difficult to predict. You do not use cost effectiveness as an excuse for avoiding a hard decision."

The interrelated elements forming the backbone of UG3RD also account for the major part of FAA's engineering and development resources. The nine elements are: 1) Intermittent Positive Control (IPC) or ATC intervention only when necessary to achieve maximum freedom consistent with the safety of other airspace users. This feature is expected to improve the safety of flight and reduce the number of mid-air collisions between aircraft flying in mixed airspace. IPC will involve pilot warning advisories and collision-advoidance commands generated

ARTS-2 i n stallation at Wilkes-Barre/Scranton Airport in Pennsylvania, USA.

on the ground and transmitted via data link. Initial flight tests using the breadboard DABS are slated for the near future.

2) Discrete Address Beacon System (DABS) is a com patible upgrading of the current Air Traffic Control radar beacon system and will provide a high-capac ity, Jowcost, ground-air-ground data link. DABS is critical to the successful implem entation of many other elements of the UG3RD. The outstanding job of design by MIT's Lincoln Labs moved into the initial procurement cycles in 1974.

3) Flight Service Stations (FSS) will be automated and capitalize on the unattended pilot self-briefing terminal (PSBT). First tests of the PSBT in general aviation applications have started. Hub stations and one or more central processing terminals will support the self-briefing units.

4) Upgraded automation is to be achieved largely by additions or modifications to the computer programs of the data processing and displays installed at the ARTCCs and TRACONs. Increasing computer capacity is the key.

New automation functions will be required to integrate with other UG3RD features including a heavy reli ance on the DABS data link.

5) Airport Surface Traffic Control (ASTC) consists of the tools needed to ensure safe, efficient movement of airside traffic in spite of increasing traffic, more complex runway-taxiway mazes and the trend to operation du ring periods of lower visibility.

6) Wake Vortex Avoidance System (WVAS) is exactly what the name implies. FAA works at avoidance and NASA researches prevention. For 1974, the move was into the data gathering phase.

7) Area Navigation (RNAV) is the establishment of direct routes between preselected fixed points rather than flying along selected radials from VOR/DME stations or to involve contro llers in providing radar vector instru ctions.

The c urrent RNAV focus is o n utilization vs. cost benefits.

8) Microwave Landing System (MLS) work in 1974 concentrated first on selected scanning techniques and then getting two contractors started.

9) AEROSAT involves the use of satellites to improve oceanic ATC communications and to provide survei llance information to reduce oceanic separation standards.

There is a wide range of subsystems, hardware, software and the other bits and pieces common to such an effort contained in each of the nine general features of the UG3RD program.

The Inputs Israel recogn izes several legitimate participants in the system design process but he is aware of the limitations of each. The engineer, he says, understands the techno logy and its possibilit ies and is generally open minded about the functions and how they can be accomplished. But his tendency is t o design for himself as the operator and he finds it hard to keep it simple and d ifficult to project himself into the personnel and environmental situation involved in actual operations. The controller is Jess aware of the technology and is generally wedded to "the way it has always been done before." The pilot is a legitim ate member of the design team. But Israel notes that " he has only a bird's-eye view of the problem, which leads to an underestimation of the complexity of the situation and an ove restimation of what he could do in the cockpit if he had the data. Nevertheless, the pilot has a deep and legitimate interest in the design and must be involved." Israel 's position is that d ifferent points of view are unavoidable.

"We are building a ground-based system. We should stop dreaming up more things for pi lots to do. If they are not busy managing their existing airborne systems or reassuring the passengers, the next best thing t hey can do is scan the skies around them. " Israel is tough on the proponents of "Jet 's return ATC to the cockpit." The talk here is about " distributed management." This is "loose talk". "Such wo rds have an inh erent appeal", he says, "but I believe they c loud the real issue.

That issue is responsibility. Does anyo ne suggest that we build air traffic management with distributed responsibility?

Th at is th e problem with current collision-avo idance-system designs."

17

Air Traffic Control is not just keeping aircraft apart; it is primarily concerned with bringing aircraft together safely and expeditiously at the terminals. "You need all the data to do this" and the FAA e5tecutive does not rule out pilot displays of the air situation or airborne CAS-PWI equipment but insists that these are supplemental backups and should be so considered.

The Human Factor Increasing automation clearly improves system performance and has a positive effect on safety. To Israel, the unanswered question is whether "we can also obtain increased productivity, and hence, cost savings as the traffic loads increase."

For example, is there a limit to the number of aircraft that can be assigned to or accepted by a controller? Will he want to accept responsibility for aircraft beyond some modest number? Will he impose his own safe limit related to his concern for responsibility? Will he let the computer perform key functions that he cannot perform? Will he permit the computer to operate for him beyond his capabilities? The answers to these questions are directly related to the confidence that the controller has in the continuity of operation of the system. To establish his confidence will be a long, hard struggle.

Israel does not expect productivity gains to be as great as many anticipate and what is achieved will be a lot harder than supposed.

Delays A fully functioning third generation ATC will not eliminate all delays. The following are cited by FAA as causing or contributing to the length of delays: 1) Scheduling more than one aircraft to depart from an airport at the same time.

2) Scheduling flights to arrive at an airport at a rate in excess of airport capacity.

3) Heavy scheduling of flights at preferred times.

4) Airport capacity, including runways, taxiways and gates.

5) Continued scheduling of flights with low load factors, thus increasing the number of flights needed to handle the number of passengers requiring service.

6) Weather that prevents the following of the desired flight path or precludes takeoff. and la~din~ on schedule.

7) Bunching of aircraft within certain airspace due to random causes, weather, accidents or other factors. .

8) Separation standards required to assu~e safe longitudinal separation between aircraft approaching a runway and lateral separation between parallel runways.

9) Capacity of the Air Traffic Control system.

10) Wind changes and changes to runway~.

11) Runway unavailability due to resurfacing or other causes.

The UG3RD can directly influence only those factors concerned with the capacity of the ATC system and airports, separation standards and management of air tr~ffic to minimize bunching. Airport capacity can only be partially improved through the UG3RD program.

The Choices Some time ago Israel went out on a limb with respect to actual design possibilities. In brief:

18

1) Good surveillance is absolutely essential. Radar is not the answer although it has a back-up role. Cooperative surveillance with a transponder is indicated and is in the cost range that makes it a mandatory piece of avionics.

The present secondary radal"' .system is in difficulty and a compatible discrete addressable system is a natural follow-on.

2) Airport surface surveillance is a growing problem.

Its solution can be achieved with the aircraft transponder although a trilateration system may be employed rather than a directional antenna.

3) As the automation factor increases, the computers will be ready to send most ground-air messages by automated data link. Two types of messages are foreseen: short formatted tactical messages and longer, less formatted messages for record keeping. At least the tactical messages can be integrated into the beacon surveillance system with the addressing function.

4) VOR-DME should be augmented by RNAV. For general aviation, remote areas and difficult terrain, lowfrequency systems such as OMEGA bear serious consideration.

5) Satellite systems, except for oceanic areas where the traffic is relatively low and there are no alternatives, are in the distant future, at least beyond 1990.

6) A new common landing system is needed; MLS needs the stated requirements and should be pursued to minimize the current investment in ILS. 7) The airport problem requires the elimination of wake turbulence or a means of tailoring the separation between pairs of aircraft as conditions permit. Two-mile approach separations should be the goal of an improved surveillance system, and best use of dual lane (IFR dependent) and parallel (IFR dependent) runways should be sought.

8) Separate airborne displays and independent airborne CAS-PWI systems should receive secondary attention and should be considered in a supplementary role.

Israel's major theme is that an improved Air Traffic Control system will be a long and costly endeavour without foreseeable shortcuts. "We want the freedom for anyone to fly anywhere, anytime. We desire the competitive freedom to operate several flights along the same routes at the same time with low load factors. we desire to travel only at peak hours and we desire to fly one passenger in a general aviation aircraft with the same priority and service as a loaded 747, among other things."

"The notion that there is an easy and inexpensive solution to the air traffic problem is not only false; its perpetuation hinders progress."

The Doubling Effect Almost all air-movement forecasts reduce themselves to the familiar "it will double in a given (usually short) number of years." Israel regards this doubling effect as "frightening in its own sense." Consider that while the demand may double, you cannot double altitudes, radio frequencies, airports, accidents, controllers, runways and range. Consider also that the usual time frames in such forecasts are from 10 to 15 years and this is barely enough time to cover the movement of technology into operational effect.

Finally, to the question "if the Air Traffic Control system could be started from scratch all over again, would you do it differently?" Israel answers "NO!" (reproduced by courtesy of Air Line Pilot Magazine)

Air Traffic Control: A Demanding Profession Still Without Status

by Mr. J-0 . Monin, President, International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA).

The identification of social and labour problems in civil aviation, and possible action in this sector by the I. L. 0., constituted the programme for the Preparatory Meeting on Civil Aviation organised by the I. L. 0., held in Geneva from 3 - 10 October 1974 with the participation of government, employers' and wo rkers' delegates from 17 countries.

Mr. Monin represented his organisation at the meeting.

In " ILO Information" (vol. 10, nr. 4, Oct. 1974), issued and distributed on the first day of the meeting, the President examined in a special article the working and employment conditions of those ¡responsible for air traffic control - the air traffic control officers - which we now reprint in this issue of The Controller.

accepted or refused entry into a specific airspace at a specific moment. it is he who decides on th e scope for manoeuvre of aircraft on the ground or in the air and it is he who issues the necessary instructions. Even more important, in an emergency, when the pilot bears the awsome responsibility for the aircraft in trouble, only the air traffic controller can ensure that it has free access and a flight path free of obstacles. And finally, if an aircraft is in distress, it is the air traffic controller again who is responsible for setting ia motion the aid, search and rescue services. It should also be noted that the air traffic controller is called on to control the movement of several air-

Introduction One of the key reasons why civil aviation has made amazing strides in the past two decades is because it has become so safe. Of course, the expansion is also due to s uch factors as increasing commercial, cultural, political and diplomatic relations, and in particular to the universal need for escape and change from familiar surroundings.

But if air travel had not so quickly established itself as the most reliable means of travel, it would certai nly not have gained such universal popu larity.

There is no denying that safety in the air is largely due to the high professional qualities of the pilots but only too often the publi c is inc lined to overlook the other hum an e lements which contribute to this security - ground staff: maintenance crews, information and telecommunication spec ialists, meteorologists and, of course, air traffic controllers. Among the ground services, air traffic control is the only one to have a direct effect on the conduct of flights.

The objectives of air traffic contro l services, as stated in Annex II of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (adopted by the Internatio nal Civil Aviation Organization), are (1) to prevent collisions between airc raft in flight, (2) to prevent co llisions between aircraft on the manoeuvring area and obstructions on that area. (3) to expedite and maintain an orderly flow of air traffic, (4) to provide advice and info rmation useful for the safe and effi cient conduct of flights and (5) to notify th e appropriate organisations regarding airc raft in need of search and rescue aid, and assist such organisations as required.

The Human Factor The impo rtance of the human factor in air traffic control cannot be overemphasised. Even in the most elaborate systems, including those w hich rely most heavily on automati o n, man is the key element in taking final decisions.

It is the air traffic controller who, in th e final analysis, makes the decision on whether an airc raft sho uld be

Middl e Air Space Room. Air Traffic Control Centre, West Drayton.

Engl and.

craft simultaneously, a number which can vary according to the sectors under control, sometimes amounting to or exceeding as many as 15 at peak traffic periods. Thus , each decision must be taken immediately and without recall.

Top physical and mental conditio n is a vital requirement for air traffic controllers. Consequently, they undergo stringent medical examinations which are repeated at periodic interva ls. However, such procedures are in vain unless th ey go han d in hand with harmonious working conditions. The unavoidable high nervous tension should be co mpensated with suitab le working hours and periods of rest. The risk of no longer being able to meet the

19

medical requirements after a certain age and of no longer coming up to the necessary qualifying standards because of failing health should be compensated with social security guarantees. And finally, a decent standard of living should be provided for these men, whose slightest error could cause considerable toss of human life and property and whose professional occupation and living standard is at stake with each decision they take. *

A Less Rigid Framework Air traffic controllers are normally government employees attached to public service agencies. Although logical at first sight, this situation is nevertheless often disputed by the associations of air traffic controllers on the grounds that excessively rigid classifications do not sufficiently take into account the demands of a unique profession which has direct impact orv. the lives and property of air transport users. Air traffic controllers normally tend to consider themselves as members of a profession with high responsibilities and demands. However, this attitude has not always been shared by the authorities, and there is no denying the fact that the profession has virtually no status. This leads to a certain amount of frustration on the part of the air traffic controllers who feet that the fundamental demands of their occupation are not recognised

and, in addition, that their professional know-how is not adequately used either in the research and elaboration of new systems, or in the administration of the air traffic control services. The numerous social disorders which have afflicted international air navigation during recent years are an eloquent demonstration of this latent discontent.

The Need for a Special Status Since its foundation in 1961, IFATCA has sought to protect and promote the profession of air traffic control.

Through this body, air traffic control officers can gain an audience at international level, whether it be with the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), or with more specialised organisations such as the International Federatior:i of Airline Pilot's Associations (IFALPA). It is high time to recognise the need to draw up a special status for this unique profession, both by these organisations and national authorities. For only a genuine recognition of the reality and rights of the profession of air traffic control will ensure that civil aviation can continue its development in complete security and retain the confidence of air transport users. • Interested readers can refer to the study, Conditions of Employment and Service of Air Traffic Controllers, ILO, Geneva 1972.

The Case for Controllers to halt Take-offs or Landings under Adverse Weather Conditions This is not a new thought. Over the years, it has been felt by many that Air Traffic Controllers should have the right to close an airport temporarily under certain adverse weather conditions, and deny take-off or landing to pilots.

Countries like Australia and New Zealand have for some considerable time now given their controllers directives to close an airport when the laid-down weather minima for that airport have fallen below the defined limits.

Now the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, following its investigation of an Ozark Air Lines Fairchild FH227 B crash on July 23, 1973, in St. Louis, and after a thorough analysis of accidents over the past 10 years, has issued recommendations that Air Traffic Controllers should have authority to refuse approach and landing or takeoff clearances during thunderstorm activity or other severe weather in a terminal area, in a belief that more controller involvement could perhaps save lives. After the NTSB recommendation had become known, PATCO issued a policy statement supporting the NTSB viewpoint, but in a letter to PATCO President John Leyden, FAA Administrator Alexander Butterfield turned down the NTSB and PATCO suggestion, saying that present weatherpredicting equipment was too inaccurate and present training insufficient.

Commenting on the Administrator's statement, John Leyden said: "This is not a pleasant admission for the FAA to make. on the one hand, developing satisfactory low-altitude weather-visibility equipment should have been a priority for the Agency over the past ten years. Secondly, it has abandoned, as a cost-saving measure, another piece of equipment which has proven of great help in preventing such

20

accidents, Precision Approach Radar (PAR). NTSB's statistics are particularly disturbing to PATCO, because we have for the past five years been trying to get FAA to reinstate PARs. In the sixties, it saved countless planes and lives. Today, still in use by the military, it continues as a major preventer of air accidents."

PAR is a type of radar which views planes when they are close to the ground, so close that they cannot be monitored by conventional radar. "What happens," said Leyden, "is that the pilot has a very limited visibility and accurate knowledge of where he is in relation to the runway during the few all-important seconds involved in the take-off or landing phases. For example, he might be at a lower altitude than he thinks, or facing ground obstructions he does not know about. If the controller, through PAR, is aware of any unusual deviation by the pilot, this fact can be called to the pilot's attention. I am convinced many accidents would have been prevented if the controller had such advisory ability.

"In adverse weather conditions, both controller and pilot are severely limited because of present equipment which can only see in a straight line to the aircraft's point of intended landing," said Leyden. "If a fog bank is moving into the plane's path, but just to the right or left, it is not displayed. When the aircraft lands, that bank may not be at the same spot. Thus, it is presently impossible to give accurate, precise runway visual readings. I cannot overestimate the need for new equipment to avoid the sort of accident this lack causes. One cannot escape the feeling after making an analysis of the hundreds of lives lost, and

those seriously injured in the past ten years - that costsaving administrative decisions override concern for the safety of the flying public."

PATCO believes that PAR is an essential backup equipment for monitoring aeroplanes during bad weather, but the equipment was phased out by FAA several years ago as an economy measure. The recent aircrash at Boston's Logan Airport once again brought public attention to this valuable safety aid.

In approaching aviation people, FAA had asked them whether they wanted PAR or Instrument Landing Systems, and afterwards had announced that aviation leaders had shown a lack of interest in this backup safety device for airports. This "either - or" presentation was, in PATCO's view, a loaded question. Both PARs and ILSs are needed.

PATCO realises the value and necessity for ILSs, but the installation of PARs as a backup monitoring device is also strongly urged. There is strong evidence that one or more of the crashes which resulted from improper use of the ILS system might have been prevented had controllers been able to advise the pilots they were below the glideslope.

