Chrysalis Spring 2018 Issue

Spring 2018 The Undergraduate Journal of International Development Studies

COPYRIGHT This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode

Chrysalis is annually published by the International Development Studies Students’ Association (IDSSA) of McGill University in Montreal, Canada. To view electronic copies of the journal, visit www.idssamcgill.com/ publications. ISSN(Print) : 1198-6123 ISSN(Web) : 2369-8624 The opinions expressed in Chrysalis are those of the authors and contributors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial board, the peer review board or McGill University.

Our Team Editor-in-Chief Corrina Vali Editorial Board Zofi Hasan Aleza Waheed Maxine Both Zachary Nanji-Smith Kayla Holmes Mia Trana Peer Review Board Peer Reviewers: Hailey Ji Adrianna Lemieux Tamara Mitchell Tala Abdullah Victoria Spiteri Design Editor Brayden Culligan

Mentors: Dr. Philip Oxhorn Dr. Philip Oxhorn Dr. Manuel Balan Dr. Khalid Medani Dr. Juliet Johnson

Table of Contents Editor’s Note Submission & Review Process Tackling Food Security in Nigeria Policies to address the causes and effects of deeply entrenched food insecurity in Africa’s largest country

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Latin America & the Caribbean: A “Goldilocks Zone” for Harbouring Extremists in a Region Immune to Global Terrorism?

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The Invisible Plight of Stranded Migrants

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Constant Vulnerability: Human Trafficking of Eritrean Refugees in the Sinai Peninsula

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Meet the Editors

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Editor’s Note Dear readers, The Spring 2018 issue of Chrysalis offers insight into some of the most challenging issues and most promising opportunities in international development. Our authors explore a variety of topics ranging from terrorism in Latin America to food security in Nigeria. This issue of Chrysalis also reflects the addition of new elements to the journal’s selection and editing processes. This year, Chrysalis launched its mentored peer-review process, which has helped to improve the academic rigour and quality of its content. The Editorial Board also chose to publish longer and more analytical research papers to offer readers a deeper understanding of international development research. When we think of international development, the idea of spending scarce time and resources on research often seems less important than development practice. However, just like any other field of work, research and practice in international development are engaged in a symbiotic relationship. For instance, pioneering research by Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen in the 1990s, shifted the world’s focus from national income to human development. As a result, the Human Development Index is now considered to be the universal standard of development. Hence, I believe thaat it is extremely important to cultivate an interest in and ability to conduct high-quality research early on. Chrysalis is our humble attempt to provide some of the brightest undergraduate researchers a platform to publish their work. I would like to thank the Editorial Board, the Peer Review Board, the Design Editor and our authors for their hard work and incredible contributions to the journal. I would also like to thank the IDSSA Executive for its continued support and guidance. Moreover, I want to convey my utmost gratitude to librarians Michael David Miller and Katherine Hanz, who were instrumental in the creation of our mentored peer review process. Last but not the least, thank you to our readers, who make all our time and effort worth it. Regards,

Corrina Vali Editor-in-Chief

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Submission & Review Process Chrysalis accepts manuscripts in either English or French from undergraduates belonging to any faculty or major, provided they offer original insight into international development. While eligible manuscripts are required to be from a class at the 300-level or above, we occasionally publish exceptional 200-level submissions. Manuscripts are accepted through December and January, after which the Editorial Board convenes to select manuscripts for publication. Selected manuscripts are then sent to selected advanced undergraduates who conduct official peer reviews under the guidance of Faculty members. Once the peer reviews are submitted, the authors are expected to incorporate their feedback into the manuscripts before the editing process. Each submission is assigned to a copy-editor who liaises with the author to prepare the manuscript for publication.

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Tackling Food Security in Nigeria Policies to address the causes and effects of deeply entrenched food insecurity in Africa’s largest country Elisa Vallette, Tali Zuckerman, LÊonie Borel, Anais Bertoluci-Perez

Abstract This policy proposal will aim to identify the key factors behind food insecurity in Nigeria and offer innovative policy solutions to tackle these root causes. The introduction will outline the current context of the issue as well as the proposal’s goals and guidelines. Next, this paper will identify three key root causes of extensive food insecurity in Nigeria: economic instability, poor governance and nationwide insecurity caused by Boko Haram. The paper will recommend three sets of policies for the government to implement over a ten year period in order to reduce food insecurity throughout the country. The policies recommended in this paper should first be carried out as pilot projects and later expanded over a ten year period in Nigeria through a bottom-up approach. The final portion of the paper presents the implementation timeline and estimated costs associated with the various recommended policies as well as a SWOT analysis for each policy set.

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INTRODUCTION With a population of over 160 million, Nigeria is the largest country in Africa and accounts for 47 percent of West Africa’s population.1 However, with falling oil prices and increasing militant activities in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’s deep reliance on petroleum has led to slowing economic growth. The country is struggling with extreme food insecurity. This is particularly apparent in the North, where 4 million people do not have access to adequate nutrition.2 The country is in a state of emergency, struggling with issues such as corruption, weak economic management of resources, a lack of economic opportunities in the agricultural sector and the ongoing war with Boko Haram. Amartya Sen states that since the 1980’s, the key to food security lies in the ability of people to obtain control over food.3 He argues that the distribution of food and the resources a population has to access it play a more significant role in food insecurity than that of food production. Nigeria’s Minister of Agriculture similarly recognized that the country

4 is struggling to tap into the potential of its fertile agricultural land and important workforce. Therefore, food security cannot be achieved by simply increasing food production but through concrete policies created and implemented in partnership with the international community. Such policies will increase agricultural production through innovation, a bottom-up approach and investment in the 50 million unemployed youths.4 Finally, peaceful negotiations with Boko Haram in the North are essential to relieving food insecurity in Nigeria’s most food insecure region. These policies should first be implemented as small, local pilot projects to effectively initiate change and later expand to a national level if they are successful. The paper recommends that the government collaborate and cooperate with external actors such as traditional community leaders, the private sector and NGOs, for the implementation of these policies.

I. FOOD INSECURITY IN NIGERIA: ROOT CAUSES

1  Website Food Security Portal, “Nigeria”, IFPRI, 2012. 2  International Crisis Group, Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in North East Nigeria. World Affairs Journal, published on May 18, 2017. 3  Sen, A. Hunger in the Contemporary World, 1997. 4  Website Food Security Portal, “Nigeria”, IFPRI, 2012.

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1. Economic Instability Economic instability, exacerbated by (1) the economy’s dependence on oil; and (2) poor financial resources, is a crucial driver of food insecurity in Nigeria. Following the discovery of oil in the 1960’s, the country has rapidly grown into a major food importing nation as the government neglects the agricultural sector. This oil resource curse, or “Dutch Disease”, creates economic issues such as irregular state revenues and trade imbalances. The government’s financial budget depends heavily on international crude oil prices, which are highly unstable (see Figure 2). The petroleum sector accounts for 80 percent of government revenue.5 Consequently, the country has faced periods of financial windfall and deficit which have resulted in a highly unstable economy that is vulnerable to international oil shocks (see Figure 1). The oil resource curse has also distorted Nigeria’s trade balance. A large influx of foreign currencies has led to an

5 ‘imported inflation’, increasing the real prices of imported goods. Additionally, the increase in the relative price of Nigerian goods on international markets, a consequence of this currency mechanism, is further impeding the agricultural sector’s ability to expand beyond local markets. Today, Nigeria’s agricultural sector is weak and mainly composed of smallholder farmers whose primary needs are centered around household subsistence. They produce little marketable surplus and lack the financial capital, skills and technology to produce enough food to meet the needs of a growing population.6 The “Dutch Disease” has resulted in huge inequalities. Oil wealth has benefited a small portion of the economic elite with connections to the government, while a majority of the population has suffered from inflated prices of agricultural goods. The Nigerian people are also faced with incomplete or unavailable sources of credit, which is central to the purchase of goods necessary for food production investment. Access to credit

5  Imo Jacob, O., Food Insecurity in Nigeria: Way Forward, African Research Review, An International Multidisciplinary Journal, Ethiopia, Vol. 7 (4), Serial No. 31, September, 2013. 6  Matemilola, S. and Elegbede, I. The Challenges of Food Security in Nigeria, Open Access Library Journal Volume 4, 2017.

Chrysalis Vol. X allows small, local farmers to invest in material such as fertilizer and machinery to increase their agricultural output. In the largely Muslim region of Northern Nigeria, the collection of fixed interest on loans is prohibited according to Islamic law (Figure 5). Even in areas where lending practices do exist, loans are “extreme in their informality” and small in scale and geographic reach.7 Only 7.5 percent of loans in Northern Nigeria come from banks, companies or projects; most take place privately, in cash and with no witnesses or written record.8 In this informal credit sector, 97 percent of loans are carried out between friends and relatives within the same village, while 65 percent of those remaining “occur between individuals who share a long history of exchanging gifts or… previous credit transactions”.9 Furthermore, due to the informality of these practices, there are no consistent borrowing norms across communities. As a result, credit transactions spanning borders of towns and states, which could produce larger returns to lenders,

6 are rare in the region.10 Local farmers with access to otherwise unattainable goods and technologies through loans will be more likely to produce larger agricultural yield. In repaying the loans with these additional funds, they will consequently generate increased income and financial security for the lender as well.

2. Poor Governance Poor governance, namely (1) corrupt practices; and (2) unstable institutions, is an important driver of food insecurity in Nigeria. According to Transparency International (TI), corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.11 This global phenomenon has crippled developmental efforts and exacerbated issues of food insecurity. Nigeria was ranked the most corrupt country in the world for three consecutive years (2001 to 2003), with corruption estimated as draining almost 20 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.12

7  Udry, C., Credit Market in Northern Nigeria : Credit as Insurance, the World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1989. 8  Ibid. 9  Ibid. 10  Ibid. 11  Transparency International, “Glossary”, 2017. 12  Ijewereme, O. Anatomy of corruption in the Nigerian public sector: Theoretical perspectives and some empirical explanations, Sage Open, 2015.

Chrysalis Vol. X In Nigeria, food security and corruption are extensively correlated. Indeed, the magnitude of corruption in Nigeria, from Yakubu Gowon’s regime from 1966 to Goodluck Jonathan’s administration today, is closely tied to petro-politics and the expansion of the oil industry. Nigeria’s dependence on oil revenue is conductive to corruptive practices, with incremental revenue a challenge to effectively manage and generally appropriated by certain government officials for private gains.13 According to Ragnar Torvik’s theory, oil-dependent governments with revenues generated from natural resources become less democratic and hence less accountable than countries that rely on other sources of income. Thus, according to TI, environments in which the culture of democracy and rule of law have yet to be established often face multiple crisis fueled by political violence, popular anger and increased inequality. Such conflicts limit access to financial resources and infrastructure within the most vulnerable populations and aggravate food insecurity. Money budgeted for public utilities is often deviated for private use in the oil sector.14 Thus, when government officials use oil 13  Ibid. 14  Ibid. 15  BBC News. Nigeria Profile, 2018.

7 profits for personal gain, public projects such as infrastructure are neglected and fail to receive receive proper funding. Nigeria also suffers from institutional instability caused by the many changes in government leadership and structure. Nigeria has been a republic, a dictatorship and a democracy; all within 57 years.15 The country’s 12 leaders over this period abandoned previous agricultural policies and programmes and chose to implement new ones instead. Inconsistent policy changes and inefficient monitoring agencies have had little effect on food production and distribution in the country.

3. Nationwide Insecurity Nationwide instability and safety concerns are an important driver of food insecurity in Nigeria, mainly caused by Boko Haram’s presence in Northern regions. These threats are present across the country, but the South, with the economic center of Lagos, benefits from a certain degree of stability that the North lacks. Since 2009, thousands of Nigerians have died from offensive and counter-offensive moves between

Chrysalis Vol. X the Nigerian government and Boko Haram. As a result, Northern Nigeria is faced with both food and health insecurity, with some regions on the verge of famine. Boko Haram has blocked access to roads and burned approximately 30 percent of the houses, roads and bridges in the Northeast of the country, threatening the Nigerian economy and exacerbating food insecurity in the region. Today, 4.7 million Nigerians in the Northeast are in urgent need of food security.16 The situation has improved in some regards since January 2017, but there remain 1.7 million International Displaced People (IDP) living in temporary camps and host communities. Most of these camps are located in the Borno state, which, according to Figures 9 and 10 from the World Health Organisation (WHO) and International Organisation for Migration (IOM), is the most food insecure state of Nigeria.17 This insecurity is strongly linked with the threat of Boko Haram.18 Hence, 72 percent of IDP sites such as

8 these have stated that access to food is their main concern.19 Instability in the North has also limited humanitarian action in the region, restricting food and health aid coming to millions of IDPs. Boko Haram has directly affected food production in the North, as farmers, herders and fishermen flee or are forcefully uprooted from their communities. Wheat production in the five states of Northeast Nigeria has declined to just 20 percent of its level prior to the terrorist insurgence.20 Even after in cases of rehabilitation of IDPs, the loss of land and property rights caused by conflict continues to exacerbate issues of food insecurity. Finally, Boko Haram’s influence in the region is attractive to young Nigerians, who face a 25 percent youth unemployment rate.21 The terrorist group pulls recruits from this restless demographic, offering economic opportunities and agency that are otherwise widely unat-

16  International Crisis Group, Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in North East Nigeria. World Affairs Journal, published on May 18, 2017. 17  ACAPS, Humanitarian overview an analysis of key crises into 2018, ACAPS, 2017. 18  Strochlic, N. Could Farmers Bring Peace to Nigeria?, National Geographic Magazine, 2017. 19  ACAPS, Humanitarian overview an analysis of key crises into 2018, ACAPS, 2017. 20  International Crisis Group, Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in North East Nigeria. World Affairs Journal, published on May 18, 2017. 21  Strochlic, N. Could Farmers Bring Peace to Nigeria?, National Geographic Magazine, 2017.

Chrysalis Vol. X tainable in the region. In addition, Nigeria and neighbouring countries have halted trade in the region in order to limit revenue and supplies falling into the hands of Boko Haram, thus decimating the region’s economy and exacerbating increasing food insecurity the Northeast Nigeria.

II. POLICY STRATEGY & IMPLEMENTATION The drivers identified above are tightly intertwined and dependent on each other. As a result, the policies outlined below address each issue through the lens of their common challenges.

Policy Set 1: Increase availability of technological and financial tools for local agriculture through a bottomup approach While the agricultural sector has been neglected in favour of the oil market in recent years, Nigeria has the potential to become a self-sufficient food producer and exporter. In order to do so, the local agricultural sector needs to become more productive, which can be made possible through the spread of (1) innovative green technologies; (2) new

9 management practices; and (3) infrastructure.

Improve access to technologies through an EU partnership In order to make expensive technologies available, we recommend that the Nigerian government partner with the EU for a technology transfer, with the promise of favorable terms of trade. This partnership with the EU, in addition to giving famers access to valuable technologies, will increase their market opportunities beyond Nigerian national borders. Because of its location and geography, Nigeria should make use of its numerous rivers to implement irrigation systems. Lake Chad, in the Northeast of the country, is the largest body of water in the Sahel and represents a significant, unexploited source of water for agriculture in the region.22 Irregular rainfall patterns caused by climate change have already caused a decline in crops yields which make the implementation of irrigation systems an immediate necessity. However, the direct exposure to the sun that crops are subject to in the region causes rapid evaporation, making drip

22  Allman Gritzner, J., Lake Chad, Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016.

Chrysalis Vol. X water irrigation system best suited to the Nigerian environment. Drip water irrigation systems allow water to drip slowly to the roots of plants, from above the soil surface or through underground channels. By delivering water and nutrients directly to the roots, this system lead to healthier plant life and far greater yields. These irrigation projects should be financed by the EU and implemented by a group of experts from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).

