From Grassroots Activism to Anti-Globalisation Movement: The Role of World Bank and Bechtel Enterprises in the Water War of Cochabamba

By: Saruul Khishigjargal

Abstract

The water war or the movement against water privatization in Cochabamba in 1999 was a response to Banzer’s government effort to privatize Cochabamba’s water system to the subsidiary of multinational giant Bechtel Enterprises, Aguas del Tunari, as part of a World Bank-mandated Structural Adjustment Program. This made water unaffordable to residents of Cochabamba and they protested to keep Bechtel out of their city. While the impact of structural adjustment programs in Bolivia has been robustly researched, the role and involvement of the aforementioned multinational corporations in creating the conditions for the formation of mass protests has not been clearly identified. Thus, this research aims to answer the question, what role did the World Bank and Bechtel Enterprises play in the transition of grassroots activism in Cochabamba into the anti-globalization movement? It argues a) coercive, top-down management and contracts from multinational organizations, b) the insurgent democratic organization and strategic resistance, and c) international alliances facilitated the success of the protest against water privatization and its proliferation into the anti-globalization movement.

La guerre de l’eau ou le mouvement contre la privatisation de l’eau à Cochabamba en 1999 était une réponse aux efforts du gouvernement Banzer pour privatiser le système d’eau de Cochabamba à la filiale du géant multinational Bechtel Enterprises, Aguas del Tunari, dans le cadre d’un programme d’ajustement structurel mandaté par la Banque mondiale. Cela a rendu l’eau inabordable pour les habitants de Cochabamba et ils ont protesté pour garder Bechtel hors de leur ville. Bien que l’impact des programmes d’ajustement structurel en Bolivie ait fait l’objet de plusieurs recherches approfondies, le rôle et l’implication des sociétés multinationales susmentionnées dans la création des conditions propices à la formation de manifestations de masse n’ont pas été clairement identifiés. Ainsi, cette recherche vise à répondre à la question suivante: quel rôle la Banque mondiale et Bechtel Enterprises ont-elles joué dans la transition de l’activisme populaire à Cochabamba vers le mouvement altermondialiste? Cet article soutient que a) la gestion coercitive de haut en bas et les contrats des organisations multinationales, b) l’organisation démocratique insurrectionnelle et la résistance stratégique, et c) les alliances internationales ont facilité le succès de la protestation contre la privatisation de l’eau et sa prolifération dans le mouvement altermondialiste.

Introduction

The anti-globalization movement began in 1999 from the Seattle protests against neoliberal globalization. Evans states the movement was “aimed at replacing the dominant global regime with the one that maximizes democratic political control and makes the equitable development of human capabilities and environmental stewardship its priorities.” 1 The supporters of the anti-globalization movement protested the economic, environmental, and human abuses that were exacerbated by globalization. 2 We observe a case of such resistance in the Water War of Cochabamba, Bolivia, where local indigenous farmers and workers united against the water privatization mandated by the structural adjustment programs that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) implemented.

The movement against water privatization in Cochabamba was comprised of three major protests against the Water Law 2029 and the intervention of a multinational corporation Bechtel. The problem was a result of the fact that communities in Cochabamba were consistently running out of water supply due to environmental causes and increased population. The local community demanded a new water national council to deal with water management from the government and advocated for a long-term solution. However, the government’s response was often to dig deep wells in nearby towns, a short-term solution that exhausted scarce water reserves under the soil. So, when a drought struck in the late 1990s, the locals appealed to the government and the city municipality again, who resultingly re-enacted the same solution. Determined to take matters into their own hands the locals started building roadblocks to protest against drilling wells.

In the meantime, a newly elected president Hugo Banzer was in conversation with the World Bank to ask for a 600-million-dollar development loan, which required the Bolivian government to privatize social services to foreign corporations. The government signed the deal and passed a new water law that effectively privatized Cochabamba’s water system to Bechtel’s subsidiary Aguas del Tunari. The protestors truly became engaged when the multinational company hiked up water rates for both the rural and urban communities. Residents of Cochabamba and local partners protested peacefully against this privatization until president Banzer declared martial law, during which time a student was shot and killed by the police. Enraged by the government’s protection of Bechtel and the lack of support from the government on decreasing water rates or changing the water legislation, locals became resolute to drive Bechtel out of their city. Eventually, Bechtel’s management left the city, and the locals won their water back. The legacy of this war and its details will be further elaborated on in the research paper.

