2017 Undergraduate Journal of Political Science

California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

Journal of Political Science Spring 2017 Volume 2, Number 11

Letter from the Editor

Dear Political Science majors,

It is that time of the year again- when seniors say their bittersweet farewells, when the last exam has been taken, and when a summer full of possibility begins. My time as a Political Science major at Cal Poly Pomona has been a very rewarding experience. I have been privileged to be part of the featured organizations in this journal such as the Political Science Club and the National Model United Nations team. However, I would say my proudest achievement at Cal Poly Pomona has to be starting up the California State Polytechnic University, Pomona Undergraduate Journal of Political Science.

This journal has come a long way since its inception as a simple idea back in Fall of 2015. For those of you are not familiar with the journal’s beginnings, the journal was inspired by the National Political Science Honor Society Pi Sigma Alpha’s Undergraduate Journal of Politics which is published biannually during the Fall and Spring. The vision for this journal was to provide Cal Poly Pomona students with the opportunity to build up their resumes and examples of well-written papers by their peers.

Unlike the Pi Sigma Alpha Journal, however, this journal is campus-specific and will be published in Spring for each academic year. The first edition of the journal was published in Spring 2016 and can be accessed on the department website.

I am proud to present the second issue of the journal as well as the next editor-in-chief, Kristen Khair. I am sure Kristen will do an amazing job overseeing the journal next year!

Thank you to everyone who has contributed to the journal in any way and helped it flourish.This journal would not have been possible without the students who submitted their papers, the editorial board who volunteered their precious time to peer review those papers, and the Political Science Department’s continued support for the journal especially Professor Chaturvedi for his tireless efforts in ensuring the journal’s success. Last but certainly not least, I would also like to profusely thank Jane Pojowa for her invaluable contributions to the journal over the past two years. Without her artistic vision and editing skills, this journal would not look as amazing as it does!

My hope for this journal is to inspire students to put more time and effort in writing papers for their Political Science courses so they can see their hard work being paid off as well as their paper being published in the journal. If any students are interested in submitting their paper or being part of the editorial board for the next issue, they can contact Kristen by email at cpppoliticalsciencejournal@gmail.com for more information.

Best of luck to all of your future endeavors and congratulations to the Political Science majors who are graduating!

Warm regards, Tara Kwan

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Letter from the Incoming Editor-in-Chief: Hello, My name is Kristen Khair, I would like to introduce myself as the new editor-in-chief of the California State Polytechnic University, Pomona Undergraduate Journal of Political Science journal. I am going into my 4th year as a political science major with a minor in philosophy. I plan on going to law school in 2018 with an emphasis in criminal law. I want to encourage all of you to submit your papers next year. I will be sending out emails and flyers so please keep a lookout. I look forward to reading all of your papers and working with you in the future! If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at khkhair@cpp.edu or cpppoliticalsciencejournal@gmail.com.

Š 2017 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission of the editors and the faculty advisor of the California Polytechnic State University, Pomona Undergraduate Journal of Political Science.

The California Polytechnic State University, Pomona Undergraduate Journal of Politics is copyrighted by Cal Poly Pomona.

The content of all papers is copyrighted by the respective authors. The Department of Political Science cannot and will not be held liable for the actions of the California Polytechnic State University, Pomona Undergraduate Journal of Political Science.

All assertions of fact and statements of opinion are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Political Science, the Editorial Board, the Advisory Board, the Faculty Advisor, Cal Poly Pomona, or its faculty and administration.

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Letter from the Faculty Advisor

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t Cal Poly Pomona, our motto is “learn by doing.” In the Department of Political Science, we strive to give our students every possible experience that will help them develop successful careers and create well rounded scholars.

We offer over 50 undergraduate courses in six different subfields (American Politics, Comparative Politics, International Relations, Public Law, Political theory, and Public Administration). In an effort to provide our students with the experience needed to succeed in graduate programs in law, master’s programs, doctoral programs, or the job force, our courses focus on the teacher-scholar model, encouraging our students to engage in scholarly research.

In our Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, we showcase some of the best articles written by our students, exemplifying the various areas of studies offered to students here at CPP. While the articles published in the journal tackle some of the most salient issues in the discipline, we also hope that these articles serve as examples for our continuing students on what successful academic scholarship looks like.

The Undergraduate Journal is a particularly impressive endeavor in that it is student run. As such, we should recognize the editor-in-chief, Tara Kwan and publication designer Jane Pojawa.

Both have served for two years, since the journal’s inception in 2015 and are now graduates of CPP! While we are sad to see them leave, we are excited for what is on the horizon for both of them. We should also recognize the hard-working editorial board composed of political science students who gave their time to offer feedback on submitted articles. A special thanks to Dr. Mario Guerrero, who served as the faculty advisor at the journal’s inception. Finally, a special thanks to Dr. Jill Hargis, our department chair who has supported the journal’s goals, Ms. Kim Alm, the department’s administrative coordinator, and all of the faculty of the political science department who inspire our students.

Dr. Neil S. Chaturvedi Faculty Advisor Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Cal Poly Pomona

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CONTENTS JOURNAL 7 LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK AND THE TEA PARTY

Scholars of political science have long debated the efficacy of legislative output in times of unified and divided party governance. One possible variable contributing to legislative gridlock is the collective actions of intraparty caucuses. Thomas Davis has conducted a quantitative analysis of Tea Party members in the U.S. House of Representatives under conditions of unified and divided government. His findings suggest that ideological caucuses do have an effect on legislative outputs.

27 OBAMACARE

»» p.7

It is fair to say that the average person’s life is busy and fastpaced, forcing people to develop an opinion on a hot topic without the time to gather the necessary information to fully understand the issues involved. Aubrey Ackermann focuses on the Affordable Care Act and finds that political perception, as determined by party affiliation, is the best indicator in predicting a person’s opinion on the Affordable Care Act.

51 S ELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS

»» p.51

»» p.27

The number of self-represented litigants has increased over time which creates several problems. Where will these self-represented litigants receive assistance? What resources are provided to them? Annaliz Loera uses her personal experience at the Pomona Self-Help Center to help answer these questions as well as to determine the effectiveness of the Pomona Self-Help Center in assisting these litigants.

62 CALIFORNIA’S LANGUAGE EDUCATION DEBATE

California is a multicultural society and diversity is one of its strengths. However, this diversity can be an obstacle in its educational institutions. Stephanie Burdo investigates how language education is taught in California’s K-12 schools and the effect of past as well as recently passed legislation on promoting English learning.

»» p.62

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CO N T E N T S

79 CALIFORNIA DROUGHT

Severe water shortages in California due to drought conditions are further compounded by environmental regulations. Joshua Ebiner examines the impact of the drought as well as current laws on water supply and infrastructure to make the appropriate policy recommendations.

107 ECOTERRORISM

»» p. 79

From Environmental Justice Advocate to Terrorist: who are the people who take their passion for the environment too far?

More than 40 years after the publication of Edward Albee’s “The Monkey Wrench Gang,” extreme environmental activism appears to be in decline. But with new challenges that may be changing.

What constitutes domestic terrorism as it applies to activists? By Jane Pojowa.

132 COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

»» p.132

The United States military has pursued counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies in targeting the terrorist and insurgent groups such as al Qaeda present in the Middle East. In the short-term, these tactics have proved to be successful but questions remain about their long-term effectiveness. Mirette Morcos explores the legality, ethics, and effectiveness of the Obama administration’s counterinsurgency policies.

148 HUMAN RIGHTS »» p. 165

»» p.107

There is an ongoing debate between universalism and relativism which highlights the never-ending dilemma regarding absolute morality versus cultural relativism. Sumaya Bamakhrama analyzes the various definitions of slavery in order to determine that universal human rights laws are not globally applicable in their nature, concluding that cultural practices must be considered in determining human rights.

165 CLOSING THE GENDER GAP

»» p.148

Women make up roughly half of the world’s population but they are not adequately represented in government. Utilizing country case studies, Tara Kwan analyzes the factors leading to high or low female-held political offices at the national level and the policies which can be implemented to increase the number of female officeholders. Pictured, Tammy Duckworth, US Senator for Illinois.

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Divided We Stalemate: Legislative Gridlock and the Tea Party in the U.S. House of Representatives

Thomas Davis California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

Scholars of political science have long debated the efficacy of legislative output in times of unified and divided party governance. Scholarly literature on the issue has no resounding conclusion as to the effects of divided governance on legislative outputs, leading scholarly research to examine a caveat of different variables associated with gridlock. One possible variable contributing to legislative gridlock is the collective actions of intraparty caucuses. A quantitative analysis of Tea Party members in the U.S. House of Representatives under conditions of unified and divided government suggests that ideological caucuses do have an effect on legislative outputs. Quantitative analysis of varied roll call votes (procedural, passage and Senate related) on tax related bills suggests that in times of a divided Congress, Tea Party members vote differently on issues of tax policy. However, the presence of divided governance has not proven to be a strong indicator of divergent voting patterns among House Tea Party members. These findings suggest that gridlock will continue to be a product of a multitude of variables instead of the simple presence of divided governance.

C

oncerned citizens throughout the nation are growingly disappointed by the rise of legislative gridlock within the U.S. Congress; leading to the lowest approval ratings Congress has ever received (McCarthy, 2016). As legislative gridlock becomes more commonplace, many scholars of political science have reasoned that split party control of the Legislative branch has become an important indicator for discrepancies in legislative outputs (Cox & McCubbins, 2005). Terminology such as “unified,’’ and “divided” government is now commonplace in the scholarly literature as the two-party system has become increasingly polarized and less willing to pass

laws under bi-partisan support (Binder, 2003; Mayhew, 1993). This thesis attempts to explore and contribute to the unified and divided government debate by analyzing the House Tea Party as an example of how intraparty ideological caucuses may be an additional variable contributing to legislative gridlock.

To further explain the causes of legislative stalemate, this thesis will analyze tax policy roll call voting patterns amongst House Tea Party Caucus members under conditions of a unified or divided Congress. Passing legislation is an extremely complex accomplishment and there are a wide variety of factors pointed to by scholars that have partially explained the reason for gridlock. This thesis mere-

Created by Thomas Davis, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona for his senior thesis project. Correspondence concerning this research paper should be addressed to Thomas Davis, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, (909) 263-6730. Email: SBDThomas@outlook.com Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2017. Pp. 7–26. ©2017, Political Science Department, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona.

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8 ly offers an additional piece of evidence for contributing factors to legislative gridlock by examining the role of the House Tea Party Caucus during the 111th, 112th, and 113th congressional sessions. This additional piece of evidence will advance the scholarly literature on unified and divided governance and its effect on legislative gridlock by attempting to demonstrate that small ideologically driven caucuses are causing additional stress to the legislative process, thereby reducing legislative productivity.

The research question proposed by this thesis is, does the House Tea Party Caucus affect legislative output in times of unified or divided party control of The United States Congress? Given that passing legislation mandates a majoritarian vote, coalitions are constructed to both pass and prevent laws (Cox & McCubbins, 2005). Therefore, the collective actions of an ideologically driven intraparty caucus like the House Tea Party could have profound effects on legislative outputs. The logic behind this research question lies in the coalition strength of the House Tea Party; their strength in numbers can create profound political power that may lead to legislative inefficiencies.

In the case of a divided legislature, it is reasonable to believe that ideological differences will increase the amount of times House Tea Party members will cast a vote against the majority of House Republicans, thereby satisfying their ideological extremism.

To successfully examine the research question and argument proposed, this thesis is composed of five separate sections. Firstly, a vast and in depth literature review of the scholarly debate on divided government provides foundational understanding and also defines the varied terminology utilized in this thesis.

Secondly, the logic behind this thesis and the various hypotheses formulated to scientifically approach this research question are outlined. Thirdly, the methodology developed to test this research question and argument will be disclosed to fully understand how this quantitative study was formulated. Fourthly, the results of the various statistical tests employed in this thesis will be explained and interpreted to understand how it relates to the research question and argument proposed. Lastly, the conclusion section will explain the implications of the findings for both the scholarly community and the Tea Party itself.

Literature Review This literature review examines a wide range of scholars, both in the United States and abroad, that have spent considerable time and resources to studying gridlock (Baumgartner, Brouard, Grossman, Lazardeux, & Moody, 2014; Binder, 2003; Coleman,

THOMAS DAVIS 1999; Colomer, 2005; Cox & McCubbins, 2005; Cox & McCubbins, 2007; Edwards, Barrett, & Peake, 1997; Fiorina, 1996; Hughes & Carlson, 2015; Mayhew 2005; Rogers, 2005; Thorson, 1998). The scholarly literature on gridlock, under the conditions of unified or divided party control, has been brought to center stage by David Mayhew (2005) and Sarah Binder (2003). Their seminal works have sparked a multitude of scholars from across the globe to study legislative gridlock in the United States. The expansive literature on unified and divided governance and its effect on gridlock have been inconsistent because of various foundational definitions, methodological discrepancies, and varying models of examination, but have converged on the acceptance of exogenous variables as alternative explanations for gridlock.

Gridlock Defined?

A wide array of scholarly interest on the topic of gridlock has produced more confusion than understanding; this is most evident in the debate over terminology. Foundationally, the definition of gridlock has been debated amongst prominent scholars and the incoherent agreement on an absolute definition has produced inconsistencies in their findings. In a well-structured debate, the definitions have to be agreed upon by all parties to progress, but this condition has not been satisfied in the debate over legislative gridlock, thereby leaving the definition to be interpreted as scholars choose.

David Mayhew (2005) and Sarah Binder (2003) are the defining scholars in the debate over the effect unified or divided governance has on legislative gridlock. These two scholars have laid the groundwork for the debate for future scholarly work, but this is problematic because these two scholars cannot even agree on similar terms and definitions (Binder, 2003; Mayhew, 2005). Mayhew (2005) defines gridlock as a consequence of congressional inactivity in a variety of areas such as investigations and lawmaking.

Binder (2003) argues that gridlock is the “share of salient issues on the nation’s agenda that is left in limbo at the close of a Congress.” Evidential in these two formative works is an apparent inability to agree to simple terms, and this has become problematic for scholars currently examining gridlock because as the terms and definitions change, so do the findings.

Other scholars in the arena define gridlock in a wide variety of ways, for example, David Jones (2001) argues that legislative gridlock is simply “how different partisan configurations affect the relative inability to enact significant proposals on the policy agenda.” Jones (2001) argues that gridlock

LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK is a product of partisan polarization, which fits well with party models of legislative productivity. Additionally, scholars such as Tyler Hughes and Deven Carlson (2015) argue that gridlock is a simple delay in the legislative process, that gridlock is defined as the inability for committees and parties to pass laws on the legislative agenda due to procedural considerations. Manabu Saeki (2009) counters this definition saying that gridlock is simply “the inability to change policy.”

It is abundantly clear that gridlock in the scholarly literature is not well defined. Prominent scholars with the highest levels of interest and credibility cannot seem to agree to the terms associated with the debate itself, and this becomes problematic when examining the findings of fellow scholars. Followers of David Mayhew (1993) and Sarah Binder (2003) have attempted to redefine the term gridlock to expand its understanding, only to add more confusion to the debate. Further examination of the scholarly literature suggests that the disagreement on definitive terminologies shapes the methods and findings to be inconclusive and inconsistent. Years of study and findings conclude that scholars are interested in legislative gridlock as a system of inactivity, which gridlock is mostly concentrated around the activity of lawmaking and that gridlock is best explained by the result of various influences or variables. Gridlock is best defined when simplified to the reductionist definition provided by Saeki (2009), whereby gridlock is simply the “inability to change policy,” thereby useful and employed by this thesis.

Divided vs. Unified Governance: The Spectrum Just as the definition of gridlock has not been completely agreed upon, the debate over what divided and unified government is, becomes equally inconsistent. Prominent scholars have chosen to focus on a multi-branch approach of divided government (Baumgartner et al., 2014; Binder, 2003; Colomer, 2005; Edwards, Barrett, & Peake, 1997; Fiorina, 1996; Mayhew 2005; Rogers, 2005), while other scholars strictly focus on one branch (Coleman, 1999; Cox & McCubbins, 2005; Hughes & Carlson, 2015; Thorson, 1998). This wide range of approaches to the study of unified and divided governance and its effects on legislative gridlock, demonstrates the enormous spectrum under which scholarly research can deviate, thereby causing large inconsistencies in their findings.

David Mayhew’s (2005) formative work Divided We Govern Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investi-

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gations, 1946-2002 monopolized the scholarly debate on the effects of unified or divided governance on gridlock. Mayhew (2005) defines divided government along an inter-branch model by which there can be three conditions of governance. The party make-up of each chamber of the legislative branch as well as the White House is the foundation for determining unified or divided control (Mayhew, 2005). This model is replicated multiple times throughout the scholarly literature by scholars such as Binder (2003), Rogers (2005), and a wide variety of others (Fiorina, 1996; Edwards et al., 1997; Kelly 1993), demonstrating that divided and unified control of governance can be analyzed under the lens of inter-branch relationships.

Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins offer a sporadically different approach to the study of legislative action (2005). As a competing area of focus, Cox and McCubbins argue that unified or divided governance can be best focused on in the context of intra-branch activities (2007).In agreement with their decision to focus on only one branch of government, there is a wide range of literature that focuses on the legislative branch as the sole lens by which unified and divided government should be studied. Scholars such as David Brady and Craig Volden (2006) extend the importance of the intra-branch debate of divided government. Intra-branch models have garnered substantial support in scholarly research, even being independently analyzed in prominent works focused on inter-branch studies, because the legislative branch is such an integral component of legislative gridlock.

These two contrasting models demonstrate how diverse and exhaustive the literature on the subject of unified and divided governance is, which speaks to the complexity of unified or divided governances effect on legislative gridlock.

Evidently, the debate over unified and divided control of government has not been cohesive or exhaustive. Many scholars have chosen to focus on one of many models as a means to explain gridlock within the context of unified or divided control, but the same foundational definition problems exist in the debate about what model is most fruitful in isolating gridlock. Although this is problematic for finding consensus as to what model of divided or unified government is actually noteworthy of study, it demonstrates that the scholarly community is continually trying to investigate, research, and inform on the complexities of gridlock in the United States and abroad. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the party model focused on the division of the legislature has produced the most fruitful and promising results in isolating gridlock, thus framing the model utilized in this thesis.

10 Methodologies and Confounding Results Academic studies on legislative gridlock under conditions of unified or divided party control have not been an exception to the scientific discourse on methodology. Because methodological decisions are so vital to producing accurate results, many scholars in political science have taken considerable time to admonish fellow scholars for constructing poorly designed research methods (Binder, 2003; Saeki, 2009).

This is most evident in the major debate between David Mayhew (2005) and Sarah Binder (2003).

David Mayhew’s (2005) methodological decisions have been both contested and praised in the scholarly community (Binder, 2003; Coleman, 1999; Edwards et al., 1997; Howell, Adler, Cameron, & Riemann, 2000; Kelly, 1993). The significance of Mayhew’s (2005) contribution to this scholarly debate was the use of a two-sweep approach in identifying legislation considered salient and lasting through time.

However, large bodies of scholars have argued that the legislation has been cherry picked, but that the laws chosen are inherently biased by media and expert opinions (Binder, 2003; Kelly, 1993; Howell et al., 2000). Not only was bias an issue, but researchers such as Sarah Binder (2003) identified the problem of excluding legislation that was never passed by the legislature. In other words, under David Mayhew’s (2005) research design, there was no denominator to create a percentage value for each congressional sessions legislative efficacy (Binder, 2003). These methodological designs may seem trivial to the average layman, but the results of these research designs are substantially different, thereby emphasizing the importance of creating a strong methodological foundation when pursuing scientific research.

Building on the ideas and works of Sarah Binder (2003) and David Mayhew (2005), countless scholars have reevaluated or completely renewed the methodological choices made in the past to give more accurate and fruitful results. A defining example is a study conducted by William Howell et al. (2000), in which his research team utilized a similar approach to David Mayhew (2005), only to find that unified or divided control of the branches resulted in mixed significance on legislative outputs. These findings are contrary to Mayhew’s and it suggests that if the data is utilized differently, then the results can also differ (Howell et al., 2000).

Although there will continue to be healthy scientific discourse on methodology, the importance is to note that research design is vital in producing sound and accurate conclusions about political phenomena. Scholars have debated for a substantial amount

THOMAS DAVIS of time as to what methods work best and what processes or branches should be included in the dataset. Just as the definition of gridlock and the spectrum of unified and divided government have been confusing and inconsistent in their terminology, it appears that methodology is also another ill-defined component of the unified and divided government debate. To counteract methodological discrepancies, this thesis employs established datasets provided by Poole-Rosenthal (2014), as well as data from the U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.). Simultaneously, this thesis uses methods similar to Poole-Rosenthal (2014) when collecting data on tax policies, thereby making the findings more methodologically consistent with other scholars.

Party and Spatial Models of Gridlock Conventional wisdom would conclude that divided governance was a necessary and sufficient condition for gridlock, but to explore this popular opinion, scholars have accepted two general models to isolate gridlock, they are the party and spatial models. Similar to the unending debate on terminology or methods, scholars deviate on what models are best suited for explaining and examining legislative gridlock in times of unified or divided party control.

Party models of governance emphasize the importance of legislative coalitions (Cox & McCubbins, 2005; Cox and McCubbins, 2007). In both Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, and Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives, Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins (2005) argue that legislative coalitions are the solutions to the inherent majoritarian obstacles outlined in the Constitution. Parties act as “legislative cartels” by which individual members sacrifice small amounts of power to party leaders for a wide variety of benefits such as a cohesive partisan legislative agenda, preferable committee assignments, and logrolling opportunities (Cox & McCubbins, 2005). This party model suggests that in an effort to overcome gridlock, party unity and party brand is key (Cox and McCubbins, 2005), thereby deterring party fracturing. This is supported by scholars such as John Coleman (1999), who argues that intraparty conflicts under unified or divided government conditions do have significance on legislative outputs.

Gregory Thorson (1998) would agree with Coleman (1999) and Cox and McCubbins (2007) in that super-majoritarian parties have the clear advantage to passing partisan slanted legislation, and that divided control does, in fact, reduce legislative productivity.

The party model is further supported by scholars such

LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK as Tyler Hughes and Deven Carlson (2015) who find that divided governance allows for a greater delay in the passage of salient or impactful legislation. The party model holds fruitful results for isolating the effects of legislative gridlock, and it supports the conventional wisdom that unified or divided control governments do actually affect legislative outputs.

Taken together, these scholars have seemingly produced a strong case for the party model as an explanatory factor of legislative gridlock; however, many other scholars have argued that parties play no role in solving gridlock and that individual preferences of pivotal voters are seemingly more important.

Spatial modeling of legislative preferences has been of common interest in recent academic scholarship. This model proposes that party control is a nominal contributor to legislative gridlock and that individual preferences of congressman and the president are the real sources of gridlock (Brady & Volden, 2006; Saeki, 2009). Taking into consideration the institutional factors that contribute to gridlock, such as the three-pivot voters (majority, cloture, and veto) (Brady & Volden, 2006), spatial models add considerable depth to the debate of legislative gridlock under unified or divided party control. Among the most prominent scholars in spatial modeling, David Brady and Craig Volden (2006) argue that legislative gridlock is the product of the inability to elect new members of congress with differing preferences. Other scholars in the spatial model argue that the pivotal voters are the most important in passing legislation, and therefore deserve the most attention (Saeki, 2009). The spatial model for explaining gridlock as outside the forces of unified or divided governance is counterintuitive to the findings other scholars and has thus sparked considerable debate about which model best isolates gridlock.

Researchers of American politics cannot seem to agree upon anything, it appears that they are not only widely differing in terminology and methodological considerations; they cannot seem to agree on what model explains or isolates gridlock best. This again is problematic because it offers multiple explanations to gridlock from different angles. In the aggregate, it appears that the scholarly community is again unable to come to a consensus on the best model to analyze legislative gridlock; this only heightens the perplexity of focus for future research. This thesis explores the actions of intraparty ideological caucuses by examining the House Tea Party; therefore, the party model of governance will be employed because it emphasizes the coalition forming ability that House Tea Party members have.

11 Additional Variables

Analyzing the extensive scholarly research on the topic of gridlock under conditions of unified or divided party control has produced questionable results. It appears that most scholars have agreed that multiple variables are intricately intertwined with the variables of unified and divided party control, leading to the discovery of additional variables. Factors originating in the institutional framework of the United States branches, or variables outside the elitist system, have had varying effects on legislative gridlock and has thus led to discrepancies in the literature as to how unified or divided control have solitary causation for gridlock.

David Mayhew (1991) and Sarah Binder (2003) finally agree that outside variables such as the public mood or public opinion can be partial explanations for the passage of salient laws under conditions of unified or divided party control. These previously competing scholars converge to suggest that individual electoral incentives and institutional factors have tangible impacts on legislative productivity (Binder, 2003; Mayhew, 2005). However, Sarah Binder (2003) and David Mayhew (1991) are not the only scholars that suggest other variables as components of legislative gridlock, many in the scholarly community agree that electoral pressures, intraparty fracturing, party polarization, individual polarization of congressman, presidential policy agendas, and electoral outcomes have played substantial roles in legislative gridlock (Coleman, 1999; Colomer, 2005; Cox & McCubbins, 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2014; Brady & Volden, 2006; Edwards et al., 1997; Howell et al., 2000; Jones, 2001; Saeki, 2009). The convergence of the scholarly literature suggests that gridlock is far more complex than previously imagined. For this reason, this thesis examines the actions of the House Tea Party as an additional variable contributing to legislative gridlock under the conditions of unified or divided governance.

Conclusion Definitions are of vital importance to the debate on legislative gridlock, just as the terms and definitions change in the literature, so do their findings. It is best for future scholarly research to agree that the simplistic definition provided by Manabu Saeki (2009) may be the best definition of gridlock because it allows for a multiplicity of variables to be considered, therefore making the definition useful to this thesis. The debate over the effects of unified or divided governance on legislative gridlock has produced several models by

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THOMAS DAVIS

Hypotheses which scholars have examined gridlock. It is clear that there is no scholarly consensus as to which According to scholars who study legislative approach may be the most fruitful in explaining or gridlock, there are a wide variety of angles by which solving legislative gridlock under conditions of unito examine legislative efficacy under conditions of fied or divided party control. However, simplicity unified or divided governance. What has been reis employed in this thesis by using an intra-branch duced from the scholarly discourse is that the causapproach, thereby eliminating variables from the Exes of lackluster legislative efficiencies are due to ecutive, making the quantitative analysis solely foa wide range of variables.

This thesis aims to concused on the effect the House Tea Party has on the tribute to this scholarly literature by arguing that legislative productivity of the legislator. the collective actions of the House Tea Party are an Inconsistency in the scholarly literature is only additional factor that may raise the rate of gridlock furthered by the methodological choices made by within a divided legislature.

Intraparty ideological scholars in the field. Even when utilizing similar data caucuses are formed within the legislator to unite sets, it is clear that variations in research design have individuals with common interest and political phiproduced mixed results on the effects of unified or losophy in an effort to shape laws in their favor.

The divided party control on legislative gridlock. ThereTea Party is one of many ideologically driven caufore, this thesis utilizes both established datasets as cuses in Congress that has been formed in an effort well as similar methods from prominent scholars to provide more consistencies in the scientific process.

This thesis attempts to add an additional contributor to legislative gridlock by examining the voting Hypotheses: behaviors of the House Tea Party H1: There is a difference in House Tea Party procedural opposition Caucus on tax policies under the condition of a unified or divided votes within the condition of a unified or divided government. government.

Party models and spatial models H2: There is a difference in House Tea Party passage opposition votes of studying gridlock have added within the condition of a unified or divided government. considerable depth to the debate over the effects of unified and diH3: There is a difference in House Tea Party Senate related opposition vided party control of government. votes within the condition of a unified or divided government.

These two models are fundamentally contrary to one another and H4: There is a difference in the way House Tea Party members vote suggest that scholars have yet with the majority of House Republicans on tax policies then they do on again been unable to agree upon policies overall. a single method to study gridlock.

However, the collective actions of H5: There is a relationship between House Tea Party procedural oppointraparty caucuses like the House sition votes and the condition of a unified or divided government.

Tea Party suggest that the party model will be of most use in this H6: There is a relationship between House Tea Party passage opposidata analysis. Inherent in many scientific studies, additional varition votes and the condition of a unified or divided government. ables causing the relationship examined in scholarly research have H7: There is a relationship between House Tea Party Senate related been equally problematic for politopposition votes and the condition of a unified or divided government. ical scientists examining gridlock within the conditions of a unified H8: Controlling for constituency demographics, there is a relationship or divided government. It is clear between House Tea Party total opposition votes and the condition of a that scholars do in fact agree upon unified or divided government. one thing, gridlock is a product of multiple variables and conditions H9: House Tea Party members vote in opposition to House Republiof a unified or divided government cans as one cohesive caucus. is but one of many variables that contribute to legislative gridlock.

LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK to formulate and pass laws that are ideologically satisfying, therefore of central interest to this thesis.

How much power do these ideologically driven caucuses actually have? According to Jeffrey Toobin (2015) of the New Yorker, the House Tea Party Caucus was actually able to force Speaker of the House John Boehner to resign. The Tea Party has been accredited with causing mayhem within the Republican Party, and this fringe caucus has garnered strong political capital to the point of dictating which bills would make it to the House floor for a vote, an honor and strategic skill previously left to the Speaker of the House to exercise (Toobin, 2015). With this abundant political capital, the voting behaviors of House Tea Party members on issues that are central to their platform deserve careful consideration and analysis.

This thesis attempts to prove that the House Tea Party members will cast opposition votes on tax policies more often under the condition of divided governance, thereby resulting in increased legislative gridlock. The logic behind this argument is centered on the coalition building capacities of the House Tea Party, which will utilize their strength in numbers to stop policies that are not ideologically satisfying to them.

Due to the ideological extremism of the Tea Party, it is reasonable to believe that House Tea Party mem-

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bers will vote in opposition to House Republicans, in an effort to stop tax policies that are not ideologically satisfying to them; this phenomenon is believed to be heightened under conditions of a divided legislator because the House Tea Party Caucus is increasingly conservative in divided legislatures (“Table 1.9: Physical Representations of Averaged “DW-NOMINATE Scores” for House Republicans and House”).

From this, the following hypotheses can be made: [see page 11] Collectively, these various hypotheses have substantial meaning for the question and argument presented in this thesis. Firstly, the hypotheses concerning the differences in opposition voting patterns under conditions of unified and divided governance are vital to establish that there is a difference in the way House Tea Party members vote against House Republicans within this specific condition (H1-H3: “Hypotheses:”). Establishing that they are different under the condition of a unified or divided government allows for further inquiry as to what explains these differences in voting patterns. Secondly, the hypothesis concerning differences in party-aligned votes on tax policy and party aligned votes overall is important because it will establish that House Tea Party members are voting differently from the party on tax policy, thereby giving reasonable pursuit to

Table 1.9: Physical Representations of Averaged “DW-NOMINATE Scores” for House Republicans and House Tea Party Members

14 discover if these patterns are due to the presence of a unified or divided legislator (H4). This leads to the next three hypotheses relating the opposition votes of House Tea Party members to the condition of unified or divided governance (H5 – H8). The importance of these hypotheses rests in the significant relationship between these two variables, if they are not significantly related, that would conclude that House Tea Party members do not vote against the party in relation to the partisan make-up of the legislature, thereby making void the question and argument presented in this thesis. Lastly, and of unmatched importance, is the hypothesis concerning cohesiveness in House Tea Party member’s opposition votes (H9). This hypothesis is of most importance because if House Tea Party members are voting as a cohesive coalition, then they are opposing laws as one cohesive entity, thereby establishing their ability to cause legislative gridlock.

Although nine individual hypotheses may seem exaggerative, they are necessary to fully isolate the effect House Tea Party members have on legislative gridlock within the conditions of unified or divided governance. The multiple tests utilized in this quantitative analysis build upon one another by providing supporting evidence for the use of other tests, which further support the argument in this thesis. To accurately test these hypotheses, four statistical tests were used to establish differences, relationships, and cohesiveness in House Tea Party voting patterns on tax policies. However, these tests cannot be conducted without data, therefore leading to an explanation as to how the data was collected and what methods were developed to answer the research question presented in this thesis.

THOMAS DAVIS

Methodology For the purposes of this research, the analysis conducted is a hybrid of data analysis and case studies, giving the findings moderate to low external validity, but higher levels of internal validity in explaining the variation within House Tea Party voting patterns concerning tax related bills. The data sets utilized in this research is a combination of datasets derived from Poole-Rosenthal (2014), a research team which has compiled data on almost every congressional session in history, demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.), and in conjunction with an original dataset of House Tea Party roll call votes on tax policy. When synthesized, this thesis will aim to empirically establish the influence of the Tea Party caucus on legislative gridlock under conditions of a united or divided legislator.

This data analysis will aim to prove that House Tea Party members will vote against the majority of House Republicans on an issue center to the Tea Party platform, tax policy, under conditions of divided governance more often than in unified governance, thereby causing increased legislative gridlock. The independent variables in this research are unified and divided governance of Congress. If a party has majoritarian control in both chambers, then unified governance is fulfilled, if each party has a majority in only one chamber, this will be defined as divided governance. The dependent variable is gridlock, which is defined as the “inability to change policy” (Saeki, 2009). The conditions of unified and divided governance are vital to prove that House Tea Party

Tables 1:1, 1:2, 1:3: Status of Tax Policies

Introduced Committee Consideration Floor Consideration Passed One Chamber Passed Both Chambers Became Law

Table 1.1: Status of Tax Policies in the 111th Congress 1,619 525

Table 1.2: Status of Tax Policies in the 112th Congress 1,175 545

Table 1.3: Status of Tax Policies in the 113th Congress 1,204 522

152 145 66

102 92 34

122 114 25

64

33

25

LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK

15

Table 1:4: Partisan Makeup of the 111th, 112th, and 113th Congressional Sessions Congress

111

111

112

112

113

113

Chamber

House

Senate

House

Senate

House

Senate

Republican

178

41

242

47

234

45

Democrat

257

57

193

51

201

53

Independent

0

2

0

2

0

2

Tea Party

48

—

71

—

70

—

United / Divided

United

United

Divided

Divided

Divided

Divided

roll call votes deviate from House Republicans on issues of tax policy more often under the condition of a divided government, thereby explaining the rise of legislative gridlock.

With the Tea Party being a relatively new political movement, it has limited the number of cases that can be included in this research. To include House Tea Party members into the dataset, only three historically recent congressional sessions are of use to this research. The 111th, 112th, and 113th congressional sessions have been specifically selected to accommodate the novice movement. These three congressional sessions include members of the U.S. House of Representatives that have publicly identified with the Tea Party, additionally, these three cases include conditions of a unified (111th) legislator as well as a divided (112th, and 113th) legislator. Moreover, the Poole-Rosenthal (2014) dataset has not been updated for the 114th Congress, thereby limiting the use of more recent congressional sessions. Lastly, these sessions are specifically under examination because public access to caucus membership is currently prohibited by law, thereby limiting the dataset to be governed by names listed in news articles, which are only available from 2011 and on.

Given that party polarization is integral to questions proposed in this thesis, the data sets created by Poole-Rosenthal are utilized for two purposes. The first purpose was to acquire the DW-NOMINATE scores for each individual member of the House Tea Party (Poole & Rosenthal, 2014). DW-NOMINATE scores are ideological scores of each congressman based on their roll call votes (Poole & Rosenthal, 2014). The DW-NOMINATE score is a numerical assignment from -1 to +1 that signifies the ideologi-

cal placement of each member, -1 being liberal, while +1 is conservative (Poole & Rosenthal, 2014) (Table 1.6 and Table 1.9). The second purpose was to acquiesce Party Unity Scores, which measures how each congressman votes in reference to their party (Poole & Rosenthal, 2014). If the individual member votes with 50 percent or more of the party, then the vote is considered a party aligned vote (Poole & Rosenthal, 2014). The roll call votes are then tabulated and divided to create a percentage score for each member (Poole & Rosenthal, 2014). The closer the score is to 100%, the more likely the member is to vote with the party. These two variables will be utilized to establish that House Tea Party members are more ideologically driven on average (Table 1.5) and that they differ in their unity scores than the majority of the Republican Party on average. In times of divided governance, the DW-NOMINATE Scores for the average House Tea Party member will expectantly increase (Table 1.6 and Table 1.9), while the Party Unity score will expectantly decrease (Table 2.2), thereby establishing the prevalence of greater difficulty in passing tax laws for House Republicans.

Additionally, data from the U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.) was utilized to acquire demographic information on the various Tea Party Congressional districts.

Some information that was taken from this data included statistics concerning racial demographics, median age, the unemployment rate, median and mean household incomes and educational attainments.

These demographics were sought for hypotheses 8 which looked to control for additional variables that may be contributing to House Tea Party opposition votes. These control variables aid in isolating the effect of the independent variable analyzed in this thesis.

16

THOMAS DAVIS

Table 1:5: Comparison of Averaged “Party Unity Scores” for House Republicans and House Tea Party Members Congress

Republican Average Unity Score

Tea Party Average Unity Score

111

89.321

95.536

112

92.686

95.523

113

94.099

95.663

To discover if House Tea Party members are a contributor to gridlock, an original dataset was created to analyze House Tea Party members and their voting patterns on issues of tax policy. After cross referencing lists of congressman in the Tea Party published

by CNN’s Shannon Travis (2011) and Drew DeSilver’s from the Pew Research Center (2015), each member was then added or removed from the appropriate congresses in which he or she was a part of.

In total, these articles identify 189 House Tea Party members across all three congressional sessions. The 189 observations breakdown into 48 members during the 111th, 71 members in the 112th, and 70 members during the 113th. Although there is repetition because of incumbents, the growth in members from the 111th to the 112th is considerably large, which significantly adds to the political capital House Tea Party members had in these congressional sessions.

With more votes, the unity of the House Tea Party caucus can become a considerably powerful voting bloc; therefore, conditions of divided governance should result in less party aligned votes on tax policies (Table 2.2).

After compiling all the names and demographic information for the respective districts, the codification for roll call votes commenced. Under similar logic used in Poole-Rosenthal’s Party Unity dataset (2014), roll call votes were coded by identifying individual Tea Party member’s votes on issues of tax

policy. Utilizing CONGRESS.GOV, a refined search for all tax related bills in the U.S House of Representatives produced a total of 3,998 results for the three congressional sessions of interest in this research (Table 1.1, Table 1.2, and Table 1.3). The search produced results including bills that were simply introduced up to bills that were passed to become federal law. For the purposes of this thesis, only policies that were not considered ceremonial in nature were included in the dataset. The determination of what search results were deemed ceremonial in nature was done so by reading the title of a bill. Ceremonial bills were usually titled as an honorarium to a statue or memorial of a given person, and since these votes do not make a “change in policy” (Saeki, 2009), therefore excluded the dataset.

Roll call votes were categorized into 3 distinct groups: procedural, passage, and Senate related. Roll call votes categorized as procedural were only codified if labeled as a motion to recommit. Motions to recommit are roll call votes for the extension of debate over a bill, which is a procedural vote and gives no advanced status to a bill in terms of becoming law.

Roll call votes categorized as passage were roll call votes that dealt with the passage of a bill and included votes labeled as “on passage” and “on motion to suspend rules and pass”. Lastly, the Senate related category are roll call votes in which House members vote to adopt and pass Senate amendments made to

Table 1:6: Comparison of Averaged “DW-NOMINATE Scores” for House Republicans and House Tea Party Members Congress Republican Average DW-Nominate Tea Party Average DW-Nominate Score Score 111 0.654 0.762 112

0.677

0.791

113

0.687

0.814

LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK a House Resolution bill, or bills that were created through the joint resolution process. Roll call votes on the adoption of amendments introduced in the House were not included in the dataset. These three categories were created to identify if House Tea Party members have different voting patterns depending on the status of a bill.

After thoroughly examining a total of 400 individual roll call votes (Table 1.1, Table 1.2, and Table 1.3), the codification for each House Tea Party members vote was applied in the following pattern. If a House Tea Party member cast a party aligned vote (a vote with 50% or more of House Republicans), the vote is coded as “0.” If the House Tea Party member cast an opposition vote (a vote against 50% or more of House Republicans), the vote is coded as “1.” If the individual answered “present,” thereby abstaining from the vote, they were also coded as “1.” Commonly, many congressmen were not present to vote at all; these cases (although plentiful) were coded as missing. The decision to abstain from codifying absence was to accommodate exterior reasons for missing a vote, such as illness, which do not denote intentional aberration from party line voting.

Once the individual votes were coded, a summation for each congressional session was conducted to identify the total amount of times in which a House Tea Party member voted in opposition to House Republicans within each category (Table 1.8). Once the sum of opposition votes was identified, each total was then divided by the total amounts of votes in that category which was subsequently subtracted by 1 and then multiplied by 100. This formula produc-

Table 2:1: House Tea Party Caucus Averaged “Tax Unity Scores” for Three Vote Categories Congress 111 111 111 112 112 112 113 113 113

Roll Call Vote Category Procedural Passage Senate Related Procedural Passage Senate Related Procedural Passage Senate Related

Tax Unity Score 97.298 91.029 92.021 99.688 93.760 73.611 99.79 94.074 91.197

17

es a negative percentage integer and is subsequently given an absolute value, resulting in a percentage score that denotes how often House Tea Party members cast party aligned votes (Table 2.1). The formula has been created to mimic the percentage scores of Poole-Rosenthal Party Unity Scores (2014), thereby making the scores comparable in this cross-congressional analysis (Table 2.2). This gargantuan dataset was developed to accurately answer the research question and various hypotheses presented in this thesis, and various statistical tests were employed to answer the questions presented, resulting in findings that raise additional questions for future research.

Results Three T-Tests were conducted to determine if the House Tea Party Caucus votes differently on tax policy under conditions of unified or divided governance.

The first T-Test sets the independent variable as the presence of a unified or divided Congress, while the dependent variable is the amount of House Tea Party opposition votes, or votes against the majority of House Republicans on procedural type roll call votes.

The independent samples T-Test produced a T value of 6.701 and a significance value of .000 (Table 4.1), meaning that there is a statistically significant difference between the presence of unified or divided governance and the way Tea Party members oppose House Republicans on procedural roll call votes. This test concludes that there is a 0% chance that this relationship is due to chance. It can be conclusively stated that there is a difference in the way House Tea Party members vote in opposition to House Republicans on procedural related roll call votes, within the condition of a unified or divided legislator. Therefore, hypothesis one is correct and confirmed.

The second independent samples T-Test sets the independent variable as the condition of unified or

Table 2:2: Comparison of Averaged House Tea Party Caucus “Party Unity Scores” and “Tax Unity Scores” Congress 111 112 113

Party Unity Score 95.536 95.523 95.663

Tax Unity Score 92.988 93.468 95.877

18

THOMAS DAVIS

Tables 4:1, 4:2, 4:3: T-Values and Significance

T-Value Significance Value

Table 4.1: T-Test for “Unified/Divided Governance” and “Procedural” Opposition Votes 6.701

Table 4.2: T-Test for “ Unified/Divided Governance” and “Passage” Opposition Votes 2.366

Table 4.3: T-Test for “Unified/Divided Governance” and “Senate Related” Opposition Votes -1.223

.000

.019

.223

divided governance, and the dependent variable as the total amount of House Tea Party opposition votes cast on passage related roll call votes. The results produced a T Value of 2.366 and a significance value of .019 (Table 4.2). This means that this relationship is only 1.90% due to chance. There is definitely a statistically significant difference in the way that House Tea Party members vote in opposition to House Republicans on the passage of tax policy, under conditions of unified or divided governance, thereby con-

firming hypothesis two.

The final independent samples T-Test conducted was to explore if there is a difference amongst House Tea Party members opposition votes on Senate related roll call votes concerning tax policy, under conditions of unified or divided governance. With the independent variable being unified or divided governance and the dependent variable as the total Senate related roll call opposition votes cast, the results of this T-Test are statistically insignificant (Table 4.3). Producing a

Tables 1:7, 1:8: Status of Tax Policy Votes Table 1.7: Total Tax Policy Roll Call Votes for the Three Vote Categories

Table 1.8: Total House Tea Party Opposition Votes Cast on Tax Policies

Congress 111

Roll Call Vote Category Total Procedural 39

Total Votes Cast Against Republican Majority 38

111

Passage

74

312

111

Senate Related

20

75

112

Procedural

49

11

112

Passage

69

310

112

Senate Related

12

228

113

Procedural

47

7

113

Passage

82

345

113

Senate Related

8

49

LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK

Table 5:1 Pearson Correlation for “Party Unity Scores” and “Tax Unity Scores”

19

Table 5:2 Scatterplot (x-axis: “Tax Unity Score,” y-axis: “Party Unity Score”)

Table 5.1: Pearson Correlation for “Party Unity Scores” and “Tax Unity Scores” Pearson Correlation Significance Value

.37 8 .00 0

T Value of -1.223 and a significance value of .223, the results of this test are not statistically significant because the significance value does not equate to .05 or less (Table 4.3), thereby confirming the null for hypothesis three.

T-Tests are of importance to this thesis because they establish that House Tea Party members are casting opposition votes differently under the condition of unified or divided governance. As demonstrated in Table 1.1, Table 1.2, and Table1.3, a significant reduction in the amount of tax policies introduced and passed to become law occurred. Although T-Tests do not explain the reduction in legislative efficacy, these results prove that House Tea Party members are in fact differing in their procedural and passage roll call votes on tax policy in the presence of a unified or divided legislator. These promising results man-

date further statistical tests for discovering if House Tea Party members are stopping tax legislation from passing under conditions of unified or divided government. The statistically different voting patterns presented here are examined later to determine if the conditions of unified or divided governance directly affect House Tea Party roll call votes on tax policy.

To view differences in House Tea Party members voting on tax policies and voting behavior overall, a correlation between Poole-Rosenthal’s Party Unity Scores (2014) and the replicated Tax Unity Scores developed in this original dataset is conducted (Table 1.5, Table 2.1). With a resulting Pearson Correlation

Tables 6:1, 6:2, 6:3: Regression and Significance

Beta Coefficient Significance Value R-Square

Table 6.1: Regression Relating “Unified/ Divided Governance” and “Procedural” Opposition Votes

Table 6.2: Regression for “Unified/Divided Governance” and “Passage” Opposition Votes

-.683

-2.058

Table 6.3: Regression for “Unified/Divided Governance” and “Senate Related” Opposition Votes .341

.000

.019

.223

.193

.029

.008

20

THOMAS DAVIS

score of .378 and a significance value of .000 (Table 5.1), this correlation is statistically significant and there is 0% probability that this relationship is due to chance, thereby confirming hypothesis four. This result demonstrates a moderate difference in the way House Tea Party cast party aligned votes on tax policy versus their overall party aligned votes. For every one unit increase in Poole-Rosenthal Party Unity scores (2014), there is only a subsequent .378 unit increase in the replicated Total Unity score (Table 5.1). The substantial difference in party aligned votes proves that House Tea Party members willingly vote differently with the party on tax policies than they do overall, thereby reinforcing the argument that House Tea Party members do have substantial political power, giving them the opportunity to cause gridlock under the conditions of unified or divided government.

This correlation furthers the argument that House Tea Party members vote differently than establishment Republicans in an effort to satisfy their ideological needs thereby increasing the chances of gridlock. Although party unity is generally high amongst

House Tea Party members (Table 1.5), the moderate difference in party aligned voting patterns on tax policy and on policies overall suggests that House Tea Party members are willing to vote differently on issues central to the Tea Party platform. The scatterplot on Table 5.2 demonstrates how House Tea Party members differ on Poole-Rosenthal’s Party Unity Score (2014) and the Tax Unity Score. House Tea Party members may be using their power as a legislative coalition in an effort to receive tax policies that are conducive to their ideologically extreme members and constituents, thereby causing legislative gridlock.

With statistically significant results from previous tests, three separate regressions were conducted to determine if House Tea Party opposition votes on tax policies are related to the conditions of a unified or divided legislator. The independent variable for each subsequent regression is the condition of a unified or divided legislator, while the dependent variables will change between three categories of roll call votes on tax policies (procedural, passage, and Senate related).

Table 6.1 demonstrates the results of the regression

Tables 3:1: Descriptive Statistics for House Tea Party Constituency Demographic Variables Variable

Mean

Standard Variation Range

White Populace

.781

.116

.593

Black/African American Populace

.113

.106

.547

Hispanic/Latino Populace

.139

.120

.512

Asian Populace

.038

.046

.305

American Indian/Alaskan Native

.009

.025

.233

Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander

.001

.001

.005

Other Populace

.030

.029

.140

Unemployment Rate

5.786

1.464

7.700

Median Income

57151.789

12557.424

61028.000

Mean Income

77384.568

17657.972

77403.000

High School Graduate +

88.611

3.803

16.000

Bachelor’s Degree+

30.117

9.291

43.4

Median Age

38.324

3.679

23.2

LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK testing for the relationship between House Tea Party procedural tax policy opposition votes cast with the conditions of a unified or divided legislator. With a Beta Coefficient of -.683, the presence of divided governance causes occasions of procedural vote opposition to decrease (Table 6.1). The presence of divided governance causes a .683 decrease in the amount of times Tea Party members vote opposing House Republicans procedurally (Table 6.1). With a Significance value of .000, this test is statistically significant and there is a 0% chance that this relationship is due to chance. However, the R-Square value for this test is only .193 (Table 6.1), meaning that this model only predicts 19.30% of the variation between votes in the dependent variable. With such a low R-Square Value, this test concludes that the condition of a unified or divided government is a poor predictor of changes in procedural opposition voting behavior amongst House Tea Party members. Although this model has poor explanatory power, neither the original hypothesis nor the null hypothesis was affirmed; instead, the results actually offer alternative explanations than originally assumed in hypothesis 5. These alternative explanations are best explained

21

by additional variables such as demographics of the various House Tea Party constituencies, as well as institutional factors that may contribute to the inverse relationship found in the Beta Coefficients.

Table 6.2 visualizes the results of a second regression relating the independent variable of unified or divided government and the dependent variable of House Tea Party passage opposition tax votes. A Beta Coefficient of -2.058 demonstrates that with a condition of divided governance (Table 6.2), there is a subsequent 2.058 decrease in the overall amount of times that House Tea Party members vote in opposition to House Republicans. The .019 significance value means that there is only a 1.9% chance that this relationship is due to chance, making this test statistically significant (Table 6.2). With an R-Square value of .029 (Table 6.2), this test model only predicts 2.9% of the variation in the dependent variable. The resulting low R-Square Value concludes that the condition of unified or divided governance is a poor predictor of House Tea Party opposition voting behavior. This model mimics the results of the previous tests in that it offers alternative explanations than the original assumption presented in hypothesis 6. This alternative

Tables 6:4: Regression for “Unified/Divided Governance” and “Total” Opposition Votes While Controlling for Constituency Demographics Variable

Beta Coefficient Significance Value R-Square

Unified/Divided Governance

-2.443

.017

.124

White Populace

-111.418

.053

.124

Black/African American Populace

-119.032

.034

.124

Latino Populace

-14.403

.058

.124

Asian Populace

-105.463

.074

.124

American Indian/Alaskan Native

-141.396

.024

.124

Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander

-613.511

.228

.124

Other Populace

-108.259

.134

.124

Unemployment Rate

1.165

.023

.124

Median Income

.000

.122

.124

Bachelor’s Degree

-.110

.247

.124

Median Age

-.315

.060

.124

22 explanation is again most likely rooted in constituency pressures as well as institutional factors, which would be considerable contributors to House Tea Party opposition votes during a unified legislator.

A third regression relating the independent variable of unified or divided governance with the dependent variable of total House Tea Party Senate related roll call opposition votes, was statistically insignificant. With a Beta Coefficient value of .341 (Table 6.3), the presence of divided governance causes a .341 unit increase in votes against the party. This means that the presence of divided governance causes Tea Party members to vote against House Republicans .341 more times on Senate related tax policy votes. Along with an R-Square value of .008, this model can only predict .8% of the variation in the dependent variable, making this an extremely poor predictor of House Tea Party opposition votes. The significance value for this test is .223, which is well below the .05 threshold, making this model statistically insignificant, resulting in a confirmation of the null for hypothesis 7.

With the condition of unified or divided governance giving only small explanatory power behind House Tea Party opposition voting patterns, a regression controlling for multiple demographics of the various House Tea Party constituencies, yields mixed results (Table 6.4). With an independent variable of unified or divided governance and the dependent variable set as the summated opposition votes cast

by House Tea Party members, only three demographic variables yielded statistically significant results (Table6.4). Meanwhile, three demographic variables yielded results approaching significance (Table 6.4).

Demographic variables that resulted in significant results were the Black/African American populace, American Indian/Native Alaskan population, and the unemployment rate (Table 6.4). Demographic variables that are approaching significance include the White population, Latino population, and the median age (Table 6.4). The addition of control variables suggests that when constituency demographics are accounted for, House Tea Party members vote more unified with House Republicans under the condition

Table 6:5 Cronbach’s Alpha for House Tea Party “Total” Opposition Votes Cronbach’s Alpha

.274

THOMAS DAVIS of a divided legislator. A Beta Coefficient of -2.443 signifies that the presence of divided governance decreases the overall House Tea Party opposition votes cast by 2.43. However, with an R-Square value of .124, this model only predicts 12.4% of the variation in the dependent variable, making it a poor predictor of House Tea Party opposition votes. These results demonstrate an alternative explanation than originally presented in hypothesis 8. These findings suggest that House Tea Party opposition votes may be most due to the institutional factors inherent in the legislator, and therefore only partially due to the conditions of a unified or divided government.

Results from these regressions are counterintuitive to the hypotheses presented in this thesis. The original hypotheses predicted that divided governance would cause House Tea Party members to vote against the majority of House Republicans more often in an effort to satisfy their ideological preferences, but the opposite is found in these results. The two statistically significant regressions on procedural and passage roll call votes demonstrate that House Tea Party members are willing to vote against the Republican Party more often under conditions of unified governance (Table 6.1, Table 6.2). These slight variations in voting patterns amongst House Tea Party members are examples of how caucuses use their coalitions to inhibit legislation from passing until it reaches their ideological preferences. That the conditions of a unified legislator add stressors upon the party, causing increasingly fractured voting behaviors within the party which is counterintuitive to what was argued in this thesis. This is most evident when controlling for demographic variables, which significantly increases the House Tea Party member’s unity with the Republican Party under the condition of divided governance. However, to determine if the House Tea Party is portraying characteristics of a legislative coalition, a Cronbach’s Alpha score can demonstrate if they exhibit cohesive opposition voting patterns, thereby giving more credence to the argument that they have an effect on legislative outputs.

To determine if House Tea Party members are voting as a cohesive block, a Cronbach’s Alpha Test was conducted by testing the summation of House Tea Party opposition votes in all 3 categories of tax policy roll call votes. The test results produced a Cronbach Alpha Score of .274 (Table 6.4). This insignificant result suggests that House Tea Party members are not voting cohesively opposing House Republicans on roll call votes concerning tax policies. Therefore, the House Tea Party opposition voting patterns are due to a variety of other influences, thereby confirming the null for hypothesis 9.

LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK With such a low Cronbach Alpha Score (Table 6.4), the argument that the House Tea Party has a direct effect on legislative gridlock is not credible.

Although there are statistically significant results relating House Tea Party opposition voting patterns to the conditions of a unified or divided legislator, these differences prove that divided governance raises the occurrences of party aligned votes. However, the inability for House Tea Party members to vote as a cohesive bloc diminishes the argument that they are causing legislative gridlock. Unified and divided governance does make House Tea Party members vote more or less with the Republican Party respectively, but the lack of unison voting patterns amongst House Tea Party members suggests that there are a plethora of other conditions that serve as alternative reasons for legislative gridlock on tax policy.

Conclusion Since David Mayhew’s (2005) seminal work on the effects unified and divided governance has on legislative gridlock, countless scholars have attempted to offer alternative explanations for the reducing legislative efficaciousness of the U.S. Congress (Binder, 2003; Cox & McCubbins, 2005; Fiorina, 1996, Rogers, 2005). The ongoing scholarly debate is best exemplified by the research and findings presented in this thesis. Central to the mission of this thesis was to contribute an additional explanatory variable for legislative gridlock; that the actions of the Tea Party contribute to legislative gridlock under conditions of unified or divided governance.

To discover if the House Tea Party was, in fact, causing legislative gridlock as a result of a unified or divided legislature, this thesis proposed nine individual hypotheses that served as building blocks to isolate the relationship between House Tea Party opposition votes, and the conditions of unified or divided governance. Using a case study and data analysis methodological hybrid, House Tea Party roll call votes concerning tax policies were collected and coded from the 111th, 112th, and 113th congressional sessions. Additionally, datasets from Poole-Rosenthal (2014) were utilized in conjunction with U.S. Census Bureau Data (n.d.). This comprehensive data set allowed for employment of multiple statistical tests that aided in answering and denying the research question and argument presented in this thesis.

Using IBM’s SPSS, four statistical tests were utilized to prove the various hypotheses presented by this thesis. Firstly, T-Tests were utilized to demonstrate that for procedural and passage type roll call

23

votes, House Tea Party members do significantly differ in their opposition voting patterns under the condition of a unified or divided legislature; thereby confirming hypotheses one and two, while confirming the null for hypothesis three. Secondly, a correlation between Poole-Rosenthal (2014) Party Unity Scores and the Tax Unity Score concludes that there is a statistically significant difference in the way House Tea Party members vote along party lines on tax policy and on policy overall, thereby confirming hypothesis four. Thirdly, regressions were employed to validate that there is a significant relationship between House Tea Party opposition votes on procedural and passage type roll call votes on tax policy, resulting in alternative explanations for hypotheses five and six while confirming the null for hypothesis seven.

Fourthly, another regression was used to relate total House Tea Party opposition votes while controlling for demographics of the House Tea Party constituencies, resulting in a significant relationship, but concluded in an alternative explanation than originally assumed in hypothesis eight. In total, the statistically significant regressions resulted in counterintuitive findings, suggesting that party aligned voting patterns rise during divided government; these alternative explanations suggest that hypotheses five, six, and eight and were accurate in assuming that a relationship between House Tea Party opposition votes and the condition of a unified or divided government existed, but the relationship was counterintuitive to the original argument presented in this thesis. However, these findings exhibit low R-Square values, meaning that the condition of a unified or divided legislator is only a partial contributor to House Tea Party opposition votes, and that the model has poor explanatory power. Lastly, a Cronbach’s Alpha test was utilized for measuring cohesiveness in House Tea Party opposition votes, which resulted in an insignificant test result, thereby confirming the null for hypothesis nine.

In the aggregate, the data analysis conveys a less than promising answer to the research question presented in this thesis. Although the majority of the results were significant, the voting patterns among House Tea Party members on tax policy serve as a poor explanatory variable for the increased gridlock in Congress. With such poor explanatory power, it would be overzealous to suggest there is any relationship between the actions of the House Tea Party, and the rise of legislative gridlock under the condition of a unified or divided legislature. Furthermore, the disunities in opposition voting patterns exhibited by House Tea Party members suggest that the argument that intraparty ideological caucuses have an effect on legislative gridlock holds no

24 truth. However, the implications of these results are not only limited specifically to the House Tea Party, but this thesis may spark new interest in the role these ideological caucuses may have on gridlock within the unified or divided government debate.

The implications of this thesis for future scholarly work lies in the actions of House Tea Party members before a bill goes to the floor for a vote. If the Tea Party was truly successful in ousting speaker John Boehner (Toobin 2015) because of their collective actions, then future scholars should examine what the Tea Party is doing outside the public sphere.

More specifically, future scholarly work should focus on the collective actions of House Tea Party members in committee, to see if the House Tea Party actually resembles a coalition that aims to only bring bills to the floor that satisfy their ideological preferences. This future work can also be within the unified and divided government debate by proposing that divided governance in the legislature will increase or decrease the amount of time the House Tea Party actually stops a bill from receiving a roll call vote.