"Our whole purpose is not to extend controller powers, but to avoid accidents. I believe it is a mere technicality as to who has the supposed power," said Leyden. "After all, if there were a dangerous landing situation, and the controller points this out to the pilot, the landing would not be made - regardless of which one technically made the decision."

Butterfield's letter to Leyden on the controller discretion issue said, in part: "After carefully considering the recommendatio11 that controllers be given authority to deny approach, landing and take-off clearances based on severe weather conditions, we concluded that this proposal would not produce the result desired and should not be adopted.

Controllers are neither trained nor qualified to make this kind of judgment, nor do they have the equipment to aid them in reaching this kind of decision. Even If the control-

ler's visual observation is augmented by weather data available on presently used surveillance radar equipment, there is still insufficient information available on which to base a sound judgment. We are convinced that the 'go-nogo' decision-making responsibility should remain with the pilot in command. His responsibility for the safe conduct of flight should not be diluted by introducing the judgment of a person outside the cockpit.

"In regard to the installation of radar with the capability of displaying severe weather and convective turbulence, we know of no radar system now available that can display this information and also be used for Air Traffic Control purposes. As you are aware, we presently use existing ATC radar as a tool to aid the pilot in avoiding severe weather.

In practice, its use is most effective when augmented by the pilot's airborne weather radar display.

"The pilot can assess the radar weather information provided by the controller as compared to his own radar display and is better able to avoid areas of probable turbulence. Recognizing the need for more research in this area, our Systems Research and¡ Development Service is currently working with the National Weather Service to determine the feasibility of developing techniques to provide controllers with severe weather and convective turbulence data on a radar display. Such information would then be used in providing advisory service as well as in carrying out severe weather avoidance procedures."

The U.S. Air Line Pilots Association also took exception to the NTSB-PATCO recommendation, feeling that the rights of the pilot as the sole "captain of his ship" would be imperiled.

The controversial question: "Should controllers have the authority to stop aircraft from taking off or landing under certain adverse weather conditions", is, after all these years, still with us today and is still being debated hotly.

The question is unlikely to be shelved unless present-day thinking alters substantially.

Comments from Air Traffic Spokesmen Across the World

at the moment but be assured that the association is working with the best interests of all in mind and working harder than ever before to achieve those interests.

Matters such as loss of licence insurance may seem mundane but they are vitally important to your future income and living standard and deserve your support in exactly the same way as a pay claim or reduced working hours do.

Like most things in life, you only get out of it what you put into it. ATC is truly a professional occupation; let us keep the professionaltsm In it.

Mr. N. T. Vldler, N.S.W. President C.A.0.0.A.A.: Now and again the question of morale in ATC is raised.

An individual's morale can vary from day to day and is essentially a personal problem. However, if the malaise of low morale spreads throughout a centre or industry it is a serious problem and should become a problem for management.

ATC is a job where morale is most important. A controller's morale directly affects that person's ability and attitude to the job more so than in other occupations. It follows that if morale is low, the standard of control is low.

There are plenty of reasons why the level of morale in ATC should be high - high salaries, rapid promotion, good equipment - but it is difficult to pin down reasons for low morale. Perhaps insufficient staff or not enough actual positive control could be attributed blame. Perhaps also the growing anonymity of controllers in an expanding system and the increasing lack of staff-management contact could be contributing factors.

The general apathetic feeling abroad seems also to have extended into regard of our association. Interest in the association and the doings thereof has again diminished. There are no spectacular pay claims being pressed

Table Talk

Talk at a recent Air League luncheon turned to the question of the likelihood of being killed in an air accident.

In the view ¡of Air Cdre J. R. Morgan, the chances of this happening were about as remote "as being kicked to death by a mule in the United Kingdom".

However, a more statistical approach, advanced by Air Marshal Sir Patrick Dunn, assessed the chances of an air passenger travelling four times a day from Edinburgh to London and back. "Do this for 200 days a year for 300 years", he said, "and you would expect to be involved in an accident. Do it for 600 years, and you could expect to be killed."

(Air way) 21

International Law

by E. McCluskey

PartV

appear illogical but if duress against the State were to be made illegal, great difficulties would arise in receiving indemnity from an aggressor State which loses a war since the victors usually impose the terms. Error or fraud invalidates the Treaty as does duress against the actual negotiators. There are of course many borderline cases such as "sign or we destroy the capital city". As in private contr~cts there is preliminary bargaining but whereas in the private contract the whole affair must be concluded to be binding, preliminary treaties and Pacta de Contrahendo (understandings to be translated into a Treaty at a future ~at~) are valid and enforceable as are occasionally negotiations. In the Minquiers and Ereches case in 1953 the International Court considered negotiations between Fr~nce a~d. the United Kingdom in 1819 where the French Foreign Minister had transmitted to the French Ambassador in London a letter from the French Minister of the Marine in which Minquiers were stated to be "possede par l'Angleterre".

International Transactions Now that this series of articles has progressed through the principles of International Law giving the rules by Which States live alongside each other in the World, International Personality which explains who can make International Law, Limits of Territory which tells us where the rules apply and objects of International Law which explains to whom and to what the law is applied, we can now proceed to examine International Transactions or the interpretation of International Law as the States themselves understand it, write it down and apply it in their dealings with each other. This is very important in the field of Air Traffic Control as most of us are servants of the State and therefore those who apply International Transactions on behalf of the governments for which we work. Each time an aircraft crosses an international boundary, one of us at each end of the telephone is carrying out an International Transaction and it must be remembered that failure to carry it out properly is a breach of an International Transaction.

In fact the International Transactions which we must now consider are contracts between States and in general the principles applied do not differ very much from the contracts which we all enter into as private individuals.

Various names are given to International Transactions such as treaties, conventions, pacts, acts, declarations or protocols. Entering into such an International Transaction is a display of sovereignty. What we apply most often is a Letter of Agreement. These are usually drawn up by civil servants who are applying the Minister's power to draw up such agreements under a treaty or convention. Treaties are generally quite formal; conventions and pacts usually give broad principles and are less formal; acts are often published after a formal conference giving the results; declarations usually declare law but some declarations have been named conventions. The term protocol as we use it in these articles means an agreement or an explanation or extension of another treaty or convention.

There are no technical rules for drawing up Treaties Which we will now use as the term to cover all the transactions mentioned above. The parties must consent to the Treaty and be able to contract. The parties must be States but not necessarily fully sovereign States. Under Articles 8 and 9 of the Swiss Constitution, the States of the Confederation can enter into Treaties of a non-political nature such as police matters with third parties. An contract between a State and a private person or body is not a Treaty so were IFATCA to be incorporated in a State the relations between that State and IFATCA would be governed by the law of that State and any redress for the Federation against another State because of acts of its nationals could only be taken up under International Law by the State of incorporation. There is one great difference between treaties and Private contracts. Although in both cases the object of. the contract must be legal, duress which invalidates a private contract does not invalidate a treaty. This may

22

Treaties are illegal if they are inconsistent with the State's previous in • t ernat•1onal obligations, . . as are agreements to break International Law. Thus the United Kingdom and Denmark had to negotiate out of treaty obligations u~der E~A before joining the EEC and still require to give certain preferential treatment to the other original members of EFTA. For members of the United Nations Organisation, a Treaty contrary to obligations under the U.N. Charter is illegal.

Provided it is clear what the parties intend a Treaty may be wn·uen, oral or by action. The well known' example of action is the wh"t . war conditions so 1e fl ag of truce in that opposing sides may talk. .

1

It is

~ rule of the International Court that treaties "save

~ certain exceptional circumstances, are binding only by

virtue of ratif"c 1 at"ion. " This applies even if ratification is not stated in the Treaty. Italy signed the Convention setting up the Eurocontrol Agency but did not ratify so never became a member State.

There are certa·1n except·ions which . are usually acceptable to the Courts: First of all there is the Treaty signed by the Heads of State Th" · . · is is rather unusual in modern times and of the bigger po:-vers would probably only be valid in the case of the United States F . . .

• ranee and China. It can of course be written into a Treaty th t .. . . . .. . a rat1f1cat1on 1s not required and generally ratification is not needed when another State adheres to an existing T .. . h reaty. Ratif1cat1on is not required ~n the negotiators are acting competently within a limited and well defi d h . . ne sp ere. However often Ministers f h . ' tend to hm1t the powe . rs o t e1r representatives. It has been noted in so~e ICAO Conferences that the United States d.el.e~ates will often require to consult advisers in the v1cm1ty. of th~ ~onference whereas the United Kingdom delegation will in similar circumstances consult London and yet again the Irish delegation which may be made up of Controllers can often agree without consultation. Other States tend to choose one of these meth 0 d s. .

Norma II Y ~at1fication means that a law defining the Treaty t~rms. is put through the national Parliament but it may be implied if the State puts the terms into practice.

"'!

If there is written ratification, the Treaty does not become effective until the ratification has been exchanged between States or deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations in certain cases. If the ratification includes reservations this amounts to re-opening negotiations.

Reservations are permitted to multilateral Conventions provided they are compatible with the purpose of the Treaty.

Whilst on the subject of ratification: now that a number of Member Associations have commenced the habit of blocking generally accepted policy within the Federation by using the method of "subject to ratification" or "nonratification" it is probably valid to state here how these possibilities should be used.

The "subject to ratification" clause in the Constitution was put there to cover the case where a delegation had been briefed but a subject outside the briefing has been voted in Conference. "Non-ratification" or "ratification with reservation" must both fall under the same clause in the Constitution and until changes are made must be the subject of a straight vote without discussion at the next Conference. Working papers on reservations submitted to Conference cannot be discussed prior to the vote and should constitutionally be submitted to be included on the agenda of subsequent Conferences. Just as a State which does not ratify a Treaty cannot have the Treaty applied to it then a Member Association which has not ratified something subject to ratification, or which has nonratified or ratified subject to reservations, if it does not accept the majority vote must consider especially on matters of administrative policy whether it can honestly remain a Member of the Federation. If one of the delegates is the President of a Member Association it is doubtful if that Association can use the "subject to ratification" clause on the grounds that the delegation has not been properly briefed. This digression may serve to clarify some Constitutional problems which still face the Federation.

Once a Treaty is signed and ratified the principles of consent, good faith and International responsibility come into play between the parties. It is up to the States to place a reasonable amount of weight on all the principles and not to exaggerate the importance of one against another.

Grotius insisted that any breach of any part of a Treaty ended the Treaty but obviously if this were applied to major Treaties chaos would result (and sometimes does). Even the outbreak of war does not necessarily end a Treaty; it merely puts the Treaty in cold-storage. In fact the Treaty ending a war usually includes which Treaties are considered lapsed. Of course States do not usually sign Treaties while asking the question "What happens if one day we go to war?" so the International Courts usually presume their intentions. Technical Treaties such as post, aviation, etc. generally revive after a war. Clearly it would be an excellent state of affairs if Treaties were sacrosanct but as we have already mentioned Treaties signed under duress are legal and if a State becomes powerful enough no longer to be put under duress human nature being what it is, it will clearly attempt to better its conditions under Treaty with changing circumstances. This can be explained by an example. Under the Treaty of Paris 1856 the Black Sea was neutralised and Russia agreed not to keep her fleet in it. (Russia had just been defeated by France and the United Kingdom in the Crimean war.) In 1870 taking advantage of France's defeat by Prussia, Russia repudiated the Treaty despite British protests. In 1871 the original

signatories. signed the Treaty of London to release Russia from her obligations and declared "It is an essential principle of the law of nations that no power can free itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify its terms, except with the assent of the contracting parties by means of a friendly understanding". In effect as far as sanctity of Treaties was concerned the parties were burying their heads in the sand and we have all seen far too many similar incidents in more recent times. J. S. Mill commenting on the Russian action in 1870 made a statement which is good for International Law but which States have yet to accept. "If a lawless act has been committed it does not entitle those who imposed the conditions to consider the lawlessness only, and to dismiss the more important consideration whether, even if it was wrong to throw off the obligation, it would be still more wrong to persist in enforcing it. If, though not fit to be perpetual, it has been imposed in perpetuity, the question when it becomes right to throw it off is but a question of time. No time being fixed, Russia fixed her own time and naturally chose the most convenient".

Some Treaties do include a time limitation but in most cases where the Treaty is of a technical nature such as post, police or even aviation, the time limitation is seldom applied particularly when buildings, equipment and personnel have been established and there can be no immediate reversal of circumstances to the pre-Treaty conditions.

In such circumstances the International Court would interpret the Treaty despite time limitations, as intended to set up a permanent state of affairs and the original period as trial period.

IFATCA entered into the field of law which we are discussing, and made its policy clear at the Reykjavik Conference (1973) with section 7 of Resolution A 5 of the 12th Annual Conference: Owing to the fact that safety is endangered IFATCA strongly condemns a situation where normal ATC services are replaced by a substitute organisation which is unable to: complete co-ordination of clearances as guaranteed within the standards of Annex 11, and/or in accordance with Letters of Agreement between States; provide controllers whose Professional Qualifications comply with International Standards and Recommended Practices on Personnel Licensing for an Air Traffic Controller as laid down by ICAO in Annex I to the Chicago Convention (as accepted and ratified by the States concerned, including their notifications of differences).

(Notifications of differences are reservations as discussed above).

Before continuing with discussions on breaches of Treaty commitments we must go back and summarise some of the points mentioned in previous Articles. In the past there have been secret treaties but the League of Nations required registration by its members. Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation states: 1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.

2. No party to any such treaty or international agreeme t which has not been registered in accordance with t; provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article may invok: that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

23

Ferranti simulators put years on your student controllers l

I

Our ATC training simulators give controllers the experience they need to do their job - before they start doing it.

This is due to the detailed and comprehensive realism of Ferranti digital simulator systems.

The trainee controller's radar displays are identical with those used operationally, and simulated RT and intercom are provided. With this equipment the trainee learns how to cope with aircraft identification, separation, sequencing, the allocation of levels, routing, stacking, and other problems.

Ferranti have studied air traffic control in depth and have an understanding of current and future needs as realistic as the simulators themselves. We know the economic importance of

handling heavy air traffic with minimum delays.

It's hardly surprising therefore that Ferranti ATC simulators have been chosen for the largest and smallest requirements and are currently in service or on order for London Heathrow, Amsterdam Schiphol, Rome Ciampino, Copenhagen Kastrup, Taiwan Taipei, Sydney Australia, and at the College of Air Traffic Control at Hum. And a F erranti simulator is used at the .CAA ATC Evaluation Unit for their real time traffic control studies.

Ferranti Limited, Digital Systems Division, Western Road, Bracknell, Berkshire, RG 12 IRA. Telephone: 0344 3232. Telex: 848117.

FERRANTI The real thing in simulation

We already saw that treaties between members of the British Commonwealth are not always registered so cases under such treaties cannot be brought before the International Court of Justice. The date of registration does not affect the date on which the treaty is agreed to come into effect. Treaties affect only States which are parties to them.

Article 2 of the United Nations Charter tries to apply compliance with United Nations Statutes by non-members.

Clearly there is more hope of achieving this as most of the World's nations are now members and together can bring pressure to bear on the others. Internally ,in a State a change of Government does not affect the State's duties and liabilities under a Treaty. Only States gain rights from Treaties and if rights are given to individuals they can only be given through the laws of a State. These last points are extremely important if we are to achieve, as is the aim of SC VII, a Convention to limit the legal liability of the Controller. Clearly if such a Convention were to be of value, the support of ICAO is essential for it would be registered with ICAO. Rights for Controllers alone would give no benefit to States so rights for Controllers must be tied to limitation of liability for the State if the required support is ever to be found and even then the Convention would have to be written into municipal law by the State before benefits would accrue to the Controller. As can be imagined ,this is a long process which requires extreme attention to detail at every stage if we are to achieve the long awaited objective.

When a Treaty has to be interpreted by the Courts, they try to find the intentions of the parties at ,the time of signing. If the meaning is not clear it must first be interpreted literally. If there is confusion in translation the more restricted meaning is taken. A later law overrules a previous one and a specialised law overrules a general one {Lex posterior derogat priori et lex specialis derogat generali).

A definition in a treaty excludes another definition {Expressio unius exclusio alterius). Negotiations and ratification instruments may be consulted for clarification.

Quite often however States sign Treaties and it is difficult to recognise the original in the subsequent law published in the State.

There are some important differences between the private laws of contract and the Laws relating to Treaties.

In private contracts there must be consideration that is to say that in order to be paid one of the parties must have provided a service or goods and without consideration one Party cannot argue breach of contract for non-payment.

There is no doctrine of consideration in Treaties so in fact an Act by one State can be just as binding as a formal Treaty. Thus a State can declare War or declare itself neutral or declare that it considers certain products to be contraband, etc. once it has so declared breaches of the declaration are treated just as breaches of treaties.