The victory of this grassroots activism was momentous for the entire movement because it challenged the legitimacy and efficacy of the structural adjustment programs endorsed by the World Bank and IMF. 3 Although the impact of the structural adjustment programs in Bolivia has been researched, the role and involvement of these multinational corporations in creating the conditions for mass protests to form has not been clearly identified. This paper aims to bridge this gap and answer the central question, what role did the World Bank and Bechtel Enterprises play in the transition of grassroots activism in Cochabamba into the anti-globalization movement of Bolivia? To answer this question, I hypothesize that the structural adjustment programs that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund implemented in Bolivia in 1986 sowed the seed for its own demise that led to the water war of Cochabamba. I argue that coercive, top-down management and contracts from multinational organizations, the insurgent democratic organization and strategic resistance, and international alliances facilitated not only the success of the protest against privatization but also its proliferation into the anti-globalization movement.

Concepts

Before the argument on how the World Bank and Bechtel Enterprises created the conditions for the grassroots activism against water privatization in Cochabamba to transition to the anti-globalization movement, some understanding of the following concepts need to be established: grassroots activism, the anti-globalization movement, water privatization, multinational corporations, and structural adjustment programs.

To start with grassroots activism, Skaidre argues that it is a form of mobilization of the ordinary people that arises “in response to the new social cleavages and increased polarization due to neo-liberalization and globalization processes”. 4 The grassroots activism in this paper will refer to the organization of Cochabamba’s rural and urban communities that united against the water privatization mandated by the Bolivian government. The success of the protests of these ordinary people proved to be exemplary progress for the anti-globalization movement; otherwise known as the transnational resistance to neoliberal globalization 5 that supported free-market capitalism for foreign investors but undermined local decision making, environmental protection, and human rights. 6 Anti-globalization movements in the Global South aimed to demonstrate against “the privatization of state-owned resources and public services”. 7

The privatization or the transfer of ownership and control of government assets to private investors 8 was required as part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank’s structural adjustment programs. The structural adjustment programs were enforced under the pressure of multinational institutions 9 to reduce government control and expenditure and integrate free-market reforms, such as privatization and free trade. 10 This paper will analyze the role of two multinational institutions, the World Bank who granted the Bolivian government a 600-Million-dollar development loan, 11 and Bechtel Enterprises, the US-based engineering and construction giant that took on the MISICUNI Dam project. 12. . .

Summary of the Water War in Cochabamba

In this section, a two-part summary of the events of the water war will be provided, reviewing the literature on the subject matter. The first part will review the involvement of the World Bank, the main events of the protests, and the outcome. The second part will summarize the successive dis putes with Bechtel Enterprises, the water war’s legacy, and its involvement in the anti-globalization movement.. . .

Part 1: The World Bank and the Water War

The structural adjustment program was introduced to Bolivia in 1985 as a response to the hyperinflation, excessive social expenditures, and lack of dependable savings, which the post-revolutionary period of military rule imparted onto the elected democratic government in 1982. 13 Specifically, the IMF and World Bank tested the “New Economic Policy” (NEP), under which Bolivia’s economic, political, and social reforms caused a significant reduction in mining, manufacturing, and service jobs, dismantled organized labor movements, and passed a controversial privatization program through Congress. 14

As part of this new privatization program, the Bolivian government introduced the SIRESE law in 1994 regarding resource management. This law trans- ferred “the economic functions of the state to the private sector and its regulative role to autarkic superintendencies”. 15 When it came to water management, the proposal for this law was redrafted in 1998. It threatened the cultural, economic, and social value of water for indigenous peoples, who declared water could not be a commercial object driven by market value. 16 So, NGOs and rural people assembled to protect the rights of indigenous peoples, who made up 62% of the population. 17 In 1999, the protestors issued a counterproposal to the Bolivian government that defended the communitarian water rights, rejected superintendency, and proposed creating a national water council. 18