Invest in African Leaf Vegetables Our goal would be to reintroduce African Leaf Vegetables (ALVs) in the daily food habits of the urban and peri-urban populations of Nigeria. With climate change posing a significant threat to small-scale farmers globally, the Nigerian agricultural sector must adapt to prevent further food insecurity. ALVs have proved to be more drought resistant and require less water than crops with GMOs.23 They are rich in the vitamins and minerals that major staple foods

10 consumed in Nigeria lack and create opportunity for women, who dominate the agricultural sector. Through educational programs for farmers centered on topic such as nutritional value and production and efforts to raise awareness, ALVs could have the same success in Nigeria as they have had in Kenya. Indeed, in 2010, ALVs such as Amaranthus and Black Nightshade exceeded 30 million dollars in production value in Kenya; in 2016, supply only met 60 percent of ALV demand in Nairobi.24 The technology is affordable, especially during the rainy season. ALVs can help mitigate the negative effects of climate change and food insecurity through the development of small-scale farmers. With current droughts and the shrinking of Lake Chad by 90 percent since 1963, ALVs are especially important in Northern Nigeria.25 These should be implemented as pilot-projects across the country, with the help of the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nation (FAO), whose goal is to improve food and nutrition security, as well as the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the

23  Van Averbeke, W.; Chabalala, M.P.; Okorogbona, A.O.M.; Rumania, T.D.; Azeez, J.O. “Plant nutrient requirements of African leafy vegetables”, 2012 24  www.bioversityinternational.org/research-portfolio/markets-for-diverse-species/african-leafy-vegetables/ 25  Allman Gritzner, J., Lake Chad, Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016.

Chrysalis Vol. X Nigeria Business Group.

Create new infrastructure and storage facilities to eliminate waste and increase ease of access to agricultural goods and services The provision of social amenities such as roads, potable water and electricity would make agricultural activities in rural areas more productive and connect them to world markets.26 Additionally, the construction of storage facilities, including silos, would help avoid the waste that accompanies the harvest season to ensure year-round food security. These should be used to store maize, grains, sorghum, paddy rice, soya beans and millet.

Foster cooperative enterprises through a cooperative program By implementing a cooperative program with its poorest populations, known as the Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP), Nigeria can develop its agriculture sector. The cooperative model uses a direct

11 bottom-up approach, empowering the BOP by engaging with the segment as producers, not simply consumers. This program would play an immediate positive role in alleviating food insecurity, with farmers able to share their limited resources to incur greater returns for the community as a whole. A successful example is the Amul dairy cooperative model that helped India emerge as the largest milk producer in the word.27 Local NGOs working with the program would bring together farmers and organize them into small cooperatives, promoting employment and increasing yield. These NGOs would offer financial and technical services to the farmers, serving as guides and regulators to moderate yield returns and profits from surplus sold and potentially organize elections to choose representatives. As well as creating community investment opportunities to aid in relieving food insecurity, this model would also foster democratic values to indirectly combat corruption, as farmers gain voting and ownership rights by being members of a cooperation. Consequently, as the population becomes more aware of its citizenship rights and obligations, it

26  Imo Jacob, O., Food Insecurity in Nigeria: Way Forward, African Research Review, An International Multidisciplinary Journal, Ethiopia, Vol. 7 (4), Serial No. 31, September, 2013. 27  Basu, P. & Chakraborty, J. Land, Labor, and Rural Development: Analyzing Participation in India’s Village Dairy Cooperatives, 2008.

Chrysalis Vol. X may demand more government transparency and promote state involvement. However, the absence of basic infrastructure, of processing and storage facilities and of collateral has been an impediment to the smooth operation of agricultural cooperative models.

Increase access to microfinance Small farmers need access to shortterm, low value lines of credit in order to finance more costly elements of agricultural production such as machinery and technology. The use of local and international microfinancing would allow small farmers to purchase agricultural technologies and goods in order to increase their yield. Local farmers require small loans that are “of a scale and timing associated with short-term consumption and working capital needs”.28 Most loans taken out in Nigeria are repaid within 5 months (Figure 4). These borrowing practices are ideal for a microfinancing model, in which members of a financial institution provide small loans for investment in income generating activities. Nigeria should begin implementing

12 microfinancing services throughout its population in order to provide more direct, equal and structured access to credit. A microfinancing organization, such as the Association of Non-Bank Microfinance Institutions in Nigeria (ANMIF) which promotes poverty reduction and development goals in local populations, should lay out a framework for Nigeria’s microfinance structure. This organization should first implement a microfinancing pilot project in several small areas of Nigeria. It should begin in the more stable South and later expand into the North as the region stabilizes and opens up to aid. This program should be expanded over 10 years, with an evaluation of effectiveness conducted after two. Data collection on pay-back rates and quality of life surveys pertaining to access to food and nutritional health would provide the necessary information on the effectiveness of the loans. If the program is successful, microfinancing models should be expanded to other regions of Nigeria. Ultimately, creating credit flows across community and state lines in Nigeria would be beneficial in unifying the country as well as generating increased revenues and a sustainable agricultural yield for the population.

28  Udry, C., Credit Market in Northern Nigeria : Credit as Insurance, the World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1989.

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Policy Set 2: Invest in education to instill values of democracy and anti-terrorism in Nigeria’s youth Although 42.5 percent of Nigeria’s population is under the age of 14 (Figure 3), this generation may see the limited employment opportunities in the agricultural sector as daunting.29 Along with investments in technology and the promise of greater financial returns, special campaigns should be implemented in schools in order to generate interest in agricultural pursuits and reinvigorate the cultivation of Nigeria’s fertile land.

Investing in small-scale youth farmers Boko Haram has been successfully recruiting younger generations disenfranchised by high youth unemployment rates.30 With few opportunities to make a livelihood in agriculture, this demographic has compelling reason to turn to Boko Haram, which promises greater economic opportunity and a degree of agency. The proposed solution is to first increase yields and access to higher price markets for young farm-

13 ers, then implement agricultural classes in schools. This will provide further incentive for youth to seek a career in agriculture and mitigate the aging population of the agricultural sector – the average farmer is 50 years old.31 Investing in small-scale farming is a way to decrease youth unemployment and consequently to reduce Boko Haram’s influence in the region.

Create civic education classes in schools Schools provide a platform to instill new democratic values. Along with courses in agriculture, civics classes would raise awareness on good governance practices and civic involvement. This education would see next generation of politicians be more accountable to the citizens that elected them and more willing to invest public funds in projects beneficial for the whole nation. In addition of combating the culture of corruption and weak rule of law, this education program would limit the lure of terrorist organisations. Many disenfranchised youths turn to organizations such as Boko Haram not only for finan-

29  Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Nigeria, CIA Website, 2018. 30  Onuoha, F.C. Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?, 2014. 31  Strochlic, N., Could Farmers Bring Peace to Nigeria?, 2017.

Chrysalis Vol. X cial reasons but also for social esteem and opportunities for achievement, as they know they can move up the military latter. Education on civic values and the role of democracy, along with the creation of economic opportunity, could discourage this radicalisation.

Policy Set 3: Negotiate with Boko Haram and educate youth The Nigerian government must step up and demonstrate commitment to providing relief to its own citizens by initiating peaceful negotiations with Boko Haram and neighbouring countries.

Negotiate peace with Boko Haram The ultimate goal of this recommendation is to negotiate peace with the armed group and to establish long term security in the region as a comprehensive strategy to end the insurgency. Indiscriminate use of force fuels displacement and prevent aid agencies from delivering food and health services to areas affected by terrorism. With half of the government food aid never reaching

14 the regions in need, the initial concern is to negotiate the secure delivery of food and health aid to IDP camps with Boko Haram.32 This is a crucial step, with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), along with other humanitarian partners, launched an inter-agency funding appeal on February 2nd, 2018 for US$ 157 million to aid over 250,000 people affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin region.33 Central to this proposition is an alliance with the other three countries affected by the conflict: Niger, Chad and Cameroon. In forming a united front in negotiations, the goal would be to reach a ceasefire with Boko Haram. This would be done with support from the international community, in order to implement a peacekeeping mission to insure the respect of human rights and assist in humanitarian action during the negotiations. Peaceful negotiations with Boko Haram have occurred on several occasions in Nigeria in the past: in October 2016 and May 2017, over 100 girls abducted by the extremist group in 2014 were released after negotiations.34

32  Reuters Staff. Nigeria says half of government food aid never reached victims of Boko Haram, 2017. 33  UNHCR. UNHCR and partners seek US$157 million to aid Boko Haram displaced, 2018. 34  International Crisis Group, Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in North East Nige-

Chrysalis Vol. X Finally, the regions in which Boko Haram is active should be developed in accordance with the previous recommendations. Boko Haram initially emerged in the region calling for better distribution of resources and a challenge to corruption, before the country saw any economic growth with the discovery of oil. By initiating economic development in the region, the organization will lose an important part of its narrative. The long term solution to the Boko Haram insurrection, as well as food insecurity, in the North is neither military nor humanitarian, it is developmental.

Restore authority, land ownership and security in liberated areas Efforts should be concentrated on areas already free of conflict in order to restore food security. Most IDPs in Northern Nigeria have lost their land and productive assets due to conflict and lack the resources to pursue agriculture. Administrative services are key to the reestablishment of secure land rights, with displaced populations gaining access to land through land leasing programs. By restoring IDPs’ land and implementing more effective admin-

15 istration, the agricultural sector in the North can grow more efficiently.

III. SWOT ANALYSIS Policy set 1: These policies aim to implement proven methods of cooperation and increase the production of traditional crops, using environmentally responsible methods. They emphasize using Nigeria’s natural resources to shape agricultural innovation with the support of experienced international organizations. A significant challenge lies in the application of these policies in Islamic communities. This is the case namely in communities governed by Sharia law, which prohibits the loaning practices necessary to the implementation of a system of microfinancing. However, by partnering with the microfinancing organization Kiva and benefiting from their “Islamic microfinancing” plan, a system can be established without violating Sharia law. Additional challenges include obtaining funding for the various projects and creating trust within the local communities (see SWOT Analysis in Appendix for further details as well as Implementation Timeline in Appendix).

ria. World Affairs Journal, published on May 18, 2017.

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Policy set 2: This policy set aims to increase opportunities for employment, civic engagement and effective democratic values within the population. Nigeria’s youthful population provides the perfect platform for the implementation of educational programs. These aim to see participants grow to become future leaders and policy makers in Nigeria. Weaknesses in this policy set arise from the long timeframe for some of the education goals, as well as the challenge of creating new educational programs without imposing on local customs and curricula. Threats in this area may arise from the presence of organisations such as Boko Haram, which may oppose certain education goals, especially for women and girls. Additionally, the policies depend on external factors such as UN support to aid in the creation of lesson plans and the construction of infrastructure. Without this support, the establishment of schools and access to remote areas will pose a significant challenge (see SWOT Analysis in Appendix for further details as well as Implementation Timeline in Appendix).

Policy set 3: This final policy set aims to create stability in Northern Nigeria through

16 peaceful negotiations, rather than physical confrontation and violence. Additionally, it seeks to develop sustainable agriculture programs in order to bring food stability to focused regions. These policies benefit from similar policies that have already been put in place in Nigeria. They have the potential to truly effect change by working with surrounding countries, including Chad, Cameroon and Niger, to engage in negotiations. However, some challenges include the long and unpredictable nature of negotiations with terrorist organizations, as well as the immense bureaucracy involved in the process. Furthermore, any real change effected by these negotiations may not be seen within the ten-year scope of this proposal. The threat of Boko Haram is ever present in this set of policy proposals for fear of a lack of cooperation, violent retaliation or unmeetable demands for compliance. Finally, the support of the UN would be needed to approve, mediate and fund such negotiations (see SWOT Analysis in Appendix for further details as well as Implementation Timeline in Appendix.)

CONCLUSION This proposal has sought to tackle the issue of food insecurity in Nigeria by

Chrysalis Vol. X addressing its various exacerbating factors. Nigeria is faced with a multitude of problems including corruption, terrorism and a lack of necessary economic resources—all of which play a role in the dominant issue of food insecurity. In order to address these challenges, this proposal has, first, outlined the dominant factors behind the issue; namely, economic instability, poor governance and nationwide insecurity. The proposal then proposed three set of policies to address these issues. First, an increase in available technological and financial tools for small farmers should result in a modernisation of the Nigerian agricultural sector and consequently a rise in output yields. Second, educational policies should be implemented to instill values of democracy on Nigeria’s youth and future political leaders. Third, negotiations with Boko Haram should mitigate the effects of terrorism and restore security and stability to the country. Finally, the proposal identified the potential challenges that these policies might face in the course of their implementation in order to ensure a rounded approach to proposing a solution to the challenge of food insecurity in Nigeria.

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Appendix Figure 1. Nigeria GDP (in billion USD) from 1960 to 2015

Source : World Bank Data Figure 2. International crude oil prices from 1960 to 2015

Source: http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-01-06-down-africas-oil-memory-laneand-why-we-areright-wrong-to-worry

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Figure 3. Nigeria pyramid population

Source: https://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/age_structure.html Figure 4. Length of loans in Nigeria

Source :http://web.mit.edu/14.75j/www/credit.pdf

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Chrysalis Vol. X Figure 5. Muslim population in Nigeria

Source : https://cdn.static-economist.com/sites/default/files/images/printedition/20150207_MAM909.png Implementation TimeLine:

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SWOT Analysis Policy set 1:

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Policy set 3:

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Bibliography ACAPS, Humanitarian overview an analysis of key crises into 2018, ACAPS, 2017. Allman Gritzner, J., Lake Chad, Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016. Basu, P. & Chakraborty, J. Land, Labor, and Rural Development: Analyzing Participation in India’s Village Dairy Cooperatives. The Professional Geographer, 2008. BBC News, Nigeria Profile, 2018. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13951696 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Nigeria, CIA Website, 2018. Fawole, W., Ilbasmis, E., Ozkan, B., Food Insecurity in Africa in Terms of Causes, Effects and Solutions: A Case Study of Nigeria. 2nd International Conference on Sustainable Agriculture and Environment, 2015. IFPRI. Food Security Portal, “Nigeria”, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/nigeria/ resources Ijewereme, O. Anatomy of corruption in the Nigerian public sector: Theoretical perspectives and some empirical explanations, Sage Open, 2015. Imo Jacob, O., Food Insecurity in Nigeria: Way Forward, African Research Review, An International Multidisciplinary Journal, Ethiopia, Vol. 7 (4), Serial No. 31, September 2013. International Crisis Group, Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in North East Nigeria. World Affairs Journal, published on May 18, 2017. Matemilola, S. and Elegbede, I. The Challenges of Food Security in Nigeria, Open Access Library Journal Volume 4, 2017. Nwajiuba, C., Nigeria’s agriculture and food security challenges, Agriculture and Food Security Journal, 2016. Onuoha, F.C. Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?. United States Institute of Peace Special Report 348, 2014. Reuters Staff. Nigeria says half of government food aid never reached victims of Boko Haram. Reuters World News, 2017. Sen, A. Hunger in the contemporary world. DEDPS, 8. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science,

23 London, UK. 1997. Strochlic, N., Could Farmers Bring Peace to Nigeria?, National Geographic Magazine, 2017. Transparency International, “Glossary”, 2017. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/glossary/ Udry, C. Credit Market in Northern Nigeria : Credit as Insurance, the World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1989. Udry, C. Critical Markets in Northern Nigeria : Credit Markets in a Rural Economy. The World Bank Economic Review, Vol 4, No 3, 1990. UNDP. “Journey to extremism in Africa”. UNDP Report, 2017. UNHCR. UNHCR and partners seek US$157 million to aid Boko Haram displaced, 2018. Van Averbeke, W.; Chabalala, M.P.; Okorogbona, A.O.M.; Rumania, T.D.; Azeez, J.O. “Plant nutrient requirements of African leafy vegetables”, in Nutritional Value and Water Use of African Leafy Vegetables for Improved Livelihoods. Water Research Commission: Pretoria, South Africa, 2012.