THOMAS DAVIS Most importantly, what implications do the findings in this thesis have for the Tea Party? The Tea Party Caucus is essentially a sham. Members of the House Tea Party Caucus may be more ideologically extreme in their legislative preferences, but their inability to cast opposition votes on tax policies as a cohesive voting bloc suggests that they are still unwilling to divert from the Republican Party. Although there are variations in House Tea Party votes on tax policy overall when related to the condition of a unified or divided legislator, their inability to vote as a cohesive coalition to publically oppose tax policies from passing demonstrates that the Tea Party is possibly more a campaign strategy than an actually politically powerful entity (Cox & McCubbins 2005). Within the context of a unified or divided Congress, the actions of the House Tea Party Caucus exhibits little to no influence on legislative gridlock, implying that the original argument in this thesis holds no weight and instead suggests that House Tea Party collective actions outside of roll call votes may hold more fruitful results.

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for House Tea Party Voting Patterns on Tax Policies Voting Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation Range

Party Unity Score

95.579 2.705

12.605

Summated Procedural Opposition Votes

.295

.673

3.000

Summated Passage Opposition Votes

5.089

5.239

36.000

Summated Senate Related Opposition Votes

1.853

1.662

7.000

Summated Total Opposition Votes

7.237

6.122

39.000

Procedural Tax Unity Score

99.291 1.618

7.690

Passage Tax Unity Score

93.201 6.892

46.380

Senate Related Tax Unity Score

84.737 13.642

50.000

Tax Unity Score

94.249 6.819

77.550

LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK

Works Cited Baumgartner, F., Brouard, S., Grossman, E., Lazardeux, S., & Moody, J. (2014). Divided Government, Legislative Productivity, and Policy Change in the USA and France. Governance, 27(3), 423-447.

Binder, S. (1999). The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-1996. American Political Science Review, 93(3), 519-533.

Binder, S. (2003). Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.

Brady, D., & Volden, C. (2006). Revolving Gridlock: Policy and Politics from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bus. Oxford; Colorado: Westview Press.

Coleman, J. (1999). Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness. The American Political Science Review, 93(4), 821835.

Colomer, J. (2005). Policy Making in Divided government: A Pivotal Actors Model With Party Discipline. Public Choice, 125(3), 247-269.

Cox, G., & McCubbins, M. (2005). Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, G., & McCubbins, M. (2007). Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House.

Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

DeSilver, D. (2015, October). What is the House Freedom Caucus, and Who’s in it? Retrieved November 15, 2017 from http://www.pewresearch. org/fact-tank/2015/10/20/house-freedom-caucus-what-is-it-and-whos-in-it/ Edwards, G., Barrett, A., & Peake, J. (1997). The Legislative Impact of Divided Government.

American Journal of Political Science, 41(2), 545-563.

Fiorina, M. (1996). Divided Government. Boston, Mass: Allyn and Bacon.

Gibbs, P. & Hiroshi, S. (1997). What is Occam’s Razor? Retrieved February 17, 2017, from http:// math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/General/occam.html Howell, W., Adler, S., Cameron, C., & Riemann, C. (2000). Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1947-1954. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25(2), 285-312.

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Hughes, T., & Carlson, D. (2015). Divided Government and Delay in the Legislative Process. American Politics Research, 43(5), 771-792.

Jones, D. (2001). Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock. Political Science Quarterly, 54(1), 125-141.

Kelly, S. (1993). Response: Let’s Stick with the Larger Question. Polity, 25(3), 489-490.

Mayhew, D. (1991). Divided Party Control: Does it Make a Difference?. PS: Political Science and Politics, 24(4), 637-640.

Mayhew, D. (1993). Reply: Let’s Stick With the Longer List. Polity, 25(3), 485-488.

Mayhew, D. R. (2005). Divided we Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 19462002. New Haven: Yale University Press.

McCarthy, J. (2016, October 12). Ahead of Elections, U.S Congress Approval at 18%. Retrieved Feb. 11, 2017.

Poole, K., Rosenthal, H., (2014). Data Download.

[Datasets] Retrieved December 28, 2017, from http://voteview.com/dwnl.htm Rogers, J. (2005). The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production. Public Choice, 123(1), 217-233 Saeki, M. (2009). Gridlock in the Government of the United States: Influence of Divided Government and Veto Players. British Journal of Political Science, 39(3), 587-607.

Sundquist, J. (1989). Can Divided Government be Made to Work?. The Brookings Review, 7(2), 14-15.

Toobin, J. (2015, September 28). The Pointless Cowardice of John Boehner. Retrieved February 12, 2017, from http://www.newyorker.com/news/ daily-comment/the-pointless-cowardice-ofjohn-boehner Thorson, G. (1998). Divided Government and the Passage of Partisan Legislation, 1947-1990. Political Research Quarterly, 51(3), 751-764.

Travis, S. (2011, July). Who is the Tea Party Caucus in the House? Retrieved November 15, 2017 from http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/29/ who-is-the-tea-party-caucus-in-the-house/ United States Census Bureau, (n.d.). My Congressional District. [Data]. Retrieved Jan. & Feb., 2017, from https://www.census.gov/mycd/

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THOMAS DAVIS

Thomas Davis

Thomas Davis has graduated Summa Cum Laude from California State Polytechnic University, Pomona with a bachelor’s degree in political science. Thomas was previously published in the California State Polytechnic University, Pomona Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Spring 2016 Issue. He is currently a seminarian discerning his vocational call to the Roman Catholic Priesthood. His ongoing formation in the Diocese of San Bernardino has awarded him the opportunity to pursue various graduate degrees in the areas of philosophy, theology, and divinity. He now spends his days studying, praying, and serving God and the people of the Diocese of San Bernardino.

Email: SBDThomas@outlook.com

The Affordable Care Act: Political perception and real world consequences viewed through the lens of Obamacare

Aubrey Ackermann California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

The average person’s life is busy and fast paced, often leaving very little time to be up to date with the constantly shifting political world. People are then forced to develop an opinion on a hot button topic, such as the Affordable Care Act, without the time to gather the necessary information to fully understand the issues involved. To alleviate this stress, they look to their already established political ideology and follow the trend of their party to simplify their vote. This study uses quantitative analysis to ascertain if a Cal Poly Pomona student’s political ideology determines their opinion on the Affordable Care Act, regardless of their knowledge or other factors self-interests on the matter.

M

any members of the general public do not consider the idea that political bias has developed an ever-increasing importance in our decision-making processes. Political polarization is becoming rampant in the United States; it has affected everything from an individual’s voting behavior to how they view the U.S healthcare system, and how they believe it should progress from here on out. This research paper will discuss the issue of political bias and how it has shaped a person’s perception of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), or otherwise known as “Obamacare.”

It will delve into an even narrower scope by specifically targeting Cal Poly Pomona students.

This topic holds great importance because it highlights the fact that our healthcare system, along with many other aspects of our lives, has become increasingly politicized. The dangers to this trend

cannot be underestimated. Ideological bias has become the baseline of our decision-making processes; and therefore, acts as the key element in the formation of a person’s opinions, while ignoring the relevant facts of the given issue. This trend is incredibly shortsighted and dangerous if left undiagnosed.

While this paper cannot prove the dangers of this phenomenon, due to its narrow scope, it will showcase how political perception, as seen through party affiliation, can play a key aspect in how we perceive and interact with our everyday lives, specifically in how we interpret the quality of our healthcare system.

This concept falls within the subfield of American Politics. This paper will be expanding on previous research and contributing to the overall study of this issue by demonstrating that by the time a person reaches the age for higher education, political bias, as a basis of decision making, has already taken root to act as

Created by A. Ackermann, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona for her seinior thesis project. Correspondence concerning this research paper should be addressed to A. Ackermann, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, (909) 263-6730. Email: aackermann@cpp.edu Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2017. Pp. 27–50. ©2017, Political Science Department, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona.

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28 the main influencer in the formation of opinions. This is especially disheartening because this is the age in a person’s life when they are supposed to welcome new ideas to be able to grow as a student and as an individual; in turn, allowing them to be more open to discussions about alternative options. This research paper will be focused through the lens of a simple question: does Cal Poly Pomona students’ political views determine their opinion on the Affordable Care Act? This thesis will prove that political views, as determined by party affiliation, does affect the opinions Cal Poly Pomona students have on the Affordable Care Act. Students who consider themselves to be more liberal in ideology will see the U.S healthcare system, as represented by “Obamacare”, in a favorable light; while students’ whose political ideology aligns with the right will see the system as too socialized and especially think less of “Obamacare” than their Democrat counterparts. The reason for this is, as a person’s political ideology moves to the left the more they will approve of “Obamacare”; while alternatively, as a person’s ideology moves to the right the more they will disapprove of “Obamacare”.

The concepts relate to one another because the U.S healthcare system has become politicized and highly polarized as well, since the introduction of this legislation. The logic behind this idea rests in the fact that, since the Affordable Care Act is a step toward socialized medicine, Democrats and those on the left will find it more appealing because they usually champion a more liberal and socialized society; while Republicans and other conservatives will disapprove of it because they desire a more individualist society with less governmental interference and oversight.

It is possible that other factors can be used to attempt to answer my question such as: age, gender, or ethnicity. These elements have been stated to also play a role in the development of a person’s perception on the Affordable Care Act. These are valid concerns that will be accounted for in the course of my research through several alternative hypotheses. A possible criticism of my argument would state that political ideology is only a small part of a person’s identity and that many other factors play into the overall psyche of an individual. Even with a corresponding political view, every person has their own thoughts, feelings, and motivations which cause them to take certain actions and come to a particular conclusion; however, political orientation is a mode in which to externalize all of those internal driving points. The true effect of this hardening of party lines comes from an individual limiting the sources of information they take in based on their preference of party affiliations, thus driving in the point that po-

AUBREY ACKERMANN litical bias plays a key aspect in decision making.

For this research paper, the evidence needed to prove my argument was collected in the form of a survey experiment. One survey form, the control group, had general questions about their opinions on the Affordable Care Act. This first group’s form had no references to “Obamacare”, and only at the end were asked about their political ideology. The treatment group had obvious mentions and ties to “Obamacare”; and, the participants’ political ideology was invoked at the beginning of the survey. With the data that was gathered from this survey experiment I used SPSS to organize and test my results. I accomplished this by using the independent sample T-Test as well as the Chi-Square test. Throughout this thesis, I will prove that regardless of multiple influencing factors, party affiliation is the best determining factor for a Cal Poly Pomona student’s perception of “Obamacare”.

Literature Review

.

Partisan bias is a powerful tool in predicting a person’s worldview on certain key aspects of life. It plays, arguably, the most important role in determining the reasons for a person’s opinions on a wide variety of issues such as the intensely debated and highly controversial Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Much has been done in the way of research on this topic, and many scholars have argued about the importance of party identification versus the self-interest of a person on a more basic demographic level in the development of their opinions on the ACA. This thesis contributes to the debate by asking if partisan bias affects the views Cal Poly Pomona students’ have on the current health care system in the United States.

Polarization in the U.S is becoming more common with each election cycle. People are tending to search for information that simply confirms their own world views on subjects instead of carefully researching a topic before coming to a definitive conclusion. The specific line of research in this analysis will be considering this trend at the university-level age group.

This is a critical time in an individual’s life when they should be open to criticism and new ideas to grow as a student and as a functioning member of society, However, if this trend holds it could foreshadow a dangerous and turbulent future. The polarization of politics only makes having substantive conversations with those who hold differing views more difficult and thus progress is almost impossible.

The following literature review discusses three key aspects in this line of scholarship. These ele-

OBAMACARE: POLITICAL PERCEPTION ments are constantly working together and against one another making it difficult to parse them out completely. The first aspect that will be discussed is symbolic perception in the formation of an individual’s opinions on the ACA. This is defined as a person’s partisan bias or political ideology being the strongest indicator of their intended actions. Often times, seen as a counter view to symbolic perceptions, self-interest is the next aspect that has been heavily researched in regards to the formation of the perceptions people form in deference to the world around them. Self-interest is used by scholars to determine motivations on how individuals come to certain conclusions based on their personal experiences and demographic information. The final aspect that helps to fit all the pieces together is the level of knowledge a person has on the topic of health reform in the United States. As stated above, these three key aspects are interconnected and as such will not be discussed separately but in connection with one another throughout this section.

Each concept competes and acts upon the others to form an individual’s opinion on the ACA. It is easy to see why many scholars have researched the role of partisan bias as the foundation of the development of an individual’s opinion on the ACA. In a 2014 poll on the ACA, 83% of Republicans surveyed opposed the bill and 56% wanted it to be repealed (Dalen, Waterbrook, & Alpert, 2015). In that same poll, however, only 19% of Democrats disagreed with the act while 4% wished for it to be repealed (Dalen et al., 2015). Political ideology helps people sort themselves into the parties that most align with their way of thinking. Ideology is as an important factor in regards to the formation of opinions on the ACA. Many Democrats believe that “universal coverage is a core value, so they are more likely to support reform regardless of other factors. By contrast, Republicans may have an ideological opposition to national health insurance” (Oakman, Blendon, Campbell, Zaslavsky, & Benson, 2010). Once these allegiances are formed it creates an easy method of obtaining information about topics, such as on the ACA, that would correspond to their own preconceived notions of the world.

Partisan elite, within the each of the political parties, help shape an individual’s opinions on healthcare reform through rhetoric distributed by the mass media (Kriner & Reeves, 2014). Research has shown that the “public responds to the changing of content of elite debate in Washington”, that is to say, people may be open to new information about health care reform, but generally from their own side of the political spectrum (Kriner & Reeves, 2014).

Knowledge and symbolic perception in opinion formation go hand in hand. Partisanship plays a key

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role in the perceptions one holds about the world around them. For example, in 2008, after the election of President Obama, Democrats switched roles with Republicans in having a favorable view of the economy (Hindman, 2012). This could be due to, in part, the partisan information sources that most people retrieve their knowledge about issues from. In past studies, it was found that whichever side that gets their message out first has the advantage when introducing a new policy topic. The initial piece of information given to the public helps set the tone of information that people are likely to look into further (Druckman, Fein, Leeper, 2012). This only strengthens the symbolic perceptions argument because Republicans are more likely to go to conservative sources for their news than Democrats, and likewise Democrats are more likely to seek out their information from liberal sources than Republicans. This is also key for “our prior beliefs and feelings guide what we perceive and how we process it” (Strickland, Taber, & Lodge, 2011). By using the media to control the level and type of information that is pushed out to the public, political elites are able to strengthen their respective sides. These elites “redefine knowledge as partisan beliefs and beliefs about knowledge. News media distribution and amplification of partisan beliefs help transform knowledge into a strategy for political gain” (Hindman, 2012).

Demographic reasoning based on association with knowledge are also hard to distinguish from symbolic perceptions. In a study of medical school students, 63% of those surveyed supported the ACA (Winkelman, 2015). Medical students were more likely to approve of the ACA in higher proportions than the general public and, as a whole, their knowledge of the bill was greater as well (Winkelman, 2015). Students with higher knowledge were more likely to support the ACA over students who knew less about it, a pattern that has followed the general public (Winkelman, 2015). Interestingly enough, it was the self-reported political ideology that played the role in determining views toward the ACA. Those who reported themselves as liberals and moderates were more likely to support the bill over conservatives (Winkelman, 2015). It is important to note that this survey also had a skewed population in terms of Democrats and Republicans counted; a large proportion of the students self-identified as Democrats. This helps to explain the large discrepancy in approval numbers for medical students as compared with the general public.

Information gathering and ideological exposure are responsible for influencing people’s opinions about a wide range of subject matters, including healthcare. Studies have indicated that the amount

30 of information people receive about a political issue affects the way they act and feel toward that issue (Pasek, Sood, Krosnick, 2015). It has been found that “media coverage of political controversies serve to transmit social identification cues to citizens, and that group identification may override knowledge that is contrary to those beliefs” (Hindman, 2012). The journal article, “Misinformed about the Affordable Care Act?”, depicted the difference between individuals that had misperceptions and individuals that were simply ignorant about the ACA (Pasek et al, 2015).

This article defines misperceptions as “holding an incorrect belief with confidence” and ignorance as “lacking a correct belief on an issue” (Pasek et al, 2015). A study has found that Republicans are more likely to misinterpret “uninsured” as “unemployed” or in families where the adults do not work. This interpretation leads the Republicans to be against the ACA on the grounds that they do not wish to aid the creation of a welfare state (Oakman et al., 2010).

Those who are ignorant can be informed, but those who have misperceptions are difficult to correct, they can be stubborn in their convictions.

Ignorance can make it difficult to determine the actual opinions people hold on the ACA. It has been found that individuals who have a lower socioeconomic status are more likely to give an “I don’t know” response when confronted with their opinions on health care reform (Berinsky & Margolis, 2011).

By asking the question in different angles, however, a person’s views can be seen indirectly in regards to the ACA. It was discovered through these means that people making $30,000 per year or less were far more likely to be in favor of policy ideas in the ACA, while less than half of those who make more than $100,000 per year approve of the same reform (Berinsky & Margolis, 2011). With this, it would seem that socioeconomic status would be a good indicator of one’s attitude toward the ACA, however individuals with higher incomes have a stronger association with voting Republican (Gelman, 2011).

A person’s fear over the future of the health care system was also seen as an indicator of public opinion. Out of their own self-interest, seniors who used Medicare were concerned about the ACA. In 2013, a survey of Medicare recipients showed that 38% had an antagonistic view of the ACA because they feared that it would affect their insurance in a negative way (Brodie, Hamel, & Norton, 2015). It has been found, in a survey from 2008 – 2010 by the Associated Press, Republicans were significantly less likely to oppose universal health care if they were personally concerned about their own medical expenses (Henderson & Hillygus, 2011). It was also found that

AUBREY ACKERMANN self-interest can play an important role in opinion formation and change against partisanship when the stakes are large and the effects would be noticeable (Henderson & Hillygus, 2011). Interestingly enough, most Americans have a favorable view of Medicare and some have suggested that the best health care delivering system for the U.S would be “Medicare for all” (Dalen et al., 2015).

The trust in the federal government can play a factor in the formation of opinions and attitudes on the ACA. It was discovered that “an individual’s degree of trust in the federal government was positively associated with approval of the federal government taking an active role in Americans access to health care” (Richardson & Konisky, 2013). There is a strong indication that Republican’s trust the federal government to a much lesser degree than their Democrat counterparts and are thus less likely to support strong governmental interference with the health care system (Richardson & Konisky, 2013). There is a fear among some Americans of the possible creation of a stronger centralized government, and they do not want to see their government assume a more prominent role as a dictator of individual decisions (Grande, Gollust, & Asch, 2011).

The ACA is a highly-polarized issue in the U.S and, as such, symbolic perceptions are an important indicator of the public’s attitudes. Research has shown that many Americans are in favor of individual policies in the ACA but are largely against the law as a whole or at least see it in a negative light, even if they were to benefit from it (Grande et al., 2011). It was discovered through survey research that the way a question was asked drastically changed the response given by the participants. By using trigger phrases and words such as “Obamacare”, an overall negative opinion base was received by the respondents, however, when the neutral wording was used there was much more approval for similar types of reforms that the ACA had to offer (Grande et al., 2011). This depicted that there is an unconscious partisan bias in regards to the ACA as it is a highly-polarized issue.

In fact, not a single Republican in congress voted to pass the ACA, it was passed by a Democrat Congress and signed by a Democrat president (Henderson & Hillygus, 2011). In highly-polarized governments that control both the Congress and the Presidency the legislation has a risk of being less thought through or less deliberately designed because it is not subject to partisan checks and balances (Pildes, 2011). When this is the case, it is easy for opinions on the issue to take on a partisanship divide with one side resenting the legislation because they feel they had no say in its creation. Instances like this have caused the two

OBAMACARE: POLITICAL PERCEPTION political parties to shift their views and move farther from the center (Pildes, 2011).

Some scholars have stated that gender and race along with partisan bias are the best indicators on the formation of beliefs and attitudes on the ACA. One study found that women were far more likely to support the ACA than men and they did it for both symbolic and self-interest related reasons (Lizotte, 2016).

This author found that women were more likely to support the ACA for humanitarian and socioeconomic justifications; they were naturally more concerned about the welfare of others and because of their gender were more worried about the economic strains of insurance on their income (Lizotte, 2016). Even with this information, symbolic perceptions were still a good indicator of their opinions. This author explained this by stating that women are more likely to be Democrat because of their humanitarian tendency and as such approve the creation of a larger safety net for society. In another study, it was found that 50% of white Americans disapproved the ACA (Fiscella, 2016). When the survey used triggering phrases such as “Obamacare” rather than the Affordable Care Act, the views instantly became more negative. Kevin Fiscella, author of the article “Why do so many white Americans oppose the Affordable Care Act?”, claims this to be accounted for by the, sometimes, unconscious racism associated with “Obamacare” (2016). It was found in another survey that while African Americans were more likely to support the ACA than white individuals, they were also more likely to keep their support over time as compared to other races (Henderson & Hillygus, 2011).

Partisian bias is the strongest indicator of opinion formation on the ACA. It has been stated by scholars that partisan “loyalties have a pervasive effect on perceptions of the political world” (Bartels, 2002).

People do not usually have the time or convenience to rigorously research a wide range of topics, and as such they resort to listening to an easily accessible information from their party elite making partisan bias a “pervasive and dynamic force shaping citizens’ perceptions of and reactions to, the political world” (Bartels, 2002). Self-interest can help indicate how an opinion was created, but it is not the best tools for it can be limited by the lack of knowledge a person possesses. In a series of surveys administered from 20102015, more than 60% of all Democrat respondents stated that they favored ACA compared to only 13% of Republicans, however, “during this same period, about half of the public has indicated that they do not have enough information to understand how the law will impact them personally” (McCabe, 2016). If the public does not understand the tangible consequences

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the ACA would have on their lives then “it is unlikely for other factors, such as self-interest, to have a major influence” in their opinion formations (McCabe, 2016). People with direct experience with the ACA will use that experience to help inform their opinions over their partisanship. This may temper their bias; however, it does not affect the overall cause of their “partisan motivated reasoning” (McCabe, 2016).

There are regional patterns to opinions. On a regional scale, partisan bias is the strongest and only factor that mattered in the formation of opinions on the ACA. Residents in New England and the Pacific States are constantly more likely to approve of the ACA, however, those in the East South Central and the West North Central regions are more likely to see the law negatively (Brodie, Deane, & Cho, 2011). The opinions in these regions correlate to the proportions of registered Democrat and Republicans in each. Even when other factors were taken into account, such as age and race, all indications point to them being irrelevant and symbolic perception being the most constant indicator (Brodie et al., 2011).

When considering the income of these regions there still remained no effect. The coverage expansions in the ACA are geared toward the uninsured and low-income individuals or families; however, “there is no correlation... between the percentage of each division’s population that is either uninsured or living below the federal poverty level and that region’s support for the ACA” ((Brodie et al., 2011). In fact, these figures were often reversed, with the region that had the most residents living under the poverty line having the least positive views on the ACA and those with the most insured individuals having the highest regard for the law. This study concluded that “health reform for many Americans to be an issue evaluated through the lens of political ideology and partisan affiliation and less through the lens of real-world experience” ((Brodie et al., 2011).

Symbolic perceptions, self-interest, and knowledge on the ACA all work together to help individuals create their own personal opinions on the legislation.

Above them all, it is a person’s symbolic perceptions that paves the way to understanding the base reasons to explain why a person possesses their particular view. Knowledge and self-interest are secondary factors that help push and maintain an individual in their ideological understanding of the world, but once these symbolic perceptions are formed a person’s partisan bias becomes the easiest route to opinion formation.

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Affordable Care Act Survey (Control) 1. Have you heard of the Affordable Care Act? a. Yes b. No c. Unsure 2. How much do you know about the Affordable Care Act? a. Knowledgeable b. Slightly knowledgeable c. No knowledge 3. Does the Affordable Care Act allow young adults to stay on their parents’ insurance until the age of 26? a. Yes b. No c. unsure 4. Does the Affordable Care Act require large companies to provide health insurance to all employees? a. Yes b. No c. Unsure 5. Did the Affordable Care Act help to expand Medicaid? a. Yes b. No c. Unsure 6. Do you have Healthcare insurance? a. Yes b. Yes, but under my parents c. No d. Unsure

Methodology

The evidence in this study used quantitative date to determine the relationship between partisan bias and how it affects opinions on the Affordable Care Act. This data was gathered through the means of an experimental survey which was distributed to students of Cal Poly Pomona (CPP). CPP is a public university that is a part of the California State University System and is located in Southern California, within the borders of Los Angeles County.

Surveys were chosen as the vehicle for data gathering in this research for the reason that they are able to gather information on a large participatory base in a generally short amount of time. In this regard, it

AUBREY ACKERMANN 7. Which of the following best describes your thoughts on the Affordable Care Act? a. Approve b. Disapprove c. Indifferent d. Unsure 8. Should the Affordable Care Act be repealed? a. Yes b. Yes, but it should be replaced with something else c. No d. No, but it should be improved upon 9. Does your employer offer medical benefits? a. Yes b. No c. Unsure d. Not applicable 10. Has the Affordable Care Act affected you or anyone you know? a. Yes, in a positive way b. Yes, in a negative way c. No d. Unsure 11. Do you agree with a government program aimed at improving the quality of health care for the poor? a. I agree b. I somewhat agree c. I somewhat disagree d. I disagree

allows the study to have a higher external validity in explaining how partisan bias affects an individual’s opinion on the Affordable Care Act. When survey research is properly done, the results are then able to be generalized to an even larger population. In these same regards, however, survey research does not explain why partisan bias affects people’s opinions on the Affordable Care Act, thus it has limited internal validity. This shortcoming aside, surveys were the best approach because it allowed for the conduction of an experiment to isolate political bias as the key element in the formation of an individual’s attitude on the health care bill. The object of the control group in this experiment was to confirm that concepts of health care in the ACA, once removed from the sting

OBAMACARE: POLITICAL PERCEPTION

Affordable Care Act Survey (Control) 12. Do you agree with a government program aimed at improving access to healthcare for the uninsured? a. I agree b. I somewhat agree c. I somewhat disagree d. I disagree 13. Do you believe the government should require all individuals to have healthcare insurance? a. Yes b. No c. unsure 14. Do you agree with the idea of guaranteeing individuals with preexisting conditions cannot be discriminated against by insurance companies? a. I agree b. I somewhat agree c. I somewhat disagree d. I disagree 15. Do you agree with payment limits to doctors and hospitals? a. I agree b. I somewhat agree c. I somewhat disagree d. I disagree 16. Should the government work on reducing the cost of Medicare? a. Yes b. No c. Unsure 17. What is your age? a. 18-19 b. 20-21 c. 22-23 d. 24-25 e. Other_____

of political ideology, are thought of in general to be necessary and beneficial to the U.S healthcare system. The experimental group confirmed that once partisan bias was added to the situation people defaulted to their de facto beliefs without thinking about the individual concepts of the Affordable Care Act. The survey experiment was conducted by separating the participants into two groups by the type

33

18. What is your political party affiliation? a. Democrat b. Independent c. Republican d. Unaffiliated e. Other party 19. What is your ideological views? a. Very Liberal b. Liberal c. Somewhat Liberal d. Moderate e. Somewhat Conservative f. Conservative g. Very conservative 20. What is your ethnicity? a. White (non-Hispanic) b. Latin/Hispanic c. African-American d. Asian/Pacific Islander e. Other____________ f. mixed 21. What is your combined family income? a. 0-$25,000 b. $26,000-$50,000 c. $51,000-$75,000 d. $76,000-$100,000 e. ^ $100,000 22. What is the highest level of education com pleted by either of your parents? a. No High school diploma/ GED b. High School/ GED c. Associate Degree d. Bachelors Degree e. Masters Degree f. Doctorate Degree g. other 23. What is your gender? a. Male b. Female c. Other of survey they were given. The first group was the control group. This group was given a general survey that asked for basic demographic information such as race, gender, and socioeconomic status. This information was used to determine that, regardless of these factors, partisan bias was the most important indicator of a person’s attitude on the Affordable Care Act. This group was asked their political affili-

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AUBREY ACKERMANN

most important factor in the formation of attitudes ation: Democrat, Independent, or Republican. Their on the Affordable Care Act. By using the demoparticular feelings about the act were derived by a graphic information provided in the survey, severseries of questions that addressed concepts covered al alternative hypotheses, in addition to my primaby the bill without actually stating its name. Such ry hypothesis, were tested in this study to further issues inquired upon involved their attitudes on: prove that partisan bias was the best indicator of improving the quality of healthcare for the poor, aca CPP student’s opinion on the ACA over any faccess to healthcare for the uninsured, and access for tors of self-interest or knowledge on the bill itself. those with preexisting conditions, to name a few.

The second group, the experimental group, was given a similar survey as the first, except that it used triggering phrases such as “Obamacare” and individual mandate to bring to the surface the participants’ Affordable Care Act Survey subconscious ideological views. This survey also (Experimental) used iconographic symbols of both the Democrat and Republican parties such as the donkey and elephant respectively. At the top of this form, participants in 1. Have you heard of “Obamacare”? the experimental group were able to see a quote on a. Yes the Affordable Care Act given by President Obama b. No at Prince George’s Community College in Maryland c. Unsure during a speech in 2013, “in the wealthiest nation on Earth, no one should go broke just because they 2. How much do you know about “Obamacare”? get sick”. The experimental group was also asked a. Knowledgeable the same questions as the first group in regards to b. Slightly knowledgeable their demographic information. All questions givc. No knowledge en on both surveys were close ended questions of varying types; asking for yes or no answers to choosing an idea that best fit their own opinions.

Hypotheses: These surveys were distributed in paper form to students of Primary hypothesis: CPP at several random times a The political perceptions of a Cal Poly Pomona student day at varying location including, have an effect on their opinion of the ACA. but not limited to, the Library, the Bric, and the Bronco Student Center. It was also distributed on Alternative hypothesis 1: at least every day of the week to The ethnicity of a Cal Poly Pomona student has an ensure the greatest diversity of stueffect on their opinion of the ACA. dents to be sampled as possible.

As a result of the time restraints enacted on this study, a conveAlternative hypothesis 2: nience sample was used to gather The gender of a Cal Poly Pomona student has an effect this data. This caused the data to on their opinion of the ACA. not be a perfect representation of the student population of CPP as Alternative hypothesis 3: a whole. This, in turn, reflects the ability of these findings to be exThe age of a Cal Poly Pomona student has an effect on trapolated to different populations. their opinion of the ACA. The data gathered by these two surveys were then coded usAlternative hypothesis 4: ing SPSS. This coded data was The amount of knowledge a Cal Poly Pomona student then put through two main tests, the independent sample T-Test has on the ACA has an effect on their opinion of the as well as the Chi-Square test, to ACA. isolate partisan bias as the single

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Affordable Care Act Survey (Experimental) 3. Does “Obamacare” allow young adults to stay on their parents’ insurance until the age of 26? a. Yes b. No c. unsure 4. Does “Obamacare” require large companies to provide health insurance to all employees? a. Yes b. No c. Unsure 5. Did the “Obamacare” help to expand Medicaid? a. Yes b. No c. Unsure 6. Do you have healthcare insurance? a. Yes b. Yes, but under my parents c. No d. Unsure

11. Do you agree with a government program aimed at improving the quality of health care for the poor? a. I agree b. I somewhat agree c. I somewhat disagree d. I disagree 12. Do you agree with a government program aimed at improving access to healthcare for the uninsured? a. I agree b. I somewhat agree c. I somewhat disagree d. I disagree 13. Do you believe the government should force all individuals to have healthcare insurance? a. Yes b. No c. unsure

7. Which of the following best describes your thoughts on “Obamacare”? a. Approve b. Disapprove c. Indifferent d. Unsure

14. Do you agree with the idea of guaranteeing individuals with preexisting conditions cannot be discriminated against by insurance companies? a. I agree b. I somewhat agree c. I somewhat disagree d. I disagree

8. Should “Obamacare” be repealed? a. Yes b. Yes, but it should be replaced with something else c. No d. No, but it should be improved upon

15. Do you agree with payment limits to doctors and hospitals? a. I agree b. I somewhat agree c. I somewhat disagree d. I disagree

9. Does your employer offer medical benefits? a. Yes b. No c. Unsure d. Not applicable

16. Should the government work on reducing the cost of Medicare? a. Yes b. No c. Unsure

10. Has “Obamacare” affected you or anyone you know? a. Yes, in a positive way b. Yes, in a negative way c. No d. Unsure

17. What is your age? a. 18-19 b. 20-21 c. 22-23 d. 24-25 e. Other_____

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Affordable Care Act Survey (Experimental) 18. What is your political party affiliation? a. Democrat b. Independent c. Republican d. Unaffiliated e. Other party

21. What is your combined family income? a. 0-$25,000 b. $26,000-$50,000 c. $51,000-$75,000 d. $76,000-$100,000 e. ^ $100,000

19. What is your ideological views? a. Very Liberal b. Liberal c. Somewhat Liberal d. Moderate e. Somewhat Conservative f. Conservative g. Very conservative

22. What is the highest level of education com pleted by either of your parents? a. No High school diploma/ GED b. High School/ GED c. Associate Degree d. Bachelors Degree e. Masters Degree f. Doctorate Degree g. other

20. What is your ethnicity? a. White (non-Hispanic) b. Latin/Hispanic c. African-American d. Asian/Pacific Islander e. Other____________ f. mixed

Results Within this section I will demonstrate the evidence I have gathered, by way of my survey experiment, to test my primary hypothesis as well as my four alternative hypotheses. I expected to find that political perception, as determined by a person’s political party affiliation, would act as the best indicator to their opinions on the Affordable Act. My alternative hypotheses, which were generated from competing ideas from the literature review, were to act as back up explanations if my primary hypothesis was proven invalid. After gathering my one hundred participants for the survey experiment, I imputed the data into SPSS, a statistical program, to test my hypotheses.

By means of crosstabs, independent-sample T-Test, and the Chi-Square test I was able to determine that political perception was the best indicator to predict an individual’s attitude toward the Affordable Act above the other possible indicators such as factors of self-interest and knowledge of the bill itself. Over the course of these next few pages, I will use several graphs and tables to effectively demonstrate how I came to prove my primary hypothesis and reject my alternative hypotheses. After imputing my results from the one hundred respondents of my survey ex-

23. What is your gender? a. Male b. Female c. Other

periment, I first checked the spread of my participants’ demographic information.

Political Party Affiliation Graph 1, opposite top, is a simple bar graph that easily conveys the frequencies of my participants’ political party affiliation. Out of the sample I was able to gather from the general population of Cal Poly Pomona students, I found that: 38 identified as Democrats, 12 as Independents, 17 as Republican, 28 as unaffiliated or not belonging to a political party, and 4 identified as belonging to a different political party than those that were listed.

Ethnicity Graph 2, opposite below, is a simple bar graph that depicts the ethnic diversity that was present in my sample population. From the individuals that provided information about their ethnicity, I found that: 28 identified as white (non-Hispanics), 35 identified themselves as Latin/Hispanic, 7 identified as African-American, 11 identified as Asian/Pacific Islander, 9 individuals did not identify with any of the previously mentioned ethnicities, and 10 identified as

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Graph I: Demographics / Party Affiliation

38% Democrat

12%

17%

28%

Independent Republican Unaffiliated

4% Other

Graph 2: Demographics / Ethnicity

28%

35%

White Latin/Hispanic (non-Hispanic)

7% AfricanAmerican

11%

9%

10%

Asian/Pacific Islander

Other

Mixed

mixed between two or more of the aforementioned ethnicities.

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Graph 3: Gender

Gender and Age Graph 3, right, is a simple bar graph that is able to illustrate the spread I gathered in regards to my participants’ gender. From the individuals that provided information regarding their gender, I found that: 48 identified as male, and 48 identified as female. I must point out that it is unusual to get such an even spread when randomly walking up to students and asking them if they would agree to participate in my survey experiment, but these results were not engineered to appear like this.

48%

48%

Male

Female

Graph 4: Age

28%

48%

14%

18-19

20-21

22-23

Graph 4, which is listed above, is a simple bar graph that depicts the variety of age groups that participated in my survey experiment. Every student that agreed to take my survey also provided information on their age. My data shows that 26 individuals aged

9% 24-26

3% Older

18-19, 48 individuals aged 20-21, 14 individuals aged 22-23, 9 individuals aged 24-25, and 3 individuals who claimed to be older took part in this experiment.

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Graph 5: Demographics - General Knowlege of the ACA/OC

12% All answers wrong

40%

27%

One answer right

Two answers right

Graph 5, which is listed above, is a simple bar graph that indicates the general knowledge on the Affordable Act the students who participated in the survey experiment possessed at the time they answered the questions. I calculated this variable by asking three simple questions that should be common knowledge about the bill (these questions, and the possible choices attributed to them, can be found on the sample survey used for this thesis which can be located in the appendix). In SPSS I recoded the questions as right or wrong. I gave the correct answers a value of 1 and the incorrect answers a value of 0. I was then able to add all of the questions together in order to obtain a range. Individuals that had a score of 3 answered all 3 questions correctly and individuals that obtained a score of 0 did not answer any of the questions correctly. Students that ranged between those two values answered both correctly

3% All answers right

and incorrectly on some of the questions. Using this model for determining a Cal Poly Pomona student’s general knowledge on the Affordable Act, I found that 30 individuals did not answer a single question right, 40 answered only one question correctly, 27 answered two questions correctly, and 3 answered all three questions correctly.

Once all of my data was coded in SPSS and I determined the frequencies of all of my relevant demographic variables, the first item I needed to test was my survey experiment itself. I wished to see if there was a difference in responses between my control group and my treatment group (an example of these two survey forms can be located in the appendix). I tested my survey form against three separate variables using an independent-sample T-Test, I also included a crosstab of my data to effectively demonstrate the spread of my results.

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Table 1.1: Survey Effect on Recognition of the ACA/OC Survey Form

Have you heard of the ACA/OC? Yes Affordable Care 36 (41.9%) Act Obama Care 50 (51.8%)

No 11 (100%)

Unsure 3 (100%)

0 (0.0%)

0 (0.0%)

Table 1.1, which is listed above, is a crosstab that compares the survey form a Cal Poly Pomona student received and their corresponding answer to the question asking if they had ever heard of the Affordable Act or “Obamacare”. The data table above shows that only 36 of the 50 students who took the control survey had heard of the Affordable Act before. 11 students claimed that they had never heard of the bill before and 3 were unsure.

The treatment group, on the other hand, had a starkly different spread with all 50 respondents claiming to have heard about “Obamacare” before they took this survey. This data spread would suggest that the survey form and the language used on it did have an influencing effect on the student’s answers.

Table 1.2, at right, is a simple data table that shows the results of the independent-sample T-Test that was preformed between these two variables. The T value was -2.442. The most important item on this table, however, is the significance value. My significance value for this particular test was .017. This means that there is only a 1.7% probability that the relationship between these two variables was caused by chance. This proves that there is a significant relationship between the survey form a student was given and their corresponding answer.

Table 1.2: T-Test for Survey Form and Recognition of the ACA/OC Value T-Test -2.442 Significance .017

Table 2.1: Survey Effect on Having an Opinion on the ACA/OC Survey Form

People who are Unsure vs Sure Unsure Affordable Care Act 20 (80.0%) “Obamacare”

5 (20.0%)

Sure 30 (40.0%) 45 (60.0%)

Table 2.1, which is listed above, is a crosstabs table that compares the variables of the survey form with students who had an opinion on the bill or not. In this case, individuals who said they either approved, were indifferent, or disapproved of the bill were marked as sure, while students who said they were unsure about their opinion on the bill were kept as unsure. In total, 75 individuals gave some form of an opinion on the bill with 25 individuals giving an answer of being unsure about their stance on the matter. The table shows that students who were given the control survey form, the form that calls the bill the Affordable Act, were more likely to be unsure of their opinion with 20 students answering as such and 30 students actually having an opinion. The treatment group, on the other hand, were much more likely to have some form of an opinion with 45 participants having an opinion and only 5 stating that they were unsure about their stance on the bill. This would suggest that the treatment survey succeeded in generating more responses that contained an opinion on the bill, while the respondents

OBAMACARE: POLITICAL PERCEPTION with the control survey were more likely to be less decisive.

Table 2.2, which is listed above, is a simple table that contains the results from the independent-sample T-Test preformed on the survey forms and the variable in which it was determined if the students who participated in the survey experiment had an opinion on the bill or not. The T value for this test was 4.056 and the significance value was .000. This means that there is a 0.0% probability that the relationship between these two variables was caused by chance. I can state with certainty that my survey form had a significant effect on whether a Cal Poly Pomona student had an opinion on the bill or not.

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Table 2.2: T-Test Survey Form on Having an Opinion on the ACA/OC Value T-Test 4.056 Significance ..000

Table 3.1: Survey Effect on Thoughts on the ACA/OC Survey Form

Thoughts on the ACA/OC Yes Affordable Care 22 Act (53.7%) Obama Care 19 (46.3%)

Table 3.1, which is listed above, is a crosstab that depicts the relationship between the survey form a student received and their opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” itself. This table shows that students who received the control survey form were more likely to approve of the bill than students who were given the treatment survey who were more likely to be indifferent to it. 22 individuals out of the 30 who gave an opinion on the Affordable Act approved of the bill with 7 being indifferent and only 1 disapproving of it. The students in the treatment group, on the other hand, were more likely to be indifferent on the bill with only 19 students approving of “Obamacare”, 24 being indifferent to it, and 2 disapproving of the bill. This would suggest that the control survey form brought out more positive opinions on the bill while the treatment form caused people to be more cautious.

Table 3.2, right, is a simple table that shows the results of the independent-sample T-Test that looked at the relationship between the survey forms and the opinions of the Cal Poly Pomona students who took the survey. The T value for this test was -3.656. The significance value was .000. This means that there is a 0.0% probability that the relationship between these two variables is caused by chance. This indicates that

No 7 (22.6%) 24 (77.4%)

Unsure 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%)

my survey experiment had a significant effect on Cal Poly Pomona students’ opinions on the bill.

After testing the effect my survey forms had on several variables, I switched gears and focused on testing my hypotheses. I began with my primary hypothesis and used the party affiliation variable to represent a Cal Poly Pomona student’s political perception. To test the effect party affiliation had on an individual’s opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” I used two different variables. The first was the simple self-reported answers about their opinions on the bill itself and the second was a summation of their opin-

Table 3.2: T-Test for Survey Form and Thoughts on the ACA/OC Value T-Test -3.656 Significance ..000 ions on the individual policies within the bill. To test my primary hypothesis, I used crosstab and the ChiSquare test.

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Table 4.1: The Effect of Party Affiliation on Thoughts on the ACA/OC Party Affiliation

Thoughts on the ACA/OC Approve Democrats 27 (65.9%) Independents 5 (12.2%) Republicans 2 (4.9%) Unaffiliated 6 (14.6%) Other Party 1 (2.4%)

Indifferent 4 (12.9%) 3 (9.7%) 10 (32.3%) 14 (45.2%) 0 (0.0%)

Disapprove 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)

Table 4.1, which is listed above, shows a crosstab table that compares a person’s political party affiliation, the independent variable, and their opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” , the dependent variable. This table depicts that a student who identified as a Democrat was much more likely to approve of the bill over any other party affiliation. Out of those who identified as Democrats, 27 approved of the bill, which made up 65.9% of all approval respondents, only 4 claimed to be indifferent to the bill and 1 said they disapproved of it. From the 9 independents that gave information on their opinion, 5 approved of the bill, with 3 being indifferent and 1 disapproving it. Republicans were much more likely to be indifferent to the bill with only 2 individuals approving the bill and 10 claiming to be indifferent, no Republicans claimed outright that they disapproved of the bill. Students that claimed to not belong to a political party acted similar to Republicans in being more likely to be indifferent to the bill. Only 6 out of the 20 individuals in this category stated that they approved of the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” while the remainders stood indifferent to it. There was only 1 individual who belonged to another political party that answered the question about their opinion on the bill, and they approved of it. This supports my primary hypothesis that states political perception does have an impact on a Cal Poly Pomona student’s opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” . This also supports my argument that students that lean to the left on the political spectrum would support the bill more often than those who lean to the right.

Table 4.2, right, is a simple table that depicts the results of the Chi-Square test between the variables of party affiliation and a students’ self-reported opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare”. The Chi-Square value for this test was 29.920. The significance value was .000. This means that there is a 0.0% chance that the relationship between these two variables was caused by chance. Thus, I can conclude that a students’ party affiliation does have a significant effect on their opinion toward the Affordable Act or “Obamacare”.

Table 4.3, on the facing page, is a crosstab table that still looks at the effect of party affiliation on a student’s opinion on the bill; however, this time I separated the test between the two survey forms to determine if the survey had any additional effect between this already significant relationship. There was a significant relationship between these three

Table 4.2: Chi-Square Part Affiliation vs Thoughts Value Chi-Square 29.920 Significance ..000 variables, but only in regards to the treatment survey form. The control survey showed no effect between party affiliation and a student’s opinion on the bill.

The data spread was similar to that in table 4.1 with more Democrats being in favor of the bill and more Republicans being indifferent toward it; in fact, in this table not a single Republican said they approved of it. The table shows 13 Democrats, which made up 68.4% of this column, approved of the bill and the remaining 4 were indifferent. Independents were evenly

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Table 4.3: The Effect of Party Affiliation on Thoughts on the ACA/OC on the Obama Care Form Party Affiliation

Thoughts on the ACA/OC Approve Democrats 13 (68.4%) Independents 2 (10.5%) Republicans 0 (0.0%) Unaffiliated 3 (15.8%) Other Party 1 (5.3%)

split on this table with having 2 respondents in both categories of approval and indifference. All 9 respondents of the Republican category were indifferent to the bill. Out of those who claimed to have no party affiliation, only 3 approved of the bill while the remaining 9 stayed indifferent toward it. In similar fashion as table 4.1 only one individual claimed to be of a different political party and they approved of “Obamacare” . These results suggest that my survey form succeeded in drawing out the students’ political ideology that is based on their party affiliation to help them determine their opinions on “Obamacare” .

Table 4.4: Chi-Square Party Affiliation vs Thoughts on the Obama Care Form Value Chi-Square 25.794 Significance .001 Table 4.4, which is listed above, is a simple table that depicts the results of the Chi-Square test on the effect of a students’ party affiliation on their opinion toward the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” with the added effect of my treatment survey form. The Chi-Square value for this test was 25.794. The significance value for this test was .001. This means that there is only a 0.1% probability that the relationship between these three variables was due to chance. This proves that the survey form had an added effect on

Indifferent 4 (16.7%) 2 (8.3%) 9 (37.5%) 9 (37.5%) 0 (0.0%)

Disapprove 0 (0.0%) 1 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)

the relationship between these two factors. This helps to further prove my hypothesis, that political perceptions can act as an indicator for a person’s opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” , because my treatment form was meant to draw on a person’s political ideology. To make them invoke their political ideologies and think along their own party lines.

Table 5.1, on the next page, depicts a crosstab table between a student’s party affiliation and their personal views on the individual policies within the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” itself. The way in which I measured the later variable was by asking six different questions regarding actual policies within the bill itself without invoking the name. I then gave them a range to answer from beginning with strongly agree and ending with strongly disagree (an example of the survey questions, both control and treatment forms are available in the appendix). I then gave each answer a value with strongly disagree at 0 and strongly agree at 5, the values in between being taken up by the rest of the choices. I then added their answers together creating a new variable. The higher their score the more supportive they were on the individual policies within the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” . I then separated the total scores into factions, not supportive, somewhat supportive, and supportive. It turned out that no one in the data set was not supportive of the individual policies within the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” . The data spread is not as clear to read as the previous tables. Those who identified as Democrats were more likely to be supportive of the policies with 31 being supportive and only 5 being somewhat supportive. Independents also followed

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Table 5.1: The Effect of Party Affiliation on Views of Individual Policies within the ACA/OC Party Affiliation

Views on Individual Policies of ACA/OC Somewat Supportive Democrats 5 (27.8%)

Supportive 31 (41.9%)

Independents

2 (11.1%)

9 (12.2%)

Republicans

7 (38.9%)

10 (13.5%)

Unaffiliated

3 (16.7%)

23 (31.1%)

Other Party

1 (5.6%)

1 (1.4%)

this trend with 9 being supportive and only 2 being somewhat supportive. There were 10 Republicans that were supportive of the policies in the bill with 7 being som e value for this test was 8.037.

The significance value for this test was .090. This significance value, however, determines that there is no significant relationship between these two variables because it is above the .050 threshold it needed to be under in order to for this relationship to be seen as significant. The lack of a significant relationship between these two variables also provides more support for my primary hypothesis which states that political perception has an impact on the views of a Cal Poly Pomona student’s opinions on the Affordable Act. It supports my hypothesis because in this test they were not looking at the bill as a whole, there was no party brand name to invoke. The participants were simply answering for themselves without the guide of their political ideologies. After testing my primary hypothesis, I set about testing my alternative hypotheses.

Table 6.1, facing page, is a crosstabs table that shows the relationship between the ethnicity of Cal Poly Pomona students and their opinions on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare”. Out of those who self-identified as White (non-Hispanic), 8 approved of the bill, with 11 being indifferent and only 2 disapproving of it. From the largest self-reported ethnic

Table 5.2: Chi-Square Party Affiliation vs Views on Individual Policies Value Chi-Square 8.037 Significance .090 group, Latin/Hispanic, 19 individuals approved of the bill with only 8 being indifferent and no one disapproving it. Out of the 5 respondents that said they were of African-American heritage, 2 approved of the bill, while 2 others were indifferent and only 1 being in disapproval of it. From the Asian/ Pacific Islander category 6 individuals approved of the bill while 5 were indifferent and no one disapproving of it. From those who did not identify with the previously mentioned ethnicities only 1 approved of the bill with the remaining 2 being indifferent. Finally, of those who claimed to be of mixed heritage 5 approved of the bill with 3 being indifferent to it. At a glance, there seems to be no strong relationship between ethnicity and a student’s opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare”, but the first Chi-Square test must be looked at to state that with confidence.

Table 6.2, which is listed on the facing page, is a simple table that depicts the results of the Chi-Square

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Table 6.1: The Effect of Ethnicity on Thoughts on the ACA/OC Ethnicity

Thoughts on the ACA/OC White (non-Hispanic) Latin/Hispanic African-American Asian/Pacific Islander Other Mixed

Table 6.2: Chi-Square Ethnicity vs Thoughts Value Chi-Square 11.628 Significance .311 test on the effect of the ethnicity of a student and their opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare”. The Chi-Square value for this test was 11.628. The Significance value for this test was .311. This means that there is a 31.1% chance that the relationship between these two variables was due to chance. This is much too high to be deemed to have any effect. Even after recoding ethnicity into several different variables to focus on the individual ethnic category, for example creating a variable looking only at White (non-His-

Approve 8 (19.5%) 19 (46.3%) 2 (4.9%) 6 (14.6%) 1 (2.4%) 5 (12.2%)

Indifferent 11 (35.5%) 8 (25.8%) 2 (6.5%) 5 (16.1%) 2 (6.5%) 3 (9.7%)

Disapprove 2 (66.7%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)

panic) and coding every other group as non-white, there was still no significant relationship between ethnicity and a Cal Poly Pomona student’s opinions on the bill. These results help to reject my first alternative hypothesis that claims ethnicity has an effect on a student’s opinion on the Affordable Act. Table 7.1, which is listed below, is a crosstabs table that shows the relationship between Gender and a student’s thoughts on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” . The data showed that out of the male respondents 16 approved of the bill, with 13 being indifferent toward it, and 3 stating that they disapproved of the bill. The Female category, on the other hand, had 24 individuals claim to approve of the bill with 15 stating that they were indifferent toward it, and no one disapproving it. It is difficult to determine any relationship without looking at the results of the test, as was the case with ethnicity.

Table 7.1: The Effect of Gender on Thoughts on the ACA/OC Gender

Thoughts on the ACA/OC Approve Male 16 (40.0%) Female 24 (60.0%)

Indifferent 13 (46.4%) 15 (53.6%)

Disapprove 3 (100%) 0 (0.0%)

46 Table 7.2, right, is a simple table that depicts the results of the independent-sample T-Test on the effect of the gender of a Cal Poly Pomona student and their opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” . The T value for this test was 1.520. The significance value was .133. This means that there is a 13.3% probability that the relationship between these two variables was caused by random chance. This is far above the .050 significant value range it must be below to be considered significant. Thus, we can conclude that there is no significant relationship between gender and a student’s opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare”. This acts as evidence against my second alternative hypotheses.

AUBREY ACKERMANN

Table 7.2: T-Test Gender vs Thoughts Value T-Test 1.520 Significance .133

Table 8.1: The Effect of Age on Thoughts on the ACA/OC Age

Thoughts on the ACA/OC Approve 18-19 9 (22.0%) 20-21 18 (43.9%) 22-23 7 (17.1%) 24-25 5 (12.2%) Older 2 (4.9%)

Table 8.1, which is listed above, is a crosstabs table that shows the relationship between the age of the students and their opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare”. For the variable of age, I started at the age of 18 and continued upward separating the choices into five distinct categories. Out of the individuals that reported being in the age range of 18-19, 9 of them claimed to approve of the bill, with 6 being indifferent and only 1 stating to disapprove of it. For those who stated they were between the ages of 20-21, 18 approved of the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” with 19 being indifferent and 2 claiming to disapprove of it. Out of the 10 individuals who fell in the 22-23 age range, 7 claimed to be in approval of the bill with 3 stating that they were indifferent toward it.

Only 7 individuals claimed to be in the age group of 24-25, 5 of them approved of the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” with the remaining 2 being indifferent toward it. Finally, out of those who were older than

Indifferent 6 (19.4%) 19 (61.3%) 3 (9.7%) 2 (6.5%) 1 (3.2%)

Disapprove 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)

Table 8.2: Chi-Square Age vs Thoughts Value Chi-Square 3.724 Significance .881 25, 2 approved of the bill, with 1 being indifferent and no one disapproving of it. As with the last two test, no conclusion can be drawn without first looking at the significance value.

Table 8.2, which is listed above, is a simple table that shows the results of the Chi-Square test on the effect of a Cal Poly Pomona student’s age on their opinion of the Affordable Acre Act or “Obamacare”.

The Chi-Square value for this test was 3.724. The significance value for this test was .881. This means

OBAMACARE: POLITICAL PERCEPTION

47

Table 9.1: The Effect of General Knowledge on Thoughts on the ACA/OC General Knowledge of the ACA/OC

Thoughts on the ACA/OC Approve No Answers 5 Right (12.2%)

Indifferent 9 (29.0%)

Disapprove 1 (33.3%)

One Answer Right

16 (39.0%)

15 (48.4%)

2 (66.7%)

Two Answers Right

18 (43.9%)

7 (22.6%)

0 (0.0%)

All Answers Right

2 (4.9%)

0 (0.0%)

0 (0.0%)

that there is an 88.1% probability that the relationship between these two variables was caused by chance.

This signifies that there is no significant relationship between a student’s age and their opinion on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare”. This is strong evidence against my third alternative hypothesis that claimed age had an effect on a student’s opinion of the bill.

Table 9.1, which is listed above, is a crosstab table that depicts the relationship between a Cal Poly Pomona student’s general knowledge on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” and their opinion on the bill itself. The method in which I determined their general knowledge on the bill can be found above, just below graph 5. Out of the individuals that answered not one of the three questions write, 5 approved of the bill, 9 claimed to be indifferent toward it, and 1 disapproved on it. From the students that answered only one question correctly, 16 approved of the bill, with 15 being indifferent and 2 claiming to disapprove of it. Out of the individuals that answered two of the three questions correctly, 18 approved of the bill with 7 being indifferent toward it and not a single person stating they disapproved it. Finally, from the two that answered all three questions correctly, both approved of the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” . As with the previous three test, it is difficult to determine the relationship between these variables without the Chi-Square test.

Table 9.2, right, is a simple table that depicts the results of the Chi-Square test on the effect of the general knowledge a student had on the Affordable Act

Table 9.2: Chi-Square General Knowledge vs Thoughts Value Chi-Square 8.604 Significance .197 or “Obamacare” and their opinion on that same bill.

The Chi-Square value for this test was 8.604. The significance value was .197. This means that there is a 19.7% probability that the relationship between these two variables was caused by chance. This significance value is above the .050 threshold it needs to be below in order to be considered significant. Therefore, there is no significant relationship between a Cal Poly Pomona student’s general knowledge on the Affordable Act or “Obamacare” and their opinion on that same bill. This acts as evidence against my fourth alternative hypothesis. The full impact and conclusions that have been drawn from the completion of these various tests will be discussed in detail in the next section.

Conclusion There is no doubt that a person is the culmination of many identifying factors; however, it is only one of those identifying factors that best describes how a person forms their opinion on the Affordable Care Act. The results of the data analysis from my survey experiment clearly show that political perception, as

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AUBREY ACKERMANN

determined by party affiliation, is the best indicator in predicting a person’s opinion on the ACA. Even when taking in to account those other factors of self-interest, such as: ethnicity, gender, and age, as well as a person’s knowledge of the bill, it was only party affiliation that had any significant relationship with a person’s opinion on the ACA. My survey experiment helped to prove this point to a further extent by demonstrating that people were much more inclined to think along party lines when their political ideology was invoked. When individuals were given the control survey, they did not typically see the polarization of the bill. Many of them were not sure what the ACA was, but when the participants were given the treatment survey, which used the highly-polarized term of “Obama Care”, every single person had heard of it, and they used their party alliance to determine their opinion. I must note that it seems odd that not a single Republican disapproved of the bill, even when the majority of them did not approve of it. There could be many possible explanations for this. I believe, however, it would be of interest to the topic of research to determine if there is a difference in views held on health care

by Republicans in California in comparison to those within other states. Since California is an extremely Liberal state, Republicans in the area may be more agreeable to some form of a governmental healthcare program while still not completely being satisfied with the current Affordable Care Act legislation. As such, more research is needed to be done on this particular subject.

In conclusion, I was able to accept my primary hypothesis, which states that the political perception of a Cal Poly Pomona student does affect their opinion on the Affordable Care Act. In conjunction, I was

also able to reject my alternative hypotheses. The rejection of my alternative hypotheses only helped to strengthen my primary hypothesis. This exemplifies that political perception is used as a basis of decision making.

People use political perception as a basis for their decision-making processes because it is easy. It is no surprise that in our world today people are simply too busy either from: work, school, or some other aspect of their complex lives, to stay abreast on the constant changing environment of the political world.

By taking cues from their party elite and following the party lines, a person can mitigate the strain of needing to know the issues and their limited time to research them. This, however, can have real world consequences.

People vote based off of their opinions on certain issues. This can be considered natural, however, there is danger in this situation when that person’s opinion was not created with the backing of facts, but with their already preconceived political ideologies.

This would mean this person was not voting because they understood the issues at hand, but instead, voted based on what they thought their political party would do. It is in situations like this were voters could truly hurt themselves. When people vote blindly, not truly understanding how a given bill or proposition would affect them, they could end up passing legislation that could have a negative impact on them; or conversely, striking down a bill that would have benefited them because they did not know what they were actually voting on. This is a serious matter that should be addressed and have further research done on its effect on society; for, it is a situation that effects everyone who lives in this country

References

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Dalen, J. E., Waterbrook, K., & Alpert, J. S. (2015).

Why do so Many Americans Oppose the Affordable Care Act?. American Journal of Medicine, 128(8), 807-810.

Druckman, J. N., Fein, J., & Leeper, T. J. (2012). A Source of Bias in Public Opinion Stability. American Political Science Review, 106(2), 430-454 Fiscella, K. (2016). Why Do So Many White Americans Oppose the Affordable Care Act?.

American Journal of Medicine, 129(5), 27.

Bartels, L. M. (2002). Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions. P o l i t i cal Behavior, 24(2), 117-150.

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Brodie, M., Hamel, E. C., & Norton, M. (2015).

Medicare as Reflected in Public Opinion. Generations, 39(2), 134-141.

--- Deane, C., & Cho, S. (2011). Report from the States: Regional Variations in Public O p i n -

OBAMACARE: POLITICAL PERCEPTION

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“In the wealthiest nation on earth, no one should go broke just because they get sick” – Barack Obama

Fullerton, S., & McCullough, T. (2014). Patient Proactivity: Behaviors, Attitudes, and Its Relationship With Satisfaction With the American Health Care Delivery System.

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Gelman, A. (2011). Economic Divisions and Political Polarization in Red and Blue America. Stat.Columbia.edu.

Grande, D., Gollust, S. E., & Asch, D. A. (2011).

