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HORIZON ADVISORY

Actionable Geopolitical Insight and Data

November 2026

THE SHELL GAME CONTINUES Updating Diligence and PFE Rules for Solar Sector Maneuvering

HORIZON ADVISORY Horizon Advisory, an independent strategic consultancy and data platform, helps businesses, investors, and government actors understand and respond to geopolitical, economic, and technological change.

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Table of CONTENTS Executive Summary

Introduction

FEOC and PFE Restrictions

To Rent or Buy? Canadian Solar

Chinese Investment, Supply, and Demand: Trina

If Dad Says No, Ask Mom: Jinko

Conclusion

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ABOUT

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Horizon Advisory

Horizon Advisory brings a new approach and unparalleled sources and methods to understanding geopolitics and supply chain risk. Decision-makers across sectors – investors, developers, procurement teams, and policy makers – face uncertainty associated with geopolitical, technological, and economic changes. Leveraging unprecedented primary sources, we apply updated strategic frameworks and novel analysis techniques to generate differentiated insights for businesses, investors, and governments grappling with uncertainties. Our approach allows us to deliver proactive diligence of investments, projects, and supply chains – and to develop competitive strategies to mitigate corresponding risks.

Disclaimer: The mention of any individual, company, organization, or other entity in this report does not imply the violation of any law or international agreement, and should not be construed as such.

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Executive Summary The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) of 2025 sought to crack down on Foreign Entities of Concern (FEOCs) (e.g., Chinese companies) obtaining US taxpayer support, including through Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) section 45X and 48E tax credits. To that end, the OBBBA expanded the FEOC definition and imposed new restrictions on foreign entity access to US taxpayer support. The intent of those updates was to align the resourcing streams of 45X and 48E tax credits with the spirit of supporting the US industrial base – with it, US energy security and job growth. In apparent response, in the final days of December 2025, three of China's largest solar manufacturers restructured their American operations in an attempt to comply with new and expected foreign entity restrictions. Those restructuring changes risk constituting surface-level compliance without altering underlying exposure to foreign influence. The changes satisfy the equity thresholds that inform PFE designations, bringing foreign ownership below the 25 percent threshold. But companies can comply with those thresholds while still exerting leverage and control through, for example, ownership of equipment and real estate, technology licenses, supply and purchase agreements, and debt relationships. Without clear, strict, and enforceable FEOC and prohibited foreign entity (PFE) rules, US policy risks seeding its own destruction; forfeiting the opportunity to reindustrialize and instead doubling down on a story of dependence on Chinese-owned, operated, and dominated supply chains that deliver net negatives for American energy dominance, national security, and industrial capacity. Recent restructuring moves reviewed in this report include: •

Canadian Solar: Canadian Solar is a solar PV module producer headquartered in Canada but with significant operations in and ties to China. Until December 2025, Canadian Solar’s US operations were owned by a Chinese subsidiary of the company. That month, Canadian Solar formed CS PowerTech, a new joint venture 75.1 percent owned by the company’s Canadiandomiciled entity, to lift its US manufacturing out from Chinese ownership. o Those changes allowed Canadian Solar’s US manufacturing operations to register below the 25 percent Chinese ownership threshold set in the OBBBA. But the equipment inside those operations appears to remain owned by Canadian Solar’s China-headquartered subsidiary – and to be leased out at rates set by a Shanghai appraisal firm. This case demonstrates lingering questions around ownership of facilities and equipment on which

HORIZON ADVISORY an operation relies; accompanying support, partnership, and potential dependence risk leaving effective control in Chinese-tied hands. •

Jinko Solar: FH JKV Holdings, which appears to be an affiliate of Hong Kong-based FH Capital, was incorporated in December 2025 in Delaware. Five months later, that entity acquired 75.1 percent of Jinko Solar's 2 GW Jacksonville, Florida module facility for 192 million USD. Announcements about the transaction described FH Capital as operating out of a New York address. o The acquisition brought Jinko’s stake in the Florida plant below the 25 percent Chinese ownership threshold set in the OBBBA. FH Capital, the parent of the purchaser, appears to be a Hong Kong-registered investment company, acting through a purpose-built shell with no public record of an independent operating history.

•

Trina Solar and T1 Energy: In November 2024, Trina Solar inked a deal to sell its Texas-based manufacturing assets to US-domiciled T1 Energy. That transaction originally left Trina with a stake in and an intellectual property (IP) licensing deal with T1 – both of which risked triggering “effective control” restrictions in the OBBBA. In December 2025, Trina made a series of “FEOC restructuring” adjustments to decrease its ties to T1. Trina Solar's intellectual property – the technology underlying T1 Energy's Texas module plant – was transferred to a Singaporeregistered holding company; and Trina relinquished its right to appoint an officer of T1. In May 2026, Trina decreased its stake in T1 to just over 10 percent. In July 2026, T1 acquired the Trinatied IP package from the Singapore holding company in exchange for 135 million USD payable in installments, the first three of which T1 has decided to settle in its own stock. o These updates are intended to bring T1 closer to compliance with effective control criteria based on foreign equity ownership. Trina has reduced its ownership stake to below the black-and-white threshold. And T1 has invested in owning the underlying IP it relies on. But questions about enduring ties to Trina linger: Trina accounted for nearly 100 percent of T1's net sales in the first half of 2026 and remains the company’s largest supplier by shipment volume.