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Latin America & the Caribbean: A “Goldilocks Zone” for Harbouring Extremists in a Region Immune to Global Terrorism? Exploring the nexus between post-2001 developmental causal mechanisms and terrorist activity in Latin America and the Caribbean Caroline Wesley

Abstract This paper aims to evaluate the impact of non-state terrorism on the Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) region’s developmental and political context. Although it is the only continent without any incidence of a Jihadist terrorist attack, the paper provides quantitative and qualitative evidence to support the hypothesis that the LAC region is not only especially vulnerable to terrorist violence, but it is also a “goldilocks zone” that is highly conducive to extremist networking and cross-border terrorist activity. This paper presents four central causal mechanisms to support this hypothesis: 1) border porosity and inadequate security forces enable the mobility of illicit drugs, weapons, and criminals; 2) institutionalized corruption facilitates interactions among higher levels of regional government, criminal organizations, and extremist groups; 3) wave-like regional tendencies towards anti-government revolution support the development of home-grown extremists; and 4) modernization and technological development allows international extremist groups to gain supporters within the region.

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I. Introduction Should a region’s security context be primarily evaluated by its transnational terrorism history—or its lack thereof? South America has long been known as the only continent in which a confirmed Islamic terrorist attack has yet to take a human life. Should this make Latin Americans breathe a sigh of relief, or does it mean that an attack is impending? The answer to these questions has been fiercely debated over the decades, but a conclusion has yet to be reached. This paper aims to contextualize the concept of terrorism in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region in the modern era. It will argue that within a theoretical developmental context, the LAC region is particularly vulnerable to the growth and spread of non-governmental terrorism, specifically in the form of suicide bombings and attacks perpetrated by armed groups, Lone Wolves (LWs) or Home-Grown Cells (HGCs). The paper will explain this argument through four main developmental causal mechanisms present in the region: 1) a high level of border porosity allows for the undocumented inter-state mobility of individuals, illicit drugs, and weapons; 2) institutionalized corruption between criminals and political elite, law enforcement, and the

25 military provides a haven for illicit activity and drug trafficking; 3) the deeply ingrained cultural perception justifying violence and anti-government movements when personal security is threatened enables the rise of revolutionary groups and extremism; and 4) increased interconnectivity and modernization facilitates easier access to radicalizing media and propaganda, causing a rise in Lone Wolf and Home-Grown Cell extremists in the region. Finally, this paper concludes that Islamic extremism and transnational terrorism as a whole may be a rising security threat to the LAC region.

II. Definitions The academic community has long languished on defining terrorism, often devoting large sections of research to the problematic nature of applying essentialist definitions to the field. Critics and terrorism researchers alike cite issues of politicization, biases and a general lack of concrete conceptualization, leaving the field of study majorly devoid of adequate theory, data and methods. In Lisa Stampnitzky’s paper titled “Disciplining an Unruly Field: Terrorism Experts and Theories of Scientific/ Intellectual Production,” she brings to light a fundamental question regarding

Chrysalis Vol. X of terrorism: if terrorism studies cannot be bound to a concrete intellectual field, and lay within an “interstitial space of knowledge production,” how can rigorous academic standards be applied to studies therein?1

How scholars define terrorism Building from their experience in building the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland, Gary LaFree et al. synthesize the most commonly agreed-upon components of terrorism’s definition as: “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”2 It is important to note that state-sponsored acts that fulfill the criteria of terrorism are excluded. This is due to the common practice of dividing the field of study into two groups of state- and non-state terrorism. Michael Walzer takes a similar stance in his definition of terrorism as a non-state actor’s means of political influence in his article titled “Five Questions About

26 Terrorism”, terming it as: “the deliberate killing of innocent people, at random, in order to spread fear through a whole population and force the hand of its political leaders.”3 Alternatively, Jessica Stern proposes an impartial definition that does not exclude states and defines terrorism as: “an act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating or otherwise influencing an audience.”4

Guerrilla warfare and CartelRelated Violence As South America is widely known as the guerrilla continent par excellence, guerrilla warfare is another essential term to be defined. In his Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare, Beckett defines it as “a set of military tactics utilized by a minority group within a state or an indigenous population in order to oppose the government or foreign occupying forces.”5 Moreover, it is an undeniable fact that in the modern era, Mexican cartel and gang-related violence dominates the LAC region’s security situa-

1  Stampnitzky, “Disciplining an Unruly Field: Terrorism Experts and Theories of Scientific/ Intellectual Production.”, 3. 2  LaFree, et al., “Building a Global Terrorism Database.”, 21. 3  Walzer, “Five Questions About Terrorism.”, 1 4  Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, 11. 5  Beckett, Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare, ix.

Chrysalis Vol. X tion in the area of non-governmental violence, and this paper would be remiss not to mention its importance. However, this paper will not focus on Mexico’s cartel and gang-related security issues, as this genre of violence, while sometimes similar in nature to extremist activity, is constantly changing in modus operandi and deserves a classification of its own.

III. Literature Review and Methodology This paper employs an interdisciplinary developmental lens to synthesize various political, cultural, economic and security indicators into a holistic view of Latin America and the Caribbean’s security context. Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks conducted a study to evaluate the effects of social programs on poor short-run and longrun socioeconomic conditions such as unemployment, poverty, inequality and dissatisfaction in Western European countries between the years of 1980 and 2003.6 They found that higher social spending in health, unemployment benefits and active labour market programs linked to a statistically significant reduction in the home-grown variety of

27 terrorism. However, the study found that spending on social programs such as public housing lacked concrete links to the reduction of terrorism. In an effort to explain these linkages, Krieger and Meierrieks argue that spending on health may improve human capital and thus stimulate economic growth, while unemployment benefits may reduce poverty, leading to decreased general dissatisfaction with the state. While this study does provide a useful insight into the effects of progressive governance on the reduction of terrorism, such findings may not necessarily apply to the unique case of Latin America and the Caribbean. This is due in part to many factors, but the most prevalent is the high level of governmental corruption and the diversion of state funds to the coffers of the political elite in the LAC region. The LAC region has been measured as one of the most corrupt regions of the world.7 As such, it is likely that the developmental effects of increased spending on social programs are felt less acutely in the LAC region, as corruption and existing human development indicators speak to an inefficient system of social program provision. In his study of the nexus between the

6  Krieger and Meierrieks, “Terrorism in the Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.”, 903. 7  Blake and Morris, Corruption & Democracy in Latin America, 2.

Chrysalis Vol. X international illicit drug trade and terrorist activity, James Piazza presents a “cash and chaos argument”: both higher prices of illicit drugs and higher rates of illicit drug crop production yield higher rates of terrorism.8 He continues by arguing that the inverse of this hypothesis is also true: a higher rate of drug crop eradication and drug product interdiction will yield lower rates of terrorism. Piazza clarifies his last hypothesis with the idea that higher rates of drug crop eradication and interdiction on drug trafficking are indicative of “enhanced domestic security and international border policing capacity.”9 While this theory accurately describes the relationship between both drug production and the effect of eradication on terrorism rates in general, Piazza fails to contextualize his theory with the real-life implications of drug eradication on the activities of armed groups and extremists in Latin America. In fact, a key case study illustrating this took place in May of 2017: as a United Nations official was working on a coca eradication project in the southern Guaviare province of Colombia, armed FARC dissidents in a convoy of vehicles kidnapped him.10 By failing

28 to take into account the population and dissidents who could rebel or incite further violence against eradication measures, this risks overlooking security implications inherent to the popularly-disliked drug eradication campaigns in these rural regions.

Methodology This paper will identify and distinctly delineate the causal mechanisms for terrorist activities in the post-WWII and post- Cold War periods in Latin America and the Caribbean. It will also survey how the complexities of state governance styles, international actors and the evolving nature of the illicit drug trade, all influenced regional changes across the period. Furthermore, regarding data collection methods presented in this paper, the founders of the Global Terrorism Database cite the challenge posed by collecting country-level data on terrorism events. This is due in large part to the collection methods employed by open source terrorism databases. LaFree et al. explain that by relying on local news sources of a given country for terror-

8  Piazza, “The Illicit Drug Trade, Counternarcotics Strategies and Terrorism.”, 300. 9  Ibid., 303. 10  Guardian News Media, “Former Farc Rebels Kidnap UN Official in Colombia from Coca Crop Region.”.

Chrysalis Vol. X ism incidents, the news organization’s biases or “spin” can affect the data’s objectivity and applicability for later comparative analysis alongside other sources.11Another issue with opensource data collection they cite, is that failed terrorist incidents or incidents prevented by police tend to receive less media attention, once again potentially skewing a well-rounded analysis.12 Accurately identifying the perpetrator of a possible terrorist incident is another issue, as some terrorist organizations’ modus operandi is less starkly identifiable among other security incidents. These fundamental issues with data collection must be considered when analyzing data taken from terrorism databases.

IV. Historical Background of Terrorism Across Latin America As a general overview, the Figure 1 graphs (see appendix) illustrate the frequency of terrorist incidents in Latin America and the Caribbean, as recorded by the Global Terrorism Database. As can be noted in the downward trend that began in 1991 in both figures, modern incidents of terrorism are much less frequent than the post-WWII period,

29 ending with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. This paper thus divides the historical context section into three periods: (a) post-World War II to the collapse of the Soviet Union; (b) 1991 to September 11th, 2001; and (c) 9/11 to present.

Post-WWII - Cold War Period The post-WWII period was critical in solidifying revolutionary tendencies across the LAC region. Specifically, terrorism in Latin America was first observed in this period with the rise of leftist armed guerrilla movements. Following the 1959 Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro spread a revolutionary communist doctrine to small militant groups beyond Cuba’s borders and deep into Latin America and the Caribbean. Castro’s successes in the Cuban Revolution effectively redefined revolutionary possibilities across Latin America: dissatisfied citizens across the region began to realize that if socialist revolution was possible directly under the noses of the anti-communist resistance (namely, the United States), then it was certainly possible in their own countries, where American presence

11  LaFree, et al., “Building a Global Terrorism Database.”, 24. 12  Ibid.

Chrysalis Vol. X was minimal.13 Classified under the name El Foco, this Marxist doctrine was immensely successful in encouraging small armed groups to challenge their bourgeois governments.14 Ample evidence points towards the USSR’s backing of Castro’s Marxist movement: through the proxy of the Cuban government, the Soviet Union provided “funds, weapons, training, political endorsements and logistical assistance, such as passports, intelligence services and the use of diplomatic facilities” to a variety of revolutionary leftist armed groups, mostly in the Andean Ridge and Southern Cone sub-regions.15 These included the leftist Montoneros in Argentina, the leftist Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Marxist-Leninist FARC and ELN in Colombia, the socialist MRTA in Peru, the leftist MIR and the Marxist-Leninist FPMR in Chile and the leftist FAR in Guatemala. The main objective of the strategic support of these armed groups was to challenge

30 American dominance in the Western Hemisphere.16 Accordingly, in efforts to garner influence over the region and to contain the spread of communism, the United States supported a variety of right-wing armed groups, mostly located in Central America. These included the death squadrons in El Salvador and the Contras in Nicaragua.17 El Foco-inspired terrorist violence was first observed in the Venezuelan Revolutionary Leftist Movement’s (MIR) 1964 terrorist campaign, in which the group staged robberies, assaults, bombings and kidnappings in east Venezuela in an effort to destabilize President Romulo Betancourt’s presidency.18 The latter half of the 1960s was punctuated by the emergence of urban guerrillas in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. These guerrilla groups were primarily composed of highly educated citizens who disagreed with their government’s inegalitarian policies responsible for the economic deterioration of the middle

13  Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: a Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956, 32. 14  Feldmann and Perala. “Reassessing the Causes of Nongovernmental Terrorism in Latin America.”, 107. 15  Ibid. 16  Feldmann, “Reassessing the Causes of Nongovernmental Terrorism in Latin America.”, 109. 17  Ibid. 18  Ibid., 107.

Chrysalis Vol. X and lower classes.19 At the same time, Pedro Antonio Marin, alias “Manuel Marulanda.”, founded the guerrilla insurgent group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), infamous for the longest communist insurgency in Latin American history.20 As a result of the overwhelming wave of guerrilla movements and their leftist violence, kidnappings and extortion, state governments in the Southern Cone and Andean Ridge began to respond with extreme repression of political expression, ushering in an era of political dictatorships across this sub-region, punctuated by military coups and crackdowns towards leftist groups. Terrorism continued to spread from the Southern Cone into the rest of the region: the leftist revolutionary socialist group, called the 19th of April Movement, combined guerrilla warfare tactics with terrorist tactics, and the FARC followed suit with their own campaign of bombings, kidnappings and extortion to fund their operations.21

31 A number of other armed insurgent terrorist groups that emerged during this period still hold their presence in the LAC region today. In Peru, a Maoist group called the Shining Path, incited a violent anti-government campaign against the new democratic administration of Fernando Belafinde Terry following the group’s formation in 1970.22 The Shining Path often tortured and massacred peasant communities who they perceived to be against their cause. A subsequent Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that it killed over 31,000 people between 1980 and 2000, often stoning victims to death or immersing them in boiling water.23 When Alberto Fujimori took office in 1990, the war against the Shining Path shifted, and the 1992 arrest of the group’s leader signaled the group’s decline. Remnants of the guerrilla group still exist, maintaining drug trafficking operations in the VRAEM region of Peru, the country’s cocaine production hub.24 The influence of international terrorist organizations was minimal in the WWII - Cold War period of Latin

19  Ibid. 20  Bargent, “The FARC 1964-2002: From Ragged Rebellion to Military Machine.”. 21  Feldmann, “Reassessing the Causes of Nongovernmental Terrorism in Latin America.”, 109. 22  Insight Crime, “Profile: Shining Path.”. 23  Ibid. 24  Insight Crime, “Profile: Shining Path.”.