Polling Analysis: Public Support For Health Reform Was Broader Than Reported And Depended On How Proposals Were Framed.

Health Affairs, 30(7), 1242-1249.

Henderson, M., & Hillygus, D. S. (2011). The Dynamics of Health Care Opinion, 2008-- 2 0 1 0 : Partisanship, Self-Interest, and Racial Resentment. Journal Of Health Politics, Policy & Law, 36(6), 945-960.

Hindman, D. B. (2012). Knowledge Gaps, Belief Gaps, and Public Opinion about Health C a r e Reform. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 89(4), 585-605.

Kriner, D. L., & Reeves, A. (2014). Responsive Partisanship: Public Support for the Clinton and Obama Health Care Plans. Journal Of Health Politics, Policy & Law, 39(4), 717-749.

Lizotte, M. (2016). Investigating women’s greater support of the Affordable Care Act. S o cial Science Journal, 53(2), 209-217.

McCabe, K. (2016). Attitude Responsiveness and Partisan Bias: Direct Experience with t h e Affordable Care Act. Political Behavior, 38(4), 861-882.

Oakman, T. S., Blendon, R. J., Campbell, A. L., Zaslavsky, A. M., & Benson, J. M. (2010).

A Partisan Divide on The Uninsured. Health Affairs, 29(4), 706-711.

Pasek, J., Sood, G., & Krosnick, J. A. (2015). Misinformed About the Affordable Care A c t ?

Leveraging Certainty to Assess the Prevalence of Misperceptions. Journal of Communication, 65(4), 660-673.

Pildes, R. H. (2011). Why the Center Does Not Hold: the Cause of Hyperpolarized D e mocracy in America. California Law Review 99(2). 273-333.

Richardson, L., & Konisky D. M. (2013). Personal and Collective Evaluations of the 2 0 1 0 Health Care Reform. Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law 38(5), 921- 956.

Strickland, A. A., Taber C. S., & Lodge M. (2011).

Motivated Reasoning and Public Opinion. Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law 36(6), 935-994.

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AUBREY ACKERMANN

Aubrey Ackermann

Aubrey Ackermann is a senior in the Political Science major with an emphasis in comparative politics. Her expected graduation date is in June 2017. She plans to move on to law school.

Email: aaackermann@cpp.edu

Self-Represented Litigants: Analysis of Senior Internship served at the Pomona Superior Courthouse

Annaliz Loera California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

The Superior Courts have seen the number of self-represented litigants increase over the last few decades. Self-represented litigants are those who choose to go through the court process without an attorney. The growing number of self-represented litigants causes a great challenge for the courts, especially in family law. This paper will explain the effectiveness of the Los Angeles Superior Courts Self-Help Centers. The literature review will analyze the problems and solutions for meeting the needs of self-represented litigants. The analysis will come from my intern experience at the Pomona-Self Help Center. The effectiveness of Self-Help Centers will be evaluated through scholarly work and my internship.

I

interned at the Self-Help Center located in the Pomona Superior Courthouse. The purpose of the center is to offer assistance and information for self-represented litigants. While the center does not represent the litigants in court, the center provides the tools so that litigants can know their rights. An attorney reviews the paperwork before the litigant files it, to ensure there are no mistakes. Located inside the courthouse, the center allows litigants to easily gain information about the court process before the hearing, access other programs that are offered by the court, and file with the clerk’s office on the same visit. Without the center’s easy availability, it would be difficult for these litigants to gain the knowledge needed to go through the court process without an attorney. To evaluate if the center meets the challenges of the litigants, the research question for this paper is: Are Self-Help Cen-

ters effective at meeting the needs of self-represented litigants?

This internship was selected to gain firsthand experience in the justice system. I was interested in how someone who does not have an attorney is able to navigate the court process and receive a fair outcome.

I was able to learn how to provide one-on-one assistance to litigants who came to the center. This internship allowed me to assist the community, while also seeing how the courts address the needs of self-represented litigants. Through my time at the Pomona Self-Help Center, I was given the opportunity to think critically about how effective the center is in helping these litigants and if any improvements could be made.

The literature review will explain multiple factors that scholars have found which lead to the effectiveness of Self-Help Centers. The factors that will be discussed are neutrality and impartiality, the com-

Created by Annaliz Loera, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona for her seinior internship project. Correspondence concerning this research paper should be addressed to Annaliz Loera, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, (909) 263-6730. Email: alloera@cpp.edu Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2017. Pp. 51–61. ©2017, Political Science Department, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

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52 plexity of the process, language barriers, online limitations, and complexity of the law. Scholars found that centers need to be neutral and impartial because they are available to all litigants and may assist both sides of a case. In terms of complexity of the process, because self-represented litigants feel overwhelmed with the process of opening a case, the center is able to minimize the stress by providing assistance and information about the court process. For language barriers, scholars have mixed views. Some believe the center has improved its ability to provide information in languages other than English. However, other scholars note how the center is not professionally trained to offer translation and may not correctly translate the court terminology. Online limitations will explain how scholars believe the information that is provided to litigants online is not the same quality as the information obtained from coming into the center. The last factor, the complexity of the law, will discuss how the center cannot assist all cases, and therefore, some litigants will need to hire an attorney or use another program offered by the court.

In the analysis, I use my experience as an example to draw connections to the scholars’ work.

In my experience, I have seen each of the factors: neutrality and impartiality, the complexity of the process, language barriers, and complexity of the law in practise. I will utilize the scholars’ research and my time at the Pomona Self-Help Center to evaluate how effective the center is at addressing the needs of self-represented litigants.

Literature Review

Over the years, the number of self-represented litigants has grown significantly in family courts, which leads to several challenges. Self-represented litigants choose not to hire an attorney if they cannot afford one. Some believe the case is simple enough to handle on their own (Barclay, 1996). It has been found that many of these “litigants require additional time at the clerk’s office and in the courtroom because they do not understand the procedures or limitations of the court” (Hough, 2004, pg. 306). So, the court gets packed with these litigants because they need more attention to understand what is going on with their case. Also, these litigants tend to lose more frequently and even if able to win some aspect of their litigation, self-represented litigants are likely to forfeit important legal rights during the process (Hilbert, 2009). Another challenge is that many of these litigants speak a language other than English. Since so many litigants are forced to go to court alone because of economic hardship, the justice system needs

ANNALIZ LOERA to implement services to help or else people will lose confidence in the courts (Podgers, 1994). There is no evidence that these numbers will decrease, so programs need to be created to assist self-represented litigants. One service that has been established to help self-represented litigants are Self-Help Centers. The factors of running a Self-Help Center will be evaluated to see how effective the center is at meeting the needs of self-represented litigants.

Neutrality and Impartiality Self-Help Centers provide assistance at no charge and are open to all members of the community regardless of income or immigration status. “SelfHelp Centers provide neutral, non-confidential information to all court users and must always be available to sides in any court action” and does not create attorney-client relationships (Zorza, 2009, pg.

522). Thus, the center will not represent the litigant at court but will provide information to the litigant to be able to achieve success at court. By being a neutral location, it will only provide assistance and not advice. The reason that no advice is offered is to maintain the ability to be impartial in the event that both parties of a case come to the center for help.

A center is opened through a partnership between the courts and local legal services to provide services inside the courthouse, which began in the 1990s (Hough, 2004). The location of the center allows litigants to easily access the center and use the other resources located at the court during the same day. Through the opening of the centers, litigants who often encounter problems with forms and procedures can correct their mistakes (Podgers, 1994). Problems can be solved because the center was designed to provide assistance to self-represented litigants who did not have the knowledge to fill out the paperwork on their own. By having the paperwork correctly done the first time, the litigants will not delay their case to fix mistakes.

According to researcher Michelle Flaherty, it is important to understand the assistance that is available to self-represented litigants. She explains how “assistance is not about helping one or the other party succeed; rather, it is about ensuring that all parties have a fair opportunity to present their case” (Flaherty, 2015, pg. 127). Therefore, the center is not there to help one side of a case win, but rather provide both sides with the tools to have the ability to ask for the orders he or she wishes by displaying the explanations of why those desired orders are needed. Another term Flaherty explains is impartiality. It “has been characterized as a legal boundary,”

SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS

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Table 1: Key Concepts Self-Help Center

Online Limitations

Language Barriers

Neutrality and Impartiality

Complexity of the Law Complexity of the Process

that should not be crossed. (Flaherty, 2015, pg. 135).

If the legal boundary is crossed, then not only will the outcome be illegitimate, but also the center will lose creditability. Therefore, it is important that the center is impartial in order to allow a fair outcome to be reached, while also ensuring both sides that no party was given extra assistance while at the center.

Complexity of the Process There are multiple benefits to self-help centers.

One is the service provided is cost-efficient and requires low maintenance, which is why self-help centers are likely to be the first option for courts to address the increasing numbers of self-represented litigants (Hilbert, 2009). This is typically the first place, even before filing, litigants go to in order to gain critical guidance through the entirety of the case. By knowing the court process, self-represented litigants will not overwhelm the courtroom with hearings. The assistance provided allows cases to be resolved at the first court appearance, thus there is no need for future court hearings (Greacen, 2011). Therefore, by not having to return to court, not only will the court save time, but also the litigants themselves save time because they do not have to take time off work to come to court multiple times. By going to the center, the self-represented can eliminate the confusion of court.

Judgments are the final step of the court process to finalize the orders and have an enforceable court order. This step tends to be the most challenging for self-represented litigants to handle without any assistance. Scholar John Greacen conducted a case study in the trial courts located in California’s San Joaquin Valley to evaluate the usefulness of selfhelp centers. Before the centers were established, judgements were incorrect, missing information, or lacked a proper proof of service resulting in all of them being rejected. (Greacen, 2011). In the case study, it was found that in post self-help centers all those errors were fixed and no judgments were rejected (Greacen, 2011). The centers provided the assistance needed to eliminate the struggle of judgments. Also, the time spent at a court hearing was drastically reduced because the litigants were aware of their rights and the process of the court.

The case study found that Self-Help Centers save an average of “at least one hearing per case, 5 to 15 minutes for every court hearing, and an hour of court staff time related to providing assistance to self-represented litigants and reviewing proposed judgments� (Greacen, 2011, pg. 20). Therefore, rather than taking up the time of the court, litigants who do not know the process of court or what was expected of them in a courtroom, could be directed to the center to gain this necessary knowledge.

54 Language Barriers California is a linguistically diverse state and there is an obstacle for litigants whose first language is not English to understand what is being asked in the courtroom. “Despite extensive efforts by the courts to recruit and train interpreters, the number of fully qualified court interpreters has actually declined over the past decade, with the largest single decrease in Spanish-language interpreters” (Robinson, 2008, pg. 1). This means litigants must wait for an interpreter to be done translating another case in order to have an interpreter in court with them. Another option the litigant has is going to court without an interpreter, which runs the risk of not understanding what is being asked in court. If there is no interpreter present, some litigants choose to have a third party serve as an interpreter, such as a family member or friend, to translate during the trial. However, this does not solve the problem as “study after study has shown that bilingual speakers who have no training in court interpretation cannot function adequately in a court setting” (Robinson, 2008, pg.

2). Thus, litigants who try to solve the problem on their own will not help themselves since the third party may not properly translate the judge’s questions. Litigants who have limited English proficiency should have an interpreter, but there is a high demand and not enough supply of interpreters to fulfill the litigants need, leaving them with few options.

Self-Help Centers cannot offer interpreters, but try to help litigants who do not speak proficient English to understand the court process. Court material have been translated into different languages to reflect the needs of the community (Greacen, 2011).

The translated court material offers explanations of the process, how to get orders, and what to expect in the courtroom. There are efforts to address the needs of the litigants whose primary language is not English, however, what is currently being offered does not satisfy the need for interpreters. Self-Help Centers have not offered interpreters or aid during trial because the centers do not represent the litigants.

Centers were created to offer assistance in filing the paperwork and providing information. Since there is no client relationship established, self-represented litigants still have to go to court without a staff member from the Self-Help Center. However, if a staff member were to go to court with a litigant, it would not guarantee that the staff member would offer the same quality of service as a trained interpreter. The only individual that should offer translation to self-represented litigants, who are not proficient in English, are professional interpreters.

ANNALIZ LOERA .

Online Limitations

The Judicial Council has provided self-represented litigants with the ability to gather information about court procedures without having to leave their homes. An online version of the Self-Help Center was created by the Judicial Council to provide a flexible way to reach as many litigants as possible (Hilbert, 2009). An online Self-Help Center has been created in all counties of California. The purpose of the online Self-Help Centers was to allow litigants the option of having their questions answered through the website, rather than having to go to a courthouse where a center is located. It is free to the public and is available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and can be accessed through the Internet. (Chase, 2003). Therefore, if at any time a litigant has a question regarding his or her court case, the answer can be quickly explained. The website was designed to make it easier for non-attorneys to read and understand. The website was created with self-represented litigants in mind, therefore it is written in plain English and not legal terms. This website provides over 1,000 pages of information on legal issues with step by step instructions for common proceedings. The standardized mandatory forms can now be filled out online, which allows the forms to be completed easily. Also, there are over 2,400 links to other resources that provide additional legal information (Hough, 2004). Thus, all the information that is available at the courthouse self-help centers is also available on the Internet. A few years after the website was established, a Spanish translation was made available.

While offering online Self-Help Centers can be useful for some litigants, not all the needs of litigants can be met through the website. It is beneficial to have the ability to access this resource at any time. h However, it does not provide the most useful service for self-represented litigants. What most self-represented litigants need is someone who understands the court process to explain how paperwork is filed and what to expect during the trial. As researcher Deborah Chase explains, the “personal contact between self-help staff and litigants is crucial” to verify the information is understood (2003, pg. 415). That is why if possible, litigants should go to the self-help centers located in the courthouse to have a more in-depth understanding of the court process, that cannot be offered through a computer.

Complexity of the Law Although self-help centers provide a wide array of information and assistance, not all questions can

SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS be answered at this location. To help self-represented litigants get the information and services they need, self-help centers operate as a major referral source for other sources. Thus, even if the center cannot provide assistance, a litigant’s time would not be wasted at the center because the center can provide a referral to someone who could provide the needed assistance.

Therefore, the center not only provides assistance, but also will be able to direct litigants to the resource that will offer the best assistance for his or her case.

Despite the centers’ best efforts, some litigants’ cases need an attorney. To help those litigants, selfhelp centers will refer to pro bono, legal aid, or private attorneys who provide low-cost or limited representation (Hilbert, 2009). Some attorneys who are on the referral list offer a free consultation to explain to the litigant what help the attorney can provide in gaining the orders that the litigant wishes. Another option for litigants is hiring an attorney for the most challenging aspect of the case. In addition, some attorneys will work pro bono, meaning for free, depending on the financial circumstances of the litigant.

Besides hiring an attorney, other programs offered by the court can assist a litigant when a Self-Help Center is not able to be handle the case. For example the family law facilitators, which is located inside the courthouse. The purpose of the family law facilitator is to offer assistance for those self-represented litigants who have questions regarding child support, maintenance of health insurance, and spousal support (Hough, 2004). This service works similarly to the Self-Help Center in that only assistance is provided and no attorney-client relationship is established (Hough, 2004). Litigants will be familiar with the structure and know the extent to which family law facilitators will offer assistance. The family law facilitator will provide all the information regarding monetary issues, which is not an area that Self-Help Centers assist with.

Conclusion

The challenges faced by self-represented litigants going through the court process alone need to be solved. One solution is Self-Help Centers. The tools that are available online do not provide the same level of assistance that one would receive at the courthouse location. Through Self-Help Centers, self-represented litigants have the ability to better understand the court process, while also receiving one-on-one assistance to verify the forms are filled out correctly. Information that is provided by the center is neutral and impartial to ensure the center is not giving advice. The one-on-one assistance reduces the complexity of the

55

process. If the litigant needs help that is beyond the scope of the Self-Help Center, then the litigant’s next option is being referred to an attorney, which highlights the complexity of the law and how the Self-Help Center is not able to provide assistance in all cases.

Self-Help Centers offer limited solutions to language barriers as during the most critical stage of the court process of the case, the trial, there is no help offered as the litigants will be alone. Also, not many volunteers at the center are bilingual, and those who are bilingual have not been trained to translate through the court. There are resources available for the self-represented to have their court process run as smoothly as possible, but not all challenges have been solved.

Experience

The Judicial Council allocates $1.25 million of the budget to all courts to establish or enhance self-help assistance throughout California. Of the $1.25 million, Los Angeles County receives $290,548 (Judicial Council of California, 2007). The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors then funds and develops SelfHelp Centers throughout the county. Each location is operated by Neighborhood Legal Services (NLS) staff comprised of a trained lawyer, knowledgeable professionals, and volunteers. The purpose of Self-Help Centers is to provide information and resources to litigants so they can effectively represent themselves in court. Assistance is provided for various cases including family law, divorce, paternity, guardianship, child custody, unlawful detainer, name change, civil restraining order, and civil complaints. Self-Help Centers fulfills a critical need in Los Angeles County by providing information and resources to people that are representing themselves in court without the help of an attorney. I completed my internship at the SelfHelp Center located inside the Pomona Courthouse.

The volunteers play an essential role in the SelfHelp Center. The number of volunteers that are present at the center will determine how many litigants can be assisted that day. It is the volunteers who are providing one-on-one assistance to the self-represented litigants. Thus, there is a demand for volunteers to be at the center or else only a small number of litigants can be assisted. Since the volunteers are expected to answer the questions of the litigants, it is important that they are knowledgeable about the court process and paperwork. Therefore, the training the volunteers receive at the beginning of their time at the Self-Help Center is key in being able to properly assist litigants. A new volunteer will shadow a more experienced volunteer for a few weeks in order to understand how litigants receive assis-

56 tance from the center. During the training period, the new volunteer will learn about the forms, how to complete the forms, and the court process. Then a short reverse shadow period will occur to ensure the new volunteer is able to handle a case on his or her own. During this phase of training, the roles will be reversed as the new volunteer will assist a litigant while the more experienced volunteer will sit during the one-on-one assistance to verify everything is done correctly. Once the volunteer has learned these skills, he or she can assist a litigant on his or her own.

However, the volunteer is never alone because if the volunteer has any trouble while assisting a litigant, the paralegals or attorney are always around to clarify any confusion about what assistance the litigant needs. Without knowledgeable and committed volunteers, Self-Help Centers would not be able to assist a large quantity of self-represented litigants.

One volunteer duty is working the front desk to answer questions of litigants and assigning the assistance they will receive from the center. Some litigants just want information about their case, while the majority come to the center to receive assistance.

ANNALIZ LOERA Since the center assists on a first-come, first-serve basis, the litigants that arrive early will be able to receive assistance that day. Therefore, if litigants would like to receive assistance, the center recommends arriving at 7 am. To receive assistance, the litigant will need to bring the necessary documents with them, which includes: the forms with the name and address written on each page, federal and state taxes from the past two years, if filing for a divorce, and a child support case number if there is an opn case. If the litigant arrived early enough and with the necessary information, then that litigant will be set aside and called when a volunteer is available to provide one-on-one assistance. If the litigant arrived too late in the day or did not bring the documents needed, then the center will explain that it is important to arrive early and what needs to be brought the next time the litigant comes to the center.

Another volunteer duty is providing one-on-one assistance to correctly complete the case paperwork.

Each volunteer gets assigned to sit down with a litigant to verify that all the information that is filled out on the paperwork is true and accurate. If any

Table 2: Litigation Budget Case Type

Budget Required

Percent of Total

Family Law

$20,584,368

47%

Domestic Violence

$5,084,973

12%

Guardianship

$4,190,005

10%

Conservatorship

$2,482,678

6%

Simple Probate

$1,030,124

2%

Civil (including landlord-tenant)

$5,552,868

13%

Small Claims

$4,026,797

9%

Other (including traffic, expungements etc)

$1,051,562

2%

Total

$44,003,364

100%

Combined Family and Domestic Violence

59%

Combined Probate

18%

SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS question on the paperwork causes confusion to the litigant, the volunteer will try to explain the question in terms that the litigant will understand. Once all the paperwork is complete, a paralegal will verify the paperwork is completed correctly. If there are any errors, the paralegal will explain what needs correction and the volunteer will take the forms back to the litigant to make the corrections before having the attorney at the Self-Help Center review the paperwork. If there are no corrections, then the paperwork can go directly to attorney review. The attorney will review the cases in the order in which they are completed. Once the paperwork is reviewed, the attorney will either ask that the litigant make some corrections or if there are no errors on the form, then the attorney will state copies can be made. Two copies will be made and handed back to the litigant along with the original copy. The final step in assisting a litigant is giving instructions on how to file the paperwork and the next steps in the case. Before the paperwork is filed, it has been reviewed by two professionals, which allows the litigant to be confident that the paperwork has been completed correctly.

Analysis

The literature review outlined how scholars believe Self-Help Centers address some, but not all, the challenges self-represented litigants will face during the court process. Since not all challenges are solved through the Self-Help Center, then the center is effective only to a certain extent. Through my internship experience, I had the opportunity to be involved in a Self-Help Center and learn what is required to assist self-represented litigants. I have seen connections between my experience and the scholars’ work, which will be explained in this section. This section will highlight how the Pomona Self-Help Center addresses the issues of neutrality and impartiality, the complexity of the process, language barriers, and complexity of the law.

Neutrality and Impartiality Zorza argued Self-Help Centers provide neutral and non-confidential information to all court users that is available to both sides in a court case (2009).

In many instances, one will open the case and a few weeks after, the respondent will come to the center to answer. When this happens, volunteers are to remain impartial and provide each with the same information.

Also, when providing information, the volunteer cannot advise a litigant. If a litigant asks a question that begins with “should,” the volunteer must be careful in

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answering because “should” questions tend to lead to advice. If the question begins with “could,” then that question is acceptable to answer because that is informing the litigant about the possible directions the case could go. Being able to recognize the difference between the two will take some practice, but it is an important concept to understand because this will ensure all parties have a fair opportunity. Without guaranteeing fairness, the center is at risk of going beyond its purpose and behaving like attorneys. Therefore, it is imperative that volunteers are trained properly and understand the significance of their work.

Another argument made by Hough is that a center located inside a courthouse allows litigants easy access to the services (2004). If the litigant needs to use another service located at the court, then it is easier for litigants to accomplish multiple tasks in one day.

By having the center inside the courthouse, it allows litigants to file paperwork the same day. Also, after a court hearing, a litigant can come to the center to ask about the next step of his or her case. In some instances, some litigants are missing necessary documents to receive assistance from the center that day.

To help with this potential problem, the center will look at the case summary and highlight what forms are missing. The litigant will take the highlighted case summary down to the clerk’s office to ask for a copy of what is highlighted. Then the litigant can return to the center with those documents to receive assistance that day. If the Self-Help Center was not located inside the courthouse, then this would not be possible and the center would be less efficient.

Complexity of the Process The scholarly argument by Hilbert states that SelfHelp Centers provide services that are cost-efficient and require low-maintenance, that allows self-represented litigants to gain guidance about their case (2009). The front desk of the center will explain how a litigant can start their case and the steps that will follow once a case has been opened. After completing the paperwork, the litigant can return to the center for help with next steps or answer any questions that arise.

The Self-Help Center can provide the litigant with the information necessary to handle the case on his or her own. This is an effective way to answer the questions typically asked at the clerk’s office or during the trial, which makes the courthouse more productive.

In addition, Podgers explained how through the opening of the centers, litigants who often encounter problems with forms and procedures, can correct their mistakes (1994). The center is the location for litigants to complete error-free paperwork. Many

58 eyes review the paperwork before the litigant files it, which eliminates the chance of the paperwork containing errors. While this allows the litigant to feel confident that the paperwork is done completely; this is a slow process as the paralegals need to be free to check the paperwork. Also, with only one attorney at the Pomona Self-Help Center, only a small number of litigants can be helped in one day. Typically, the center will have 60 to 100 litigants arrive at the center in one day, some just to ask questions, but the majority are in need of assistance. However, it is not possible for all the litigants to receive one-on-one assistance, so many have to be turned away and told to come back earlier on another day. If there were two attorneys at the Self-Help Center, then it would be possible for more litigants to receive assistance, which would increase the effectiveness of the center.

Greacen, in his scholarly work, discussed how cases are resolved with fewer court appearances with the assistance of Self-Help Centers (2011). While a representative from the center will not appear in court with the litigant, the center tries its best to explain what is expected in court. Before filing paperwork, the volunteer will explain the court process and will answer any questions. However, since some time passes between the litigant’s visit to the center and his or her court appearance, it is possible for the litigant to forget the information about how the trial will go. Also, for family law cases there are no pamphlets or information that the litigant can take home unless he or she wrote down what the volunteer explained on the day the paperwork was completed. For unlawful detainer cases, more information is provided as the center will play a video for the litigant to watch while his or her paperwork is in attorney review. It would be a good idea to have videos for cases of family law since that is the majority of cases the Pomona Self-Help Center assists with. This would allow litigants, who have family law cases, to get a visualization of how the trial will go. The center tries its best to give litigants the tools and knowledge to represent themselves in court, however, more could be done.

Another finding of Greacen, was that Self-Help Centers located in the San Joaquin Valley have eliminated errors made in judgments and no judgments have been rejected since the centers began offering this assistance (2011). Judgments can be completed once all matters have been discussed and agreed upon by both parties. When a litigant comes to the center to complete his or her judgment, all the documents filed in the case and the minutes of the trial must be brought in. This is so the volunteer who assists in the judgment will have all the necessary information.

The volunteer will type all the judgment documents

ANNALIZ LOERA and the litigant will verify that all the information is correct. The judgment is what the final orders will be, therefore, it is important that there are no errors.

By completing the forms of judgment, the Self-Help Center drastically minimizes the chance of error, since an attorney will review the judgment before taking the paperwork to file. There are instances when litigants believe they can handle the judgment without any help and often times will be rejected. Then they must come to the center to fix those errors. Thus, if the litigant wants the judgment to be done correctly the first time, it is wise to receive help at a center.

While judgments are done at the Pomona SelfHelp Center, not all the volunteers know how to complete judgments. Of all the volunteers, I am the only one who has been trained to complete judgments, so the majority of my time spent at the center is finishing the final step of the court process. If I am not at the center that day, then a paralegal is responsible for completing the judgment. It is unclear why I have been the only volunteer trained to do judgments. I believe all volunteers should be trained to know how to assist in judgments.

Language Barriers According to Robinson, only those who have been trained to translate will offer quality translation and the number of professional interpreters in the courts has decreased (2008). The Pomona Self-Help Center has not been trained to translate, but if a volunteer does speak another language, he or she will use bilingual capabilities to try to translate for a litigant. However, this does not mean a correct translation will be offered. There have been instances when a volunteer may not know how to correctly translate, but will try his or her best to explain the process. For example, some volunteers, including myself, have had trouble explaining stocks, bonds, and sanctions. Therefore, it takes some time to attempt to translate one of these terms, but it may not be the correct translation. To fix this issue, it would be a good idea for volunteers who are bilingual to be trained on how to properly translate court terminology. That way, there would be no issue of incorrectly translating for litigants.

Greacen argued that court material has been translated into different languages to assist the litigants who do not speak fluent English (2011). The Pomona Self-Help Center provides how-to guides in both English and Spanish. These guides explain what each question is asking in the paperwork in case the litigant does not want to wait for one-on-one assistance with a volunteer. The paperwork itself is not translated into Spanish, but with a guide available it makes

SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS it easier for Spanish-speaking litigants to know what the paperwork is asking. Even though these guides are offered, the majority of Spanish-speaking litigants would prefer to receive assistance from a Spanish-speaking volunteer. The challenge I have seen in the center is that there are not enough Spanish-speaking volunteers. On the days that I volunteer, I am one of two volunteers that speak Spanish. However, there are some days when no volunteer speaks Spanish, meaning the paralegals will have to assist the Spanish-speaking litigants. Since there is a short supply of staff who speak Spanish, often times the Spanish-speaking litigant will have to wait a little longer for someone who speaks Spanish to be free. Therefore, these litigants are at a disadvantage of being helped on the day they would like because of the few volunteers present at the center who speak Spanish.

Another issue is that the center does not provide translation for languages other than Spanish. During my time at the Pomona Self-Help Center, I have seen how it can be a challenge to provide assistance for litigants who speak Mandarin. There have been instances where an Asian litigant, who is not fluent in English, cannot get proper assistance because of the language barrier. There is only one volunteer who speaks Mandarin and he is not at the center every day. When no one in the center is able to communicate with the Asian litigant, the Pomona location would either try to call an interpreter to help translate between the staff member and the litigant or the litigant will be directed to another location, either the Self-Help Center in Pasadena or Downtown Los Angeles, to receive assistance. Also, there are no guides offered in Mandarin or any other language besides English and Spanish. Thus, the center has overlooked the needs of its litigants who speak other languages, besides the two most common languages. It would be a good idea to have the documents in our computers in multiple languages, in the case someone who is not able to speak Spanish or English comes into the center. This would allow them to receive some information. Therefore, the center needs to expand its information into multiple languages because the community does not just speak Spanish and English.

Complexity of the Law

According to Hilbert, there are some litigants whose needs go beyond the help of the Self-Help Center and need to be referred to another service (2009).

The Pomona Self-Help Center does provide referrals, which are typically given at the front. The Family Law Facilitator is the where litigants should go if their case is only about financial issues, such as child or

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spousal support. Some litigants make the mistake of thinking the center will help with monetary disputes, however, if that is the only issue of the case the center will not be able to help. Luckily, the Family Law Facilitator is also located in the Pomona Courthouse, so the litigant can still receive assistance that same day. Another referral the center provides is lawyer referral. The litigant will come to the front and explain his or her situation and then the center will provide the phone number and address of multiple lawyers who will be able to better assist. These lawyers will provide service for a low-cost or can be hired for only one aspect of the case. Therefore, there are instances when a litigant needs professional help, which is why the center tries to provide lawyers that provides services at a lower cost. Therefore, the center keeps up to date its referral list to guide the litigant to the best location to obtain the help he or she needs.

In addition, not all Self-Help Centers provide assistance for the same type of cases. There are cases the Pomona location does not provide assistance for, but another Self-Help Center does. An example would be the El Monte Self-Help Center, it provides assistance for worker’s rights, while Pomona does not. Thus, Pomona will advise the litigant to go to the El Monte location to be able to receive assistance that meets the litigant’s needs. Since there are multiple centers within Los Angeles County, it allows each location to specialize in assisting certain cases. This may seem like an inconvenience to the litigant because the court closest to his or her home does not meet his or her needs. However, it would be a challenge for each center to have the knowledge for all types of cases.

Conclusion

From the scholarly research and my intern experience, I can conclude that Self-Help Centers are effective at meeting the needs of self-represented litigants to a certain extent. Scholars have identified several variables which are needed to have an effective SelfHelp Center. However, not all the areas have been fulfilled, meaning there are areas of improvement to increase the level of effectiveness. In all the factors, it was shown how the center tries its best to help satisfy all the needs of each self-represented litigants, but because of the complexity of the process and law, the center could only help so much. Also, language barriers are a serious obstacle that needs to be addressed, otherwise litigants whose primary language is not English will have a challenge with the court process, even with the assistance of currently available programs.

In my analysis, I evaluated the level of how effective each of these factors were in my case study and

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ANNALIZ LOERA

saw the areas in which the Pomona Self-Help Center was lacking. Since the volunteers are the ones who provides the one-on-one assistance, it is important that enough volunteers work at the center to ensure people are being helped. The volunteers must learn not only the paperwork and the court process, but also how provide impartial assistance. Litigants who come to the center do not all speak English. Thus, the center should make an effort to find volunteers who are

bilingual and then train them to know how to translate court terminology to address the language barrier. Not all the litigants who arrive at the center can be helped that day. To correct this fault, the number of staff needs to be increased for the center to be able to handle more cases. Therefore, the Pomona Self-Help Center does provide assistance to the community, however, more litigants could be helped if improvements are made.

References

Hough, B. R. (2004). Description of California court’s programs for self-represented litigants.

International Journal of the Legal Profession, 11(3), 305-334.

Judicial Council of California. (2007). California courts self-help centers. Retrieved from http:// www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/rpt_ leg_self_help.pdf Podgers, J. (1994). Chasing the Ideal: As more Americans find themselves priced out of the system, the struggle goes on to fulfill the promise of equal justice for all. ABA Journal, 80, (8) 56-62.

Robinson, G. (2008). A language gap in justice. Retrieved from http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/JusticeCorps_Language_Gap_in_Justice. pdf Zorza, R. (2009). An overview of self-represented litigation innovation, its impact, & an approach for the future: an invitation to dialogue. Family Law Quarterly, 43(3), 519-543.

Barclay, S. (1996). The decision to self-represent. Social Science Quarterly, 77(4), 912-923.

Chase, D. (2003). Pro se justice & unified family courts. Family Law Quarterly, 37(3), 403428.

Greacen, J. (2011). The benefits & costs of programs to assist self-represented litigants. Judges’ Journal, 50(2), 15-20.

Greacen, J. (2014). Self-represented litigants, the courts, & the legal profession: myths & realities.

Family Law Quarterly, 52(4), 662-669.

Flaherty, M. (2015). Self-represented litigants, active adjudication & the perception of bias: Issues in administrative law. Dalhousie Law Journal.

38(1), 119-146.

Hilbert, J. (2009). Educational workshops on settlement & dispute resolution: another tool for self-represented litigants in family court. Family Law Quarterly, 43(3), 545-569.

Student volunteers can make a tremendous difference in the lives of the self-represented litigants they serve. Shown here: the Los Angeles East District Superior Court and County Building in Pomona, California.

SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS

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Annaliz Loera

Annaliz Loera is a senior Political Science major, who is graduating in June 2017.

Following graduation, she plans to attend Loyola Law School in the fall.

Email: alloera@cpp.edu

Bilingual Education:

Understanding California’s Language Education Debate from the Perspectives of Teachers, Parents, and Students

Stephanie Burdo California State Polytechnic University, Pomona A multicultural society brings forth diversity, strength, and creativity which can be found within our schools, workplaces, and professional settings. Amidst these various cultures, beliefs, and values, our educational institutions are tasked with creating environments which promote language sharing. In the case of America’s schools, and more specifically, California’s K-12 schools, this is a quite a controversial task. Time and time again, we find that capturing California’s vastly multicultural society while promoting English language learning has not come without its challenges. As a result, methods of instruction and institutional motives have been questioned.

In the November 2016 general election, California passed Proposition 58 “Non-English Languages Allowed in Public Education” initiative, a direct referendum to Proposition 227 “English in Public Schools” initiative passed in 1998 in regard to language learning in California’s K-12 public schools. This thesis aims to tackle all questions including methods of instruction in language education courses, the transition from Proposition 227 to Proposition 58, and overall opinions on nationalized languages from the perspectives of scholars, teachers, and students.

By utilizing interviews from all previously mentioned parties, we aim to tackle the debate itself and gather insight on the topic from those who are directly affected by language education.

W

ith an issue as controversial as California language education, it is no surprise that most Californians are divided on the issue and share dissimilar experiences and opinions in regard to various California language education programs. The common understanding remains that English language education is intended to be beneficial for English as a second language (ESL) students and English-speaking students alike. For ESL students, English language education seeks to enrich a student’s ability to communicate in the United States with other En-

glish-speaking citizens. For English-speaking students, language education is intended to facilitate better communication with California’s ethnically diverse citizens. In modern day California public schools, a uniform system for language education does not exist. Since the passage of Proposition 58, public schools are now capable of creating their own unique programs and assume local control over language education practices. Before the passage of Proposition 58, California language education continued to diversify to better represent children who speak different native languages. Considering the

Created by Stephanie Bardo, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona for her senior thesis project. Correspondence concerning this research paper should be addressed to Stephanie Bardo, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, (909) 263-6730. Email: burdostephanie@gmail.com Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2017. Pp. 62–78. ©2017, Political Science Department, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

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BILINGUAL EDUCATION variety of language education programs available in California, we will highlight them as they are encountered during the administration and reporting process. It is important to note that in this thesis, we will refer to all language focused education programs as simply “language education”, rather than use the term “multilingual” which implies multiple languages or “bilingual” implying simply two languages.

In this particular line of research, I have conducted interviews with seven unique individuals. Amongst these interviewees we have three young adults who completed language education: one who is currently a language education student, two of which currently teach language education, and one who is the parent of an English-speaking student who completed language education during her early school years. As we continue through this thesis, we will note the unique experiences amongst all seven individuals. Once this thesis has concluded, we will have synthesized our collected information with our hypothesis; California’s complex language education system produces complications for California students and teachers.

In modern day California schools, there is an understanding that the availability of language education enriches an English-speaking student’s ability to process different languages. Of our seven interviewees, most them believe that learning a second language is undoubtedly beneficial for students.

Although this may be true in some cases, there are many who claim, students and teachers alike, that dual-immersion language education is a hindrance for students who did not grow up with English as a first language and believe in more direct forms of English education. Furthermore, dual-immersion is believed to have an even greater negative impact on English-speaking students who are still in the process of fine tuning their English language at a younger age.

Before diving into the topic of language education itself, it is important to take a look at the current subfields of political science that are associated with it. In regard to the domestic state of language education, one must look to the subfield of Ameri-

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can Politics to better understand the local and state level processes that operate in order to make language education possible. With different bills, bonds, and propositions being introduced and new methods and practices constantly being discussed, we must first consider the diverse landscape of California. With nearly 73% Caucasian, 40% Hispanic, and 27% foreign-born Californians, it is crucial to closely examine the complex nature of California’s education system. With the passage of Proposition 58, we will now see more local school districts incorporate this diversity into the classroom. However, this is not the end of the discussion. Although Proposition 58 passed, the issue will continue to hold its relevance and be debated for years to come.

Therefore, the end results of this thesis would be beneficial to anyone participating in the discussion.

There are various, complex topics which are associated with our language education debate such as multiculturalism, political education reforms, ethnic context, assimilation debate, age concerns, and many others. This thesis aims to analyze all of these topics and combine them with issues presented in our interview in an attempt to better understand our topic.

Therefore, this particular line of research intends to answer the question; what are the concerns associated with California’s complex language education system?

This research question and concerning argument aims to analyze the presumption that language education is “good for everyone”. Considering the complex forms of language education and our interviews, I predict that this blanket statement will be considered too overly simplified to hold any validity. Whether this presumption will ultimately be confirmed, negated, or left unanswered, will be the goal of the thesis itself. At the conclusion of this thesis, I hope that readers will simply question language education and whether or not it is really “good for everyone”. I do not intend to prove that language education is fundamentally flawed or fails to assist students, because that is undoubtedly false. My goal is to contribute to the subfield of American Politics

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost, I would like to give credit to those who have inspired me the most. Mom and Dad, it is impossible to put into words how much I appreciate everything you have done for me. Thank you for always being my support system and granting me a college education that will allow me to pursue a successful future. I could not have done this without you and I love you more than words can express.

I would also like to offer my sincere thanks to Dr. Guerrero for his assistance and support throughout this process. For if not for you, I would not have been able to complete this thesis. You have been an amazing mentor and positive influence on me as a student and working professional. Thank you. .

64 by simply highlighting the possibility that the effects of language education are mixed and are not shared unanimously throughout society and California’s diverse students. By questioning the structure of language education, one may be able to introduce new methods or approaches to this controversial topic.

Literature Review Language education is a controversial concern within the subfield of American politics and California’s K-12 education system. The literature available in regard to language education is similarly divided, focusing on both advantages and disadvantages of this particular form of education and its many complex methods of instruction. This thesis aims to examine the debate of language education from the perspectives of teachers, parents, and students. Additionally, the findings of this thesis will serve as contributions to the subfield of American politics by adding to the ongoing discussion of whether language education, in its current form, is beneficial for everyone affected by it.

In order to properly analyze the state of language education in California, such literary works are imperative to consider when constructing a solid thesis.

Many scholars have focused on the effectiveness of language education, the controversy and complexities of its instruction, and various correlated historical perspectives. This thesis aims to draw a line connecting the literature and varying perceptions surrounding the viability of language education servicing English-speaking and non-English-speaking students. Considering that “public schools are projected to have more minority students than non-Hispanic whites” (Karaim, 2014) it is important to properly consider both California’s non-English-speaking and English-speaking students in this thesis.

The following literature review examines a variety of different topics surrounding language education. Historical works provide in-depth accounts on the passage of public policies (Bali, 2001), and the evolution of language education in California.

Controversial works include critiques of debilingualization (Montano et al., 2005), nationalized language (Donegan, 1996), and assimilationist education (Lampe, 1996). The thesis will also utilize texts which have analyzed the structure and functions of language education in California in order to understand its complex nature (Walker, 2000). This diverse set of literature outlines a very multifaceted issue in reference to the varying effectiveness of language education on California’s K-12 students.

STEPHANIE BURDO

Historical Analysis One main scholarship for historical analysis of this topic includes Yoon Kyong, Hutchinson, and Winsler’s, “Bilingual Education in the United States: a historical overview and examination of two-way immersion” (2015). Within this study, Y.K Kim et al. provides detailed explanations of different language education program models which include submersion, English as a second language, early-exit (transitional), late-exit (developmental), and lastly, TWI (two-way immersion, or more commonly known as dual-immersion). The scholarship takes note of the evolution that led to the development of dual-immersion, deeming it the more “intense bilingual education experience” (Y.K Kim et al., 2015), among its predecessors. According to Y.K Kim et al., TWI is designed to help language-minority students achieve additive bilingualism, as well as to help native English-speaking students acquire second language skills in a natural way (2015). This is achieved through “combining both native speakers of English interested in learning a second language, and language-minority students in the process of acquiring English, in the same classrooms learning throughout the day taught in both languages.” (Y.K Kim et al., 2015).

Considering that dual-immersion is more rigorous in comparison to previous methods and provides several advantages and disadvantages to its students, this method of language education continues to be a hot topic of debate in the dispute of various programs.

With the increased popularity of dual-immersion in California’s language education system, Y.K Kim et al.’s critiques, praise, and policy recommendations are sound contributors to the thesis in question.

Taking a step away from the evolution of current language education programs and their disputed effects, it is important to research the aftermath of the passage of Proposition 227 in California. The proposition intended to remove language education programs in California’s K-12 public schools by replacing them with English-only programs. In a journal article written by Valentina A. Bali, the enactment of Proposition 227 encompassed many unique events concerning academic performance between that of bilingual and non-bilingual students (2001). According to Bali’s findings, a large majority of non-bilingual students achieved math and reading scores that hardly varied from that of bilingual students. Although Proposition 227 was claimed to hold anti-immigrant, assimilationist connotations, the removal of language education programs had absolutely no negative effect on California’s bilingual

BILINGUAL EDUCATION students in comparison to non-bilingual students.

Overall, they ended up achieving the same quality of performance with or without the programs being offered. Aside from there being no real negative effect on academic performance, Proposition 227 accomplished something that no other language education policy or study could accomplish before, that is, “Proposition 227 allowed for a natural experiment of the effects of bilingual education” (Bali, 2001). Regardless of the extreme gridlock present in the study and application of language education, Proposition 227’s general application allowed us to reflect on something observable and draw our own conclusions, or in the case of the state of Arizona, pass similar legislation. However, with the creation of new language education programs annually, the reliability of readily available research, observations and statewide studies, is frequently questioned.

Considering the recent passage of Proposition 58 in California, the direct referendum to Proposition 227, Bali’s findings are incredibly useful to consider. Arguments in opposition of Proposition 58 claim that the new “Non-English Languages Allowed in Public Education Act” would indirectly harm Latino children in California by forcing them into Spanish-almost-only classes which hinder them from acquiring the English language properly. Using historical references similar to that found in Bali’s study, the passage of Proposition 58 was met with great resistance from both the Republican and Libertarian parties in California. Bearing in mind the declaration of widespread educational success amongst Hispanic and minority students in California from the passage of Proposition 227, it is crucial to examine the potential effects of a possible removal of English-only programs in California’s K-12 schools.

It is also important to note the instantaneous effects that a swift change in education instruction produces affects students. For example, after the passage of Proposition 227, Bali found that the shift of educational regimes, from one encouraging instruction in a student’s primary language to one emphasizing early English instruction, affected mostly Hispanic students with limited English skills (2001).

Bali’s findings may cause one to question whether or not an instant shift of educational regimes after the passage of Proposition 58 would have a similar negative effect on Hispanic and minority students in California. However, the intention of this thesis is not to highlight probabilities surrounding Proposition 227 and Proposition 58, but rather, highlight the complications which arise from a complex language education system. Therefore, Bali’s findings in regards to the implementation of Proposition 227

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and the discoveries of Y.K Kim et al. concerning dual-immersion (TWI) programs will be incredibly useful when considering the historical perspectives involved with dissecting language education.

Controversy Although most scholarly journals surrounding language education controversy are rather antiquated, they are still important to consider when analyzing language education programs as a whole. One of the most controversial debates over bilingualism is whether or not English should be classified as the nation’s official language. By confronting this issue and similar controversies, we will have a more realistic understanding where arguments in favor of and stark arguments against language education programs such as dual-immersion may resonate from. In Craig Donegan’s study, “Debate Over Bilingualism: Should English be the nation’s official language” (1996), Donegan attempts to tackle this theoretical question by addressing the concerns of many at the local, state, and federal level. According to “Debate over Bilingualism”, a lower court ruling determined that the state of Arizona’s official-English provision violated the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment (1996). In direct contrast to this ruling, successful business owners and career politicians that Donegan spoke with employed a more conservative attitude in claiming that “approaches that focus almost entirely on native-language instruction are crippling the children’s educational opportunities” (1996). Other conservative opinions on language education include that “many bilingual education programs perpetuates the students’ original language and promote non-native cultures at the expense of the English” (Donegan, 1996). Although Donegan’s work seems to be somewhat slanted towards one unilateral perspective, the topic of language education asks that we consider these controversial opinions when analyzing the entire debate itself.

Another significant controversy surrounding the debate of language education is the study of debilingualization which is also defined as the removal of bilingualism. In a published journal by Montano, Ulanoff, Sarellana, and Aoki, debilingualization is a major issue facing California students and teachers alike (2005). After the passage of Proposition 227, the debate over bilingualism developed into somewhat of a taboo topic among education advisory boards and even local educational institutions. This led to the removal of various board members and the exclusion of terms such as “bilingual” and “culture” from official state documents (Montano et al., 2005). The blatant

66 controversy surrounding what the text perceives to be as “linguistic supremacy” (Montano et al., 2005) is a direct contributor to the perceptions that there is a discriminatory homogenization that has taken hold of California’s public schools under Proposition 227.

Aside from limiting cultural diversity in academic programs, debilingualization has also directly affected the availability of bilingual teachers. According to the Montano et al., regardless of language education, students seek to benefit from a bilingual teacher, and since the passage of Proposition 227, the demand for bilingual teachers has exceeded their supply (2005).

When assessing the mixed effects of language education and its various forms, this polarization exists at nearly every level of public opinion. In light of this clear and present divide, such conflicting discoveries prove to be incredibly useful when considering all sides of the debate accurately. In correlation to our study, both academia and the general public hold mixed opinions on the topic. Hence, the debate of language education is a complex issue where neither side, whether being proponents or opponents of language education, are quite superior to the other.

Additional controversial keynotes in debates over bilingualism include the array of studies associated with critiquing assimilationist institutional practices. One such scholarship was conducted by Van C. Tran titled, “English Gain vs. Spanish Loss? Language Assimilation among Second-Generation Latinos in Young Adults”, (2010) intended to tackle this very issue. In this particular investigation, Tran examined second-generation Latino children of American immigrants. Findings for this included varying academic success across various Latino groups who were enrolled within the same academic program.

As these distinct Latino groups were assimilated into English-only programs, their native language fluency was damaged as a result. Among Mexicans, Cubans, Colombians, and Dominicans, Mexicans faced far more difficulties in English acquisition and assimilation in comparison to other Latino students in the program. According to Tran, Mexican-Americans hold the strongest Spanish retention in contrast with other Latino ethnic groups and are the most likely to speak Spanish at home (2010). Therefore, the underperformance of this particular set of Mexican-American students was a direct result of the assimilationist practices which contradicted their home life and community engagement. This specific examination of the Latino community adds to the debate that bilingualism is extremely multifaceted and is not as evenly retained amongst students who may or may not speak the same language. This probes the idea that language education requires variations of prac-

STEPHANIE BURDO tice in order to coincide with various English retention abilities and non-English proficiency levels.

Literature Review Conclusion This literature review intends to highlight the various sources of information that aim to study the language education in California’s K-12 schools.

Considering factors such as the historical evolution of language education, its complex structure, and surrounding controversies, it is important to reference such literature in this thesis. By taking into account these sources, we are provided detailed information in regard to our study. Utilizing historical texts will provide us with a longitudinal analysis of the topic and a structural foundation for finding room for possible improvement. By examining the controversies encased within the debate itself, we will have a better understanding of the direct polarization that exists between the major points of disagreement. An additional analysis of the various forms of language education will also provide an in-depth explanation to the assessment of the case study associated with this thesis.

Methodology This thesis will take a qualitative approach by conducting a series of interviews in regards to language education. In order to properly understand the language education debate and the complex nature of California’s language education programs, these interviews will be administered with multiple interviewees in an attempt to gather their thoughts on this complex topic. Considering the controversially mixed views regarding language education, the effectiveness of this thesis derives directly from the unshared experiences and perspectives of the respondents. Before discussing the interview process that was selected for this thesis, we will first discuss the state of California from which the respondents were selected from.

The state of California has an exceedingly large foreign-born population which far surpasses the U.S. percentage two times over. Of these 27% foreign-born citizens, at least half have at minimum one immigrant parent. In addition, a vast majority of California’s foreign-born citizens are Hispanic and Asian.

However, over the more recent years, more than half of California immigrants come from various Asian countries. The majority of foreign-born or immigrant Americans occupy over 30% of California’s largest counties including Los Angeles County. The majority of this thesis will closely examine language education as it exists in Los Angeles County. That being said, our interviewees will come from different back-

BILINGUAL EDUCATION grounds and will possess dissimilar first languages.

We will interview four language education students (current and former), one parent, and two language education teachers --- a total of seven interviews. By speaking with students who have completed the program or are currently enrolled, we can discuss their progress and outlook on the education they have received. This will be an important factor when analyzing the academic impact of language education on its students. Parents will also be questioned in order to gather an adult perspective on issues involving child welfare, opinions on their child’s success, and the quality of the program itself. Through interviews conducted with teachers, we will gather a professional perspective of their experiences and opinions on language education and the many students they have seen progress throughout their programs. It is important to note that we have used aliases for all of our interviewees, as a way to protect their identities throughout this study.

Concerning the interview questions, there will not be any central focus on a particular form of language education, but rather, the various relevant forms discussed in the interviews. Questions will be primarily open ended and specialized for each interviewee.

Therefore, interview questions for current students, former students, teachers, and parents will vary in order to maximize relevant information collection.

Although there will be more specialized questions, the interview will also include general demographic questions and blanket, opinion-oriented questions.

For this thesis, general demographic questions will include gender, age, ethnicity, and first language. Additionally, I have asked all interviewees to specify the area and location of their relevant experience (which school they attended/taught and the corresponding area). Opinion-oriented questions included asking the interviewee for their opinions on language education as a whole, Proposition 227, Proposition 58, whether the United States should have an official language, and what their opinions are on the assimilation of language. Considering that forming an opinion on Proposition 227, Proposition 58, and language education requires independent research, I provided interviewees an alternative to skip any question they do not feel confident in answering. In order to properly describe assimilation of language to the interviewees and remain completely unbiased, the question will provide a brief general definition and ask interviewees for their opinion and to explain their reasoning.

For our single current student interview, questions were asked to probe discussion in regards to their present experience. In order to gather a bigger picture in regards to what they are currently encountering in

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their program, I asked the current student to describe the events that led up to their participation of the program. These questions were directly related to their educational background, ethnicity, and first language.

I also asked the current student to comment on the quality of education they are currently experiencing and how they feel it has impacted them thus far. Queries include asking how they feel about the performance of their teachers, performance of their fellow students, the quality and/or quantity of resources provided to them in school, and their opinion on their personal academic performance thus far. Considering that current students are still quite young and may not grasp the depth behind questions concerning nationalized language, language assimilation, and California propositions and initiative processes, I have collected their opinions but kept in mind their age and educational level when reporting my results.

While interviewing former students, I have attempted to gather information from students belonging to different ethnic backgrounds. For this particular thesis, we will examine two former Hispanic, Spanish speaking students and one former Armenian speaking student, all three of which were tasked with learning English in elementary school. Considering that California has a much smaller Armenian population in comparison to its Hispanic population, questions for the former Armenian student included asking them additional questions in regards to availability of resources and staff. In regards to all former student interview questions, additional queries included asking for their completion age/grade, the type of program they experienced, whether or not they were able to provide ample time to properly focus on each of their subjects, and their overall rate of success in the program. It is also important to note that while interviewees were answering specific questions, they were able to provide additional information that did not exactly correspond to the direct question. For example, although the interviews were directed towards particular people, many the respondents shared the experiences of their friends and classmates. As a result, many interesting and unexpected topics were recorded in regards to each individual’s unique experience.

Considering that interviews are extremely qualitative in nature, it is expected that the findings of this thesis will be somewhat subjective, or otherwise, limited in the general application towards language education as a whole. Although a quantitative approach to this dilemma is as equally crucial in order to properly monitor language education, it is imperative to also record individual experiences considering that California commands it. The complex structure of California’s language education

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STEPHANIE BURDO

Appendix: Interview questions Demographic Questions 1.

2.

3.

4.

Gender (male, female, other) Age Ethnicity First language. If you acquired English as a second language, what was the form you were taught?

5. Are you fluent in any other languages other than your first language? If so, how did you acquire this additional language?

Language Education Questions Based on Relevant Experience 6. What type of program did you (or your child/students) experience?

7. What was the language being learned?

8. Where was the program located and what type of school was it?

9. How old were (are) you (or your child/students)?

10. How would you rate the success of the participants of the bilingual education program? (unsuccessful, somewhat unsuccessful, somewhat successful, successful, neither). Why did you answer this way?

11. What are your opinions on this form of bilingual education you (or others) experienced?

12. Did the program help or hurt your (or your child/student’s) other academics?

13. Do you feel that enough adequate resources were provided to you (or your child/students) in order to succeed? Adequate resources may contain, but are not limited to, knowledgeable and helpful staff, materials, quality time and so forth?

Opinion-based Questions 14. What are your opinions on language education as a whole?

15. Do you believe there is room for improvement with language education? If so, could you explain your reasoning?

16. Do you happen to have an opinion on the Proposition 227 or Proposition 58? If you do not feel you have enough knowledge to answer this question, we can skip it.

17. The definition of assimilation is “to make similar”. Do you believe that Americans should be assimilated, or “made similar”, in regards to language? Could you explain your reasoning?

18. Do you believe that English should be the official language of the United States? Could you explain your reasoning?

BILINGUAL EDUCATION programs, the diverse background of California’s students, and questionable availability of proper resources and need for quality instruction methods, asks that we record more than statistical data and general census information to properly assess the complicated topic. We must, as political scientists, ask questions which allow interviewees to adequately describe their experience in a way that cannot simply be measured. Therefore, a qualitative approach to this topic will be useful when assessing California’s multifaceted language education debate.

Results Amongst the various interviews that were conducted for this thesis, the results varied greatly and no two interviews were quite the same. The conversations that took place during each individual session differed. For the former and current students, our interviews were more extensive, while the interviews with parents and teachers were done much quicker.

Additionally, the willingness to share more personal opinions also varied between respondents. While some interviewees seemed eager to share raw and somewhat intimate information, others were more reserved or attempted to rush the interview with short, poised responses. Regardless of the differences between the interviewees, the sessions were conducted tentatively while avoiding leading any questions for the participants or probing predicted responses.

Similarly, some of our interviewees were more positive than others. With each response and shared dialogue, the analysis became far more interesting and further added to the California language education debate. From struggles at home or in the workplace, each interviewee came across unique obstacles and triumphs that made the interview process far more compelling in comparison to asking the same monotonous, repetitive questions without any real reward.

While we analyze the findings of this study, I will focus on each interviewee while comparing and contrasting similar statements from their corresponding respondent type. For example, I will report on the findings of our three former student respondents by highlighting key points of each interview while simultaneously synthesizing them against each other.

We will then apply the same process when discussing our two current teachers, reporting their individual responses and then directly comparing findings. In regards to the current students and parents of this study, we must investigate each respondent’s statements individually, since there is only one of each. After we have highlighted major points of each interview and group findings, we will then reflect on all respons-

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es concerning our specific questions on Proposition 227 and 58, language assimilation, and whether or not our interviewees believe English should be the United States’ official language. After all responses have been reported concerning relevant experiences and general opinion, we will then attempt to either reject or confirm our original hypothesis that California’s complex language education system produces complications for California students and teachers.

Former Students We will begin our report with an interview conducted with Martin, a 25 year old male and California language education student in his early elementary school career. The program he participated in was an English Development Program (ELD). With Spanish being his first language, Martin was placed in the program in order to acquire English as a second language. Martin partook in the ELD program in a Los Angeles County public school located in the city of Covina from kindergarten through fifth grade.

According to Martin, “My situation was complicated because my parents didn’t know any English so they had no way of teaching me. They were banking on me learning it in elementary school”. When asked what the ELD program consisted of, Martin claimed that “They used our knowledge of Spanish and would compare Spanish words to the same word in English.

We essentially learned English through Spanish.

When you would first start the program, the questions were very simple. They would show you a picture of a dog and ask what color it was and your responses could only be in English.” A key element to highlight in Martin’s interview is progression in terms of age and language and the use of English-only instruction. Since Martin started this ELD program in kindergarten and began English-language instruction at five years old, he was able to progress throughout elementary school while being taught English at the same pace. However, for other students who started the ELD program later, they were placed in the same beginner English courses that Martin took in kindergarten, although most of these students were at much higher levels academically. According to Martin, “I recall a friend who came from Mexico and went straight into ELD and had to take the same test that we took in kindergarten. They didn’t have different levels. You were expected to start from the beginning and that was that.” In a discussion with Martin, we concluded that this would not be an issue if these ELD classes were taken separately in their own time slot and did not come at the expense of other classes. However, this was not the case with Martin’s

70 ELD program. Martin pointed out several times that within these ELD programs, students were pulled out of regular classes to attend ELD class, “We had our normal classes and then around two-to-three times a week, they would pull us out of our regular classes to go to ELD class. So by pulling us out of those classes, we were forced to miss whatever we learned that day. I remember having to miss math or English.”

When I asked Martin why this may have occurred, he speculated that “Since every teacher had their own schedule, it didn’t line up with all of the other teachers, and since all of the ELD students were from different teachers, we encountered schedule conflicts which resulted in us being pulled out of class”.

Although it seemed that the ELD program that Martin experienced seemed to possess its own set of issues, Martin did not feel that it was a complete failure and claimed that he was “somewhat successful” in terms of completing the program. Additionally, Martin’s ELD program did grant students some flexibility. “Every year there was a test that you could take to complete the program. If you passed, you were placed in regular English courses with the rest of the students. There were quite a few that were able to test out but there were a lot of students who fell behind.

From those who did pass after cramming preparation, I remember a lot of them struggling with English courses later on in school.” Essentially, participants did not need to remain in the program if they could prove they were English proficient. However, Martin notes that some of these students did experience English difficulties later on. When asked if there was room for improvement with language education or his program, Martin claimed that “My program was pretty good, but I think it could be better. Schools need to look more into the actual students and how they are learning and decide what is best for them.”

Our next interviewee was a former language education student named Arthur, a 28 year old male who participated in an English as a Second Language program (ESL) from kindergarten to fourth grade in a Los Angeles public school. With Armenian being his first language, the pathway to Arthur’s English learning success is extremely useful for this thesis. When I asked if there were adequate resources or quality teachers to help him transition from Armenian to English, Arthur noted that only speaking Armenian was not an issue because the teachers in the ESL program never had to speak Armenian with him. Arthur noted that, “There was no Spanish speaking in the hour or two that I was there, I only spoke English with them.” This English-only, Proposition 227 mandated program allowed Arthur to acquire English without any Spanish immersion.