A Treaty may end in many ways: Its object has been achieved; the written time limit has expired; the object of the Treaty has disappeared; one of the signatories has disappeared; the parties agree to end it; there has been a clear change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus}; force majeure which suspends the treaty but which must be a case of endangering the State itself; it is inconsistent with International Law; violation by one of the parties.

It is not necessary at this stage to go into detail on Economic Treaties and the special rules for such treaties

26

will be mentioned as necessary when we come to discuss Aviation Law. We have touched twice on violation of Treaties. We must ask now what can be done in this case? First of all breach of treaty must be proved and never presumed. Normally restitution must be made in kind but, if this is impossible, by payment of a sum equivalent to the value of any damage. The damage is done against a State but damage to individuals is normally used as the yardstick for measurement of damages which must be paid in the currency of the successful State in a case before the International Court.

At the time of writing this Article, the situation in Cyprus is extremely delicate. The Turkish occupation of the northern part of the island has been completed and Turkey has appealed for a new Geneva Conference. For us in IFATCA it is an extremely sad period as the States of three of our Member Associations are directly involved and others are involved by the restrictions on Air Traffic enforced by the situation.

All the facts are not yet known .but we have all followed the story in our daily papers so as it is a well known subject let us try to summarise the purely Legal problems which arise. Under the Treaty granting independence to Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom were guarantors of that independence. Greece had provided officers for the Cypriot National Guard and when these officers were asked to leave by the Head of State, they led a coup d'etat to attempt to overthrow him. This was not only intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign State but was a further breach of law apparently as Greece was a guarantor of Independence. Consultations between the other guarantors did not reach agreement so Turkey acted unilaterally as she could equally legally have done in concert with the United Kingdom. This action followed by certain circumstances inside Greece precipitated a change in government in Greece. If the first act should be proved illegal, the new Greek government will be equally responsible at law as the old one to make reparations.

Having acted to protect Cyprus under the Treaty, Turkey then chose to use duress at the Conference table and we have seen that negotiations under duress can still produce legal settlements. However she then went further in attempting to use duress to change the Constitution of Cyprus by military action. This is now a further intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus by a guarantor and at some stage this action may also prove to have been illegal. It will be more difficult to prove that the United Kingdom did not do sufficient to carry out her treaty obligations by not participating with Turkey in the original invasion. All three can probably be faulted in starting a peace conference without the representatives of the de jure government of the independent State they had guaranteed to protect. The legal arguments on this problem are far from finished but it is to be hoped that peace will soon be restored to all the people of Cyprus and that aviation can return to normal.

1

We have just touched a little on the subject of the next Article which deals with International Violence.

For further study: United Nations Charter. Law of Nations Chap. VII Brierly O.U.P. International Law Chap. 5 Chambers Sweet & Maxwell. l.C.J. Report 1953. Oppenheim's International Law Lauterpracht Vol. I Part IV Longmans.

International Courts and Tribunals Schwarzenberger Stevens.

How not to Combat Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation

The Total International Deadlock: Where do we go from here?

the embarkation and disembarkation phases and to provide international legal protection against violence in those phases.

It is now more than a year ago since ICAO's 20th Session (Extra-ordinary) of the Assembly and Diplomatic Conference (Rome 28 Aug - 21 Sep 1973) ended in dismal failure. The Session was called together for the specific purpose of finding effective ways and means to combat the scourge of terrorism and unlawful acts against civil aviation. Since then, more unlawful acts have taken place; more sessions of international meetings, a. o. lFALPA and IFATCA, have struggled with the problem, but the international community seems incapable of solving this curse against mankind.

None of the above proposals was adopted. The whole Conference became divided into blocks and the national and the regional politics played a dominant role. Each block was voting the other's proposal down with the result that both the Assembly and the Diplomatic Conference failed to agree on a single positive proposal aimed at effective international action against air piracy or sabotage.

Impartial observers conceded that it was one of the worst politicizing that has been witnessed in an international Conference of this nature.

Just how total is the deadlock? And have organisations of aviation personnel done enough to demonstrate to the world at large that effective measures must be resorted to?

The answer to this question is given in the statement issued by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) an Organisation with whom IFATCA collaborates closely after the Conference ended in complete failure, and is illuminating. It is a damning indictment of our present-day society, and IFATCA feels that readers of our journal should digest the statement carefully, and that both IFATCA and IFALPA should combine their efforts to bring some degree of sense into the political arena and to achieve at least some measure of success and not accept the present impasse as final.

Before printing ITF's Closing Statement, the following background information is of interest: The main proposals before the Conference were as follows: 1. U.K./Swiss/French proposal for the amendment of the basic ICAO Chicago Convention by incorporating in it all the main articles of the Hague and Montreal Conventions and in addition amendment of Art. 87 of the Chicago Convention extending the penalty clause against defaulting States by refusing Airlines of defaulting States permission to use the airspace of other contracting States.

2. The USSR proposal in the form of a protocol to the Hague and Montreal Conventions aiming at giving preference to extradition to the State of Registry of aircraft over prosecution of the offender in the country where he has been detained. This was considered by the Sponsors as an effective deterrant against hijacking and sabotage.

3. The Nordic/Belgian proposal asking for the appointment of an independant 'Commission of Enquiry' or giving powers to ICAO Council to investigate into each major hijacking/sabotage incident and then to notify the defaulting State for it to take remedial action. If the State concerned refused to comply with the notice, the Secretary-General should convene a meeting of the ICAO Assembly to decide what action should be taken against that State.

4. The Greek proposal in the form of a Protocol to the Montreal Convention aiming to extend the Convention's scope to cover the passengers and personnel during

The ITF delegation initially supported the U.K./Swiss/ French proposal because it was the only proposal with a penalty clause in it. However, as the meeting progressed, the ITF delegation supported other proposals as well in a desperate attempt to get a positive result aimed at an effective concord.

The lTF is now convinced that there seems to be no political will at all on the part of the ICAO Member States to take effective measures against States which fail to fulfil their international obligations. This is the third time that an attempt to evolve an enforcement machinery has been thwarted.

ITF's Final Statement We would like to express our organisation's profound and bitter disappointment at the way the Rome Conference has gone. We have noted with deep regret that the Conference has been a dismal failure. There seems to be no political will at all on the part of the Governments of the world to do anything about this menace which has plagued this industry for so many years. Legal niceties and timewasting abstract debate on minor points of procedure still take precedent over the lives of ordinary citizens who, despite all the hazards and dangers, continue to render this vital service to the international community. In this city we cannot help but recall that 'Nero fiddled while Rome burned'.

We came to this Conference with a sincere hope that in the light of the appalling incidents of hijacking and other forms of air terrorism in the recent past, the Diplomatic Conference and the Assembly would act with the urgency and efficacy that the situation demanded. But we have been utterly disappointed and we are sorry to say that in the eyes of our members the credibility of the ICAO and its Member States will now be drastically diminished.

Our position can be stated quite simply. It is our members, that is the men and women who work on the ground and in the air, to keep the world's airlines flying, who face totally unacceptable hazards as a consequence of hijacking, sabotage and other attacks. The patience of aviation employees has been tried almost to the point of exhaustion. They are no longer ready to be the sacrificial victims of the indifference or inaction of governments. They have already demonstrated their determination to protect their own interests, and no surer indication can be given

27

of their feelings than the action organised jointly by the ITF and the Pilots on 19 June 1972.

We have been particularly disappointed by the dominant role which matters of narrow political interest have played in this Conference on an issue which is potentially a major threat to all States regardless of their political beliefs or interests. We have at times wondered whose views were being represented. Certainly not the views of the aviation industry - both sides of which are united in their desire for effective international action. Equally certainly it was not the views of world public opinion which the governments are supposed to represent. We trust, in fact, that world public opinion will take good note of the positions which have been taken here in its name and react accordingly.

Brief News Items New Landing Aid for General Aviation A British Company (M.E.L. Equipment Company Ltd.), has developed a new low-cost civil landing aid for general aviation which is ideally suitable for small airfields and heliports.

This new approach aid is unaffected by site reflections and electrical interference and it has an accuracy suitable for Cat. II operations.

Known as "MADGE", the airborne units provide variable approach paths and indicate deviation from selected approach paths on any suitable instrument. It provides the pilot with an immediate warning of low flying; it interfaces with standard flight control systems and it has an automatic system monitoring device.

On the ground, the features of the MADGE includes easy installation, low maintenance costs, high traffic handling capacity and it includes terminal area navigation.

Brief specifications of the MADGE in its operational coverage is that its azimuth (approach and overshoot} in the horizontal plane is ±45° to at least 15 n.m., and ±65° to at least two n.m. In the vertical plane it is 0 to 45 degrees.

The makers claim that it has an aircraft handling capacity in excess of 100 aeroplanes on one frequency channel and one ground station.

The airborne equipment requires a nominal 28 V. DC supply and its consumption is 100 watts. The ground equipment is 24 v. DC nominal but can accept variations from 18 to 32 volts DC. Its power consumption is 65 watts in the standby mode and 300 watts while operating.

The equipment has a long list of safety features built in and, in addition, talkdown facilities can also be incorporated.

Eurocontrol Activity in Ireland Ireland's strategic position on the main air routes between Europe and North America is the principal reason for the Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) providing a data processing system for air traffic 28

services in the Irish upper airspace, i. e. the airspace above 25,000 feet. This new system will effect a smooth transition between the navigational systems and the control procedures used over Western Europe and those used over the North Atlantic routes. For the time being, responsibility for staffing and operation of the U.A.C. will remain with the Irish Department of Transport & Power, but this position will be reviewed in 1976 at which time Eurocontrol may take full responsibility.

Ireland became the seventh Member State of Eurocontrol on 1st January, 1965 and in May 1969 the SSR Station at Woodcock Hill, ten miles east of Shannon Airport and 1,000 feet above sea-level, was opened.

The Shannon SSR was installed by Thomson-Houston Hotchkiss Brandt (now Thomson lnformatique et Visualisation}, and microwave and UHF links transfer the radar information and control system information between Woodcock Hill and the U.A.C. The PPl-scope (40 cm. diameter} has a displayed range of 240 n.m. and video map facilities are provided. The facility of discrete symbols: single bar, double bar or solid wide line, is provided. Normal responses from aircraft carrying SSR 1rensponders are shown as bright marks. Each operating position is provided with a 'rolling ball' the function of which includes read-outs, in alphanumerics form, of aircraft identity and flight level. . The first phase in a programme leading to full automation. of the Shannon U.A.C. (SHANDAP} is nearing completion. Full automation is scheduled for 1976.

Irish technical officers are presently training at the Eurocontrol Institute for Air Navigation in Luxembourg (INSTl.LUX} ~nd at locations in France, and on completion of their studies will take up positions in the software and hardware sections In SHANDAP. (NAVAIRE, official journal of IFATSEA)

Maintaining Quality-Control in Air Traffic Control Equipment The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has adopted a new program that places on the manufacturer the burden of maintaining quality control in equipment purchased by the agency.

The quality-control program will apply to FAA contractor~ who .manufacture air traffic control equipment, navigational aids and related items. FAA officials said the Quality System Certification Program will operate much the same way the agency's aircraft certification program operates. Prospe?tive contractors will submit a quality-control plan along with their technical proposals to FAA for evaluation. In the quality-control plan the manufacturer must sho~ there is. ~ .sy.stem to assure that all phases of production from m1t1at1on of design through manufacture and delivery -. inclu~ing control over supplier-furnished products - will be m conformity with the requirements of the contract.

A succesful contractor will be issued with a qualitycontrol certificate, and his system plan will be made part of the awarded contract.

Performance of the quality-control system will be subject to periodic audit and revalidation by FAA. Non-conformity with the certificate by the contractor will be the basis for revocation of the certificate, rejection of the products and possible termination of the contract by FAA. (Aviation Week & Space Technology)

News from the Federation l.T.F. Meeting, Geneva, October 2 1974 The meeting of the International Transport Federation was held to discuss preparations for the I. L. 0. Preparatory Meeting for Civil Aviation scheduled to commence the following day, and President J-D. Monin attended on behalf of the Federation. ITF agreed that the following officials should form part of the Workers Group who - together with a Government Group and an Employers Group - would take part in the ILO Meeting: 1 Chairman, 4 Vice-Chairmen and 1 Secretary, one of the Vice-Chairmen to be an Air Traffic Controller: ITF agreed to Mr. Monin's recommendation that Mr. J. Kalvik, Vice-President of the Norwegian Air Traffic Controller's Association, should be appointed as Vice-Chairman.

l.L.O. Preparatory Meeting for Civil Aviation, Geneva, 3-10 October 1974 The Federation was represented by President Monin and the Chairman of IFATCA Standing Committee IV, Mr. E. Just (Germany). Mr. Monin addressed the Plenary Session on Monday, October 7, 1974, and outlined the views of the world community of controllers, resulting in these views being included in the draft Report of the meeting.

The President commenced by saying that he wished to thank the International Labour Organisation for the invitation to attend It was the first time that IFATCA attended an ILO meeting ~nd this for the reason that the Federation is only 13 years old and the last meeting of the ILO on Civil Aviation was held some 14 years ago.

Mr. Monin then went on to outline that IFATCA, as a professional Federation representing Member Associations from 39 countries, was formed in 1961 in response to controller requests for international recognition of the profe~­ sion. The profession of Air Traffic Control had been in existence for 40 years and this was the first opportunity controllers had to discuss their human and social problems at an ILO meeting. While some of these problems were the same as those faced by other groups within the aviation community, others were of such a nature as to make them unique.

Unfortunately, in most cases Air Traffic Controllers are public servants and as such are grouped with and compared to other public servants. This is wrong because the profession is unique among public servants. Controllers are required to pass medical examinations which are draw~ up to ICAO standards. This is only one example of uniqueness for there are others such as periodical testing of knowledge, the impact that a wrong decision ~n the controller's part would have on human lives and aircraft, etc. The problem is particularly acute when it comes to consultation and collective bargaining with employers.

Because controllers are public servants they are denied the basic inherent rights of workers in the private sector to determine through negotiation their terms and conditions of employment. It is the Federation's firm belief that controllers cannot and should not be compared with other public servants when it comes to determining their employment conditions.

IFATCA has been striving for many years to gain proper recognition for controllers. To this end good relations have been developed with the ILO and this has been manifested by the report for this meeting. The Federation wishes to place on record its appreciation to the ILO for the great concern shown towards the position of Air Traffic Controllers in the past few years. We have seen in that period a drastic increase in traffic volume as well as the speed at which aircraft fly. This has all been to the detriment of the controller for governments tend to be conservative in their estimations for the requirement of additional controllers, radio- and radar equipment, and automation. As a result the controllers continually find themselves in a position where they are short staffed and attempting to control tomorrow's aircraft with yesterday's equipment and rules.

Actions by controllers have a very direct bearing on the safety and the economy of the airlines. If conditions of employment are not on a par with the responsibilities of the profession, then the dissatisfaction and unrest that is being experienced in the controller's world will continue to grow.

At the final Plenary Sitting on Thursday, October 10, 1974, the following resolution by the Workers Group was accepted: 1) Preamble: In the interest of air safety vis-a-vis ¡the reduction of fatigue, morale, and well being to the Air Traffic Controller, it is recommended that the ILO should establish an international convention on the profession of the Air Traffic Controllers, which is unique in the civil service; 2) Action to be taken: In accordance with the report prepared by ithe ILO concerning Social and Labour Problems in Civil Aviation, such a convention should develop standards in terms of: a) Retirement age and adequate pension scheme; b) Amount of working hours; c) Annual leave; d) Protection in the event of loss of licence or ratings; e) Adequate remuneration; f) Negotiations on all subjects having a direct bearing on working conditions and environment; g) Establishment of Medical Examination Boards, which must be independent in order to give the controller an opportunity of appeal in the event of alleged defects resulting in non-renewal of licence; h) Legal liability; i) Consequences of automation on the Air Traffic Controller; 3) Recommended means of action: The Preparatory Meeting recommends the Governing Body to decide that the urgent problems concerning Air Traffic Controllers should be the subject of a specialised meeting of the same type as a meeting of experts as soon as possible.

In view of the fact that controllers were the only ones who had a recommendation passed especially for them, participation in this meeting can be considered a successful step forward on the still long and arduous road to proper recognition of our profession.

29

Closing of Airfields to Hi-jacked Aircraft President J-D. Monin has sent the following letter to Mr. W. Binaghi, President ·of the ICAO Council: "The problems of 'hi-jacking' and terrorism in the air are generally matters of the greatest importance in the world of Aviation. These, of course, cannot be physically prevented by Air Traffic Controllers any more than they can be prevented by pilots. .

However the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Ass~ciations (IFATCA), through its Executive B~ar~. have condemned such criminal acts and directed individual Member-Associations to use their influence as Professional Organizations to pursuade their respective ~over~­ ments to take active measures towards combattmg ~ir piracy and to ratify existing conventions which deal with the matter.