Chrysalis Vol. X American history when compared to the continent-wide rise of leftist and right-wing armed groups that employed terrorist tactics. However, Hezbollah, a Lebanese, Iran-supported Shi’a Islamist militant group, is a pertinent example of such an international terrorist organization with roots in the region. This organization has established global networks in at least 40 countries worldwide.25 Most importantly, it is known that Hezbollah established itself in the largely ungoverned Tri-Border Area (TBA) in the 1980s, bounded by Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Ciudad del Este, Paraguay; and Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil.26 The organization reportedly maintains a large operational network in the TBA in order to generate funds for the party through drug trafficking.27

b. Post-Cold War Period Following the end of the Cold War and notably after the signing of the Esquipulas I and II regional peace treaties, terrorism as a whole decreased in the LAC region. This sharp decrease in

32 terrorist incidents is clearly visible in above Figure 1a at the year marker of 1991. However, a number of terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, persisted in the LAC’s sub-regions. In fact, two terror attacks in 1992 and 1994 reported in Argentina were perpetrated by groups with links to Hezbollah.28 Moreover, in a symbolic attack against Israel, the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was hit by a suicide bomber truck bomb on March 17th, 1992.29 The attack killed 29 and wounded 242, Argentina’s deadliest terror attack until the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association building on July 18th, 1994, which killed 85 and injured over 300.30

V. Terrorism within a Developmental Framework Modern Causal Mechanism #1: Border Porosity and Inadequate Security Forces As mentioned in Part IV, the Tri-Bor-

25  Miryekta, “Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Area of South America.”, 105. 26  Neumann, “The New Nexus of Narcoterrorism: Hezbollah and Venezuela.”; Dumitrascu, El Radicalismo Islámico En América Latina. De Hezbolá Al Daesh, 3. 27  Miryekta, “Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Area of South America.”, 105. 28  Marulanda, Yihad En Latinoamerica, 18. 29  Ibid. 30  Jewish Virtual Library, “Terrorism: Bombings in Argentina.”.

Chrysalis Vol. X der Area lying between Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil is a hotbed for illicit criminal activity, primarily the drug trade. The lawless nature of the area, enabled by porous borders and inadequate security forces, is particularly attractive to extremist group activity. The case of Colombia is perhaps the most striking example of the influence of porous borders on the illegal drug trade, as well as on the prolongation of terrorist insurgent armed conflict. Robert Rotberg, Director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Interstate Conflict, explains that cocaine is transported across Colombia’s porous borders with Venezuela and Brazil and is then flown to secret airfields in Guinea-Bissau for further distribution to Europe and beyond.31 One study estimated that the FARC used to derive approximately 50 percent of its operating revenue from the production of the coca plant and the trafficking of cocaine to the United States and Europe.32 The FARC Peace Process is currently in its stages of implementation, but many believe that the

33 surrender of the FARC’s weapons and dominance over Colombia’s rural areas caused a power vacuum for the region.33 As some of the group’s guerrilla fighters become increasingly dissatisfied with the slow progression of the peace process and contest a lack of implementation of the key components of the deal, the region is simultaneously seeing an increase in FARC dissidents.34 An ever-growing number of former FARC fighters are returning to their forested compounds to continue the lucrative drug trade. Central to the survival of the FARC, which utilizes guerrilla strategies to remain hidden in Colombia’s dense rainforest, is money-earning drug trafficking ventures. The FARC dissident’s maintenance of a hold over Colombia’s drug trade is thus a main factor inhibiting the full armed surrender of FARC guerrillas and stands obstruent to the Peace Process’ success in Colombia.35 A recent study by Jenna Frost into extremist-organized crime linkages in the LAC region found that members of extremist and criminal organizations

31  Rotberg, “The War on Drugs Is Fueling Islamist Terrorism.”. 32  Piazza, “The Illicit Drug Trade, Counternarcotics Strategies and Terrorism.”, 298. 33  Crisp, “The new struggle for Colombia’s countryside after FARC.”. 34  Albaladejo, “Is Colombia Underestimating the Scale of FARC Dissidence?” 35  Ibid.

Chrysalis Vol. X partake jointly in a large variety of illicit activities, ranging from drug trafficking to counterfeiting goods. This enabled the creation of linkages and relationships between extremist groups and drug traffickers, money launderers and illegal weapons dealers. Specifically, illicit money laundering and trafficking in arms and drugs were these groups’ main activities, however not all extremist groups engaged in both.36 Frost’s study employed social network analysis, which examines the relational structure of relevant actors and their relationships or ties amongst themselves. This method uses both quantitative and qualitative data, which is then analyzed through graphs and matrices to identify key actors and their behavioural patterns of interaction.37 Figure 2a in the appendix, taken from Frost’s paper, illustrates this interconnected nature of criminal and extremist groups in Latin America. While the objective of the study was to identify the extremist capability of indigenous and transnational extremist groups to acquire unconven-

34 tional material and weapons, the study also revealed crucial evidence of deeply rooted criminal-extremist relationships. Following the 9/11 terror attacks, the international community created collaborative programs to impede state sponsorship of extremist groups. In order to sustain their operations, extremist groups were thus forced to expand their network of financial contacts in search of new sources of income. 38 In analyzing the interconnectivity of extremist groups, as illustrated by Frost’s matrix, it becomes obvious that criminal links, especially through drug trafficking, are essential to the funding of extremist causes. This is because drug trafficking helps to cover extremists’ operational expenses and their criminal activity proves to be an effective non-violent method of attacking the West.39 Throughout the complicated process of cultivating drug crops, final production of the drug, to transportation and distribution across the globe, opportunities for criminals to collaborate are abound.40

36  Frost, “The Nexus between Criminal and Extremist Groups in Latin America: Implications for Unconventional Weapons Acquisition.”, 55. 37  Ibid., 34-39. 38  Frost, “The Nexus between Criminal and Extremist Groups in Latin America: Implications for Unconventional Weapons Acquisition.”, 2. 39  Ibid., 84. 40  Ibid., 85.

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Modern Causal Mechanism #2: Institutionalized Corruption Since Transparency International began to complement its Global Corruption Barometer with its qualitative Corruption Perception Index in 1995, Latin American and Caribbean countries consistently rank among the most corrupt in the world.41 Furthermore, cross-sectional studies analyzing economic factors consistently found that corruption is inversely related to economic and human development.42 The border porosity of the region explained above links closely to institutionalized corruption due to the nature of the illicit drug trafficking industry in Latin America. As reported in Transparency International’s specialized 2017 report on Latin America and the Caribbean, surveys found that citizens in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela rated their governments as the most corrupt in the region.43 This is not a coincidence: nearly all of the most corrupt countries in the region are either the largest producers

35 of illicit drugs, such as Colombia and Peru, or are the main countries through which illicit drugs are transported, such as Mexico and Venezuela.44 Venezuela is a key example in the synergetic combination of a state with the ideal environment for drug trafficking. A weak judicial system, a porous western border with Colombia, a permissive and corrupt environment and irregular international counter-narcotics cooperation collectively ensure that Colombian cocaine and Mexican heroin are transported outside of South America without detection.45

Modern Causal Mechanism #3: Wave-Like Cultural Responses of Civil Unrest and Revolution Towards AntiGovernment Violence and Repression With anti-government dissent against the silencing and quashing of political freedom in the 80s and 90s, the region became unique for its collective consciousness and wave-like patterns towards and against symbols of govern-

41  Blake and Morris Corruption & Democracy in Latin America, 2. 42  Ibid., 7. 43  Transparency International, “People and Corruption: Latin America and the Caribbean.” , 27. 44  United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.”, 1-297. 45  Ibid., 286.

Chrysalis Vol. X mental oppression. In her paper titled “The Causes of Terrorism”, Martha Crenshaw explains this phenomenon as “continental solidarity”; in the past historical context of widespread revolutionary anti-governmental movements, “given a perception of limited means, the group often sees the choice as between action as survival and inaction as the death of resistance.”46 The LAC region is uniquely predisposed to revolutionary movements, indicating that Latin Americans could resort to political or ideological extremism and/or revolution much faster and much more coordinated than individuals from other regions. The President of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank, Michael Shifter further confirms this phenomena stating: “The region has a strong tradition of protest that tends to come in waves—and is particularly pronounced when long-standing deficiencies are revealed.”47

Modern Causal Mechanism #4: Modernization Influences HGC and LW Activity Modernization in the LAC region

36 may further encourage the growth of Home-Grown terrorist Cells, Lone Wolf terrorists and suicide terrorist attacks. Crenshaw makes the argument that the modernization of societies “produces an interrelated set of factors that is a significant permissive cause of terrorism, as increased complexity on all levels of society and economy creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.”48 While Crenshaw’s argument was made before the fall of the Berlin Wall, her observation continues to hold true in the modern era. For example, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is the most notable modern case of technological advancement and modernization’s impact on communities in both the West and East. The group has employed a strategic social media campaign, utilizing, enticing and inspiring propaganda to radicalize communities far from their ideological center. Klausen analyzes the social media presence of ISIL fighters and their network of popular accounts on Twitter, and argues that Twitter served as the ideal medium to proselytize and recruit followers, as well as to reaffirm

46  Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism.”, 388. 47  Miroff, “Protests Sweeping South America Show Rising Antigovernment Anger.”. 48  Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism.”, 381.

Chrysalis Vol. X believers through the strategic distribution of propaganda.49 Thenceforth, ISIL recruiters can easily outsource recruitment to fighters across the globe, enabling the low-cost dissemination of propaganda across a wide array of social platforms. Additionally, this ease of access to social media platforms enabled widespread misinformation campaigns and strategic deception tactics.50 Klausen posits that ISIL’s “transformation of social media into an offensive strategy of psychological warfare” is a feat of innovation within terrorist strategy.51 The efficacy of ISIL’s propagandist recruitment affects a number of LAC region countries, making this causal indicator highly important to this paper’s analysis and forecasts. The most salient modern example of ISIL’s influence on LAC region occurred in July of 2016, when Brazilian authorities arrested ten Brazilians who had declared loyalty to ISIL. Members of this Home-Grown Cell located in 10 states across Brazil were found to

37 be using applications such as Telegram and Whatsapp to coordinate terrorist attack plans against the impending Rio Summer Olympic Games.52 According to the Brazilian Minister of Justice Alexandre de Moraes, the members of the Cell self-designated as “Defenders of Sharia”, and while they acknowledged Brazil’s non-membership from the U.S.led anti-ISIL coalition, they argued that Brazil remains a target due to its hosting of foreigners during the Games. Notably, one member of the Cell entered into contact with a Paraguayan seller of clandestine arms, aiming to purchase an AK-47 rifle.53 =

VI. Latin America’s Modern Security Threat Context: Ideal “Goldilocks” Conditions for Terrorism As Rut Diamint argues in his paper on the “Security Challenges in Latin America”, modern terrorist threats in the region are unpredictable, multidirectional and multidimensional.54 Long

49  Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.”, 20. 50  Ibid. 51  Ibid. 52  Philips, “Police in Brazil arrest group suspected of planning terror attack during Rio Games,” 53  Ibid. 54  Diamint, “Security Challenges in Latin America.”, 44.

Chrysalis Vol. X gone are the days of the Cold War, in which the USSR and the United States would fund the groups that represented their ideological allegiances; in its wake, a complicated and rapidly shifting security context has emerged. This paper tends to agree with Diamint: in order to understand these new threats to both citizens and security personnel, a creative and multidisciplinary understanding of security is needed.55 As such, this section will focus on the regional hotspots and extremist groups identified as key contributors and facilitators of the escalation of the LAC region’s terrorist security threat context. Perhaps the most central causal mechanism dictating developments in the modern era in Latin America and the Caribbean includes the cultivation, production and trade of illicit drugs such as cocaine, opium and marijuana. According to 2015 figures released in the U.S. State Department’s March 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Colombia, Bolivia and Peru together produce nearly all of the world’s cocaine, mainly through the means of rural family producers who are dependent on the lucrative produc-

38 tion of the drug for survival.56 The Tri-Border Area (TBA) is a long expanse of territory along Brazil’s border with the cocaine-producing powerhouse states of Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay. This vast and porous border region is over three times longer than the United States-Mexico border, and is known as South America’s busiest contraband and smuggling centre. The TBA, infamous for its mostly unguarded border, is historically known as a hotbed of extremist activity through funding from drug trafficking in partnership with organized crime groups. The late leader of Al Qa’ida, Osama bin Laden, visited the region in 1995, perhaps due to its large Arab and Muslim community composed of a Shi’a majority and Sunni minority, and a small percentage of long-established Christian emigrants from Lebanon, Syria and Egypt call the TBA home.57 Figure 3 in the appendix is a visualization of all non-governmental terrorist incidents reported in the LAC Region from December 1st, 2016 to December 1st, 2017; plotted from logged co-

55  Ibid., 59. 56  “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.”, 27. 57  Neumann, “The New Nexus of Narcoterrorism: Hezbollah and Venezuela.”; “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.”, 114.

Chrysalis Vol. X ordinates from Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Database. Colombia has the highest concentration of terrorist activity due to a high level of activity by armed insurgent groups in the region. Also contributing strongly to the security threat context is the continuously growing number of dissident FARC fighters becoming dissatisfied with the Peace Process and returning to drug trafficking and armed conflict.58 At the time of writing, the Colombian government estimated that only a small percentage of former FARC guerrilla fighters abandoned the peace process, approximately 5-7 percent. However, analysts at InSight Crime estimate that approximately 1,000 to 1,500 dissidents have abandoned the peace process.59 In the wider security context, the FARC has historically been a key trafficker of cocaine in Colombia, the country that produces the largest quantity of the narcotic worldwide, producing 495 metric tons of pure cocaine in 2015, with approximately 90 percent of cocaine samples seized in the U.S. of

39 Colombian origin.60 Although the LAC region has yet to experience a terrorist attack at the hands of Islamist extremist groups such as Al Qa’ida and ISIL, the presence of returned Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) to Latin American and Caribbean countries is a specific threat that should not be overlooked. Richard Barrett outlines the case for 5,600 individuals from 33 countries who returned home from training in Syria from ISIL in a recent report.61 Barrett’s report cites that over 130 Trinidad and Tobago citizens are confirmed ISIL FTFs; however, it is unclear how many of these fighters returned to their home country.62 American officials expressed concern surrounding the potentially radicalized Trinidadian fighters, as the small Caribbean island nation off the coast of Venezuela is relatively close to the United States’ shores.63 Trinidad’s history of Islamist extremism adds particular credence to the threat: a failed coup in 1990 was perpetuated by a radical Muslim group, and a Trinidadi-

58  Acosta and Cobb. “FARC Dissidents Face Full Force of Colombia Military: President.” 59  Albaladejo, “Is Colombia Underestimating the Scale of FARC Dissidence?”. 60  U.S. Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.” , 132. 61  Barrett, “Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees.”, 5. 62  Ibid., 13. 63  Robles, “Trying to Stanch Trinidad’s Flow of Young Recruits to ISIS.”.

Chrysalis Vol. X an man was sentenced to life in prison for his participation in a plot to blow up Kennedy International Airport in New York City in 2012.64

VII. Policy Recommendations The identification and tracking of key members of organized crime with known relationships with extremist groups would be a potential better practice to reduce extremist activity in the region. Moreover, Latin American and Caribbean security forces should be trained to investigate deeper into the links of extremist groups to networks of drug traffickers, illicit/counterfeit goods transporters and organized crime in general. In line with the continuous theme of drug trafficking throughout this paper, the decriminalization of illicit drugs in the region would lower the security threat. Decriminalization could potentially abate or eliminate the necessity for organized crime’s underground networks with extremists and the deep-rooted links with corrupt public officials. Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan is Chairman of the Global Commission

40 for Drug Policy that is proposing to decriminalize the personal use and possession of illicit drugs. Furthermore, the Commission’s 2016 report argues that the regulation of drugs can undercut the illicit drug trade, which currently constitutes the largest revenue stream for organized crime worldwide.65 As explained earlier in Part V1, the lucrative illicit drug trade enables organized crime to institutionalize corruption within the public sphere. Therefore, if the Commission is successful in eliminating this corruption, extremist access to illicit goods and ease of undetected movement would be significantly decreased.