STEPHANIE BURDO Although a more dual-immersed Spanish-to-English program could be useful for Spanish speakers, this English-only program allowed someone like Arthur to solely focus on English learning while he was simultaneously perfecting his native Armenian language. The ESL program achieved this English-only method of instruction by utilizing techniques such as showing photos to students and asking them to translate the contents in English. Other methods included short puzzles and simple vocabulary questions.

In comparison to Martin’s experience, Arthur’s general opinion regarding his time in the program was far more positive. Starting ESL in kindergarten, Arthur noted that “Kindergarten was really hard for me because I couldn’t communicate with anyone.

I had to do charades and could only say “hey” and “yeah”.” Arthur went on to highlight the success of his English acquisition experience by saying “I knew zero English and by second grade, I was fluent in the language.” Although Arthur commented on his overall English acquisition success, he claimed that “I was successful, but I didn’t take mental notes at the time. I wasn’t sure if it was ESL that helped me learn English or my surroundings.” He followed up his feelings of improbability by claiming, “Being surrounded my English speakers is what helped me learn, more so than the structured class itself.” This uncertainty of where to attribute English acquisition success was a recurring topic brought about in many of the interviews conducted. In an interview with one of the current teachers in our study, she noted that in her experience as a teacher, she found that it is more likely that her students will acquire English when they are constantly surrounded by the English language outside of the classroom. Our parent interviewee also contributed to this point by claiming that her daughter’s ability to learn Spanish as an English-speaking student was limited since she was not exposed to Spanish at home or anywhere else. Therefore, her daughter was far more unlikely to acquire Spanish in comparison to a Spanish speaking student who is attempting to learn English.

It is also important to contrast the differences between Martin’s and Arthur’s experience in terms of the longevity of the program and exit strategies, or lack thereof. Although Martin was able to test out, Arthur was required to remain in the program, which he later went on to say, “There were times when I would take advantage and was happy to leave but other times it sucked. At one point, it became so casual that I would leave and I would say that I was going to class, even though I wasn’t. Thankfully, no one ever noticed.” In Arthur’s case, there was no opportunity to prove that you could exit the pro-

BILINGUAL EDUCATION gram, and in his own words, ESL “became a waste of time”. When evaluating language education, it is important to scrutinize programs that have no exit-strategy, are not properly supervised, and fail to accommodate each student’s developing skills.

Additionally, Arthur reported the same issue that Martin experienced with having to leave class in order to participate in ESL by saying “I think it affected my academics because once or twice a week I had to leave my regular classes to go to ESL. If there was a test or anything going on at the time, I had to skip it.”

He also claimed that “If you’re removed from class to be placed in an ESL class and miss out on crucial information, it can certainly affect your overall grade.”

Although Martin and Arthur both claimed that pulling students out of regular instruction for language education classes could be potentially damaging towards a student’s overall academic success, they failed to associate any personal conflicts with the issue. Overall, both Martin and Arthur were successful in the program and only held recommendations for improvement of treatment with other students.

Our third and final former language education student interview was conducted with Julie, a 19 year old Hispanic female who was tasked with learning English from kindergarten through third grade. The form of which she was taught English was a dual-immersion program (otherwise known as “TWI”) which allowed for exit tests if students met the necessary requirements. In this particular type of program, Julie mentioned that “They taught all subjects in different languages and afterwards students would return to their main school work.” Amongst all three students, Julie’s experience seemed to be the most positive.

Her only comments for improvement involved the issue of children leaving their regular classes to learn English and the overall problem of not having enough quality time with teachers. “Sometimes we would come in late to social studies or art, which wasn’t that bad since it’s not English or Math, but it was free time that we missed out on. At the time, I didn’t know what I was missing.” She also stated, “When the teachers would take us out, they would extend the lesson the next day because some students couldn’t comprehend it. This was good for us but was frustrating for other students who wanted to move forward.”

Towards the end of her interview, Julie divulged her opinions and experience considering the teachers which were assigned with helping her learn English.

She mentioned that all English learning students in the school were assigned to the same teacher and there was no other option. Although she enjoyed her time with the teacher, she noted that “Looking back as an adult, I couldn’t imagine how difficult it must

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have been to teach English to an entire school of students who didn’t know the language. I’m sure parents were also placed in a difficult position because the school provides no other options for their child. If the teacher is substandard, you’re stuck with them.”

Current Teachers Our first current teacher interview was conducted with Mary, a kindergarten teacher of both Spanish and English-speaking students. Within her classroom, Mary instructs her children in English and Spanish, a dual-immersion (TWI) method of instruction. Mary noted that “Some students are dominant in English and some are dominant in Spanish. I teach them in the same class.” Since Mary has been a kindergarten teacher in the same school for nearly 15 years, she has seen major changes in the forms of language education being taught. She stated, “It’s changed.

We used to solely teach bilingual education which consisted of more Spanish instruction throughout the day and then an additional 45 minutes of instruction in their native language. Today, half of the class is taught in Spanish and the other half is taught in English. This is our sixth year implementing dual language and it’s working well.” However, although Mary claimed that the dual-immersion implementation has been great for her students, she still stated, “I wish we could return to the old bilingual program, although the dual language program is good, I think it’s harder for teachers to teach dual language. We simply do not have enough time in the day. We are tasked with teaching everything twice and it is sometimes harder for us. For example, if I teach math in the afternoon, students will get math in English and then next week they will get math in Spanish. No one is getting a full day’s worth of their native language, which requires additional explanation for some students. This is good for students, but it is harder for teachers to accommodate everyone and still get through the items of the day.” Although this presents an issue to Mary as an instructor, she still praises the current program for the rewards it provides to the students. According to Mary, “My students end up acquiring a second language ninety percent of the time. For all of my students, whether they are native English or Spanish speakers, they are provided with amazing opportunities in the future due to dual-immersion and I am proud to be a part of that.”

Our next interviewee was Kim, a second grade dual-immersion teacher in Los Angeles County who teaches fourth grade in both English and Spanish.

During this interview, I noticed that Kim’s feelings towards dual-immersion were similar to the dis-

72 cussion shared with our parent interviewee (which will be discussed later). That being, a majority of the conversation focused on the ineffectiveness of dual-immersion for English-speaking students.

Kim described her concerns by stating “Since we implemented dual-immersion, I noticed that this has greatly helped my Spanish-speaking students but has not helped my English-speaking students.

I feel that most of my Spanish-speaking students are more exposed to English throughout their daily lives and are already in the process of solidifying their English acquisition. My English students are forced to speak Spanish in order to learn basic concepts and I can see them struggling, especially those who joined the program at an older age.”

Kim also discusses the lack of proper resources in great detail by claiming, “In terms of inadequate resources, availability of bilingual teachers is a major issue. Since dual-immersion requires that every student is taught two languages, it’s difficult to find bilingual teachers who can capture the needs of all our students. This may change in the future with newly credentialed staff, but in its current state, most teachers are not fluent enough to provide this. As a result, the bilingual teachers we do have are stretched thin and some students potentially fall through the cracks.” In comparison to all of our interviews, Kim’s responses primarily focused on the problems she encounters with language education daily. Of all seven interviewees, she is one of two who did not have a single positive remark in regards to her relevant language education experience (the other being Carol, our only parent).

Parents Carol, the only parent we were able to interview with for this thesis, primarily focused on the negative experience she and her daughter had with language education. Carol’s daughter Amy is an English-speaking student who encountered language education in Azusa, California from first to third grade. In order to accommodate the large majority of Spanish-speaking students at the school, Amy was placed in dual-immersion classes with Spanish speakers. According to Carol, this greatly affected Amy academically.

“Since Amy was placed in these dual-immersion classes, she was forced to stay behind while other students were attempting to grasp the English language portion of the class.” Carol continued to say that Amy “did not pick up any new information” and most students “were very behind”. Additionally, Carol pointed out that Amy was unable to fine tune her English language. “At first, I thought that it would be a great thing for her to learn Spanish. I then re-

STEPHANIE BURDO alized two years too late that dual-immersion was the issue and I quickly pulled her out of the school”.

As Carol’s interview continued, the topic of language education itself was no longer the main topic of conversation, and instead, she discussed the experience she encountered when she attempted to voice her concerns. “When I approached the teacher about my daughter’s issues with dual-immersion, she was offended and thought I was attacking her as a person.

When I finally talked to the principal, he suggested that I opt to move Amy forward by one grade and insinuated that I was a racist. At the time, she had already placed one grade above and it made absolutely no sense to move her up further when I knew that she wasn’t prepared for that. My only option was to take Amy out of the school.” Although interpersonal interactions vary in opinion from all parties included, it is still important to include this interaction in our thesis, for it may explain some of the controversies associated with language education as a whole.

Later in our interview, Carol went into great depth about her recommendations for language education and noted that schools should “group children by language and skill level, so no one falls behind”. As we delved into more opinion-based questions concerning nationalized language and Proposition 227 and 58, she was extremely open-minded and enthusiastic in regards to the acquisition of new languages. However, she did not believe dual-immersion was the best option by claiming that “This experience affected my daughter negatively, which required additional tutoring to bring her up to speed with her classmates.”

Current Students Our final interview was conducted with Max, a 15 year old male who came to the United States from Mexico at nine years old and attended a dual-immersion program at a La Habra public school. According to Max, “I fell behind in most of my classes because I was not prepared for dual-immersion.” As a result, Max was required to retake his second grade year.

Max noted, “I felt alone most of the time and that I was the only student who couldn’t keep up.” When I asked Max what his issues are with dual-immersion, he claimed that “I wasn’t exposed to enough English throughout the day and my parents don’t speak English. When I come home, I don’t have any help with homework or anything else.” Max continued to discuss the issues he experienced by not being exposed to enough English throughout the day and now as a 15 year old teenager. Max claims that “It would have been better if the school taught me more English when I was younger because I think I would

BILINGUAL EDUCATION have learned faster. Also, I think I entered the program too late so I missed most of the basic concepts.”

Throughout most of Max’s interview, he primarily focused on the issues associated with not naturally progressing through dual-immersion and the difficulties of not having English-speaking parents at home.

Opinion-Based Questions: Nationalized Language When our interviewees were asked, “Do you believe that English should be the official language of the United States? Could you explain your reasoning?” various responses ensued. Of our three former students, only Arthur did not have an opinion. He felt that he was “biased” in his reasoning because he already knows English. However, Julie claimed that, “I believe there should be one language in the United States. We need to communicate with different people belonging to different cultures and sharing one universal language would achieve that.”

When asking our current teachers for their opinion on the possibility of English becoming our nation’s language, Mary and Kim differed greatly from one another. Mary strongly advocated against English being the official language and stated, “We are a melting pot and there are so many languages here. We should all learn as many languages as possible and a nationalized language may change that.” In comparison, Kim felt strongly in support of English becoming the nation’s official language and directly correlated this with the issues she encounters with language education in her career. She stated that, “I believe that if we had a nationalized language, we would be able to properly position our education system and professional institutions. Currently, this confusing spectrum of language identity is causing events like the passage of Proposition 58 to take place.” When Martin, our only current student, and Carol, our only current parent, was asked the same question, both responded with a simple “yes” to the question.

Opinion-Based Questions: Assimilation of Language Our interviewees were also prompted with the following question which consisted of a brief definition introduction and follow-up controversial inquiry.

“The definition of assimilation is “to make similar”.

Do you believe that Americans should be assimilated, or “made similar”, in regards to language? Could you explain your reasoning?” Considering the term “assimilation” holds a certain degree of negativity, we

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were able to predict that some of our responses would be passionate in nature. Of all seven responses to this prompt, only Arthur, our former student, and Mary, our current teacher, responded strongly in opposition of language assimilation. Arthur noted that, “What makes America special is its diversity. If language is assimilated and we are expected to speak one universal language, America will lose some of that diversity.

Diversity is responsible for different forms of thinking and that is a direct result of coming from a different background and knowing different things.” Mary, our current teacher, contributed to this ideal by stating, “We should all have the right to learn any language.

If the opportunity arises and it is available, we are liberated. More language means more opportunity.”

In comparison, five of our seven respondents believed that students should be assimilated into speaking English. In comparison to Arthur and Mary who focused primarily on the collective good of the nation, a majority of our respondents were more concerned with individual opportunity. In Max’s response, he directly relates language assimilation to his father’s current career prospects by claiming that, “Knowing English would help my dad find a better job, but he doesn’t know it and he’s more limited in terms of what jobs he can apply for.” In Kim’s response, she passionately stated, “I believe that language is the common denominator amongst people and if we do not advocate for a shared language, those who do not learn it will be disadvantaged. It is important to learn and imply the language that will be employing and educating you in the future. Therefore, I am a strong advocate for language assimilation in terms of mandatory English language learning.”

Opinion-Based Questions: Proposition 227 and Proposition 58 In one of our final questions, interviewees were asked, “Do you have an opinion on Proposition 227 and Proposition 58?” Of all seven interviewees, only Martin, our current student, opted to skip the question. When assessing the remaining answers, four out of six stated in their response that they “did not have enough information” to answer the question, but continued to voice opinions. We will not list these opinions in our findings considering they may be categorized as responses based on misinformation. Therefore, only two valid opinions can be extracted from this particular prompt.

The only two responses which can be extracted from this question came from Kim, our current teacher, and Julie, our former student. Kim stated, “I personally voted against Proposition 58, although the

74 California Teachers Association supported it. I knew that my school would not be able to properly implement greater language education reforms, so I advocated against it. I still believe that we should have continued to enhance the quality of language education that we already had.” In comparison, Julie noted, “I know that many teachers in Los Angeles want the best for the students and I think they have the right idea to give back local control. However, I am concerned that school districts with inadequate funding could fall by the wayside. I’m also fearful that we now lack any statewide language education structure.

How will we be able to study this longitudinally?” Julie concluded her statement with, “I believe that an adaptation from the former Proposition 227 would have been a better choice. Since Proposition 58 has passed, we are now removing all of the progress we made.”

Conclusion: Amongst the various findings that were collected during our interviews, many results were discovered to better support our hypothesis. Now that our results have been reported, we can correlate our final conclusions. It is important to note that each interviewee provided different pieces of information that have been extremely useful for this thesis and support our argument that language education is not simply “good for everyone” and if executed incorrectly, can negatively affect both California students and teachers. Therefore, the general ideology that a complex California language education system is good for culturally diverse students and teachers, contradicts the findings in our thesis. Although our study did not attempt to focus on whether a more general application of language education is more effective in comparison, we can still draw the conclusion that more various language education programs can potentially hinder the performance of our teachers and students. For the conclusion of this thesis, we will focus on some of these hindrances in detail by those who have been directly impacted by them.

Language Education & Age From the interviews conducted with our former students, we discovered a connection between students and the complications they experience due to the age of which they enter a particular language education program. In the case of those we interviewed, the student’s lack of progression throughout the program was a major issue, which was a direct result of them entering the program too late. In the case of Martin’s friends who were also in the ELD program

STEPHANIE BURDO and entered later, they were placed in the same beginner’s class as kindergarten students, regardless of their academic standing. Although these students are essentially learning together, being one of the older students implies that they are not being as equally challenged, considering the majority of the class is learning at a much lower level. This disproportionate age difference amongst students could certainly affect a student’s ability to retain information at the academic level which best suits their corresponding age.

On the other hand, if you enter a program after it has already begun, such as Max did, this can also be extremely problematic. When Max started his dual-immersion program, the remaining students had already been immersed into the program and had acquired far more English than Max did. As a result, Max was extremely ill equipped to handle the English half of the class and his grades suffered. For someone such as Max who was still learning English while simultaneously struggling with mathematics, it was difficult for him to learn math in English, considering he hardly knew the language. When formulating ideas for improved language education programs, it is imperative to keep age between students and age of program initiation in mind so that no student is left behind or placed into scenarios they cannot overcome.

Prioritizing Language Education One of the largest reoccurring issues we discovered in our interviews with former students was how many of them were pulled from regular class to attend language education. According to our respondents, they had to “sacrifice” whatever they were currently learning to learn English for an hour or two.

For our former students, this included missing out on lessons in math, English, social science, science, or art. According to our respondents, you would need to miss class, whether or not you had an exam or more pressing commitments. This clear and present issue of extracting children from class to prioritize another, pressures students to sacrifice particular subjects and cram lessons that they may have missed. If a teacher is understanding and notices that a portion of the class had to skip lecture for language education, they could possibly teach the lesson again but this is to the detriment of the students who had already learned it.

Exit Strategies and Completion Tests In our interviews with Martin and Arthur, we discovered that although Martin was able to complete his ELD program and join the other children in regular English classes, Arthur was not provided the same option and had to stick with language education until the very end of the program. When discussing

BILINGUAL EDUCATION this “exit test”, as Martin referred to it, he did not go into too much detail in regards to the parameters of the completion test, however, he claimed that some students still struggled after passing it. In Martin’s case, he was successful in English after he exited the program, although some students fell behind. In Arthur’s case, there was no exit strategy for students and as a result, he was pulled out of his other classes for a program that he felt he had already completed.

When assessing this issue, I noticed there were two major considerations to notice. First, schools must develop exit-strategies for students. Second, if they do develop an exit-strategy such as a completion exam, it must be standard enough so that if a student passes, they have proven that they are less likely to struggle later. In the case of Martin’s friend, they were able to cram studying in order to pass the exam, so they can return to regular English classes.

Most of these students which Martin mentioned, encountered several challenges later on due to the low level of difficulty associated with the test. Therefore, if applying the findings of this thesis, schools may consider developing exit strategies for language education programs which include completion exams that are only passable if the student has acquired a longitudinal understanding of the English language.

Teacher Ability & Lack of Available Staff When discussing California education, lack of adequate resources continues to be a pressing issue in the state of California and its public schools. During our interviews, many respondents noted that their language education teachers were tasked with teaching all of the language education students in their particular school. Although not every school solely has one language education teacher, we must question those who do not have enough teachers available. According to our literature, the availability of bilingual teachers is a major issue in California, which further adds to this point. Additionally, students of smaller minority groups such as Arthur, with an Armenian background, may have even greater issues with this dilemma. For someone such as Arthur, the lack of available teachers able to synthesize English with his native Armenian language is even more difficult to find.

During our interviews with current teachers, both noted the difficulties they face while attempting to capture the needs of all of their students.

Mary expressed her positive opinions in regards to dual-immersion but continued to convey her frustrations towards teaching students in both English and Spanish. Mary described how difficult it is to help each student who requires her additional assistance

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while speaking to them in their own language, all the while, not being able to speak to the majority. For Mary and Kim, this is a necessary skill that teachers must have, although it becomes a very cumbersome task and delays their instruction. In Kim’s case, she focused primarily on the negative feelings she has towards dual-immersion and noted the same problems which Mary described. Overall, although positive attributes linked with dual-immersion were noted, the interviews were overwhelmingly negative towards to this particular program since it is difficult for teachers to accommodate each student and, in the case of Carol, can potentially hold back English-speaking students and in the case of our teachers, hold back the progression of the classroom.

English-only vs Dual Language Proposition 227 provided an English-only method of instruction for students. For Arthur, our former Armenian student, he was taught English under a Proposition 227 mandated, English-only program.

During our interview, Arthur was asked if the lack of Armenian instruction made it more difficult for him to acquire English. He claimed that the language education teacher never spoke Armenian with him, but rather, taught him English only. For someone such as Arthur who speaks a very uncommon language in California, English-only instruction was extremely beneficial for him. If Arthur were to have been placed in a dual language program that taught English and Spanish, this success may have never occurred, as is the case of Amy, the daughter of our parent interviewee who was placed in dual-immersion and regressed in terms of language and academic performance. Overall, for students who speak uncommon languages that are not English, English-only instruction provides a common ground for them without introducing a third language (mostly, Spanish).

Conclusion From the interviews we conducted in this thesis, many results were found and many interesting topics were discussed concerning students, teachers, and the future of language education in California. These conversations highlighted numerous conditions in California that require further consideration when creating new language programs in California K-12 schools. Since the passage of Proposition 58, school districts now hold local control over the language education programs they choose to implement, which could potentially give rise to new issues associated with our already complex California language edu-

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STEPHANIE BURDO

cation system. Although these new locally controlled programs must be evaluated annually by local parents and district officials, one can only hope that they will bear in mind past mistakes and currently flawed processes associated with various language education programs. These issues include student age and age of initiation, the expectation of students to sacrifice one class over another, the need for language education programs to have exit strategies, the issues related to poorly constructed completion tests, the limits of our teachers, the lack of available staff, and the concern for students who speak uncommon languages to not be lost in the shuffle of dual-immersion.

The main goal of this thesis was not to paint an image of what a successful language education program looks like, but rather, take note of the mistakes and shortcomings of former and current language education programs which have arisen as a result of

our complex language education system. Now that we have gathered opinions on nationalized language and language assimilation from those who have directly been affected by language education, we can now attempt to tackle the debate moving forward.

Additionally, as we conclude this thesis, we can confirm our hypothesis that California’s complex language education system produces complications for California students and teachers. As language education programs continue to diversify and local school districts implement their own teaching methods and programs, it is imperative to consider what we have discovered and continue to conduct qualitative research on the experiences of our students, teachers, and parents in regards to language education so that each student has a chance at success and no teacher is expected to achieve impossible results.

References

Leal, D., & Hess, F. (2000). The Politics of Bilingual Education Expenditures in Urban

School Districts. Social Science Quarterly, 81(4), 1064-1072.

Kim, YK; Hutchison, LA; Winsler, A. (2015) Bilingual Education in the United States:

A Historical Overview and Examination of Twoway Immersion. Educational Review.

67, 2, 236-252, May 2015.

Walker, C., & Tedick, D. (2000). The Complexity of Immersion Education: Teachers

Address the Issues. The Modern Language Journal, 84(1), 5-27.

Rodriguez, L. (1999). Discretion and Destruction: The Debate Over Language in California’s Schools. Texas Journal On Civil Liberties & Civil Rights, 4(2), 189.

Cammarata. L., & Tedick, D. (2012). Balancing Content and Language in Instruction: The Experience of Immersion Teachers. The Modern Language

Journal, 96(2), 251-269.

Mitchell, C., & Cardoza, K. (2016). Bilingual Education Poised for a Comeback in

California Schools. (Cover Story). Education Week, 36(8), 1-20.

Mitchell, C. (2016). Dual-Language, Bilingual Ed. Expanding in Los Angeles. Education Week, 36(2), 4.

Worsnop, R. L. (1993, August 13). Bilingual Education. CQ Researcher, 3, 697-720.

Montaño, T., Ulanoff, S., Quintanar-Sarellana, R., & Aoki, L. (2005). The DEbilingualization of California’s Prospective Bilingual Teachers. Social Justice,

32 (101), 103-121.

Bali, V. (2001). Sink or Swim: What Happened to California’s Bilingual Students

after Proposition 227? State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 1(3), 295-317.

Conger, D. (2010). Does Bilingual Education Interfere with English-Language Acquisition? Social Science Quarterly, 91(4), 1103-1122.

Donegan, C. (1996, January 19). Debate Over Bilingualism. CQ Researcher,

6, 49-72.

Jost, K. (2009, December 11). Bilingual Education vs.

English Immersion. CQ

Researcher, 19, 1029-1052.

Karaim, R. (2014, September 5). Race and Education.

CQ Researcher, 24, 721-744.

McNamara, T. (2011). Multilingualism in Education: A Poststructuralist Critique. The Modern Language Journal, 95(3), 430-441.

BILINGUAL EDUCATION Ouellette-Schramm, J. R. (2016). Developmental Diversity in the Academic Language–

Learning Experiences of Adult English as a Second or Other Language Learners.

Adult Education Quarterly, 66(3), 219-236.

Alt, M., Arizmendi, G. D., & DiLallo, J. N. (2016).

The Role of Socioeconomic Status in

the Narrative Story Retells of School-Aged English Language Learners.

Language, Speech & Hearing Services In Schools, 47(4), 313-323.

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Tran, V. C. (2010). English Gain vs. Spanish Loss?

Language Assimilation Among

Second-Generation Latinos in Young Adulthood.

Social Forces, 89(1), 257-284.

Rumbaut, R., Massey, D., & Bean, F. (2006). Linguistic Life Expectancies: Immigrant Language Retention in Southern California.

Population and Development Review,

32(3), 447-460.

Lampe, P. (1976). Assimilation and the School System. Sociological Analysis, 37(3), 228-242.

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STEPHANIE BURDO

Stephanie Burdo

Stephanie Burdo is a fourth year Political Science major with an emphasis in American Politics and Political Theory. She is graduating Spring 2017 and is heading to graduate school afterwards to earn her Master’s in Education to begin her career in academia.

Email: burdostephanie@gmail.com

California Drought: Environmental Considerations in Water Supply and Infrastructure

Joshua S. Ebiner California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

California is experiencing prolonged drought conditions which has created severe water shortages throughout the state. Environmental laws and other regulatory compliances have further limited available water supplies. There are many stakeholders seeking legislative reforms including agricultural, environmental, industrial, recreational, and urban groups. Congress is currently considering a variety of bills that aim to address these issues by investing in and maintaining infrastructure, establishing disaster preparedness and response plans, and reforming environmental laws. This report explores the California drought, its effects on state water supplies, and current laws that affect water infrastructure projects and water distribution.

The report also discusses proposed legislation that aims to provide relief to the stakeholders.

O

ver the past decade, the state of California has experienced severe drought conditions which have contributed to a number of social, economic, and environmental consequences. The widespread dry hydrological conditions over the last decade have further exacerbated the state’s already limited water supply.

Water shortages and water delivery disputes, coupled with no existing federal drought preparedness plan, prompted state officials to implement a series of actions to better conserve and distribute water. In 2014, Governor Jerry Brown declared a State of Emergency and directed state and local officials to prepare for and mitigate the impact of the drought conditions. By the start of the 2015 Water Year,13 “nearly 60% of Califor13

The term “water year” is used by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to measure the surface water supply between a 12-month period that begins October 1 and concludes on September 30 (USGS, 2016).

nia was experiencing [an] exceptional drought” which is the most severe classification at the U.S. federal level (Folger & Cody, 2015: p.16; See Figure 1). By April 2015, the state was experiencing more severe water shortages, which prompted Governor Brown to mandate a 25% reduction in water use for nonagricultural users to better conserve the state’s water (California Department of Water Resources (DWR), 2016).

As of November 2016, roughly 20% of the state continues to experience exceptional drought conditions which represents considerable improvement from previous years (See Figures 2 & 3). While overall conditions may have improved, over 93% of the state still faces varying degrees of drought conditions, and most water reservoirs are well below storage capacity and historical averages (See Figure 4). Central and Southern California are hardest hit by the drought.

Created by Joshua S. Ebiner, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona submitted for the Panetta Institute’s Congressional Internship Program as a policy project. Correspondence concerning this research paper should be addressed to Joshua S. Ebiner, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, (909) 263-6730. Email: joshuaebiner@gmail.com Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2017. Pp. 79–106. ©2017, Political Science Department, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona.

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Table of Contents Abstract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Hydrological Conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Water Infrastructure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Environmental Impact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Figure 1: Drought Severity Classification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Figure 2: California Drought Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Environmental Laws and Regulatory Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Figure 3: National Drought Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Clean Water Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Figure 4: State and Federal Reservoirs in California. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Table 1: Water Allocations for CVP Contractors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Table 2: California State Water Project Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Water Resources Planning Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 National Environmental Policy Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Table 3: Status of Five Species of Pacific Coast Salmonids . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88-89 Endangered Species Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Figure 5: California Average Precipitation, 1895-2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Figure 6: California Average Temperature, 1895-2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Water Resources Development Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Central Valley Project Improvement Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Figure 7: Water Infrastructure Facilities in California. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Figure 8: Land Subsidence Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 California Water Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Congressional Response to California Drought and Selected Legislative Action . . . . 93 Figure 9: Land Subsidence in Central Valley. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Drought Preparedness and Response Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Figure 10: Estimated Future Land Subsidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Amendments to Existing Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Figure 11: Comparison of California Drought. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Figure 12: Current California Precipitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta National Heritage Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Water Resources Development Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Table 4: Cooperative Federalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Table 5: Comparing H.R.5303 and S.284 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT the drought conditions and water shortages, creating tension throughout the region over water deliveries.

California’s current hydrological conditions, water infrastructure, and environmental and other regulatory compliances have created a largely unpredictable and unreliable distribution of water to the 25 million people who depend on federal and state water deliveries (Brougher, 2009; National Drought Mitigation Center [NDMC], 2016). These stakeholders, who share competing needs and interests, include the agricultural industry, outdoor recreation and sport industries, urban communities, and wildlife refuges managed by federal agencies. For the fourth consecutive year, many of the stakeholders will experience a severely curtailed water supply because of the drought.

Hydrological Conditions Historically, California has experienced periods of long-term dry conditions which put stress on the state’s water supply. The current drought conditions are unique in this case as they occur during the warmest and driest period of the state’s recorded history.

Between 2012-2015, the state received a total of 62.2 inches of rain (DWR, 2016), and the average temperature between May 2014 and June 2015 was 61.5°F (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] National Centers for Environmental Information [NCEI], 2016). The average annual rainfall California receives is 22.4 inches (NCEI, 2016; See Figure 5); its average temperature is 57.6°F (NCEI, 2016; See Figure 6). These conditions have significant and detrimental consequences for the state as a growing population creates a higher demand for water while simultaneously having less of it. More concerning for the state is the anticipated precipitation patterns for the next couple of years. According to the NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center (CPC), California will continue to experience widespread drought conditions through February 2017 (NOAA, 2016).

California receives much of its water supplies from precipitation, runoff from melting snowpacks on the Sierra Nevada Mountains, and groundwater. On an average year, the state receives as much as 80% of its precipitation from winter storms that occur between November and April (Cody, Folger, & Brown, 2015).

During the spring months, runoff from the melting snowpacks provide a vital source of water that supplies the state’s reservoirs. On an average year, the state receives about 30% of its water supplies from snowpacks (Stern, Sheikh, & Cody, 2016). “If there is no snowpack or the snowpack has low water content,” the amount of water available for distribution will not be sufficient to satisfy the state’s water needs for the

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second half of the year (Cody, 2016: p.2). When there is a gap between the water supplied from these two sources and the demand, the state relies on groundwater supplies to supplement that difference. Accordingly, the demand for groundwater fluctuates depending on the availability of water from other sources.

Water Infrastructure California’s water supply is delivered through two major delivery projects: the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP) (See Figure 7). The former is owned and operated by the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) which is situated in the Department of the Interior; the latter by the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) (Cody, Folger, & Brown, 2015). Both projects use “natural waterways and constructed facilities to convey water” to users in Central and Southern California (Reclamation, 2008: p.iii). With roughly 1,400 dams and a complex system of canals and pumps, the projects divert water that flows into the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta (the Bay-Delta) which is “formed by the confluence of the north flowing San Joaquin River, and the south-flowing Sacramento River, and the San Francisco Bay, to which the delta of the rivers is linked” (Brougher, 2009: p.1).

The diverted water is stored in reservoirs where it will be periodically released back into the Bay-Delta.

The CVP supplies approximately 7 million acre-feet (MAF) of water to agricultural, municipal and industrial (M&I) users, as well as several wildlife refuges (Stern, Sheikh, & Cody, 2016).

The CVP covers roughly 400 miles, starting from the Cascade Mountains near Redding in northern California and ending near the Tehachapi Mountains by Bakersfield in Southern California (See Figure 7). The SWP primarily services agricultural and M&I users, delivering an average 2.5 MAF of water (Stern, Sheikh, & Cody, 2016). The SWP starts at Lake Orville in Butte County and ends at Lake Perris in Riverside County (See Figure 7).

The water users who rely on both delivery projects “are experiencing unprecedented water supply shortages” because of the drought conditions. The CVP’s water deliveries, for instance, have been drastically curtailed for “many of the state’s largest and most prominent agricultural areas for the fourth consecutive year” (Stern, Sheikh, & Cody, 2016: p.4; See Table 1). Most of the contractors affected by this reduction reside south of the Bay-Delta where the drought has been the most severe. SWP’s water deliveries has been below contract allotments since 2006, reaching as low as 5% in 2014 (DWR,

82 2016; See Table 2). However, SWP is estimated to deliver 60% of its water allocations in 2016.

Because of the adverse effects of California’s drought conditions, many cities and counties have implemented water rationing policies, and statewide mandatory water usage cutbacks have been enacted. To adjust to water shortages, many agricultural users have started to rely more on groundwater to meet their need. In 2015 for instance, as much as 65% of the state’s water needs was met by the usage of groundwater which is about 20% more than an average year (Stern, Sheikh, & Cody, 2016).

This dependence on and use of groundwater is currently unregulated as California “lacks a formal state-administered system that regulates and permits groundwater use” Kaldani, 2014). This functions as a short-term solution, though sustained reliance on it will have detrimental environmental consequences.

JOSHUA S. EBINER

Environmental Impact While the drought conditions and water shortages have largely contributed to the deterioration of natural habitats and ecosystems, human activity further exacerbates this decline. For instance, dozens of fish species including salmon, steelhead, and the Delta smelt have experienced significant reductions in their population (Cody, Folger, & Brown, 2015). In 2015, several salmon runs “experienced a 95% loss of eggs laid…and surveys of Delta smelt found fewer than five fish that year” (Stern, Sheikh, & Cody, 2016: p.6).

In fact, “more than 80 percent of the state’s 122 remaining native freshwater fish species are in decline, with a quarter listed as threatened or endangered” under the Endangered Species Act (Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), 2014: p.45; See Table 3).

Figure 1: Drought Severity Classification Category

Description

Possible Impacts Going into drought:

D0

Abnormally Dry

•

Short-term dryness slowing planting, growth of crops or pastures

Coming out of drought: • •

Some lingering water deficits Pastures or crops not fully recovered

Some damage to crops, pastures Streams, reservoirs, or wells low, some water shortages developing or imminent • Voluntary water-use restrictions requested • •

D1

Moderate Drought

D2

Severe Drought

• • •

Crops or pasture losses likely Water shortages common Water restrictions imposed

D3

Extreme Drought

• •

Major crop/pasture losses Widespread water shortages or restrictions

D4

Exceptional Drought

• •

Exceptional and widespread crop/pasture losses Shortages of water in reservoirs, streams, and well creating water emergencies

Source: United States Drought Monitor. (2016). U.S. Drought Monitor Classification Scheme. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/aboutus/classificationscheme.aspx

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT This phenomenon can be attributed to lower water levels, higher water temperatures, and water quality degradation due to salt water intrusion. These effects are a direct result of human activities which include an increasing reliance on groundwater pumping to compensate for reduced surface water supplies. This dependence on groundwater has serious environmental consequences including lower water table levels, reduced availability of groundwater supplies, and an increased probability of land subsidence32 (Cody, Folger, & Brown, 2015; See Figures 8, 9, and 10).

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Land subsidence is the gradual sinking of the Earth’s surface-level and is often attributed to the removal of large amounts of groundwater from certain types of rocks. As groundwater is removed, the rock begins to fall on itself causing the ground to sink (USGS, 2016).

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Environmental Laws and Regulatory Factors To protect and conserve wildlife species and their habitat, a complex system of state and federal laws have been implemented to regulate human activity and mitigate their effects on natural resources. The Clean Water Act, the Water Resources Planning Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Water Resources Development Acts, and California’s water rights system are the primary laws that affect water availability and distribution for industries and communities, government-sponsored water infrastructure projects, and ecosystem protec-

Figure 2: California Drought Conditions

Source: United States Drought Monitor. (2016). U.S. Drought Monitor: California. The National Drought Mitigation Center. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from http://www.californiadrought.org/drought/currentconditions/

84 tion and restoration efforts. These laws aim to address three issues that have challenged California: ecosystem health, water quality, and water supply reliability (Sheikh & Cody, 2005).

The oversight and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations follows a cooperative federalism model wherein the federal government creates a framework and guidelines for states to operate in.

Because the federal government lacks the necessary resources “for [the] day-to-day monitoring and enforcement” of its environmental laws at the state and local levels, most of the actions and responsibilities fall upon the states. Accordingly, the California State Legislature has enacted the necessary state laws that comply with its federal counterparts, and enforce the provisions through the establishment of state agencies (See Table 4). This section will examine and provide background information for the most relevant fed-

JOSHUA S. EBINER eral and state laws that apply to water infrastructure and environmental regulations. The following laws correspond to legislative action taken in the 114th Congress to address drought conditions in California which is discussed in the next section.

Clean Water Act The enactment of the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1948 represented “the first comprehensive statement of federal interest in clean water programs” as it established water quality standards and regulations that would provide state and local governments guidance in addressing water pollution problems (Bearden et al., 2013: p.25). The federal government’s role in regulating surface and groundwater quality was expanded with the passage of the CWA insofar as ensuring that water infrastructure projects and water

Figure 3: National Drought Conditions

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2016). U.S. Seasonal Drought Outlook. Climate Prediction Center. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/expert_ assessment/sdo_summary.php

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT distribution practices met federal standards. Those standards were designed to regulate overall quality of water and water supply in such a way that protects and benefits wildlife specifies and their habitat. In California, the CWA would regulate CVP and SWP operations to ensure that “springtime flow and export limits” in the Bay Delta would comply with ESA standards and other measures to improve environmental conditions such as “water discharge control and habitat restoration” (Sheikh & Cody, 2005: p.7).

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There are three main criticisms of the CWA: the lack of regional monitoring and data compilation of water quality; the legislative limitations to enforce environmental protection standards; and the lack of funding to finance water infrastructure projects. Addressing the first criticism, the CWA does not mandate the regional monitoring and data compilation of water quality which makes it difficult to evaluate its effectiveness in improving overall water quality. Although Lyon & Stein (2009) indicate that the CWA has been

Figure 4: State and Federal Reservoirs in California

Source: Californiadrought.org. (2016). Current Conditions. Pacific Institute. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from http://www.californiadrought.org/drought/current-conditions/

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Table 1: Water Allocations for CVP Contractors, 2012-2016

(percentage of maximum contract allocation)

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 (est.)

North-ofDelta Users Agricultural 100% 75% 0% 0% 100% M&I 100% 100% 50% 25% 100% Settlement 100% 100% 75% 75% 100% Refuges 100% 100% 75% 75% 100% American River M&I 100% 75% 50% 25% 100% In DeltaContra Costa 100% 75% 50% 25% 100% South-ofDelta Users

Agricultural 40% 20% 0% 0% 5% M&I 75% 70% 50% 25% 55% Exchange 100% 100% 65% 75% 100% Refuges 100% 100% 65% 75% 100% Eastside Division 100% 100% 55% 0% 0%

Friant Class 1 45% 45% 0% 0% 0% Friant Class 2

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

 Source: Stern, C. V., Sheikh, P. A., and Cody, B. A. (2016). Central Valley Project (CVP) Operations: In Brief (CRS Report No. R44456). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

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Table 2: California State Water Project Allocations, 2006-2016

(percentage of maximum contract allocation) 2006

State Water Project

100%

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016 (est.)

60%

35%

40%

50%

80%

65%

35%

5%

20%

60%

Source: California Department of Water Resources (2016). State Water Project Allocation Increased: Storms Improve Conditions, but Drought Remains. Retrieved October 28, 2016, from http://www.water.ca.gov/news/ newsreleases/2016/042116.pdf successful in reducing the number of contaminants in water sources over the past 35 years, the data is not as accurate and publicly available as it should be.

With hundreds of billions of dollars being spent to implement the CWA requirements, the absence of an integrated national database is counterintuitive for legislators and policy experts who attempt to examine the performance of the legislation (Lyon & Stein, 2009). Second, the CWA alone is not sufficient in effectively ensuring ecosystem protection especially in areas like the Bay-Delta where water quality standards and environmental protections directly conflict with consumptive water rights. Doremus & Tarlock (2013) suggest that if the CWA is effectively implemented and enforced, it can extend protections to at-risk species not yet covered by the Endangered Species Act which could reduce costly and less successful attempts to restore endangered and threatened species populations. Third, inadequate funding through the CWA has created a substantial gap between “available funds and projected needs” (Copeland, Maguire, & Mallett, 2016: p.1). This gap has rendered the CWA largely ineffective in addressing state and regional drought conditions because of a growing backlog of water infrastructure project proposals. These projects are necessary in maintaining, repairing, and improving existing infrastructure, developing new facilities to support urban and rural development, and expanding sustainable water collection and recycling programs (Copeland, Maguire, & Mallett, 2016). These challenges have been discussed

by Congress though it is unlikely to see comprehensive adjustments made in this Congressional session.

Water Resources Planning Act During the 1960s and 1970s, Congress began to deliberate and enact legislation that would address

the environmental impact of federal projects and evaluate investments in water resources developments (Luther, 2013). The Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 (WRPA) was the product of this shift in national priorities. The passage of WRPA made two major contributions to federal project development and investment. First, it established “Water Resources Planning” requirements which “created a coordinated planning process related to the conservation, development, and use of water resources” (Luther, 2013: p.4). Second, WRPA created the Water Resources Council (WRC), which was tasked with maintaining an ongoing study and assessment of water supplies and programs in every region of the United States to determine whether federal water requirements were being met. The WRC was also responsible for identifying the impacts of water resource agencies (e.g.

Army Corps of Engineers). A WRC Task Force determined that it would measure that impact by four factors: “national economic development, environmental quality, regional economic development, and social well-being” (Luther, 2013: p. 4). The WRC was disbanded in 1988 due to lack of funding, though the provisions set forth in WRPA remain as guiding principles for water resource agencies and projects.

National Environmental Policy Act The passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969 represented a growing national concern about the consequential impact that human activity has on the environment. NEPA has two main focuses: (1) to require all federal agencies and project sponsors to consider the environmental impact of their action before conducting it; and (2) to inform the public of their proposed action to assure them that all environmental concerns are considered and that the action complies with federal regulations. Accordingly, NEPA has been used as an umbrella statute which provides a framework

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JOSHUA S. EBINER

Table 3: Status of Five Species of Pacific Coast Salmonids

Species Coho Salmon (oncorhynchus kisutch)

Status

Federal Register (FR) Citation

1. Central California Coast

Endangered

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

2. Southern Oregon/ Northern California

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

3. Lower Columbia River

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

4. Oregon Coast

Threatened

73 FR 7816 (Feb. 11, 2008)

5. Puget Sound/Strait of Georgia

Species of Concern

69 FR 19975 (Apr. 15, 2004)

6. Southwest Washington

Undetermined

Population (ESU)

Chinook Salmon

1. Sacramento River winterrun

Endangered

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

(Oncorhynchus tshawytscha)

2. Upper Columbia River spring-run

Endangered

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

3. Snake River fall-run

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

4. Snake River spring/ summer-run

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

5. Central Valley spring-run

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

6. California coastal

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

7. Puget Sound

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

8. Lower Columbia River

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

9. Upper Willamette River

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

10. Central Valley fall and late fall-run

Species of Concern

69 FR 19975 (Apr. 15, 2004)

to coordinate all major federal actions in a responsible manner. In this sense, federal action refers to any action “that are potentially subject to federal control and responsibility” (Luther, 2011: p.11-12).

Section 102 (2)(C) of NEPA requires all federal agencies to conduct an environmental impact statement (EIS) whenever it proposes an action. An EIS is a “full disclosure document [which] provides a

Pending Action

Critical habitat under review by NMFS

description of the proposed actions, and the existing environment, as well as analysis of the anticipated beneficial and adverse environmental effects of all reasonable alternatives” (Bearden et al., 2013: p.125). If it is determined that there will be likely adverse environmental costs because of the proposed government action, the agency is given the authority to continue the action only if it can demonstrate

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT

Species

Population (ESU)

Status

Federal Register (FR) Citation

Chum salmon

1. Hood Canal summerrun

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

2. Columbia River

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

Sockeye salmon

1. Snake River

Endangered

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

(Oncorhynchus nerka)

2. Ozette Lake

Threatened

70 FR 37160 (June 28, 2005)

Steelhead trout

1. Southern California

Endangered

71 FR 834 (Jan. 5, 2006)

(Oncorhynchus mykiss)

2. Upper Columbia River

Threatened

74 FR 42605 (Aug. 24, 2009)

3. Central California Coast

Threatened

71 FR 834 (Jan. 5, 2006)

4. South Central California Coast

Threatened

71 FR 834 (Jan. 5, 2006)

5. Snake River Basin

Threatened

71 FR 834 (Jan. 5, 2006)

6. Lower Columbia River

Threatened

71 FR 834 (Jan. 5, 2006)

7. California Central Valley

Threatened

71 FR 834 (Jan. 5, 2006)

8. Upper Willamette River

Threatened

71 FR 834 (Jan. 5, 2006)

9. Middle Columbia River

Threatened

71 FR 834 (Jan. 5, 2006)

10. Northern California

Threatened

71 FR 834 (Jan. 5, 2006)

11. Puget Sound

Threatened

72 FR 26722 (May 11, 2007)

12. Oregon Coast

Species of Concern

69 FR 19975 (Apr. 15, 2004)

(Oncorhynchus keta)

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Pending Action

Critical habitat under review by NMFS

Source: Upton, H.F. (2012). Pacific Salmon and Steelhead Trout: Managing Under the Endangered Species Act (CRS Report No.98-666). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

that the benefits will outweigh the costs. In this regard, NEPA has proven effective in “getting agencies to incorporate environmental values in their making” (Mandelker, 2010: p. 294). However, there are some critical limitations to NEPA which

have been source of criticism since it was enacted.

The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was developed in 1970 to provide the President advice on environmental matters which would eventually be submitted to Congress in an annual Environmental

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JOSHUA S. EBINER

Figure 5: California Average Precipitation, 1895-2016

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2016). National Centers for Environmental Information. Climate at a Glance: U.S. Time Series, Precipitation. Retrieved on November 23, 2016 from http:// www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/

Quality Report (Luther, 2011). Recent studies by the CEQ have found that NEPA’s application is subject to structural problems which affect the effectiveness in implementing its statutory provisions. One problem lies with federal agencies that fall under NEPA’s jurisdiction. Although agencies are required to submit an EIS before starting a project, agencies have developed a general practice to skip this step if the agency determines that the environmental impact is not significant (Mandelker, 2010). Another problem lies with NEPA’s slow bureaucratic process which some argued have been used to obstruct and delay federal agencies as they develop programs and projects though the extent of this delay is unknown due to the lack of data (Luther, 2011). Generally, legislative efforts have been directed to streamline the NEPA environmental review and compliance process, to establish time limits on EISs, and to emphasize interagency cooperation on federal projects and programs (Luther, 2007).

Endangered Species Act The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) was a federal attempt to identify threatened and endangered plant and animal species and provide legal protection to those species. Preserving the species’ habitat is con-

sidered a critical part of the ESA’s purpose. Under the ESA, an endangered species is defined as “any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range” (Corn & Wyatt, 2016: p.7). A threatened species is one “which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range” (Corn & Wyatt, 2016: p.7). As of November 2016, 1,604 animal and plant species have been listed as either endangered or threatened in the United States (FWS, 2016). Since its passage, the ESA has been largely successful, preventing over 225 species from extinction (Center for Biological Diversity, 2011).

The two main federal agencies that administer the ESA are the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).

The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce manage the ESA species listings and coordinate efforts to enforce the provisions of the act.

The authority of the ESA is exercised through both statutory provisions and appropriations authorizations. As either Secretary endeavors to improve the conditions for a listed species, they can designate land that is both occupied by that species as well as surrounding land that is considered “essential for the conservation of the species” (Corn & Wyatt,

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT

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Figure 6: California Average Temperature, 1895-2016

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2016). National Centers for Environmental Information. Climate at a Glance: U.S. Time Series, Average Temperature. Retrieved on November 23, 2016 from http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/

2016: p.15). In 2015, ESA regulations accounted for approximately 236,000 acre-feet (AF) of water reductions between the CVP (144,000 AF) and the SWP (92,000 AF) (Cody, Folger, & Brown, 2015).

These restrictions were applied, in part, to protect the natural habitat and ecosystems of ESA-listed salmon and steelhead species (NMFS, 2014).

Water Resources Development Act Water Resources Development Acts (WRDA) are omnibus bills that authorize the Corps to undertake the construction and maintenance of national water resource infrastructure projects (Luther, 2013). The Corps is an agency within the Department of Defense that undertakes the planning, construction, operation, and maintenance of national water resource infrastructure projects. A WRDA bill may authorize “Corps studies, projects, programs, and establish policies for Corps civil works activities” (Carter & Stern, 2016: p.2). Since the enactment of the first WRDA bill in 1974, Congress has used WRDA bills as directives for the Corps to address region-

al water resource and management activities. These activities primarily pertain to “maintaining navigable channels, reducing flood and storm damage, and restoring aquatic ecosystems” (Sargent, 2016).

Generally, Corps’ projects are aimed at addressing national priorities in relation to water resources, and should balance sustainable economic development with environmental protection and restoration.

Central Valley Project Improvement Act Acknowledging that the CVP was initially designed and operated for the sole purpose of transporting water for agricultural and municipal uses, Congress passed the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) which was signed into law in 1992.

CVPIA mandated several changes in the operation and management of the CVP to include “fish and wildlife protection, restoration, and mitigation as project purposes having equal priority with irrigation and domestic uses” (Interior & FWS, 2016: p.1).

Specifically, provisions within the CVPIA were designated towards: improving the natural production

92

JOSHUA S. EBINER

Figure 7: Water Infrastructure Facilities in California

(federal, state, and local water infrastructure facilities)

Source: Cody, B. A., Folger, P., and Brown, C. (2015). California Drought: Hydrological and Regulatory Water Supply Issues. (CRS Report No. R40979). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT of fish species in Central Valley rivers and streams (Section 3406(b)); mitigating adverse environmental impacts of the CVP on endangered and threatened fish species (3406 (b)(1); and providing quality water supplies to “maintain and improve wetland habitat areas” within the National Wildlife Refuge System located in the Central Valley (Section 3406 (d)) (Interior & FWS, 2016: p.1-2). These provisions reduced the amount of water available for distribution from the Bay-Delta which have environmental benefits but may worsen economic consequences.

For instance, the California State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) estimated that the drought caused a total of $2.2 billion in economic losses in 2014 alone (Cody, Folger, & Brown, 2015). Most of that amount was dealt to the agricultural industry and stemmed from reduced water exports from the Delta.

California Water Rights

California utilizes a dual system of water rights— “one that recognizes riparian and prior appropriation doctrines”—which has a profound effect on the allocation of water (Cody, Folger, & Brown, 2015).

The riparian doctrine grants water rights based on landownership. If a person owns land that physically borders a watercourse (river, stream, lake, etc.), they have an equal right to use that water. The prior appropriations doctrine grants persons a right to water they diverted from its course if they have made a reasonable and beneficial use of that water (Brougher, 2009: p.2). This hierarchical system is based on seniority and does not guarantee that

93

all users will receive their contracted allotment of water, especially during drought conditions. Recognizing that the water of California is the shared ‘property of the people of the State’, California requires that water users utilize their supply of water in a manner that is “reasonable and for a beneficial purpose” (appropriative rights) (Brougher, 2009: p.1-2). Those who obtain water rights by the latter doctrine must obtain permission from the SWRCB. When California’s major water infrastructure projects were installed, appropriative water rights were necessary to ensure that it could operate as designed. Between 1927 and 1967, Reclamation and the DWR obtained appropriative rights for the CVP and SWP so it could divert water without interfering with senior water users that predated both projects (Cody, Folger, & Brown, 2015). These water rights were secured through settlement contracts and exchange contracts. In both instances, the state and federal projects secured appropriative rights to water to allow their projects to operate free from interference. This decentralized water management system has created conflicts among the thousands of local entities that provide water to their communities.

Congressional Response to California Drought and Selected Legislative Action The 114th Congress currently faces numerous water resource issues as it deliberates appropriations and authorizations for water resource development, management, maintenance and protection. Some of

Figure 8: Land Subsidence Simulation (before and after) Before Subsidence:

After Subsidence:

Source: California Water Science Center. (2016). Simulating Land Subsidence. United States Geological Survey.

Retrieved November 23, 2016, from http://ca.water.usgs.gov/land_subsidence/california-subsidence-simulation. html

94

JOSHUA S. EBINER

Figure 9: Land Subsidence in Central Valley (measurements conducted in 2015)

Source: United State Department of the Interior. (2016). Groundwater Depletion and Land Subsidence in California’s Central Valley. United States Geological Survey. Retrieved November 16, 2016, from http://ca.water. usgs.gov/data/drought/drought-water-decisions.html.

the most pressing issues include maintaining and reinvesting in an aging infrastructure, investing in new infrastructure and programs, and establishing flood and drought preparedness and response plans to assist states who are impacted by such events. Reaching a consensus regarding these issues is further complicated because of the many competing interests that often pit stakeholders against each other (Cody, Stern, Carter, & Sheikh, 2015). In California, for instance, “agricultural needs are often in direct conflict with urban needs, as well as with water demand for threatened and endangered species habitat, recreation, and scenic enjoyment” (Cody & Sheikh, 2006). With a complex system of federal and state laws and regulations that affect water deliveries from the CVP and SWP, resolving these issues will be difficult.

As of November 2016, there are over 341 legislative proposals that deal with federal investment in water resources and environmental protection. Multiple bills have been introduced to address California drought conditions by maximizing water exports

while adhering to environmental regulations like the ESA, CWA, and NEPA (e.g. H.R.2983, H.R.2898, H.R.3045, H.R.5247, H.R.6022, S.1894, and S.2533).

Several bills have been introduced to amend existing laws including the ESA (e.g. H.R.1667, H.R.5281, and S.292) and the CVPIA (H.R.4582). A set of companion bills has been introduced which aim to designate the Bay-Delta a national heritage area to preserve the land for outdoor recreation and environmental conservation as well as to promote businesses in the local economy (H.R.1208 and S.630).

Finally, two WRDA bills (H.R.5303 and S.2848) have passed their respective chambers in September 2016. Both bills include provisions that would authorize Corps water resource development projects, studies, and partnerships with nonfederal sponsors.

Drought Preparedness and Response Plan Members of the California delegation have introduced legislation to address the recent drought condi-

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT

95

Figure 10: Estimated Future Land Subsidence

Source: Cody, B. A., Folger, P., and Brown, C. (2015). California Drought: Hydrological and Regulatory Water Supply Issues. (CRS Report No. R40979). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

tions that have plagued the state over the past decade.

H.R.5247 and S.2533 (California Long-Term Provisions for Water Supply and Short-Term Provisions for Emergency Drought Relief Act), which were introduced in early 2016, are companion bills which would authorize Reclamation to provide cost-shared financial assistance to nonfederal sponsors to facilitate the development of new water storage and reclamation projects. The bills would direct the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to utilize State Revolving Fund (SRF) programs3 to fund the development of State Revolving Fund (SRF) programs are the most “prominent source of federal financial assistance for municipal water infra3

those projects which prioritize providing “additional water supplies to areas at risk of having inadequate supplies for public health and safety purposes, or to improve resiliency to drought” (H.R.5247, 2016). If enacted, these bills would direct Interior and Commerce to identify ways to increase water supplies to CVP and SWP contractors and the other stakeholders that rely on those water projects for their deliveries.

H.R.5247 and S.2533 also contain provisions that aim to protect and enhance native fish species and structure projects” (Copeland, Maguire, & Mallett, 2016: p.3). SRFs can be used to develop new projects and improve existing ones such as wastewater and drinking water treatment facilities.

96

JOSHUA S. EBINER

Figure 11: Comparison of California Drought {November 24, 2015 and November 22, 2016)

Source: United States Drought Monitor. (2016). U.S. Drought Monitor Map Archive. The National Drought Mitigation Center. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/MapsAndData/MapArchive.aspx.

their natural habitat. NOAA would receive appropriations to restore the natural habitat in the Sacramento River for the “benefit of Chinook salmon and steelhead trout” and to conduct studies of CVP and SWP operations to predict their effects on those fish species (H.R.5247, 2016; S.2533, 2016). Interior and Commerce would receive directives to implement pilot programs that would improve survival rates of juvenile fish species in the Bay-Delta, and in conservation hatchery programs to rebuild fish populations.

Interior would also be directed to conduct studies to determine potential methods that would reduce the impact CVP and SWP operations have on native fish species. Lastly, the NMFS would be tasked with pilot programs that remove nonnative fish species to maximize other agencies’ efforts to protect and rebuild native species populations. Both bills are under committee consideration in their respective chambers.

Amendments to Existing Laws The ESA − and to a lesser extent the CVPIA− have been the center of controversy as critics suggest that neither law has been effective in achieving its purpose of protecting and restoring threatened and endangered species. To the contrary, the regulatory restrictions that these laws impose on water deliveries have been cited as actually worsening the impact of the recent drought conditions in California which

has prompted legislators to deliberate changes to existing laws (Cody & Sheikh, 2009; Stern, Sheikh, & Cody, 2016). H.R.1667 and S.292 (21st Century Endangered Species Transparency Act) are companion bills that were introduced by Rep. Cynthia Lummis (R-WY) and Sen. John Cornyn respectively.4 H.R.1667 and S.292 would amend the ESA by requiring Interior and Commerce to “make publicly available on the Internet the best scientific and commercial data” used for each regulation enacted for the protection of an endangered or threatened species (H.R.1667 & S.292, 2016). Both bills are under committee consideration in their respective chambers.

H.R.4582 (Save Our Salmon Act) was introduced

by Rep. Jeff Denham (R-CA) in June 2016. The bill would amend the CVPIA to “exclude striped bass from the fish doubling requirement and other provisions” of the law to ensure the protection and recovery of ESA-listed native salmon and steelhead species (House Committee on Natural Resources, 2016).

Striped bass are non-native, predatory fish species that have undermined conservation efforts in the Central Valley to protect threatened and endangered species (H.R.4582, 2016). H.R.4582 passed the House on July 5, 2016 and is currently under consideration by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

A similar bill (H.R.4315) passed the House of Representatives in the 113th Congress in 2014 but it was not enacted.

4

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT

Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta National Heritage Area H.R.1208 and S.630 (Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta National Heritage Area Establishment Act) are companion bills that were introduced by Rep. Garamendi and Sen. Feinstein in March 2015. The bills propose making the Bay-Delta a national heritage area (NHA)5 to secure federal assistance to “help implement the locally-developed Heritage Area management plan to conserve and protect the delta’s natural, historical and cultural resources” (Feinstein, NHAs are regions that are managed by local coordinating entities and receive federal financial and technical assistance (Delta Protection Commission, 2012).

5

Figure 12: Current California Precipitation

97

2015). The industries and their economic activities in the region largely depend on its ecological, historical, “cultural, recreational, natural…and agricultural values” which make supporting those values critical for the State (Delta Protection Commission, 2012: p.33).

By making the Bay-Delta an NHA, a regional network of businesses, property owners, and government agencies can build support to preserve, protect, and enhance the region through a balance of economic development and environmental preservation. The bills are also praised for not implementing new regulations on water deliveries or property rights (Feinstein, 2015). Both bills are currently under consideration in their respective chambers with hearings already held.

Water Resources Development Act In September 2016, two WRDA bills, H.R.5303 and S.2848, were passed in their respective chambers but have not been enacted.

Most provisions in the bills relate to authorization for cost-sharing Corps projects that focus on disaster response and recovery, environmental restoration and protection, water supply, and infrastructure. H.R.5303 would authorize 30 new construction projects which are estimated to cost the federal government $8.7 billion. Similarly, S. 2848 would authorize 29 new construction projects, costing roughly $8.4 billion (Carter, 2016).

H.R.5303 and S.2848 also contain revisions to existing policies to better address national water resource issues.

Several provisions in both bills would authorize the Secretary of the Army “to review and approve proposals to increase the quantity of water available from federal water resource projects” insofar as those proposals comply with applicable environmental laws (Carter, 2016: p.1). The bills would establish operation and maintenance responsibilities for nonfederal sponsors that will remain in effect 10 years after a restoration project has been determined successful by the Secretary. H.R.5303 would also authorize the Secretary to “design and develop a structural health monitoring

Source: United States Department of Agriculture (2016). Map Products: Precipitation. Natural Resources Conservation Study & National Water and Climate Center. Retrieved November 26, 2016, from http://www.wcc.nrcs. usda.gov/ftpref/data/water/wcs/gis/maps/WestwideWYTDPrecipPercentACIS.pdf

98 program to assess and improve the condition of” infrastructure managed by the Corps (H.R.5303, 2016).