However, the Bolivian government bypassed this debate and passed Law 2029, which allowed concessions and licenses to be sold to any legal institution, however, favored large enterprises and discouraged community management. 19 This law meant two things: first, any license or concession holder has exclusive rights to the water supply over a designated area; 20 and second, locals need to pay money to concession holders to use any water services, which included the local community wells, private wells, and even collected rainwater. 21

The water system in Cochabamba had been facing a crisis due to old infrastructure, population growth, and chronic poverty leading up to Law 2029. 22 In tandem with this law’s passing, through the municipal water company, SEMAPA, the Bolivian government signed a contract with Aguas del Tunari, a subsidiary of Bechtel Enterprises, behind closed doors in 1999. 23 This contract granted 40 years of exclusive rights to all water supply and services in the region of Cercado, where Cochabamba is located. 24 It also gave Bechtel Enterprises the responsibility of building the MISICU- NI dam, which was the government’s long-term solution to the water crisis. 25 The contract also guaranteed Bechtel and investors an average annual profit of 16%, calculated from the planned water rate increases. 26 This increased rate started the Water War in Cochabamba.

The protests began in January 2000 after the water rate increased up to 200% for the citizens of Cochabamba. 27 The rural and urban communities in Cochabamba formed the alliance Coordinadora Departamental en Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (Coordinadora) to channel their collective action against Bechtel and the Bolivian government. 28 On January 11th, 2000, citizens created road blockades demanding a reduction in water prices and nullification of Law 2029. 29 For three days, the city shut down, with thousands marching and protesting at Cochabamba’s central plaza. 30 On January 13th, Coordinadora leaders, headed by Oscar Olivera, met with representatives of the government and negotiated an investigation into the increased water prices, revision and change of the Law 2029, and a revision of the contract with Aguas del Tunari or Bechtel Enterprises. 31 The Coordinadora leaders gave the government three weeks, during which citizens ceased water payments and Bechtel Enterprises threatened to cut off the water. 32

On February 4th, 2000, a few hundred people planned a peaceful march at the central plaza to reaffirm their cause during lunch hour. However, a regional governor and then President Hugo Banzer’s appointee, Hugo Galindo, announced that the protest was illegal and sent a thousand-armed troops to repress the activism. 33 Cochabamba leaders saw this as a declaration of war as the government refused to diminish Bechtel’s water spikes and protected Bechtel. 34 This led to more factions of society joining the Coordinadora, from cocoa farmers like Evo Morales to political figures like Congressman Maldonado. 35 With the new partnerships, Coordinadora leaders acquired the contract with Bechtel and changed their strategies entirely after learning its exploitative details. They were now after an annulment of the contract with Bechtel and to get back the public ownership of their water supply. 36

On March 26th, 2000, the Coordinadora conducted survey research of almost fifty thousand respondents, whereby 99% declared the rejection of water rate increases, 96% affirmed the annulment of the contract with Bechtel, and 97% rejected the water privatization of Law 2029. 37 On April 4th, 2000, the final battle began. With road blockades, marches, and a city-wide shutdown, thousands gathered to demand the departure of Bechtel and the annulment of water privatization in Law 2029. However, on April 7th, government officials arrested Coordinadora leaders. The day after, President Banzer, a former dictator, declared a state of siege, where constitutional rights were curtailed, and armed forces opened fire with real ammunition. 38 Amidst the violence, an unarmed seventeen-year-old civilian, Victor Hugo Daza, was shot in the face by an army captain Robinson Iriarte de La Fuente. 39 A local television station broadcasted the bloody event, and the city stood at a standstill. 40

On April 9th, 2000, after the bloody event, Coordinadora’s supporters grew more resolute, and ten thousand protestors filled the streets with the chants for Bechtel to leave. 41 As a supporter claims, “Once you have already paid a certain price… you don’t back down for anything”. 42 On April 10th, representatives of Bechtel fled the country, and the Bolivian government announced the contract is annulled. 43 The government signed an agreement with the Coordinadora stating that SEMAPA will be in charge of the water systems, and the road blockades will be lifted once the Law 2029 is amended and proof of the annulment of the Bechtel contract is provided. 44 On April 11th, President Banzer revises the Law 2029, and on April 20th, the state of siege is lifted. 45

Part 2: Anti-Globalization Movement, Dispute with Bechtel, and the Legacy of the Water War