These restructuring dynamics highlight the active shell game playing out in the solar sector that risks proving a FEOC circumvention playbook for other sectors and across other applications throughout government. This report details the tactics that PRC-tied companies appear to be deploying to attempt to bypass PFE and FEOC restrictions in the solar industry. These maneuvers suggest a taxonomy of criteria and considerations that should be incorporated into rulemaking by policymakers and in the diligence that investors and developers should be conducting across their portfolios of potential partners and suppliers. This report is not rendering determinations of PFE identification. It is focused on highlighting ways in which actors are adjusting for new restrictions – as well as indicators and criteria that constitute relevant considerations for ongoing rulemaking and diligence. The tactics that can be documented from the past year of corporate restructurings, like those captured in this report, can serve as a cautionary tale. Aligning the enforcement of PFE and FEOC rules with the ambition of 2

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reindustrializing US energy capacity will require transparent rules that close potential loopholes and constant vigilance in enforcement. The stakes are high for US political leaders, who may be overseeing a once-in-a-generation opportunity to level the playing field for domestic industry. And the stakes are just as high for investors and developers, who have to execute diligence with the risk of a 10-year clawback window hanging over suppliers that straddle the line of effective control.

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Introduction The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), signed into law in 2022, aimed to catalyze the domestic supply chain for renewable energy. But that law had a major flaw. It left the door open for Foreign Entities of Concern (FEOCs) (e.g., Chinese companies) to obtain US taxpayer support, including through section 45X and 48E tax credits, to extend their non-market dominance of solar and related supply chains. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) of 2025 recognized this flaw – and the deleterious impact it could have on ultimate ambitions for energy dominance and national security. The law expanded the definition of a FEOC, imposed new restrictions on foreign entity access to US taxpayer support – notably through 45X and 48E tax credits -- and denied those credits to projects for which a “prohibited foreign entity” (PFE) provides material assistance. PFEs include FEOCs; Chinese military companies; companies controlled by covered nations (e.g., China), for instance through physical headquartering or ownership; and companies influenced by covered nations, for instance through investment or debt. The intent motivating these restrictions is to ensure that US government funding and tax incentive programs meant to support domestic industry actually do so, rather than enabling China and other adversarial and non-market nations. But Beijing is adept at evading US policies – including and especially those intended to restrict China’s access to American markets and taxpayer-backed incentives. Since the passage of the new provisions in the OBBBA, Chinese companies have developed sophisticated playbooks to present themselves as FEOC and PFE compliant. These firms are maneuvering to meet blackand-white thresholds, such as ownership percentages, while maintaining commercial, technical, and/or financial ties to PRC entities that risk running afoul of the less black and white and less clearly defined “effective control” prohibitions. In December 2025, days before the OBBBA restrictions went into effect in earnest, PRC solar companies restructured their American operations in an attempt to comply with new foreign entity restrictions. Those restructurings appeared to primarily focus on the OBBBA’s clear-cut equity threshold. Companies that are 25 percent or more owned by covered (e.g., Chinese) entities are disqualified from receiving IRA credits. Therefore, PRC solar companies found ways to drop their direct ownership stake in US operations to under 25 percent. For example, Canadian Solar, the US operations of which had previously been owned by Chinese subsidiaries, formed a new joint venture 75.1 percent owned by the company’s Canadian arm. As the company’s own disclosures state, absent these entity and ownership adjustments, "the U.S. business entities would begin to lose eligibility for the Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit starting early 2026." 4

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But equity ownership is not the only means of influence. Chinese companies have other ways of influencing US operations – ones that OBBBA foreign entity restrictions acknowledge, though with less clear-cut measures than the equity ownership threshold. Examples include equipment and facility leasing, offtake agreements, reliance for intellectual property, and investment through holding companies with close ties to covered entities. The solar restructurings that have played out risk leaning on all of these. Chinese sources are explicit on the subject. As a January 2026 article explains: Faced with FEOC barriers, Chinese photovoltaic companies generally adopt flexible approaches such as technology licensing, joint ventures, or shareholding (but with less than 25 percent control) to establish compliant production capacity in the US. "Light ownership, heavy brand value, and guaranteed revenue rights" has clearly become the optimal solution.1 These attempts to “establish compliant production capacity in the US” may meet the standard of measurable FEOC and PFE restrictions as they currently exist. But the statute’s foreign entity restrictions do not hinge exclusively on equity stakes for identifying potential foreign influence and control. The statute also defines influence and control in terms of debt, officer appointment, effective control arising from contractual arrangements, and material assistance. These indicators have been tested against PRC companies’ maneuvers far less rigorously or quantitatively than have equity stakes, and in some cases not at all. As a result, it is likely premature to assume that any particular restructuring approach, regardless of intent, guarantees compliance. This report details the recent restructuring that PRC-tied companies appear to be deploying to position for PFE and FEOC restriction compliance in the solar industry. This report also outlines recommendations for strengthening PFE restriction rules and guidance to protect against Chinese manipulation and to align with the underlying intent of allocating US taxpayer support toward US energy security and US industrial capacity. The United States stands at an energy and industrial crossroads. Clear and enforceable FEOC and PFE restrictions stringently applied and diligently monitored will better position US policy interventions to support reindustrialization and energy security. The overarching goal of this report is to draw attention to the criteria and framework needed to protect against Beijing’s ability to manipulate the US regulatory environment. The recent restructuring efforts in the solar sector were themselves a response to a law written to close the gaps left by the IRA three years earlier. That whack-a-mole exercise underscores that Chinese companies will keep finding loopholes and manipulating US restrictions. Washington must be dynamic in responding – and "天合美国关联公司变现 1.6 亿美元：揭秘政策金融游戏 [Trina Solar’s U.S. Affiliate Cashes Out $160 Million: Unveiling the Game of Policy-Driven Finance]," Zhihu, January 9, 2026. 1