Analysis Although the current hydrological conditions in California have considerably improved from recent years (See Figures 11, 12, & 13), the effects of the drought remain severe. Challenged with balancing economic prosperity with environmental protection, legislators must find solutions that encourage the sustainable management of the state’s limited water resources. Achieving this end is no easy task however, as there are many stakeholders involved in the decision-making process. This process is further complicated with the hundreds of legislative propos-

Figure 13: Current Snowpack Levels

JOSHUA S. EBINER als under Congressional consideration and growing federal budgetary constraints which limit the government’s ability to implement potential legislation.

A popular approach to addressing the drought conditions in California revolve around improving and expanding the state’s water infrastructure to more efficiently utilize and store available water supplies.

H.R.5247 and S.2533 prioritize federal investment in water recycling and desalination projects that will provide additional supplies to states. In California, over 1.4 MAF of water supplies can be made available through 137 identified water recycling and desalination projects (H.R.5247, 2016). This approach will certainly assist California in developing longterm, sustainable, and reliable sources of water as it provides alternative resources that have minimal environmental impact. One shortcoming of these bills however, is their failure to maximize other natural sources of water. Previous bills (e.g.

H.R.2983)6 indicated that stormwater capture projects in urban and suburban areas in California could increase water supplies by as much as 600,000 AF annually (H.R.2983, 2015). Yet even this proposal does not entirely resolve the issue. As Kaldani (2014) suggests, there have been “no significant infrastructure investments since the 1970s” when the CVP and SWP facilities were designed to satisfy water demands for 19 million people, or half of the state’s current population. Furthermore, the existing infrastructure was designed with little consideration for its environmental impact and it is becoming more expensive to maintain.

Resolving this issue is not necessarily a matter of build H.R.2983 (Drought Recovery and Resilience Act of 2015) was introduced by Rep. Jared Huffman (D-CA) in July, 2015. H.R.2983 received considerable support in the House, gathering 38 cosponsors. The last action on the bill took place in August, 2015 when it was referred to the House Subcommittee on Environment.

6

Source: United States Department of Agriculture (2016). Map Products: Precipitation. Natural Resources Conservation Study & National Water and Climate Center. Retrieved November 26, 2016, from http://www.wcc.nrcs. usda.gov/ftpref/data/water/wcs/gis/maps/ca_swepctnormal.pdf

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT

99

Table 4: Cooperative Federalism (federal and state laws and enforcing agencies) State Law

Enforcing State Agency

Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act of 1969

State Water Resources Control Board

Water Resources Council (defunct due to lack of funding)

None

None

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

Environmental Protection Agency

California Environmental Quality Act of 1970

Self-executing statute

Endangered Species Act of 1973

-Fish and Wildlife Service -National Marine Fisheries Service

California Endangered Species Act 1970

California Department of Fish and Wildlife

Water Resources Development Act

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

None

None

Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992

-Fish and Wildlife Service -Bureau of Reclamation

California Natural Resources Agency

California Department of Fish and Game

Federal Law

Enforcing Federal Agency

Clean Water Act of Environmental 1948 Protection Agency Water Resources Planning Act of 1965

Sources: California Natural Resources Department. (2014). Frequently Asked Questions About CEQA. Retrieved November 25, 2016, from http://resources.ca.gov/ceqa/more/faq.html; Corn, L. M., and Wyatt, A. M. (2016). The Endangered Species Act: A Primer. (CRS Report No. RL31654). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service; Luther, L. (2011). The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA): Background and Implementation. (CRS Report No. RL33152). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service; Luther, L. (2013).

Environmental Requirements Addressed During Corps Civil Works Project Planning: Background and Issues for Congress. (CRS Report No. R43209). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service; Sheikh, P. A., and Cody, B. A. (2005). CALFED Bay-Delta Program: Overview of Institutional and Water Use Issues (CRS Report No. RL31975). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

100 ing more reservoirs, dams, and levees. Building and maintaining these infrastructure projects have high financial implications7 as well as lasting environmental consequences. On the other hand, if the infrastructure is left at or near its current state, environmental consequences are likely to follow, undermining existing federal and state efforts to invest in and implement ecosystem and wildlife restoration projects. For example, if water deliveries from the CVP and SWP continue to be reduced in response to drought conditions and environmental regulations, users (particularly in the Central Valley) will rely more heavily on groundwater supplies to supplement the gap. Sustained reliance on groundwater will only further increase the already alarming rate of groundwater basin declines which “could lead to irreversible land subsidence, poor water quality, reduced surface flows, ecosystem impacts, [infrastructure damage,] and the permanent loss of capacity to store water as groundwater” (California Natural Resources Agency, California Department of Food & Agriculture, & California Environmental Protection Agency, 2016: p.15). The financial implications of this damage will be crippling and will limit the state’s flexibility to utilize water sources and storage options. Simply put, if H.R.5247 or S.2533 are enacted, some relief will be provided to California but it will not completely address the fundamental issues in the state’s aging infrastructure.

Protecting the environment and restoring degrading ecosystems are critical components to ensuring a reliable water supply that complies with federal and state regulations. The House of Representatives and Senate each passed a WRDA bill (H.R.5303 and S.2848) which, among many other provisions, contain authorizations to conduct feasibility studies for federal actions regarding flood control and ecosystem restoration in California (See Table 5). These provisions target important infrastructure projects across the state, but they do not address the more pressing issues within the CVP and SWP which is the hub of the state’s water conveyance and storage system. For instance, there are no provisions to monitor or provide technical assistance for groundwater usage. This is a critical issue for the state, as current groundwater pumping is causing potentially irreversible environmental damage to one of the state’s largest water supply and storage mechanisms. Two additional long-term environmental issues for Cali Some estimates suggest that the maintenance of California’s current water infrastructure costs $30 billion each year (PPIC Water Policy Center, 2014). Another estimated $34 billion will be needed to improve the state’s infrastructure to increase water supply and restore ecosystem health (PPIC Water Policy Center, 2016).

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JOSHUA S. EBINER fornia’s infrastructure which are not addressed in the current WRDA bills are: (1) a rapidly deteriorating habitat in the Bay-Delta; and (2) degrading habitat in the upper watersheds of the Sierra Nevada and Cascade Mountains whose runoff accounts for as much as two-thirds of the state’s surface water supply.

However, these issues extend much further than environmental concerns. Most of the state’s economy relies on the existing water infrastructure, especially outdoor recreation, sport and commercial fishing, and tourism. A 2012 NMFS economic report found that recreational expenditures on groundfish alone contributed an estimated $2.7 billion to California’s economy, supporting roughly 13,000 jobs (California Fish and Game Commission, 2014).

Similarly, sport and commercial salmon industries in northwest and northern California generate roughly $1.25 billion annually (Upton, 2012). In the Bay-Delta, the outdoor recreation and tourism industries generate $353 million annually, supporting over 5,300 jobs throughout the state (Delta Protection Commission, 2012). These industries depend largely on the health of the ecosystems in that region and further decline of those resources will have detrimental consequences on the local economy.

H.R.1208 and S.630 represent initiatives wherein the federal, state, and local government cooperatively implement a framework that could help balance economic, residential, and environmental interests.

Historically, water supply and economic growth has been developed at the expense of environmental health. Human activity has significantly altered the ecosystem which has led to the decline of many wildlife species. To date, 31 of the state’s 122 native freshwater fish are listed under the ESA as endangered or threatened and there is no local funding source to supplement federal and state investments in restoring these populations (PPIC, 2014). Both bills aim to preserve the historical, cultural, and natural values of the Delta which would promote and support the economic development of those industries that rely on those values. While these initiatives do not directly target environmental quality and preservation, they do add incentives for local and regional entities to better manage those natural resources. These bills, however, have not gained much support in Congress and have been introduced and reintroduced in every Congressional session since the 111th Congress (2010, 2011, 2013, and 2015).

Another critical component of improving water management and enhancing the ecosystem is fixing the inefficiencies of existing laws. The enactment of H.R.1667 or S.292 could prove beneficial by publicly disclosing the scientific and commercial data Interior

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT and Commerce use for listing and delisting species under its legal protection as well as regulations to improve species population. The ESA has been controversial, especially in California during the recent drought conditions as its regulations have restricted water deliveries from the CVP and SWP. California state officials have not “identified the quantity, quality, and timing of water required to sustain ecosystem health,” which makes it difficult to monitor the performance of certain regulatory efforts (PPIC Water Policy Center, 2016). In this regard, the legislation would require government agencies to justify ESA regulations and track the progress of species population recovery and the health of designated critical habitats. H.R.4582 would accomplish a similar result as it removes the nonnative striped bass from the CVPIA’s population doubling requirement. With the federal and state governments investing millions of dollars each year for enhancing the ecosystems and native wildlife species, retaining a nonnative predatory fish that threatens the salmon population undermines restoration efforts. These laws can help utilize government funding more efficiently and improve the performance of existing legislative efforts to improve the health of aquatic ecosystems and biodiversity.

Conclusion With California continuing to experience longterm drought conditions, Congress faces several

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pressing issues to provide relief for the state. Those issues include improving the state’s aging water infrastructure and water delivery reliability; protecting and restoring the ecosystems and native plant and animal species; and exploring long-term solutions that will help the state prepare for and mitigate the impact of future drought conditions. Addressing all three issues is essential to ensure the state can support its diverse economic sectors, residential growth, and environmental integrity. The legislative proposals covered in this report touch upon a few options that Congress has deliberated. However, none of those bills have been enacted, and many of them have circulated committees and subcommittees for a number of years. With the current Congressional session ending on January 2, 2017, those bills will have to be reintroduced and begin the legislative process again in the 115th Congress.

Congress must be proactive in passing legislation, anticipating long-term issues and developing solutions before a crisis strikes. Implementing reforms are going to be costly, especially in California whose water infrastructure stretches across most of the state. But if Congress continues to delay addressing the larger issues with California’s current infrastructure, it will be harder and more expensive to find viable and effective solutions.

Federal and state officials need to coordinate their resources to develop plans that benefit its vast economy, diverse population, and critical ecosystems.

Table 5: Comparing H.R.5303 and S.2848 (federal Authorizations of feasibility studies for water resources development and ecosystem restoration) H.R.5303 Cache Creek Settling Basin Coyote Valley Dam Del Rosa Channel, City of San Bernardino Merced County Streams Mission-Zanja Channel, Cities of San Bernardino and Redlands Soboba Indian Reservation

S.2848 Cache Creek Settling Basin Coyote Valley Dam Del Rosa Drainage Area Merced County Mission-Zanja Drainage Area Santa Ana River Basin

Sources: Water Resources Development Act, H.R.5303, 114th Cong. (2016). https://www.congress.gov/ bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5303?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%225303%22%5D%7D; Water Resources Development Act, S.2848, 114th Cong. (2016). https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/ senate-bill/2848?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22s.2848%22%5D%7D&r=1.

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Works Cited 21st Century Endangered Species Transparency Act, H.R.1667, 114th Cong. (2016). https:// www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/ house-bill/1667?q=%7B%22search%22%3A% 5B%221667%22%5D%7D&r=1.

21st Century Endangered Species Transparency Act, S.292, 114th Cong. (2016). https:// www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/292?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B% 22S.+292%22%5D%7D&r=1.

Bearden, D. M., Copeland, C., Luther, L., McCarthy, J. E., Tiemann, M., Esworthy, R., and Yen, J. H. (2013). Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency. (CRS Report No.RL30798).

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Brougher, C. (2009) California Water Law and Related Legal Authority Affecting the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta (CRS Report No. RL34554). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

California Department of Water Resources. (2016).

Drought and Water Year 2016:

Hot and Dry Conditions Continue. Retrieved November 7, 2016, from http://water.ca.gov/waterconditions/docs/a3065_Drought_8page_v8_ FINALsm.pdf.

California Department of Water Resources. (2016).

Governor’s Drought Declaration. Retrieved September 17, 2016, from http://www.water.ca.gov/ waterconditions/declaration.cfm.

California Department of Water Resources (2016).

State Water Project Allocation Increased: Storms Improve Conditions, but Drought Remains. Retrieved October 28, 2016, from http://www. water.ca.gov/news/newsreleases/2016/042116. pdf.

California Fish and Game Commission. (2014). Economic Impact Statement. Retrieved

November 28, 2016 from http://www.fgc.ca.gov/ regulations/2014/1_91eia.pdf California Long-Term Provisions for Water Supply and Short-Term Provisions for Emergency Drought Relief Act, H.R.5247, 114th Cong.

(2016). https://www.congress.gov/ bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5247?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%225247%22%5D%7D &r=2.

JOSHUA S. EBINER California Long-Term Provisions for Water Supply and Short-Term Provisions for Emergency Drought Relief Act, S.2533, 114th Cong. (2016). https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/ senate-bill/2533?q=%7B%22search%22%3A% 5B%22S.2533%22%5D%7D&r=1.

California Natural Resources Department. (2014).

Frequently Asked Questions About CEQA. Retrieved November 25, 2016, from http://resources.ca.gov/ceqa/more/faq.html.

Carter, N. T. (2016). Water Resources Development Act of 2016: H.R.5303 and S.2848. (CRS Report No. IN10579). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Carter, N. T., and Stern, V. (2016). Army Corps of Engineers: Water Resource Authorizations, Appropriations, and Activities (CRS Report No. R41243). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Center for Biological Diversity. (2011). A Future For All: A Blueprint for Strengthening the Endangered Species Act. Retrieved January 21, 2017 from https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa/pdfs/A-Future-for-All.pdf Cody, B. A. (2016). California Drought: Water Supply and Conveyance Issues. (CRS Report No. IF10133). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Cody, B. A., Folger, P., and Brown, C. (2015). California Drought: Hydrological and Regulatory Water Supply Issues. (CRS Report No. R40979).

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Cody, B. A., and Sheikh, P. A. (2009). Title X of H.R.146: San Joaquin River Restoration. (CRS Report No. R40125). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Cody, B. A., and Sheikh, P. A. (2006). Western Water Resource Issues. (CRS Report No. RL33565).

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Cody, B. A., Sheikh, P. A., and Stern, C.V. (2014).

H.R.5781: Legislation Proposed to Maximize Water Supplies to Address Drought in California.

(CRS Report No. IF10019). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Cody, B. A., Stern, C.V., Carter, N. T., and Sheikh, P. A. (2015). Water Resource Issues in the 114th Congress (CRS Report No. R43910). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Copeland, C., Maguire, S., and Mallet, W. J. (2016).

Legislative Options for Financing Water Infrastructure. (CRS Report No. R42467). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT Corn, L. M., and Wyatt, A. M. (2016). The Endangered Species Act: A Primer. (CRS Report No. RL31654). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Delta Protection Commission. (2012). Feasibility Study for a Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta National Heritage Area. Retrieved November 17, 2016, from http://www.delta.ca.gov/res/docs/ DelHAI/NHA/Delta_NHA_Study.pdf.

Doremus, H., and Tarlock, A.D. (2013). Can the Clean Water Act Succeed as an Ecosystem Protection Law? Retrieved March 10, 2017 from http://faculty.uml.edu/sgallagher/Clean_Water_ Act_case_study.pdf Drought Recovery and Resilience Act of 2015, H.R.2983, 114th Cong. (2016). https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2983/ text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22california+drought%22%5D%7D&r=6 Feinstein, D. (2015). Bill Designates Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta as National Heritage Area.

Retrieved November 19, 2016, from http:// www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/ press-releases?ID=7d75e609-4d98-4d6f-bbc3c3fc76bed530.

Folger, P., and Cody, B.A. (2015) Drought in the United States: Causes and Current Understanding (CRS Report No. R43407). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. House Committee on Natural Resources. (2016).

House Passes Bill to Address Conflicting Federal Statutes that Exacerbate California Drought.

Retrieved November 21, 2016, from http://naturalresources.house.gov/newsroom/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=400929.

Hanak, E., Gray, B., Lund, J., Mitchell, D., Caitrin, C., Fahlund, A., Jessoe, K., Medellin- Azuara, J., Misczynski, D., Nachbaur, J., & Suddeth, R. (2014). Paying for Water in California. Public Policy Institute of California. Retrieved November 28, 2016 from http://www.ppic.org/content/ pubs/report/R_1016WPCBKR.pdf.

Hanak, E., Lund, J., Dinar, A., Gray, B., Howitt, R., Mount, J., Moyle, P., Thompson, B. (2011).

Managing California’s Water: From Conflict to Reconciliation. Public Policy Institute of California. Retrieved November 28, 2016 from http:// www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_211EHR. pdf

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Kaldani, D. (2014). Water Supply – Unsustainable California: The Top 10 Issues Facing the Golden State. United States Common Sense.

Retrieved November 23, 2016, from http://uscommonsense.org/research/unsustainable-california-the-top-10-issues-facing-the-golden-state-water-supply/.

Luther, L. (2013). Environmental Requirements Addressed During Corps Civil Works Project Planning: Background and Issues for Congress.

(CRS Report No. R43209). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Luther, L. (2011). The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA): Background and Implementation. (CRS Report No. RL33152). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Luther, L. (2007). The National Environmental Policy Act: Streamlining NEPA: Retrieved January 28, 2017 from http://nationalaglawcenter.org/ wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL33267.pdf Lyon, G. and Stein, E. (2009). How effective has the Clean Water Act been at reducing pollutant mass emissions to the South California Bight over the past 35 years? Retrieved January 22, 2017, from ftp://ftp.sccwrp.org/pub/download/DOCUMENTS/AnnualReports/2007AnnualReport/ AR07_001_012.pdf Mandelker, D.R. (2010). The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of its Experience and Problems. Retrieved January 12, 2017 from http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1082&context=law_journal_ law_policy Mount, J., Hanak, E., Gray, B., & Lund, J. (2016).

California’s Water: Climate Change and Weather. Public Policy Institute of California Water Policy Center. Retrieved November 28, 2016 from http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_314EHR.pdf National Drought Mitigation Center. (2016). Current Conditions. National Integrated Drought Information System. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from https://www.drought.gov/drought/datamaps-tools/current-conditions.

104 National Marine and Fisheries Service. (2014). Recovery Plan for the Evolutionarily Significant Units of Sacramento River Winter-Run Chinook Salmon and Central Valley Spring- Run Chinook Salmon and the Distinct Population Segment of California Central Valley Steelhead. West Coast Region. Retrieved October 28, 2016, from http://www.westcoast.fisheries.noaa.gov/publications/recovery_planning/salmon_steelhead/ domains/california_central_valley/final_recovery_plan_07-11-2014.pdf.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

(2016). National Centers for Environmental Information. Climate at a Glance: U.S. Time Series, Precipitation. Retrieved on November 23, 2016 from http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

(2016). National Centers for Environmental Information. Climate at a Glance: U.S. Time Series, Average Temperature. Retrieved on November 23, 2016 from http://www.ncdc.noaa. gov/cag/.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

(2016). U.S. Seasonal Drought Outlook. Climate Prediction Center. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/expert_assessment/sdo_summary.php.

Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. (2014). Governor Brown Declares Drought State of Emergency. Retrieved October 21, 2016, from https:// www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18368.

Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta National Heritage Area Establishment Act, H.R.1208, 114th Cong.

(2015). Retrieved November 22, 2016, from https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/ house-bill/1208?q=%7B%22search%22%3A% 5B%221208%22%5D%7D&r=5.

Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta National Heritage Area Establishment Act, S.630, 114th Cong.

(2015). Retrieved November 22, 2016, from https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/ senate-bill/630?q=%7B% Sargent, M. (2016). WRDA: The Water Resources Development Act in the 114th Congress. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/09/wrda-the-water-resources-development-act-in-the-114th-congress.

Save Our Salmon (SOS) Act, H.R.4582, 114th Cong.

(2016). https://www.congress.gov/ bill/114th-congress/house-bill/4582?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%224582%22%5D%7D &r=1.

JOSHUA S. EBINER Sheikh, P. A., and Cody, B. A. (2005). CALFED Bay-Delta Program: Overview of Institutional and Water Use Issues (CRS Report No. RL31975). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Stern, C.V., Sheikh, P. A., and Cody, B.A. (2016).

Central Valley Project (CVP) Operations: In Brief. (CRS Report No. R44456). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

United States Department of Agriculture (2016). Map Products: Precipitation. Natural Resources Conservation Study & National Water and Climate Center. Retrieved November 26, 2016, from http://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/ftpref/data/water/ wcs/gis/maps/WestwideWYTDPrecipPercentACIS.pdf United States Department of Agriculture (2016). Map Products: Precipitation. Natural Resources Conservation Study & National Water and Climate Center. Retrieved November 26, 2016, from http://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/ftpref/data/water/ wcs/gis/maps/ca_swepctnormal.pdf United State Department of the Interior. (2016).

Groundwater Depletion and Land Subsidence in California’s Central Valley. United States Geological Survey. Retrieved November 16, 2016, from http://ca.water.usgs.gov/data/drought/ drought-water-decisions.html.

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Mid-Pacific Region. Retrieved September 19, 2016, from http://www.usbr.gov/mp/cvp/docs/ water-supply-and-field-study.pdf.

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United States Geological Survey. Retrieved November 21, 2016, from http://water.usgs.gov/ nwc/explain_data.html.

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Retrieved November 12, 2016, from http://water. usgs.gov/edu/earthgwlandsubside.html.

United States Department of the Interior & United States Geological Survey (2016). Simulating Land Subsidence. California Water Science Center. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from http:// ca.water.usgs.gov/land_subsidence/california-subsidence-simulation.html.

CALIFORNIA DROUGHT United States Department of the Interior, & United States Fish and Wildlife Service. (2016). 2017 Annual Work Plan Public Final. Retrieved October 17, 2016, from http://www.usbr.gov/mp/ cvpia/docs/2017-workplan-cvpia.pdf.

United States Drought Monitor. (2016). U.S. Drought Monitor Map Archive. The National Drought Mitigation Center. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/ MapsAndData/MapArchive.aspx.

United States Drought Monitor. (2016). U.S. Drought Monitor Classification Scheme. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from http://droughtmonitor. unl.edu/aboutus/classificationscheme.aspx.

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Upton, H.F. (2012). Pacific Salmon and Steelhead Trout: Managing Under the Endangered Species Act (CRS Report No.98-666). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Water Resources Development Act, H.R.5303, 114th Cong. (2016). Retrieved November 22, 2016, from https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5303?q=%7B%22search%22% 3A%5B%225303%22%5D%7D. Water Resources Development Act, S.2848, 114th Cong. (2016). Retrieved November 22, 2016, from https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2848?q=%7B%22search%22% 3A%5B%22s.2848%22%5D%7D&r=1.

Folsom Lake, California in 2014. California Department of Water Resources.

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JOSHUA S. EBINER

Joshua S. Ebiner

Joshua Ebiner is a fourth-year political science and philosophy double major. His expected graduation date is June 2018. After completing his undergraduate programs, Joshua plans on attending law school.

Email: joshuaebiner@gmail.com

Ecoterrorism: From Environmental Justice Advocate to Terrorist: Who are the people who take their passion for the environment too far?

Jane Pojawa California State Polytechnic University, Pomona The biggest security threat facing the United States is not international war but terrorism, including both radical Islamic attacks and violent domestic extremism. Until recently, a sub-type of special interest terrorism, ecoterrorism, dominated headlines but it has almost disappeared in the last decade. Expanded legislation, broad investigations and aggressive sentencing have all but eliminated ecoterrorism from public consciousness. But is it due for a resurgence? By examining the definitions, origins and methods employed by ecoterrorists, we may discover what motivates and how to diffuse this form of ecologically-motivated fanaticism.

D

riving down a country road flanked with artichoke and strawberry fields in Watsonville, California, John Hanna became the victim of a chemical attack.

A crop duster came up from behind and, flying only 15 feet above him, sprayed Parathion on his car and in through the open windows. Parathion is an organophosphate poison that was developed by Nazi scientist Gerhard Schrader in the 1940s as an insecticide. Schrader went on to invent Sarin, among other chemical weapons. Parathion has been banned in several countries and the Environmental Protection Agency considers it a Toxicity Category I pesticide – the most dangerous classification. (Tucker, 2006) Hanna, feeling like he was “jumping out of his skin” from the neurotoxin, reported the incident to the agricultural commissioner’s office. “Nothing ever came of it,” he said. “The incident served as a catalyst.

The ELF was born.” The “ELF” was the “Environmental Life Force,” now the “Earth (or Environmental) Liberation Front,” and the time of its birth was in the mid-1970s. (Interview, 2001) Hanna, a veteran with strong anti-war and pro-environmental leanings felt a calling to save the Earth and its people. The Environmental Life Force/Environmental Liberation Front is considered the oldest and most influential ecoterrorist organization in the country and its genesis can be traced to the radicalization of John Hanna.

(Cecil-Cockwell, 2008)

Defining EcoTerrorism Eco-terrorism is defined by the FBI as “the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against people or property by an environmentally-oriented, subnational group for environmental-political

Created by Jane Pojawa, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona for her terroriam class final. Correspondence concerning this research paper should be addressed to Jane Pojawa, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, (909) 263-6730. Email: jmpojawa@cpp.edu Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2017. Pp. 107–131.

©2017, Political Science Department, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona.

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JANE POJAWA

Founding ELF members Carla Susan Olander and John Hanna in Watsonville, California. Both Olander and Hanna suffered chemical poisoning before engaging in “direct action” to protest industrial destruction of the environment.

Photo by Jennifer Teeter.

reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature.” (Jarboe. 2002) Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism and Terrorism in Perspective devote whole chapters to the issue of what precisely constitutes a terrorist act. Griset and Mahan note that “more than 100 definitions of terrorism exist.” (Griset, 2) Most commonly it is assumed that (1) the perpetrator of the act is a subnational group or clandestine agent (2) the target is one or more noncombatants and (3) that the act itself is premeditated,

politically motivated violence. (Gottlieb, 2014) The critical difference between ecoterrorism and ordinary terrorism is, of course, the environmental motivation behind attacks. The secondary difference is that destruction of property is sufficient to constitute a “terrorist act.” Indeed, very few acts of ecoterrorism result in human injury or death.

James F. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division, FBI before the House Resources Committee, Subcommittee on For-

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS As a recent graduate of Cal Poly Pomona, I would like to thank all of the teachers who helped and inspired me including Michael Moreau, who taught me journalism and editing; Jane Ballinger, my faculty advisor in journalism; and Marc Scarcelli, my political science advisor, and whose terrorism class inspired this paper. These exceptional instructors went far above and beyond to help me achieve my academic goals and in the process have become dear friends. Thank you.

I also thank my husband, Jeryd Pojawa, for being supportive of my educational pursuits, learning along with me, and providing encouragement when my enthusiasm was low. I would also like to thank the editor of the Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Tara Kwan, for having the vision to start this publication. It has been a privilege to be your designer for the last two years.

ECOTERRORISM ests and Forest Health. grouped ecoterrorism with domestic terrorism and defined it thusly “Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States (or its territories) without foreign direction, committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” (Jarboe, 2002) In 2004, John E. Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the topic of animal rights extremists and eco-terrorists. What he said puts ecoterrorism in the context of domestic terrorism that is neither left- nor right-wing, but constituting a type of “special interest” terrorism.

“During the past decade, we have witnessed dramatic changes in the nature of the domestic terrorist threat. In the 1990s, right-wing extremism overtook left-wing terrorism as the most dangerous domestic terrorist threat to the United States. During the past several years, however, special interest extremism, as characterized by the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and related extremists, have emerged as a serious domestic terrorist threat. Special interest terrorism differs from traditional right-wing and left-wing terrorism in that extremist special interest groups seek to resolve specific issues, rather than effect widespread political change.

Such extremists conduct acts of politically motivated violence to force segments of society, including the general public, to change attitudes about issues considered important to the extremists’ causes. Generally, extremist groups engage in activities that are protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly. Law enforcement only becomes involved when the volatile talk of these groups transgresses into unlawful action. The FBI estimates that the ALF/ ELF and related groups have committed more than 1,100 criminal acts in the United States since 1976, resulting in damages conservatively estimated at approximately $110 million.” (Lewis, 2004) Lewis’ testimony comes two years after that of Jarboe, who estimated that ALF (the Animal Liberation Front) and ELF had committed more than 600 criminal acts in the United States since 1996, costing upwards of $43 million. (Jarboe, 2002) Michael Hough, Criminal Justice and Homeland Security Task Force director for the American Legislative Exchange Council, stated that since 2003 the FBI has credited ecoterrorists with more than $200 million in property damages. (Baldwin, 2008). Such discrepancies between definitions of terrorism, the number of crimes

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committed and valuation of property damage indicates that there are be inconsistencies in the way that ecocrimes are tried and prosecuted.

Origins of Ecoterrorism Ecological protest can be quite violent. After John Hanna’s poisoning, he formed Environmental Life Force in Santa Cruz with his girlfriend, Carla Susan Olander. Olander herself had suffered exposure to pesticides while working in a cannery. A series of protest actions followed including a peaceful protest against herbicide use in Rose Lodge, Oregon.

“Publishers’ Paper owned land in Rose Lodge, Oregon,” said Hanna. “They cultivated fast growing trees to provide pulp for their paper mills. They routinely sprayed herbicides to kill off competing plant species. Eventually the chemicals found their way into streams. The spawning habitat for steelhead and salmon were at risk. In protest, some local folks had chained themselves to trees on Publishers’ land. They were ordered off the property and when they didn’t go, a helicopter sprayed them all with the herbicide Tordon.” (Interview, 2001) Twenty of 70 protestors were arrested. Tordon is a picolenic acid herbicide that is used to kill tree stumps after clear-cutting. It has been linked to low birth weights and other birth defects in the Triangle Lake region of Oregon. (Workman, 2015) Links to cancer and other

Environmental essayist Edward Abbey’s 1975 book “The Monkey Wrench Gang” about a group of misfits attempting to destroy the Glen Canyon Dam resonated with early eco-warriors.

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JANE POJAWA mando”) on behalf of the environment became part of environmental protest culture. Hanna is adamant that the use of violence discredited the positive actions of the organization, and that time spent in jail would be better spent in direct but not destructive action.

In a 2008 interview he stated, “For me, the lesson is clear: Stand up for your beliefs and tell the court that you’re a proud eco-warrior. It’s the only way to go.

If a person truly believes in their cause and the tactics they’ve chosen, then a plea of “not guilty” is a total cop out. It serves only to invalidate your actions and diminishes your character.” (Cecil-Cockwell, 2008) Since the passing of the Environmental Life Force, other organizations have formed in much the same vein including Earth First, which began by spiking trees in the Pacific Northwest; the Earth Liberation Front, considered more radical than Earth First! and which also has a provisional branch; the North American Earth Liberation Front Press Office [NAELFPO]; and the Animal Liberation Front [ALF], which grew from hunt saboteurs in England but is now more often associated with animal testing. Hanna disavows the actions of the Earth Liberation Front, insisting that they only share an acronym, but the influence of the previous ELF is certainly apparent. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals [PETA] is occasionally considered an ecoterrorist organization, but more often grouped with advocacy. At various times and in various places, advocacy groups such as Sea Shephard, Greenpeace and the Humane Society of the United States [HSUS] have been accused of everything from harboring extremists to actual terrorism.

It’s a slippery slope.

herbicide related illness have been deemed inconclusive. (Oregon Health Authority, 2014) ELF demanded that Publisher’s Paper provide life-long health care and medical monitoring for the spray victims, then in retaliation, they launched a series of attacks against the paper mill. A low-impact pipe bomb blew out a window at Publishers’ Paper corporate offices. Hanna was arrested several months later and charged with that in addition to placing handmade napalm bombs on seven crop dusters.

Publisher’s Paper, then a subsidiary of the Los Angeles Times News Agency later dropped the charges, possibly to avoid further bad publicity. Other actions included shooting the windows out of Senator Dianne Feinstein’s (then a San Francisco county supervisor) vacation home in Watsonville in response to the negligent death of a young black inmate, Larry Williams, who died in custody. Williams was a diabetic who was denied an insulin shot. ELF demanded that medical screening should be provided for all new prisoners.

John Hanna was arrested on November 22, 1977 and plead guilty to all charges, insisting that he acted alone. Because the damage caused was more potential than actual, the great lengths he went to to ensure that no one was injured, public sentiment, a lack of context for ecoterrorism and a number of other reasons, Hanna’s sentence was relatively light; five years which was later changed to time served and probation. That amounted to about three months in Lompoc federal prison. Hanna disavowed violent protest and the original ELF disbanded however, the method of using guerilla tactics (they use the term “ecom-

1975

1980

1980 Earth First!

Founded 1979 - 1995 Unibomber 1978 ELF disbanded 1977 John Hanna starts ELF 1976 Animal Liberation Front Founded 1975 Edward Albee writes The Monkey Wrench Gang

1985

1990

1990 Activist Judi Bari survives car bombing

1995

1992 Earth Liberation Front founded

1985 Publication of Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching by Dave Foreman (founder of Earth First!)

1984 ALF raid on the University of Pennsylvania’s head injury clinic (primate testing) 1995-1996 Protest of logging at Warner Creek, OR

ECOTERRORISM

people, maybe 1,000. This amorphous form gives the illusion of a massive organization with many cells.

Infiltration is slightly more difficult and it protects the leadership, which is at best, decentralized. If one cell or action is compromised, it is unlikely to do significant damage to the cause. As an organization, they’re nimble “ELF has no official presidents, spokesmen, physical headquarters or membership fees. Potential members, in autonomous cells, engage in direct action and follow ELF’s philosophies. Then they send media coverage of their actions to the site.” (Baldwin, 2008) This also means that it is easy for agent provocateurs to create false flags and difficult to establish policy, control membership, or for leadership to negotiate terms.

John Hanna sometimes refers to himself as “The Old Elf” and the Elves, as they call themselves, have a romanticized self-identity of a mischievous woodland creature protecting the environment by any means necessary. Ecommandos believe that they are acting in self-defense. The FBI tends to view them more as sociopaths who use the environment as a justification for criminal anarchy. “Every time a fire breaks out and somebody takes a spray can and writes ‘ELF’ or ‘ALF’ on there, then everybody gets all excited that ‘Oh this movement has started back up,’” said Bob Holland, a retired arson investigator. “The movement never really left.” (“FBI,” 2008) Ecommandos use guerilla tactics such as surprise raids and sabotage. Vandalism and trespassing are commonplace, but while those are criminal activities they in no way constitute terrorism as it is generally defined. The 1990s iteration of the Earth Liberation

Ecoterrorist Tactics Chemical weapons are forbidden by the Geneva Protocol, but that technically only applies to international war and specifically named chemical agents.

Parathion might be considered “Sarin-lite” and corporations expose civilian populations to these sorts of poisons with impunity. The lived experience of John Hanna and the Rose Lodge protestors might suggest that they are fighting back in an asymmetric conflict.

The strategies of ecoterrorists are not dissimilar to other terrorist organizations except that the “terrorists” generally target only property and not people and they also expect to be captured alive to face a trial if they are captured during or following a protest event. The “rules” are basically the same as the ones Hanna adhered to while acting on behalf of the Environmental Life Force. “(1) act alone (2) don’t conspire with others (3) focus on one problem and put your heart and soul into that one thing. (4) don’t rat out your comrades (5) do no harm to all living beings; that includes Mother Earth. (6) If you do choose to practice civil disobedience, be prepared to go to jail if you’re busted. But keep in mind, you won’t be an effective “ecommando” or activist behind bars.

(7) Think for yourself! Don’t follow leaders.” (Earth Liberation Front) The mandate to not follow leaders is taken very seriously among ecoterrorists and for good reason.

As with Daish (ISIS), any individual can commit an action and then give credit to the “organization.”

Who is in the organization? Who knows? Maybe 10

1996

2000

2005

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2004 Save the Newchurch Guinea Pigs (SNGP) disinterrs body of grandmother (UK)

2015

2011 Occupy protests

1999 WTO protests in Seattle 1998 Approximately 30 direct actions taken by ELF, including the Vail ski resort arson

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2009 Seattle area radio towers destroyed by ELF 2005-2006 Operation Backfire arrests

1997-1999 Julia Butterfly Hill Sits in coast redwood 1997 arson of BLM horse facility

2016 Dakota Access Pipeline protests

112 Front was particularly drawn to using arson as a form of industrial sabotage and caused millions of dollars in damages. The Animal Liberation Front has been known for extreme action, although more moderate animal rights activists such as Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd have been labeled ecoterrorists for destroying fishing nets and disrupting whaling activities.

Peter Manus, a professor of environmental law, disagrees with equating extreme environmental protest action with terrorism. “The term is abused when it’s used to describe folks who commit just any kind of illegal act as a political statement, even when those acts are crimes and do serious economic damage to, say, a ski resort, a whaling expedition, or a construction project… Terrorism is the attempted control or coercion of others through fear — that’s why it’s got the word ‘terror’ in it — and my view is that the term should be reserved for the horrific types of acts that we have all witnessed over the past several years in the international arena where death and torture are used to focus attention on one or another cause.”

(Baldwin, 2008) Ecoterrorists tend to be educated college-aged young men in their late teens and early twenties, but it is not uncommon for the activists to break the “disenfranchised/radicalized young man” model that is a given for religious or nationalist terrorists. Some ecowarriors are middle aged or even elderly and although there are fewer women among the ranks, they are a significant presence. Like other domestic terrorists, ecoterrorists are overwhelmingly white. It is a movement that attracts anarchists and it does not have a clear agenda or party platform.

Actions Over the last 40 years, the radical environmental movement has launched a diverse collection of ac-

JANE POJAWA

The late Gladys Hammond

tions. Jarboe listed a 1997 arson attack on a BLM facility where captured wild horses were held. They were supposed to be offered to the public at auction, but instead BLM employees were selling them to meat processing plants in Mexico and making a substantial profit. The arsonists also released 400 mustangs back into the wild. Tree spiking to disrupt logging operations is an ongoing form of protest initiated by Earth First. In Vail, Colorado five buildings and four chair lifts were set on fire in protest of the ski resorts’ incursions into lynx habitat. Newly constructed luxury homes are a frequent mark. Sometimes SUV owners find that their gas-guzzling, pollution-spewing vehicles are the targets of vandalism.

College offices have been burned in protest of genetic engineering research or the heavy-handed promotion of genetically modified seed to indigenous farmers.

Among ecoextremists, there is the belief that these actions are not only necessary but that they are a form of self-defense. The Government-Corporate Complex will exploit nature until the earth becomes uninhabitable and that time is of the essence to pre-

Members of the “Save the Newchurch Guinea Pigs Campaign” who were ultimately charged with desecration of a grave and theft of human remains. Left to right: Kerry Whitburn, 36, Josephine Mayo, 38, John Smith, 39, Jon Ablewhite, 36. In 2006, for their respective roles in the crime, the men were sentenced to 12 years imprisonment each and served five. Mayo, who was Whitburn’s girlfriend, was sentenced to four and served two. This incident of ecoterrorism has become a case study of what not to do to attract sympathy for your cause.

ECOTERRORISM serve nature. These actions are designed to be highly visible, have measurable results and cost business sufficient money and bad publicity that they cannot continue profitably. They should raise public awareness and not endanger any lives (often extended to animal and plant).

And then sometimes the forms of protest get very strange and very personal. In England, the ALF targeted David Hall and Partners, a family business that bred guinea pigs for animal testing. After years spent harassing the family, their employees, and associates, and including an incident that freed 600 of the rodents, the Save the Newchurch Guinea Pigs Campaign had achieved approximately 450 separate, prosecutable criminal acts. A video, “Save the Newchurch Guinea Pigs Campaign Film” shows conditions inside the facility and the “rescue” mission. Then a cell of four activists, all in their late 30s, dug up the corpse of family grandmother Gladys Hammond. They subsequently hid the corpse in the woods. Hammond died of natural causes at the age of 82 in 1997 and was disinterred by the cell, who called themselves the Animal Rights Militia, in October 2004. David Hall and Partners closed the operation of their farm after this incident, hoping the body would be returned. In May 2006, after the ALM members were arrested, they gave up the location of the remains, which have since been re-interred. (Reuters, 2006) The three male ecoterrorists, who had more agency in the cell, were sentenced to 12 years for their part, the female cell member, who functioned in more of a support role, was sentenced to four. Detective Chief Inspector Nick Baker of the Staffordshire Police in an interview with the BBC said, “While lawful protestors have nothing to fear, single issue extremists will be caught and strongly punished for their offences… Today’s lengthy sentences send a strong message to people who might be considering doing anything similar.”

(BBC, 2006) Although this operation was a “success” in the sense that the facility was shut down and no one was physically injured, this action has been soundly and uniformly denounced by other animal rights organizations.

Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, more popularly known by the FBI’s designation of him as the University and Airline Bomber, is an outlier among environmental terrorists. Between 1978 and 1995 Kaczynski mailed crude improvised explosive devices from his shack in the Montana wilderness targeting people he identified as members of the Technical-Industrial Complex.

These included computer store owners, a public rela-

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Ted Kaczynski, shown in this 1994 Montana drivers license photo. Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber, mailed 16 bombs which killed three people and injured 23 others before his capture in 1995. He will spend the rest of his life in a supermax prison in Florence, Colorado.

tions professional who had Exxon as a client, a timber industry lobbyist, a computer science professor at Yale, and others that would not seem like obvious political targets. In 1978, Kaczynski was targeting airline officials and in 1979 one of his early bombs was placed in the cargo hold of an American Airlines passenger plane flying from Chicago to Washington DC. A faulty timing mechanism kept the bomb from exploding, although the plane was forced to make an emergency landing. Eventually Kaczynski mailed 16 bombs which killed three people and injured 23 others.

On April 24, 1995, Kaczynski mailed a letter to several publishers promising to stop the bombings if his manifesto “Industrial Society and Its Future” was published by a major newspaper. He had some leverage – at that point, he was carrying out a bombing per year with increasing sophistication and loss of life. Eventually, the New York Times and Washington Post published his pamphlet at the behest of the FBI and Department of Justice, hoping it might lead to his arrest. It worked. His brother David recognized his syntax and philosophy and turned him in, in hopes that it would stop the killings, and possibly protect him. Kaczynski is serving eight life sentences (served concurrently) without possibility of parole at a super-

114 max prison in Fremont, Colorado. Despite much evidence to the contrary, he insists that he is not insane.

Kaczynski claims that his moment of radicalization came when his favorite hiking spot was paved to become a road, but the environment or animal rights is not his chief concern. He is more interested in how “the industrial system has robbed contemporary humans of their autonomy, diminished their rapport with nature, and forced them to behave in ways that are increasingly remote from the natural pattern of human behavior.” (Kaczynski, 1995) Among ecoterrorists, Ted Kaczynski is an outlier, more in line with the definitions of a domestic terrorist than an environmental extremist. He acted alone and did not affiliate with any radical environmental groups, even by the loose standards by which they are organized. His “organization” was the Freedom Club, which is a darkly funny moniker since he was basically a hermit, he targeted civilians with disregard to loss of life and his goal was not a concrete

The St. Paul Principles 1. Our solidarity will be based on respect for a diversity of tactics and the plans of other groups.

2. The actions and tactics used will be organized to maintain a separation of time or space.

3. Any debates or criticisms will stay internal to the movement, avoiding any public or media denunciations of fellow activists and events.

4. We oppose any state repression of dissent, including surveillance, infiltration, disruption and violence. We agree not to assist law enforcement actions against activists and others.

(D’Arcy, 2014) The St. Paul principles were developed by militant protestors at the Republican National Convention held in St. Paul, Minnesota in 2008, building on the work of the A16 Revolutionary Anti-Capitalist Bloc in 2000.

JANE POJAWA action like blocking a development, but to dismantle humanity’s relationship to advanced technology.

The Battle in Seattle The World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference was held in 1999 in Seattle at the Washington State Convention and Trade Center with the purpose of launching a new millennial round of trade negotiations. Although that sounds rather benign, there was fierce opposition to these negotiations by numerous anti-globalist organizations ranging from trade unions, who correctly predicted that American jobs would flow overseas, to environmentalists who were concerned that the kind of pollution and environmental degradation experienced in the industrial world would soon be exported to developing countries through the mechanism of neocolonialism. This belief was also vindicated as vast open-pit mines proliferate in Latin America. (Misoczky and Böhm, 2013). In all, about 40,000 protestors, including some from other countries, went to Seattle to express their dissent to the multi-national corporations and governmental agencies negotiating trade agreements.

Some of these protestors were politically aligned as anarchists and they came primarily to protest capitalism. This was initially termed the N30 Protests (for November 30) and later The Battle in Seattle.

In Europe starting in the 1980s, in response to police crackdowns on activists, protestors began to adopt paramilitary tactics. One of these is the “black bloc formation” in which protestors anticipate a violent police response and dress accordingly. They all wear black to make identification of specific individuals more difficult, may wear goggles to protect eyes from smoke and tear gas, and helmets to protect against police batons. This anticipation of violence might seem like these protestors plan to incite violence rather than simple self-defense preparation, but the reality is more nuanced, and even among extremists, definitions of violence and appropriate response are hotly debated. A code of ethics for black bloc protestors are the “St. Paul Principals” which were developed by militant protestors at the Republican National Convention held in St. Paul, Minnesota in 2008, building on the work of the A16 Revolutionary Anti-Capitalist Bloc in 2000. These were not in place for the Battle in Seattle, of course, but demonstrate that there has been discourse about the ethics of protest and civic responsibility since then.

Militant environmentalists view themselves as victims of violence, and not without justification. As with John Hanna and the protestors at Rose Lodge,

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Sometimes insurgency is described as “asymmetric warfare.” Typically this involves a professional fully-equipped standing army opposed by civilians with limited access to weapons. Ecoterrorists view themselves as “ecommandos” engaged in an asymmetric struggle against anti-democratic, pro-business entities bent on destroying the environment. These two sides were thrown into high visibility during the WTO protests of 1999 when blac blocs vandalized corporate businesses and police sprayed unarmed protesters with chemical weapons.

corporate interests and government often work together to suppress dissent. It is undeniable that clearcutting forests, butchering wild horses and animal experimentation are all violent acts. Whereas the Rose Lodge protestors were sprayed with dangerous herbicides, the Seattle protestors were beaten, teargassed, restrained while being pepper sprayed in violation of their fourth amendment rights. In some instances, residents and bystanders were also the victims of police brutality. The protestors, in turn, caused about $20 million in damages to police vehicles and private property, mainly to storefronts owned by multinational corporations like Starbucks, Nike, Old Navy and the Gap, which were specifically targeted for their role in environmental degradation and human rights abuses. The protests were far more brutal than peaceful. Among the protest factions, for it was an unwieldy and large loosely-formed coalition, debate raged about whether property crimes should be considered violence, and if so, is it justifiable? (Marx and Gilham, 2000)

Although, short of self-disclosure, it isn’t known which of the environmental extremists later caught up by the FBI were part of the Black Bloc Formation of N30 (Daniel McGowan said that he was among them in the 2011 documentary “If a Tree Falls: Story of the Earth Liberation Front”) (Curry, 2011) but many of the environmentalists who were based in the Pacific Northwest were present at the protests and many of them may have developed their incendiary skills or become more aware of the possibility of ecoterrorism as an effective tactic. Many of the Earth First core members met while protesting proposed logging venture in forest in Oregon’s Warner Creek watershed in 1995. They blocked the logging road and held it for 343 days declaring it the Cascadia Free State. Eventually they were driven out by the forest service, working in concert with the timber industry, but they had formed the key connections that united them in later direct actions. (Kauffman, 1999) Several of these protestors, later exposed by Operation Backfire, were referred by the prosecution as the “Family,” and they

116 were united by their radicalizing experiences at Warner Creek and Seattle.

The Decline of Ecoterrorism In a working paper for the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society, a group of researchers analyzed acts of eco-terrorism from 1970 to 2012, and found that ecocrimes in the US peaked in 2001 and by 2012 were practically non-existent. They believe that a number of factors converged for this to happen including expanding the definition of terrorism to include property crimes, the implementation of the Patriot Act and stiffer sentencing laws, and that the ringleaders of the movement were jailed.

The conflating of ecoterrorism and terrorism that targets human safety is extremely problematic for democratic society. After all, the Boston Tea Party, led by Samuel Addams and the Sons of Liberty, on December 16, 1773 was an example of direct action.

In a seminal Rolling Stone article, “The Rise and Fall of the Eco-Radical Underground” reporter Vanessa Grigoriadis wrote, “In 2003, when activists including CalTech graduate students fire-bombed several SUV dealerships in Los Angeles, FBI director Robert Mueller responded by assigning the entire terrorism task force in L.A. to the case and personally briefed President Bush about it. In a post-9/11 world where every FBI agent wants to catch a terrorist, an “eco-terrorist” is better than nothing.

Branding activists as terrorists not only makes for good headlines, it also results in longer prison sentences. In 2001, forest advocate Jeffrey “Free” Luers, perhaps today’s most passionately embraced eco-martyr, was sentenced to nearly twenty-three years for setting fire to three Chevy SUVs. The Family faces far more prison time. Under a 2003 order by then-Attorney General John Ashcroft, any arson set with a timer must be prosecuted under a post-Oklahoma City statute that defense lawyers call “the hammer.” Under standard arson charges, the maximum sentence is five years for each building or car that is set ablaze.

Under the hammer, the mandatory sentence for a single act of arson is a minimum of thirty years in prison. For two, the minimum is life — with no possibility of parole. The government wants to sentence some members of the Family to life plus 1,015 years.” (Grigoriadis, 2006) Given these conditions, it is easy to see why otherwise stalwart environmental justice warriors might betray their comrades. Protestors who set fire to an

JANE POJAWA SUV were facing more jail time than murderers.

Donald Liddick, a criminal justice professor at Pennsylvania State University wrote “My guess is that there was just a core, really just a few members, who were responsible for these more serious arsons,” and once they went to jail, that was it. There really weren’t a large number of people that committed, in the U.S. at least, to begin with.” Liddick referenced several high-profile cases including the torching of the Vail ski resort and the FBI’s (with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives) “Operation Backfire” which eventually indicted 18 prominent animal rights activists. The Operation Backfire arrests took place between 2004 and 2009. Charges of ecoterrorism have been minimal since then.

The Future of Ecoterrorism It has been more than 40 years since Edward Abbey wrote the seminal environmentalist novel the “The Monkey Wrench Gang,” and it seems like radical environmentalism, never particularly widespread, may have had its day. The most extreme ecoterrorists have been jailed and prohibitive laws against this form of dissent (many of which were drafted by business interests and include such laws as making it an act of terrorism to film inside a factory farm) have made the consequences of such actions dire indeed.

(Kirchner, 2017) Domestic terrorism by white nationalists is on the increase and radical Islamic terrorism is the focus of most security policy. Notwithstanding, ecoterrorism may yet make a resurgence.

Ted Kaczynski is back in the media spotlight. His brother David wrote a book about him, “Every Last Tie: The Story of the Unabomber and His Family” in 2016 and there is a TV miniseries in the works. Ted Kaczynski has offered break his silence to the media under certain conditions, one of which is that he be portrayed in a flattering light, specifically that he is perfectly sane. The FBI joint terrorism task force (JTTF) is investigating at least three of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) protestors in conjunction with their activities at the Standing Rock campground.

At the height of the occupation, the DAPL hosted 10,000 protestors and hundreds were arrested. (Cuevas et al, 2017) The Occupy movement from 2009 to 2012 was more concerned with social injustice than environmental issues, but it attracted tens of thousands of people to march on Wall Street. Dissenters poured into streets for the Women’s March on January 21. There are thousands of disaffected Americans protesting for various issues, some of which relate directly to environmental causes. Antifa, the

ECOTERRORISM anti-facist group, may have concerns which overlap environmental agendas. Climate change, not as politically charged an issue in the ’90s, may become a rallying point in the 2020s. The Trump administration’s disdain for the environment and his mandate to dismantle the Environmental Protection Agency may

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radicalize some environmental activists into more extreme action. The numbers are certainly there, but are there the John Hannas who are willing to take direct action on behalf of the environment? And if so, would those actions be prosecuted as ecoterrorism or something else?

Appendix: Meet “The Family”: an ecoterrorist cell active between 1995-2001 This group which is loosely referred to as “The Family” or “The Book Club” were direct action protesters affiliated with ELF and ALF. They formed

William C. Rodgers aka Avalon 1965-2005 Although considered the “mastermind” of many of ALF and ELF’s direct actions, Rodgers was only charged with one crime, the June 1998 fire set by the ELF at the National Wildlife Research Center in Olympia, Washington. Rodgers developed the incindiary devices, wrote a handbook describing how to make them, and was responsible for recruiting many of the members to the group. According to Gerlach, he was the sole actor in the Vail Ski Resort arson. Rodgers killed himself in prison before trial.

Operation Backfire: Rodgers was arrested in an FBI raid on Dec. 7, 2005 at the Catalyst Infoshop in Prescott, AZ.

around 1995 with the Warner Creek Occupation. In this protest, activists prevented the logging of an old growth forest by blockading a fire access road for 360

Jacob Ferguson b 1972 Once ELF’s most enthusiastic arsonist, Ferguson later became addicted to heroin and was thus vulnerable to accepting a plea deal with the FBI whereby he would turn informant and, while wearing a wire, travel the country to gather intel about his former associates.

Ferguson was also romantically linked to several other group members including Josephine Sunshine Overaker and Kendall Tankersley.

He took part in the actions at Warner Creek along with Rodgers, Overaker, McGowan and Tubbs.

Ferguson was not prosecuted for his involvement in the actions, but in 2011 he was arrested on charges related to his drug use and sentenced to 22 months, He was released in 2015.

Chelsea Dawn Gerlach b.1977 aka Country Girl Sentenced to 9 years for arson at Childers Meat Co. in Eugene; arson at a Boise Cascade office in Monmouth, OR; toppling of a Bonneville Power Administration tower; arson at the Eugene Police Department West University Public Safety Station; attempted arson at Jefferson Poplar Farms in Clatskanie, arson at the Vail Ski Resort acting as an accomplice to Bill Rodgers. Gerlach was a Warner Creek protestor and dated Stan Meyerhoff in the ‘90s..

Operation Backfire: Arrested on Dec. 7 in Portland, OR with boyfriend Canadian animal rights activist Darren Todd Thurston. In 2011, Gerlach was sentenced to 9 years and was released on October 10, 2013.

118 days, including the most brutal days of winter. This non-violent action was not ecoterrorism, but some activists connected there, and many of them continued to be based in Eugene, Oregon. “The Family” (a contentious name, as they did not call themselves that.

The prosecution may have used the name as a convenience, or more cynically to link these neo-hippies to the notorious Manson gang in the public imagination) considered themselves friends and colleagues; ecowarriors with a shared desire to protect the earth and animals from exploitation and destruction. Membership was not fixed or constant and the network was not particularly organized. Many of the members were also romantically linked. Most actions involved less than five people, and their most “sophisticated” crimes involved little more than gasoline and an ignition timer.

Despite these limitations, they did a staggering amount of destruction – more than 30 direct actions, over $43 million in damages and hundreds of criminal charges were leveled against the members. By the end of 2001, the group had disbanded, many of them disenchanted by other members or frightened of the direction their protests had taken. However, although they may have moved on, law enforcement had not.

In 2004, seven arson investigations were merged into one dubbed “Operation Backfire.” In December 2005 and January 2006, with assistance from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the FBI, under the leadership of Robert S. Muller III

JANE POJAWA (now famous for investigating the Trump campaign’s ties with Russia) indicted six women and seven men on a total of 65 charges. Sometimes they are known as the “Eco 11” and this period referred to as “The Green Scare.”

Initially spurred by one informant, Jacob Ferguson, others were coerced into testifying against the others in exchange for more lenient sentencing. Since the penalties for domestic terrorism are much more stringent than those for arson, especially in the aftermath of the 9-11 terror attacks, most chose to “snitch” over a life behind bars and took plea agreements rather than face trial under U.S. District Judge Ann Aiken. Several were able to reach a deal whereby they plead guilty to their own crimes without testifying against the others. Josephine Sunshine Overaker and Joseph Dibee remain at large. Despite “The Family’s” past commitment to extreme direct action, most have not been welcomed back to the ELF/ALF community, which keeps databases on those they consider informants and collaborators. Although these direct actions were being monitored carefully by law enforcement, police got their first big break in the case in the form of Jacob Ferguson, a prolific activist who became caught up in heroin addiction. He may have been promised immunity from prosecution in exchange for complete cooperation including meeting with his former associates and recording them. Kera Abraham, writing for the Eugene Weekly, set out a timeline of the arrests and prosecution arrangements:

Josephine Sunshine Overaker aka Lisa Rachelle Quintana b. 1971 (or 1974) Overaker is still at large and still on the FBI’s most wanted list. She is fluent in Spanish, and it is believed that she may have moved to Spain in 2006. Overaker, at the time Jacob Ferguson’s girlfriend, was one of the group of Warner Creek protestors. According to Oregon Live, a “2006 indictment accuses Overaker of helping to destroy the US Forest Service ranger station in Oakridge and a truck at a Detroit ranger station — both in late October 1996 and both by fire. After that she allegedly torched a US Bureau of Land Management wild horse corral in Burns, Oregon, in 1997, a US Department of Agriculture facility in Olympia, Washington, in 1998, a BLM wild horse holding facility in Rock Springs, Wyoming in 1998, Childers Meat Co in Eugene, Oregon, in 1999 and the Boise Cascade timber company office in Monmouth, Illinois in 1999.” Overaker was not originally part of the Operation Backfire sweep, she was indicted in April 2006.

• In December 2005 the feds swooped in for the bust, arresting William Rodgers, Kevin Tubbs, Stanislas Meyerhoff, Chelsea Gerlach, Kendall Tankersley and Daniel McGowan. They also jailed Gerlach’s Canadian boyfriend, Darren Thurston, on immigration charges; he would later be indicted for arson.

• William Rodgers killed himself in prison on Dec. 21.

• In January 2006 they arrested southern Oregon residents Suzanne Savoie and Jonathan Paul; in February and March, Joyanna Zacher, Nathan Block and Briana Waters, all from Olympia, Wash. By April they had also indicted Josephine Sunshine Overaker, Rebecca Rubin, Joseph Dibee and Justin Solondz, who are still at large. At some point during the sweep Spokane

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•

•

natives Jennifer Kolar and Lacey Phillabaum came forward to cooperate, according to the FBI. Federal prosecutors minced no words, calling the defendants “eco-terrorists” and threatening them with staggering, post-9/11-style sentences. Faced with that terrible decision — rat out your friends or sit in jail until you die — each defendant, it seems, reacted differently. Meyerhoff reportedly started cooperating immediately; Tubbs, Savoie, Gerlach, Thurston and Tankersley had made the same decision by the time they pleaded guilty in July. So did Kolar and Phillabaum, who pleaded guilty in October. While “snitch” provisions have not been made public, virtually all such deals require cooperating defendants to name names, according to Civil Liberties Defense Center attorney Lauren Regan, who lived with Phillabaum for a year.

Four defendants before the federal court in Oregon — McGowan, Paul, Block and Zacher — pleaded not guilty. On behalf of all four, the team of defense attorneys filed discov-

Darren Todd Thurston b. 1970 Initially faced five federal charges including arson with an incendiary device and conspiracy in addition to two federal charges for the possession of fraudulent identification.Took a cooperating plea agreement. When Gerlach and Thurston were arrested, they had in their possession four pounds of marijuana and several hundred ecstacy pills. Thurston was given a sentence of 37 months in prison after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy and arson in the 2001 fire at the Litchfield, Calif., U.S. Bureau of Land Management wild horse corrals.

Operation Backfire: Arrested on Dec. 7 in Portland, OR with girlfriend Chelsea Dawn Gerlach.

Thurston ultimately served 37 months in jail and was deported to Canada in late 2008.

•

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119

ery motions asking the feds to hand over any information that had been obtained through National Security Administration surveillance or warrantless wiretaps, which a judge had recently ruled illegal.

The federal prosecutors stalled, pushing back their court-ordered deadline three times while maintaining that no illegal surveillance had occurred. But eventually they struck a plea deal with the defendants: In exchange for withdrawing the discovery motion and confessing to their own crimes, all four defendants would get dramatically reduced sentences and would not have to implicate anyone else. They took the deal, pleading guilty in November.

Only one defendant, Briana Waters, continues to plead not guilty before the federal court in Washington. Her attorney is pursuing a discovery motion similar to that filed by the Oregon defense team.

Source: Abraham, Kera. 2006. “Eugene Weekly.” Flames of Dissent PT. IV: THE BUST (blog). December 17, 2006. https://www. eugeneweekly.com/2006/12/07/flames-of-dissent-2/.