To all our amazement some Governments have in effect acted during recent hi-jacking incidents contrary to. th~se conventions by deliberately closing airfields. ~r by swi~chmg off essential Radio Navigation Aids to ~1-J~cked aircr~ft within their territories presumably not .w1shmg to be in. volved in such incidents.

A It IFATCA 13th Annual Conference held m t w k" g s a resu , Tel Aviv in May 1974, after studying the re 1evan or in Paper (74. c. 18) resolved to take such action ~s. necessa.ry under the circumstances to assist pilots of h1-1acked aircraft to affect safe landing even if such action is contrary to administrative directions. .

IFATCA firmly believes ,that such government action may frustrate hi-jackers and cause them to harm crew and passengers and also create unnecessary hazards to other traffic. f •rt· Id IFATCA, therefore, condemns the clos.u~e o a1. ie s and essential air navigation facilities to h1-1ack~d airer.a~ and suggests the establishment, by the lnterna~1onal C~v1I . t'on of Standards and Practices which AV .1at'ion 0 rgamza 1 , .. should be adopted by all Contracting States.

To this letter Mr. Binaghi replied as follows: "I acknowledge your letter on the subject of 'Closing of Airfields to Hi-jacked Aircraft. . . n of concern with the closure of a1rYour express10 ... .. fields and essential air navigation fac1hties to h1-1acked aircraft and suggestion as to the establishment ~y ICAO of Suitable Standards and Recommended Practices are being referred to the council's Committee on . Unlaw!~' Interference with International Civil Aviation and its Facilities, which will examine the whole question a~ the po~t Assembly Session of the council along with IATA s suggestions on similar lines."

Correspondence on this subject has also been exchanged with IATA, and IATA has express~d sati~faction with the Federation's initiative. The Board 1s desirous of establishing closer links with IATA, and the exchange of views on this topic is a step in this direction.

The Media and the Lunatic Fringe In all pal'its of the world, IFATCA's workers are active all the year round. This was illustrated recently by the following letter which was sent to the Director of Programmes of the French TV Service 'ORTF': "I have just watched your programme 'Air Atlantic 725' Which had as its subject a hoax regarding a bomb on an aircraft. Air piracy and allied subjects is permanently being studied by SC VII of IFATCA and as Chairman of the U. K.

30

sub-comittee I am forced to write to you urgently but without the possibility of prior discussion with my Chairman who lives in Cyprus nor our Executive Board. Therefore I can only express to you feelings which have been expressed many times by our Conferences. I should point out that our Federation has 39 members being Air Traffic Controllers' Associations on five continents.

The problem of air piracy and also of course the problem of hoaxers which your programme described will never be resolved ·if responsibility is lacking in media such as press, TV and radio. This evening under the name of entertainment you have shown the public a second rate film without any research whatsoever into the technical problems in such an incident across the North Atlantic neither in the communications field nor in the character portraying the captain of the aircraft. Certainly the wrongdoer was arrested at ithe end by the police but let us hope that in real life we will not now be faced with such a series of hoaxes.

Your magazine 'Telepoche' says in its critique: "We had no end of difficulty in finding an airline which allowed us to film in flight. Only one, it- charter company at Nice, gave us permission." I am certain that the airline companies had the same misgivings as our Federation in the use of air piracy with no other end in view but to have a sensational viewing subject. To underline how our Federation condemns such films you may not be aware that recently our President sent a letter to the Norwegian Minister of Transport expressing our misgivings following his decision to allow filming of 'Ransome' in his country.

This film touches on the same subject and again the film company did not ask for the technical advice of our Norwegian colleagues.

In June 1974 our Executive Board wrote to us in the Federation's Circular: "In this day and age IFATCA subscribe to the view that there is no point in stimulating the lunatic fringe into this kind of activity by showing them how to do it". Thank you for studying this complaint and with the hope that our work for air safety will not suffer as a result of your transmission, I remain etc."

The Situation in Cyprus The Federation has been much concerned with the difficult Air Traffic Services situation in Cyprus where members of the Cyprus Association are responsible for the Area Control Centre operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Following the occupation of Nicosia Intern. Airport

by U. N. Forces, the Centre's operations have been conducted from an operations room outside the airport boundary in unsatisfactory conditions from an expeditious and safe ATC point of view.

President Papathomas and immediate past President Telonis of CYATCA held discussions with IFATCA's President Manin in Geneva some months ago where Mr. Manin introduced the visitors to IATA officials L. Armen and G. N. Anastasi, and editorial staff members of lnteravia, while a meeting was arranged through President Gorin of the French Association with Mr. P. Berger of the ICAO Paris Office and the French Pilots' Association. In London, IFATCA Executive Secretary Harrison arranged a meeting with Messrs. V. H. King and B. Edwards of IFALPA H. a., which lasted some five hours and which was held in the IFALPA conference room. CYATCA's stand was that it seemed only a matter of time before an airborne collision took place.

IFATCA's Standing Committee I

by Arnold Field, 0. B. E., Past President of IFATCA ; Chairman of S. C. 1.

History of Standing Committee I: "Technical and Professional Matters" At the 1974 IFATCA Conference held ¡in Tel Aviv, the following Recommendation was passed at the Final Plenary meeting: " That the United Kingdom Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers be awarded the IFATCA Scroll of Honour for the outstanding services it has g iven to the Federation on the management of Standing Committee I." Having been associated with IFATCA for many years and during the course of this time been privileged 10 be its President, I am well aware that IFATCA does not lightly bestow this honour. It was therefore with considerable personal pleasure that I heard of th is award from our delegates on their return from Tel Aviv. However, it is fitting that the terms of the recommendation are framed as a tribute to the British Guild, for it is the Guild who have provided the effort and expertise which has resulted in the recognition of the air ~raffic controller's professional opinions by International Aviation Authorities.

As a tribute to the members of Standing Committee I it occurred to me that an article on the history and achievements of the Committee might be appropriate, also because there may be a number of our Guild's and IFATCA's membership not fully conversant with the work of this committee and as a result possibly not fully appreciate the significance of the award. Fortunately I was asked some time ago if I could set down the history of S. C. I and having re-read what I then wrote I feel that its reproduction might be of interest to readers on this particular occasio n.

Standing Committee I was one of the first of the committees to commence operating following the formation of IFATCA. The prime object of th is committee was to set about the task of formulating policy for the Federation.

To do so it was necessary in the first instance to prepare papers on topi cs of importance to air traffic control and to circulate these papers to member associations as an initial step to stim ulating their interest in technical matters.

The su bjects cove red were as diverse as possible and covered such items as: a) Area Navigation b) Radar Procedures c) Airspace Organisation d) Civil/Military Co-ordination e) Pilo t/Controller Relationship f) Cruising Level Systems g) Control of Flights in VMC etc.

Having thus established a background of 'thinking' it was then necessary to examine these subjects in detail and to prepare papers for discussion at annual conferences. These papers were so framed to conclude with proposed Recommendations and/ or Resolutions, the object being to circu late the material sufficiently in advance of the conference date that delegates of member associations c ould debate the conclusions of the papers in the concerned sub-committee and if approved or amended submit

Arnold Field, after the work is done ...

Resolutions and Recommendations for acceptance by the Final Plenary Session. This pattern was followed and gradually over the years an IFATCA Policy Manual has been formulated. This procedure gave the Standing Committee a solid basis upon wh ich to give advice to the Executive Board of IFATCA w henever they required assistance in the answering of requests from outside bod ies on IFATCA opinion.

Having established the general background, it became, however, clear that IFATCA could make little progress in trying the influen ce the 'ATC thinking' of national or international aviation bodies unless it directed its energies towards subj ects and institutions which were the concern of these administrations. The obvious choi ce was of cou rse ICAO .and it was therefore decided that the main effort of Standing Committee I should be directed towards those subjects set down for discussion in the various ICAO

31

Committees and Regional meetings. This was no easy task, for a basic requirement was a knowledge of the organisation and working of the !CAO machinery. In this respect, however, Standing Committee I was fortunate in having at its disposal the advice of Mr. Tekstra the then President, Mr. Atterholm the then Vice-President and Mr. Monk the then Executive Secretary. It is primarily due to the advice of these gentlemen that the early efforts of Standing Committee I were correctly directed and as a result able to make a modest start in an accepted international role.

As the effort available to the Standing Committee was purely on a voluntary basis it was necessary to be extremely selective not only in the amount of work which was to be undertaken but also to ensure that the subject matter was within the competence of those persons to whom the task of preparing papers would be delegated.

The Executive Board had quite rightly decided that all submissions should be in the prescribed ICAO format and their quality correctly reflect the professional maturity of IFATCA. In this respect it is interesting to note that a paper entitled: 'Radar Monitoring of Aircraft Navigational Accuracy and Reduced Horizontal Separation' submitted by IFATCA was used as a working paper by the ICAO Panel 'Review of the General Concept of Separation (RGCS) (Paper RGSP-BID/7 dated 28th May 1973). This contribution, though small in the overall aspect of an international body such as ICAO does serve to illustrate the road which Standing Committee I has travelled since its early beginnings.

The intention was to prepare background material, prepare Policy from IFATCA Conference debate and thereafter to try to present this policy in an international forum to try to influence aviation thinking by opinions expressed by Practising air traffic control officers. This has been achieved however modestly.

Today IFATCA are present as Observers at a number of lCAO meetings and as full members at the West European Informal Flow Control meetings held under the aegis of the ICAO Paris Office and Standing Committee I is actively engaged in the preparation of material for forthcoming conferences and equally important the follow-up action from

Comments by Air Traffic Spokesmen across the World Mr. A. Maneus, Representative of the International Air Navigators Council, at IFATCA '74 in Tel Aviv: As you know, our profession is dying slowly, but we are not in a hurry and I think we can still survive for 10 to 20 years, finishing with freelance work. The story of our profession may hold some lessons to a Federation like yours. Two main factors have influenced it: the first was the development of the black boxes which excluded us from the flight deck. The second was internal. Some years ago one of our national Associations, in discussions with their management, arrived at an agreement. Our Council proposed to stand up for their cause, but the answer was 32

past conferences. Of equal importance to the direction of Standing Committee I towards ICAO affairs was the need to associate itself in a professional sense with the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations. This aspect was pursued in parallel and from the outset a welcoming and friendly hand was extended to us by that highly organised and competent body. Today IFATCA, represented

by Standing Committee I, is invited to attend the IFALPA RAC/COM Study Group meetings. This Study Group covers the main items of concern to both Pilot and ATC organisations and participation has been of considerable assistance to Standing Committee I. It is also pleasing to record that IFALPA are appreciative of having access to ATC opinion. IFATCA is also invited as official observers to the annual conferences of IFALPA and to Standing Committee I falls the task of preparation of briefs for our delegation.

In summary therefore, Standing Committee I supports the President and other members of the Executive Board of IFATCA in the discharge of their professional duties in between conferences. The Committee accepts direction from Conference in regard to Its Work Programme; prepares briefs based upon IFATCA policy when these are required and endeavours to cover as wide a spectrum as possible of future activities which it considers will be of concern to the Federation. It must however be borne in mind that Standing Committee I still remains a voluntary body based upon the goodwill and dedication of a relatively small number of practising air traffic controllers and therefore, of necessity, the output has to be related to the effort available. A development in recent years has been the encouraging response of member associations to assist, by accepting responsibility for specific tasks thereby acting in the role of sub-committees with Standing Committee I acting as the parent body. This is a healthy sign for not only does it assist in the deployment of the work load but is material in reflecting in the work of Standing Committee I a truly international flavour. (first published In 'TRANSMIT' official journal of the British Guild of ATCOs)

'no'. In the end they disappeared as an Association. It was the beginning of the end for them. If we apply this lesson to your Federation, you will understand that you have to stick together. All national Associations have specific problems in their lands, but when trying to resolve them, they must look for IFATCA backing. (This echoes the editorial in this issue - Ed.) To take a simple example like the question of salaries: until now we have always run behind the cost of living, but - if by a happy solution - you increase your income, put part of it into the Federation's coffers to increase your power, and you will need it because - and this goes for both flight deck crew members and controllers - the profession is such that no outsider is able to understand it completely or defend it for you. You have to defend it yourself. Please think it over.

News from Member Associations

Canada

GATCO's CONVEX '74

Compulsory Reporting Points

Air Traffic Controllers and many others interested in the art, from equipment manufacturers to pilots, were present in Bournemouth for GATCO's biennial conference and exhibition CONVEX '74, which was held from October 30November 2, 1974. One of the participants was the Controller of Britain's National Air Traffic Services, lvor Broom.

The venue was held at the spacious Bournemouth Pavillion.

Besides a full program of business sessions on the conference themes of SST Operations and General Aviation, there were various equipment manufacturers' displays in the exhibition. There was also a full program of social events including an Aviation Gala Night, a luncheon given by the corporate members of the Guild, a GATCO luncheon, and a civic reception.

IFATCA was represented by President J.-0. Manin and

by Executive Secretary T. H. Harrison, a former Master of the Guild. Mr. Manin had come to perform a special task.

It will be recalled that at the 1974 Annual Conference of IFATCA in Tel Aviv, the following recommendation was approved: "That the Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers (U. K.) be awarded the IFATCA Scroll of Honour for the outstanding services it had given to the Federation in the management of IFATCA's Standing Committee I (Technical)."

Since the formation of the Standing Committee within IFATCA, the British Guild has, by continued re-election, held the responsibility for IFATCA's technical work programme under the chairmanship of the CAA's Joint Field Commander, Arnold Field. Amid acclaim, IFATCA's President presented the Federation's Scroll of Honour to the Master of the British Guild, an honour which will surely go down in GATCO and IFATCA history as one richly deserved after many years of painstaking and exacting work.

The Canadian Air Line Pilots Association, with whom CATCA has close and long-standing relationships, has advised CATCA of problems their members are encountering and which CATCA can help to solve.

It appears that controller opinion varies as to when position reports over compulsory reporting points should be omitted once radar identification is established.

Under present regulations pilots are not permitted to discontinue position reporting on the basis only of being radar identified. Rather, if the controller is satisfied that further reports are not required he should so inform the pilot.

The reason for the variance in controller opinion is obviously the difference in equipment and radar coverage.

In areas with full radar coverage it admittedly does not seem to make sense to have to advise the pilot of something that appears obvious. However, as stated above, he is bound by the regulations, and is entitled to consistency, since he utilizes the airspace of many FIRs and is not aware of the equipment differences between them.

The simple phrase "omit position reports" will indicate to the pilot what the controller wants him to do. Use of this procedure will prevent friction in a relationship which both Associations are eager to keep at its present amiable state.

CATCA Biennial National Convention,

Vancouver, B.C., May 6-9, 1975.

The Association will be holding its 1975 Biennial National Convention in Vancouver, B. C., May 6-9, 1975, and would be happy to welcome any IFATCA members who may be able to attend. For specific details, please write to the following address: CATCA '75, P. 0. Box 94506, Richmond, B. C., V6Y 2V6, Canada.

The Association says that it hopes to took forward to renewing old, and making new, acquaintances among IFATCA members on that occasion. Many IFATCA members have some first-hand experience of CATCA hospitality and the Executive Board of the Federation expresses best wishes for a most successful Convention.

United Kingdom New Master Appointed The new Master of the Guild of Air Traffic Controllers for the 1974/5 period is Thomas Johnston, a Chief Sector Controller at LATCC, West Drayton.

Tom Johnston, 51, a founder member of the Guild, has had a varied career in air traffic control, including a spell as an instructor at the CATC, Hurn, and as a Watch Supervisor at Heathrow. He is an Associate Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and is a member of the Guild's Mediator sub-committee.

United States The PATCO Scene The protracted negotiations between the FAA and PATCO during 1974 over the renewal of the labour contract for controllers which had expired, were further complicated when the American Air Transport Association, on behalf of its member airlines, withdrew its FAM trip programme on September 1, 1974, and reinstituted - on September 20, 1974 - a revised programme of familiarization flights on a curtailed basis and with certain limitations and conditions imposed. The old programme was obtained at the bargaining table during the negotiations for the expired contract, but ATA said that this had come about without the knowledge of the airlines, and that the familiarization programme should be removed from the contract.

ATA, alleging controller abuse and violation of Civil Aeronautics Board Regulations, put forward that the airlines had documented cases of abuse, but PATCO maintained that no such specific allegations had been substantiated, and went on to declare that the Organisation totally

33

rejected the new concept as an offer not worthy of consideration.

About half the U.S. controller force used jumpseat authority in Fiscal 1974; of that 50 °/o, about 5 D/o took more than four trips during the 12-month-period. Eight trips are permitted per year under the old union contract.

(ATA has since agreed to restore the old programme -

Ed.)