VIII. Conclusion This paper aimed to outline the modern existence of terrorism in the LAC region within a developmental context and exemplified that the region, with its current terrorism-enabling causal mechanisms, is a “goldilocks zone” for non-governmental terrorism. Four fundamental developmental causal mechanisms currently present in the region illustrated the region’s ideal conditions for terrorism. First, a high

64  Robles, “Trying to Stanch Trinidad’s Flow of Young Recruits to ISIS.”. 65  The Global Commission on Drug Policy. “Advancing Drug Policy Reform: A New Approach to Decriminalization.”, 27.

Chrysalis Vol. X level of border porosity and lax border control in the region not only allows the largest illicit cocaine, heroin and marijuana trafficking network in the world to flourish, but it also gives criminal groups and weapons traffickers undetected inter-state mobility. Ultimately, through the drug trade, extremist groups establish relationships and contacts with organized crime, which enables access to illicit goods, weapons and even unconventional weapons materials.66 Second, Latin American and Caribbean countries’ high levels of corruption between criminals, the political elite, law enforcement and the military, not only provides for extremist-organized crime linkages, but also creates public dissatisfaction and inefficient social spending provision schemes, contributing towards civil unrest. Third, the continent-wide, deeply ingrained cultural perception that violence and anti-government movements are justified when personal security is threatened, enables the rise of revolutionary groups and extremism. Lastly, increased interconnectivity and modernization has facilitated an ease of access to radicalizing media and propaganda, particularly that of ISIL’s. This, among other factors, has caused a rise in Lone Wolf and Home-Grown Cell

41 extremists in the region, most notably in Trinidad and Tobago, and in Brazil. Finally, this paper concludes that due to these aforementioned factors, Islamic extremism and transnational terrorism as a whole may be a rising security threat to the LAC region and demands more consideration.

.

66  Frost, “The Nexus between Criminal and Extremist Groups in Latin America: Implications for Unconventional Weapons Acquisition.”, 95.

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Appendix Fig. 1a. Terrorist Incident Frequency Across LAC Region. From: Global Terrorism Database, 2017.

Fig. b. Most Active Countries in Terror Incidents Across Latin America by Decade. From: Global Terrorism Database, 2017.

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Fig. 2. Composition of Cluster Actors from Newman’s Grouping Algorithm. Yellow represents Hezbollah; blue is FARC; green is Al Qa’ida; red is Los Zeta Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) and Oficina da Enviado; and aqua is Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia. From: Jenna Frost, “The Nexus between Criminal and Extremist Groups in Latin America: Implications for Unconventional Weapons Acquisition,”, 56.

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Fig. 3. Terrorism Security Incidents in the LAC Region from December 2016December 2017. From: Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Database, 2017. Points plotted by this paper’s author

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Neumann, Vanessa. “The New Nexus of Narcoterrorism:

Chrysalis Vol. X Hezbollah and Venezuela.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3 Dec. 2011, www.fpri.org/article/2011/12/the-new-nexus-of-narcoterrorism-hezbollah-and-venezuela/. “People and Corruption: Latin America and the Caribbean.” Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer, 9 Oct. 2017, www.transparency.org/_view/publication/7983. Piazza, James A. “The Illicit Drug Trade, Counternarcotics Strategies and Terrorism.” Public Choice 149, no. 3-4 (2011): 297–314. doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9846-3. Philips, Dom. “Police in Brazil arrest group suspected of planning terror attack during Rio Games.” The Washington Post, 21 July 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ police-in-brazil-arrest-group-suspected-of-planning-terror-attack-during-rio-games/2016/07/21/197c2076-4f51-11e6-bf27405106836f96_story.html?utm_term=.bad176eec756. “Profile: Peru.” InSight Crime: Investigation and Analysis of Organized Crime, 28 Feb. 2016, www.insightcrime.org/peru-organized-crime-news/peru/.

46 “Terrorism Act 2000.” Legislation.gov.uk, 20 July 2000, www. legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1. “Terrorism: Bombings in Argentina.” Jewish Virtual Library, 2018, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/terrorist-bombings-in-argentina. “Terrorist Incidents in LAC Region, December 2016-December 2017.” IHS Market: Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center, 2017, janes.ihs.com/. “Terrorist Incidents Over Time, 1970-2017.” University of Maryland: Global Terrorism Database, 2017, www.start.umd. edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&casualties_ type=b&casualties_max=&dtp2=all®ion=2,3. Torres, Noe. “Mexico Suffers Deadliest Month on Record, 2017 Set to Be Worst Year.” Reuters, 21 Nov. 2017, www.reuters.com/ article/us-mexico-violence/mexico-suffers-deadliest-month-onrecord-2017-set-to-be-worst-year-idUSKBN1DL2Z6. “Transparency International - Colombia.” Transparency International, 2016, www.transparency.org/country/COL.

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Robles, Frances. “Trying to Stanch Trinidad’s Flow of Young Recruits to ISIS.” The New York Times, 21 Feb. 2017, www. nytimes.com/2017/02/21/world/americas/trying-to-stanch-trinidads-flow-of-young-recruits-to-isis.html.

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The Invisible Plight of Stranded Migrants Samaa Kazerouni

Abstract This paper will consider a situation often overlooked in the international labour migration regime: the issue of stranded migrants. Stranded migrants are those who get ‘stuck’ in the course of migration, either in transit, in destination countries, or after being sent to third countries. First, this paper will review historical cases of stranded migrants. It will then turn to more contemporary cases, including the Arab Spring in Libya, flooding in Thailand and the US-Mexico border. This paper will argue that stranded labour migrants are unaccounted for in legislation and human rights documents. Although there is some consideration of contingency plans for the mass exits of migrants in emergencies, further paradigm shifts need to be considered for smaller-scale cases of stranded migrants. This highlights a major flaw in the governance of labour migration and this paper concludes by pushing for equal human rights for stranded migrants, as well as reintegration support for repatriated migrant workers by their home state.

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Introduction There are more people than ever before residing outside of their country of origin.1 As of 2013, 51.2 million people were forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations.2 With this massive spike in migration, traditional classifications for migrants must be reconsidered. These classifications define the status of a migrant as an economic migrant, a refugee, an asylum seeker or an irregular migrant. These definitions are used to determine the assistance and protections that can be provided to said migrants.3 Many migrants fall outside these classifications and are overlooked as a result. Specifically, stranded migrants are a large body of unnoticed migrants. While there is no legal definition for this classification, stranded migrants are commonly identified as those who become ‘stuck’ in the course of their migrations, either in their country of

48 origin, in a country of transit or in their country of destination.4 This paper will argue that stranded labour migrants become invisible as they are the most vulnerable migrant population and will specifically consider the cases of Libya, Thailand and Mexico. First, this paper will introduce the context surrounding stranded migrants and present background information on the three case studies. Then, it will consider the paradox of receiving states upholding their sovereignty while stranding migrant workers. Next, it will highlight the lack of legal frameworks considering the plight of stranded migrant workers. Finally, it will present recommendations for nation-states and the international community to address the difficulties faced by stranded migrant workers.

History of the Stranded Migrant The term “stranded migrant” was first used by the international community in the early 1990s, following the breakup

1  Sanjula Weerasinghe et al. “On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster,” Journal on Migration and Human Security 3 no.1 (2015): 26-57. 2  Ibid, 26-57. 3  William Gois and Karen Campbell. “Stranded Migrants: A Call to Rethink the Current Labour Migration Paradigm.” Migration and Development 2, no. 2 (2013): 157-172. 4  Vincent Chetail and Matthias A. Braeunlich. Stranded Migrants: Giving Structure to a Multifaceted Notion. Technical paper no. 5. 2013.

Chrysalis Vol. X of the USSR.5 At the time, the term referred to undocumented migrants who were stranded in transit and in need of assistance. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) later used the concept during the first Gulf War.6 The IOM now uses the term “stranded migrant” in relation to its voluntary assistance programmes and Stranded Migrant Facility.7 The Stranded Migrant Facility was set up in 2006 to provide humanitarian assistance to those who do not fall under traditional protection mandates.8 A drawback of this facility is its exclusive focus on repatriation, without any discussion of a migrant’s ability to return to her host country once the crisis is resolved.9 Repatriation is not always a viable option for migrant workers whose livelihoods and whose families back home depend on their income earned abroad. Legally, migrants become stranded because they do not have the option to

49 regularize their status; they are unable to move lawfully to a third country and their lack of documentation does not allow them to return home.10 However, the practical reasons behind stranded migrants are considerably wider in range. Stranded migrants are starting to be addressed in crises, however the frequency of scenarios in which migrants can be stranded outside of conflict or emergency is much higher.11 This paper will consider migrants stranded in transit, as well as in the context of crises by turning to three case studies: the 2011 Libyan uprisings, the 2011 flooding in Thailand and the contentious issue of the US-Mexico border.

Case Studies Libyan Uprisings of 2011 The pro-democracy protests of the Arab Spring inspired Libyan anti-government protests, which were met with violent retaliation from Colonel Muam-

5  Gois & Campbell, “Stranded Migrants: A Call to Rethink the Current Labour Migration Paradigm.”, 157-172. 6  Weerasinghe et al., “On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster,” 25-57. 7  Rebecca Dowd. Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. Technical paper no. 156. UNHCR, 2008. 8  Gois & Campbell, 157-172. 9  Ibid, 157-172. 10  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 11  Stranded Migrants. Issue brief no. 5. Migrant Forum in Asia, 2015.

Chrysalis Vol. X mar Gaddafi’s regime. This repression resulted in armed conflict between the government forces and NATO-backed rebels.12 Given that Libya is a popular host country for migrants due to its oil wealth and proximity to Europe, these uprisings created a unique set of challenges for the large number of migrant workers in the region, as well as their countries of origin.13 It is estimated that there were more than one million migrant workers in the country at the start of the uprising, comprised mainly of African men working in low-skilled occupations.14 Prior to the Arab Spring uprisings, protection for non-citizens in Libya was minimal and discrimination in the form of human rights violations, racial discrimination and power imbalances was common.15 This climate was further aggravated by the political unrest and armed conflict, resulting in 790,000 non-citizens fleeing to neigh-

50 bouring countries in 2011.16 During this period, migrant workers were the largest single category of people forced from their homes.17 Hence, in the case of Libya, stranded migrants include three different groups: migrants stranded inside of Libya and unable to reach the border, migrants stranded at the border of Libya waiting to be admitted to a neighbouring state and migrants stranded in neighbouring countries .18

Flooding in Thailand of 2011 From August to December of 2011, Thailand experienced the worst seasonal flooding it had seen in 60 years.19 There was extensive damage to homes, public infrastructure and crops, which affected the lives and livelihoods of 12 million people and resulted in 1500 deaths.20 Prior to the floods, there were an estimated three million migrant

12  Weerasinghe et al., “On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster,” 25-57. 13  Ibid, 25-57. 14  Gois & Campbell, “Stranded Migrants: A Call to Rethink the Current Labour Migration Paradigm.”, 157-172. 15  Weerasinghe et al., 25-57. 16  Ibid, 25-57. 17  Khalid Koser. “Migration, Displacement and the Arab Spring: Lessons to Learn.” Brookings, March 22, 2012. 18  Chetail & Braeunlich. Stranded Migrants: Giving Structure to a Multifaceted Notion. 19  Gois & Campbell, “Stranded Migrants: A Call to Rethink the Current Labour Migration Paradigm.”, 157-172. 20  Ibid, 157-172.

Chrysalis Vol. X workers in Thailand, mainly working in agriculture, construction and seafood processing.21 Of these workers, one million were believed to have lived in areas affected by the floods and 600,000 were thought to be stranded as a result.22 These low-skilled workers were from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos and represented the largest population of non-citizens in Thailand.23 In Thailand’s case, stranded migrant workers were seen at the border of Thailand trying to escape, within Thailand but unable to reach the borders, as well as in their own places of residence, unable or unwilling to leave due to the flooding.

US - Mexico Border Stranded migrants have been identified between the US-Mexico border for decades. Each year, half a million undoc-

51 umented migrants from Latin America cross Mexico’s southern border, the last border they must cross prior to reaching the US-Mexico border.24 The majority of these migrants lack documentation and are motivated by their end goal of finding work in the US.25 Mexico is both a destination and a transit country and stranded migrants can be difficult to distinguish from migrants residing in Mexico.26 The IOM estimates that between 400,000 and 500,000 undocumented migrants transit through Mexico each year, with 90 percent of them coming from Central America.27 Many of them are in a desperate condition, vulnerable and in dire health and face mistreatment, arbitrary detention and extortion.28 In recent years, interception, detention and deportation practices have intensified along this popular

21  Khalid Koser. “Migration, Displacement and the Arab Spring: Lessons to Learn.” Brookings, March 22, 2012. 22  Weerasinghe et al., “On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster,” 25-57. 23  Ibid, 25-57. 24  Jordan Young, Andrew Pollack and Megan Morales. “The U.S.-Mexico Border: Under the Economic Lens and in the Historical Frame.” Pulsamérica, July 24, 2013. 25  Jordan Young, Andrew Pollack and Megan Morales. “The U.S.-Mexico Border: Under the Economic Lens and in the Historical Frame.” Pulsamérica, July 24, 2013. 26  Chetail & Braeunlich. Stranded Migrants: Giving Structure to a Multifaceted Notion. 27  Kirk Semple. “As Migrants Strain Border Towns, Pressure Builds on Mexico to Act.” The New York Times, January 27, 2017. 28  Chetail & Braeunlich. Stranded Migrants: Giving Structure to a Multifaceted Notion.

Chrysalis Vol. X migration route.29 Today, there is a great deal of racism and prejudice against Hispanic immigrants, which has been continuously reflected in the remarks and policies in US government.30 For instance, a controversial anti-Hispanic law in Arizona took away many basic rights from immigrants and discriminated against anyone who might appear to be an undocumented immigrant.31 The combination of dire conditions and widespread prejudice against Hispanics leaves migrants not only stranded, but immensely vulnerable. In this case, stranded migrants are solely seen at the US-Mexico border, or on their way to the border, in transit.