During the same week as the heated demonstrations in Cochabamba, another momentous anti-globalization protest against the World Bank and IMF was taking place in Washington, D.C. It was the first collective action since the Seattle protests six months earlier. Moreover, the news about the Cochabamba Water War broke out into the international forum from the updates provided by The Democracy Center, and Coordinadora’s leader Oscar Olivera was invited to speak at the protest. 46 Thousands of activists welcomed Olivera and President of the Council of Canadians, a highly esteemed water rights activist, Maude Barlow celebrated the Coordinadora’s success against Bechtel and named Olivera the hero from Bolivia. 47 Olivera later became an internationally known champion for the anti-globalisation movement. 48 The Bolivian water war became a media sensation with dozens of academics, filmmakers, and media channels reporting and investigating the case years after the victory was won. 49

However, the victory was short-lived in Bolivia. In November 2001, a year and a half after Bechtel Enterprises left Cochabamba, the US-based multinational organization filed for a demand of 50 million dollars to recover the costs and lost profits from the Bolivian government at the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 50 The ICSID was a strictly confidential international trade disputes court run by the World Bank. It was “created…to provide arbitration between countries and foreign investors”. 51 The Bolivian government offered to pay the cost of the actualized investment from Bechtel, which was less than 1 million dollars, but Bechtel refused and proceeded to court. 52 The Coordinadora, with its partners and supporters, launched an international campaign to suffocate Bechtel’s will to continue with its demand. 53 As a result, protesters worldwide from San Francisco to Amsterdam to Sri Lanka demanded Bechtel drop its charges as protestors directly petitioned Bechtel’s CEO, Riley Bechtel. 54 In January 2006, Bechtel dropped the charges with a settlement of 30 cents. 55 It was the first time a multinational organization like Bechtel dropped a case due to public pressure. 56

The water war left a robust democratic legacy for Bolivia and a widespread impact on the anti-globalization movement. 57 There was a clear social and political transition towards democracy when Coordinadora’s close ally and head of the Movement to- ward Socialism (MAS) party, Evo Morales, ran for the presidency and became the first indigenous president with a landslide victory in 2005. 58 This was a significant election because Morales represented the working class as well as the indigenous population, whose campaigns and policies reflected his indigenous values. 59 It showed that “a new form of democracy ‘from below’” 60 was taking root in Bolivian politics.

More globally, multiple groups from Atlanta to Uruguay to Stockton to India emerged to fight against water privatization, proceeding Cochabamba’s water war. 61 For instance, in 2002, in Uruguay, a coalition against water privatization, the National Commission in Defense of Water and Life (CN- DAV), was formed after the Uruguayan government and IMF sought to privatize the water systems. 62 Coordinadora leader Oscar Olivera consulted the CNDAV multiple times, exchanging ideas and strategies. 63 Their collaboration led to a constitutional amendment in Uruguay that “secures the protection and sovereignty of this natural resource [water] against attacks from transnational corporations transcending the national limits of Uruguay and setting a strong political precedent of the whole region.” 64

The Role of the World Bank and Bechtel in the Bolivian Grassroots Activism: Transitioning to an Anti-Globalisation Movement

This section answers the main research question of this paper: Chiefly, what role did the World Bank and Bechtel Enterprises play in the transition of grassroots activism in Cochabamba into the anti-globalization movement of Bolivia? It argues that coercive and extractive contracts, democratic organization and strategic resistance, and international alliances facilitated not only the success of the protest against privatization but also its proliferation into the anti-globalization movement.

The Bolivian water war escalated due to chronic water shortages, increased water prices, and a lack of support from the government. 65 On the surface, it appears as though Cochabamba citizens were fighting against the Bolivian government to rectify the Law 2029 and annul the contract with Bechtel Enterprises. However, upon closer inspection, the World Bank and Bechtel Entreprises had a substantial involvement and direct influence in the Bolivian government’s decision-making. 66 This correlation and the resulting proliferation of Bolivian grassroots activism into the anti-globalization movement will be examined through the following subsections: coercive and extractive contracts, democratic organization and strategic resistance, and international alliances.

Coercive and Extractive Contracts

Through the structural adjustment programs, the World Bank and IMF aspired to let the market manage the resources and systems of a state. 67 They assumed that states in the Global South were incapable of administering public services due to monopolies and high corruption and private corporations were better equipped to deliver more efficient services. 68 However, market regulation does not account for the more impoverished segment of the population, which would be left out by privatization, 69 and this became the seed of their demise in Bolivia, as demonstrated by the victory of the water war.