Study of the FAA, by Glen A. Gilbert In early 1974, PATCO commissioned Glen A. Gilbert of Glen A. Gilbert & Associates (a Corporate Member of lFATCA) to carry out a study to analyse possible way~ ~nd means of improving the operation of the Federal Aviation Administration. Under the title of the study: "The Future ATC System: Inside or Outside the FAA/DOT?" (DOT: Department of Transportation), Glen A. Gilbert describes the philosophy underlying his approach to this assignment by accepting that the people who work in government generally are more often the victims than the wilful perpetrators of what the public may consider to .be.. inefficient or incompetent performance of governmental functions, because of having to work within a weak or inefficient governmental structure. Good people cannot do good things with . bad government organisational mechanisms. Bad mecham~ms can frustrate both those working within the mechanism and those working with it from the outside. Bad mechanisms cause low internal morale, which in turn, can lead to poor performance of duties and wastefulness or carelessness in the expenditure of the taxpayer's money.

How can we best organise our government to achieve the goal of meeting most effectively the needs of our tot~I national air transportation resources in general and the Air Traffic Control System in particular? What should we do to successfully pursue the purposes of. greater eco~~m~ and at the same time increase organisational productivity.

The final Report should be in the hands of appropriate Senators and Congressmen (and Congressional Committees) around Spring 1975. By then, it should be appar~nt to the new Congress that there is a case for urgent action in support of a new governmental aviation mechanism which will be emphasised in the Report. Gilbert believes that the new Congress will give his study prompt attention. The U. S. Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 provides for the imposition of "user taxes" on all segments of civil aviation for a ten jear period commencing July 1, 1970. These taxes go into a so-called "trust fund" from which funds are to be expended only for airport and airway purposes.

Spending authority under the Act expires on June 30, 1975.

In other words: if Congress does nothing before then, the taxes will still be collected from the users and wilt continue to go into the trust fund, but none of this money would be available for airport/airway purposes. The trust fund already has an uncommitted surplus which, at current user tax and appropriation levels, will amount to about $ 600 million by June 30, 1975, and well over $ 4 billion by June 30, 1980.

If no funds were to be drawn from the trust fund after June 30, 1975, a projection indicates that the surplus could reach over $10 billion by June 30, 1980, the end of the program's original ten year life. It is obvious that some form of Congressional action is needed with respect to the 1970 Act during the first half of 1975.

There are two basic questions: (a) what advantages have accrued to air transportation since 1966 by virtue of having

34

the FAA located within the DOT?; and (b) what disadvantages have resulted? Positive responses to the first question were virtually nil. Probably the single comment most voiced to the second question was that the DOT, since its inception in 1966, has been railroad and surface oriented, and either has been anti-aviation or, at best, unsympathetic in its treatment of aviation matters. The current DOT national transportation policy statement gives little recognition to aviation as a significant transportation medium.

Gilbert thinks that the new mechanism should be aviation oriented from top to bottom and be able to operate in a technical/engineering/economic environment free of political domination. It should be able to respond rapidly to the changing needs and priorities of air transportation, which involves both internal and external implications. The airspace users should have a continuing and positive voice in the decision-making process of the mechanism before the fact, not after. The mechanism should be able to operate under streamlined budgeting procedures so that its expenditures and revenues are closely coordinated, and budgeting can be more reflective of changing needs as they occur. The mechanism must:-be cost beneficial, both now and in future projections, as compared with the current FAA/DOT structure. These goals and many others will be analysed and quantified in the study in order to reach objectively derived final conclusions and recommendations as to more precisely what the proposed new mechanism should look like.

Outside of the U. S., the study will review the aviation organisational structure in Canada, the U. K.'s British Airports Authority, British Civil Aviation Authority and International Aeradio Ltd. (a Corporate Member of IFATCA), plus the ATC organisation in Switzerland.

Letters from Readers Shakespeare among the Controllers Following Greg Mellen's delightful article In your August issue, may I put forward two further examples: Airport Surface Control at dawn with a heavy ground fog.

"This most excellent canopy, the air, look you, this brave o'erhanging firmament, this majestic roof fretted with golden fire, why it appears no other thing to me but a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours".

Near miss on the radarscope "-Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair And makes my seated heart knock at my ribs Against the use of nature. Present fears Are less than horrible imaginings".

Macbeth Act I Sc iii - G. A. Bartley-Denniss

by J. R. Adderley, Principal Consultant, Operational Planning Group, Software Sciences Limited.

Plan Ahead Abstract

Who Cares About Software

The Ad hoe application of Flow Control is a thrombosis that threatens to paralyse the Air Transport System. We must meet the increasing demand of air traffic by exploiting our available Airspace Capacity which is limited not by the physical volume of the airspace but by the techniques and procedures currently available to us. Although the long term answer may involve 40 or Time Slot Navigation, the immediate remedy is with the continual exploitation of radar techniques at acceptable levels of cockpit and controller workload.

Controllers cannot be expected to regulate the Flow of Traffic unless they are provided with knowledge of the impending traffic demand balanced against the available capacity of the A TC system. Computers are a powerful tool that can aid the controller to complete this task if the computers are harnassed and not allowed to dominate the system.

The application of Computer Technology for Planning and Scheduling offers an increase in rthe capacity of the system. Real and Fast Time Computing Techniques offer the possibility of providing the controller with advance warning of excess demand. They can assist the dynamic management of the traffic flow to protect its safety with the minimum disruption of its regularity or economy of operation.

The terms Hardware and Software are evidence that computers do not automatically relieve man of his tasks, for they themselves are additions to man's vocabulary, that as generic terms in an ATC data processing context, mean: a) Hardware - the electronic machinery and associated input devices such as keyboards or touch wire displays, and output devices such as radar and data displays that are physical evidence of a computer; b) Software - the programs that are compiled and contained within a computer system to make it function as required and the brainpower to define and control exactly how they should do it.

~\\\E9

1

,,, \\'' '

HARDWARE

Introduction In 1972 I had the honour of talking along the lines of this paper to the Convention of the British Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers. At that time I prefaced my remarks by saying that indeed it was the Age of Aquarius we lived in, when the technique of Flow Control was sometimes instigated by the less than scientific practice colloquially termed, "A feeling in the waterl" Since then Strategic Flow Control restrictions have been widely introduced. They are commonly in the form of severe limitations upon the number of aircraft per hour permitted to enter certain airways. Although indeed they may be wellintentioned attempts to prevent overloading of ATC sectors, in many cases the effect of these restrictions, with their arbitrary rules, has been to stifle the expeditious flow of air traffic across a complete Continent. The resulting delays and operating penalties, particularly considered in the current economic and fuel situation, are threats to the viability of the World Air Transport System. We must cure the paradox that provides adequate capacity at the majority of our airports, yet is unable to effectively use the vastly greater volume of airspace available to us.

Speaking to the Air Traffic Controllers and their guests I defined the objectives of this paper as: a) explaining the application of software to ATC technology, and b) expressing some constructive, though possibly controversial, views on ways of achieving expedition.

I still suggest there is a dynamic compromise between 'playing it by ear' or introducing crippling constraints, providing that the controllers have adequate information and providing we 'Plan Ahead'.

SOFTWARE PACKAGE

ELECTRONIC DATA DISPLAY PTA PTB ETA

PROCESSED RADAR DISPLAY

There are of course good, better and possibly even best computers for particular tasks. The majority of Corporate Members of the Guild are directly, or indirectly, concerned with computers, and I understand that even some overseas manufacturers who are not Guild Members are considered favourably in high places. As Airport and Airspace System Consultants, particularly concerned with Air Traffic Control, my own company has no direct association with any manufacturer of computers, or indeed of radar, communications, or any of the excellent hardware that you use. But, as our name implies, we are closely concerned with specific applications of Software.

Software can be thought of as the stimulus that makes a computer sing, or dance, or tell amusing stories. Indeed this is a useful analogy because, if you think of a tap~ recorder as hardware and a tape cassette as software, you will readily appreciate that it is the software that dictates whether the recorder will play Haendel's 'Messiah', or the

35

As you yourselves are keenly aware, the task of controlling is a 'Real-Time' task, that I~ to say, one in which your decisions have to be made whilst a specific situation or situations are occurring. All but the simplest computer systems used by ATC must also be Real-Time systems because the information they handle, just as you do as a controller, is the radar and flight plan data relating to the present and short term future situation. To elaborate the analogy of a tape recorder representing the hardware and the tape representing the software, you will appreciate that tape recordings are completed before you receive them, and the recorder merely reproduces them. In the case of a Real-Time ATC computer, the information, such as the position of an aircraft as represented by radar data, is only available at the time it is received, and is only valid momentarily, and may have to be correlated with Flight Plan data, that is also only valid for a limited period. Therefore, in these circumstances, the software that is fed to the RADAR OR computer before it begins to operate, contains none of FLIGHT PLAN PROCESSING this Real-Time data, but merely serves as an empty vehicle AND DISPLAY waiting to receive it and immediately process it.

This rather suggests that the ,Programmer's task is someAPPLICATIONS _ _ _ what akin to the chaps who paint spots on dominoes, on the day they make double blanks; but it is far from that.

The software program is a set of rules that instruct and control the computer and its functions. In a real-time system particular degenerate sounds that are the current Tops of it is part of the software task to receive real-time data e. g. the Pops. Certainly it is true that a more sophisticated tape a coded secondary radar signal, and to process it by, for recorder, with stereophonic woofers, tweeters or what have instance, correlating it with a Flight Plan and displaying it you, will achieve a more faithful reproduction of the clasas a callsign label adjacent to the correct target which sics or indeed a more terrifying version of the Pops. The it generates on a synthetic dynamic display. This perhaps same principle applies to ATC computer hardware, where is indicative that the design and production of computer more sophisticated output displays could, for instance, persoftware is indeed a rather complex process. mit aircraft to appear in glorious technicolour, and might even display a Rainbow on a Purple Airway!

We Care About ATC My point, quite simply, is that ATC certainly requires good hardware, but it is equally essential that the hardIndependent system houses have a very real contriware is nourished with adequate software. bution to make in the design and production of ATC systems. Converting a real-time operational requirement into an effective software package is only part of this contribution.

Computer Models can be used to undertake fast-time CAPACITY simulations of specific or complex ATC problems. The importance of these fast-time simulations and evaluations is RADAR PROCEDURAL not that they can, for instance, simulate 24-hours traffic in (non radar) the Terminal Area in the space of 10 minutes, but that they can provide a detailed analysis of any event, or sequence, or sum of events, that is considered at all significant. This Result of Applying Horizontal Separation enables a thorough understanding to be achieved not of Minima the finer points or skills of controlling, but of the overall pressures and problems.

818818188 I a I a The Fast-Time Simulation is indeed a Planning Tool to be ~mlnu~ used to assess the value of additional facilities or the me"' 80 nm at 480 kt11 rits of proposed changes. It also serves to educate those = 40 nm et 240 kt11 who use it into a fuller understanding of what makes the at worst 1 : 16 system tick. Our experience gained from System Design and Ratio at best 1:4 Planning Studies, simulations and computer applications, both at Home and Abroad, suggests the following possible methods of improving system capacity and system effiSeparation Minima Dictated by_; ciency.

COMPUTER TECHNIQUES

t.

t

Navigational Accuracy and Predictability of aircraft adhering to Flight Plan and ATC clearance

Radar Discrimination Reaction I Manoeuring Space Vorticity Constraints

Other Factors Aircraft Performance : Controller/ System Workload : Communications

36

Capacity The capacity of an Air Traffic System can be measured by its capability to handle the traffic demand at the time when the demand occurs. This ability to handle all the traf-

fie, at the time that it offers, is synonymous with the expedition which is a primary objective of any Air Traffic Service. A system that imposes delays at peak periods, whilst offering excess capacity at other times, cannot rest upon its laurels, for it is inescapable that when it is most needed it substitutes economic penalty instead of expedition. The capability to expedite an increased traffic demand may be improved by the availability of additional airport or airspace capacity or advances in navigational capability leading to improved airspace utilisation. Although it would need a Cost Benefit analysis to prove my remarks I strongly suspect that the cost of some of these improvements, except in the short term, is small compared with the cost of delays resulting from an overloaded ATC system.

The practice of Air Traffic Control has evolved from a strategic system, whereby aircraft filed flight plans and controllers used Flight. Progress Strips to plan a safe flight path ahead of the aircraft, and to record details of its actual progress. This system has a capacity limitation, both in terms of the number of aircraft permitted by procedural separation minima to simultaneously use a given volume of airspace, and the controller's ability to update, sensibly interpret and plan ahead for the aircraft on his sector.

An increasing traffic demand threatened saturation of the system, but the situation was saved by the introduction of area radar techniques, permitting reduced separation minima and corresponding increases in traffic capacity. As traffic has increased, radar sequencing techniques have improved. Currently, much greater emphasis is given to the dynamic situation, as interpreted from the radar display, than to the static information on the Flight Strips which, nevertheless, have importance both as Planning Information and as Back-up or Historic Data.

But a new capacity limitation is reached when the radar control and co-ordination workload threatens to overwhelm the controller's thought and communication capabilities, and further sectorlsation of densely occupied airspace becomes progressively self-defeating. This saturation level is often thought of as an "airspace capacity" limitation - but is really, of course, a limitation of the air traffic control system, rather than a shortage of actual airspace.

Flow Restrictions The ad hoe application of Flow Control is becoming a thrombosis that, in order to relieve pressure on certain weak extremities of the system, has spread into the arteries and threatens the normal circulation.

In practice, this often means that aircraft routeing to an airport suffering from excess demand are penalised by excessive delays. Even worse, aircraft routeing to other airports that actually have spare capacity available, are subjected to the same delays because they have the misfortune to be routed via certain of the same en-route sectors.

It is easy to be critical of others in adjacent Centres who impose restrictions because of restrictions placed on them by their neighbours. Rather than attempt to apportion blame, it is more useful to offer a solution and this implies quantification of the question and answer.

The question is firstly 'What is the capacity'? Now, although this is seemingly a difficult question, there is no reason why the capacity of individual segments of an entire system cannot be methodically quantified to indicate a total capability and more importantly it can provide a clear indication of the bottlenecks. Quite obviously although values can be obtained to represent the capacities in normal con-

ditions, provision also has to be made to allow for reduced capacities associated with such factors as adverse weather or equipment unserviceability.

Secondly, 'What is the demand'?

By this I mean what is the predicted size and timing of the traffic demand that will require to use each segment of the system. I use the term 'predicted' to imply a future demand that can be forecast with a reasonable degree of accuracy. You will appreciate that, if the available capacity of a system is known and there are obvious bottlenecks, much can be done to eliminate them or to re-route via available capacity any demand in excess of this particular limitation.

To do this, the size and the timing of the demand must be known to a reasonable degree of accuracy. This is what is lacking with present day procedural techniques which, despite having the information in the flight plan, tend to use it only a few mim:ites prior to when the aircraft enters the airspace of concern. Indeed, this is a bigger failing with

FLOW RESTRICTION? OR REGULATION? SURGES OF DEMAND CAUSE DELAYS

1

2 0®©®®0

3

~~ ~ ~ PLANNING AND FLOW REGULATION LEAD TO EXPEDITION

most automated Flight Plan Processing systems which store this data in their vast memories until ejaculating it towards the luckless controller just prior to the aircraft entering the area. At least, with the manual system, the sheer number of accumulating strips was a warning to the 'D' man even if 'A' was getting writer's cramp.

I therefore suggest that, if we can provide each Area Control Centre with precise data of the number of aircraft and the times at which they require to use each segment of the system, this will permit plans to be made and, if necessary, modified to exploit the available capacity to meet this demand. It will also facilitate re-routeing where this is advantageous and should minimise the impositions of delays, and permit their equitable application and adequate forewarning of the luckless operators. This all amounts to more effeotive utilisation of the available airspace.

Computer Applications A significant improvement in ATC capability is offered by the application of computer technology. The computer

37

is undoubtedly the most powerful tool devised by man but, like any powerful beast, unless it is properly harnessed, it can do untoward harm.

It is sometimes assumed that automation is the final panacea and that its introduction could at once remedy all shortcomings of the system and could result in a fully automatic system. Let me say that, given time and money, both in very large quantities, this is technologically possible. But it is not what we require for many years to come.

The practice of Air Traffic Control is a Real-Time process, whereby decisions have to be made very quickly. This appears to be an ideal environment for the computer, which thrives on instant results, but in practice the dynamic problems which the controller solves are extremely complex when broken down into sets of conflict prediction or conflict resolution logic.

The human controller is far more efficient than any current computer system in accepting responsibility for controlling aircraft. But clearly the controller is overloaded in

COMPUTER APPLICATIONS

1

NON¡RADAR ENVIRONMENT FLIGHT PLAN PROCESSING

2

REDUCED WORKLOAD

RADAR ENVIRONMENT IMPROVED AIRSPACE UTILISATION

3

MORE CAPACITY

MUCH MORE CAPACITY

ANY ENVIRONMENT

some of his work tasks and is likely to become even more so as traffic demand increases. The initial role of computer technology, as applied to ATC, is not to dominate the system, but to give assistance to the controller by taking over routine tasks and using certain advanced techniques to make the controller's task easier.