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structure its rules to move at an operational pace. Failure to do so will allow Chinese manufacturers operating in the United States to continue to draw on non-market support from Beijing to dominate global markets and to suffocate US domestic manufacturers, completing their cannibalization of American industry – all with the support of US taxpayers. America’s increased leverage of trade remedies has registered for the Chinese government and Chinese industry. They recognize that it will no longer be sufficient to simply re-route supply to evade tariffs and non-tariff trade remedies. They want now to export their manufacturing base to establish more formidable beachheads for assembly. But the underlying effects of those new maneuvers are no different: They leave supply chains tethered to Beijing and the true rewards of next-generation energy growth flowing back to Beijing’s coffers. And the solar case is not anomalous. It speaks to a recurring and high-stakes industrial contest that is playing out across all energy domains. US policy resolve in this moment stands to compound and have multigenerational influence. Recommendations Treasury and the IRS are crafting PFE restriction implementation guidance and have not issued final rules governing how foreign-influenced entities are to be identified. To ensure American taxpayer dollars are not handed over to the same Chinese companies that appear to be gaming the system, the following dynamics should be addressed by clear guidance: 1. Count leases and tolling arrangements toward effective control. A long-term lease of production equipment from a restricted party gives that party the ability to interrupt production. Leases and tolling arrangements should be considered a form of control. 2. Treat retained guarantees as retained interests. Where a foreign parent divests equity but continues to guarantee the divested entity's obligations, there is no observable change in underlying economic interest. Ownership threshold calculations should account for these dynamics and only be adjusted based on clear and observable separation of economic interest. 3. Apply look-through to family and other closely related party holdings. A nationality test applied at the level of an entity’s controlling individual can be evaded by assigning ownership to a related entity (e.g., family or long-term business partner) with non-covered nationality. Implementation should take into account controlling entities’ family and business relations in assessing ownership thresholds. 4. Require a complete recorded chain of title as a condition for treating an intellectual property transfer as having severed a licensing relationship. Recording is not required for an assignment to be effective between the parties, but it is the only public means by which a transfer can be verified. Final rules should require that, as of the date a taxpayer first claims a credit in reliance on an intellectual property transfer, the chain of title for each transferred property be recorded, and that the taxpayer identify any property for which it is not — placing the burden on the claimant to evidence the transfer by other means where the record is silent.

HORIZON ADVISORY 5. Require disclosure of lessors, licensors, guarantors, and principal customers, not only equity holders. The present disclosure architecture asks about only equity, where the other variables can all be used to influence, profit from, and potentially disrupt business operations. 6. Enforce the aggregate ownership threshold and build capacity to verify certifications. Compliance currently rests substantially on self-certification and supplier attestations. Absent examination capacity, the thresholds are self-reported. Enforcement capacity should be a resourcing priority and signaled as a deterrent to errant self-reporting. Full disclosures should be mandated prior to booking any tax credit support with clear fraud repercussions. 7. Test ownership on a fully diluted basis, require disclosure of rights that restore a position, and re-test at each credit claim. A point-in-time equity percentage can fall without the restricted party disposing of anything and can be rebuilt at that party’s option through convertible instruments, anti-dilution rights, subscription rights or warrants. Final rules should calculate the threshold on a fully diluted, as-converted basis; require holders to disclose any contractual right to restore or increase a position and the maximum position obtainable under it; and re-test eligibility in each taxable year in which a credit is claimed, rather than certifying once at the time of restructuring. Where a specified foreign entity holds any position, the disclosure and re-testing obligations should attach to the claimant; they need not extend to issuers with no such holder.

FEOC and PFE restrictions are, as discussed in this report, most actively relevant to US federal tax policy and to eligibility for existing US tax credits, like 45X and 48E. But this set of rules and policy challenges carry broader implications. FEOC and PFE rules address foreign influence in a way that builds on legacy frameworks like the Foreign Ownership Control and Influence (FOCI) regime that dates back to Cold War-era efforts to protect America’s defense industrial base. Clear and enforceable FEOC and PFE rules stand to empower more trusted investment across a range of US taxpayer support mechanisms. In the renewable energy and solar fields, the rules could immediately be leveraged by authorities beyond tax policy. For example, the August 2026 Section 232 tariffs on polysilicon and its derivative products codify an onshoring incentive program. US Commerce Department and US Trade Representative (USTR) authorities managing that policy effort could learn from the restructuring responses to FEOC and PFE restrictions and could benefit from the example of clear rulemaking. The PRC playbooks outlined here could inform not only finalization of PFE implementation, but also consideration of which companies ought to be eligible for tariff relief to build on American soil. And other efforts to apply American industrial policy toward the goals of US energy security and reindustrialization can similarly leverage FEOC and PFE restrictions better to protect US research security and supply chains in sectors ranging from semiconductors to quantum materials, and across broader critical material supply chains.

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Understanding FEOC and PFE Restrictions FEOC and PFE restrictions cover links to and dependence on foreign adversaries including the means by which material assistance to operations can be defined: investment, debt, tech licensing, material supply, personnel, and corporate network ties that contribute to determinations of effective control. The overarching intent of these restrictions appears to be preventing companies with any form of dependence on or affiliation to covered nations from receiving US government support. But the letter of the law provides a narrower definition. Two overarching categories of entities are captured under the PFE umbrella. •

The first is a “specified foreign entity” (SFE). These are FEOCs as well as other entities that the US government has directly identified as bad actors – for example Chinese military companies, identified in the Department of War’s 1260H list of Chinese Military Companies;2 companies identified in the Department of Homeland Security’s Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List; and entities ineligible for Department of Defense contracts, as identified by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.

Within this category, FEOCs are defined as entities with ties to “covered nations” (China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia). More specifically, FEOCs are: governments, agencies, or other arms of the government of a covered nation; citizens or nationals of covered nations who are not also US citizens, nationals, or lawful permanent residents; entities or qualified business units incorporated in, organized under the laws of, or with its principal place of business in a covered nation, and/or entities controlled by any of the above. “Control” in that definition means ownership of more than 50 percent of stock for corporations, profit or capital interests for partnerships, or beneficial interests for other entities. •

The second is a “foreign-influenced entity” (FIE). FIEs are entities under the “effective control” of SFEs. Effective control is defined in the OBBBA as arising from contractual arrangements including IP licensing, ownership of 25 percent of equity, ownership of debt, ability directly or

As an example of an entity discussed in this report, on June 8, 2026, the Department of War added Trina Solar Co., Ltd. to the 1260H list: https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jun/08/2003945537/-1/-1/1/ENTITIES-IDENTIFIED-ASCHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES-IN-ACCORDANCE-WITHSECTION-1260H.PDF.