Maintaining Sovereignty Stranded migrant workers are often an outcome of mechanisms used by nation-states to protect national security and uphold their sovereignty. This is especially obvious in the tightening of

52 border controls of destination countries.32 There is an increasing global perception that irregular migration is a problem and a threat.33 As a result, migrant receiving nations are increasing border security in an attempt to deter and control irregular migration. However, the tightening of borders often leads to the diversion of migration routes and an increased reliance on smuggling.34 This tends to increase the vulnerability of migrants due to high costs of smuggling and smugglers’ mistreatment of migrants. As a result, migrants are often stranded in transit.35 This is a common plight for migrants from Central America, making their way through Mexico into the US. In the past decade, the US has been increasing border controls with Mexico, making it more difficult to cross the border.36 However, these migrants, hailing from Central America, Asia and Africa are unwilling or unable to return to countries of origin.37

29  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 30  Young et al, “The U.S.-Mexico Border: Under the Economic Lens and in the Historical Frame.” 31  32  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 33  Ibid. 34  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 35  Stranded Migrants, 2015. 36  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 37  Rory Carroll. “The Global Waiting Room: Displaced Migrants Headed to US in Limbo in

Chrysalis Vol. X As a result, they stay put in cities on the US-Mexico border such as Tijuana, which are now facing an unprecedented crisis of stranded homeless people.38 In line with the tightening of border controls, national governments are becoming stricter in their regulation and requirement of identification documents. In the case of migrant workers, these documents are often lost, stolen, or destroyed by smugglers.39 In fact, some migrants destroy their documents themselves, with the belief that this will protect them from deportation.40 When authorities are unable to establish the migrant’s identity, the migrant can become de facto stateless.41 This means that the migrant would be unable to avail the protection of the country of destination, she would not have the protection of her country of origin and she would lack the documentation needed

53 to move onto another country.42 Especially in crisis situations, migrants who lack documentation tend to be reluctant to make themselves known to the authorities, rendering them unable to avail protection from their home country.43 Migrants who do seek the protection of the state are rarely in a better situation, as they tend to face delays in receiving new documents.44 During the Libyan uprisings, due to a lack of travel documents, the vast majority of non-citizens had no personal means of exiting the country.45 Some of these migrant workers lacked identification because their employers had not returned their passports. As a result, they were made to wait days or weeks in harsh conditions with insufficient food, water and shelter until they found out whether they would be able to leave the country.46 Measures taken to uphold national sovereignty are one of the root causes

Tijuana.” The Guardian, February 21, 2017. 38  Ibid. 39  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 40  Ibid. 41  Stranded Migrants, 2015. 42  Ibid. 43  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 44  Ibid. 45  Weerasinghe et al., “On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster,” 25-57. 46  Gois & Campbell, “Stranded Migrants: A Call to Rethink the Current Labour Migration Paradigm.”, 157-172.

Chrysalis Vol. X of the creation of stranded migrants.

Legal Frameworks There are no legal frameworks considering the plight of stranded migrants. Very few international frameworks address migrant workers to begin with, with three main international legal instruments on migrant workers. However, fewer than 50 countries have ratified the United Nation’s (UN) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW), a broad set of rights for migrants drafted in 1990, including those who are abroad illegally.47 This more comprehensive document builds off of the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Migration of Employment Convention from 1949, as well as its Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention of 1975.48 More specifically, the CMW is the least ratified treaty among all major human rights treaties, mainly

54 ratified by migrant sending countries as opposed to migrant receiving countries.49 In fact, none of the major migrant receiving countries have ratified the CMW, which is concerning because this is already an under-regulated population.50 The rights of non-citizens affected and displaced by crises are implicit in human rights law and international law, but are not explicitly stated anywhere.51 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement come closest to enumerating the rights of migrants who are displaced within a host country. A common question is who the responsibility to protect and assist non-citizens during a crisis should fall upon. The Guiding Principles assign primary responsibility for displaced migrants to the state where the displacement occurs, although the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations emphasizes the legal, civil and moral responsibility of

47  Martin Ruhs. “Why Do So Few Countries Care?” In The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labour Migration, 13-26. Princeton University Press, 2013. 48  Martin Ruhs. “Why Do So Few Countries Care?” In The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labour Migration, 13-26. 49  Ibid, 13-26. 50  Koser, “Migration, Displacement and the Arab Spring: Lessons to Learn.” 51  Khalid Koser. “Non-citizens Caught up in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster.” Forced Migration Review 45 (2014): 43-46.

Chrysalis Vol. X countries of origin to protect their own citizens.52 In the case of Thailand, the political will of Myanmar and other major countries of origin to assist their citizens displaced by the flooding was absent, leaving the burden on Thailand.53 In other cases, countries of origin are poor countries who simply lack the capacity to provide aid to their citizens.54 Migrant workers and non-citizens are not specifically included in the definition of internally displaced persons (IDP) in the Guiding Principles.55 It could be argued that they apply to non-citizens who are displaced from their place of habitual residence, however it is unlikely that this would extend to temporary migrant workers. It is also important to note that these principles are not legally binding and many countries have developed their own laws on internal displacement.56 Though the Guiding Principles show promise as a legal framework, it falls short of ad-

55 dressing the rights of stranded migrant workers.

Frameworks for Crises Considering migrants that are stranded specifically as a result of crises, there are no explicitly stated provisions in place for their protection. Neither the ILO instruments, nor the CMW mention migrants in crisis, or contain provisions for the rights of migrants during displacement.57 When migrant workers cross borders while fleeing a crisis, they are not usually legally entitled to claim refugee status, as you can only do so when relating to conditions in your country of origin.58 Additionally, it is important to note that non-citizen migrant workers are likely to have differing needs from the average displaced citizen in a crisis. For instance, a common plight of stranded migrants is a lack of access to crisis-related information due to language barriers.59 In the case of

52  Khalid Koser. “Protecting Non-Citizens in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster.” In Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences and Responses, edited by Susan F. Martin, Sanjula Weerasinghe and Abbie Taylor, 267-86. Routledge, 2014. 53  Ibid, 267-86. 54  Ibid, 267-86. 55  Koser, “Migration, Displacement and the Arab Spring: Lessons to Learn.” 56  Koser, “Non-citizens Caught up in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster,” 43-46. 57  Ibid, 43-46. 58  Koser, “Migration, Displacement and the Arab Spring: Lessons to Learn.” 59  Weerasinghe et al., “On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Vio-

Chrysalis Vol. X the flooding in Thailand, the Thai government provided some relief and relocation assistance to non-citizens, but many were unable to make use of this aid due to a lack of clear communication and information provided in their native languages.60 It is imperative for this group to be considered separately from citizens in relief efforts. If migrants are able to understand information about evacuation during crises, the evacuation effort is rendered futile because it excludes migrants from relief services as a whole. Due to the severity of the crisis, Thai authorities were forced to prioritize their own citizens and turn away migrant workers from evacuation centres.61 On top of this, shelters provided by the Thai government were largely inaccessible because they were often isolated from migrant worker-concentrated areas.62 If indeed they were able to access shelters, they were often rejected because of an inability to present identification docu-

56 ments, either due to immigration status or loss of documentation in the floods.63 It is evident that migrant workers are not taken into consideration during evacuation procedures. Besides international frameworks, individual countries fail to consider migrant workers in their legal frameworks for migrants, or in their contingency plans for disasters. National laws and policies often draw from international guidelines, meaning that they are equally mute when it comes to the rights of migrant workers during crises64. For instance, there is an overall lack of consideration for non-citizens in disaster management planning by the Thai government.65 It does not explicitly include this population as part of the country’s permanent disaster management infrastructure and no government agency was given the responsibility to support this population during the floods.66 Furthermore, many affected states lack the basic capacity to implement exist-

lence, Conflict and Disaster,” 25-57. 60  Ibid, 25-57. 61  Weerasinghe et al., “On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster,” 25-57. 62  Ibid, 25-57. 63  Ibid, 25-57. 64  Koser, “Non-citizens Caught up in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster,” 43-46. 65  Weerasinghe et al., 25-57. 66  Ibid, 25-57.

Chrysalis Vol. X ing laws during periods of crisis.67 In Thailand, work permits restrict migrant workers to designated zones.68 During the flooding, officials continued to enforce this law, despite the Ministry of Labour temporarily voiding these policies.69 This issue goes beyond stranded migrants, touching the ineffectiveness of governance during periods of crisis.

Responsibilities of Countries of Origin There are three bodies of nations whose national frameworks for migrants need to be considered. First, this paper will consider the role and obligations of countries of origin. A country of origin is defined as the country that is a source of migratory flows, whether legal or illegal.70 There are significant failures on the part of migrant sending countries to guarantee the rights of their citizens overseas. These sending states have a tendency to view migrants as “remitters first and people in need of protection

57 second”.71 Essentially, these nations focus heavily on sending a large number of citizens abroad, to ensure the greatest remittances possible for their economy, without considering their rights as humans. In fact, these countries focus so heavily on sending citizens abroad, that there are few efforts in place to create and promote opportunities for decent work within their state.72 These states will deny such accusations, claiming to ensure the protection of migrants while also portraying them as national heroes who are making sacrifices for their families and their country.73 If sending states are so dependent on the export of migrant workers, they should be obliged to ensure the protection of their people while away. The lack of support by sending countries is seen in the lack of embassy support for migrants in major host countries. Embassies are necessary for stranded migrants to secure travel documents and register with authori-

67  Koser, “Protecting Non-Citizens in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster,” 267-286. 68  Weerasinghe et al., 25-57. 69  Weerasinghe et al., “On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster,” 25-57. 70  Richard Perruchoud, ed. Glossary on Migration. Publication. 2004. 71  Gois & Campbell, “Stranded Migrants: A Call to Rethink the Current Labour Migration Paradigm.”, 160. 72  Ibid, 157-172. 73  Ibid, 157-172.

Chrysalis Vol. X ties, as well as to get information about evacuation options.74 However, most countries of origin lack credible and accurate statistics on the numbers and locations of nationals living and working abroad, a task further complicated by undocumented migrants.75 During the Libyan crisis, more than 3000 Nepali migrant workers were stranded as a result of the violence and were made to rely on the Nepali embassy in Cairo, Egypt for support.76 In fact, this embassy had to assist migrant workers from 12 countries, solely with the support of one ambassador and first secretary.77 Nepal was not the only country that lacked the capacity to evacuate its citizens, with many primary migrant-sending countries in Asia challenged with identifying and locating their nationals.78 The sending government’s basic lack of accountability is a clear-cut recipe for their citizens to be left stranded abroad.

58

Responsibilities of Host Countries Second, it is vital to consider the specific responsibilities of migrant worker host countries. A host country is the country of destination for a migrant.79 Although every state has the sovereign right to regulate the admission and stay of non-citizens in its territory, this must be exercised in accordance with international law.80 One of the basic principles of human rights law states that a migrant who enters a country in violation of immigration laws cannot be deprived of his or her most fundamental human rights, including the right to life, non-discrimination and non-refoulement.81 Typically, migrant workers are rendered invisible in national level decision making, unless the state is considering policies that involve migrants directly.82 In the case of Thailand, the

74  Ibid, 157-172.

75  Gois & Campbell, “Stranded Migrants: A Call to Rethink the Current Labour Migration Paradigm.”, 160. 76  Ibid, 160. 77  Ibid, 157-172. 78  Stranded Migrants, 2015. 79  Perruchoud, Glossary on Migration. 80  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 81  Ibid. 82  Gois & Campbell, 157-172.

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government only focused on Thai nationals in their relief effects, leaving migrant workers to fend for themselves.83 These workers were denied access to shelters and emergency facilities and generally lacked access to information.84 By accepting migrant labourers, host countries should be assuming a responsibility to respect and uphold their human rights without discrimination. However, most host states view migrants as a “reserve army of labour” that is recruited when needed and sent home immediately when no longer of use.85 It seems that both sending and receiving countries are in agreement with this sentiment, placing human rights secondary to the economic contributions of these workers.

these workers leave their designated areas, they are rendered irregular and are subject to arrest and deportation.87 At the time of the flooding, 1.5 million migrant workers were in possession of these work permits and these restrictions resulted in many of them choosing to remain in flood affected areas.88 Many factories and production plants were shut down as a result of the floods, leaving migrant workers with no source of income or shelter.89 In day-to-day situations, these restrictions on mobility seem to be unjust, so upholding such regulations in a crisis situation is not only discriminatory but dangerous.

Host countries have a tendency to impose strict regulations on migrant workers through their visas and work permits. As previously mentioned, Thai work permits restrict their holders to specific geographic areas.86 If

Third, transit countries are an overlooked but vital actor in the stranded migrant discourse. A country of transit is any state through which a person passes on any journey to the state of employment or from the state of employ-

Responsibilities of Transit Countries

83  Gois & Campbell, “Stranded Migrants: A Call to Rethink the Current Labour Migration Paradigm.”, 157-172. 84  Ibid, 157-172. 85  Ibid, 163. 86  Weerasinghe et al., “On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster,” 25-57. 87  Ibid, 25-57. 88  Koser, “Non-citizens Caught up in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster,” 43-46. 89  Ibid, 43-46.

Chrysalis Vol. X ment to the state of origin or the state of habitual residence.90 Stranded migrants are even more prevalent in non-crisis situations. In non crises, migrant workers often get stranded in transit countries and border areas while they attempt to continue their journeys. Irregular migration takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries, for instance, when a migrant is lacking the necessary documents required under immigration regulations.91 In transit countries, there is a widespread inadequacy in the protection of human rights, as well as a lack of enforcement of pre-existing legislation. Mexico’s General Population Law does not sufficiently protect the rights of irregular migrants, as it has an article making it a crime to enter Mexico illegally. While migration in Mexico has evolved, its legal framework remains unchanged.92 In addition to this, Mexico’s state policies and legislation are not congruent with the international instruments to which it are a signatory,

60 such as the UN’s CMW.93 However, even if legislation is present, it is often ignored by authorities. In Mexico, it is common for people without any legal power to make arrests, as a means of extorting money.94 It is important for major transit countries such as Mexico to ensure adequate rights for migrants within their territories, especially because it is also a major migrant worker sending nation. Besides tightened border controls and a lack of documentation, a common reason for migrants to become stranded is a lack of financial resources.95 Most migrants use smugglers who smugglers steal their money, force them to pay more than agreed and often abandon them, leaving them no choice but to pay other smugglers to continue their journey.96 In the journey to the US-Mexico border, the police and smugglers extort and brutalize migrants.97 By the time many of them reach the border, they are penniless. However, crossing the border

90  Perruchoud, Glossary on Migration. 91  Ibid. 92  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 93  Ibid. 94  Ibid. 95  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 96  Ibid. 97  Carroll, “The Global Waiting Room: Displaced Migrants Headed to US in Limbo in Tijuana.”

Chrysalis Vol. X can cost more than US$20 000, which is unaffordable, thus leaving them stranded.98 Some migrants underestimate the cost of their journey, exhausting their resources prior to arriving in their destination country.99 To top it off, many migrants have debts back home that they have the intention of repaying through their work abroad.100 In most cases, migrant workers struggle to earn money in transit countries because of their irregular status. These migrants are left without the option of moving on, or of regularizing their status. The breakdown of international solidarity is ubiquitous in the labour migration paradigm. Not only is there a dearth of legal frameworks put in place by sending, transit and receiving nations, as well as the international community, but there is also a lack of coordination between these actors.101 Migrant receiving countries are constantly in

61 competition, resulting in the persistent lowering of the standards that they will accept for their migrant workers.102 To add to this, host countries shift their recruitment from country to country as it suits the labour market demand.103 Moreover, developed countries tend to provide funds to organizations to implement evacuation procedures and fail to assist migrants of other nationalities while evacuating their own citizens.104 A controversial reason behind the stranding of migrants is their unwillingness to return to their home state, even when remaining in the country of transit or destination in unsafe and moving to another country is impossible.105 It is very difficult to raise the funds to leave one’s country as a migrant and often individuals turn to their families and communities for the money required.106 As a result, their family considers them an investment, meaning that returning

98  Ibid. 99  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 100  Ibid. 101  Koser, “Non-citizens Caught up in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster,” 43-46. 102  Gois & Campbell, “Stranded Migrants: A Call to Rethink the Current Labour Migration Paradigm.”, 157-172. 103  Ibid, 157-172. 104  Ibid, 157-172. 105  Stranded Migrants, 2015. 106  Gois & Campbell, “Stranded Migrants: A Call to Rethink the Current Labour Migration Paradigm.”, 157-172.