Computer technology has the potential to take over repetitive tasks, such as reproducing Flight Progress Strips and if called upon to do so to complete complex calculations upon them. Certainly in the USA, the successful introduction of Flight Plan Processing systems has led to the achievement of very high flow rates of traffic through certain sectors and within certain Terminal Areas that would otherwise have been constrained by the ability of the controllers and their assistants to produce, interpret and update by manual methods, the number of strips required.

But I do not wish to suggest that the rapid production of Flight Progress Strips whether by sleight of hand or by an automated monster is really the way to relieve the pressures on controllers or the way to obtain a significant in-

38

crease in capacity in areas where so called airspace capacity is already at a premium. certainly, beyond the coverage of radar and in the absence of satellite surveillance, Flight Plan Processing Systems offer the attainment of increased capacity, that would otherwise be limited by controller capability to calculate and interpret clearances. The most important applications will be for ssTs over the North Atlantic and for the increased density of conventional Oceanic traffic. In both cases, all the aircraft concerned are amenable to strategic control.

The concordes posses a high order of navigational predictability and, whilst this virtue is not always shared by conventional Oceanic traffic, there is ample airspace within which to continue to operate a strategic system.

But within domestic airspace where high density traffic is constrained within the limits of controlled airspace, such strategic procedures, with their necessary large standards of longitudinal separation, simply would not permit the necessary flow rates to be achieved and would lead to ever increasing delays and excessive workloads. In the long term we may perhaps see a reduction in this procedural separation standard justified by applications of Time Slot or 4 o navigation that would provide extremely accurate Timing and Prediction of along track progress. But such techniques are not likely to be implemented before the turn of the century and it is more important that we exploit the capability we have more immediately available.

Therefore, I suggest that we should concentrate upon improving the capability of our radar environment to handle the continual growth of traffic. This does not mean that we should permit sectors to be bombarded by salvoes of random traffic, but rather that we should sensibly regulate the flow into acceptable levels of demand that can expeditiously be sequenced by radar techniques without overloading the sectors. It is with this task of regulating the traffic flow that the computer can be of most assistance.

1 do not suggest that the techniques or separation standards of radar control should be changed. The responsibility of navigation must remain in the cockpit and progressive advantage must be taken of Area Navigation routes and procedures, prescribed for ATC reasons, to avoid traffic interactions and to reduce both ATC and cockpit workload. such techniques as Computer Aided Approach and/or Departure Sequencing (CAAS) and (CADS) offer a small but useful increase in airport capacity although unfortunately the apparent advantages may be negated by the vorticity constraints applicable behind Heavy Jets. But although they may help the airport they will do little to help the en-route situation unless, as I would like to suggest, their principle is applied to assist the application of Speed Control to inbound streams that would otherwise have to be delayed in holding stacks in the Terminal Area.

These measures themselves, by their better utilisation of airsp.ace, will lead to improved capacity. But inevitably there will be peaks and surges of traffic or restrictions in the available capacity of the system that will lead to excess demand. In such circumstances there is the need for Flow Regulation, particularly if our aim is not simply to avoid excessive workload, but also to do all possible to reduce delays and to ensure that if any restrictions are imposed they are applied in a carefully preplanned logical way based on the best possible prediction of future demand, rather than on the best guesses of a well-intentioned flow controller, who without adequate information may act too late and cannot stop the action at the right time either.

The Pres ident of IFATCA. .:lean-Daniel Mon in, discussing Flow Regulation with Bob Adderley, Principal Consultant, Operational Planning Group, Software Sciences at UK GATCO CONVEX 74.

A Flow Controller requires knowledge both of the s ize, nature and timing of the traffic demand and of the available capacity in the system. Computer technology can use real and fast-time techniques to provide him with this information.

Regulation of the Traffic Flow 1 suggest that the app li cation of computer technology should be directed to assisting the implementation of Flow Regulation 10 exploit availabl e capacity.

Let me repeat that, whilst capac ity is sometimes limited by the utilisation th at can be attained from a runway o r runways, it is more gene rally limited by the application of the prescribed ATC procedures wi thin the avai lable airspace, which is normally the confines of the avail abl e contro lled ai rspace. It is no digression to admit that if an inc reased volume of contro ll ed ai rspace were available, then add itional capac ity could be attained. Conversely it is true, but not always c learly recog nised, that considerab le add itional capacity would be available if the nav igational capability of all ai rcraft were improved enough to permit c losely spaced parall el tracks to be established. I must admit that this is a favourite ho bby-horse of mine so let me content myself w ith the predictio n th at , by 1985, the Air Traffic System will be based on some fo rm of multipl e (not random) route stru cture - prescribed to achieve exped ition and to red uce ATC and cockpit wo rkl oad and based on so me form of A rea Navig ation.

What matters in 'the more immed iate future is that whilst the c urrent navigati ona l capabi lity is dominant, and even if more controlled airspace becomes available, t he constantly increasing traffic demand wi ll resu lt in in creased work loads upon the controllers. You , yourselves, see t he problem only too c lea rly and have considered the Regulation of the Fl ow in your Guild Paper. So let me now offer my apologies for the seemin gly f rivolous comments on my opening remarks and rep lace them with some constructive sug gestions.

If the controller had a crystal ball, instead of a radartube, he wou ld be abl e to prevent prob lems from occ urring, rather t han having to solve them at the last moment. Now this is not a frivolous suggestion nor even a hint that a

recruiting drive should be opened for Cadet Clairvoyants.

Prov iding th at our crystal ball is, in fact, an electronic device, it is perfectly feasible to achieve a dynamic or tabular display that, instead of d isplaying the present situation, will display the predicted future one.

There are two different techn iques currently available to us, one tactical and one planni ng: a) The tactical technique involves radar process ing and basically caicu l ating the velocity of the airc raft concerned and projecting t his forward to prov ide a short term and probably very accurate display of what the real situat ion may be in, say, 5 minutes t ime. This principle suffers f rom the serious disadvantag e that, without considerable additional complexity, it cannot ac curately present changes in velocity, e. g. tu rns that aircraft may make. A more relevant factor is t hat, despite an appa rent contribution towards making the control-

POSS I B LE

FLOW REGULATION

ELECT RON IC DISPL AY CFREDl T IM E : 1003

OVERLOAD

PREDICTION PERI OD .. g. 110 0 - 1130

SECTOR 3

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CAPACI T Y 10

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RECOMMENDE D ACTION

REROUTE

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V IA SECTOR 5

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DE LAY J Ml N U TES

39

ler's task easier, it in no way eases his total workload nor gives adequate early warning of the size of the controller's task. b) The planning technique which I have termed Flow Regulation Display (FRO) adapts a principle that is embodied in Flight Plan processing but requires only brief details of each flight, civil or military, either stored or notified several hours in advance. It will store these as long as required and will issue them at any time in advance of the flight as a print-out or simple dynamic or tabular display in a format that represents the demand on each sector or Centre balanced against the available capacity. Where this demand is in excess of capacity, it will indicate alternative routes available, the results of imposing delays and/or the results of amending other flights that form the demand.

Now this is a simple explanation of a complex system that will involve the use of both real-time and fast-time computer techniques to take account of late revision to capacity, late notifications of demand and the investigation of alternative courses of action. But it will provide the controller with his Crystal Ball which will show as far ahead in time as he wishes to know what the demand on his sector, airport or particular area of Middle or Upper Airspace is Predicted to be.

It is not intended, nor can possibly be a substitute for the controller on the sector but will be of assistance to him and of direct use to the Supervisor or Flow Controller, or the Military Allocator, to see the nature and size of the traffic demand and to recognise, some time before they occur, where the problems will be. Used in conjunction with Predetermined capacities for specific elements, e. g. airport or airways of the system, it will immediately assist, where necessary, the application of some form of flow regulation, be it re-routeing or even delay, that will preserve the system from overload with the minimum penalty to the aircraft operator.

This is the crucial point of what we must seek to achieve.

We must not seek to simplify the system just to make People's jobs easier. We must seek a more efficient ATC service, that can handle more aircraft without overloading ~ontrotlers. We must seek to avoid the delays that impose financial penalty to the operator and that almost certainly are also an economic penalty to the nation. This applies, not only to Air Transport Operations within controlled airs~~ce, but also to many Military and General Aviation activities outside, or wishing to cross, controlled airspace. At all costs, we must avoid the trap that says the traffic must be delayed to suit artificial constraints and we must learn to exploit and not to waste the capacity that is available.

There is an urgent need to obtain International agreement on the objectives and principles of Flow Regulation and for Political acceptance of the need to allocate time and money for the developments necessary to maintain the expedition of our traffic.

As an immediate measure where peak or seasonal de~and is clearly in excess of capacity and until we have eveloped and implemented a dynamic system of Flow Re~ulation we should utilise rational planning and scheduling, based upon the known limitations of the airspace, to avoid overstressing the system.

Conclusion In conclusion, let me repeat the Air Traffic Service is Part of the Air Transport System, which although primarily

40

Commercial, also comprises Military and General Aviation.

All users of the airspace require expedition with safety; any delay that is imposed is an economic penalty. We must guard against seeking simplification of the ATC task at the expense of penalties to airspace users, but should seek increased efficiency of the ATC service measured in terms of exploiting available capacity and maintaining acceptable levels of workload.

In this paper I have offered some suggestions of what can be done to assist ATC in handling the increased levels of traffic demands that are forecast. I should like to stress that I do not believe that ATC alone should take the brunt of excess demand but that the exploitation of capacity of which I have spoken can only be achieved by improved ATC capability being matched by improved aircraft performance and navigational capability. What is needed is not merely system design for the Air Traffic Service but system design for the whole Air Transport system.

We cannot impose local solutions on International problems and we all agree that Flow Regulation is of Continental rather than National dimensions. But in the absence of International or Continental solutions we should not be deterred from offering our own solutions providing they are feasible and providing they are not irreconcilable with International practice.

The use of radar is acknowledged as a significant step forward in improving ATC efficiency and the use of computer technology can be an even greater advance. The Software Industry and System Design concepts have much to offer to the solution of ATC problems and in particular Real and Fast-Time Computer techniques offer the possibility of implementing Flow Regulation to maintain expedition.

About the Author:

. Bob Adderley Is a Member of the U.K. Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers and served for 21 years In the Royal Air Force at Home and Overseas as Aerodrome, Approach, Radar, end Area Radar Controller, and as a Command Staff Officer. He completed tours as an Instructor at the Royal Air Force GCA Training Squadron and t ' a the Joint Area Radar School (JATCARS), Sopley.

He originally joined Software Sciences, then known as GPS, as an Operations Analyst and has since been appointed as Principal Consultant of the Operational Planning Group. In this capacity he has contributed to computer appllcation projects In The Netherlands and B~lglum and has undertaken Airport and Airspace system evaluations and planning studies In Canada, The Netherlands, Turkey, West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

Book Review Papa India: The Trident Tragedy,

by John Godson Compton Press, Compton Chamberlayne, Sussex; ÂŁ 2.50 The ~uthor appears to be setting a pattern adopted by ot~er writers - that of taking maximum advantage of certain human and administrative shortcomings within particular institutions. There have been, and still remain, some ac~nowledged shortcomings in the field of flight safety relating to the degree of communication between manufacturers, aircraft operators and Government departments.

And few readers will disagree with Mr. Gordon's demands for legislation to improve a number of aspects of flightsafety intelligence; of course, some action in this area has already been taken as a result of the public inquiry.

But the author relates a number of opinions in his book which are laced with some rather naive assumptions, and not all readers will agree with them. Indeed, some are almost certainly guaranteed to meet with rejection or dismissal by those who are engaged in certain aviation disciplines and who will be considerably better qualified to comment authoritatively. Mr. Godson attempts to prove, for instance, that the accident was a survivable one - by arguments which will fail to convince many a reader.

One ill considered criticism is aimed, rather unfairly, at the CAA, through an assumed lack of awareness and action on the part of the Air Traffic Controller who handled the Trident following its transfer to the LATCC frequency. The book suggests he was slow to react to a loss of radar echo, perhaps because he was asleep! Such remarks seem offensive in the light of a total absence of R/T emergency or. distress calls, followed by a period of exhaustive R/T and telephone checks by the controller in accordance with correct pursuance of trace action before declaration of a crash alert. The author falls into the trap of assuming that radar itself is able acurately to pinpoint a point of impact and ignores the well-known technical reasons for occasional loss of radar returns. By innuendo, therefore, Mr. Godson reasons that some blame attaches to the Air Traffic Controller for what he considers to have been a rather later arrival by emergency services at the scene than might have been the case, and suggests that some deaths could thus have been avoided. On balance,

Aviation on Stamps An attractive set of 4 stamps was issued by New Zealand in June last year to commemorate 50 years of Airmail in New Zealand. Each stamp prominently features an aircraft from New Zealand's air transport history.

The first unofficial postal delivery by air in New Zealand was made in 1914 when a parcel containing a letter addressed to a South Canterbury farmer was dropped from the cockpit of a biplane! Official airmail services began in 1919 and the aircraft used was the Boeing Seaplane depicted on the 3c. stamp. Captain Bolt piloted the aircraft on the flight from Auckland to Dargaville and took all of 90 odd minutes to do the 112 mile trip.

Shown on the 4c. stamp is the Lockheed Electra of 1937 vintage. ZK-AFD was one of several operated by Union Airways of New Zealand Ltd. on the Auckland to Wellington route. The Model 1o Electra was the all metal successor to the wooden Lockheed Orion and provided accommodation for 10 passengers as well as a toilet! Powered by two Pratt & Whitney Wasp Junior engines, the Electra had a cruising speed of 165 kts. and a landing speed of around 50 kts. Union Airlines was taken over by National Airways Corporation and the aircraft shown (named "Kauka") on the stamp was the last Electra used by them. It now enjoys retirement at Auckland's Transport and Technology Museum. Some 148 Electra's were built and as many as 20 were still in service in the U.S.A. a few years ago.

the reader may feel with justification that rescue services generally did fairly well in the circumstances and that actual pinpoints of accidents beyond the visual range of airport boundaries will in any event mainly derive from emergency telephone calls.

The Trident itself and its unique aerodynamic features, resulting in equally unique operating procedures, are the main targets of the author's criticism throughout the book.

Apart from CAA, other institutions also come under fire BAA, BEA, BBC and the public, to name but a few. One feels that there is some justification for some of the criticisms, but it is difficult to determine whether some arguments raised are genuine attempts at reasoned and learned insight or perhaps the products of a particular 'bete noire' for reasons best known to the author. Noise abatement procedures are discussed generally but with emphasis on whether Papa India would have crashed had it not been necessary for Capt. Key to comply with the procedures after take-off. There are many who will be inclined to agree with the writer's conclusions that such procedures can, and do, present aircrews with potentially hazardous situations. BALPA, GATCO and IFATCA have made similar public noises on this very point.

In summary: the book makes some good points, some rather indifferent and some offensive. Arguments are quite cleverly presented but many readers will remain unconvinced by a book which does not really measure up to the expertise which the subject demands of its author.

by G. M. Sinclair

New Zealand EMPIRE 830 FI.YING GOAT t1ICO

~ New Zealand

23c

The 5c. stamp depicts a Bristol 170 Freighter of Safe Air Ltd. (previously Straits Air Freight Express Ltd.) which has operated this type throughout New Zealand since 1951.

The Bristol 170 was originally designed as a freight or passenger aircraft capable of carrying a large payload over comparatively short distances. Various marks were built with nose-opening doors for bulky freight, cars, animals etc. The Freighter can carry up to 56 passengers, and va~ riou~ combinations of. passengers and freight. Powered by 2 Bristol Hercules engines of 2,000 h.p., the Freighter could take a payload of 16,000 lbs over a range of up to 1600 miles at a cruising speed of 145 kts.

41

The Empire Flying Boat shown on the 23c. stamp was designed by Short Bros. with the long-range routes of Imperial Airways in mind - especially as the U.K. Government had decided that all mail to the Empire was to be carried by air without surcharge. The prototype model S.23 flew in 1936 and was considered far in advance of its time. The S.30 model was a development from the S.23 - with its endurance almost doubled to 8 hours. A total of 41 Empire Boats were built before World War II stopped production.

The last three S.30 boats off the production line in 1938 were GA-FCY, GA-FCZ, and GA-FDA. These were re-registered as ZK-AMA. ZK-AMB and ZK-AMC and named AOTEAR~A, AUSTRALIA, and AWARUA when sold to Tasman Empire Airways Ltd. (TEAL}. "AUSTRALIA" was put back on the U.K. register in 1940 when BOAC was formed!

The Empire boats operated the Sydney to Auckland route twice weekly to start with - and then thrice we~kly over a triangular route: Sydney - Auckland - Wellington. "AOTEAROA" made the inaugural flight from Auckland

to Sydney in 1940 and also made the last flight in October 1947 having completed 442 Tasman Sea crossings with her sister ship the "AWARUA". The flying boats thus forged the final link in a direct aerial chain between New Zealand and overseas countries - a chain which was part of the Empire Airmail Scheme initiated by Imperial Airways.