When the World Bank lent the Bolivian government 600 million dollars as a development loan to improve its infrastructure, it imposed privatization 70 as part of its main conditions vis-à-vis the structural adjustment program. The coercive nature of this contract is noted by scholars 71 as it forced the Bolivian government to choose between no loan and a de- velopment loan with disadvantageous conditions. In the context of the water crisis, the first option would lead to the continued suffering of numerous communities, e.g., Cochabamba, La Pez, and El Alto, from outdated infrastructure and a lack of water supply. The second option would benefit the upper-middle and upper class 72 but jeopardize the interests of the most vulnerable communities in the country, such as farmers, miners, and blue-collared workers, from a reduction in state expenditure and employment cuts. 73 Understandably, the Bolivian government signed the contract of the developmental loan.

This contract explicitly included the MISI- CUNI dam project, a plan to build a dam that would provide a long-term water supply to Cochabamba and neighboring areas. 74 The MISICUNI dam was estimated to cost 185-million-dollar and not many engineering companies volunteered to take up the project due to concerns with profitability and viability. 75 Since the developmental loan depended on implementing the MISICUNI project, the Bolivian government sought to speed up the process. 76 It opened the project proposal to negotiation, and Aguas del Tunari – the subsidiary of Bechtel Enterprises – was the first to show interest. 77 Eager to have an investor, the Bolivian government rushed to sign a heavily altered contract with Bechtel Enterprises that would also grant the exclusive right to own and provide water sources for 40 years. 78 In the alteration, Bechtel’s intention to gain profits from this project was evident. The water rate was exorbitantly increased, which the World Bank was aware of 79 and the social criteria that protected the rights of the water users were eliminated. 80 As former CEO Stephen Bechtel stated, the company was “more about making money, than making things”. 81

These coercive and extractive contracts diverted the head of the Bolivian government, or President Hugo Banzer, from functioning as an elected representative of Bolivian citizens to a willing hostage to the contracts’ conditions. However, the President was not powerless or innocent by any means. President Banzer proceeded against the consultation of his advisors when he sent armed troops and declared the state of siege, 82 illustrating to the people that the Bolivian government was protecting Bechtel, which fueled the protestors’ resolve to prevail even more. Nevertheless, certain actors within the Bolivian government also assisted the Coordinadora in developing its strategy against the Banzer administration and Bechtel. 83 This suggests the Bolivian government had internal conflicts that reflected its opposition to water privatization and its duty to comply with the conditions of the transnational agreements. This can be further justified by the government’s prompt annulment of the contract with Bechtel when its personnel left the country. Nevertheless, bound by the conditions of coercive and extractive contracts, the Bolivian government acted in defense of Bechtel Enterprises and as the hand of the World Bank and, by extension, neoliberal policies, which left a scarring distrust and disassociation of the protestors from the elected government. 84 This created the condition of a power vacuum for the diverse communities of Cochabamba to come together and democratically organize against a common enemy through the Coordinadora. This brings us to the next section.. . .

Democratic Organization and Strategic Resistance

The Coordinadora accomplished two key breakthroughs that led to the success of the water war. First, it facilitated the democratic organization of diverse groups of people under a common cause. Second, it encouraged strategic resistance against the Bolivian government and the contract with Bechtel. Before the Bolivian government enacted Law 2029 and Bechtel Enterprises came to Cochabamba, there was a distinct demographic split between the urban and rural communities, where they routinely fought over resources and job opportunities. 85 The rural community consisted of blue-collared workers, such as cocoa farmers and miners, who often had no access to the existing water systems, which ran through city centers. 86 The rural community had built up grievances with the local authorities, who following the government’s directives dug wells in the farmlands to provide water. 87 But soon, they dried up from heat waves, leaving the irrigation land useless 88 and the water crisis unresolved. On the other hand, the urban community consisted of white-collar workers who had access to the water systems, but the pipes carrying the water lost 55% due to leaks and “clandestine hookups”. 89 The latter group was aggravated by the Bolivian government’s employment cuts due to neoliberal policies. 90