Chrysalis Vol. X home empty-handed is not an option.107 However, states tend to be insensitive to the anxiety of migrants who are worried about being unable to return.108 In this case, migrants clearly are not stranded, but choose to remain in their host country. This brings up a difficult question: can migrants who are unwilling (as opposed to unable) to return to their countries of origin truly be considered stranded? Should there be a distinction between the two cases?

Recommendations and Conclusion After considering the causes and vulnerabilities of stranded migrants, it is clear that numerous changes need to be made to national and international policies surrounding this overlooked group. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the sending and receiving states to help these migrants. States can benefit from migration instead of considering it a threat to sovereignty and national security. It is imperative that authorities

62 of all states work to protect vulnerable people without prejudice because international law forbids discrimination on the basis of nationality and legal status,.109 Any individual at risk should be moved to a safe location immediately and only once their safety is ensured, should next steps regarding repatriation and/or legal status be considered.110 This should be a baseline provision in all frameworks that are ratified by the majority of nations. There is a fundamental need to change the way in which governments and societies think about irregular migration, in an effort to reverse anti-immigration sentiments and promote the ratification of the CMW.111 Generally, there is a need for more legal migratory channels to reduce irregular migration. The international community must work together to identify and fill gaps in the protection and assistance of migrants.112 Moreover, international bodies need to stress the creation of cri-

107  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 108  Stranded Migrants, 2015. 109  Koser, “Protecting Non-Citizens in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster,” 267286. 110  Stranded Migrants, 2015. 111  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 112  Ibid.

Chrysalis Vol. X sis contingency plans alongside deployment targets for migrant workers.113 This should be introduced during pre-departure training for migrant workers, so they are aware of protocols during emergency situations.114 If sending nations are going to invest so many of their citizens into their labour export economy, they must have a structured plan in place for situations where migrants end up stranded. In fact, it would be beneficial to all parties involved if sending countries turned some of their focus to strengthening their own work opportunities in order to reduce their dependence on the export of migrant workers. Sending countries should also strengthen their consular capacity in nations with large migrant worker populations and focus on creating standard operating procedures for the protection of migrant workers.115 International legislation is not likely to be sufficient in changing the mi-

63 grant worker regime because it is not legally binding. Hence, a coordinated, migrant-centred and rights-based approach is required, with comprehensive contingency plans in liaison with all actors involved.116 States must work together on a bilateral and regional level, but also revise and enact their own national legislation, ensuring that the human rights of all migrants are adequately protected.117 During crises, it is important for host nations to limit enforcement activities and focus on providing humanitarian assistance instead. They must ensure that all information about relief measures is accessible and easy to navigate for their migrant workers and facilitate the re-entry of these individuals following the crisis.118 Sending nations must regularly update their statistics on citizens working abroad to streamline emergency operations.119 Moreover, both sending and receiving countries

113  Koser, “Protecting Non-Citizens in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster,” 267286. 114  Ibid, 267-286. 115  Koser, “Protecting Non-Citizens in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster,”, 267286. 116  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 117  Ibid. 118  Weerasianghe et al., “On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster,” 25-57. 119  Stranded Migrants, 2015.

Chrysalis Vol. X should oversee the creation of emergency task forces with protocols.120 Finally, it is important to form reintegration plans, because many migrants would otherwise be returned to a worse situation than what drove them to leave.121 However, as poor and developing countries continue to export migrant workers, the burden of providing protection during times of crisis is likely to continue to fall significantly on the international community.122 The challenge of protecting and assisting migrant workers has promoted greater cooperation between three major international organizations: the ILO, the IOM and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).123 Such cooperation must continue as the backbone for the protection of stranded migrant workers. However, it is important to note that international organizations do not always have access to crisis regions, especially in cases of violence. During the Libyan uprising, there was limited access for international organizations in areas

64 that were held by government forces, hence the humanitarian assistance provided was sporadic and geographically limited.124 When it comes to the overall protection of stranded migrants, it is clearly not feasible to rely exclusively on these organizations. The creation of an international emergency fund which countries of origin could access to fund the evacuation of their citizens during crises would be highly beneficial to all parties involved.125 Thus far, coordination among international agencies has been unpredictable, hence a coordinating mechanism is needed to ensure consistent support. Stranded migrants are invisible to the eyes of the international community, however it is a group of particularly vulnerable migrants with a large range of protection and assistance needs. Stranded migrant workers are a result of a lack of legal frameworks in sending, transit and receiving countries, as well as in the international community. They are often prone to greater expo-

120  Ibid. 121  Dowd, Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. 122  Koser, “Protecting Non-Citizens in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster,” 267286. 123  Koser, “Migration, Displacement and the Arab Spring: Lessons to Learn.” 124  Koser, “Protecting Non-Citizens in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster,” 267286. 125  Ibid, 267-286.

Chrysalis Vol. X sure to the perils faced by documented and undocumented migrants.126 As a result, both within and outside of crisis situations, this group is especially vulnerable and overlooked.

Bibliography Carroll, Rory. “The Global Waiting Room: Displaced Migrants Headed to US in Limbo in Tijuana.” The Guardian, February 21, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/21/ tijuana-migration-latin-america-mexico-homelessness. Chetail, Vincent and Matthias A. Braeunlich. Stranded Migrants: Giving Structure to a Multifaceted Notion. Technical paper no. 5. 2013. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ Migration/StudyMigrants/CivilSociety/Vincent ChetailStrandedMigrants.pdf. Dowd, Rebecca. Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants. Technical paper no. 156. UNHCR, 2008. http://www.unhcr.org/research/working/486c92d12/ trapped-transit-plight-human-rights-stranded-migrants-rebeccadowd.html. Gois, William and Karen Campbell. «Stranded Migrants: A Call to Rethink the Current Labour Migration Paradigm.» Migration and Development 2, no. 2 (2013): 157-72. doi:10.1080/2163232 4.2013.802126.

65 IML_1_EN.pdf. Robinson, W Courtland. “Intractability and Change in Crisis Migration.” Edited by Sanjula Weerasinghe and Abbie Taylor. In Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences and Responses, edited by Susan F. Martin, 138-59. Taylor and Francis, 2014. Ruhs, Martin. “Why Do so Few Countries Care?” In The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labour Migration, 13-26. Princeton University Press, 2013. https://press.princeton.edu. Semple, Kirk. “As Migrants Strain Border Towns, Pressure Builds on Mexico to Act.” The New York Times, January 27, 2017. Stranded Migrants. Issue brief no. 5. Migrant Forum in Asia, 2015. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/docs/135/PB5.pdf. Weerasinghe, Sanjula, Abbie Taylor, Sarah Drury, Pitchaya Indravudh, Aaron Gregg and John Flanagan. “On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster.” Journal on Migration and Human Security 3, no. 1 (2015): 26-57. doi:10.14240/jmhs.v3i1.42. Young, Jordan, Andrew Pollack and Megan Morales. “The U.S.-Mexico Border: Under the Economic Lens and in the Historical Frame.” Pulsamérica, July 24, 2013. http://www. pulsamerica.co.uk/2013/07/the-u-s-mexico-border-under-theeconomic-lens- and-in-the-historical-frame/.

Koser, Khalid. “Migration, Displacement and the Arab Spring: Lessons to Learn.” Brookings, March 22, 2012. https://www. brookings.edu/opinions/migration-displacement-and-the- arab-spring-lessons-to-learn/. Koser, Khalid. “Non-citizens Caught up in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster.” Forced Migration Review 45 (2014): 4346. http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/ en/crisis/koser.pdf. Koser, Khalid. “Protecting Non-Citizens in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster.” In Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences and Responses, edited by Susan F. Martin, Sanjula Weerasinghe and Abbie Taylor, 26786. Routledge, 2014. https://www.routledge.com Perruchoud, Richard, ed. Glossary on Migration. Publication. 2004. http://www.iomvienna.at/sites/default/files/

126  Chetail & Braeunlich. Stranded Migrants: Giving Structure to a Multifaceted Notion.

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Constant Vulnerability: Human Trafficking of Eritrean Refugees in the Sinai Peninsula Shannon Chen See

Abstract Eritrean refugees are among the populations that are the most vulnerable to human trafficking in the Northern desert region of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. This paper will first examine the factors that increase Eritreans’ vulnerability to trafficking, before assessing one of the key inter-regional responses to Sinai trafficking: the Khartoum Process. Moving forward, this paper will argue that high-level policy attempts for curbing human trafficking in the Sinai peninsula are only effective with collaboration with domestic NGOs, women’s rights organizations and effective compliance mechanisms.

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Introduction and Key Terms As refugees flee violence or hardship in their own country, they often risk experiencing difficulty on their journey. Migration in some cases can be conceptualized as a journey out of, through into more violence.1 According to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”2. In customary international law, the principle of non-refoulement underpins this convention by requiring that refugees have “protection against return to a country where a person has reason to fear persecution”.3 While there are many issues that affect refugee populations, the challenge addressed in this paper will be human trafficking of Eritrean refugees in the Sinai Peninsula. In recent decades

67 Eritreans have comprised a large proportion of migration flows from East Africa, resulting from a 30-year war for independence and the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. Three main factors increase Eritreans’ vulnerability to trafficking: 1. poor human rights conditions in Eritrea, 2. insecurity of the journey and 3. difficulty securing refuge. Firstly, Eritrea’s human rights violations and mandatory military conscription feed the supply side of the trafficking cycle. The insecurity of the journey – while crossing the border and in refugee camps – further increases Eritreans’ vulnerability. Finally, even when Eritreans escape the trafficking cycle, they find it difficult to claim asylum. Through highly securitized borders, “refuge” countries such as Egypt violate the principle of non-refoulement by detaining and deporting migrants. Following ongoing international human rights issues surrounding migration, the European Union (EU) and several African states have sought to intervene in

1  Andre Bank, Christiane Frohlich and Andrea Schneiker, 2017, “The Political Dynamics of Human Mobility: Migration out of, as and into Violence”, Global Policy. 8: 12-18. 2  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951, “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” UNHCR, accessed February 11, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf 3  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1977, “Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High Commissioner),” UNHCR, accessed February 11, 2018, http://www.unhcr. org/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html

Chrysalis Vol. X the trafficking cycle. The second half of this paper focuses on their initiation of the Khartoum Process in 2014, a program that offers financial incentives for projects that combat human trafficking in the Horn of Africa. Although this Process represents a high-level, inter-continental approach to the reduction of human trafficking, it has been widely criticized for its heavy focus on border security and for shifting the burden of security from EU countries to African countries. This paper will argue that high-level policy attempts to curb human trafficking in the Sinai peninsula are only effective when complemented with greater collaboration with domestic NGOs, especially women’s rights organizations (WROs), and an effective compliance mechanism to ensure designated funds are used for their intended purpose.

Eritrea: A Historical Background Eritrea is a Northeastern African state in the Horn of Africa region, bordered by Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan. Eritrea experienced Italian colonization

68 from 1890-1941, followed by British military administration from 19411950. While under British rule, the United Nations created a “loose federation” between Eritrea and Ethiopia that effectively placed Eritrea under Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie’s control. What began as Ethiopia’s attempt to undermine Eritrean autonomy in the Federation through the suppression of political movements, became Ethiopia’s formal annexation of Eritrea in 1962.4 The annexation marked the start of a 30year Liberation War for independence from Ethiopia, which is the main reason why Eritreans have comprised significant shares of migrant flows through the Horn of Africa region for decades. After Eritrea gained formal independence in 1993, a war with Ethiopia from 1998-2000 once again led to the forced migration of Eritreans. Migration flows intensified after Eritrea became an authoritarian, one-party state in 2001 under President Isaias Afewerki and the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ).5 In 2015, the UNHCR estimated more than 411,000 Eritreans

4  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea,” OHCHR, accessed February 24, 2018, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIEritrea/A_HRC_29_CRP-1.pdf, 21-23 5  Ibid., p. 4

Chrysalis Vol. X were refugees or living in refugee-like situations.6 Under the PFDJ, Eritreans have experienced heavy oppression and human rights violations, which this paper will discuss. These conditions continue to serve the supply side of the human trafficking cycle, ensuring traffickers a stable “supply” of persons that are easy to exploit due to their desperation to escape persecution.

Human Trafficking The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) defines human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or ben-

69 efits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”7 The clandestine nature of trafficking makes the collection of accurate data difficult, but on any given day in 2016, an estimated 40.3 million people were victims of modern slavery, which includes forced labour, marriages and sexual exploitation.8 Traffickers benefit from globalization and from the push and pull factors that drive people to uproot themselves from one location and seek refuge or better opportunity in another. Refugees are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking; their desperation to flee persecution makes them easier to deceive into exploitation.9 Migrants can “fall in and out of various legal categories in the course of their journey” ; this means that their enti-

6  Christopher Horwood and Kate Hooper, “Protection on the Move: Eritrean Refugee Flows Through the Horn of Africa,” Transatlantic Council on Migration, September 2016, 1-30, accessed December 05, 2017, http://www.regionalmms.org/images/sector/TCM_Development_ Horwood.pdf. p. 3 7  Liam McLaughlin, “Human Trafficking,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed December 04, 2017, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/what-is-human-trafficking.html. 8  International Labour Office, “2017 Global Estimates of Modern Slavery and Child Labour,” Alliance 87, accessed December 04, 2017, https://www.alliance87.org/2017ge/modernslavery. 9  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2016,” UNODC, December 03, 2017, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2016_Global_Report_on_Trafficking_in_Persons.pdf, 10

Chrysalis Vol. X tlements to protection can change depending on their circumstances.10 For example, migrants can enter the trafficking cycle at different points (within their country or after having fled), can remain in the cycle for varying lengths of time and can exit and re-enter trafficking several times or in other countries.

Sinai Trafficking As the name suggests, Sinai Trafficking refers to the form of human trafficking that takes place in the Northern half of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, a desert region close to the Israeli border, and was first documented in 2008.11 Traffickers kidnap or coerce migrants, use them as hostages to extract ransoms from their relatives (usually in the diaspora) and “commodify” migrants by buying and selling them to other traffickers. Eritreans can enter the trafficking system in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt or Lib-

70 ya under varying circumstances. In Eritrea, there have been reports of smugglers kidnapping migrants from military camps and ‘Defence Farms’ (sites of forced agricultural labour controlled by the military) within the country.12 On the journey from Eritrea to Ethiopia and Sudan, smugglers that help refugees get out of Eritrea may be traffickers themselves or may sell them to traffickers. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) found that local tribesmen and criminal gangs are “the main actors responsible for smuggling and human trafficking from Eastern Sudan into Egypt”.13 From there, trafficking victims are taken to “holding areas”, where they wait - sometimes for months on end - to be transported further or sold to other traffickers. In these holding areas, survivors have reported being subject to various forms of torture and human rights vio-

10  Ibid., 18 11  Mirjam Van Reisen, Meron Estefanos and Lena Reim, “Chapter 2: Human Trafficking in the Sinai: Mapping the Routes and Facilitators,” in Human Trafficking and Trauma in the Digital Era: the Ongoing Tragedy of the Trade in Refugees from Eritrea (Mankon, Bamenda: Langaa Research et Publishing CIG, 2017), 19 12  Mirjam Van Reisen, Meron Estefanos and Conny Rijken. The Human Trafficking Cycle: Sinai and Beyond (Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publ. (WLP), 2014), 46 13  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Concern at Refugee Kidnappings, Disappearances in Eastern Sudan,” UNHCR, accessed December 06, 2017, http://www. unhcr.org/news/briefing/2013/1/510275a19/unhcr-concern-refugee-kidnappings-disappearances-eastern-sudan.html.