Powered by 4 Bristol Perseus XII engines, the S.30 Flying Boat had a cruising speed of 145 kts.

Note: In the same part of the world, one of the last regular flying boat services anywhere in the world recently came to an end. The final flight by Ansett Flying Boat Services on their regular fortnightly passenger and mail service between Sydney and Lord Howe Island took place in September, 1974. The aircraft used was a Short Sandringham Flying Boat. This was the civil version of the military Sunderland, and a successor to the Empire Flying Boats.

(Readers are kindly requested to send any correspondence regarding this column direct to Mr. Sinclair, 1 Malson St. Louis, St. Saviour, Jersey, C. I., U. K.)

News from Corporation Members International Air Carrier Association Charter Airlines Meet in Montreal At the regular Autumn meeting of the International Air Carrier Association held in Montreal on 11 October 1974, members reviewed the international air transport situati~n and indicated their concern over the current economic crisis facing it - notably escalating fuel prices, wage~ and other cost increases. The Association resolved that international air transport should be placed on ~ sound econ~­ mic basis and to that end scheduled services should eliminate below cost promotional fares, such as the newly introduced advance purchase fare (APEX), and return to a sound system in the best interest of the public.

Recognising that charters have been a matter of concern, not only to the consumer who depends on this mode of service for mass transport purposes, but also to governments and scheduled carriers, IACA again repeated the invitation it first issued in June 1973 for all carriers who perform charters to join it in the interest of promoting this important part of air transport.

Rate matters are intricately involved under various government rules and regulations, consequently rendering undesirable, both from the consumer and carrier standpoint, any attempt to establish uniform rates for charter services by governments. Rate setting other than on the basis of economic justification by the individual carriers tends to produce artificially high fare levels and removes the element of competition, all to the detriment of the consumer and therefore is not in the public interest.

Marconi Radar Systems An advanced distributed data-processing system for use in Air Traffic Control and in air defence has been introduced by the company under the name of "Locus 16". It

42

handles information directly at control, display and input points, thus leaving the central processor free to deal with essential data only or to perform protracted calculations at a slower rate. Standard modules - data processing, display handlers, communications handlers and storage can be built up to suit particular applications and can be expanded on demand. Locus 16 uses the Coral 66 highlevel programming language.

Philips Telecommunications An additional contract valued at nearly 50 million U.S. dollars has been awarded by the Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Zaire to Philips Telecommunications for the supply of communications equipment, navigational aids and lighting equipment for 38 secondary airports. This contract is an extension to the original contract which covered equipment for nine main airports, and brings the total value of the project to 77 million U.S. dollars.

The additional contract covers the following: HF circuits for the AFS Direct Speech Network covering six of the main airports and the respective secondary airports in their sectors; VHF ground-to-air circuits for Air Traffic Control; Air Traffic Controllers' consoles; Nav-aids, including ILS, VOR, DME, Radar and NOB equipment; DS714 Message switching system for the AFTN network; ARQ equipment for the domestic HF telegraph channels; Mobile radio; Power supply systems, including stand-by diesel generators; Airport lighting systems; Civil engineering works involving more than 80 buildings; and comprehensive training programmes for all levels of staff.

The first project covered the delivery, installation and commissioning of equipment at Zaire's nine main airports (Kinshasa, Kitona, Lubumbashi, Kamina, Kisangani, M'Bandaka, Goma, Kindu and Kananga). Initially, a gigantic technical evaluation took place of the problems of communi-

Operator's desks and aeronautical telecommunications facilities in the Air Traffic Control Centre; as al so installed in Ecuador and Peru .

cations between widely separated airfields throughout the country. Local surveys at each airfield were also involved to determine the requirements for approach aids and communication links. In the international sphere, provision has been made for one speech and two telegraph channels (meteorological services) between Kinshasa and the airports of Brazzaville, Luanda, Lusaka, Nairobi and Khartoum in addition to the national airfields previously mentioned.

Kinshasa has seven secondary airports under its control and so forms the first network. The second network which operates under M'Bandaka, comprises eight other airports.

HF transmitters of 300 W PEP will be provided on the local point-to-point networks within each sector . The transmitters will have three preset alternative frequencies, while the receiving systems will provide simultaneous reception on these frequencies. Broadband dipole aerial systems will be used. At the main airports, duplicate standby equipment will be installed and the transmitting and receiving equipment will be in separate buildings. All the equipment will be remote ly controlled from operators' consoles.

Kisangani controls 3 airports, while Goma covers seven other airfields. Each of the secondary airports will have 50 W transmitters for ground-to-air communications, and all airport control commu nications (TWR) will be duplicated.

Additionally, 1 kW HF transmitters and receivers will be installed at M 'Bandaka, Kananga and Goma for regional domestic ground-to-air communications. This equipment will be duplicated and wi ll operate on three frequencies in the A3 (DSB) and A3J (SSB) modes.

Lubumbashi controls seven airports within its sector. In the sixth network, Kananga controls six airfields of which one (M' Buji-Mayi) will be equipped with extra duplicated 50 W VHF transmitting and receiving equipment for approach (APP).

A processor-controlled message and data switching system , type DS 714, will be installed at Kinshasa for handling the telegraph channe ls of the AFTN network. Since the system wi ll be as automatic as possible, operation of the switching centre will be si mplified. The HF circuits will be provided with TOR Mk2 ARQ equipment for protecting the telegraph channels against the imperfections of transmission paths.

Th e supp ly and installation of nav-aids for the many airports has been set down as follows: Kinshasa and Lubumbashi will have a TMA radar type STAR operating in the S-Band, while a secondary surveillance radar (SSA) will be installed additionally at Kinshasa Airport. The radar equipment will be duplicated to provide greater detection probability and improved coverage. Each radar unit is to be provided with two 16" diameter display screens accomodated in the operators' consoles. High resolution video-mapping equipment will also be provided. In addition to the two radar installations, numerous direction-finding and approach aids will be installed at other airfields. Completion of the co ntract will bring the total of ILS installations to five, and VOA to 21 . There will be 24 airfields with DME, and non-directional beacons (NDB) will total 20.

All the secondary airports will be equipped with standby diesel generators, in case of failure of the local public mains. The contract also provides for the supply and installation of electrical equipment including high tension switchgear, high tension power transformers, low tension switching and distribution equipment.

The new contract in cludes airport lighting systems for five airports and approach and threshold, runway and tax iway lighting including the new T-VASIS (T-Visual Approach Slope Indicator System) will be installed. Heliport, apron and terminal lighting systems are also included. The transmitting , receiving, terminal and radar equipment as well as the stand-by diesel generator sets will be installed in some 80 buildings to be erected by Philips.

Semiconductors and integrated circuits are used wherever possible in the new equipment. Special precautions have been taken to prevent adverse effects of the severe climatic conditions which the equipment will encounter.

In order to give the RVA (Regie des Voies Aeriennes) the necessary backing in the maintenance of equipment after acceptance, the contract provides for t hree maintenance teams to be stationed in Zaire at special servicing centres. Initially, these teams will be composed of Philips¡ personnel, and after two years local personnel will take over. Local co urses for maintenance and operatin g personn~I will be o~ganised by Philips Telecommunications.

The instructors will be both Dutch men and Canadians ; ILS

43

and VOR equipments are produced by Philips Electronics Industries in Canada. Many instructors and field personnel will stay on after commissioning of the equipment to assist with maintenance and operation. A course for 12 students will additionally be given in Air Traffic Control at the Eurocontrot Training Centre in Luxembourg.

Plessey Doppler VOR Many advantages are claimed for Doppler VOR when compared with conventional VOR, including better accuracy and stability and less sensitivity to amplitude interference and installation and siting errors. Although DVOR has a higher initial cost, the reduction in normal maintenance, testing and operating costs means that the initial expense becomes less significant over the operational life of the equipment. The British Civil Aviation Authority has chosen DVOR as the standard ground-based navigation aid and all 41 conventional VORs in the United Kingdom will eventually be replaced by Doppler systems.

Some 15 operational DVOR stations are either in operation or are being installed in the U.K. - ten are being supplied by Plessey and five by Standard Electrik Lorenz.

Decca manufactures the DVB-50D Doppler system under licence for Amalgamated Wireless of Australia and is competing for the second batch of DVOR orders.

Conventional VOA operates by rotating an antenna to produce a shaped horizontal radiation pattern. The airborne receiver picks up a carrier which is amplitude modulated the phase of which is dependent on the azimuth position of the aircraft in relation to the beacon. DVOR employs two fundamental principles: the use of the Doppler effect for the determination of direction and a wide-aperture antenna array for minimising the effects of multipath wave propagation. The amplitude modulated carrier, which can carry speech and identification signals, is radiated from an omnidirectional antenna and is the reference signal. The direction-dependent signal is generated in space by rotating a radiation source.

It is impractical to rotate an antenna of the size and at the speed demanded, and therefore the circular motion is electronically simulated by a number of antennae equally spaced round a circle. These are sequentially fed with radio frequency energy so that a continuous movement of the radiating source is achieved. The distant observer can therefore detect a Doppler shift of the sideband frequencies. The ring of antenna is mounted about half a wavelength above an artificial earth or counterpoise in the form of 100 ft, 30 m diameter wire mesh suitably supported to Provide a controlled ground reflection.

The Ptessey Plan 50 is designed for unattended operation over tong periods and is normally supplied with dual transmitters, one of these remaining as a standby. There are 50 sideband antennae equally spaced in a circle of 40 ft, 13.5 m diameter and mounted on the counterpoise.

There is also a central carrier antenna. The distributor consists of two separate 14 in, 356 mm diameter drums each having upper and tower sideband inputs and 25 antenna outputs. Each drum has two readily accessible circular printed wiring boards on which the switching components are accomodated, one switch channel occupying one of the 25 sectors. The transmitter is completely solid-state and operates in the 108 MHz-118 MHz frequency band. It generates the carrier and upper and lower sideband. Extensive moni-

44

toring and built-in test facilities are incorporated in the Plessey Plan 50 and a mean time between failures of 8,100 hr is claimed.

(T.E. Ford in FLIGHT International)

Thomson-CSF A subsidiary of Thomson-CSF, T-VT, has received an order from Sweden for five RS 770 secondary radars. Another order received is for the modernisation of the DASR-1 S-band primary radar at Stockholm/Arlanda, of which only the antenna will be retained. The two contracts are worth fr. 5 million.

The contract for secondary radar provides for delivery before the end of 1975 of five SSR stations, to be sited at Torslanda, Batista, Arlanda, Smaland and Sundsvall. T-VT has sold more than a hundred RS 770s in two years.

The modernisation of the Arlanda primary radar involves the installation of dual transmitter receiver channels, each with a digital MTI; the equipment is similar to that supplied for T-VT's TA 10 airfield radar.

Thomson-CSF's representative in Sweden will assist in the execution of the contracts.

LEADERSHIP by Example •. ¡ There is a certain amount of dignity attached to the title of Supervisor; and rightly so. As an outgrowt~ of the m~_rit system, where an individual's experience, skill, and ab1hty are recognized and rewarded, the title of Supervisor would naturally take on dignity and respect.

The Supervisor Is a leader of men. N~t only can he organize and administer, but he has considerable knowledge and experience to draw upon and set the examples to be followed.

The product of leadership by example is the ~~'.d!ng of the minds of co-workers to accept the respons1b1ht1es of their profession, to follow established proc7dures, to recognize orders and instructions as the authority, to develop good techniques and practices and, above all, to perform quality products.

One of the requisites of a good Supervisor is that he has a thorough technical knowledge of the job he is supervising. He must keep abreast of technical advances and changes in technical instructions that affect his area of work responsibility. In order for the supervisor to maintain the respect and dignity of his position, he must not only exert his authority, but must practice his teachings and prove his ability as an individual. The holder of a supervisory title suffers greatly and needlessly when he abuses his position of responsibility by not enforcing the required standards; or, as an individual, when he deviates from the standards that he professes to abide by. The co-workers took to their supervisor for guidance when forming their own personal appreciation of standards. The final outcome of the co-worker/supervisor relationship will be that their appreciation of standards will be very nearly alike.

To supervise is to lead. It is human nature to follow the examples set by respected and experienced leaders. With the great responsibility that the supervisor has on his shoulders, it is a source of personal satisfaction to him to know that others are prone to follow the example he sets, so, it follows that the supervisor who sets the examples that he wishes to be followed is, in effect, lessening the burdens of his own responsibilities.

(The Airman, LISA, adapted by F. W. Fischer)

Airports and their Control Towers

Air Traftic Control Tower.

Charles de Gaulle Airport, Paris. France.

This is the first of a planned new seri es of short, on epage a rticl es on airports and their control towers, nation al and international, big and small. IFATCA members are asked to jot down some particulars regarding their own station, mu ch in the same form as the following story on Charles de Gaulle Airport, and send their contributi ons to the Editor together with a good pi cture (black and w hite) of the Control Tower. Pl ease do not let yourselves be put off if find in g the co rrect English phraseo logy gives prob lems as we shall amend your text as necessary to make it suitable for pub lication.

Charles de Gaulle Airport: An ATC Challenge One striking feature of Charles de Gaull e Airport is th e rough concrete used for its various buildings : terminal building, cont rol tower, office blocks, fire station, etc. This is a challenge in itself which leaves no one indifferent ; it is ei ther love or hatred o n first sight with the odds generally favouring the love relationship.

The siting of this modern and complex airport built for tomorrow's air traffic is, like most airports in the wo rld , subject to political, environmental and noise abatement pressures. It can, howeve r, be noted that, in spite of its c loseness to downtown Pa ris (about 12 NM from the centre of the city) , t he site is comparatively clear of those tentacula r housing developments which one usually finds clutteri ng up the areas surround ing larg e c ities.

With Grei l military air base 12NM due north, Le Bourget Airport 3 NM south west and Orly Ai rport 20 NM to the south, Cha rles de Gaulle lies in a very dense trajectory area. The use of procedural approaches and departures has been preferred for the Par is Termi nal Area. Based on a comp lex network of completely segregated trajectories

the system requires no coordinatio n between departure and arrival posit ions in the same unit ; on the other hand , the system deprives air t raffic of the f lexibility afforded by radar position ing. By no stretch of the imagination could a zero nine approach via Boursonne, three navaid intersections and three flight level and speed changes before interception of the ILS be likened to the ease of effective rada r positioning.

A visit to the control tower provides a fine panoramic v iew from a vantage point over 260 ft above the ground.

Category one conditions (cloudbase of 200 ft) which occur regularly in the area, place the controllers in IMC conditions and un able to see ground movements. A surface radar is scheduled for installation in the future .

Th e IFR room houses both civil and military personnel sitting side by side. They jointly monitor the movements in and out of Charles de Gaulle, Greil military base, Le Bourget and Pontoise ai rports. The ultimate goal is to have a joint civil-military controller force able to man any position in the IFR room; this requires some adjustments since the military were not trained to handle civilian traffic and the c ivi l controllers seldom had to take care of fighter aircraft before. The ostensible purpose of the idea is to promote a better use of the airspace. The controllers generally regret that th is decision was not taken some years ago, as it would certainly have been interesting to have noted the effect had properly trained military controllers taken the place of the ir civil counterparts at the time of the French controlle rs' strike in 1972. The establishment of equiva lent ratings for civi l and military controllers co nstitutes a problem which , it seems, has not yet been so lved.

Sources say t hat anothe r 15 years will be needed to complete all construction, at which time it will be able to accomodate more than 1,000 aircraft a day. Charles de Gaulle can truly be described as an ATC challenge.

45

To The Ladies, or Who said Chivalry was Dead?

Girl Talk . . mp"ilation of statistics . .

Heretofore missing from any co published on the subject of the great aviation expansion is a column headed "Females Involved". But according to our colleagues both far and near, it is not unc~mmo_n no":' t~ have a traffic pattern saturated with aircraft tilted m vanou directions and all flown by pilots of the distaff side. It naturally follows that this activity has managed to produc~ a whole new collection of somewhat bizarre occurrenc~s which we faithfully record here, in the hope that the~ will eventually wend their way into the folklore of air traffic control.

So we shall begin by taking what we assume to be a in the left seat of perfectly normal young lady. Place h er . a small aircraft equip her with the necessary radio gear With which she 'can receive the thunder~ng .commands of a control tower, and for some unaccountable reason all sorts of strange things begin to happen, to wit: Noticing a Piper which had been running for sometim~, and assuming it was another case of lost radio com~um­ cations, the local controller took steps to correct the situa.: tion; "Tri-Pacer south side of eight left, cleared for takeoff • he offered.

And with that, the Piper galloped madly down the runway, leaped into the air and rapidly proceeded to complete a tour of the pattern. Following which, with the patient assistance of a green light, the aircraft landed and pointedly return~d t 0 ·its original spot in the run-up area. "Any d"ff" 1 icu lty?" · mquired our slightly puzzled cohort.