HORIZON ADVISORY indirectly to appoint officers, and/or influence over production of components, generation, or storage.

Some specifics of these definitions are still unclear. The Department of Treasury and Internal Revenue Service have not yet published final guidance on how foreign entity restrictions are to be interpreted and applied or how exactly FIEs are to be identified. That said, rulemaking appears to track with the overarching intent and policy ambition that propelled the framing of these challenges in OBBBA language: These restrictions are intended to prevent Chinese companies – and those of other covered nations – their arms, their affiliates, and entities dependent on them from receiving US taxpayer support. That said, many actors are seeking loopholes in these restrictions – and China-tied players are actively exploiting potential loopholes to position in a way that may allow them to retain US policy benefits and access to the US market. The case studies that follow detail ways in which this process is playing out. These case studies can offer cautionary tales for rule makers, as they seek to ensure that PFE restrictions are implemented in the most effective way possible. These case studies should also constitute cautionary tales for customers of Chinese and Chinese-tied entities as well as the investors and marketplaces that are transacting in company- and project-based assets valued based on assumptions of FEOC and PFE restriction compliance. The PFE rules include strict claw back provisions. If tax credits are sent to entities later determined to be a PFE, those credits can then be “clawed back.” This creates significant risk for the customers of PFE-exposed companies. Rulemaking may also further require up-front disclosures that could carry added risk for fraud repercussions at company and board levels. And as certainty in rulemaking arrives, policy should continue to stress the scope and tenure of claw back provisions. Investors and developers should internalize those risks more clearly in their assessment of the market and the procurement processes they adopt.

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To Rent or Buy? Canadian Solar Canadian Solar is NASDAQ-listed and headquartered in Canada. Since its founding, Canadian Solar has maintained major operations tied to China; the company was founded by a Chinese returnee benefiting from the National Thousand Talents program; and the company receives Chinese government support in the form of subsidies.3 Canadian Solar’s 2024 annual report, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, acknowledges that this means that the company is bound by Chinese laws and regulations.4 As recently as April 2025, the company’s US-facing statements have maintained that it cannot assert that its de facto management is not located in China: “However, it remains unclear as to whether our ‘de facto management body’ is located in China for PRC tax purposes.”5 On their own, Canadian Solar’s extensive PRC ties, documented in more detail below, raise questions as to whether the company as a whole, including its Canada-headquartered operations, ought to qualify as PFEs. In addition, the company went through acrobatics – ranging from shifts in controlling shareholders to leasing of equipment owned by Chinese subsidiaries – in 2025. These constitute apparent attempts to ensure that its US presence complies with at least the letter of prospective PFE restrictions. Notably: •

Canadian Solar’s US-based operations (e.g., Canadian Solar US Module Manufacturing Corporation) have historically been 100 percent owned by the company’s China-headquartered and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE)-listed CSI Solar.6 In 2025, Canadian Solar established new

阿特新阳光店里集团获 2015 中国原创技术 [Art New Sunshine Store Group Won the 2015 China Original Technology],” China Economic Weekly, December 28, 2015; “Canadian Solar Form 20F,” Canadian Solar, April 30, 2025. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/static-files/8c409658-082c-4758-b72b-964cd26eed05; "阿特斯： 2025 年年度报告 [Canadian Solar: 2025 Annual Report (Download Announcement)]," 2026. 4 For example, Canadian Solar’s 2024 annual report states that, because of its extensive presence in China, “we are subject to risks arising from the PRC legal system,” including the Data Security Law, the Personal Information Protection Law, and the Cybersecurity Review Measures. (“Canadian Solar Form 20F,” Canadian Solar, April 30, 2025.) 5 “Canadian Solar Form 20F,” Canadian Solar, April 30, 2025. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/8c409658-082c-4758-b72b-964cd26eed05 6 CSI Solar is a 64 percent owned subsidiary of Canadian Solar Inc.

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•

US manufacturing facilities as joint ventures between China-headquartered CSI Solar (24.9 percent) and Canada-headquartered (75.1 percent) Canadian Solar Inc. That ownership structure would comply with the 25 percent ownership threshold outlined in PFE restrictions. These new US-based manufacturing subsidiaries might be less than 25 percent owned by CSI Solar. But their broader dependence may endure in terms of facilities and equipment that that Chinese entity owns – and leases to them, based on appraisal by Zhoulan (Shanghai) Asset Appraisal Co., Ltd.7 In other words, the company’s US facilities risk depending on equipment, facilities, and other assets owned by a PRC entity.