Kendall Tankersley aka Sarah Harvey b. 1977 Charged with arson and attempted arson of US Forest Industries in Medford, OR on Dec. 26, 1998.

Reached a plea arrangement for a reduced sentence. She and Ferguson had a rbrief elationship which was when she became involved in the arsons as a lookout/driver. She had a BS in molecular biology and had been accepted to medical school when she was arrested.

Operation Backfire: Arrested in Dec. in Flagstaff, AZ. Tankersley, was sentenced to three years and 10 months. She could have received more than eight years had she not testified against her co-conspirators. She was released on Sept.17, 2010.

120 Briana Waters was found guilty in 2008 of the UW arson, but had the conviction overturned on appeal.

Facing a retrial, she accepted a plea bargain that would require her to admit to perjury in her first trial and to testify against her ex-boyfriend, Justin Solondz. She was eventually sentenced to four years in jail.

Justin Solondz went on the run for several years after Operation Backfire but was eventually apprehended in China where he had already served two years on a local charge of making hashish out of wild marijuana. He was sentenced to seven years in prison in 2012 and was released from prison in the US in early 2017. As it happens, Waters did not have to testify against Solondz; he plead guilty in exchange for more lenient sentencing.

An interesting aspect to this case are the interpersonal relationships that were forged in the course of the actions and destroyed in the aftermath of the arrests. On pages 122-123, a timeline of the actions is correlated with the Family members associated with each of 19 actions. Some of the Family met at Warner Creek and formed the core of the group. It is believed that William Rodgers aka Avalon was chief recruiter for the actions, and that he and Jacob Ferguson were responsible for manufacturing the incendiary devices.

Members of this group frequently joined as couples, but often the women had active roles in these actions.

JANE POJAWA

Jonathan Mark Christopher Paul b. 1966 Paul’s sister stated that he “dismantled corrals to release wild mustangs. He impersonated a fur buyer to film the treatment of minks. He put himself between whales and whalers despite warnings that his boat would be impounded and that he would be jailed.”

Paul plead guilty to the arson attack on the Cavel West Slaughterhouse, which killed and processed horses for food. He did not implicate others, and served 51 months.

Operation Backfire: Arrested Jan. 16 in OR.

Timeline of direct actions specific to “The Family” 1997

1998

Nov. 29, 1997, Burns, OR: Arson attack BLM Wild Horse Corrals (horse slaughter)

Oct.28, 1996 arson at the US forest service Detroit ranger station in Marion County, OR Oct. 30, 1996 Oakridge, OR Ranger Station arson

July 21, 1997 Redmond, OR: Arson attack on the Cavel West meat packing plant. (horse slaughter)

June 21, 1998, Olympia, WA: The USDA Animal Damage Control building and another U.S.D.A. wildlife station, miles apart, go up in flames on the same morning.

1999

June 1999

Dec. 26, 1998, Medford, OR: Arson of the headquarters of U.S. Forest Industries. (razing forests and killing wild animals for profit) May 9, 1999, Eugene, OR. Childers Meat Co. arson Oct. 30, 1998 at the US forest service Oak Ridge Ranger Station in Lane County OR Oct. 19, 1998, Vail, CO: Two Elk Lodge Ski resort arson (lynx habitat) Oct. 10, 1998, Rock Springs, WY: Saboteurs cut the locks off horse pens at a BLM corral, freeing about 40-100 wild horses.

Oct. 4, 1998, Wray, CO: Attempted arson at Wray Gun Club

ECOTERRORISM Predictably, these unconventional people did not always have the most straightforward relationships.

Jacob Ferguson and Josephine Overaker were a couple and consequently participated in actions together. Overaker was described in Vanessa Grigoriadis’ Rolling Stone article as being utterly devoted to Ferguson and Ferguson was described as practicing polyamory. In the U.S. Forest Industries arson, he involved another lover, Kendall Tankersley, but by the time of the Childers Meat Co. arson, he and Overaker were back together. Overaker’s last action was helping to topple the Bonneville Power Administration hi-power transmission line. In this way, group member’s involvement was influenced by bonds of friendship and love and the betrayals that followed were particularly brutal.

In the tangled relationships of Family members, Jennifer Kolar dated both Jonathan Paul and Joseph Dibee. Stanislas Meyerhoff “Country Boy” and Chelsea Gerlach “Country Girl” were high school sweethearts who forged their relationship during the Warner Creek Occupation. Later on, Meyerhoff dated Lacey Phillabaum and was living with her at the time of the arrests. Briana Waters believed that former boyfriend Justin Solondz once slept with Lacey Phillabaum while they were still dating. Rebecca Rubin was linked to Kevin Tubbs, possibly Thurston as Continued on page 124

July 1999

Kevin Tubbs b. 1969 aka Dog Plead guilty to firebombing of the U.S. Forest Service ranger station in Oakridge in 1996, a horse slaughterhouse in Redmond in 1997, the Bureau of Land Management wild horse corrals in Burns in 1997, offices of U.S. Forest Industries in Medford in 1998, a meat packing plant in Eugene in 1999, a police substation in Eugene in 2000, offices of Superior Lumber Co. in Glendale in 2001, and the Jefferson Poplar Farm in Clatskanie in 2001.

Operation Backfire: Arrested in Dec. in Springfield, OR. Facing life in prison, Tubbs ultimately got 12 years and 7 months in prison with 3 years supervised release for his cooperation. As of June 6, 2016, Kevin Tubbs was in a Kansas City halfway house.

2000

Dec. 25, 1999, Monmouth, OR: Arson attack on main office of the Boise Cascade logging company (logging)

121

2001

Not an Operation Backfire case: June 16, 2000, Jeffrey “Free” Luers and Craig “Critter” Marshall torch 3 SUVs at the Joe Romania dealership. aka Romania I

May 21, 2001, Two arson attacks, one at the Jefferson Poplar Farms in Clatskanie.

OR and one at the University of Washington’s Center for Urban Horticulture in Seattle, WA. (genetic engineering)

Sept. 6, 2000 at the Eugene police department West University Public Safety station in Eugene, OR

Dec. 30, 1999 toppling of Bonneville Power Administration hi-power transmission line

2002

Jan. 2, 2001 Glendale, OR arson of Superior Lumber Company (logging) March 30, 2001 at Joe Romania Chevrolet truck center in Eugene OR., aka the Romania II arson (SUV dealership)

Oct. 15, 2001 of the US Bureau of Land Management wild horse facility in Litchfield, CA. (horse slaughter)

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JANE POJAWA

Timeline of direct actions associated with specific members of “The Family” Ferguson Overaker Tubbs Rubin Rodgers Meyerhoff Gerlach Ferguson, Overaker

Ferguson Overaker Tubbs Rubin Rodgers Meyerhoff Gerlach

Ferguson, Overaker Tubbs

1997

Ferguson, Tubbs, Dibee, Paul, Kolar

Ferguson, Overaker, Tubbs, Rubin, Rodgers

Nov. 29, 1997, Burns, OR: Arson attack BLM Wild Horse Corrals (horse slaughter)

Oct.28, 1996 arson at the US forest service Detroit ranger station in Marion County, OR Oct. 30, 1996 Oakridge, OR Ranger Station arson

1998

Ferguson, Overaker*, Tubbs, Rodgers, Dibee

July 21, 1997 Redmond, OR: Arson attack on the Cavel West meat packing plant. (horse slaughter)

June 21, 1998, Olympia, WA: The USDA Animal Damage Control building and another U.S.D.A. wildlife station, miles apart, go up in flames on the same morning.

Ferguson, Overaker, Tubbs, Meyerhoff, Gerlach and “others”

Kolar

Ferguson, Tankersley 1999

June 1999

Dec. 26, 1998, Medford, OR: Arson of the headquarters of U.S. Forest Industries. (razing forests and killing wild animals for profit) May 9, 1999, Eugene, OR. Childers Meat Co. arson Oct. 30, 1998 at the US forest service Oak Ridge Ranger Station in Lane County OR Oct. 19, 1998, Vail, CO: Two Elk Lodge Ski resort arson (lynx habitat) Oct. 10, 1998, Rock Springs, WY: Saboteurs cut the locks off horse pens at a BLM corral, freeing about 40-100 wild horses.

Oct. 4, 1998, Wray, CO: Attempted arson at Wray Gun Club

ECOTERRORISM

Source: Abraham, Kera. 2006. “Eugene Weekly.” Flames of Dissent PT. IV: THE BUST (blog). December 17, 2006. https://www.eugeneweekly.com/2006/12/07/flames-of-dissent-2/.

Ferguson Overaker, Meyerhoff Gerlach

Ferguson Overaker, Meyerhoff Gerlach

July 1999

2000

Dec. 25, 1999, Monmouth, OR: Arson attack on main office of the Boise Cascade logging company (logging)

Tubbs Meyerhoff Gerlach

Ferguson Meyerhoff Tubbs McGowan Savoie

Meyerhoff Tubbs Block Zacher Rodgers 2001

Not an Operation Backfire case: June 16, 2000, Jeffrey “Free” Luers and Craig “Critter” Marshall torch 3 SUVs at the Joe Romania dealership. aka Romania I

UoW: Meyerhoff, Gerlach,Rodgers, Waters,Kolar, Phillabaum Solondz

Dibee Rubin Thurston Solondz Meyerhoff Tubbs Gerlach Rodgers 2002

May 21, 2001, Two arson attacks, one at the Jefferson Poplar Farms in Clatskanie.

OR and one at the University of Washington’s Center for Urban Horticulture in Seattle, WA. (genetic engineering)

Sept. 6, 2000 at the Eugene police department West University Public Safety station in Eugene, OR

Dec. 30, 1999 toppling of Bonneville Power Administration hi-power transmission line

123

Poplar Farm: Meyerhoff McGowan Savoie Block Zacher Ferguson* Gerlach* Tubbs* Rodgers* *Implicated in preparations for arson, not arson itself

Jan. 2, 2001 Glendale, OR arson of Superior Lumber Company (logging) March 30, 2001 at Joe Romania Chevrolet truck center in Eugene OR., aka the Romania II arson (SUV dealership)

Oct. 15, 2001 of the US Bureau of Land Management wild horse facility in Litchfield, CA. (horse slaughter)

124

Snitches and Anarchy •

•

•

•

JANE POJAWA Continued from page 121

Undercover Agent/Infiltrator: A law enforcement officer who uses an assumed name or fake identity to infiltrate a movement or organization to gather information or evidence.

In political infiltration cases, an agent will typically pose as a sympathizer to a particular organization, gain the trust of its key members and then use this access to gather confidential information to pass on to the investigative agency. A secondary objective may be to lay the groundwork for a separate investigation.

Undercover agents typically concoct a cover story as detailed as the assignment requires as well as a basic biography and plausible story covering past and present activities.

Informant: Individuals who are not employed as law enforcement agents who provide law enforcement agents with information, often in exchange for money. An informant ordinarily has previous involvement in – and more intimate knowledge of – the movement or organization that the agents are investigating.

Cooperating Witness: Similar to informants, except that cooperating witnesses usually agree to ‘flip’ or ‘snitch’ after being threatened with prosecution. Cooperating witnesses will testify in court in exchange for lesser or no charges filed against them.

Law enforcement recruits informants and cooperating witnesses from the ranks of people already active within the movements or organizations being targeted. The government often threatens these individuals with charges carrying massive jail time, offering to not file charges in exchange for a promise to inform on others in the movement. Undercover agents, on the other hand, use false pretenses from the beginning of their association with any movement or organization.

well. Thurston was living with Chelsea Gerlach at the time of the arrests. Daniel McGowan and Suzanne Savoie were romantically linked and Joyanna Zacher and Nathan Block were, and still are, a couple. This is rather convoluted, but not unexpected. This was a very tight-knit community, and if one’s interests run to radical veganism and setting horse meat facilities on fire, then finding partners outside the group may be problematic.

As mentioned before, the case against these individuals came through a weak link, Jacob Ferguson.

When that leverage was achieved, law enforcement was able to use terrorism-enhanced sentencing to compel testimony from other participants including those whose involvement was minimal. It also helped that by 2005, the members of this cell had (largely) moved on with their lives and were starting families and careers. They had more to lose. The threat that “You’ll never see your child” carried enormous weight. It also helped that the group dissolved acrimoniously after the actions of May 21, 2001. The arson attacks directed at genetic engineering of forest trees were successful in execution but not in choice of target. Instead of winning public support, which was generally with the group when they destroyed horse slaughterhouses, they were condemned for destroying a family business that was arguably helping the environment (and did not use genetically engineered poplars as they assumed) and for burning a university (again mistaken about the actual research being conducted). Among the group there was dissent about whether their actions were effective and if they should be scaling back or escalating the violence.

Many of the group were disenchanted with William Rodgers. The 9-11 terror attacks in New York were a game-changer for some of them in how they viewed politicized violence and their role in it. In short, the arsonists of 2005 had grown up and were not the committed ecowarriors they were in 2000. The legal

Source: “Information on Informants and Snitches.” 2011. Earth First! Newswire (blog). August 9, 2011. http://earthfirstjournal. org/newswire/informant-tracking/.

Stanislas “Stan” Gregory Meyerhoff, aka “Jack” and “Country Boy” b.1977 Meyerhoff was a participant in Warner Creek and was romantically linked to Chelsea Gerlach, who he knew from high school. His sentencing memorandum states that he was largely involved with direct action in an effort to impress Gerlach. At the time of his arrest, Meyerhoff was living in Virginia with Lacey Phillabaum and studying engineering. For his cooperation, Meyerhoff was sentenced to 13 years at USP Terre Haute and was scheduled to be released on July 8, 2015.

ECOTERRORISM

125

Jennifer “Diver” Kolar b.1973

Lacey Phillabaum b. 1975

Daniel Gerard McGowan b.1974

Kolar and Phillabaum each pled guilty to charges of conspiracy, arson and use of a destructive device. Kolar also pled guilty to an attempted arson charge for a failed 1998 firebombing that damaged a Wray, Colorado gun club that organized a multistate turkey shoot. Lacey Phillabaum and Jennifer Kolar dramatically reduced their sentences, with Phillabaum received 36 months and Kolar 60 months. Kolar was romantically tied to Dibee and Paul. She was released on February 1, 2013.

A former editor of Earth First! Journal, Phillabaum took a cooperating plea agreement, pleaded guilty to conspiracy, arson, and use of a destructive device at the University of Washington’s Center for Urban Horticulture in 2001. Phillabaum was not a target of Operation Backfire, but turned herself in to the FBI as an informant in return for a reduced sentence, joining Meyerhoff who also sought a reduced sentence through cooperation with the investigation. Phillabaum was released on April 21, 2010.

One of the Warner Creek protesters and a member of the blac block in the battle in Seattle, McGowan. was charged in federal court on multiple counts of arson and conspiracy for the arson of Superior Lumber company in Glendale, Oregon on Jan. 2, 2001, and Jefferson Poplar Farms in Clatskanie, Oregon on May 21, 2001 With co-defendants Jonathan Paul, Joyanna Zacher and Nathan Block he accepted a non-cooperation plea agreement. Operation Backfire: Arrested in Dec. in New York City.

Sentenced to 7 years, released June 5, 2013.

Joseph Dibee b. 1967 Dibee was a computer software tester who had occasional contact with the group. Dated Kolar. Improved the design of the incidiary devices with new digital timers and led the group at its last arson, at the BLM horse corrals in Litchfield, CA. Not part of the initial Operation Backfire sweep, the FBI sought Dibee’s cooperation, but he fled the country instead. In 2005 he was believed to be in Syria. He remains a fugitive, wanted by the FBI.

landscape also changed during that period and crimes that were once considered criminal mischief now had terrorism enhancements added to the sentencing.

Mueller et al were able to use these factors not to prevent more ecoterror attacks - at least not from these individuals - but to capture the key members of the cell; catch some tangential members, gather information about radical ecological groups and send a

deterrent message to others who would emulate them.

By compelling them to testify against old friends and lovers, rifts were created among the group, but also with all of their former connections in the environmental movement. It was an extremely effective take down.

The ALF/ELF movement has a special virulent hatred for those they consider collaborators and infor-

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JANE POJAWA

Joyanna “Sadie” Zacher b. 1978

Nathan “Exile” Block b.1981

Suzanne “India” Savoie b. 1977

Zacher and Block met in the Spring of 1999 at the WTO protests. There they met Bill Rodgers, Suzanne Savoie, Lacey Phillabaum and probably Daniel McGowan. Between the actions of 2001 and their arrest in 2006, they married. Zacher and Block refused to cooperate with the prosecution and received harsher sentencing than Savoie, to the chagrin of their defense. There were several other crimes they were not charged for, including killing GMO trees, having a marijuana grow operation and tree spiking.

Throughout their incarceration, they were unrepentant about their actions, expressing no regrets.

They also condemend the “former friends, trusted colleagues” who took cooperating plea agreements.

The prosecution painted the pair as being more interested in the adventure of anarchy and violence and less in the environment than the other defendents and claimed that they were actively seeking the status of activist martyrs. The two agreed to plead guilty only after six others had agreed to testify. In June 2007, Zacher and Block were sentenced to seven years and eight months imprisonment each for the arsons of the Romania Chevrolet dealership on March 30, 2001 and the Jefferson Poplar on May 21, 2001. They were released from prison in May 2012.

Once Daniel McGowan’s girlfriend, Suzanne Savoie turned herself in to FBI agents in January 2006 She accepted a cooperating plea deal and made statements against Joyanna Zacher and Nathan Block.

She was sentenced to 51 months in prison for her role in two arsons.

Savoie was released in March 2011.

mants. It’s a valid consideration as law enforcement attempts to infiltrate and arrest extremists and organizers alike. However, this extends to these groups keeping extensive “snitch lists” on cooperating witness, which makes it very difficult for people who have reached a plea agreement with the prosecution to move on with their lives once they have been released from prison. In some cases they are doxxed their addresses, phone number, work information and social media accounts may be shared on the internet.

Many have received death threats. Conversely, activists who do not testify against their co-conspirators are elevated to hero status, which has a different dark side. Joyanna Zacher and Nathan Block were idolized by elements within ELF/ALF who regarded them as

Craig “Critter” Marshall b. 1974

martyrs, despite relatively low involvement in the actions. Now that their socio-political leanings tend to white nationalist fascism, many of their one-time fans have distanced themselves. Support for animal rights does not necessarily mean support for human rights.

Craig “Critter” Marshall and Jeffery “Free” Luers were known to the defendants in the “Family” case: they too were taking direct actions in Eugene, Oregon during the same period. The first Romania SUV dealership fire, which burned three cars, was executed by these two on June 16, 2000, and they were caught

ECOTERRORISM

127

Rebecca “Little Missy” Rubin b. 1973

Justin Solondz b.1979

Briana Waters b.1975

Rubin is a Canadian activist who was introduced to the group through Darren Thurston. Her case became complicated - she initially fled to Canada, then spent years in a legal limbo. Eventually she accepted a deal that allowed her to serve 60-90 months without implicating others in her crimes. By then it was 2012, and unlikely her testimony would have any bearing on her co-conspirators. Eventually she was sentenced to five years in prison and she was released in April 2016.

Solondz dated Briana Waters while attending Evergreen State College. He was indicted for arson and conspiracy in absentia based on testimony from other co-defendants in 2006 but evaded capture for several years. In 2009, he was arrested in China for processing hashish. In 2011, he was taken into federal custody and in 2012 he reached a non-cooperation plea agreement and was sentenced to seven years in prison. Solondz was released from prison in the US in Jan. 2017.

Waters pled innocent in her first trial. The evidence against her stemmed from Kolar and Phillabaum’s testimony, for which they got substantially reduced sentences. She was found guilty, but remained free prior to sentencing to spend time with her 3-yearold daughter. Her convidtion was overturned on appeal in 2008, but when faced with a retrial in 2012, she signed a cooperating plea agreement, where she admitted to participation in several arsons and agreed to testify against Justin Solondz. She was sentenced to four years in prison,with reduction for tme served. As a result of the plea agreement, Waters is considered a “snitch” although she did not actually testify against Solondz.

Waters was released from prison in 2013.

red-handed. Marshall pled guilty to the arson and was sentenced to fiveand-a-half years in prison. He was released on January 6, 2005 having served four-and-a-half years. Jeffery “Free” Luers was not as fortunate.

Although their crimes were identical, Leurs’ legal strategy and trial had a very different outcome and Leurs was sentenced to 22 years, 8 months, the longest sentence ever given in an ecoterrorism case. Remember that in 1977, John Hanna was sentenced to five years (and served considerably less) for a similar offense. In 2007, the Oregon Court of Appeals overturned Leurs’ sentence, which became 10 years. He was released December 16, 2009 after serving nine-and-a-half years. Leurs’ sentence was seen within the ecological community as a gross miscarriage of justice and Daniel McGowan was part of a letter writing campaign to try to bring about a sentence that had more parity with the offense. Free Free!

The Operation Backfire case is the most high-profile ecoterrorism prosecution, and as such was tremendously successful. But was justice served? Some actions and some activists may have slipped through the net. Others may not have been guilty, or at least not of all the charges they were accused of. Many lives were disrupted, and one was ended.

Charges inflated with terrorism enhancements, then confessions coerced by plea arrangements, do not establish guilt or innocence in any objective sense. Lack of a trial simplifies the work of the criminal justice system

Jeffery “Free” Leurs b. 1980

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JANE POJAWA

but leads to mass incarceration. According to Emily Yoff, writing for The Atlantic, “The vast majority of felony convictions are now the result of plea bargains—some 94 percent at the state level, and some 97 percent at the federal level.” She continues with a quote from Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy for the majority in Missouri v. Frye (2012), a case that helped establish the right to competent counsel for defendants who are offered a plea bargain. Quoting a law-review article, Kennedy wrote, “ ‘Horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel]

determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.’ ” (Yoff, 2017) Because law is established through precedent (a literal application of the principle of “trial and error”), the criminal justice system will not have precedents to base ecoterrorism penalties against until cases go to trial, and that isn’t likely to happen. When activists complain that the system is rigged, they are stating a fact.

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Lewis, John E. “Animal Rights Extremism and Ecoterrorism.” Testimony of John E. Lewis Before the Senate Judiciary Committee. FBI, 18 May

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2004. Web. 18 Feb. 2017. https://archives.fbi. gov/archives/news/testimony/animal-rights-extremism-and-ecoterrorism Marx, Gary T., and Patrick F. Gilham. “Complexity & Irony in Policing and Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle.” Social Justice 27, no. 2 (2000): 212–36.

Meyerhoff.sentencing, 2006 (United States District Court, District of Oregon). CR-06-60078-01AA. Retrieved from https://www.scribd.com/ document/78201197/Meyerhoff-sentencing Misoczky, Maria Ceci, and Steffen Böhm. “Resisting Neocolonial Development: Andalgalá’s People Struggle against Mega-Mining Projects.” Cadernos EBAPE.BR 11, no. 2 (June 2013): 311–39. doi:10.1590/S1679-39512013000200008.

Novak, Robert D. 2000. “Incident at Warner Creek.” Washington Post, April 3, 2000. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/ opinions/2000/04/03/incident-at-warner-creek/ a02499ca-dada-4de6-8364-4b08ad536690/.

Oregon Health Authority; Public Health Division. Environmental Health Assessment Program. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.

Public Health Assessment Highway 36 CorridorExposure Investigation October 2014 Oct. 2014.

18 Feb. 2017 <https://public.health.oregon.gov/ HealthyEnvironments/TrackingAssessment/ EnvironmentalHealthAssessment/Hwy36/Documents/Highway_36_PHA_final_10-17-2014. pdf>.

Regan, Lauren. 2016. “Informants and Information: Looking at the Green Scare and Surveillance with Lauren Regan.” It’s Going Down (blog).

August 3, 2016. https://itsgoingdown.org/informants-information-looking-green-scare-surveillance-lauren-regan/.

Report from Sentencing for Nathan Block and Joyanna Zacher, June 1, 2007. https://cldc.org/ wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Block-Zacher. sent_.notes_.pdf Reuters. “British Animal Rights Protesters Admit Plotting Against Farmers.” The New York Times.

The New York Times, 11 Apr. 2006. Web. 26 Feb. 2017.

“Save The Newchurch Guinea Pigs Campaign Film” YouTube. N.p., 04 Nov. 2007. Web. 26 Feb. 2017. <https://youtu.be/3DONT2Aucgs>.

Shapiro, Nina. Jun 19, 2012. n.d. “Justin Solondz Torches a Movement.” Seattle Weekly. Accessed February 16, 2018. http://www.seattleweekly. com/home/873190-129/story.html.

130 Siegel, L. J. (2015). Criminology: Theories, Patterns, and Typologies. Cengage Learning. https:// books.google.com/books?id=djB-BAAAQB A J & l p g = P T 4 1 7 & o t s = G t 0 Z i b 8 V q 5 & dq=Rebecca%20Rubin%20ELF%20horse%20 BLM&pg=PT431#v=onepage&q=Rebecca%20Rubin%20ELF%20horse%20BLM&f=false St. Clair, Jeffery, and Joshua Frank. 2017. “The FBI’s ‘Operation Backfire’ and the Case of Briana Waters.” Counterpunch. June 23, 2017. https:// www.counterpunch.org/2017/06/23/the-fbisoperation-backfire-and-the-case-of-briana-waters/.

Tucker, Jonathon. War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda. Pantheon Books, 2006.

“UK | England | Staffordshire | Four jailed in gravetheft case.” BBC News. BBC, 11 May 2006.

Web. 26 Feb. 2017.

JANE POJAWA Workman, Justin. Pesticides and Birthweight: A response to the Hwy. 36 exposure investigation.

Eugene Weekly, 15 Jan. 2015. Web. 19 Feb. 2017. http://www.eugeneweekly.com/20150115/ guest-viewpoint/pesticides-and-birthweight Yang, Sue-Ming, Yi-Yuan Su and Varriale Carson, Jennifer. “TSAS WP14-04: Eco-Terrorism and the Corresponding Legislative Efforts to Intervene and Prevent Future Attacks.” Working Papers. Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security & Society, 2014. Web. 28 Feb. 2017. http://tsas.ca/tsas_library_entry/tsaswp14-04-eco-terrorism-and-the-correspondinglegislative-efforts-to-intervene-and-prevent-future-attacks/ Yoffe, Emily. 2017. “Innocence Is Irrelevant.” The Atlantic, September 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/.

The most widely publicized act of ecoterrorism in the United States was the Oct. 19, 1998, Two Elk Lodge ski resort arson in Vail, CO. Chelsea Gerlach claimed that although several members of the cell took part in planning the attack, ultimately she acted as driver and lookout while William Rogers carried gasoline up the mountain and set the fire. ELF protested the construction on the basis that Vail Associates, a private company, built the massive lodge and several ski lifts on national forest property, habitat of the Canadian lynx, among other species. No one was hurt and the lodge was rebuilt.

(Boynton, 2004 Gerlach, 2007)

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Jane Pojawa

Jane Pojawa graduated from Cal Poly Pomona in 2016 with a bachelor’s degree in communications, journalism emphasis, and a minor in political science. Her interest in ecoterrorism stems from two classes offered by Cal Poly Pomona’s Political Science Department, PLS 352 “Environmental Security” and PLS 499 “Terrorism and National Security,” both taught by Marc Scarcelli, Ph.D. Pojawa hopes to write about environmental subjects in a manner that is both informative and interesting to readers. Pojawa is currently in the Masters of Regenerative Studies program at the John T. Lyle Center for Regenerative Studies at Cal Poly Pomona. Her thesis work involves interviewing people who are (or were) participants in intentional communities with sustainable values with consideration to theory and practice.

Email: jmpojawa@cpp.edu

Counterterrorism: Can both Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Operations be Compatible and Mutually Reinforcing, or do both Inherently Operate at Cross-Purposes?

Mirette Morcos California State Polytechnic University, Pomona In the shadows of failed enemy-centric counterterrorism policies in the Iraq War, a new counterinsurgency manual has been adopted by the United States military. While the official US policy on countering terrorist and insurgent groups in the Middle East is inherently a counterinsurgency doctrine, there has been an overreliance on counterterrorism force tactics, such as kill and capture campaigns and drone strikes in undeclared war zones in order to eradicate high value targets. Although these force tactics can indeed have short-term resolutions, questions remain regarding their long-term effects on the United States’ counterinsurgency goals in the region. This research paper discusses the United States’ official counterinsurgency policy under the Obama administration and its stated long-term goals in the regions where al Qaeda and their affiliates are present. Furthermore, the paper analyzes the short- and long-term consequences of these seemingly paradoxical shadow operations by discussing their legality, ethics, and effectiveness. The research paper concludes that while these tactics have proven effective in some situations, overreliance on them is counterproductive to the long-term goals intended to maintain security both in the host countries and on an international level.

A

midst the entanglement of the United States in an ongoing and seemingly expanding Global War on Terror, different tactics and policies have been utilized in attempts to weaken and eventually eradicate terrorist groups. Although counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are inherently different doctrines, the United States policy under the Obama administration is a hodgepodge of tactics from both doctrines. While the new United States army manual has been rewritten to include counterinsurgency (COIN) as its main ap-

proach, counterterrorism and the focus on force tactics has remained embedded into its Global War on Terror.

Despite understanding that population-centric approaches and political solutions to the conflict are necessary in order to curb the violence, during his presidency, President Barack Obama signed and approved a large number of drone strikes and signature strikes in order to kill high value targets in undeclared warzones such as in Pakistan and Yemen. More so, the United States Joint Special Operations Command

Created by Mirette Morcos, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona for her senior thesis project. Correspondence concerning this research paper should be addressed to Mirette Morcos, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, (909) 263-6730. Email: mirette.morcos@yahoo.com Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2017. Pp. 132–147.

©2017, Political Science Department, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona.

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COUNTERTERRORISM & COUNTERINSURGENCY (JSOC) continues to expand kill and capture campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The differences in the approaches used to counter the current global threat of Islamic terrorism raises questions regarding the compatibility of these strategies when utilized simultaneously in the same region.

Moving towards effective counterterrorism approaches requires understanding the potential repercussions, as well as successes, of certain tactics and the government’s overall policy in the region.

There is a sharp division regarding the proper policies and tactics that should be enacted to deal with the threat of terrorism and insurgency. In addition, the potential compatibility of the two main schools of thought, counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN), remains debatable. Before delving into the compatibility issue, it is crucial to understand both doctrines along with their potential opportunities and obstacles. Below is a literature review that is meant to provide a comparative analytical framework, highlighting the main contributors to each school of thought and their respective arguments.

This literature review will also lay the groundwork in addressing the debate regarding counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics, and whether they are mutually reinforcing or counterproductive.

II. Literature Review Definitions: The first doctrine of combating terrorism and insurgency is referred to as counterterrorism. It is a force doctrine that is defined in the United States Army Field Manual as “operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism”(qtd by Rineheart, 2010).

This doctrine focuses its efforts on the enemy, and seeks their physical annihilation as the primary goal (Adam, 2012). It is also defined by David Kilcullen, a former Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department, as “a variant of conventional warfare…it could be summarized as ‘first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow’” (Kilcullen, 2007).

Counterterrorism includes different strategies that argue for the use of different levels of force. Kilcullen explains that these levels are scattered across a spectrum, and can vary from extreme to less brutal forms (Kilcullen, 2009). These counterterrorism methods are often referred to as “enemy-centric”, because they focus on the enemy as their main priority. The most brutal form of counterterrorism occurs when the military takes no account of civilian casu-

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alties, but rather eliminates everyone in the territory that harbors the terrorists; Kilcullen refers to this as “scorched earth”(Kilcullen, 2009). This approach defends the destruction of entire villages and the death of civilians by arguing that they are providing safe havens for the insurgents. Other, less brutal, methods of counterterrorism often attempt to minimize casualties by searching for the insurgents within the population, rather than kill everyone in a specific area (Kilcullen, 2009). Kilcullen calls this approach “search and destroy”; since the military are searching for the insurgents among the civilians (Kilcullen, 2009).

The second doctrine of combating terrorism and insurgency is counterinsurgency.

The Department of State defines counterinsurgency as: Unlike conventional warfare…non-military means are often the most effective elements, with military forces playing an enabling role… Strategies will usually be focused primarily on the population rather than the enemy and will seek to reinforce the legitimacy of the affected government while reducing insurgent influence. This can often only be achieved in concert with political reform to improve the quality of governance and address underlying grievances, many of which may be legitimate (“The Counterinsurgency Guide”, 2009).

The United States army manual also defines it as “a political struggle (that) incorporates a wide range of activities by the host nation government of which security is only one, albeit an important one”, as well as “comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes”(DTIC, 2013).

Dissimilar from counterterrorism, which focuses its efforts on the enemy, counterinsurgency focuses their efforts on the wider population in order to minimize casualties, and gain proper intelligence (Adam, 2012). It understands insurgencies as a control problem, and in return employs “an all- encompassing approach to countering irregular insurgent warfare – an approach which recognizes that a military solution to a conflict is not feasible; only a combined military, political, and civilian solution is possible” (Rineheart, 2010). Counterinsurgency is often referred to as “population-centric”, or “hearts and minds”, which implies that it is an anti-force doctrine. That is a common misconception; counterinsurgency includes and advocates for the use of some force (enemy-centric) and military tactics. However, it is not

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Thirty-seven soldiers in the Djibouti army conduct counter-terrorism training along with U.S. Army National Guard soldiers from Guam, currently assigned to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.

inherently a force or military doctrine. Kilcullen explains that population-centric approaches understand the situation as “fundamentally a control problem… it believes that establishing control over the population, and the environment (physical, human and informational) in which that population lives, is the essential task… the underlying philosophy is “first control the population, and all else will follow” (Kilcullen, 2007).

Counterinsurgency:

Following the initial loss of the Iraq war, counterinsurgency gained increased support as the dominant approach to countering terrorists and insurgent groups. General David Petraeus revised the United States army manual to include counterinsurgency (COIN) as the primary military doctrine (Springer, 2011). Advocates of COIN point to both pragmatic and ethical reasons for their support; they argue that current-day insurgencies are a different kind of war from other wars in history, and therefore should be dealt with accordingly. Since the insurgents are hiding amongst the civilians, the difficulty in this type of warfare is to eliminate the enemy without having large numbers of casualties. Therefore, counterinsur-

gency scholars and military personnel advocate for different tactics and policies in order to win over the population and establish control over territories that were once safe havens for terrorists and insurgents.

John Nagl, a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the conflict in Iraq, supports this argument in his book Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife. He discusses insurgency tactics through a comparison between the British’s response in Malaya and the United States in Vietnam (Nagl, 2002). He explains that Britain’s success was due to its ability to adapt its tactics and techniques to its specific needs. Although a “direct approach”, focusing on eliminating the enemy first may seem more familiar to the military in terms of conventional warfare, the “indirect approach”, which focuses on diminishing the population’s support of the insurgents, is the most effective long-term strategy (Nagl, 2002). Therefore, Nagel advises the United States military to train soldiers in addressing insurgencies with different political and economic strategies, and not simply military tactics (Nagl, 2002).

Nagel’s analysis and argument for counterinsurgency is widely accepted by most counterinsurgency advocates. One of the most influential strategists and writers about counterinsurgency is David Kilcullen.

COUNTERTERRORISM & COUNTERINSURGENCY Kilcullen has written multiple books and articles advocating for counterinsurgency methods of winning over the civilian population’s support in territories where the United States is fighting insurgencies and terrorism. In his book The Accidental Guerrilla, Kilcullen examines the weaknesses in the United States’ initial policy in the Iraq War (Kilcullen, 2009). He argues that counterterrorism (enemy-centric) approaches lead to the creation of more fighters since the number of casualties pushes the civilians into arming themselves against the military solely out of defense and personal vengeance, a term he refers to as “accidental guerrilla” (Kilcullen, 2009). He explains that if the enemy-centric tactics are killing insurgents, but in return, creating more insurgents, then the insurgency will never end.

Therefore, he argues that the best way to end conflict and maintain stability with the country is to gain control of the territory, through whatever means necessary, and establish trust with the population in order to gain intelligence about who hiding among them are insurgents (Kilcullen, 2009). This can only be done if the population feels secure and trusts the military. Therefore, he argues that this should be the military’s main task in order to avoid the accidental guerrilla syndrome and deal with the root causes of

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the problem at hand (Kilcullen, 2009). According to Kilcullen, counterinsurgency is mostly political and needs to secure the people as well as provide them with political solutions to their grievances (Kilcullen, 2009).

Since counterinsurgency is inherently different from conventional military practices, Kilcullen wrote his article “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency Editorial” in order to provide the military with twenty-eight steps that would help them win the insurgency and secure the territories (Kilcullen, 2006). These twenty-eight steps include learning the language and culture, gaining the elders’ support, building trusted networks, and proceeding with precautionary methods in order to not let their actions be used as recruitment propaganda by the insurgents (Kilcullen, 2006).

More so, Kilcullen explains that the military cannot simply respond to the insurgents’ attacks; but rather keep the initiative and be preemptive in order to initiate every attack necessary to leave the insurgents constantly reacting (Kilcullen, 2006). He argues that this is only possible through the mobilization of the civilians in the territory, and accumulating human intelligence of who and where the insurgents are (Kilcullen, 2006). Addressing the misconception

Hamid Karzai, center standing, the President of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014, with Special Forces and CIA Paramilitary in late 2001.

136 of counterinsurgency discussed earlier, Kilcullen, in his article “Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency”, explains that “the key to ‘good counterinsurgency practice” is the agile integration of civil and military measures across security, economic, political and information tracks -- and this is something that has to be done regardless of which approach you adopt, and is just as necessary in both” (Kilcullen, 2007). He explains that successful counterinsurgency needs to include both enemy-centric and population-centric tactics, depending on the situation at hand. The military needs to be properly trained to know what circumstances require which approach.

Paul Cornish, a former researcher at the RAND Corporation and scholar, agrees with Kilcullen and argues that political measures are the only viable way to defeat terrorist groups. In his article, “The United States and Counterinsurgency: ‘Political First, Political Last, Political Always’”, Cornish explains that counterinsurgency is not against the use of force, and that in some situations the insurgents must be dealt with militarily (Cornish, 2009). However, he argues, that the main goal of counterinsurgency is to win the support of the population, not to defeat the insurgents through conventional military tactics (Cornish, 2009). He explains that the best way to win local population’s support is not by focusing on solving their small grievances, but by convincing the local population that they are secure from the insurgents and will not be “abandoned prematurely” (Cornish, 2009). According to him, this can only be granted to these populations if there are political solutions to their problems, and the counter insurgent is aware of those solutions (Cornish, 2009).

The combination of different agencies such as the military, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), law enforcement and foreign policy makers, in order to solve a situation can be problematic in cooperation, information sharing, and enforcement efforts. In his article “Counterinsurgency Warfare”, David Galula addresses the complexity of this kind of holistic approach and emphasizes the necessity of it being carried out under single leadership in order to be efficient (Galula, 2006).

He argues that no operation can be strictly militarily or strictly political. Military action is needed, but it should be secondary to the political goal (Galula, 2006). Therefore, he explains that the hardest task is to retrain conventional soldiers to adjust catering to political goals since they have never been trained this way before (Galula, 2006).

Many advocates of counterinsurgency also point to state building as an essential task of effective counterinsurgency efforts. This approach is simi-

MIRETTE MORCOS lar to providing stability and security for the population, but includes more political approaches. Seth Jones, an analyst for the RAND Corporation, dissects America’s policies in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009 (Jones, 2009). In his book, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, Jones explains that the war in Afghanistan failed because it did not establish a democratic government or provide the population with the security they needed (Jones, 2009). He insists that a renewed form of counterinsurgency is needed to gain the population’s support in order to weaken the Taliban (Jones, 2009). He argues for a population-centric approach with a focus on the Afghan countryside as well as the need for the government of Afghanistan to build better institutions and address the root issues that are leading to the problems of their people (Jones, 2009). Jones’ argument, however, raises questions about whether a democratic government can be strong enough to counter terrorism and insurgencies, and whether the democratically elected leader will be willing to cooperate with the United States in order to ensure regional and global stability.

Counterterrorism: The counterterrorism doctrine is supported by scholars, policy makers, and military personnel that consider the threat of terrorism ideological, and not necessarily due to social and political grievances.

They argue that enemy-centric tactics that focus on the insurgent or terrorist as the primary target are the most effective ways to defeat insurgencies and terrorist groups. Moreover, they explain that abiding human rights laws and using political tactics makes the United States weak in its chances of winning this type of war.

One of the most acclaimed scholars of counterinsurgency is Gil Merom. In his book How Democracies Lose Small Wars, Merom dissects three different countries’ experiences with counterinsurgency; France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Merom, 2003). He argues that democracies lose these wars because they are unable to use the sufficient amount of force and enemy-centric approaches that are needed to win (Merom, 2003).

Therefore, he recommends a scorched earth approach, and argues that the United States military should be prepared to use brutal methods, such as destroying the opposing population as a whole or carrying out whatever means necessary to kill the insurgents (Merom, 2003). However, he criticizes democracies’ limitations in regards to what policies are employed due to public opinion; which becomes antiwar as soon as the

COUNTERTERRORISM & COUNTERINSURGENCY numbers of casualties rise (Merom, 2003). He argues that the media usually influences a more soft-handed approach, and prevent the hard-handed approach that is needed to combat the threat (Merom, 2003).

Douglas Porch, a United States military historian and academic, agrees with Gil Merom that counterinsurgency tactics will never lead to the United States winning the war on terror. He dissects the history of counterinsurgency in France, Britain and the United States, from the 19th century to the Iraq war, and explains that the idea of counterinsurgency as the humane way of war is false (Porch, 2013). According to Porch, counterinsurgency “consists of the application of petty war tactics that its advocates since the 1840s have puffed as infallible prescriptions for effortless conquest, nation-building and national grandeur” (Porch, 2013). He argues that population-centric approaches will never ensure lasting stability in the region (Porch, 2013).

Max Boot, a military historian and foreign-policy analyst, also supports counterterrorism methods and argues that the military’s success in conducting counterterrorism tactics is the main reason the United States has not experienced any major terrorist attacks on its soil since 9/11 (Boot, 2011). He contributed an article to the series “Ten Lessons Since the 9/11 Attacks”, in which he praises the United States’ counterterrorism policies. He explains that counterterrorism has been successful through President Bush’s approval of the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on high value detainees, warrantless wiretapping, and CIA operated black sites, and drone strikes (Boot, 2011). He argues that although they are controversial practices, they have been successful in preventing more terrorist attacks and continue to be carried out by the Obama administration (Boot, 2011). However, the article was written in 2011 and predates the rise of ISIS as well as the terrorist attacks that have happened since.

Regarding the war in Afghanistan, counterterrorism tactics are supported by some officials in the White House; most famously by Vice President Joe Biden. Biden argues that COIN strategies are expensive and will not lead to a victory in the war in Afghanistan (Antal, 2009). Therefore, he advocates for reducing the number of American troops in Afghanistan in order leave a smaller “footprint” on the region. He explains that this will prevent the population from viewing troops as an occupation force (Antal, 2009). Biden’s approach is interesting because it supports counterterrorism tactics, but also accounts for the population’s reception of United States’ actions; a different approach than any of the others. Former Afghanistan CIA case officer, Marc Sageman explains

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that targeted strikes are very close to “completely eliminating al-Qaeda” (Antal, 2009). Although drone strikes are very controversial, they indeed reduce civilian casualties. Their low cost, precision, and ability to reduce civilian deaths are the main reasons behind the increase for their utilization.

Alex Wilner is an advocate of targeted killings and drone strikes, which are common counterterrorism tactics. In his article “Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency”, Wilner provides a case study analysis of four targeted killings in Afghanistan (Wilner, 2010). He argues that targeted killings are effective because they can lead to a change in the terrorist’s behavior in order to avoid being monitored (Wilner, 2010). Therefore, this could lead to a decrease in their success of planning attacks.

He explains his findings support the notion that targeted killings diminished the success rates of the Taliban in conducting terrorist attacks, and therefore argues that targeted killings should continue to be utilized in anti-terrorism operations (Wilner, 2010).

Are the two doctrines compatible or mutually reinforcing?

In the article “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency: Competing Approaches to Anti- Terrorism”, Scott Adam analyzes the two competing approaches of responding to terrorism; counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. He explains that counterterrorism is effective in removing high value targets (Adam, 2012). However these approaches usually lead to high numbers of civilian casualties, as well as raise questions about the United States’ legitimacy in the war on terror (Adam, 2012). Adam goes on further to discuss how counterinsurgency has a completely different approach to the problem. It focuses on the local population and attempts to minimize and address their grievances in order to get rid of their support for the terrorist and insurgent groups (Adam, 2012). Therefore, he concludes that both approaches are mutually exclusive and counterproductive, since counterinsurgency strives towards gaining the populations’ trust, while counterterrorism tactics may alienate the population due to the excessive use of force (Adam, 2012).

Michael Boyle also raised the question of compatibility of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in his article “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together”. Boyle compares and contrasts counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and explains that while they are used interchangeably, they are inherently very different (Boyle, 2010). Focusing

138 on the war in Afghanistan, Boyle argues that counterinsurgency focuses more on state building, as well as population support (Boyle, 2010). On the other hand, counterterrorism focuses solely on defeating the terrorist group militarily (Boyle, 2010). Boyle explains that if the terrorists differ demographically from the local population, then a combination of both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics can be successful (cited by Adam, 2012). This is because each approach is targeting a different people; with counterterrorism targeting the terrorists, and COIN targeting the civilian population (cited by Adam, 2012). However, he explains that this is not always the case and argues that counterterrorism strategies can sometimes undermine counterinsurgency efforts (Boyle, 2010). He concludes by explaining that both approaches are not mutually exclusive, however they are not complementary or mutually reinforcing by any means (Boyle, 2010).

III. Methodology Although not all-encompassing, this thesis is a qualitative study that will analyze the United States’ use of drone strikes in undeclared warzones under the Obama administration. It will analyze legality, transparency, and overall effectiveness and consequences of the tactic both short-term and long-term.

This research is not focused on an analysis of country case studies , but rather an analysis of the tactic with references to different countries, specifically Pakistan and Yemen; both undeclared warzones. Additionally, this research will analyze kill and capture campaigns carried out by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will also analyze the legality, transparency and overall effectiveness and consequences of the tactic both short-term and long-term. For the scope of this thesis, this research will not discuss detainee policies or policies not pertinent to the Obama administration.

Given the fact that data from the region discussed is often not reliable, and governmental data regarding counterterrorism operations is mostly classified, this study will use a qualitative approach to the question at hand. The research will discuss and analyze the long-term results of these tactics in the light of United States’ counterinsurgency policies under the Obama administration. This will be done in order to see if counterterrorism tactics such as drone strikes and kill and capture campaigns can ever be compatible with the United States’ counterinsurgency policies and their end goals, or if they are mutually exclusive.

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The United States’ counterinsurgency policy under the Obama administration:

In order to understand the basic overarching American policy in the war on terror during the Obama administration, this research will focus on main aspects of “The Counterinsurgency Guide” (2009), “National Strategy for Counterterrorism” (2011), as well as “Quadrennial Defense Review” (2014). These reports offer a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency, which is the government’s official stated policy in dealing with terrorism and insurgency.

“The Counterinsurgency Guide” includes five different components, which appear to be the main components of counterinsurgency in the Middle East and South Asia, the economic and development component, the security component, the information component, the political strategy component, and the control component (“The Counterinsurgency Guide”, 2009). The guidelines explain that the economic component involves immediate aid such as humanitarian relief, sustainable infrastructure and medical activities. The security component is the process of providing security to the population form insurgent violence, in order to progress towards human rights, and freedoms. The information component is the process of gathering human and technological intelligence regarding terrorist and insurgent activity. The political component, which is essential to counterinsurgency, works towards political reconciliation, the establishment of a functioning government within the host country, as well as supporting civil society and governmental programs. And, the most important component of all, control of the territory, is the underlying function for all the other components to build upon (“The Counterinsurgency Guide”, 2009).

The guide states that finding a balance between involvements to counter the threat, and allowing the host country to maintain its sovereignty is essential.

Overstepping the boundaries of the host state’s sovereignty can be counterproductive to the main goals (“The Counterinsurgency Guide”, 2009). Furthermore, the guide explains that success in the mission can be measured by, “improved governance that brings marginalization of the insurgents to the point of destruction or at least reduction” (“The Counterinsurgency Guide”, 2009). This calls for a legitimate and strong government that is capable of controlling their institutions and territories, as well as addressing the needs and grievances of the people in order to marginalize insurgent groups.

Additionally, the “National Strategy for Counterterrorism”, published by the White House, lists core

COUNTERTERRORISM & COUNTERINSURGENCY values that the United States must adhere to in order to be successful in their counterinsurgency mission (“National Strategy for Counterterrorism”, 2011).

These core values include “respect for human rights, encouraging a responsive government, respect for privacy rights, and civil rights, balancing security and transparency, and upholding the rule of law”(“National Strategy for Counterterrorism”, 2011). These guidelines focus on the importance of balancing United States’ short- and long-term goals and missions in the region. The end goal of this guideline is more specific towards Al Qaeda (AQ), and aims to disrupt and defeat AQ, prevent their expansion, eliminate safe havens, and build partnerships (“National Strategy for Counterterrorism”, 2011). Moreover, the 2014 “Quadrennial Defense Review”, published by the Department of Defense, explains that counterinsurgency efforts will focus on “ building partnership capacity, especially in fragile states, while retaining robust capability for direct action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance, precision strike, and Special Operations Forces” (“Quadrennial Defense Review”, 2014).

The United States’ counterinsurgency policy, as evident by these documents, focuses on state building and cooperation with both the host government and the population. Although counterinsurgency doctrine is not against the use of force or the utilization of military tactics to kill targets, questions remain regarding the compatibility of the force tactics, as they stand today with the long-term goals in the region.

This research will shed a light on this dilemma within the two case studies discussed.

IV. Case Study 1: Drone Strikes “The inherently secret nature of the weapon creates a persistent feeling of fear in areas where drones hover in the sky and the hopelessness of communities that are on the receiving end of strikes cause severe backlash both in terms of anti US opinion and violence” (Abbas, 2013).

Drone strikes have been an extremely controversial counterterrorism tactic both on a national and international level within the last decade. The Obama administration has received criticism from the international community regarding its use of drones to carry out attacks on key leaders, militants, and affiliates in undeclared warzones around the globe. The administration’s overreliance on drone strikes has led to many people referring to drone strikes as “The Obama Doctrine” (Rineheart, 2010). While the use of force tactics is not in opposition with counterin-

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surgency doctrine at large, many questions remain regarding the compatibility of drone strikes in undeclared warzones with counterinsurgency policy in the Middle East. In attempt to answer this question, this case study will analyze the short-term successes of drone strikes, and compare the long-term repercussions of their use with the stated long-term goals and measures of success discussed in the various counterinsurgency documents and policies of the Obama administration.

Legality and transparency of drone strikes:

The legality of drone strikes has long been contested both domestically and internationally. Although domestic laws were passed to legitimize and legalize their use, their utilization in undeclared warzones remains illegal under international law. The Obama administration, much like the Bush administration, cites legal basis for the use of drone strikes abroad, such as The Authorization for Use of Military Force bill passed by congress after September 11 2001. The bill gave the president the broad authority to use force on those responsible for the attack. It states: The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons (Daschle, 2001).

The ambiguity of the bill in giving the president the ability to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or persons”, makes it difficult to deem the president’s use of drone strikes as illegal under domestic law. Moreover, the Global War on Terror declared a war on terrorism internationally and therefore is arguably not constrained to borders. However, their utilization in undeclared war zones has been contested as violating state sovereignties, the underlying principle of all international relations.

Lack of governmental transparency in regards to the use of drone strikes has also sparked debate regarding their legality. For a long time, information on drone strikes was classified, and the government refused to provide information regarding the aftermath of the strikes. Although some governmental data has since been declassified and released to the public, a report by the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School stated that the data is still lacking

140 in many aspects, and does not match with data from independent networks’ investigations (Human Rights Clinic, 2012). The report explains that the official government reports on drone strikes state that very few civilians have been killed; however, news reports on strikes as well as independent investigations have concluded otherwise (Human Rights Clinic, 2012).

“It’s hard to credit (the government)’s death count, which is lower than all independent assessments,” explained Hina Shamsi, the director of the ACLU’s National Security Project (qtd by Devereaux, 2016).

Additionally, further complications to obtaining clear data on drone strikes arise due to severe inconsistencies between different investigative journalists’ data and other independent sources. “NGOs provide accounts that differ not only from official figures, but also vary widely from organization to organization…

For the period between January 20, 2009, and December 31, 2015, non-governmental organizations’ estimates range from more than 200 to slightly more than 900 possible non-combatant deaths outside areas of active hostilities”(Devereaux, 2016). Although discrepancies between different investigative networks and other independent sources regarding the numbers of strikes and civilian casualties exist, all of them agree, “there is evidence to suggest that deaths, and civilian deaths in particular, are much higher than U.S. officials admit” (Human Rights Clinic, 2012).

This discrepancy between governmental data and independent sources can be explained as a result of differences in labeling and definitions. “The Obama Administration claims that U.S. officials have, over the years, maintained a practice of labeling military-aged males killed in drone strikes as militants unless evidence is produced indicating otherwise”, explains Ryan Devereaux, author of “Obama Administration Finally Releases Its Dubious Drone Death Toll” (Devereaux, 2016). This means that any military aged male killed during a drone strike is written off as a combatant until this information is contested, which explains the reason the number of civilian casualties reported by the government is much lower than independent organizations.

Since governmental data does not provide information on the details of the strikes, or accurate justification for their count, this research will use independent data from the New America Foundation reports on drone strikes. According to the New America Foundation, there have been 403 drone strikes in Pakistan, 355 of them carried out by the Obama administration, which is 88% of the total strikes in the country (New America Foundation). The Obama administration’s drone strikes in Pakistan have killed between 1,904 to 3,114 people. The report states

MIRETTE MORCOS that between 1,645 to 2,731 were militants, 129 to 161 were civilians, and 130 to 222 were “unknown” (New America Foundation). Upon averaging and calculating the data into percentages of casualties for each category, the results showed that around 87% of all deaths were militants, 5.7% were civilians, and 7.01% were unknown. This means that civilian casualties are from 5.7% to 12.8% [if unknown are counted as civilians].

In regards to Yemen, the International Security Reports report 182 drone strikes, with 99.5 % of them carried out by the Obama administration. These strikes killed between 1,085 to 1,363 people. The report states that between 965 to 1,218 were militants, 87 to 93 were civilians, and 33 to 52 were “unknown” (New America Foundation). Upon averaging and calculating the data once again, the results showed that 89.17% of all deaths by drone strikes in Yemen were militants, 7.35% were civilians, and 3.47% were unknown. Which means that civilian casualties range from 7.35% to 10.82% [if unknown are included in the count].

It is important to note that the numbers of civilian casualties due to drone strikes are less than that from other force tactics. However, the contested legality and transparency of the use of drone strikes, coupled with the number of civilian casualties, has had negative repercussions in regards to United States’ intervention in the region as a whole. Furthermore, the excessive use of drone strikes by the Obama administration has resulted in a negative view of the tactic worldwide.

Effectiveness of Drone strikes:

This case study will measure the effectiveness of drone strikes by evaluating the short- and long-term successes and repercussions of drone strikes in comparison with the measures of successes stated in the counterinsurgency policies of the Obama administration. While drone strikes have been proven effective in carrying out their tasks of killing key terrorists and insurgents, their long-term effectiveness remains debatable. Drone strikes are more precise than other tools and offer low cost surveillance and response to threat without risking the lives of US soldiers (Abbas, 2013; Byman, 2016). They have also killed key terrorist and insurgent leaders as well as denied terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia (Byman, 2016). According to the New America Foundation, data shows that the Obama administration drone strikes have killed around 3,300 AQ Taliban and others in Pakistan and Yemen alone (Byman, 2016). Proponents of drone strikes argue that

COUNTERTERRORISM & COUNTERINSURGENCY they have devastated the groups and denied them the potential and capacity to grow (Boot, 2011; Wilner, 2010). However, it remains debatable whether drone strikes have actually devastated terrorist groups and their growth, or simply altered their way of functioning.

Despite their short-term successes, drone strikes have caused a number of long-term consequences.

Although it is difficult to gather an accurate estimate of the number of terrorists or insurgents in the Middle East, the numbers seem to have grown and spread.

This is largely due to alienation of the host population, which is often a result of civilian casualties. The rise in casualties works against the United States’ goal to be seen as protecting the population, but rather reinforces the idea that the intervention is terrorizing the people and their homes. This alienation of the population often results in rising recruitment for terrorist groups. Hassan Abbas, author of the article “How Drones Create More Terrorists”, explains that drone strikes are used as recruitment tools in order to help terrorists gain recruits and monetary support (Abbas, 2013). The civilian casualties legitimize the grievances of terrorist groups, and justify their actions to the population (Abbas, 2013). In his book, The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda, and the Battle for Arabia, Gregory Johnsen argued that drone attacks in Yemen have had the opposite of their intended outcome due to civilian casualties, and has helped AQ grow immensely (Johnsen, 2013). Hassan Abbas explains that “the political message of drone strikes emphasizes disparity in power between the parties and reinforces popular support for the terrorists who are seen as David fighting Goliath”(Abbas, 2013) The rise in recruitment can also be a result of ‘the accidental guerrilla’ syndrome discussed by Kilcullen, which is the push of civilians arming themselves against the military solely out of defense and personal vengeance for innocent relatives or friends who were killed (Kilcullen, 2009).

Moreover, drone strikes alienate the host government fighting terrorist or insurgent groups on their territory and hinder potential cooperation. Drone strikes often occur without the knowledge or approval of the host government, such as the case in Pakistan. This can aggravate the government and strain relationships and cooperation with them in order to address the current terrorist threat (Benjamin, 2013).

Imran Khan , leader of the PTI [the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf] Political Party, showed his disapproval of the United States’ continued use of drone strikes by stating, “we will put pressure on America, and our protest will continue if drone attacks are not stopped” (Benjamin, 2013). This hostility is potentially harm-

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ful to the United States’ goals in the region since Pakistan is a vital partner in the region. Furthermore, drone strikes reinforce the terrorist and insurgent groups’ portrayal of the host government as either too weak to protect its people, or conspiring against them with the United States. This is problematic as it hinders the host government’s capacity to control their territory, and marginalize the terrorist and insurgent groups.

Conclusion on Drone Strikes:

Prior to addressing the compatibility question, this case study assessed the legality, transparency, and efficiency of the United States’ use of drone strikes in undeclared warzones. Furthermore, it discussed the short- versus long-term successes and repercussions of their use. With regards to the United States government’s counterinsurgency guidelines discussed earlier, this case study concludes that while the use of drone strikes can indeed result in some short-term successes, overreliance on drone strikes is inherently counterproductive to the United States counterinsurgency policy, values, and end goals in the region.

The excessive use of drone strikes has violated most of the United States’ core values discussed in the “National Strategy for Counterterrorism” such as, valuing human rights, encouraging a responsive government, and balancing security and transparency (“National Strategy for Counterterrorism”, 2011).

Moreover, excessive use of drone strikes has had a negative effect on the five components addressed in the “Counterinsurgency Guide”. Drone strikes destroy infrastructure and hinder the distribution of humanitarian aid, which undermines the economic and development components. The security and the information components are also negatively affected by the use of drone strikes because the strikes alienate the population and therefore push them towards supporting the insurgent and terrorist groups.

The excessive use of drone strikes also prevents the success of the political component, which works towards establishing a functioning government and supporting governmental programs. The rise in civilian casualties and, by default, rise in anti-US sentiments also undermines the control component as a whole, which could result in the government’s loss of control of the population and the territory.

The “Counterinsurgency Guide” measure of success points to an “improved governance that brings marginalization of the insurgents to the points of destruction or at least a reduction (“The Counterinsurgency Guide”, 2009). However, the Obama administration’s excessive use of drone strikes has resulted in

142 quite the opposite. Additionally, the administration’s excessive use drone strikes has also undermined state sovereignties, cooperation, and unintentionally helped terrorist groups gain support and legitimacy.