"Yes!" came an indignant female reply, "I just wish you wouldn't clear me for takeoff until I'm ready!"

by Orville Stinson

culty?" "No!" she replies, innocently. "Mind telling me why you sat down out in the boondocks?" I query. "Oh," she says, "I thought the runways were for the big airplanes !" That reminds me of the time I'm up to my ears in traffic and the frequencies are jammed with everybody howling at the same time. Away off in the background I can hear this female Aeronca calling but she is being smothered by the stronger transmissions ... so when I finally get a break I say, "Aeronca calling Phoenix Tower, say again!" And she says, "AGAIN ... AGAIN!"

The Unidentified Flying Sex Object If all this has somehow given you the impression that tower people generally take the new gender of pilots lightly, perish the thought.

For the truth of the matter is that the female pilot receives the same dedicated service, and sometimes even greater protection than that offered the male, as proven in the following: Cessna: (Sexy voice) "Tower, please close my flight plan."

Tower: "Request your full number."

Cessna: "My ... er ... phone number is Crestwood seven four eight five three."

Air Carrier, Pilot: "Tower, what was that number?"

Tower: "University niner seven zero eight ninerl"

Nice Old Gal

We realize of course, that on this subject we are braving a Collective jaundiced eyeball response from such worthy ~rganizations as the Ninety Niners. Power Puffers. etc., but et us continue:

Let's face it, some tower visitors naturally get more attention than others. We reach this conclusion belatedly after recently suffering a formidable onslaught of sightseers, who for little reason at all, want to see what goes on up here.

Turning crosswind the blonde in the baby-blue Bonanza heard the following h~lpfut bit of tower issued information:

The casual stranger, arriving at our rarified level in the general condition of one who has successfully conquered the Matterhorn on hands and knees, normally receives little if any sympathy. "You ... need ... an ... elevator!" is gasped in the midst of what is apparently a first-class case of cardiac arrest. Since this opening gambit falls well beyond the realm of an original remark it does not exactly precipitate an inspired exchange of ideas pro or even con.

"Caution the no-radio Champ entering downwind to your left." Grasping the microphone she complied dutifully, "No;~dio Champ". she said, towe; says to caution you · · · but ey didn't say ... about what!" t Perhaps this is an obscure case, for even we will agree ~at most lady pilots are co-operative when called upon fro~ r lofty Perch, as in the incident of the comely Cessna cutie Who was shooting touch-and-gos under a decidely low ragged Sky condition.

0

Tower: "Weather Bureau requests an estimated base report." . Cessna: "Standby one (long pause) estimate I'll be turning bas ·1 e n 45 seconds•" 0 . b h" ne day at Vegas t sequence this lady Cessna number 2 s e Ind a Connie and I'm watching her on downwind leg ... o~~denly she falls off on a wing and disappears in a clo~d th· u~t behind Bonanza Air Lines' hangar. Doing some rapid a~~~~g I arrive at the conclusion she's run out of pet~ol m st control. I hit the siren and out rolls the crash equ1p·· b k ent. Prett int 0 .

Y soon to my surprise she comes tax11ng ac view w·th · 1 a fire engine in hot pursuit. "Are you m d"ff" 1 1-

46

But when the interloper happens to be one with a genuine interest in things aviation-wise, the mood changes for the better, particularly if she is an ex-stewardess and is in appearance everybody hopes, God willing, the little woman is eventually going to look like.

"I hope I'm not annoying you fellows," she says, for a starter, "but I had some time to kill on the airport and -. " Naturally we hasten to assure her she has uttered probably the most ridiculous thought ever entertained by anybody with any smarts at all. And to make our new-found friendship even more binding, we even add a dusted-off day-old doughnut to her cup of coffee. This, as you can plainly see, demonstrates that we are not negligent in the social graces.

"This may date me," she offers, "but I used to be a stewardess on a DC-3!"

"Now there was a flying machine!" we answer with considerable fervor, for we have a sneaking suspicion what with the way this business is going, the sleek jets are just a passing fancy and the Gooney-Bird will eventually rise again.

"On my first trip", she continues, "the Captain checked me out on the operation of the tail gear control. According to him it was the only operation he couldn't handle from the cockpit. Pointing to a mess of little buttons on a bulkhead, he counted thirteen over and eight up. 'Whenever we are about to land or have just taken off, it is your job to operate this very important control.'

"So for a whole week I flew with the same crew and I didn't miss once. I got so good I didn't even have to mess with the thirteen and eight business. I was so proud of myself, I could have burst. Why, I'd just drop everything when necessary, and rush forward, and push the button!

"And then there was· a ..c;r.ew change and the new Captain took me aside and told me to cease and desist. It seems I was making the passengers nervous, watching me bound up the aisle like a gazelle - just to push on a stupid rivet!"

Well, since this tale did not alter our considered opinion of some Captains of our acquaintance, we could only chuckle in sympathy.

"Next I found all about the DC-3's forward baggage corn-

partment the hard way," she reflected, "I didn't know it, but you could enter and exit the airplane via the cockpit and baggage compartment. Well, as luck would have it, I had become real interested in a not-too-punctual co-pilot, and the Captain was always griping about my boy friend showing up with only moments to spare. This one day he apparently wasn't going to show up at all - only I didn't know it was a put-up job and he was hiding in the forward hatch all the while.

"If he's not here in two minutes ... we're going to take off without him, and he's had it with this airline," the Captain growls, acting like he's real mad.

"We finally left without him and I was crushed; what with all the plans I was dreaming about for the two of us. Then we made our first stop and I opened the door, and there was the big lug, hanging desparately onto the trailing edge of the wing. 'Geez!' he yelled, 'What a ride - I almost missed the plane!'"

All too soon it is time for our visitor to leave and we all invite her up again whenever ... Later one of the younger guys says, "Nice old gal, huh?"

And because we must be operating in a different time zone or something, and we still have that thing on about the DC-3, we whisper, "Yeah ... both of them!"

(Reprinted from the Journal of ATC)

When a Pilot needs Help, and Needs it Quickly

by Carl A. Swanson, Jr., Chief of the FAA Tucson Tower* Let me paint a couple of word pictures for you. One happened at Tucson. It was an October evening, overcast at about 7000 feet. Local traffic was light. There were air carriers coming and going, an occasional general aviation itinerant, and a Lufthansa Boeing 707 out for four hours of transition. There were two men on duty in the control tower. The Lufthansa 707 called the tower to report a woman's voice calling Tucson Tower for help. We were not picking up the signals. A Hughes Air West DC-9, inbound from Phoenix, also reported calls from a lady pilot for help. Soon after this we began receiving calls from the lady. She needed help.

Her husband, the pilot of their Cessna 182, had just died.

She was lost on top of the undercast. She was a pilot with a minimum of time, was not checked out for night flight, and didn't hold an instrument rating.

The two controllers jumped into action. One called his colleague in the Flight Service Station, asking him to get a direction finder fix on the calls from the lady pilot. The response was "Tell her to steer 340 degrees for Tucson Airport." The other controller meantime called Tucson Approach Control to see if he had a target on radar on about 160 degrees from Tucson. He did. We asked the pilot if she were transponder equipped. She was. Could she operate it?

She could. Very well, change to 7700, the emergency squawk, for identification of target.

Another controller in the RAPCON, meantime, asked an AF-T-29 in the pattern if he would accept some vectors to assist. The T-29 left the pattern and proceeded by radar

• Carl A. Swanson, Jr. from his talk "ATC Cooperation with Medical Emergencies in Flight" to the members of the Flying Physicians Association at their 19th annual meeting in San Diego, California, July 26.

1973.

vectors to an intercept. In about six minutes they joined up.

The tower called one of ourfixed base operators and explained the situation, asking if he could crank up a Cessna 206, provide an escort for the lady pilot, and talk her down for a landing. Meantime the T-29 established eyeball contact with the Cessna 182. The pilot lowered his gears and flaps, reduced to a minimum safe speed, turned on all his lights, and made himself an easy target for the lady to follow. He led her to a point about 35 miles west of Tucson where the overcast broke off. She followed him in a visual descent back towards Tucson.

In a few minutes the Cessna 206 had eyeball contact with both targets and he joined up with them. The T-29, on observing this, flew off. The Cessna 206 gave the lady a few dual instructions on night landing, gave her the pattern altitude, power setting and air speed, stayed handily on her left wing bringing her around with many words of encouragement to a good landing.

1 have another story. On an afternoon at Shreveport ther was rain, reduced visibility, broken clouds, and in one qu:. drant solid overcast and heavy r~in. Shreveport Approach Control had ARTS Ill radar operative but not commissioned Traffic was light. A Baron called in, VFR on top, requestin~ an IFR clearance and approach. The Baron was transpond equipped but did not have altitude encoder. The control!:; gave the Baron vectors and descent clearances to 1700 f and a turn to heading 120 degrees. Until now everythin eet 9 routine. But the Baron didn't turn. The controller re Was peated the turn clearance but go no response and no turn E tually, there came a frantic voice from the Baron. "S · ven. . · omeone come m. Someone please come m. My pilot has had attack." The controller asked, "Can you fly?" and th: ~e~rt responded, "I don't know anything." oice

47

From their ARTS Ill equipment at Shreveport Approach Control, controllers could read the air speed of the Baron on the electronic tag associated with the target, but they could not get electronic altitude information. Finally, through a series of questions, answers, and instructions, they got the Baron to about 4000 feet, cruising about 120 knots over an area that had scattered clouds.

When this event began, controllers had alerted an Operations Inspector at the GADO who had taken off in a Twin Comanche and had been radar vectored to the Baron. All this time the non-pilot had been leaning over the inert body of his pilot to handle the yoke, because he could not find the pin to throw the yoke to the right side. As the Twin Co-

manche joined up, the two planes were over a solid undercast. Visibility on top was good. The first thing the inspector did was to carefully describe the pin and how to throw the yoke. This worked, and for the first time the non-pilot seemed to be in control of his emotions and himself.

The next transmission from the non-pilot a few minutes later was, "I think my pilot is coming around," and in another couple of minutes the pilot was on the mike saying he thought he could land. The elapsed time was slightly more than an hour.

We assume these people are convinced there are some good guys on the ground who can give you a lot of help.

The Pilot's Point of View Minimum Safe Altitudes The problems of pilots in trying to reconcile the minimum safe altitude requirements of their, flight documentation with those of ATC are still with us despite determined attempts over the years to resolve them.

IFALPA's 1974 Annual Conference decided that an attempt should be made once more to try and crack this apparently unbreakable nut and the task was entrusted to the RAC/COM Study Group.

What is the major problem involved here?

Basically, it is the dilemma facing the pilot when the terms of an ATC clearance given to him conflict with the minimum safe altitudes (MSA's) prescribed by his company or (what is just as bad) when the pilot cannot relate the ATC clearance to his company route minima, as is sometimes the case when he is being given radar vectors. It is true that, in these circumstances, the pilot can "request an alternative clearance" but this can create difficulties with a busy ATC unit and certainly compound congestion on the R/T. It also amounts to "passing the buck" to the pilot.

The trouble lies essentially in the absence of an ICAO international standard which would require States and operators to promulgate common minimum safe altitude data and compel ATC to conform to this when issuing clearances to aircraft whether under radar or procedural control.

IFALPA m~de a valiant effort at the ICAO 6th Air Navigation Conference in 1969 to achieve this goal but, whilst some improvement to the ICAO legislation was accomplished, agreement on the key requirement for standardisation, or even a common set of criteria, was regarded as being "impossible to reach" because of "differing circumstances applicable to local or regional aspects"¡ We are therefore left with the situation that the minimum flight altitudes established by the States and operators can differ (and frequently do); those of individual operators can differ (and frequently do), whilst ATC is required to apply only the State minima (and frequently complicates the issue by vectoring pilots on to routes not covered by their company minima anyway). In the case of Palma (Majorca), for example, the Andraitx Departure One SID is often issued by ATC with an associated altitude restriction of 4,000 feet. The appropriate operators' MSA within 1o n. ms. of track is 4,000 feet, the relevant terrain being 3,370 feet a. m. s. I. 8 n. ms. off track. . Ironically, in some States the same civil aviation authority condones the application of one standard by way of the

48

operator's certification and, at the same time, instructs the Air Traffic Services to apply conflicting limits.

Clearly, we have a long way to go on this one. Unfortunately this seems to be an issue in which IFALPA is, in fact, the only body which has sufficient incentive to get it resolved and the only one with a single vested interest - flight safety.

Vertical Separation in Holding Patterns Controller: Pilot: Controller: Pilot:

"Clipper 100, descend to 6000."

"Out of seven for six, Clipper 100."

"Sabena 14 descend to seven."

"Roger, Sabena 14 is out of eight."

In this holding pattern, the Clipper and Sabena have legal vertical separation, but not necessarily 1000 feet. All that is fairly certain is that it is greater than zero. Pilots in several parts of the world are becoming concerned that this ancient form of vertical separation may be more hazardous with jet operational practices than it was when most aircraft were unpressurized. Too often, pilots ignore the rule to descend the last 1OOO feet at 500 feet per minute, and just as frequently report leaving an altitude when in fact the aircraft doesn't really leave it for another 20 or even 30 seconds.

At the most recent meeting of IFALPA's RAC-COM Study Group, this hazard was confirmed by the IFATCA observer who has personally observed, via the mode C altitude readouts, vertical separation far less than 1000 feet as a result of the procedure laid down, and the piloting techniques actually used. In the U.S., ALPA has expressed its concern about this problem to the FAA, and they have promised a look at their own system to measure just how serious it is.

But what of the remedies for the situation? If ATC authorities were to wait until an aircraft reached the lower altitude before clearing another aircraft into the next higher level, the problem would be solved. However, State authorities are very reluctant to do this, citing a severe loss of capacity.

Whether this is true or not, the pilots can minimize the hazard on their own through stricter adherence to the rules.

Specifically, pilots should not report out of an altitude until their aircraft has actually left that altitude and a 500 fpm rate of descent has been established. Also, they should avoid a high speed descent all the way to the cleared level in a holding pattern. The IFALPA RAC-COM experts feel that when pilots are made aware of this situation and its simple solution, the hazard will quickly disappear.

(IFALPA News Bulletin)

I FATCA '75 14th Annual Conference of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations

Programme: Monday 14 April:

Official Opening and Fi rst Plenary Session

Tuesday 15 April :

Committee Sessions

Wednesday 16 April:

Committee Sessions

Thursday 17 April:

Committee Sessions

Friday 18 April :

Final Plenary Session and Closing Ceremony

Pre and Post Tours: A comprehe nsive range of p re and post tours will be planned to enable delegates to see the major attractions of Austral ia.

Social Programme: An extensive social programme is being organised for Delegates and Assoc iates. A n interesting and comprehensive programme is also being planned for ladies. This will inc lude so me of the historical, geographical and cultural features of the city of Melbourne and its environments.

Registration: A final ann ouncement brochu re detailing registration feel:!. programme, accomodation forms , post-Congress tours , etc .. wil l be ci rc ulated in due course.

Photo by Courtesy - The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd., Melbourne

Melbourne/Aust ralia:

IFATCA '75, Melbourne, Australia, 14-18 April 1975, Hilton Hotel.

Host Association: Civi l Air Operations Office rs' Association of Australia; Box 789 F, GPO Mel bourne, 3001, Australia.

Phone : 67 56 61 .

Melbourne (population 2,5 milli_o~) is the capital city of t~e State of Victoria an d is Australia s second largest city. It 1s renowned for its d ignified charm, park~. gardens und t reelined streets, art galleries, small boutiques, and a_lso has the largest department store in the southern hemisphere.

Australia 's major financial centre: Melbour_ne has a concentration of industry on its outsk irts, a ma1or s~aport and international air terminal and ~as been described as a cosmopolitan c ity with international standard hotels and restaurants.

Venue : The Congress w ill be held at the Melbourne Hilton ~otel Melbourne's newest International hotel, overlooking t~e famous and historic Fitzroy G ardens. The Hilton Hotel is located 5 minutes from the city centre.

Official International Ca rrier for Conference participants : QANTAS. Attractive air fare discounts will be avai labl~ to all delegates. Fu rther details w ill be supplied in the final b roch ure.

Weather : The average April temperatur~ in Melbourne is 20 C maximum and 10 C minimum. It 1s Autumn and the days are usually sunny. . . .

Australia is an continent of ~ontrasts. One th i rd 1s tropical , but then it a lso has a vast inland desert. The more fertile country is either side of a mountain range wh ich is snow capped for almost half of the y~ar and runs the length of the eastern seabo.a rd. Australia is the_ land of sophisticated cities, large grazing and small farm ing properties and a unique flora and fauna in its seven States.

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1975

REGISTER WITH BRIAN HOPLA CHAIRMAN IFATCA'75 REGISTRATION COMMITTEE BOX 789F GPO MELBOURNE, 3001. AUSTRALIA. : PICTURE COURTESY VICTORIAN

FISHERIES & WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT

FLY QANTAS OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL CARRIER FOR IFATCA'75