As Canadian Solar’s SEC filings put it: “Pursuant to the relevant provisions of the U.S. One, Big, Beautiful Bill Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), if the above business adjustments were not made, the U.S. business entities would begin to lose eligibility for the Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit starting early 2026.”8 On paper, these ties might fall below the PFE thresholds laid out in the OBBBA. But taken as a whole, they risk running afoul of the “effective control” test – as reflected in influence over production of components, generation, or storage – and certainly undermine the spirit of the restrictions. Company Overview Canadian Solar was founded in 2001 by Xiaohua Qu (瞿晓铧) – who remains the company’s CEO, Chairman, and largest shareholder, with a 20.7 percent stake as of April 2026.9 Canadian Solar’s 2025 annual report notes that, “our founder, Dr. Shawn Qu, has substantial influence over our company.”10 The company’s English-language website describes Qu as having founded the company in Guelph, Ontario.11 Chinese sources report that Qu “returned” to China in 2001 to launch Canadian Solar, bringing “advanced photovoltaic equipment” with him, as part of the National Thousand Talents program.12 The reality appears to potentially be both. In 2001, Qu established two companies: Ontario-based Canadian Solar and Canadian Solar (Changshu) Co., Ltd., located in Jiangsu Province, his

“Canadian Solar Form 6-K,” Canadian Solar, February 2026. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/5d83c4f2-d84a-4799-80c3-686598c524fc 8 “Canadian Solar Form 6-K,” Canadian Solar, February 2026. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/5d83c4f2-d84a-4799-80c3-686598c524fc 9 “Canadian Solar Form 20F,” Canadian Solar, April 10, 2026. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/482e97bd-68b7-4851-99b5-c35659a8b4ce 10 “Canadian Solar Form 20F,” Canadian Solar, April 10, 2026. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/482e97bd-68b7-4851-99b5-c35659a8b4ce 11 “Board of Directors,” Canadian Solar, Accessed October 17, 2025. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/corporategovernance/board-and-management. 12 阿特新阳光店里集团获 2015 中国原创技术 [Art New Sunshine Store Group won the 2015 China Original Technology],” China Economic Weekly, December 28, 2015.

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manufacturing arm.13 Canadian Solar has maintained that structure in the decades since, scaling it as the solar industry has grown and leveraging it to benefit both from Chinese State support, on the one hand, and the access to the US market provided by a Canadian domicile, on the other. Canadian Solar is technically headquartered in Canada. From that outpost, it has established a presence in the United States. But the company runs on, and its critical mass is made up of, manufacturing affiliates in the PRC. The company’s 2025 annual report acknowledges that “a significant portion of [its] manufacturing operations [are] in China.”14 A Critical Mass in China This division, and the corresponding concentration of Canadian Solar’s physical presence in China, is reflected in the distribution of the company’s long-lived assets, including property, plant and equipment, solar power and battery energy storage systems, intangible assets, and ROU assets. As of the company’s 2024 annual report, about half of those assets were based in China, as reflected in the table below – as of the 2025 annual report, Canadian Solar’s public reporting appears to no longer break out long-lived assets by country, instead grouping all of the Asia Pacific together. Canadian Solar Long Lived Assets by Country/Region15 (Thousands of USD)

Country China US Thailand Europe Brazil Colombia Argentina Others Total

December 31, 2023 2,398,130 528,538 691,467 99,738 409,211 61,847 63,526 44,232 4,296,689

December 31, 2024 2,515,326 1,405,757 620,060 500,229 374,177 57,822 49,150 38,635 5,561,156

As of December 31, 2024, Canadian Solar had almost 12,000 employees in China and less than half of that in all of the rest of the world combined, including the US, Canada, Japan, Australia,

See: “Canadian Solar AMENDMENT NO. 3 TO FORM F-1 REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933,” Canadian Solar, Accessed October 17, 2025. 14 “Canadian Solar Form 20F,” Canadian Solar, April 10, 2026. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/482e97bd-68b7-4851-99b5-c35659a8b4ce 15 “Canadian Solar Form 20F,” Canadian Solar, April 30, 2025. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/8c409658-082c-4758-b72b-964cd26eed05

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Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Latin America, and the European Union. 16 The company’s China-tied reality is also evident in a quirk of its corporate filings: Those, filed by an ostensibly Canadian entity to the US Nasdaq, are audited by “Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Certified Public Accountants LLP, an independent registered public accounting firm located in China.”17 Chinese Government Backing Further underscoring Canadian Solar’s ties to the PRC, its affiliates in China receive government incentives and support. Multiple Canadian Solar subsidiaries – including Suzhou Sanysolar Materials Technology Co., Ltd, Changshu Tegu New Material Technology Co., Ltd, CSI New Energy Development (Suzhou) Co., Ltd, CSI Solar Technologies (JiaXing) Co., Ltd, Canadian Solar Photovoltaic Technology (Luoyang) Co., Ltd. and CSI Energy Storage Co., Ltd. – have been designated by the Chinese government as “High and New Technology Enterprises.”18 That designation, granted to preferred companies in key supply chain nodes, comes with, among other perks, preferential tax status. And in its 2025 annual report, CSI Solar Co., Ltd., Canadian Solar’s main operating subsidiary in China, reported receiving over 125 million RMB in government subsidies in 2025, as well as over 200 million RMB in 2024.19 Key Personnel Canadian Solar’s affiliates – in Canada, the United States, China, and across the world – exist in a complex web of subsidiaries and parents. Qu serves as a clear and unifying thread, as both a shareholder and manager.20 For example, he is chairman of both Canadian Solar, listed on the Nasdaq, and CSI Solar Co., Ltd., listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange's Sci-Tech Innovation Board.21

“Canadian Solar Form 20F,” Canadian Solar, April 30, 2025. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/8c409658-082c-4758-b72b-964cd26eed05 17 “Canadian Solar Form 20F,” Canadian Solar, April 10, 2026. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/482e97bd-68b7-4851-99b5-c35659a8b4ce 18 “Canadian Solar Form 20F,” Canadian Solar, April 30, 2025. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/8c409658-082c-4758-b72b-964cd26eed05 19 CSI (阿特斯阳光电力集团股份有限公司) 2025 Annual Report, April 28, 2026. 20 “Canadian Solar Form 20F,” Canadian Solar, April 30, 2025. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/8c409658-082c-4758-b72b-964cd26eed05 21 "阿特斯：2024 年年度报告 [Canadian Solar: 2024 Annual Report ]," Sina Finance, April 29, 2024.