V. Case Study 2: JSOC Kill and Capture Campaigns “If killing were all that winning wars was about, the book on JSOC would be written. But no war in modern times is ever won simply by killing enough of the enemy. Even in an era of precision weaponry, accidents happen that create huge political setbacks” (Arkin & Priest 2011).

Although drone strikes are often viewed as the most controversial tool of targeted killing, the increasing prevalence of JSOC kill and capture campaigns has also resulted in much criticism. Despite the shift in military strategy in Iraq from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency in 2007, JSOC kill and capture operations were increased accordingly and spread across the country, later expanding to Afghanistan (Niva, 2013). The increasing use of kill and capture campaigns simultaneously with the military’s population-centric operations has raised questions regarding their compatibility. To shed a light on the question, this case study will discuss the legality and transparency of the kill and capture campaigns.

Furthermore, it will discuss their short- and longterm successes and consequences under the Obama administration.

Legality and transparency of JSOC kill and capture campaigns: Aside from The Authorization to Use Force discussed earlier, the Obama administration cites legal basis for kill and capture operations. Obama has continued many policies from the Bush administration that allow US forces to operate globally to pursue high value targets (Scahill, 2011). Al Qaeda Network Execute Order, known as AQN ExORD was originally signed by Rumsfeld in 2004 and expanded

by General David Petraeus in 2009 (Arkin & Priest 2011). The initial order was “intended to cut through bureaucratic and legal processes in order to allow US Special Forces to move into denied areas or countries beyond the official battle zones of Iraq and Afghanistan”(Schahill, 2015). The order listed fifteen countries in which terrorists operate, and gave JSOC pre approvals to carry out their operations (Arkin &

MIRETTE MORCOS Priest 2011). General David Petraeus expanded AQN ExORD in 2009 in order to allow JSOC forces to further operate without legal obstacles (Schahill, 2015).

In addition, General Petraeus signed an executive order known as Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF), which Scahill explained as “a permission slip of sorts for US Military Special Operations teams to conduct clandestine actions without the president’s direct approval for each operation”(Scahill, 2014, p. 282). While there have been domestic laws passed in order to protect JSOC operations, the legality of kill and capture campaigns have been contested both domestically as well as internationally.

Criticism of kill and capture campaigns is often due to the secrecy and unchecked nature of the campaigns, as well as the groups carrying them out, specifically JSOC. In his publication “Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare”, Steve Niva explains that JSOC has their own intelligence divisions and drones for surveillance (Niva, 2013). Moreover, their overarching group, SOCOM (Special Operations Command), has control over budgeting and training, which he explains is usually reserved for actual departments such as the Navy or the Army (Niva, 2013). Essentially, JSOC collects their own intelligence and acts upon it without the required approval from any other powers. This is problematic considering the secretive nature of JSOC, and the fact that the group’s functions are classified, with no proper way of checking them.

“JSOC operates with practically no accountability”, argues Ackerman in his article, “How the Pentagon’s Top Killers Became (Unaccountable) Spies” (Ackerman, 2012).

Most data regarding kill and capture campaigns is classified and very little is disclosed regarding their processes (“Kill/Capture”, 2011). The classification of such tactics is understandable considering the need to remain anonymous and secretive in order to effectively target the enemy. However, the lack of transparency and accountability regarding JSOC operations is often seen internationally as contradictory with the United States’ core values such as abiding to the rule of law and checks and balances. This can contribute to many long-term negative consequences.

Effectiveness of JSOC kill and capture campaigns: There has been an overreliance on kill and capture campaigns for counterterrorism operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Retired Colonel John Nagl, explained to PBS Frontline that the operations are utilized extensively and their capabilities are those

COUNTERTERRORISM & COUNTERINSURGENCY of “an almost industrial-scale counterterrorism killing machine” (“Kill/Capture”, 2011). The excessive use of JSOC kill and capture campaigns raises many questions regarding the effectiveness of the campaigns in reaching the final goals of the US counterinsurgency policies. Much like the previous case study, this case study will measure the effectiveness of JSOC by evaluating both short- and long-term successes and consequences. It will then compare them with the measures of successes stated in the counterinsurgency policies of the Obama administration.

JSOC operations have had many successes. Proponents of JSOC operations praise JSOC for their “devastating effectiveness”, in finding and killing key leaders (Porter, 2011). JSOC Seal Team 6 is known and praised for the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, leader of AQ, in 2011. However, it remains debatable whether the killing of a key leader is in fact destructive of the group as a whole. While killing key leaders can be somewhat damaging to a group, it can also open the door for younger, even more violent individuals to take charge, making it less likely for the group to negotiate. Such is the case with the Taliban in Afghanistan; while the US military says kill and capture campaigns might force the Taliban leaders negotiate, the group has repeatedly stated otherwise (Edge, 2011). Proponents also argue that the tactics of targeted killings such as kill and capture have altered the way that terrorist groups function. However, there is no proof that the alterations truly affect their functionality and efficiency in communication.

Although data regarding details of kill and capture operations including number of civilian casualties is classified, various news reports highlighting civilian casualties in Yemen, Iraq, and Afghanistan have emerged throughout the years, and have negatively impacted United States’ image and goals in the region. “Every JSOC raid that also wounded or killed civilians, or destroyed a home or someone’s livelihood, became a source of grievance so deep that the counterproductive effects, still unfolding, are difficult to calculate”, explained Arkin and Priest in their article “ Top Secret America’: A look at the military’s Joint Special Operations Command” (Arkin & Priest 2011). The article argues that success of targeting the correct individuals was around 50%, but there is no clear way of verifying this information.

However, civilian casualties caused by JSOC kill and capture operations are a reality, and often yield unexpected consequences. General Mccrystal expressed this concern in an interview, “sometimes our actions were counterproductive… we would say, ‘We need to go in and kill this guy,’ but just the effects of our kinetic action did something negative and they

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[the conventional army forces that occupied much of the country] were left to clean up the mess” (Arkin & Priest 2011). The death of civilians is often due to inaccurate data gathering methodologies. Although the official criteria for placing names on the kill list are mostly classified, it is known to be some sort of digital quantitative methodology. Gareth Porter, author of the article “How McChrystal and Petraeus Built an Indiscriminate “Killing Machine””, explains that JSOC gathers their own intelligence through mobile phones of the locations they monitor, and maps them out in order to monitor communications between phone numbers on the kill list and others (Porter, 2011).

The inevitable result is that more phone numbers held by civilian noncombatants show up on the charts of insurgent networks. If the phone records show multiple links to numbers already on the “kill/capture” list, the individual is likely to be added to the list” (Porter, 2011). This methodology can be quite problematic since there is not a person verifying and understanding the nature of the contact or linkage between the phone numbers (Porter, 2011). Aside from civilian casualties, targeting civilians in night raids, whether deliberately for information gathering, or accidentally, also yields negative results.

While JSOC kill and capture operations have been effective in killing key leaders, their consequential long-term effects are detrimental to United States’ goals and policies in the region. Despite the killing of thousands of militants and key leaders, the number of fighters in these groups have not decreased .In fact, the Taliban in Afghanistan seems to be recruiting at a very close rate to the rate of them getting killed (Edge, 2011). This is due to the unexpected civilian casualties of the campaigns. As with drone strikes, the death of civilians in JSOC kill and capture campaigns often results in the alienation of the population, and rise in recruitment for terrorist groups. Terrorist groups use the civilian deaths caused by US intervention in the region in order to gain support from the population and legitimize their grievances. They portray US intervention in the region as a western war against Islam and Muslims, and civilian casualties help them prove their case. The portrayal of the US forces as terrorists delegitimizes America’s goals in the region, while further legitimizing the grievances of the insurgent groups. This can ignite anti-American sentiments that result in violence against civilians in the United States.

Furthermore, much like drone strikes, JSOC kill and capture campaigns often occur without approval or input and control from the host government. This strains the relationship between the host government

144 and the United States, and hinders potential cooperation for reaching a political end goal. The former President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, showed his discontent of American forces violating the sovereignty of Pakistan to pursue high value targets. “I would like to point out one sensitivity of Pakistan and its people, and that is it’s a violation of the sovereignty of Pakistan,” he stated after the killing of Osama bin Laden (qtd by Schahill, 2011). He continued saying “American troops coming across the border and taking action in one of our towns…is not acceptable to the people of Pakistan”(qtd by Schahill, 2011).

Additionally, this reinforces the terrorist group’s rhetoric that the host government is too weak and inefficient to protect its people from the violence of US intervention. It also portrays the host government as conspiring with the West against their own population, all of which can lead to the host government losing control of their people and their territory to the terrorist or insurgent group.

Conclusion on JSOC kill and capture campaigns: Prior to addressing the compatibility question, this case study assessed the legality, transparency, and efficiency of JSOC kill and capture campaigns.

Additionally, it analyzed the short- versus long-term successes and repercussions of their use. Since information about JSOC operations is classified, it remains a challenge to conclude how effective they actually are. JSOC kill and capture campaigns have killed key leaders and disrupted safe havens. However, in discussing their long-term effects, it is evident that many of them are detrimental to our goals in the region. With regards to the United States government’s counterinsurgency guidelines discussed earlier, this case study concludes that while JSOC operations have yielded short-term successes, their long-term repercussions are counterproductive to the Obama administration’s main components, values, and end goals.

JSOC kill and capture campaigns work against the five main components projected by the Obama administration in “The Counterinsurgency Guide” as essential to successful counterinsurgency in the region (“The Counterinsurgency Guide”, 2009). Unlike drone strikes, kill and capture operations do not have a direct negative effect on the economic and development component. However, the campaigns work against the security and information components, as the United States is no longer seen as securing the population from insurgent violence, but rather terrorizing them. Therefore, the population is less likely

MIRETTE MORCOS to cooperate with US forces in finding the insurgents hiding among them, but is more likely to (passively or actively) support the insurgent groups.

The political component is essential to the stability of the region, and is one of the most important aspects of counterinsurgency doctrine at large. However, overreliance on the kill and capture campaigns prevents the possibility of achieving a political end goal; due to rise in tensions between the host government and the United States, as well as lack of cooperation from the population. Consequently, this undermines the control component, as both the US forces, and the host government, lose control of the population and the territory to the insurgent groups. Furthermore, much like drone strikes, the excessive utilization of kill and capture campaigns violates United States’ core values discussed in the “National Strategy for Counterterrorism” such as, respect of the rule of law, valuing human rights, and balancing security and transparency (“National Strategy for Counterterrorism”, 2009). This is problematic because if the United States is seen as unabiding to these core values, it becomes increasingly difficult to hold other countries accountable for their actions and violations of core values. Furthermore, the alienation of the host government through the excessive use of kill and capture campaigns works against “The Quadrennial Defense Review”, which advocates for “ building partnership capacity, especially in fragile states” (“Quadrennial Defense Review”, 2014).

In noting “The Counterinsurgency Guide”, which points to an “improved governance that brings marginalization of the insurgents to the points of destruction or at least reduction” (“The Counterinsurgency Guide,” 2009), it is evident that the excessive use of JSOC kill and capture campaigns is counterproductive to the main goals in the region. Furthermore, kill and capture campaigns have resulted in many negative consequences such as undermining state sovereignties, hindering regional and international cooperation, and failing to reduce support for the terrorist and insurgent groups.

VI. Conclusion This research assessed counterterrorism tactics, such as drone strikes in undeclared warzones and JSOC kill and capture campaigns, in order to answer the ongoing question of whether counterterrorism and counterinsurgency doctrines can ever be compatible.

The research concludes that these counterterrorism tactics have been proven effective in getting rid of key leaders and militants. However, in understanding

COUNTERTERRORISM & COUNTERINSURGENCY the importance of long-term consequences and successes, the research concludes that overreliance on counterterrorism tactics is counterproductive to the long-term goals of counterinsurgency in the region and to maintaining international security. Keeping in mind the extreme opposition to the overutilization of drone strikes and kill and capture campaigns by the affected populations, host governments, and the region as a whole, it remains difficult to project longterm political successes for the operations.

While both doctrines agree on the killing of key leaders and militants, counterinsurgency seeks a long-term political solution to the conflict by addressing political grievances and root causes. This can be done by working towards diminishing the population’s support for the insurgents, rather than focusing on physically eliminating the enemy (Nagl, 2002).

Therefore, as Kilcullen suggests, counterinsurgency operations should proceed with caution so as to not alienate the population in the process of eradicating the enemy (Kilcullen, 2009). This type of approach can address the political solutions needed to defeat the insurgencies in the region, and is different from counterterrorism, which has no political end goal, but seeks the physical destruction of the enemy as its primary goal. The inherent difference of the end goals between both doctrines makes their compatibility difficult, but not impossible.

Moving forward with counterinsurgency policy, it is important to understand that counterinsurgency is not against the use of force tactics, but rather the overreliance on them and their consequential negative effects. Therefore, precise and limited utilization of force tactics is essential in eradicating militants without yielding negative consequences. The task of balancing the appropriate use of force tactics with the goal of furthering political objectives was never considered the purview of the military, or the magical equation for a successful war. However, any success of the war on terror will be reliant on just that balance.

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COUNTERTERRORISM & COUNTERINSURGENCY

Mirette Morcos

Mirette Morcos is a Senior Political Science major. She conducted her senior thesis on the compatibility of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts. She is starting a PhD Program in International Relations at University of California, Irvine in the fall. Her career focus is to become a professor.

Email: mirette.morcos@yahoo.com

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Human Rights: Are universal human rights laws globally applicable to combat cultural pathways that lead to modern day slavery?

Sumaya Bamakhrama California State Polytechnic University, Pomona There is an ongoing debate between universalism and relativism, which highlights the neverending dilemma regarding absolute morality versus cultural relativism. These theories complicate political stances regarding universal laws against modern day slavery and raise questions about whether or not universal human rights laws are truly universal in their nature, or if they are an example of western imperialism, in which a set of western laws are forced upon non-western populations who may not want to abide by them. Although both universalists and relativists agree that slavery is morally wrong, there is a gray area in the definition of slavery in which cultural practices become an obstacle to defining and targeting modern day slavery cases. Using the current objective definitions of slavery, modern day slavery, freedom, coercion, and consent, this paper examines cases which represent a gray area in the definition of modern day slavery: child labour, child brides, arranged and forced marriages, the male guardianship system, and the sponsorship system. This study also analyzes the actual underlying factors that led to these practices in order to conclude whether it is indeed a cultural practice and therefore should be protected from outside interference, or an attempt to exploit persons under the umbrella of “culture.” Finally, this paper concludes that universal human rights laws are not globally applicable in their nature. Therefore a holistic approach geared toward considering different aspects, such as countries’ cultural practices, is needed in order to appropriately combat the cultural pathways that lead to modern day slavery.

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n an unstable world and with the current humanitarian crisis of Syrian refugees, we witness new sets of dilemmas that make us question our basic values. Last year in 2016, waves of refugees reached Europe after fleeing war zones, which exposed the European countries to conflicts concerning human rights laws.

For example, young married girls under the age of 18

were arriving with their spouses and kids. In such cases, “The question is one of rights and protections - but which? When authorities stop minors cohabiting with their older spouses, are they combating child abuse or breaking up (often already traumatized) families?”

(BBC News, 2016) These incidents are currently rising because of the cultural backlashes, and this issue makes us ask: Which unit do we value more to pro-

Created by Sumaya Salah Bamakhrama, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona for her seinior thesis project. Correspondence concerning this research paper should be addressed to Sumaya Salah Bamakhrama, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, (909) 263-6730. Email: sumaya. bamakhrama@gmail.com Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2017. Pp. 148–164.

©2017, Political Science Department, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

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tect, the individual or the family? For some people, the answer might be easy, and they would say that all individuals must follow the laws within the countries they are located, which also should entail universal human rights laws. However, when it comes to personal beliefs or cultural practices, the question becomes more complicated. According to BBC News (2016), “The DIS cited Denmark’s ‘international obligations’ as the trigger for its policy change, concluding that enforcing separate living quarters would violate the UN’s Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to one’s ‘private and family life.’” The current refugee crisis demonstrates the importance and urgency of the dilemma that requires our instant action regarding the universality and appropriateness of human rights laws.

However, the ongoing debate between universalism and relativism, which highlights the never-ending puzzle regarding absolute morality versus cultural relativism, complicates the political stances regarding universal laws against some cultural practices that are considered modern day slavery. This conflict raises questions about whether or not universal human rights laws are truly universal in their nature.

This paper examines the cases of child labour, child brides, arranged and forced marriages, the male guardianship system, and the sponsorship system because they fall under the umbrella of cultural norms and beliefs, which make them represent a gray area of modern day slavery. This gray area tends to be protected and supported by its people since it has different underlying factors for its occurrence. Therefore, we cannot ignore it or classify it under the concept of modern day slavery without fully grasping it. Our understanding for this analysis would allow us to judge if these practices are indeed cultural and the universal human rights laws protect them, or if the laws interfere with them and prioritize certain values over others.

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Literature Review and Definitions: No matter who we are, what background we come from, or other characteristics that define us, the international community from December 10, 1948 committed itself to protecting human rights for all of us by creating the international human rights law. For all countries who are part of the treaty, it is their duty to respect and follow that law. The Foundation of International Human Rights Law “represents the universal recognition that basic rights and fundamental freedoms are inherent to all human beings, inalienable and equally applicable to everyone, and that every one of us is born free and equal in dignity and rights” (The United Nations (UN), 1948). This foundation that discusses freedoms and rights introduces a major argument about the theory of universalism and also poses the question: Are there universal freedoms and rights?

According to universalists, human rights have been practiced throughout history and every individual was born with certain dignities and rights despite their backgrounds, such as culture, religion, or identity. In Daum’s article (2011), he discusses the idea that each person has an universal ability to think critically and consequently make a rational decision; he also believes that universal rights should be adopted by all nations regardless of their cultural diversity because they are not imperialist tools being used to exert their power. In this school of thought, it is believed that there should be an unified agreement about human rights even if individuals are capable of thinking, making decisions, or belonging to different cultures. Zechenter (1997) argues that human rights are obvious and are within the limits of a person’s dignity. Ignatieff (2001) adds that by discussing that human rights are universal and arguably most of the communities around the globe have practiced them throughout their history. Universalism asserts that each individual has certain inalienable rights for being human. They set these standards by applying

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost, all praise to Allah by whom’s blessings all good deeds are accomplished.

My very sincere gratitude goes out to my supportive family who have always believed in me.

Additionally, a special thanks goes for the Ministry of Higher Education in Saudi Arabia which provided me with the opportunity to pursue my educational career.

Last but not least, I would like to express my appreciation for my advisor, Dr. Marc Scarcelli for his insightful comments and encouragement.

150 clear definitions and objective human rights that are free from the chains of religion, culture, value systems, or ideology.

However, universalists agree that individual moral values are different, and each person has a right to make a decision on what he or she should believe in (Zechenter, 1997). It is important to keep in mind and take into consideration culture, politics, religion, gender, age, or nationality. Nevertheless, basic human rights should be the same everywhere because human beings are the same. The opposing concept of universalism is cultural relativism, and it is believed to be a concept that undermines international human rights law. Donnelly (2007) mentions that relativism is a challenge that cannot be avoided or justified; human rights laws should be respected and followed under all circumstances, and they cannot be violated under the name of culture, religion, politics, or any other relativism theory. He also adds that cultural relativism is very dangerous for the effective application of international human rights since it basically links human rights to customs and traditions (Donnelly, 1984). If international human rights were connected and based on individuals’ beliefs, this would defeat the whole purpose of having a unified universal law and would allow for people to justify the violations of human rights by their personal practices. Renteln (1985) discusses cultural relativism in relation to human rights; relativism is a huge hindrance to universal human rights. In most societies where there is relativism, for instance in Asia, there is often a gross violation of human rights. This conflict is one of the fears that universalists try to avoid because it makes it easier for societies to use the concept of cultural norms to justify their actions and culture is a changeable concept that differs from time to time. However, universal human rights should be stable and equal at all times. For these reasons, universalism is in conflict with relativism when it comes to international human rights law.

In a different field of thought, the theory of ethical relativism which includes the concept of cultural relativism is based on the idea that principles are valid in relation to cultures and personal beliefs. Relativists argue that what determines morals and basic principles are the different backgrounds and cultures: “What is considered morally right and wrong varies from society to society, so that there are no moral principles accepted by all societies; and a dependency thesis, which specifies that all moral principles derive their validity from cultural acceptance” (Audi, 1995, p. 790). They believe that nothing like universal truths and moral principles could be applied globally at all times even if there are core and basic

SUMAYA BAMAKHRAMA principles that everyone agrees on universally. However, Donnelly (1984) talks about cultural relativists who believe that culture is the main source of validity of any moral rule or right; in addition, they believe that moral rules function within the limits of a moral community. Thus, the major concept and its core is that there are no universal morals or truths that can be enforced in each society because cultures, religions, and beliefs are the origins that construct morals and truths.

Unlike universalism, this theory is all about considering and respecting cultural beliefs and religions when making any decisions or creating any law.

Renteln (1988) also discusses the concept of human rights by bringing up the argument that human rights never existed in ancient civilizations, and according to him, non-Western moral systems should not have universal rights. He adds that the discussion between universal laws and relativism is portrayed as a never-ending topic in the legal world, and the main issue of discussion is whether human rights are universal in their application and nature or whether they are relative to religious and cultural backgrounds (Renteln, 1988). Relativists do not agree that human rights were practiced in history, which for them indicates that they are not compatible with people’s cultures and beliefs. For this reason, it is believed that human rights are standardized Western ideologies that are being enforced for all people and nations. As Nickel (2002) argues, human rights are viewed as a tool being used by the imperialists to dominate the world and they mask themselves behind this universal language called human rights; relativism asserts that values vary in a great deal depending on different cultural perspectives. This imposing of ideas is the main fear that relativists are concerned about- an universal language or law that could control and dominate other cultures. The core of the cultural relativism theory is the respect and protection of each cultural idea, norm, or belief. Having an universal law, for relativists, means that all our agreements and understanding will be united under the same concepts and definitions, which eliminates the idea of cultural diversity. Skinner (2009) discusses that in some cultures, for instance, human rights defenders and activists are branded as Western imperialists who are violating societal norms, and this limits the application of these universal fundamental rights. It is believed that human rights law is influenced by the Western ideologies, beliefs, and thoughts without having any consideration for other societies, which makes relativists concerned about which laws matter the most and whose laws apply.

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Even though relativists believe that the source of morals, values, and truths stem from culture, they could face a huge challenge and dilemma because cultural norms and beliefs are not stable and change with time. Nickel (2002) discusses that the ideology perceives culture as something that is stable and cannot be changed, but culture is very dynamic and flexible; these aspect of culture provide a huge challenge for those who argue in favor of relativism. With all this in mind, they concluded by agreeing that there are no universal morals or truths that can be applied globally.

In regard to the dilemma of modern day slavery, applying these schools of thoughts is very challenging and complex. The universal truth that both universalists and relativists agree upon is that slavery is morally wrong and against any beliefs. However, when we talk about the gray area where it is hard to apply the definition of slavery because of the cultural practices that justify it, the two theories get into a deep disagreement. For universalists, it is hard to deal with the issue of modern day slavery without setting clear, solid definitions and laws that apply to everyone in every nation, but of course, this would contradict the concept of cultural relativism. In the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 4 states that, â&#x20AC;&#x153;No one should be held in slavery or servitude, slavery in all of its forms should be eliminatedâ&#x20AC;? (UN, 1948, art. 4). Everyone agrees on this principle because the concept of slavery in itself is perceived as immoral in every culture. However, universalists believe that allowing for cultural relativism to influence the laws in actuality creates the gray area of modern day slavery because certain cultures and nations will justify their abuse of human rights under the name of norms and beliefs. Donnelly (2007) analyzes the concept of universal laws and relativism in relation to human rights and he concludes that in many societies, social interactions are regulated by traditional norms, which could lead to the abuse of human rights.

In contrast, relativists argue that the underlying effects that cause this abuse of human rights are not related to the culture, religion, or beliefs, but to the wrong interpretations of them and to the exploitation of the cultural concepts. Polisi (2011) explores the practicability of cultural relativism as a tool of enhancing the marginalization and degradation of women in certain societies, and he concludes by highlighting human rights violations committed against women and a justification that they are not related to culture. Thus, the understanding of cultures would give a better perspective of the different practices and that insight should narrow and clear the gray area of conflict in regard to certain practices that

151 are being described as modern day slavery. Nevertheless, universalists oppose this and say that since cultures and norms are changeable with time, it is hard to understand them or place laws based on them.

Craig (2010) discusses another relativist view, which is the contribution of globalization and universalization to the development of different forms of modern day slavery and that they are the factors under this problem. The argument is that globalization and universalization are what opened the new doors for human trafficking and other human rights abuse issues so solving the problem by creating a universal law is not an adequate solution.

All in all, universal law and relativism have a dilemma when it comes to international protection of human rights. Skinner (2008) says that trafficking and slavery attracts a global attention and debate in different political, social, legal and educational circles, for he concludes by saying, to end this global slavery dilemma, there should be some objectiveness. This debate between the two different theories concerning the cultural pathways that lead to modern slavery raises many questions. For example, is there actually a real problem in regard to whose laws apply? Can we reach an objective agreement? Is the objectiveness of the human rights law questionable or is the law actually universal in its nature? Can cultural norms and beliefs justify the abuse of human rights?

To reach a solid conclusion about these questions, we need to examine the current definitions and laws in regard to specific examples and situations of what is considered a gray area in modern day slavery. This would allow us to see if these definitions enforce new ideologies into some cultures or if the concept of culture is being used to justify these practices that abuse human rights. Finally, it would allow us to judge if universal human rights law is globally applicable to combat cultural pathways that lead to modern day slavery dilemmas.

Before answering any of these questions, we have to lay the foundation and agree on a set of current objective definitions. This objectiveness would make the process of analyzing and examining each of the issues easier and more understandable. This would be important in understanding how the cultural gray area of modern day slavery formed even if later in the discussion we might see that not every culture actually agrees on each of these definitions and relativists might support that.

According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), modern day slavery is considered to be: The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat

152 or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation (UN, 2016b).

Committing any of these actions, no matter what the motive or justification, is would be considered a violation of Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that prohibits slavery, which the UNESCO defines as “an element of ownership or control over another’s life, coercion and the restriction of movement and by the fact that someone is not free to leave or to change an employer”(UN, 2016b). To be very clear, the word “coercion” in the definition means “the practice of persuading someone to do something by using force or threats”, and the word “free” is from the concept of freedom that means “the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants without hindrance or restraint” (Oxford Dictionary, 2017a,b).

In a related matter to modern day slavery, understanding what or who is a child becomes very crucial because it intertwines with many cultural gray areas such as labour and marriage. Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as: “A person below the age of 18, unless the laws of a particular country set the legal age for adulthood younger. The Committee on the Rights of the Child, the monitoring body for the convention, has encouraged States to review the age of majority if it is set below 18 and to increase the level of protection for all children under 18” (UN, 1989, art.1). Knowing the right age that defines a child matters in many

SUMAYA BAMAKHRAMA ways when we come to the conversation about child labour, and child labour is actually defined as: work that deprives children of their childhood, their potential and their dignity, and that is harmful to physical and mental development… In its most extreme forms, child labour involves children being enslaved, separated from their families, exposed to serious hazards and illnesses and/or left to fend for themselves on the streets of large cities – often at a very early age (“What is child labour”, n.d.).

Marriage is also another concept that is interpreted differently depending on cultures, religions, or beliefs. To avoid any misunderstanding, I will utilize the United Nations’ definition, which is “The act, ceremony or process by which the legal relationship of husband and wife is constituted. The legality of the union may be established by civil, religious or other means as recognized by the laws of each country” (UN, 2016a). In other definitions of marriage we see the word “consent” appears often; it is defined according to Oxford’s Dictionary as, “The permission for something to happen or agreement to do something” (2017c). All these definitions face many different interpretations and manipulations to serve different actions and this controversy allows for the wrong justifications of certain practices.

With all this in mind, the legal world has witnessed a lot of discussion between universalism and relativism. Universal laws are rules which govern our conduct as human beings and they are considered to be most legitimate. They are also universal in application, translation and acceptance. On the other hand, relativism is a theory that asserts that human knowledge is relative to the nature of the mind and that ethical truths largely depend on the type of group and individuals holding them.

Using the objective definitions provided, this paper will be analyzing and examining a number of practices that are believed to be a type of modern day slavery to identify if universal human rights law is in its nature globally applicable, if there is any manipulation and exploitation of the concept of culture and religion, or if culture is an actual threat causing a pathway to slavery. This study will focus on some of the most controverSlavery impacts every region of the globe, but nowhere is the problem so acute as it is in the Asia-Pacific region.

Source: https://www.globalslaveryindex. org/findings/

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sial issues that have some gray area to them where drawing the line becomes hard and unclear. This will allow us to judge if it is acceptable to have a universal law or if cultural ideas and beliefs should be taken in consideration while creating the law. Establishing what the universal human rights laws entail and the complexity that arise from these laws will allow us to understand and clarify our upcoming studies.

Universal Human Rights Laws: When referring to universal human rights laws, we are actually referencing “The International Bill of Human Rights [that] consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols” (UN, 1996).

The base of all universal human rights is the concept that all human beings have one fundamental inherent basic right; “They set forth everyday rights such as the right to life, equality before the law, freedom of expression, the rights to work, social security and education. Together with the UDHR, the Covenants comprise the International Bill of Human Rights” (UN, “The Foundation”, 1948). With time the treaties became more specific and focused to include and protect more rights “addressing concerns such as racial discrimination, torture, enforced disappearances, disabilities, and the rights of women, children, migrants, minorities, and indigenous peoples” (UN, “The Foundation”, 1948). These basic rights are binding to all countries that ratified them. However, due to the concept of state sovereignty, there is no clear mechanism on how to enforce these laws by the international community. Yet the way these laws work in protecting our rights is by expecting those countries to respect the laws, fulfill the obligations that come with them, and to take actions to put these laws in effect.

Universal human rights laws were formed on the ground which assumes that we all think the same way and have the same beliefs, missing a fundamental and crucial element that we cannot ignore, which is cultural ideologies. As Renteln (1988) explains: The presupposition is that individuals stripped of their cultural and political heritage would be pure rational beings and would thus dutifully select liberal democratic principles of justice. The premise that individuals could negotiate for fundamental principles in the absence of culture is quite fantastic. And this is precisely the root of the problem: underlying the presumption of universality is the belief that all peoples think in a

153 similar fashion (p. 349).

Cultures are patterns which are derived from certain beliefs that people practiced and embedded in their lives for generations until they became the norm for their societies. Cultural beliefs concept is considered the underlying factor for many different practices and ideologies in different cultures. This consent indicates that the current universal human rights laws are influenced by Western societies’ practices and ideologies, which are culturally based; “Western philosophers in particular seem to be prone to projecting their moral categories on others. As a consequence, the presumption of universality is deeply ingrained in Western moral philosophy” (Renteln, 1988, p. 349).

Western inspirations and influence had a predominant part in setting universal human rights laws and excluding other cultures. These laws were meant to include universal morals, ethics, and rights; however, this is not the case, and they actually tend to be more Western because “the Third World did not participate in great numbers when it was drafted”(Renteln, 1988, p. 351). Due to this exclusion, current laws now evolve around western values than any other societies: In an article entitled ‘Human Rights: A Non-Western Viewpoint,’ Sinha argues that the current formulation of human rights contains three elements which reflect Western values: One, the fundamental unit of society is the individual, not the family. Two, the primary basis for securing human existence in society is through rights, not duties. Three, the primary method of securing rights is through legalism where- under rights are claims and adjudicated upon, not reconciliation, repentance, or education (Renteln, 1985, p. 517).

The clarification of the contrasted beliefs and values within the laws creates a gray area and a major dilemma on whose laws should be applied. As humans and cultures we tend to believe that there is absolute morality and in all monotheistic religions, the concepts of good versus bad or right versus wrong actually exist. Nonetheless, we still do not agree on what is, in fact, right or wrong; what your culture or belief considers good or right, my culture or belief could consider bad or wrong even though we both agree that the two concepts of right and wrong exist. Thus, one view, Western, being enforced universally among all humans will face many challenges and backlashes. According to Ignatieff (2001), “Rights doctrines arouse powerful opposition because they challenge powerful religions, family structures, authoritarian states, and tribes… Thus universality cannot imply universal assent, since in a world of unequal power, the only propositions that the powerful and powerless

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would agree on would be entirely toothless and anyone” (p. 109).

Child Labour: Childhood is very treasured in all civilizations and cultures; we tend to protect it and give it considerable attention. However, in our current time it is threatened by the problem of child labour. “In India, In agrarian societies, child labour is not viewed as exploitive, but rather emblem[for example], the problem of child atic of positive cultural values. Source: https://fee.org/resources/child-labor-waslabour is quite alarming. It is said wiped-out-by-markets-not-government/ that roughly out of 5 children below the age of 14 years, one child is labourer which means 20 per cent children are work is a tool of survival. In such desperate circumlabourer’s.” (Maurya, 2001, p. 493). As mentioned stances, families resort to sending their children to before, child labour in its extremes could also fall work or the kids will fall into a deeper poverty and under the area of slavery because it involves deprivwill not find any path of survival because the parents ing children of their basic needs and exploiting their are not able to provide for them. Dutta states, “in a vulnerability to receive payments or benefits. Even [country] like India … over 40% of the population is though most of the international community agree on still living under the poverty line. Therefore, poverty the Convention on the Rights of the Child, we still may be identified as the chief cause that force chilsee violations and abuse of the child worldwide withdren to work. It is [in fact] the financial backwardness out anyone’s intervention, which makes it clear that of the parents that forced their children to work. In there is still a loophole or an element missing in the many poor families, children are treated as a source universal laws that is preventing us from combating of income by their parents.” (1987). This observation such practices. regarding poverty is very accurate due to the fact that One of the factors that complicates this issue and we do not tend to see working children in rich and makes it hard for us to approach is the actual age of wealthy communities and these parents who choose a child. In most Western countries the legal age of to put their kids in to work believe that work will lead a child is under 18, but in other countries the age their children to provide them with a better future. of adulthood is below 18. Since we do not have a If the international community tried to combat this universal stable age of a child, we might consider a phenomenon of child labour with the current univerteen, who is recognized as an adult in some counsal human rights laws, they could potentially worsen tries, a working child. The level of maturity that dethe situation since these laws do not take into account fines an adult differs in many cultures; for example, any of the actual motives that fuel the need for this a 16 or 17-year-old person in Yemen is considered practice. Moreover, under the Convention on the a full-grown person who can take full responsibility Rights of the Child, it is stated that, “The best interand work to provide for the family, unlike in Westests of children must be the primary concern in makern countries. Another factor, in countries like India, ing decisions that may affect them. All adults should China, Pakistan, or Yemen, it is the duty to help those do what is best for children. When adults make dewho are elders and be part of the family business from cisions, they should think about how their decisions a young age; “‘In most agrarian societies, children’s will affect children” (UN, 1989, part.3). Parents who work is not only highly prized for its economic utility send their children to work refer to the same concept but as representing the highest ideals of the culture, in the article of the convention, which attempts to viz. obedience, respect, or filial piety. Serving those protect children and justify their decision in sendabove one in the domestic hierarchy of age statuses ing their children to work. As we saw child labour is conceptualized as moral duty, often as a sacred obis a necessary evil for many kids, but solely coming ligation’” (Renteln, 1988, p. 360). This cultural obliup with a law that bans it completely could actually gation could be misunderstood sometimes as a form cause more damage and backlash. According to Rentof child labour, when in fact it is a cultural and relieln (1988), “to say that A has the right to X, is to say gious belief in some societies. Moreover, in the most that B has a duty to insure that A can, in fact, obtain extreme situations letting and persuading children to X.” (p. 344); this theory of rights and duties applies

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to child labour and universal laws in the context that the Western ideas enforced in these laws assume that these working kids will, in fact, obtain their rights if they stopped working, without understanding that they might actually lose more rights or basic needs.

However, child labour in most cases is defended under the idea of culture or survival, which makes it hard for universal human rights laws to combat.

Universal laws do not tackle any cultural practices or beliefs, which allow for exploiters to justify all their violations under this umbrella of culture. To understand the practice of child labour better, we need to identify and classify it into different types if it is harming or preventing the development of the child, if the parents are receiving money in return for their kids’ services, or if these kids desire to work or were they forced. Adding these elements of clarification and classification to the laws and making them relative to each situation would allow us as an international community to combat this practice of child labour without worsening the circumstances.

Child Brides: The exploitation of a child could be in numerous different ways other than just labour; From the same problem of uncertainty, regarding the age of the child, many other serious issues are derived, such as child brides and forced marriages. These outrageous practices of underage and forced marriages intertwine greatly and could easily be hidden under the cultural or religious beliefs’ category, especially since the act of marriage in most cases establishes its legality by religious means. As discussed before, these practices are rapidly increasing these days due to the refugee crisis and the unstable war zone regions causing huge international tension; “In 2003, the International Centre for Research on Women estimated that more than 51 million girls under 18 years were married and they expected the figure to rise to over 100 million within the next 10 years” (Thomas, 2009, p. 3). Such practices actually fall under the definition of slavery because parents put themselves in a position to make decisions for their children; their action would be classified under controlling of another venerable human being, which is part of the definition for slavery. In addition, “Forced and early marriage deprives women and young girls of their basic human rights”, and this deprivation is a clear violation of international human rights laws (Thomas, 2009, p. 2).

Even though there are many strict laws to protect human rights and the child, there are loopholes that allow for such practices like child marriages to

155 be widely performed, which implies that these laws are not appropriately formed. In many cultures the practice of child marriages is justified in many ways; for example, in some scenarios the child is in a place where marriage is a tool of survival just like the case with child labour. Poverty or instability would lead some parents to choose such decisions for their kids thinking it is better for them; “As refugees, Syrian families are reliant on dwindling resources and are lacking economic opportunities. At the same time, they are all too aware of the need to protect their daughters from the threat of sexual violence” (BBC news, 2016). In such harsh circumstances families resort to such practices to protect their young girls from severe poverty for instance, which complicates the issue of child brides for the international community to combat because it raises the dilemma of which rights are more valued to protect. Another justification for this act would be religious beliefs; “Many marriages in Uzbekistan are purely religious and not legally registered. This is, in part, because religious ceremonies allow for under-aged women to be married as well for polygamy” (Thomas, 2009, p. 13).

In most Islamic cultures people refer to the underage marriage as an accepted practice under the name of the religion, but this argument has many sides to it and it is not as simple as it may seem. Muslims follow and refer to the holy book, which is the Quran, and the prophet Muhammad’s, peace be upon him, orders in everything they do under the name of religion mixing what exactly were, in fact, religiously accepted acts with cultural practices that were accepted at the prophet’s time and era. Historically, in Arab societies, the marriageable age was very young and it was accepted as a cultural norm; for this reason we see why the prophet, peace be upon him, married a young female in that era. However, religious extremists did not distinguish between what was a cultural norm at the time with what they consider a religious act approved by the prophet. Since Muslims also believe that the Quran and the prophet’s orders are not a living document or texts, some do not try to understand or adapt to the change in culture, ignoring the fact that culture actually is a changeable concept. All of this misunderstanding and interpretation of old religious versus cultural practices makes it hard to combat this problem of child brides since some people genuinely believe that it is part of their beliefs. Furthermore, what people would use to justify the practice of underage marriages other than religion would be cultural beliefs such as in Uzbekistan; “As one Uzbek woman explained: ‘My daughter is 16. My husband says that he is not going to give her in marriage before she is 20. ...[but] we won’t succeed because

156 people are starting to criticize – how can you keep a girl home for so long? It’s a terrible thing and then suddenly no one will propose. Here, the sooner she’s out of your hands what comes later no longer worries us’” (Thomas, 2009, p. 9, comments in original). In this country the legal age of marriage is 17, but the people there have their own norms of marrying their girls at a young age. Applying an international law to such culture could cause more harm to its girls instead of protecting them. Thus, universal human rights laws should be written in a way that takes in consideration the consequences and cultural backlashes of their application.

In addition, in Yemen, for example, marriage is an outlet for many teen girls who are restricted from doing basic feminine practices, such as applying makeup, because they are considered just for married women to perform. In scenarios like this young girls willingly give consent to get married just so they can have other basic rights. However, this type of consent should not be valid or accepted since kids at a young age are not capable of giving a reliable consent that demonstrates their full understanding of all the

SUMAYA BAMAKHRAMA obligations that come with it, and here the international community would be able to interfere. Underage marriage is protected and practiced under many cultural and religious beliefs, which complicates the stance against it, and it makes it hard to distinguish when it is indeed cultural practice or just exploitation of the circumstances and hiding it under the cultural umbrella. Thus, to combat this dilemma we need to differentiate between what is culture and what is exploitation of it, which makes the act falls under slavery. For instance, in the Muslim Middle Eastern and Christian North African countries there is a common practice, due to religious beliefs, that requires the husband to pay a certain amount of money to his future wife, which is called “Mahr” in Islam, “but in marriages between two adults …, it has less significance and is usually channeled through practical arrangements … In poor areas, however, where child marriage is most prevalent, the dowry becomes of great importance. It turns into a one-way transaction, a clear-cut payment” (Mikhail, 2002, p. 44). If we were able to understand how the religious practice actually applied, we will be able to point out easily

Abu Shouk: (left to right) Sisters Nana and Zakia Abdulrahman Mohamed Ahmed.Nana, 16 years old, got married when she was only 13 years old, and she had to stop going to the school. She is also working in the farms outside El Fasher, North Darfur, and she has no money to continue her studies. Zakia, 20 years old, was married in 2010, when she was only 17 years old. Her family arranged the marriage, but she never saw her husband until she got divorced due to the threats of her husband’s second wife, currently living in Khartoum with him. She also works in farms outside El Fasher and she stays in her grandfather house. Photo by Albert González Farran, 13 December 2012. UNAMID

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what could be slavery, and this distinction is going to help with combating the problem. Also, as discussed before, this type of marriage is considered a tool of survival and protection in many cases; “Analysts say early marriage is often carried out in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey by families trying to protect girls from poverty or sexual exploitation.

Elsewhere, poor families might marry off their young daughters in exchange for dowries” (BBC, 2016).

Even though in such scenarios child brides are tools to lift families of poverty, we cannot allow for such practices to become prevalent because it is clearly a form of slavery where there is exchange of a human being for money. When there is a clear-cut exchange of money and exploitation of the vulnerability of girls, the act must never be justified under any circumstances.

All in all, poverty might be a great underlying factor that leads people to exploit the cultural practice of underage marriage and turn it into a form of slavery. Therefore, combating poverty would be a better solution for these families than marrying their young children. Cheryl Thomas (2009) states, “While forced and early marriages are becoming increasingly less common among the wealthiest sectors of society in all regions of the world, they are most common still in Africa and South Asia, but also persist in certain areas of CEE/FSU and other parts of the world” (p.

3). Hence, we need to focus on educating and lifting these poor families from poverty to understand better where to eliminate such practice. Moreover, the age of a child must be taken in consideration when dealing with different cultures and societies.

Arranged and Forced Marriages: For a marriage to be valid it needs to follow its definition which requires clear consent from both parties. To start the discussion about arranged and forced marriages we need to understand the different types of marriages first. There is a very thin line between arranged and forced marriages that requires greater attention in discussion. Penn (2011) states, “There are broadly two main types of marriage systems globally. The first are the ‘love’ marriages that dominate Western nations such as the United States and those in Europe. The second involves ‘arranged’ marriages. These are dominant in many parts of Asia and Africa” (p. 637). These two types are practiced worldwide and follow the definition of marriage, which makes them legitimate. Hence, we cannot be

157 against one of them or classify arranged marriage as “wrong”, especially since it is related to a certain cultural practice. However, we often confuse arranged marriages, which are acceptable, with forced marriages which fall under the definition of slavery. The difference between them is that arranged marriages “begin with a match-making process in which the spouses are chosen for one another by third parties to the marriage such as parents or elder relatives”, but forced marriage is “a marriage in which at least one of the spouses, whether by reason of physical, emotional or psychological pressure, did not give consent to be married” (Enright, 2009, p. 331). As we see, there is a clear distinction in the definitions, but these two types of marriages intertwine and overlap, which complicates the problem when we try to identify and handle them separately. Unlike arranged marriages, forced ones fall directly under the concept of slavery since there is coercion, lack of consent, and a complete control over someone’s life. Aptel (2016) asserts, “Forced marriage may amount to a form of slavery, when married children are subjected to conditions which meet the definitions of slavery and slavery like practices” (p. 316-317). Withal, this type of marriage is still prevalent in many parts of the world because people tend to wrongfully cover it under the concept of culture or sometimes religion.

Therefore, we must be able to differentiate between what is culture or religion and what is exploitation of them because forced marriages must never be accepted and should be combated worldwide.

The concept of marriage has various sacred components to it which are different in each society and religion, and we should respect that without enforcing one universal type. Arranged marriages are, indeed, a respected type of marriage that is highly regarded in many cultures, but Westerners do not tend to recognize it as an acceptable type because it does not follow their way of marriage. According to Penn (2011) “[sociologists] have argued that relationships premised on notions of romantic love and mutual emotional support have come to typify the ‘late modern world.’ Such ideas represent an extension of earlier convergence theory with its emphasis on the spread of ‘modern’ values such as love, romance and independence…” ( p. 637). If the universal laws are not accepting arranged marriages as a legitimate type of marriage, then we cannot say that these laws are universal in their nature and applying them universally would not be appropriate. Especially, when some cultures do not regard love marriages as a respected or strong based marriage; In addition, “Generally, love is considered a weak basis for marriage because its presence may overshadow suitable qualities in spous-

158 es. Therefore, arranged marriages result from more or less intense care given to the selection of suitable partners so that the family ideals, companionship, and co-parenthood can grow, leading to love” (Gupta, 1976, p. 77). Having different values and different views on a matter does not always make the act or the matter wrong. For, in order to appropriately enforce universal laws, we need to be more tolerant, understanding, and open for different cultural practices.

Some argue that forced marriage is accepted by some religions, so we cannot intervene to prevent the act; these accusations are not accurate, and those people are using the concept of religion to justify their acts. Let us examine the religion of Islam, for example, since many people associate the practice of forced marriage to it. Islam, like many religions, sanctifies the act of marriage and requires both spouses to consent and agree to it in order for the marriage to be valid, which makes it far from encouraging forced marriages. As Shaykh Ghisa (2005) says, “Islam regards marriage as a right of the individual and therefore others cannot make the decision for them.

If a woman OR man is forced into marriage then the marriage would not be valid and would therefore need to be cancelled.” The wrong association of this practice and Islam is very problematic because it makes the problem complicated to combat. It gives people the influence and perception that this act is approved and acceptable to practice by the name of the religion when in fact forced marriage is considered a sin in Islam. He adds, “one must also recognize that forced marriage is a problem occurring today and Islam condemns it to the highest degree. The issue of forced marriages is not one that is limited to some Muslims, but Hindus, Sikhs and other religions also acknowledge it as a problem” (Ghisa, 2005). Acknowledging that forced marriage is not approved by religion makes it easier to distinguish when marriage is done unlawfully and assures that it is appropriate for us to combat by setting universal laws against it without worrying that we are enforcing Western ideas on these cultures.

Male Guardianship: In a country like Saudi Arabia, every woman, no matter what her age or social status is, has a male guardian who controls her life and must approve of almost all critical decisions before she can do anything. The male guardian could be her father, husband, brother, or son, which could be very humiliating. A report that was conducted in 2016 by Human

SUMAYA BAMAKHRAMA Rights Watch (HRW) states: “Adult women must obtain permission from a male guardian to travel, marry, or exit prison. They may be required to provide guardian consent in order to work or access healthcare. Women regularly face difficulty conducting a range of transactions without a male relative, from renting an apartment to filing legal claims” (p. 1). This male guardian system falls greatly under what we call modern day slavery because there is the element of having control and ownership of someone else’s life and in some cases restriction of movement and more. In many cases, these male guardians exploited the authority that was given to them to gain money in return, and this exploitation leads to modern day slavery. For example, “Guardians have conditioned their consent for women to work or to travel on her paying him large sums of money” (HRW, 2016, p.

1-2). When women are put in such a controlled position, the door opens for those male guardians to benefit from this vulnerability. Moreover, for some males with this much power over someone else, they could exceed the limits of power and take the exploitation to new extremes.

Saudi Arabia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which claims “the States Parties to the International Covenants on Human Rights have the obligation to ensure the equal rights of men and women to enjoy all economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights…” (UN, 1988, p. 1).

With these obligations it means that Saudi Arabia is in violation of the Convention because the practice of male guardianship violates major human rights laws especially those of equality and human dignity. In the CEDAW, it is noted “ that the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women…” (UN, 1988, p. 1). It is clear that the male guardianship system discriminates against women and there is no equality between the two genders at all. It gives more power and authority to men, so they can have women under their control; this system also entails all parts of what we call “discrimination against women.” In Article 1 of the Convention, “the term ‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex …” (UN, 1988, p.

2). With this Convention and all these restrictions and laws, we still see this system of the male guardianship practiced and prevalent; hence, what is the reason behind it and why can we not combat it?

For many Muslims and Islamic countries the idea of the male guardian tends to be exploited and justified under the name of the religion, where the text

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gets interpreted differently according to whomever is interpreting it and what kind of ideologies they believe in; “Islamic scholars who support the imposition of male guardianship do so based on an ambiguous verse in the Quran. The verse states, ‘Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has given the one more [strength] than the other, and because they support them from their means’ (Quran 4:34)” (HRW, 2016, p. 13).The Quranic verse is not a clear verse, for it was explained and interpreted in different ways. Those Wahhabi, the most restrictive, religious extremist, always advocate to restrict women’s rights, and their opinions are rarely challenged because of the male dominant society in Saudi Arabia. These misinterpretations lead people to believe that this practice is indeed a religious act, which make many Muslims defend and protect it. However, “Islamic legal experts have argued that male guardianship as interpreted by Saudi Arabia misinterprets fundamental Quranic precepts and that male scholars have elevated guardianship over Quranic concepts like equality and respect between the sexes” (HRW, 2016, p. 13). Islam is a religion that promotes equality in numerous ways, so it is hard to understand and believe that it would promote such a system. If it was, in fact, religious and the interpretations accurate, why do we not see this system prevalent in other Islamic countries? Why is it just practiced as a religious concept in Saudi Arabia? Simply, the reason is that this system is not Islamic; “Religious scholars also challenge the interpretation, including a former Saudi judge who told Human Rights Watch that the country’s imposition of guardianship is not required

by Sharia…” (HRW, 2016, p. 5). The Quranic verse refers to extreme situations when a female needs protection and it becomes mandatory for the male to be there for her and protect her, but that does not imply that the male is in a higher place than the female.

Human Rights Watch also interviewed professors, Islamic feminists and a former Saudi judge who explained: According to the Sharia, there is no need for any guardian [for women], except when she travels in a risky situation… All the Sharia schools consider that women after adulthood … should be considered as an independent human being … royal orders and ministry orders talking about the permission of the guardian against the women … aren’t rooted in Sharia law (HRW, 2016, p. 14).

The extreme misinterpretation of the verse allows for this system to be a clear type of modern day slavery, and we must combat it regardless of all the religious or cultural concepts that people try to exploit.

The international community needs to cooperate with

159 moderates to understand when religion is being used to justify outrageous practices that are not religious in their nature. When these societies see that we respect and understand the concept of the male guardian in its accurate and religious context, they will appreciate our understanding and work with us to eliminate and combat the exploitive system. Universal laws should have room for moderate interpretation of religious texts that involve political policies in them; thus, everyone abides by these moderate interpretations, and we avoid falling in the gray area of modern day slavery by exploiting religions.

Sponsorship System: The Kafala or sponsorship system has a similar dichotomy to it, so it could look as if it is a cultural accepted practice or the norm in some societies, when in reality it is pure political exploitation that is covered under the idea of protecting identities. This sponsorship system is prevalent in a variety of forms, but its extreme appears mostly within the GCC countries. For example, “In Kuwait, migrant workers receive an entry visa and a residence permit only if a GCC citizen or a GCC institution employs them. The employer is also their sponsor. Sponsorship (kafala) requires the sponsor-employer (kafeel) to assume full economic and legal responsibility for the employee during the contract period” (Longva, 1999, p. 20).

Workers under such system are required to stay with the same sponsor for the whole duration of their time in the country, and in many cases they must solely work with their sponsor either if it is an individual or an institution. This system violates many international laws and conventions because of the way these workers are treated under the system; according to the Global Slavery Index (GSI) (2016): Workers facing conditions that may amount to those of slavery. These include work performed under the threat of penalty or deportation, deprivation of food, inadequate accommodation with limited or no privacy, physical confinement in the work location or labour camp severely restricting freedom of movement, misrepresentation and substitution of types and terms of work, confiscation of identity documents, non-payment, withholding and/or deductions from pay, and unsafe working conditions in extremely high temperatures. (p. 13 5) As we see, being involved in this system might cause degrading treatment of workers, and this type of treatment is a violation and against what is stated in Article 10 of the International Convention on the

160 Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families which states that there should be no inhumane treatment for any migrant worker (1990). In addition, this convention states in its Article 11 that compulsory labour should not be performed on migrant workers, which makes the sponsorship system unacceptable (UN, 1990, p. 5).

With all this in mind, the sponsorship system falls under the definition and concept of slavery simply because there is control over another person’s life, a sense of ownership, and restriction over movement especially among employers. Longva (1999) mentions that, “structural dependence is aggravated by a practice that constrains migrants’ freedom of movement. Throughout the GCC, expatriate workers are required to surrender their passports to their employers. The documents remain in the employer’s possession as long as the workers are in the country” (p. 21).

Most expatriate workers in the GCC countries who are under the sponsorship system are under the new form of slavery. Even though this practice is purely exploitive and a type of slavery, it is practiced widely within some regions. To understand why and how this system is being practiced, we need to understand how it is being justified, so we can combat it appropriately.

Just like the other practices of modern day slavery, people tend to justify the sponsorship system under the umbrella of cultural norms in regions such as the GCC countries. Arabs from that region perceive themselves in a higher social structure and status than any other Arabs or foreigners. Thus, they wanted to protect their societies from being equal to others or mixed with other races and solve the unbalanced population problem by putting such a system of the sponsorship in place. With time and many years of practicing the system, it was believed that it is part of the cultural norms, and people started defending it and making it hard to combat as a type of slavery.

However, the actual underlying factor of such practice is purely political, which should not be accepted and must be combated; “The GCC states are unique because of the skewed character of their demographic profile: Expatriate workers make up more than 50 percent of the total population in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, and more than 25 percent of the populations of Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia” (Longva, 1999, p. 20). These unbalanced populations, which make indigenous people minorities in their own countries, put their governments in deep concern and lead them to create strict rules regarding all other foreigners. This political idea developed to become a problem of ethno-nationalism that is now embedded in these societies. When a concept like ethno-nation-

SUMAYA BAMAKHRAMA alism is prevalent in certain societies, people start to believe in the idea over time and think that is is part of their culture so they start protecting it under the name of culture, rather than understanding the root of it, which is political in such cases.

As we may think the sponsorship system is more clear cut than the other practices due to its political ground, it in fact has a gray area to it. In some cases we see migrant workers willingly enter countries with the sponsorship system knowing that they will be trapped in it. This acceptance of the facts makes it hard to say if it is slavery at this point, especially since these workers chose to give up their rights for different gains. For example, “In Dubai, expatriates willingly give up political rights such as free speech and due process, and they live precariously on short-term visas that can be revoked at any time for any reason. In exchange, they earn tax-free wages as ‘economic mercenaries,’ fully aware that they are there solely to work” (Ali, 2010, p. 27). When people willingly accept this kind of treatment and join the system, it is hard to say that there is controlling of someone else’s life or restriction of their movement since they agreed to it. This kind of situation demonstrates the gray area of the system, but it never justifies that the system in itself is a type of modern day slavery. If someone willingly put himself in such an exploitative system and gave consent to be part of it, that does not mean that their willingness or consent was not influenced by harsher circumstances. Therefore, this sponsorship system remains under the concept of modern day slavery and should be combated.

Even though there are universal laws that protect migrant workers, we still see that the sponsorship system violates them repeatedly through different means. In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 1 it is stated that, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (UN, 1966). Under the sponsorship system it is very clear that migrant workers are deprived of their right to freely determine or pursue what they want or need; therefore, we need to recognize this system as a form of slavery and combat it directly, especially because of its purely political ground. Understanding the real underlying factors behind certain practices reveals what is actually culture and what is hidden under it without any connections to cultural practices or beliefs.

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Conclusion: According to the 2016 Global Slavery Index, it is estimated that there are 45.8 million people currently trapped in modern slavery (p. 8). As it can be seen, many of these incidents are derived from what people think or believe are cultural or religious practices. However, in reality, there are different underlying factors such as poverty or personal interest that play the major role in fueling such practices and exposing the concept of culture and religion to exploitation.

We see these outrageous practices hidden under the umbrella of beliefs which makes it hard to target and combat with the universal human rights laws and to function appropriately without stepping on others’ cultures. Additionally, having universal laws without considering the cultural or religious factor is not appropriate or ethical. Ignatieff (2001) says, “Human rights do not, and should not, delegitimize traditional culture as a whole” (p. 110). If we excluded the element of culture or if we did not have room to understand the different cultural and religious practices, we could worsen the situation in some cases, especially if poverty was the underlying factor. In addition, it could be seen as enforcing Western ideologies on other cultures; as Renteln (1988) argues in regard to unified laws, “the ethnocentric assumption in the literature leads to a narrow-minded solution which is not only unworkable, but which is also undeniably, a form of cultural imperialism” (p. 360). If people engage in certain practices believing that they are cultural or religious related acts, then we need to use the same ideologies to clarify to what extent these practices are related to their culture, or if these practices are, in fact, part of their culture or not. He adds, Sinha attacks the single catalogue approach because it does not take into account cultural variability. He advocates an approach which is cultural based…Sinha prefers to let societies devise their own means of paying homage to human rights standards. But while his theory is cultural sensitive, it cannot provide any universals. Hence it is no longer a theory of human rights but rather a theory of cultural rights (Renteln, 1988, p. 351).

Even though we need to consider different elements in our universal laws such as cultural practices, as Sinha argues, we cannot completely agree with him and ignore the fact that in many cases people use the concept of culture to justify their acts and that culture changes with time, which demonstrates the

161 need for universal laws. Moreover, we need to examine the actual underlying factors that lead to such practices and classify and show the limitations of the acts, so we can combat the dilemma easier without worsening the situations. We also need to cooperate with religious moderates to understand the actual moderate interpretation of the texts, since they too are against slavery;“ leaders of the world’s largest faiths came together to declare their common humanitarian commitment to eradicate modern slavery” (GSI, 2016, p. 86). Many believe that “a key way to combat these crimes is for religious leaders to encourage their followers to support the abolition of exploitative practices” (GSI, 2016, p. 86). Understanding what is indeed religion or culture and what is exploitation of them is needed when forming universal laws, so we do not impose laws that contradict with legitimate cultural and religious practices.

With all this in mind, the legal world has witnessed a lot of discussion between universalism and relativism. Relativism is a theory which asserts that human knowledge is relative to the nature of the mind. Also, that ethical truths largely depend on the type of group and individuals holding them. In contrast, universal laws are rules which govern our conduct as human beings and they are considered to be the most legitimate. They are also universal in application, translation and acceptance. In all the cases examined it is evident that cultural relativism could hinder international laws in combating such practices by creating a gray area and allowing for exploiters to use the concept of culture or religion to cover for their acts. Additionally, universal laws ignore the legitimate cultural practices and distort them with other outrageous acts under the umbrella of modern slavery. These laws tend to use Western ideologies to identify and combat the problem, which worsens the situations in most cases because there is lack of understanding of other cultures’ practices. Many pieces of literature have been written, either in favor of universalism or relativism. However, this research does not advocate for either one or the other, but stresses that a combination of both is needed when forming the universal human rights laws, so they can be appropriate to apply globally. A holistic approach geared towards considering different aspects and elements, such as countries’ legitimate cultural practices, moderate interpretation of religious texts and practices, and understanding the actual underlying factors behind each practice is needed in order to appropriately combat the cultural pathways that lead to modern day slavery.