Even so, these groups had common denominators: their desire for Bechtel to leave Cochabamba and their indigenous heritage that valued water as a human right rather than a commodity. 91 Their collective action through the Coordinadora was characterized by these commonalities. 92 And factions like university students, factory union workers, environmental groups, members of Congress, lawyers, and engineers had joined to defend their collective right to water by the final battle. 93 The Coordinadora achieved this by holding town meetings or assemblies that ensured equal participation. 94 Up to 70000 people came to voice their opinions on critical decisions through votes in these meetings, and this led to the mass survey conducted to validate their collective action. 95 The organization of Coordinadora set the foundation for democratic, bottom-up governance as a form of resistance against the top-down management of the World Bank, Banzer’s administration, and neoliberal policies. This later enabled fellow proponent Evo Morales to run for President in 2005.

Moreover, the Coordinadora used strategic tactics to resist the passive and violent repression from the Bolivian government. It used road blockades, marches, plaza occupations, and negotiations as its core strategies. As Bjork-James argues, road blockades have been a successful form of protest in labor protests, political conflicts, indigenous rights movements, and environmental and antiwar movements around the globe. 96 While not a novel tactic, the blockades used by Coordinadora were creative and effective. To prevent vehicles from passing, the protesters left “blankets of spikes and nails on roads”. 97 Alternatively, they built rock walls to hide behind to collect and throw back the tear gas canisters at the police. 98 Finally, tens of protestors called water warriors would run across the road edge-to-edge to stop police from advancing further, creating a makeshift barrier. 99 In addition, their negotiation tactics were noted to be successful because of their technical accuracy and academic literacy, which demonstrated concrete knowledge of the water issues within Bolivia. 100 This was thanks to the experts supporting their movements through alliances and partnerships, which the next section will examine .

International Alliances

Through its alliance with the anti-globalization movement, the water war in Cochabamba forced the World Bank to reconsider and adapt their recommendations on water privatization to become more open and inclusive. 101 Arguably the strongest alliances to the protestors in the water war were The Democracy Center and the proponents of the Anti-Globalization Movement. The Democracy Center is a U.S-based organization dedicated to foster local and global democracy by supporting grassroots activism. 102 It was the main on-ground international news outlet that informed the world about the water war. 103 The Democracy Center aided the war in two crucial ways. First, it disseminated accurate information to the international community via newsletters, which was especially critical during the state of siege, when all television and radio broadcasts were blocked. 104 The newsletters gained more traction and attention when the Democracy Center’s reports debunked President Banzer’s foreign press release stating that the protesters were drug traffickers who were out to destabilize the government. 105 The international community could clearly see that the government was using violence to repress peaceful protestors through the Democracy Center’s updates of the media footage of police brutality and Victor Hugo Daza’s assassination. 106

Moreover, the use of the Internet and media allowed the story to reach beyond borders and gain more allies because it created momentum and raised awareness. 107 It authorized proponents of the anti-globalization movement across the world to condemn the Banzer administration for human rights violations and to participate in campaigns against the Bechtel dispute. 108 The Democracy center reports that over 500 people petitioned the CEO of Bechtel to drop the 50-million-dollar charge against Bolivia, 15 people chained themselves to the Bechtel headquarters in San Francisco, and Dutch activists renamed the street of Bechtel headquarters, Victor Hugo Daza Street. 109 These modes of nonviolent protest and nonviolent intervention, particularly the signed public statements (petition), communication with a wider (newsletter) audience, and physical interventions (stand-in protest), pressured Bechtel Enterprises to finally withdraw its demands.

The alliance with the proponents of the transnational anti-globalization movement also legitimized the water war’s victory as a collective triumph against neoliberal policies. After the water war and protest in Washington D.C, where the leader of Coordinadora Oscar Olivera was welcomed as a water rights activist, the World Bank and IMF were under intense scrutiny for the efficacy and implementation of their policies. 110 In 2000, the President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, and chief water official, John Briscoe were questioned about the water war in Cochabamba and forced to defend their water privatization policies. 111.