Chrysalis Vol. X lations. The purpose of this abuse is to put pressure on hostages and their relatives to pay exorbitant ransoms. 14

Factors that Increase Eritreans’ Vulnerability to Trafficking While the entirety of contributing factors that increase Eritreans’ vulnerability to the trafficking cycle is beyond the scope of this paper, three key factors can be identified: poor human rights conditions in Eritrea, refugees’ insecurity along the journey and difficulty securing refuge in countries such as Egypt, Israel and EU countries.

Poor Human Rights Conditions in Eritrea The PFDJ has subjected its own people to trafficking, including forced labour, begging and sexual exploitation, within Eritrea’s borders. The government has several exploitative “national service programmes”, such as Maetot, which signs up secondary-school children to

71 work in the agricultural sector during summer holidays.15 One of the more notorious “national service” programmes, which has been cited as a key push factor for Eritrean refugees, is mandatory military conscription. Under the Proclamation of National Service (No. 82/1995), Eritreans aged 18-40 must undergo military training and service for a total of 18 months, and those over the age of 50 must be on reserve status. However, in 1988, the government declared a state of emergency, meaning conscripts are not demobilized when they should be. The state of emergency has since not been lifted, with the result that many conscripts serve indefinitely.16 This programme is also rife with harsh conditions, human rights violations, child labour and sexual exploitation, and has forced many to flee the country.17

Insecurity of the Journey Though Eritreans face oppression in their own country, if they leave Eritrea

14  Mirjam Van Riesen et al., The Human Trafficking Cycle, 74 15  U.S. Department of State, “Eritrea,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 03, 2017. https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2017/271184.htm. 16  Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, “Going West: Contemporary Mixed Migration Trends from the Horn of Africa to Europe,” accessed December 05, 2017, http://www.regionalmms.org/images/ResearchInitiatives/Going_West_migration_trends_Libya_Europe_final. pdf, 17 17  Mirjam Van Riesen et al., The Human Trafficking Cycle, 57

Chrysalis Vol. X they embark on a life-threatening journey and becoming even more vulnerable to Sinai trafficking. All points of the journey are extremely dangerous, but parts of the journey that this paper will analyze are: 1) crossing the Eritrean border; 2) the insecurity of refugee camps in Sudan and Ethiopia; and 3) the violation of the principle of non-refoulement by “refuge” countries such as Egypt and Israel. It is extremely difficult to obtain a passport, exit visa or means of crossing the Eritrean border legally. This forces many Eritreans to consult more precarious means of exit, such as the utilization of smugglers.18 Smuggling conditions vary depending on the fee a person can pay. Eritrea’s former Finance Minister has noted that people are able to pay exorbitant sums in the range of USD 8,000-10,000, in order for smugglers to drive them across the border in vehicles owned by the Eritrean Border Surveillance Unit. Meanwhile, those who cannot afford such luxuries have to walk through unprotected open areas, making them “easy targets” for traffickers.19 Some reports paint an even more alarm-

72 ing picture of Eritrea’s border controls. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia found evidence that military commanders and other senior members of the regime are complicit in controlling the movement of migrants out of the regime to be sold to traffickers. This military involvement perpetuates the issue of trafficking.20 Even when Eritreans make it to UNHCR refugee camps in Sudan and Ethiopia, they are still at risk of being kidnapped. In 2014, the Sudanese Commissioner for Refugees estimated that as many as two-thirds of Eritrean refugees choose not to register at refugee camps. This trend has been attributed to the reported kidnappings from camps.21

Difficulty Securing Refuge Traffickers tend to release victims once they receive a ransom, although there may be instances in which the trafficker continues to hold them. After being released, survivors often journey to Egypt, Israel or Libya, in the hope

18  Ibid., 57 19  Ibid., Human Trafficking and Trauma in the Digital Era, 43 20  Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, “Going West”, 21 21  Christopher Horwood and Kate Hooper, “Protection on the Move,” 5

Chrysalis Vol. X of crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe.22 By the principle of non-refoulement, the victims are entitled to protection due to the poor state of human rights conditions in Eritrea and for being a trafficking survivor. However, “refuge” countries such as Egypt and Israel have highly securitized borders and shoot-to-kill policies that make it virtually impossible for survivors to claim asylum. If survivors do manage to cross the border, they risk being placed in detention centres in Egypt. While detained, Egyptian authorities give survivors the choice of deportation to Eritrea, deportation to a refugee camp in Ethiopia or incarceration in Egyptian prison, which represents a violation of the principle of non-refoulement23. Survivors that avoid detention or deportation must then use smugglers to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe, once again placing their lives at risk. The Lampedusa Tragedy of 2013, during which 359 migrants drowned while attempting to cross the Mediterranean

73 Sea from Libya to Italy, demonstrates the precarity of migrants’ situations in their desperation to escape heavy handed oppression.

Evaluating the Khartoum Process The Lampedusa Tragedy prompted the EU to respond to the trafficking of migrants from the Horn of Africa region, including but not exclusive to Sinai Trafficking.24 One EU initiation was the Khartoum Process, an inter-regional forum that “aims at establishing a continuous dialogue for enhanced cooperation on migration and mobility while identifying and implementing concrete projects to address trafficking...”.25 The selection committee for the Khartoum Process is comprised of a partnership between the EU and the African Union (AU), specifically the Horn of Africa. Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Malta act on behalf of the EU, while Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan act on behalf

22  Mirjam Van Riesen et al., The Human Trafficking Cycle, 87 23  Ibid., 98 24  Nick Grinstead, “The Khartoum Process: Shifting the Burden,” Clingendael, accessed December 05, 2017, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/khartoum-process-shifting-burden 25  International Organization for Migration, “EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process),” International Organization for Migration, accessed December 05, 2017, https://www.iom.int/eu-horn-africa-migration-route-initiative-khartoum-process.

Chrysalis Vol. X of the Horn of Africa.26 The Khartoum Process funds projects that strengthen border-control capacity in African countries, promotes the sharing of information between states and involves joint investigations against human trafficking and smuggling.27 The program is commendable in that it is at least nominally a cooperative effort, and the project funding mechanism encourages the committee to go beyond making international decrees and instead towards the implementation of concrete projects. This is an incremental improvement from previous EU-AU efforts, such as the Ouagadougou Action Plan, which was merely a “plan” to address trafficking that never materialized into concrete measures.28 Moreover, €7 million of the Process’ €40 million budget has been allocated to protection efforts.29 While this is a small proportion of the overall budget,

74 protection efforts are often against the interests of states30 and so dedicating some funding towards the protection of survivors can compensate for this lack of political will. The Khartoum Process has also been criticized for being too security focused and for shifting the burden of “migration control” onto source countries.31 €25 million, more than half of the budget, goes towards “capacity building” efforts, including funds for the justice sector, border security and state institutions responsible for law enforcement.32 These “capacity building” efforts are in the political interest of destination countries such as Egypt, Israel and the EU countries who seek to restrict the influx of migrants. Capacity building enhances prosecution efforts but does little for protection and prevention. The focus on security undermines anti-trafficking efforts by failing to recog-

26  Zara Tewolde-Berhan, Martin Plaut and Klara Smits, in Human Trafficking and Trauma in the Digital Era, 452 27  Tuesday Reitano, “The Khartoum Process: A Sustainable Response to Human Smuggling and Trafficking?,” Institute for Security Studies, accessed December 05, 2017, https://issafrica. s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief93.pdf, 7 28  Zara Tewolde-Berhan et al., in Human Trafficking and Trauma in the Digital Era, 450 29  Tuesday Reitano, “The Khartoum Process”, 6 30  Eun-Hye Yoo and Elizabeth Heger Boyle, “National Human Trafficking Initiatives: Dimensions of Policy Diffusion.” Law & Social Inquiry 40, no. 3 (2015): 639 31  Nick Grinstead, “The Khartoum Process” 32  Tuesday Reitano, “The Khartoum Process”, 6

Chrysalis Vol. X nize that many migrants have legitimate claims to asylum.33 This approach makes asylum more difficult to reach for trafficking survivors and fails to address the root causes of migrant flows: poverty and human rights violations in countries such as Eritrea.

Suggested Improvements to the Khartoum Process Bearing in mind the aforementioned shortcomings, the committee should consider the following improvements to the Khartoum Process: engagement with women’s rights organizations (WROs) and the creation of a compliance/monitoring mechanism. Engagement in integrated programming with domestic NGOs such as WROs can help align conflicting political interests and balance the policy agenda, by decreasing the policy focus on prosecution and focussing the agenda on protection and prevention. A compliance/ monitoring mechanism can help to ensure there is a credible commitment from all member states and that funding for anti-trafficking initiatives is used as

75 intended. Increased collaboration with local NGOs, especially WROs, can help to bolster protection and prevention in anti-trafficking efforts. Human trafficking mainly affects women and young girls; in 2016, 51% of all trafficking victims were women and 20% were girls.34 As a result, WROs play a key role in directly lobbying governments to recognize issues of gender, particularly human trafficking.35 Whereas prosecution is often in the political interest of states, prevention and prosecution require a “victim-centred” human rights approach, which aligns with the goals of WROs. There is empirical evidence to prove this fact: a cross-country study of 146 states throughout the period of 2000 to 2007 found that the presence of WROs contributed to greater protection of trafficking survivors and more stringent prevention laws.36 In other countries, domestic WROs have been instrumental in laying important groundwork for anti-trafficking that far exceeds any external, high-level intervention. For example, in Thailand in the 1980s, fe-

33  Ibid., 5 34  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2016”, 7 35  Sam R. Bell and Victoria Banks, “Womens Rights Organizations and Human Trafficking,” Social Science Quarterly, March 8, 2017: 4 36  Ibid., 13

Chrysalis Vol. X male anti-trafficking activists created domestic NGOs that pressured the Thai government to adopt domestic anti-trafficking policies, long before the UN or the United States developed any formal anti-trafficking legislation.37 In Eritrea, the National Union for Eritrean Women (NUEW) encouraged and successfully organized women’s participation in the country’s struggle for independence. This placed women at the centre of Eritrea’s new nation building. The NUEW now numbers over 200,000 in membership and continues to strive for gender empowerment.38 Alongside these efforts, the Eritrean state has made gender empowerment a priority, as exemplified by a 5-year National Gender Action Plan (2014-2019).39 Collaborating with local WROs, such as the NUEW, represents a huge opportunity to tackle trafficking in a way that aligns with the Eritrean state’s priorities. The Khartoum committee should consider greater collaboration with grassroots NGOs such as

76 the NUEW, building the capacity of NGOs and improving the conditions for NGO activity in countries such as Eritrea. Anti-trafficking approaches should not only address prosecution, but also prevention and protection: WROs can help balance the policy agenda. The funding mechanism in the Khartoum Process is intended to serve as an incentive to implement anti-human trafficking projects. However, it is questionable whether these funds are used for their intended purpose in the context of Eritrea’s extractive, authoritarian institutions and human rights violations. This indicates a need for a compliance/monitoring mechanism to ensure that these states are indeed implementing their promised projects and evaluate the outcomes of these projects. At the same time, the introduction of such a mechanism raises the question of the authority that would arbitrate a monitoring mechanism and whether it would reinforce an already imbalanced

37  Stephanie A. Limoncelli, 2017, “The Global Development of Contemporary Anti-Human Trafficking Advocacy,” International Sociology, 32 (6): 823 38  National Union for Eritrean Women, “About NUEW,” NUEW, accessed February 11, 2018, http://www.nuew.org/about-nuew 39  Eritrea Ministry of Information, 2016, “Statement Delivered By Ambassador Girma Asmerom, Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations,” accessed February 11, 2018, http://www.shabait.com/editorial/press-release/21416-statement-delivered-by-ambassador-girma-asmerom-permanent-representative-of-eritrea-to-the-united-nations

Chrysalis Vol. X power dynamic between the global North and South. Moreover, a compliance mechanism may make countries such as Eritrea more hostile and closed to addressing the root causes of mass emigration from the country. Cooperation with states that are complicit in the trafficking trade may be a moral dilemma, but it is the best alternative to incrementally change the system from the inside. At the very least, for the Khartoum Process to be effective, member states must recognize that any form of policy should uphold the basic human rights of migrants.

Conclusion In conclusion, Eritrean refugees are extremely vulnerable to human trafficking in the Sinai peninsula, but international efforts to combat trafficking in this region have largely been unsuccessful. Human rights violations force Eritreans to leave the country, which serves the supply side of the Sinai trafficking cycle. It is extremely difficult to obtain a legal means to exit Eritrea, and the insecurity of camps and reliance on smugglers increases refugees’ vulnerability to becoming trafficking victims. Even when survivors reach “refuge” countries, they experience barriers to their formal declaration of asylum and even

77 detention, which are violations of the right to non-refoulement. The EU sought to respond to this challenge through cooperation with the AU on the Khartoum Process. While it is commendable that the committee is moving beyond policy declarations towards concrete implementation, these projects are too security-focused and wrongly shift the burden of “migration control” to African countries. High level policy approaches such as the Khartoum Process can only be effective through collaboration with domestic NGOs - especially WROs such as the NUEW - and a compliance mechanism to ensure that funds are used for their intended purpose.

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Meet the Editors Corrina Vali is a graduating student pursuing a Bachelor of Arts degree in Honours International Development with Economics. She is extremely interested in development economics, Asian development policy and population dynamics. Upon graduation, Corrina will be starting her own social enterprise in India as an OceanPath Fellow. Corrina aims to work in public policy and development economics in the future. Zachary Nanji Smith is a U1 student majoring in International Development Studies. His research interests include the historical role of Western nations in Third-world development, and the application of social entrepreneurship and emerging technologies to improve living standards. Zachary is considering a career in NGO work and aspires to build development solutions from a business perspective. Zofi Hasan is a second-year student pursuing a major in Political Science with a double minor in International Development Studies and French Language. She has worked with non-profit organizations in the Greater Toronto Area, focusing on policy implementation within social service programs. Zofi’s research interests include international security studies, economic development, and political philosophy, specifically pertaining to the politics of developing regions. Mia Trana is in her third year studying Economics and Psychology with minors in International Development and French Language. Outside of school, Mia is interested in politics, international relations, sustainable development and behavioral economics. This summer, Mia will be working as an intern at the U.S. State Department and hopes to pursue policy work after she graduates in 2019. Kayla Holmes is a U2 student in International Development, Social Entrepreneurship and Computer Science. Her main academic interests include gender and minority rights, the role of religion and the process of revolution. She hopes to work both within international NGOs and as

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a journalist in order to create global conversations. Aleza Waheed is a U1 student studying international development, focussing on economic development and living standards. She also has minors in political science and history. Aleza is interested in exploring the intersection between development, equity and sustainability. She aspires to work in international law and diplomacy in the future. Maxine Both is in her final year of studies (U3), pursuing a JointHonours International Development and Political Science degree. She is passionate about the intersection of law and international development, specifically concerning minority groups, along with human rights and grassroots mobilization strategies. After graduating she will be studying a M.A. in Political Science at McGill under the Guy Drummond Fellowship program. In the future she hopes to work in human rights, transitional justice, or refugee law.