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Qu’s personal biography underscores the company’s ties to China. Born in Beijing, he holds a bachelor’s degree from Tsinghua University, where he was made a visiting professor in 2011.22 He has won major PRC government awards including the Jiangsu Province May 1st Labor Honorary Medal and the Jiangsu Province “Young and Middle-Aged Experts with Outstanding Contributions” awards.23 Qu has held roles affiliated with the PRC government too: He was a member of the Changshu Municipal Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. And he has held leadership roles on government-overseen industry associations including the China Renewable Energy Society and Suzhou Photovoltaic Industry Association. 24

The PFE Evasion Playbook To some extent, the entire Canadian Solar structure – and the often counterintuitive relationship between its Canadian headquarters and Chinese operations – can be framed in the context of regulatory evasion, or at least arbitrage. But the company has taken additional steps since 2025 to massage the details of its operations to align with the OBBB and PFE restrictions. First was the establishment of US “joint ventures.” As of December 31, 2024, Canadian Solar’s US-based operations were all 100 percent owned by the company’s China-headquartered CSI Solar subsidiary. In 2025, Canadian Solar established new US manufacturing facilities. These are subordinate to a new “joint venture” entity, CS PowerTech, which is 24.9 percent owned by China-based CSI Solar and 75.1 percent owned by Canada-headquartered Canadian Solar Inc.25 Therefore, the company’s US-based manufacturing facilities – at least on the surface – slip just under the 25 percent ownership threshold specified in PFE restrictions. Second is the question of the equipment, facilities, and other assets on which those joint ventures depend. Those remain owned by the China-headquartered CSI Solar. But CSI Solar, via USbased subsidiaries, leases the assets to CS PowerTech on approximately five-year terms. This allows CSI Solar to claim literal rents on – and maintain control over – production ostensibly carried out by non-Chinese entities. 26

“瞿晓铧 [Qu Xiaohua],” Sina East Money, Accessed October 17, 2025.

"阿特斯（中国）投资有限公司董事长、总裁兼首席执行官瞿晓铧[Qu Xiaohua, Chairman, President and CEO of Canadian Solar (China) Investment Co., Ltd]," Xinhua, July 4, 2017. 24 “瞿晓铧 [Qu Xiaohua],” SolarZoom, Accessed October 17, 2025. 25 “Canadian Solar to Resume Direct Oversight of U.S. Manufacturing and Operations,” Canadian Solar, December 1, 2025. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/news-releases/news-release-details/canadian-solar-resume-directoversight-us-manufacturing-and; “Canadian Solar Opens US Solar Cell Factory in Indiana,” Reuters, July 24, 2026. 26 “Canadian Solar Form 6-K,” Canadian Solar, February 2026. https://investors.canadiansolar.com/staticfiles/5d83c4f2-d84a-4799-80c3-686598c524fc.

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Chinese Investment, Supply, and Demand: Trina and T1 In November 2024, Trina Solar (Schweiz AG), a subsidiary of Chinese solar energy giant Trina Solar, inked a deal to sell its Texas-based solar manufacturing assets to T1 Energy. A USdomiciled company, T1 describes itself as “building an integrated US supply chain for solar and batteries.” The transaction has been billed as a victory for US domestic energy production and the bid to loosen China’s stranglehold on the solar industry. But the details of the deal raise questions about continuing ties between T1 and Trina. Their ties appear to remain in financial and market dynamics. Namely: • •

Trina holds a stake in T1 Energy – though one that registers as in compliance with prospective PFE regulation. Trina is T1’s largest – and, for the three months ended June 2026, only – customer and appears also to be T1’s largest supplier.

T1’s business model appears to rest on combining US ownership, which could afford compliance with regulatory restrictions and the benefit of US government incentives, with a “commercial partnership” with Trina. The company’s 2025 form S-3 SEC registration statement described the company’s competitive differentiation as follows: “The superior performance characteristics of the PV solar modules that we manufacture through our commercial partnership with Trina Solar (“Trina”) and our domestic content will competitively differentiate T1 Energy in the U.S. market.”27 T1’s financial disclosures also indicate awareness that ties to the PRC risk running afoul of US regulations – more specifically, restrictions on foreign entities of concern. Its August 2025 Form S-3 noted that new US legislation: eliminates the availability of tax credits for taxpayers that source a particular percentage of their products and components from, or have certain commercial arrangements with, foreign entities of concern (“FEOC”). We are actively working to ensure compliance with the FEOC-related provisions of the OBBBA to allow us and our customers to retain the availability of tax credits in the future. Chinese media sources are explicit in their assessment of “FEOC barriers” and Trina. A January 2026 article explains that, 27

"T1 Energy Form S-3," T1 Energy, September 2025. https://ir.t1energy.com/static-files/971b1866-a469-4f16bb46-59476535aee1.

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Although T1 operates as an independent publicly traded company in the United States, it is seen as a key platform for Trina Solar to achieve "localized manufacturing" in the U.S. market, given the strict controls imposed on "Foreign Entities of Concern" (FEOC) by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA)…. The T1 case reflects the collective landscape of how China's photovoltaic industry is responding to changes in the US market. Faced with FEOC barriers, Chinese photovoltaic companies generally adopt flexible approaches such as technology licensing, joint ventures, or shareholding (but with less than 25 percent control) to establish compliant production capacity in the US. "Light ownership, heavy brand value, and guaranteed revenue rights" has clearly become the optimal solution.28 Importantly, none of the facts of this dynamic mean that T1 is currently at risk of PFE restrictions. However, the company does appear still to have clear dependencies on – and therefore risks influence on the part of – the PRC. This dynamic does highlight how Chinese companies like Trina may be positioning and where added clarity may be needed from FEOC and PFE rulemaking. T1’s form 10-Q spells out the importance of compliance and the variety of areas where OBBBA provisions drive firm-level responses: The Company recognizes compliance with these provisions of the OBBBA as a significant regulatory and business priority, and we are focused and actively working to ensure we maintain compliance with these provisions to allow us and our customers to retain the availability of tax credits in the future. On December 30, 2025, we announced a series of transactions intended to allow us to continue our eligibility for 45X Tax Credits (as defined herein) in 2026 and beyond (referred to as the “FEOC Restructuring”). In this update, we detailed our actions designed to facilitate compliance with the following requirements: •