Part 3: Conclusion

Overall, this paper has aimed to identify the role of the World Bank and Bechtel Enterprises in the transition of grassroots activism in Cochabamba into the anti-globalization movement. After a comprehensive summary of the water war in Cochabamba, it established three main findings. Firstly, coercive and extractive contracts from the World Bank and Bechtel Enterprises set the foundation for the Bolivian government’s actions against the interests of its citizens. In turn, this propelled the protestors to collective action through the Coordinadora, who united diverse factions of society and left robust democratic governance leading to increased alliances and expert strategies against the Bolivian government. Thirdly, the alliances with the Democracy Center and proponents of the anti-globalization movement enabled the Coordinadora to win against the Bechtel dispute through an international campaign and triggered the World Bank to review and revise its neoliberal policies.

Discussion on Water Management

The Vice-President of the World Bank, Ismail Serageldin, stated that wars in the 21st century will be about water. 112 The accelerated climate change from pollution, deforestation, droughts, and urbanization diminishes the scarce freshwater sources, recyclable only through rainwater. 113 In 2017, more than 884 million people did not have access to safe drinking water, according to the WHO and UNICEF. 114 To respond to this scarcity, the World Bank and IMF implemented water privatization. 115 In theory, through privatization, water would be priced as a commodity according to its economic and environmental cost and be managed by private companies who would be directly accountable to their customers and stakeholders. 116 However, in practice, many countries in the Global South were apprehensive about the neoliberal approach because it meant that many citizens would not be able to afford the price of water. 117 Citizens of Global South countries approached water management from the perspective of “water as a non-substitutable resource essential to life”. 118 In this frame, access to water should be recognized as a human right, not a commodity.

The water war of Cochabamba is a clear example of this debate of water as a human right versus a commodity. The rationale behind the argument water as a human right is built upon two pillars: firstly, water is a non-substitutable, essential good for life, and secondly, many human rights mandated by the UN depends on the supply and access to water, such as the right to food, health, and life. 119 Bakker explains that after water rights movements against privatization, like in Bolivia and Uruguay, central development agencies, such as the UNDP and WHO, began to support their movement as it would propel governments to prioritize water issues and fulfill basic water needs more efficiently. 120

While the support of these international organizations is a significant breakthrough for water rights activists, much progress still needs to be made. For instance, the skeptics and proponents of water privatization critique that water as a human right will not produce practical changes to improve water equality and sustainable management. 121 Private companies motivated by profit (like Bechtel Enterprises) will undoubtedly manage water systems less sustainably than the public sector, whose main agenda is to ensure everyone has access to water (like the Coordinadora). However, using water as a free resource could lead to faster degradation of the earth’s fresh water supply, which we all depend on.

The solution for future of water management needs to incorporate sustainability while recognizing that water is a human right. One such proposal comes from Bakker, who argues that the alter-globalization movement provides viable alternative models to the neoliberal privatization for water management. 122 As opposed to anti-globalization, alter-globalization is a social movement that supports global cooperation but values environmental rights and civil liberties. The main alter-globalization alternatives include mutualization of asset ownership, where the majority of shares are owned by users in a private company, and public-public partnerships, where two non-governmental organizations from different countries collaborate to exchange expertise and resources. 123 Such partnerships could feasibly provide the first steps towards balancing the need for long-term sustainability with access to water’s existence as a human right.

Endnotes

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47. Shultz, Jim. “The Cochabamba water revolt and its aftermath.”: 27. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Dangl, B., 2007. The Price of Fire: Water War in Cochabamba. 51. Shultz, Jim. “The Cochabamba water revolt and its aftermath.”: 30. 52. Norris, Amanda L., and Katina E. Metzidakis. “Public protests, private contracts: confidentiality in ICSID arbitration and the Cochabamba water war.” Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 15 (2010): 31-76. 53. Shultz, Jim. “The Cochabamba water revolt and its aftermath.” 54. Shultz, Jim. “The Cochabamba water revolt and its aftermath.”: 32-41. 55. Dangl, B., 2007. The Price of Fire: Water War in Cochabamba. 56. The Democracy Center. n.d. Bechtel VS Bolivia — THE DEMOCRACY CENTER. [online] Available at: <https://www.democracyctr.org/bechtel-vs-bolivia> [Accessed 5 April 2021]. ; Wagner, A. and Schultz, J., 2006. Bechtel Surrenders in Bolivia Water Revolt Case. [online] Earthjustice. 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