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Worldwide, 45.8 million people live in slavery. The nations with the highest number of slaves by proportion of their population are North Korea, Uzbekistan, Cambodia, India, and Qatar, but the countries with the highest absolute numbers of people living in modern slavery are India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Uzbekistan Source: https://www.globalslaveryindex. org/findings/

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Sumaya Bamakhrama

Sumaya Salah Bamakhrama is an international student from Saudi Arabia, who is a fourth year Political Science major with an emphasis in International Relations. Her expected graduation date is December 2017. She intends to attend law school for international law to pursue a career as a human rights lawyer with the United Nations.

Email: sumaya.bamakhrama@gmail.com

Closing the gender gap: How can levels of female political leadership at the national level increase?

Tara Kwan California State Polytechnic University, Pomona Women make up roughly half of the world’s population, yet this is not reflected in the level of female political officeholders worldwide. The disparity in the descriptive and substantive representation of women is a problem that warrants closer examination. This thesis explores the gender gap in politics with in-depth case studies of the United States, Mexico, Rwanda, Spain, and Denmark, analyzing the factors leading to high (or low) female held political offices at the national level in the respective countries. The presence of quotas and proportional representation electoral systems largely explain the level of female political leadership in these countries. Implementing these measures across the globe will help increase the number of female politicians thus working to achieve gender parity in the political sphere.

A

merican women’s rights activist, Susan B. Anthony, once said, “The day will come when men will recognize woman as his peer, not only at the fireside, but in councils of the nation. Then, and not until then, will there be the perfect comradeship, the ideal union between the sexes that shall result in the highest development of the race” (Harper, 1898). Anthony’s hope that men will one day recognize women as their equals in government is unfortunately still far away from becoming a reality. Women have long been fighting to have equal rights and there are women who are still doing so in less developed countries in the world.

The age-old struggle is far from over especially in the political arena where women are not adequately represented. Women make up nearly half of the world’s population yet they are noticeably absent from serv-

ing as heads of states, heads of governments, and/or members of parliament. In fact, according to statistics from UN Women and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, only ten women have served as Head of State, merely nine women served as Head of Government, and less than a quarter, 22.9%, of the world’s parliamentary seats are currently held by women. The broad gender gap in politics is disconcerting and needs to be closely examined as to why this is the case. Women have been underrepresented in the economic, political, and social sectors and relegated into subservient roles compared to that of men’s for far too long.

Although the modern era has ushered in many new opportunities for female advancement, there is still much progress that needs to made and one of the most effective ways to promote women in today’s society is through direct political participation, particularly by holding political office. Female political em

Created by Tara A. Kwan, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona for her seinior thesis project. Correspondence concerning this research paper should be addressed to Tara Kwan, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, (909) 263-6730. Email: tarakwantk@gmail.com Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2017. Pp. 165–185.

©2017, Political Science Department, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

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166 merican women’s rights activist, Susan B. Anthony, once said, “The day will come when men will recognize woman as his peer, not only at the fireside, but in councils of the nation. Then, and not until then, will there be the perfect comradeship, the ideal union between the sexes that shall result in the highest development of the race” (Harper, 1898). Anthony’s hope that men will one day recognize women as their equals in government is unfortunately still far away from becoming a reality. Women have long been fighting to have equal rights and there are women who are still doing so in less developed countries in the world.

The age-old struggle is far from over especially in the political arena where women are not adequately represented. Women make up nearly half of the world’s population yet they are noticeably absent from serving as heads of states, heads of governments, and/or members of parliament. In fact, according to statistics from UN Women and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, only ten women have served as Head of State, merely nine women served as Head of Government, and less than a quarter, 22.9%, of the world’s parliamentary seats are currently held by women.

The broad gender gap in politics is disconcerting and needs to be closely examined as to why this is the case. Women have been underrepresented in the economic, political, and social sectors and relegated into subservient roles compared to that of men’s for far too long.

Although the modern era has ushered in many new opportunities for female advancement, there is still much progress that needs to made and one of the most effective ways to promote women in today’s society is through direct political participation, particularly by holding political office. Female political empowerment is key to addressing the underlying issues obstructing women from reaching their full potential. Women are a distinct group in society with their own specific interests and therefore must hold roles in political leadership to ensure that they are properly represented. After all, women hold a discernable, different point of view than men on policy issues (Swers, 1998). Gender is also only second to ideology on its level of influence regarding legislative votes (Frederick, 2009).

This thesis aims to further the discussion on and raise awareness about the gender disparity present in governments around the globe by answering the following question: How can levels of female political leadership at the national level increase? The lack of female political leaders at the global stage is a pressing issue that needs to be addressed and can only be addressed by the passing policies that facilitate an

TARA KWAN increase in female representation. This will result in more representative governments around the world as well as a higher platform for women’s issues to be voiced and resolved. The paper seeks to make policy recommendations on what actions that countries interested in working towards achieving gender parity in their parliaments or parliamentary equivalents can take.

In order to ascertain and recommend the most effective policy options to increase female political leadership at the national level, this paper will consist of five sections following the introduction and clarification on “female leadership at the national level”.

The paper will first examine the scholarly literature on the importance of why women need to be adequately represented in politics to establish why policies should be passed to address the gender discrepancy in modern-day governments. Moreover, within the literature review, five country case studies- Rwanda, Sweden, Mexico, United States, and Denmark- will be referenced to as well as the benefits and the limitations of policies- quotas and proportional representation electoral systems- in increasing female political representation. Following the literature review, the paper will proceed to identify the policies in these chosen countries which have led to either high or low levels of women present in their respective parliaments. Once the policies have been explained, the methodology utilized to select the countries as case studies as well as the chosen policies. With the use of case studies, this paper largely utilizes a qualitative approach to testing the paper’s research question and argument. The paper will then analyze the impact of the policies in increasing female representation in the countries featured in the case studies. Lastly, the paper will close with the conclusion, which will make policy recommendations and identify what future research is needed in order to further advance the presence of women in national government across the globe.

In the context of this paper, female political leadership at the national level refers to the amount of women serving in parliament in their respective governments as opposed to women serving as the heads of state or heads of government. The head of state is defined as the highest representative of a sovereign state whose primary role is to serve as its representative but may also serve as the head of government whereas the head of government is defined as the person in charge of running the state but that does not necessarily always mean the head of state. Although

CLOSING THE GENDER GAP heads of states or heads of government can be considered as female leadership at the national level, this paper does not include women who have served in that capacity due to the low numbers of women in those positions along with the difficulties in determining their influence in those roles. Consequently, this paper is focused on the women in parliament.

In this context, parliament is defined as any national assembly which, according to domestic law, is endowed with the power to legislate and oversee the executive. Parliament for countries may consist of a lower house and an upper house or just a single house. Every country has a parliament or parliamentary equivalent and the parliament’s role is essentially the same throughout the world so it is easier to evaluate the impact of women who serve on parliaments.

In addition, it is more impactful to prescribe policy recommendations that can be applied more readily.

II. Literature Review This literature review is intended to the academic discourse between scholars over the female political representation. The first section will highlight the importance of involving women in the political process especially serving in elected positions. The second section will concentrate on the country case studies- Rwanda, Sweden, Mexico, United States, and Denmark into more detail along with references to the aforementioned countries throughout the literature review. The third and final section will examine the benefits and detriments on commonly suggested policies designed to increase the amount of women serving on the national level.

The Importance of Female Presence in Politics The significance of having and the impact of female legislators at the national level must first be established before delving in the various policies that countries may undertake to address the gender imbalance in their political systems. After all, unequal representation of women compared to that of men’s is not a vital concern and does not warrant action unless the representation leads to substantively disparate policy outcomes. Women have distinctly different views on many issues compared to that of men’s especially on gendered issues such as education, reproduction, and welfare. Swers examines whether the greater presence of women in the U.S. Congress would translate into substantive pol-

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icy differences as opposed to just increasing equity.

The results of the regression analysis on the votes of the U.S. Representatives in the 103rd Congress (the year 1992 was known as Year of the Woman) concerning women’s issues “indicates that gender exerts a significant and major effect on voting for women’s issues in the face of controls for other major influences on congressional voting” (Swers p. 435). Regarding the factors contributing to the influence on parliamentary votes, gender comes in second only to party ideology. Frederick (2009) delves further in the issue of whether women truly are more liberal and tend to support women’s issues more than their male counterparts since studies with these findings were conducted before larger numbers of conservative women took political office. The study examines rollcall votes from 13 past Congresses to find that the women in the Democratic and Republican parties are the most partisan in years even more so than their male colleagues. As time passed, there was a marked, decreased influence on voting solely based off of gender in the Republican Party but this can be attributed to the Republican women elected to Congress who desire to show their party loyalty to move up in the ranks or do not see a need to substantively represent women. Going beyond traditionally designated women’s issues, Boles and Scheurer (2007) find that the substantive representation of women in government does increase support for gendered, but not necessarily labeled as women’s, issues such as the arts.

Political party evidently played an important role in influencing the resulting vote but Republican women were more likely to support art bills compared to their male counterparts. Analysis from the House of Representatives’ voting records from 1983 to 2002 was also analyzed to come to this same conclusion.

Lawless and Fox (2010) conducted the Citizen Political Ambition Panel Study among professionals most likely to go into politics which provides additional support the idea of women having a different policy concerns than men. The potential female political candidates were “more liberal and feminist than men; they are also more likely than men to prioritize “women’s issues” as motivating forces behind their political engagement” (Lawless et. al p. 92). When asked about policy issues that motivate them to be politically engaged, the female respondents named abortion, education, health care, gay rights, and the environment as important issues and four out of these five issues are women’s issues. They also value each of the issues as equally important whereas no pattern of importance existed for the male respondents. It is clear that women truly do have a different perspective, although this may be tempered by other factors

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Women in the U.S. Congress 2018. In 2018, 106 (79D, 27R) women hold seats in the United States Congress, comprising 19.8% of the 535 members; 22 women (22%) serve in the United States Senate, and 84 women (19.3%) serve in the United States House of Representatives.

such as party identification, than men do and it is essential that their point of view is taken in account on policies affecting the general populace. It is clear that women truly do have a different perspective, although these this may be tempered by other factors such as party identification, than men do and it is essential that their point of view is taken in account on policies affecting the general populace.

The effect of women in politics is not limited to legislative measures but also can be extended to influencing party issues. Greene and O’Brien (2016) tested three diversity hypotheses with data on the gender makeup of parties’ parliamentary delegations and their manifestos for 110 parties from 20 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development democratic countries between 1952 and 2011. Parties are the primary actors in today’s democracies and the parties addressed a greater diversity of issues in correlation with the increasing percentages of women in the party itself. In addition, a larger female presence in political parties is associated with a more left-leaning manifesto. Male and female parliamentarians may view themselves as ideologically similar but the women’s presence can indirectly lean their

parties leftward since female politicians’ preferences on gender equality policies tend to be to the left of their male colleagues Kittilson (2010) also provides a more comprehensive analysis on the impact of women on party agenda and policies by analyzing 142 political parties in 24 post-industrial democracies in the time period of 1990 to 2003. She finds that increasing female representation among a party’s parliamentary delegation and among its leadership committee helps emphasize the issue of social justice in the party program and the adoption of gender quota policies.

There is also a considerable impact on welfare state expansion. However, women appear to have little direct effect on the issues that political parties have traditionally structured themselves around. These scholars show that women bring their own perspective with an emphasis on issues deemed as women’s issues and they should be more directly involved to ensure a more equitable representation of the population as a whole.

The effect of females on the political process is evident even from the impact of legislator fathers’ daughters on their vote regarding liberal and women’s issues. Washington (2008) states that sociolo-

CLOSING THE GENDER GAP gists have found a link between the gender of offspring and parental beliefs on political issues as seen in studies done in Canada and the United States. She further supports the assertion by analyzing the voting records of U.S. representatives and found that “conditional on total children parented, each female child parented is associated with a score increase of that is approximately one-quarter of the difference in score accounted for by legislator’s own gender” and the influence of female children affects voting in all sectors especially in regards to reproductive rights (Washington p. 313). Conley and Rauscher (2013) support this sentiment by running a data analysis of nationally representative data from the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS) survey. However, their findings suggest an opposite effect- the proportion of “girls significantly increase Republican Party identification in the United States… for high-status parents” and “daughters are related to more pro-choice abortion attitudes and disapproval of teen sex” (Conley et. al p.705). Despite the differences in results with Washington finding that daughters liberalized their fathers’ political stance and Conley et. al discovering that having daughters tended to result into more conservative attitudes for their parents, it seems as the merely raising female children impacts how their parents will identify and vote which gives credence to the idea of females being an important group to be incorporated in the political process as legislators. To be fair, Lee and Conley (2016) reexamine the relationship between the gender of offspring and the political orientation of the parents to explain the discrepancy behind the contradictory results. They used independent samples across different countries and time periods. Then, they proceeded to utilize Bayesian Additive Regression Tree models as well as multilevel analysis to conclude that all findings are null. Yet it is acknowledged that their findings do not disprove previous studies and may be due to limitations in the analysis or the issues with estimating small effects.

Furthermore, more female politicians at the national level increases the visibility of women in politics which in turn inspires women to be more politically involved and aspire to run for office one day. This perpetuates a cycle of female political empowerment and organically encourages women to run in the absence of policies designed to promote women to office. Political ambition for women is rather low so encouragement in any way can help as well as normalize the idea that women, not just men, can also serves as leaders in the political field.

The same goes for political engagement as people are more likely to be more invested if they see some-

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one representing them actively involved. Analyses done by Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007) on three cross-national European datasets find that adolescent girls and adult women are more likely to discuss politics when there are more female MPs. This effect on female political activity is constant regardless of age but it is more pronounced for the younger generation. This role model effect of female politicians is especially important since only girls in 11 of the 20 countries surveyed in the Civic Education Study, as mentioned in the article, are far less likely to see themselves as politically active adults compared to boys. Atkeson (2003)’s research generates additional evidence supporting the view that visible female political candidates raise increase political engagement among their fellow female citizens. Her models based off of Senate and gubernatorial races from American National Elections Studies (ANES) from 1990 to 1998 show that women are more likely to be more politically engaged with female candidates are running but there appears to be no effect on their level of engagement if it is a noncompetitive contest. The presence of women running, who are viable and more than a token candidate, appears to have a positive effect on engaging roughly half of the electorate which is a major achievement. Beaman, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova (2012)’s randomized natural experiment in India clearly showed that female leadership, stemming from a 1993 law reserving leadership positions for women in village councils, ended the education attainment gender gap between girls and boys as well as shorter hours for girls to be spent on chores.

They surveyed over 8,000 adolescents and parents in nearly 500 villages to find that, compared to villages with no reserved leadership positions, the gender gap in aspirations closed by 20% in parents and 32% in adolescents in villages assigned a female leader for two election cycles. Broockman (2014) employs regression discontinuity to analyze the effect of female leadership on political engagement of women in the United States in response to Beaman et. al.’s study.

Yet he does not find any significant impact but this can be attributed to the differences in between the two countries and that there are other underlying barriers to equal female political participation. Despite mixed findings in the United States, female political officeholders and candidates gives the impression that their presence does increase female political engagement which is positive. At worse, there is no change in the level of political engagement so there is no harm but only benefits in promoting more qualified women to run for office.

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Country Case Studies As a developing sub-Saharan African country with uncharacteristically high levels of female political representation in parliament, Rwanda is an intriguing case and the large numbers of women in government can mainly be attributed to its quotas in place. These quotas were the byproduct of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. In a short time period, the Hutu majority slaughtered approximately a million people, predominantly male and the Tutsi minority, were killed which devastated the nation. Women were in the majority, making up to 70% of the population, and they had to step up to fill in traditionally male roles, such as merely holding a job, in place of the men who were killed or were being tried for their crimes against humanity.

In the aftermath of the genocide, women stepped into leadership roles which resulted in legislation on providing more rights and protections to women, such as the ability to own and inherit land, to pass. Their efforts also led to gender quotas to be enacted in 2003 which propelled Rwanda to become the first country in the world with a majority-female, national legislative body in 2008. Yet there are still significant progress to be made as Burnet (2011) clearly states that “more detailed analysis of the Rwandan case reveals that increased representation of women has not led to a greater statutory protection of women’s rights, nor has it led to a more democratic political terrain” (Burnet 3). Nonetheless, she contends that it has had other positive impacts such as promoting women’s social mobility and helped overturn the patriarchal gender paradigm where women are subservient and dependent on men. Bauer and Burnet (2013) utilized Botswana and Rwanda as two divergent country case studies to understand what conditions can best represent women’s interests. They found that “‘taking the fast track’ to parliament [as seen in Rwanda] – through the adoption and use of electoral gender quotas – has come to replace the ‘incremental approach’ (waiting for cultural, political and socioeconomic developments over time) to gaining access to women’s increased political representation” in the world today (Bauer 12).

Sweden and Denmark will be discussed in tandem with one another since both are Nordic countries which have enjoyed a reputation for being strong proponents for gender equality and their governments have typically featured high numbers of women in government. Additionally, Nordic countries have generally seen steadily increasing proportions of women serving in parliament since World War II although there were slight decreases recently. The

TARA KWAN explanation for the relatively high female political participation in the Nordic countries can be attributed to several factors: institutional factors, such as electoral systems and party ideology; socioeconomic factors such as women’s labor force participation and women’s educational level; and cultural factors such as religion and public attitudes on gender equality influence and positively impact women’s participation in parliament. In fact, the Nordic countries have long reigned on the top of the list for women’s representation in the world following an “incremental track of gradual, step-by-step increases in women’s representation” till global South countries began to the top the list by going on the “fast track” through implementation of gender quotas (Dahlerup 146).. Legislated quotas are not in use in Nordic countries but there are party quotas instituted in some of the Nordic countries such as Sweden while no quotas are in use in Denmark.

Dahlerup and Leyenaar (2013) designate the last 1800s as the time when the process towards women’s access to political institutions in Sweden began. The big breakthrough came in 1921 when suffrage was granted to women and led to the election of women to parliament. Legislative reforms, such as maternity leave, was first enacted around this time helping to pave the way and these reforms would be heavily expanded upon later, particularly in the so-called bloodless revolution in the 1960s due to the amount and ease of passage, to be more female-friendly. Women activists were highly active in campaigning for nomination of female candidates within parties as well as in national women’s federations. Coupled with the growing support for gender equality beginning in the 1960s, notably with the Group of 222 which was a think tank on the issue, and the second-wave women’s movement in the 1970s led to the 1974 elections where the percentage increase of women in parliament raised by 7%, from 14% to 21%, which was the “largest increase ever in the history of women’s political representation” (Dahlerup 100). The decrease in the proportion of women in parliament, from 38% to about 33% in the 1991 elections raised concerns and reignited discussion on female representation.

Sweden has continuously promoted gender equality since and has proudly declared itself to be a feminist government today.

Danish women gained the right to vote incrementally first for Parish Councils in 1903 then finally for parliament in 1915. Dahlerup states that the male monopoly (the 10% threshold) ended after World War II with substantial increases in the 1970s and 1980s - the 25% threshold was passed in 1984. Although the 35% threshold was passed in 1998, female rep-

CLOSING THE GENDER GAP resentation ended up being stagnate in the 1990s and 2000s. Formation of women’s lists in elections emerged in 1908 but faded away when the view that women should prove political maturity by joining political parties to run against men became dominant which led to the increased presence of women in the more mainstream parties. The Socialist People’s Party, established in 1960, and has emerged as the most female friendly political party in Denmark as the first party to adopt a feminist program in 1974 and the first party in parliament with a majority of women in 1979. The 1970s and 1980s were crucial times for gender equality with many new developments with the prime minister establishing a Commission on Women in 1963, “thereby for the first time constituting gender equality as a policy issue in its own right” (Dahlerup 155). Due to several important legislations advancing gender equality, such as the 1921 law on women’s access to public offices, forming the base for further reforms despite the lackluster presence of women in parliament, Denmark was on track to transform into one of the most progressive, gender equal countries in the world now. Gender equality remains the Danish government and political parties’ goal to achieve. There is certainly much to be done especially concerning female representation in leadership roles on parliament as well as to ensure that the women’s representation does not stagnate or decrease.

The next and final two cases are on developed countries that are both located in North America and are - Mexico and the United States. Mexico has drastically improved its percentage of women on parliament in recent years. Its transition from an authoritarian one-party system governed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional to a democracy today happened over a long period of time and reforms were passed in the 1990s to establish a more competitive, inclusive multi-party system. Several of the main political parties in Mexico adopted quotas at the party level which was purely voluntary in the early 1990s and the Mexican Congress, in line with promoting gender equality, passed a considerably weak quota law in 1996 which only recommended that neither gender should exceed the 70% threshold for candidate slots. Yet the quota law allowed parties to comply be designating women to serve as alternates or placing them on the bottom of the party list.

New reforms in 2002 have increased the quota requirement for female candidates to 50%, with more stringent rules related to how the quota is implemented, like the candidate and replacement both have to be female, so political parties are pushed to put in

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more effort into recruiting female candidates. Mexico’s actions in advancing female political power is commendable but it also raises a few questions as Baldez (2004) brings up like how it is strange for a country notorious for its machismo culture in which masculinity is prized. However, this can largely be explained by the Supreme Court’s ruling on the constitutionality of gender quotas which was done in part to support women but also to carve its independence from the other branches and women’s overwhelming support for the policy which mobilized effectively to lobby for the quotas.

Despite being lauded as the land of freedom and opportunity, the United States has not been the friendliest place for women to seek political office in evident in the large majority of male Congress members let alone a bastion for gender equality. Women were first able to gain universal suffrage in 1920 with the passage of the 19th Amendment after mobilization from women organizations and their contributions in World War I. Yet women hardly occupied any major elected positions as of the 1970s. Lawless and Fox (2012) find that there were gradual, steady increases in the percentage of women running for elected office in the 1980s which surged in the early 1990s most notably with 1992 dubbed the Year of the Woman where a number of women were elected to the Senate, and the early 1990s experienced a sharper surge. However, the last several election cycles have experienced a plateau and the 2010 congressional elections resulted in the first net decrease of women in the House of Representatives since 1978. Furthermore, the United States does not have many policies in place designed to promote women unlike the Nordic countries. In fact, the United States is the only developed country without a national law on paid maternity leave and the Equal Rights Amendment, stating that rights guaranteed by the Constitution apply equally to all persons regardless of their sex, failed to be ratified by the required 38 states by 1982. It also does not have any form of quotas in place. This shows the United States’ commitment or, rather, lack of commitment in addressing the gender disparity in government.

Policies Aimed At Increasing Women Officeholders Many obstacles face women when they seek political office simply because of the fact they are female. One notable pitfall is the stereotypes of women such as not being able to handle the strenuous duties as a politician, women are too overly emotional, and women should leave politics to the men. This is compounded with the additional responsibilities tra-

172 ditionally held by women of taking care of the family and home coupled being held to higher standards compared to their male counterparts and the lack of political ambition which may be attributed to the aforementioned reasons. There are certainly more barriers for women who wish to hold office compared to men and this needs to be addressed to level the political playing field. Consequently, there is a demonstrated need for countries to pass policies ensuring that women are not overlooked in favor of men for elected political office.

A popular option to increase the number of female political officeholders and therefore the descriptive representation of women is through establishing quotas. Quotas are policies which set aside a certain amount or percentage of seats for women in office and are widely agreed by scholars to be the most effective way to increase the number of women in office but this policy is not without its flaws. Krook (2008) discusses the emergence of female quotas in politics (party quotas, reserved seats, and legislative quotas), how to establish these quotas, and the impact of quotas. Civil society, the state, and the international and transnational spheres are the actors in play for quotas and motivations for quotas are principled stands, electoral considerations, empty gestures, promotion of other political ends, and extension of representational guarantees, international pressure, and transnational learning. Issues regarding quotas stem from increasing separation between political empowerment and social and economic empowerment, election of women that uphold the status quo, makes women a political category, and reduce effectiveness of female political actors. Feminist groups hold mixed feelings about quotas but the quotas do result in concrete gains in female political representation. Rwanda, as mentioned earlier in the paper, ranked 1st in the world by the Inter-Parliamentary Union for its gender inclusive parliament, is a prime example. Devlin and Elgie (2008) find mixed results on the effect of women in parliament- they do bring a different perspective to the policy agenda but there is no significant support that they change policy outputs. This also seems to be the case in Rwanda where female politicians consider themselves more concerned with grassroots politics and it is easier to raise women’s issues. Only one gender-related major piece of legislation concerning violence passed since quotas were established in 2003.

The effect of female representation in Rwanda was similar to that of Western countries but there is strong sense of solidarity leading to coordinating with other women and the presence of a gender agenda that should produce more female friendly legislation in the future. Devlin and et. al.’s findings are supported

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by Gray (2003) who also found that gender quotas are generally seen to increase women’s representation and make it easier for women to raise gender issues in policy through the comparison of the electoral quotas’ impact in increasing female representation in Argentina and Chile. Quotas are clearly seen as a positive force for growing representation in when they are implemented well in Argentina as opposed to the situation in Chile.

Yet female gains in office have not translated into greater gendered policy outcomes. Nevertheless, this is may be due to the fact that women are a minority coalition and there are partisan divides. Zetterberg (2008) looks into the possible negative effects of quotas that can arise by analyzing Mexican state legislatures, Zacatecas and Michoacán. There has been some empirical support in regards to women who gain political office due to quotas face more legislative constraints compared to women who do not. There are three obstacles- tokenism, marginalism, and invisibilization- that women from quotas get more than women who do not. There does not appear to be any significant evidence supporting the claim that female representatives entering parliament from gender quotas face more discrimination than female representatives who did not. All political candidates struggle not to be a token and future political career in Mexican politics seems to be dependent on ties and loyalty to dominant leaders and groups which pits all female legislators against their male colleagues. But women are expected to focus on particular issues and men on other issues due to the “machista” cultural norm. Adding to the criticisms of quotas, Kerevel and Rae (2013) explore why women seem to be marginalized in legislatures or denied access to resources that reduced their ability to be effective legislators when elected. They analyze data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies regarding gender differences in bill sponsorship, bill passage rates, and committee assignments both before and after the gender quota was established. They found no significant impact on how effective female legislators are although they held less leadership positions and were placed on less prestigious committees. Yet this disparity in leadership roles within the organization and placement on less prestigious committees can be explained by lack of experience since the gender quota was implemented relatively recently.

Electoral systems also play a role in determining whether women will be elected to office. As mentioned earlier, Gray analyzed the impact of quotas but found that national electoral quotas work best at gaining female political representation in a closed list, PR system. Roberts, Seawright, and Cyr (2013) sought

CLOSING THE GENDER GAP to understand why there are significant differences in female political representation in different countries.

They postulate that a possible explanation for this divide is due to electoral systems since countries with party based proportional systems are found to elect far more women compared to countries with candidate based plurality systems. Three separate methods are used to more accurately estimate the effect of electoral rules on female representation. Their findings do not suggest that electoral laws are the answer to address low female representation although they may with certain factors. However, Fortin-Rittberger and Rittenberger (2014) seems to disprove the notion of PR systems as being “friendlier” to women through analysis of the types of PR rules used in European countries and how it shapes the European Parliament (EP) which is composed over a third female members of parliament. Their results suggest that documented empirical connection between electoral rules and descriptive representation is possibly due to an endogenous rather than a causal relationship.

Party recruitment is also vital in ensuring that women run for office and its influence cannot be underestimated. Women lack political ambition compared to men so an external push might be what they need to start running for office. Cheng and Tavits (2011) emphasizes the importance of party recruitment in increasing female held political offices and argue that local party gatekeepers’ recruitment of female candidates by parties is the most important out of all the informal influences on whether a woman will run for office so more female political gatekeepers would help. Female party gatekeepers are more likely to recruit people who are like them, provide direct support to candidates, have vast social networks with qualified female candidates, and inspire women to be politically active. They test their argument by studying gatekeepers in five significant political parties (BQ, Conservatives, Liberals, NDP, and Greens) in Canada’s 2004 and 2006 elections. The local party president’s gender did have a positive and significant, albeit small, effect on the gender of the party candidate. This thus gives credence that more female party gatekeepers lead to more female political candidates.

Affirmative action policies in the BQ, NDP, and Liberal parties are also found to be statistically significant in increasing the number of female candidates.

Lawless also advocates for party recruitment since encouragement from anyone can be critical in initiating a candidacy but “electoral gatekeepers are strategic in their recruitment efforts and that recruitment to public office is a selective process that reflects various dimensions of social stratification” (Lawless p.

95). Female respondents in the study, as mentioned

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before, were less likely to receive encouragement to run showing that there is a gender gap in party recruitment that needs to be addressed. Of course, the level of recruitment may vary depending on the region and type of office but the overall gender gap is still noteworthy. Furthermore, gatekeepers’ networks are still overly male dominated and past surveys done by other people have revealed gender bias on the part of male party leaders who preferred male candidates to run.

There are more radical, albeit not implemented, policies that are conducive to increasing women’s representation in politics such as job-sharing.

Job-sharing is essentially splitting a full-time position into two part-time jobs and is an increasingly popular flexible work arrangement. Campbell and Cowley (2014) state that job-sharing has been raised as a possibility in the House of Commons but failed to become a stature. Nevertheless, it enjoys the support of feminist groups and is endorsed by the Liberal Democrat party. Due to traditional gender roles of women being the homemaker and the caretaker in the family, many women do not possess enough time or resources for other pursuits such as political office.

The issues with policies such as gender quotas are that these policies simply address the demand-side of the issue but not the supply-side which job-sharing does. Job-sharing is an attractive policy which can potentially lower the barriers for women to run and serve in political office since it would shorten the hours required and the duties needed to be fulfilled.

This may be strange in a political setting and there are certainly issues that need to be worked out before implementation but job-sharing is rather common in the workplace. Additionally, although job-sharing may increase women’s representation, it is not gender-specific in who it benefits. In fact, it can also assist other members in society who also have time-heavy constraints but wish to serve. Their study finds that the public seems to be rather ambivalent about the idea of job-sharing parliamentarians. Nevertheless, “most of the public appear to make judgements on the basis of the candidates offered, rather than automatically rejecting job-share set-ups out of hand” and there is more support for “offering [members of Parliament] MPs the opportunity to job share among women than men” (Campbell pg. 444 - 445).

III. Methodology

This paper looks into what actions can be undertaken to increase the presence of women in parliament and the methodology utilized for the paper is

174 relatively straightforward. To identify the policies which can be passed to increase female representation, the paper uses qualitative research, mainly in the form of case studies. Since this paper is focused on the level of political leadership at the national level, the paper looks at the amount of women currently serving in parliament. There is a sample size of 193 United Nations recognized countries but this number is too large to evaluate in detail so only a select few countries were picked. A total of 5 specific countries (Rwanda, Sweden, Mexico, United States, and Denmark) are featured and analyzed in detail for this thesis project. The case studies utilize a most similar system and a most different system approach along with a special case study to determine what accounts for the levels of female national political officeholders.

The presence or absence of measures, namely quotas (whether it be legislated or party) and proportional representation electoral systems, will be closely examined in conjunction with the country case studies to determine their impact on the number of women serving in parliament in the respective countries. Essentially, the independent variables that the paper is looking at are quotas and electoral systems and the dependent variable is the percentage of women in parliament. Statistics from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the international organization of parliaments, on election results in respect to gender is used to evaluate how countries stand on proportion of women in government compared to the rest of the world. Data on quotas is obtained from the Quota Project, which is a joint project among the International IDEA, Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Stockholm University aiming to provide up-to-date information on gender quotas worldwide. Figures on electoral systems were taken from the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, which is a collaborative effort between the International IDEA, EISA, Elections Canada, the National Electoral Institute of Mexico, IFES, The Carter Center, UNEAD, and UNDP to disseminate comprehensive information on electoral processes.

From these countries, the characteristics that appeared to explain the high or low amounts of female representation in parliament stems from mainly the presence or the absence of two policies- quotas and proportional representation electoral systems. There are also other measures that countries can implement that are not related to either quotas or electoral systems such as party recruitment. These measures will be briefly discussed but not in detail due to the difficulties in measuring their impact on increasing percentages of women on parliament.

Quotas are chosen as one of the policies given their indisputable effectiveness of quotas in increas-

TARA KWAN ing female representation on parliament. According to the Quota Project, quotas establish a percentage or number for the representation of a certain group, which, for the purpose of this paper, are women. Quotas usually are in the form of a minimum percentage, for instance, 20% percent of candidates in national elections must be female. The purpose of quotas is to increase the representation of historically excluded or underrepresented groups in politics. Quotas can be mandatory or voluntary as well as legislated or party.

There are 3 areas that quotas are able to target- the potential candidates, the candidates running in the election, and/or the elected members of parliament and their equivalents.

Legislated quotas are enshrined in a countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s constitution or in its law, usually electoral law, making it a mandatory quota. This type of quota regulates political party actions within the country and can possibly apply sanctions in case of non-compliance.

The other form of quotas is party quotas which are decided upon and implemented on a voluntary basis by political parties in a country. This allows parties wishing to demonstrate their support for women in politics to institute quotas but also gives parties the freedom to determine whether they would want quotas or not.

Electoral systems were picked since certain types of electoral systems have been proven to facilitate representation of marginalized groups in society such as women. As defined by the ACE Electoral Network, electoral systems are a specific catalogue of norms and procedures used in an election to determine how to choose the next elected officials. In essence, electoral systems transmute votes into either offices or seats.

For the purpose of this paper, the electoral systems mentioned refer to the electoral system at the national level as electoral system at the state or local level may vary. One of the hallmarks of democracy are fair elections so one of the most important decisions for democratic countries is to choose the right electoral system since electoral systems tend to remain constant once picked. Yet most electoral systems have not been deliberately selected by the countries until recently. Instead, the resulting electoral systems for countries were often due to circumstances in place or history such as the influence of colonialism or powerful neighboring countries. There are many types of electoral systems but only the ones mentioned in the country case studies will be discussed in detail.

Proportional representation electoral systems are intended to limit the disparity between the partyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s share of the national vote and its share of the parliamentary seats which incentivizes political parties to run in the elections. It is not possible to utilize a pro-

CLOSING THE GENDER GAP portional representation system with only one member in each electoral district since one seat cannot be divided. The system works best with as many seats as possible and through the use of party lists specifying the candidates that they are putting forth to voters on the national level. There are 2 major types of proportional representation system- List PR and Single Transferable Vote. The biggest benefit to a proportional representation electoral system is that it creates a more representative legislature and does not waste votes compared to plurality or majority electoral systems. However, the issues with proportional representation systems include the likelihood of forming fragmented party systems and coalition governments which would make it harder to govern.

List PR electoral systems are most likely to elect minorities and women since it encourages parties to put up a diverse slate of candidates where specific characteristics of these groups are not singled out so people are more focused on voting on policy stances.

Yet List PR systems may propagate weak links between elected legislators and their constituents and the power that political parties hold in forming those lists.

Mixed electoral systems attempt to mesh the best qualities of proportional electoral systems and plurality or majority electoral systems. There are two systems in place during elections for countries with mixed systems- one is usually a single-member district system while the other a List PR system. There are 2 forms of mixed systems- Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system and Parallel system.

In MMP systems, proportional representation seats are given to compensate for any disproportionality seen in district seat results which retains the benefits of proportional representation electoral systems but it also links the elected representatives to geographical districts. The disadvantages in the MMP systems are the same as the ones for the proportional representation electoral systems.

Plurality or majority electoral systems simply award seats to the candidates or parties with the most votes. There are five common types of these electoral systems: the First Past the Post (FPTP), Block Vote, Party Block Vote, Alternative Vote, and the TwoRound System. In the FPTP system, also known as a plurality single-member district system, the winner is the candidate who receives the most votes and that does not necessarily mean the absolute majority of votes. The advantages of the FPTP system are that it is simple for voters to understand, established a more effective government that is not fragmented due to minority parties, allows voters to establish a closer relationship with the candidates, and excludes ex-

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tremist parties from gaining seats. Nevertheless, the FPTP has its drawbacks as well since it is dependent on electoral boundaries which can be manipulated, makes it difficult for minorities, women, and small parties to gain representation, and wastes peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s votes.

IV. Results Most Different Case Studies: Rwanda & Sweden Rwanda and Sweden are chosen as the most different case studies due to their divergent paths leading to the same outcome- the Inter-Parliamentary Union ranks both of these countries in the top ten for their percentage of women in government in the world.

Rwanda is ranked 1st and Sweden is ranked 6th in the world. The high level of female participation despite the numerous differences between these two countries makes for an interesting comparison. Rwanda, more formally known as the Republic of Rwanda, is a less developed country located in central Africa while Sweden, more formally known as the Kingdom of Sweden, is a developed, northern European country.

Furthermore, both countries have extremely different histories leading them to develop into the states that they are today. In line with many African countries, Rwanda was colonized by Europeans, which was Belgium in its case, to exploit their abundant resources. Despite having few, short-lived colonies, Sweden played the role in colonizing other countries and was not colonized. The structures of their respective governments are also dissimilar. Rwanda is a presidential republic where the power lies within the people and their elected representatives as well as the president being independent of the legislature. Its legislature is a bicameral parliament consisting of two houses- the lower house, also known as the Chamber of Deputies (Chambre des Deputes) and the upper house, or the Senate (Senat). The Chamber of Deputies is made up of 80 seats with 53 members directly elected through proportional representation vote, 24 women elected through special interest groups, and 3 members selected by the youth and disability organizations to serve 5-year terms. The Senate is made up of 26 seats and 12 of these seats are indirectly elected by local councils, 8 are appointed by the president, 4 are appointed by the Political Organizations Forum, and 2 are chosen by the institutions of higher learning to serve 8-year terms. On the other hand, Sweden has a parliamentary constitutional monarchy meaning that it is ruled by the parliament and the monarch serves a more symbolic role with their power constrained

176 by the constitution. Sweden has a unicameral parliament consisting of only one house known as the Riksdag. The Riksdag has 349 seats in which 310 of its members are directly elected in multi-seat constituencies through proportional representation vote and 39 members in at-large seats are directly elected by proportional representation vote to serve 4-year terms. For electoral systems, both Rwanda and Sweden have list proportional representation (List PR) systems which are conducive to electing minorities and underrepresented groups like women.

Most Similar Case Studies: Mexico & United States In contrast, Mexico and United States were selected as the most similar case studies since both countries share many of the same characteristics.

However, Mexico is ranked significantly higher than the United States, in 8th place, while the United States is ranked at 104th place globally. Mexico, more formally known as the United Mexican States, and the United States, more formally known as the United States of America, share many similarities, most notably their proximity to one another in North America which has led them to become close allies.

In addition, they share a similar history of being the European powers’ colonies as Mexico was colonized

by Spain and the United States was colonized by the United Kingdom. This led them to develop similarly although the United States is a more developed, wealthier country compared to Mexico. Both countries have federal governments in place. Mexico has a federal presidential republic in which its government is made up of states with power to self-govern to a certain level and its people elect their representatives with the president being independent of the legislature. The United States virtually has the same government except the division of power between the three branches of government is codified in its constitution. Mexico has a bicameral National Congress (Congreso de la Union) that is composed of the lower house, also known as the Chamber of Deputies (Camara de Diputados), and the upper house, also referred to as the Senate (Camara de Senadores). The Chamber of Deputies has 500 seats in total where 300 of its members are directly elected into single-seat constituencies through simple majority vote and the remaining 200 members are directly elected in a single, national constituency through proportional representation vote to serve 3-year terms. The Senate has 128 seats with 96 of its members directly elected into multi-seat constituencies through simple majority vote and 32 of its members are directly elected

TARA KWAN into a single, nationwide constituency through proportional representation vote to serve 6-year terms.

Likewise, the United States has a bicameral Congress that is made up of the lower house, also known as the House of Representatives, and the upper house, also known as the Senate. Its House of Representatives has 435 seats and all states, excluding Georgia, directly elected their representatives which are proportioned according to the states’ populations into single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 2-year terms. Georgia is the only state to require an absolute majority to obtain the seat. The Senate has 100 seats meaning 2 seats for each state and their representatives are directly elected to represent their individual state constituencies through simple plurality vote to serve 6-year terms. The only exceptions are Georgia and Louisiana which require an absolute majority. Concerning electoral systems, Mexico has a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system while the United States has a first past the post (FPTP) system.

Special Case Study: Denmark Denmark, more formally known as the Kingdom of Denmark, is a special country in this regard since it has relatively high percentage of women in parliament compared to the rest of the world and is currently ranked at 22nd place. Yet its placement is rather low for a Nordic country and it has been criticized for not doing more to promote women into governmental positions. Similar to Sweden, Denmark is parliamentary constitutional monarchy where the monarch’s power is limited and the parliament has the real power in making as well as passing legislation. Its legislature is unicameral and consists of only the People’s Assembly (Folketing) which has 179 seats which includes 2 seats representing Greenland and 2 seats representing the Faroe Islands. The members are directly elected in multi-seat constituencies through proportional representation vote to serve 4-year terms unless the People’s Assembly is dissolved earlier. Denmark also has a List PR electoral system.

Impact Of Quotas & Elector al Systems

Rwanda’s high proportion of women in government can mainly be attributed to the quotas and its List PR electoral system. There are quotas present in its lower house, upper house, and at the sub-national level. Currently, women hold 51 out of the 80 seats in the Chamber of Deputies which means that women constitute 64% of the lower house after the

CLOSING THE GENDER GAP 2013 elections. The lower house has legislated quotas in place. The constitution states that “The State of Rwanda commits itself that women are granted at least 30 per cent of posts in decision making organs’ (Constitution, Article 9 [4]). The 80 members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected as follows: 53 members elected by direct universal suffrage through a secret ballot using closed list proportional representation, of which at least 30% must be seats reserved for women; 24 women (2 elected from each province and from the city of Kigali by an electoral college with a women-only ballot); 2 members elected by the National Youth Council; and 1 member elected by the Federation of the Associations of the Disabled (Constitution, Article 76)”. The electoral law sets up provisions for the election of 24 women deputies ‘Twenty four (24) female Deputies shall be elected by specific organs in accordance with national administrative entities. A Presidential Order shall determine a national administrative entity and the number of women Deputies to be elected at each entity. At each entity through which election has been conducted, candidates who obtain more votes shall be considered as elected’ (Article 109 of Organic Law 03/2010/OL of 18 June 2010 governing presidential and legislative elections)”. However, there are no legal sanctions for non-compliance or rank order/placement rules for party lists in voting.

After the 2011 elections, women hold 10 out of the 26 seats or 38% of the seats on the Senate. For Senate elections, reserved seats are set up and people are both indirectly elected and appointed to office.

As set up in the constitution, “The State of Rwanda commits itself that women are granted at least 30 per cent of posts in decision making organs’ (Constitution, Article 9 [4]). The total of 26 members of the Senate are either indirectly elected or appointed. Article 82 of the Constitution (2005) states that ‘within the 26 members in the senate at least thirty percent (30%) should be women”. (Constitution, Article 82).

However, just like for the lower house, there are no legal sanctions for non-compliance or rank order/ placement rules for party lists in voting so issues with enforcement can possibly arise.

At the sub-national level, “at every Sector, one female member and one male member of Council shall be elected through direct and secret ballot” (Article 155 of Law 27/2010 of 19/06/2010 on elections) In addition, ‘... at least thirty percent (30%) of all District Council members shall be women and shall be elected through indirect and secret ballot as well as by the members of the Council Bureau of Sectors’ (Article 156). Political party legislation: ‘Each political

177

organization shall ensure that at least thirty percent (30%) of posts that are subjected to elections are occupied by women” (Article 5, Organic Law 16/2003 of 27/06/2003 governing political organizations and politicians as amended by Organic Law 19/2007 of 04/05/2007).

The adoption of the 2003 constitution which instituted a mandatory minimum of 30% gender quota in all decision-making institutions and the 2007 amendment for the Law on Political Organizations and Politicians established that party lists for all elective offices must contain at least 30% women candidates along with the edge that List PR electoral systems have accounted for its position as first in the world for gender representation.

Sweden’s considerably high level of female political representation is mainly due to its pro-feminist policies, party quotas, and List PR electoral systems.

There are no legislated quotas in the lower house or at the sub-national level but some of its political parties have voluntary gender quotas in place. After their 2014 elections, 152 of the 349 seats or 44% of their seats were held by women. For the parties represented in parliament, the Social Democratic Party, the Left Party, the Green Party, and the Moderate Party all have some form of quotas or policies in place to encourage female political participation. The Social Democratic Party has had internal quotas since 1978 and has instituted the zipper system which alternates candidates based off their gender since 1993. The Left Party first had internal quotas in 1978 which led to the first party quota law to be implemented in 1987, paving the path for the 50% minimum of candidates on party lists to be women in 1993. On the other hand, the Green Party started with internal quotas in 1981 leading to the introduction of the first party quota rule in 1987 and the 50% gender quota on party lists in 1997. The Moderate Party simply has two women and two men have to be placed in the top 4 positions on the party list for the European Parliament elections since 2009.

Mexico has quotas at all levels; it has legislated quotas for the lower house, upper house, at the sub-national level and political parties. Mexico’s lower house has 500 seats and 212 of those seats are held by women meaning that they constitute 42% of parliament after the 2015 elections. Article 41 in its Federal Constitution mandates that political parties develop “...rules to ensure gender parity in the nomination of candidates in federal and local congressional elections.” As Mexico has a MMP electoral system, their elections are not as straightforward. 300 of the seats in its lower house are elected in single-member constituencies by plurality vote while the rest of the

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Table 1: Comparison of the Countries Rwanda Legeslated Quotas

Sweden

Yes

Party Quotas

Mexico

US

Denmark

Yes Yes

Yes

Electoral System

List PR

List PR

MMP

FPPT

List PR

Women in Parliament

63.8%

43.6%

42.6%

19.1%

37.4%

36.7%

21.0%

38.5% 200 seats are elected by proportional representation in five 40-seat constituencies. With the most recent Senate election in 2012, 33% of the seats or 42 of the 128 seats are held by women. 96 of these Senate seats are elected in single-member constituencies by plurality vote with the remaining 32 members elected by proportional representation in a single nationwide constituency. Mexico’s electoral law requires political parties to guarantee that a minimum 40% of the candidates on the lists to be of the same gender for the constituency and the proportional representation lists. The only exemptions would be for political parties that democratically elect their candidates.

(Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales, COFIPE, Article 219). Specifically for

the proportional representation elections, every section of 5 candidates must have 2 candidates of the same sex with male and female candidates alternating (COFIPE, Article 220). Unlike in Rwanda, there are legal sanctions in place to address non-compliance. Political parties that are not complying with Articles 219 and 220 have 48 hours to amend their lists. The parties will be publicly reprimanded by the General Council of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) and given an extra period of 24 hours to rectify their list if they are still found to be non-compliant.

The party’s electoral list will then be rejected by the IFE if it is still not compliant after the extra 24 hours grace period (COFIPE, Article 221). This puts immense pressure on political parties to recruit women

Graph 1: Line Graph of Women in Parliament (1995 – 2016)

Sweden

Rwanda Mexico Denmark U.S.A.

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179

Graph 2: Bar Graph on Political Parties in the Swedish Parliament *denotes parties with gender quotas 120

100

80 Members 60

Female Male

40 20

0 Social Dem

Moderate Swedish Dem Green *

but it certainly explains Mexico’s high ranking for female political representation. One Mexican political party has taken promoting gender equality one step farther by establishing its own party quota. As stated in its party statute in Article 38, the Institutional Revolutionary Party has a 50% quota for women. Furthermore, Mexico also takes the extra step in promoting women with funds specifically intended for gender-related activities. 2% of political parties’ yearly public funding must be directed to train, promote, and develop women leaders. Mexico’s quotas do not seem to be working as effectively as it ranks below Rwanda and Sweden despite its extensive use of quotas. There are certainly other factors in play but perhaps, given more time, the effect of the quotas will truly be felt. After all, Mexico only amended its constitution to advocate for gender parity in February 2014 and the deadline for additional electoral amendments was set in April 2014. Also, Mexico’s electoral system MMP may also explain why since List PR electoral systems are most likely to promote women.

In stark contrast with the countries discussed as case studies, the United States does not have any form of quotas, legislated or party, and its electoral system is not favorable towards the election of women. After

Centre

Left *

Liberal Christian Dem

the 2016 elections, women hold 83 of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives which means that make up only 19% of the lower house. Women do fare slightly better in the Senate where they consist of 21% or hold 21 out of the 100 possible seats in the upper house. For majority systems, like the FPTP in the United States, parties face pressure to support the “best” candidate which is usually not a minority or female since there is only one seat that can be won which is a lot at stake. Women have gradually started running for more seats in the United States but progress is slow and there are still considerable barriers to women running. The United States can certainly do more to support women in their pursuit of political office. After all, politics is still seen as mainly a man’s world especially in the United States.

Denmark’s case is of particular interest since it also does not have any legislated or party quotas.

That is, Denmark no longer has any quotas but some of its political parties have had quotas in place. In 1977, the Socialist People’s Party was the first political party in Denmark to introduce a 40% quota only to end up abandoning it in 1990. They also previously had candidate quotas for the European Parliament in 1983 which ended in 1990 and only had these quo-

180

TARA KWAN

Graph 3: Bar Graph on Political Parties in the Mexican Parliament *denotes parties with gender quotas 60

50

40 Members 30

Female Male

20 10

0 Institutional Rev*

Nat Act

tas for parliament and local elections from 1988 to 1990. Likewise, the Social Democratic Party adopted 40% party quotas in 1983 as well as candidate quotas for local and regional elections in 1988 but left these quotas behind in 1996. Although it is no longer an active party, the Left Socialist Party did have party and candidate quotas that called for 50% quotas in elections. The parties abandoned the quotas after they determined that the quotas were unnecessary in promoting women in politics. While Denmark can certainly work on improving female political representation nationally, it is currently doing very well compared to the rest of the world since it is ranked in the top 25 for women in parliament. This shows that countries can still have relatively high percentages of women in parliament without quotas and that quotas can be phased out if it does not appear that women need a boost in the election process anymore. However, Denmark is one of the Nordic countries where women generally enjoy a high standard of living and it also has a List PR system which does help propel women into government. (See Table 1 and Graph 1) This clearly shows the impact of the quotas and/or electoral systems have on the percentage of women in parliament for Rwanda, Sweden, Mexico, United States, and Denmark. There is no doubt that insti-

Dem Rev

Green

Labor

tuting quotas are the easiest and most effective way to increase women’s representation descriptively.

However, despite the mixed impact on policy, having more women in government shows that the government is more representative, validates women’s unique perspective on issues, and encourages more women to be actively engaged in politics. Legislated quotas may be difficult to implement and would depend on a country’s political climate. But party quotas are relatively easy to implement and can be done by the political parties themselves. This type of quota may be less effective in comparison to legislated quotas but they are still impactful. The parties have free reign to decide the minimum percentage of women they would like to include as candidates. It does not matter too much exactly what party quotas may entail since the very action of setting up quotas show the public that the political parties and hence the political system welcomes women’s participation.

This line graph is constructed with the data provided on elections results from the Inter-Parliamentary Union for the time period of 1990 to 2016. There are some missing data on some of the elections so it is not the most accurate graph but it still paints a clear picture of the increasing representation of women in parliament due to instituted gender quotas and

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181

Graph 4: Electoral Systems of the World from ACE Electoral Knowledge Network

electoral reforms. There are slight dips in the amount of women serving on parliament but this can be explained by complacency on the government and political parties that they have done enough to encourage women to run.

Overall, all of these countries have experienced momentous increases since 1990 due to increased promotion of women into politics. Some of these countries have significantly improved thanks to the combination of gender quotas implemented and their electoral systems. Rwandaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s parliament was composed of only 17.1% women back in 1990 but its current parliament has skyrocketed to being 63.8% women. The Nordic countries, Sweden and Denmark, have not shown as much growth but they did have the higher percentages of women in government back in 1990 and have slowly progressed since then. Sweden started with 38.4% of its parliament being women in 1990 and this has grown to 43.6% in 2016. Similarly, Denmarkâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s parliament was made up of 30.7% women in 1990 which has become 37.4%. Mexicoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s parliament was 12% women in 1990 and it has jumped to 42.4% nowadays. The United States, lowest out of all the mentioned countries, started off at a mere 6.6% of its parliament being women in 1990 but has grown to being 19.4% women today. This may be a big increase over time despite the lack of quotas and the non-proportional representation system. However, the United States is considered a world power and a more developed country so the percentage is not as impressive as it could be. (See Graph 2 and Graph 3)

Graphs 2 and 3 demonstrate the effect of gender quotas just within political parties and it is a substantial impact. Graph 2 is a bar graph depicting the current political parties and their elected members in the Swedish parliament. The Swedish political parties (Social Democratic, Moderate, Green, and Left parties) with an asterisk all have some form of quotas and at least or more than 50% of all the members in the respective political parties are female. It is no coincidence that the political parties with gender quotas have higher female political representation than the other parties. With 57.1% of its party members in parliament as female, the Left Party leads the other Swedish political parties in gender equality. It is followed by the Green Party whose elected members

182 are 56% female, then the Social Democratic Party at 51.3%, and finally the Moderate Party at 50%.

Another good example illustrating the power of party quotas can be seen in Mexico. The only political party with a quota in place, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, has the second highest number of women in office from its party. In fact, 34.6% of its elected members are women. The Labor Party has a higher percentage of women elected, at 40%, but this may be accounted for by its rather low numbers in parliament to begin with. (See Graph 4) Changing a countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s electoral system is a difficult and highly unlikely task since most countries in the world have established electoral systems in place.

However, if countries were to embark on electoral reform and one of their goals is to increase female representation, then proportional representation electoral systems, especially List PR, would be a great system to consider. As seen in Graph 4, List PR electoral systems are the most single most used electoral system in the world. Adding up all electoral systems with a proportional representation element like the Single Transferable Vote, Parallel, and MMDP systems, it is clear that countries recognize the advantages of a proportional representation system as it is a better reflection of voting overall.

V. Conclusion The status of women in the world has undoubtedly improved over the years. Women are becoming more involved in politics and winning seats in elections. In fact, the Inter-Parliamentary Union states that womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s average share of parliamentary membership almost doubled in the time period of 1995 to 2015, from 11.3% in 1995 to 22.1% in 2015. Women have increased their numbers in parliament in almost 90% of the 174 countries which had data for this time period. This had led to greater diversity in the top 10 rankings which previously featured 8 European countries in 1995 but now includes 4 Sub-Saharan African countries and 3 American countries as well as Europe. The shifts over time are heavily due to the adoption of electoral gender quotas around the world. A record of over 120 countries had some form of quotas in 2015 which is far cry from the small number of countries in 1990.

With all of these positive developments, it may appear that there is nothing that needs to be done concerning the state of female representation in parliament. However, progress is a never-ending cycle and the number of women in parliament can certainly improve. In 2015, there were still 5 all-male parliaments and only 5 countries managed to reach or

TARA KWAN surpass the 50% threshold of women in government.

The truth is that it is still a challenge to elect women to government even in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s society. Women continue to be bombarded with gender stereotypes, lack time and resources due to their duties, and are hard on themselves which makes it difficult for them to even think about running for office. Yet it has been well established that women do bring a fresh, different perspective to policy matters than men and their focus on more gendered issues like welfare only makes sense. Furthermore, their presence in such high office of government serves as role models to the next generation of women and encourages them to be politically involved as well as possibly run for office themselves in the future. Consequently, governments and political parties need to step up and actively work to encourage women to serve on parliament to ensure that they are doing their best to serve the population.

As seen in the country case studies of Rwanda, Sweden, United States, Mexico, and Denmark, gender quotas, which can be either legislated or party, play a large role in increasing the percentage of women in parliament for the countries which have these quotas enacted. Quotas, in particular party quotas, can be generally easy to introduce to countries seeking to improve their own female representation with results in the upcoming elections although the full effect will take time to show. Electoral systems also have a large part in facilitating the election of women to government. Generally proportional representation electoral systems, especially List PR, work the best. Although having a proportional element in the electoral systems might be best overall if countries do not want to contend with some of the issues of a sole proportional representation such as a more fragmented government. Gender quotas, in conjunction, with proportional representation electoral systems will lead to a more gender representative government in countries.

Yet other methods such as party recruitment and possibly job-sharing should be further researched.

Political parties are the gatekeepers to elected office so parties have immense influence into choosing which candidates to support. Actively recruiting female candidates can also help since women tend to have lower political ambition than men and having the support of a political party would greatly increase their chances of running. Also, more female leaders in the political parties themselves will help make the parties more welcoming to women and make it easier to identify women to run. Job-sharing is a fascinating area to explore since it is common in the workplace but its effectiveness in a political setting is still untested. Nevertheless, these factors along with gender

COUNTERTERRORISM & COUNTERINSURGENCY

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quotas and proportional electoral systems will help usher more women into politics to ensure that women

are properly represented and have a voice in deciding on what is best for the country.

References

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TARA KWAN Paxton, P., & Hughes, M. M. (2015). The Increasing Effectiveness of National Gender Quotas, 19902010. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 40(3), 331362.

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CLOSING THE GENDER GAP

185

Tara A. Kwan

Tara Kwan is a fourth year Political Science major who will be graduating in June 2017. Her involvement in multiple student organizations on campus such as the Political Science Club, Inter-Hall Council, and ASI Student Government has led her to consider pursuing an MPA in the future. Tara would like to thank all the Political Science department and the professors for making her time at Cal Poly Pomona such an enriching, learning experience!

Email: tarakwantk@gmail.com

Journal Editorial Board 2016 - 2017 Aubrey Ackermann Ayman Bahrun Sumaya Bamakhrama Evan Benson Stephanie Burdo Daisy Campuzano Thomas Davis Tripp Hatch Carla Hernandez Max Iskeiv Ashling Kelly Kirsten Khair

William Lambdin Gerardo Martinez Kaleab Mekennon Jake Messenger Mirette Morcos Carlos Navarrete Joshua Palacios Leydy Rangel Gabriel Smith Megan Warhurst Laura Yeghiazaryan Steven Zhang

Thank you to everyone who helped peer review the papers submitted to the California State University of Pomona, Undergraduate Journal of Political Science! This journal would not have been possible without the time and effort they spent to meticulously read through the articles and offer insightful comments.

Special thanks to Jane Pojawa for her work on the journal over the past two years. She has spent countless hours to ensure that it looks incredible.

Her expertise and experience in working with publications have proved to be indispensable.

Many thanks to Professor Neil Chaturvedi for all of his help on the journal.

Also, thank you to Professor and Chair Jill Hargis as well as the Political Science Department at California State Polytechnic University, Pomona for their continued support of the journal. * There was no conflict of interest between the people who peer reviewed papers for the journal and the papers that were chosen for publication. No one was assigned their own paper to read and papers were reviewed by more than one peer reviewer.

ORGANIZATIONS THE POLITICAL SCIENCE CLUB Established in 2005, the Political Science Club represents Political Science majors and those who enjoy politics. The club publicizes career opportunities for the major, offers post-graduate advising, provides a forum to discuss political matters, and contributes the betterment of the campus and surrounding communities. Meetings are held weekly on Thursdays at U-Hour (12:00 PM to 12:50 PM) in Building 5 Room 138.

»» Poli Sci Club Executive Board 2016-2017

»» Mock Trial Team 2016-2017

»» NMUN Team 2016-2017

New members are always welcome!

MOCK TRIAL The Cal Poly Pomona Mock Trial team is an organization that brings interested students together to simulate the practice of law in a mock trial. The organization competes at multiple tournaments against schools from across the country.

Through trial simulations, the Mock Trial Team not only allows students to participate in an organization unlike any other on campus, but it also allows students to develop public speaking and critical thinking skills. In order to participate students must take the prerequisite PLS 308 and PLS 308 Activity courses where they will learn the basics of trial advocacy and they will have the opportunity to be invited to participate based off in-class participation and work product.

NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS (NMUN) The Cal Poly Pomona NMUN team is a prestigious, awardwinning organization where students interested in the field of international relations come together to simulate the United Nations. Students will be assigned an UN committee and act as delegates for the assigned country. In NMUN, students hone in their research, writing, public speaking, and diplomacy skills through class exercises and NMUN simulations. NMUN offers students the opportunity to meet their peers from across the country and the world at the NMUN NY conference which is usually held in late March.

Interested students can apply to join the NMUN team through an application which is available during fall quarter and go through an interview process. Once selected, students are required to sign up for a class during winter quarter.