•

• •

Equity: Trina Solar (Schweiz) AG’s (“Trina Solar”) equity holdings have never exceeded the 25 percent limit under the OBBBA. In addition, to further bolster our compliance position, we have amended our certificate of incorporation to provide certain limits on SFE equity ownership. Debt: We raised significant capital in late 2025 and have used certain of that capital, together with shares of common stock, to make a substantial debt repayment to Trina Solar. As a result, the percentage of our debt held by Trina Solar is below the relevant threshold set by the OBBBA. Appointment of Covered Officers: We and Trina Solar entered into an agreement that removes Trina Solar’s previous right to appoint a covered officer. Effective Control: After careful analysis and diligence, we concluded that we do not have any agreements that would render us an SFE pursuant to the “effective control” provisions of the OBBBA.

"天合美国关联公司变现 1.6 亿美元：揭秘政策金融游戏 [Trina Solar’s U.S. Affiliate Cashes Out $160 Million: Unveiling the Game of Policy-Driven Finance]," Zhihu, January 9, 2026. 28

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•

Intellectual Property: We previously licensed certain patents and other intellectual property from Trina Solar. Trina Solar later sold that intellectual property to Evervolt and as a result we licensed the intellectual property from Evervolt. After conducting customary diligence on Evervolt, we believe that Evervolt is not an SFE. As described further above, on July 28, 2026 we acquired such patents and other intellectual property rights from Evervolt. Material Assistance: After conducting supply chain diligence, we have purchased solar cells for use in a portion of our PV solar modules to be produced in 2026 from suppliers that have provided certifications of its non-PFE (“MA Compliant”) status and are undertaking diligence to help ensure the remainder of cells for use in 2026 will be MA Compliant. Our efforts to build a domestic supply chain, including domestic cells to be produced at our G2_Austin facility, domestic polysilicon from Hemlock Semiconductor, domestic wafers from Corning, and domestic steel frames from Nextpower are expected to further bolster our ongoing material assistance compliance efforts. On February 12, 2026, the United States Department of the Treasury released initial guidance pertaining to the implementation of PFE restrictions under the OBBBA. We believe that we remain in compliance with these restrictions and expect to be eligible for 45X Tax Credits.29

Trina’s Shareholding Trina appears to remain an active T1 shareholder – though its current stake, approximately 10 percent, is lower than it has been in the past. The November 2024 deal between Trina and T1 Energy was not a simple acquisition. It also granted Trina a significant stake in T1 Energy: In addition to 100 million USD in cash and a 150 million USD loan note, T1 gave Trina 15,437,847 common shares and an 80 million USD unsecured convertible note – convertible to 30,440,113 common shares. The result was that in September 2025, after a first tranche of conversion, Trina held a 16.6 percent stake in T1 Energy (27,959,500 common shares). Based on T1 filings from October of that year, Trina appeared to be the largest holder of T1’s common stock at the time.30 Trina’s original stake in T1 also granted the Chinese company influence over T1’s board of directors – a direct trigger for PFE restrictions. In December 2025, Trina and T1 removed that appointment right.31

“Form 10-Q for T1 Energy Inc Filed 8/12/2026,” T1, August 12, 2026. https://ir.t1energy.com/staticfiles/b662ce30-5f15-4227-8009-5bee4fe82f55. 30 “T1 Energy Schedule 14A,” T1 Energy, October 10, 2025. https://ir.t1energy.com/static-files/26aa31c7-b0ff4ae1-8580-bc81504bca36. 31 “Form Schedule 13D/A for T1 Energy Inc filed 5/26/2026,” T1, May 26, 2026. https://ir.t1energy.com/staticfiles/483d1733-8372-4453-aef8-3431c3393ec4.

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In May 2026, Trina cut its stake in T1 to approximately 10 percent, apparently to stay compliant with PFE restrictions.32 That said, the Chinese company appears to remain T1’s second largest holder of common shares. And, as of August 2026 filings, T1 still has a 65 million USD debt obligation to Trina.33 The Evervolt Tie T1’s restructuring and compliance efforts have also addressed technological ties to Trina. Originally, the US-based company licensed IP from Trina. Later, that IP was transferred to Evervolt -- before T1 purchased it from that entity with shares and debt. On the one hand, this avoids Trina registering as a source of “effective control” via IP licensing. On the other hand, Evervolt now holds a stake in T1. And that introduces different potential risks. T1’s November 2024 agreement with Trina Solar involved commercial support and technology licensing agreements. These included a module operations support agreement, IP license agreement, and IP sublicense agreement, among others.34 However, those relationships were adjusted at the end of 2025 – likely in order better to comply with IP licensing criteria relevant to PFE restrictions laid out in the OBBBA. On December 29, 2025, T1 announced that Trina's IP had been transferred to Evervolt Green Energy Holding Pte. Ltd., a Singapore-registered entity.35 In July 2026, T1 acquired the IP portfolio from Evervolt for 135.0 million USD, to be paid in tranches of cash, shares, or a combination.36 T1 has elected to satisfy at least the first three tranches with shares. As recently as October 21, though, the settlement of the third tranche was deferred under an agreement that prevents Evervolt from owning more than 4.99 percent of T1’s outstanding shares at any time.37 As of October 6, 2026, Evervolt was reported beneficially to own more than 14 million shares in T1.38 Evervolt appears to have business ties to Trina and separate connections to the PRC’s militarycivil fusion ecosystem. Evervolt’s sole owner is Tan Chin Piaw (Simon Tan). While Tan is a 32

See: “Form 4/1 for Trina Solar Schweiz AG Filed 5/26/2026,” T1, May 26, 2026. https://ir.t1energy.com/staticfiles/6287d11e-5ac5-4530-8ea1-dc3e466c2c37. 33 “Form 10-1 for T1 Energy Inc Filed 8/12/2026,” T1, August 12, 2026. https://ir.t1energy.com/staticfiles/b662ce30-5f15-4227-8009-5bee4fe82f55. 34 " T1 Energy Form S-3," T1 Energy, September 2025. https://ir.t1energy.com/static-files/971b1866-a469-4f16bb46-59476535aee1. 35 “Form 8-K,” Securities and Exchange Commission, December 29, 2025. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1992243/000121390025126306/ea0271222-8k_t1energy.htm. 36 T1 Energy Inc., Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2026, filed August 12, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001992243/000199224326000022/t1-20260630.htm. 37 "T1 Energy defers stock issuance in $30 million Evervolt asset purchase," Investing.com, October 21, 2026. 38 T1 Energy Inc., Current Report on Form 8-K and Prospectus Supplement on Form 424(b)(7), filed October 6, 2026.

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Singaporean citizen,39 he has maintained a commercial relationship with Trina for at least 15 years across multiple jurisdictions. More broadly – bearing out Tan and Evervolt’s ties to the PRC, and to its military-civil fusion ecosystem – Tan was appointed as a director in 2025 at CETC Electronics Equipment Group (HK) Company Limited, an apparent subsidiary or former subsidiary of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC). A CETC press release subsequent to that development noted that a “100 percent equity transfer” occurred with Tan and Evervolt serving as the “transferee.”40 CETC is a State-owned PRC defense conglomerate, one of the country’s backbone military companies. The US Department of War has identified several CETC affiliates as Chinese military companies.41 More details on the T1-Evervolt IP transfer agreement, as well as Trina’s shareholding in T1, are included in an appendix to this report. Market Dependence T1 and Trina have worked over the past year to adjust their equity and IP relationships in order to remain compliant with prospective PFE restrictions. But those changes may not have fundamentally altered their market relationship. And this market relationship might be the clearest signal of Trina’s potential ties to T1 – if also an overlooked type of connection in current PFE identification guidance and criteria. T1’s Q2 2026 financial disclosures suggest that Trina makes up 100 percent of its sales and its trade receivables. In the three months ended June 30, 2026, T1 reported 250,128,000 USD in sales. 250,128,000 USD of those – or all of them – were to Trina: PV solar module gross sales of $261.5 million and $450.2 million to the Trina Group are presented as net sales - related party for the three and six months ended June 30, 2026, respectively. Net sales - related party for the three and six months ended June 30, 2026, are reduced for amortization of $11.4 million and $22.7 million, respectively, for the

“Exhibit 7-03,” Securities and Exchange Commission, September 22, 2024. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1210618/000121390017009143/sc13d0617luex7-03_spienergy.htm. 40 中电科电子装备集团（香港）有限公司完成股权交接｜要闻-中电科电子装备有限公司 [China Electric Electronic Equipment Group (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. completed the equity handover], November 7, 2025, https://zbjt.cetc.com.cn/cemec/334983/334959/2113059/index.html. 41 See relevant entities in a recent listing update: https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jun/08/2003945537/-1/1/1/ENTITIES-IDENTIFIED-AS-CHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITEDSTATES-IN-ACCORDANCE-WITH-SECTION-1260H.PDF.

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intangible asset related to a favorable acquired customer contract that was recorded as part of purchase accounting for the Trina Business Combination.42 On the supply side, T1’s August 2025 Form 10-Q states that “the Company has agreements with the Trina Group to supply certain materials and components used in our solar module production, provide operational support and sales agency and aftermarket services.”43 And between June 2025 and September 2026, the Dallas facility that T1 bought from Trina (“T1 G1 Dallas Solar Module” in Wilmer, TX 75172), based on shipping manifest data, received 820 shipments from Trina Solar Changzhou, more than from any other supplier. The next most shipments (120) came from Sbh Kibing Solar New Materials which, while based in Kota, Malaysia, appears to be an operating company under Zhuzhou Kibing Group Co., Ltd., specializing in, among other things, photovoltaic glass with a headquarters in Shenzhen, China, and listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.

“Form 10-1 for T1 Energy Inc Filed 8/12/2026,” T1, August 12, 2026. https://ir.t1energy.com/staticfiles/b662ce30-5f15-4227-8009-5bee4fe82f55. 43 T1 Energy Form 10-Q,” T1 Energy, August 19, 2025.

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If Dad Says No, Ask Mom: Jinko Solar In May 2026, Delaware-incorporated holding company FH JKV Holdings acquired a 75.1 percent stake of the 2 GW Jacksonville, Florida, module manufacturing facility of JinkoSolar, one of the PRC’s largest solar module companies. This brought Jinko’s stake below the 25 percent PFE threshold.44 The deal was presented as a win for domestic manufacturing in the US market. But digging deeper reveals potential concerns and considerations -- areas where future FEOC and PFE restriction guidance could provide clarity: •

•

FH JKV Holdings appears to be a part of the FH Capital brand. FH Capital appears to be a Hong Kong-headquartered entity led by PRC-tied owners: It risks serving simply as a pass-through for potentially continuing Chinese ownership and influence at the Florida facility. Jinko maintains a 24.9 percent stake of its Jacksonville operations, just under the PFE threshold. PRC media suggests that “components produced by this factory can still be sold under the Jinko Solar brand.”45 And, according to Jinko’s financial disclosures, the company continues to guarantee the Jacksonville facility’s performance obligations.

Again, Chinese language media is explicit on the subject: “Jinko Solar’s decision to relinquish its controlling stake is driven by the 25 percent ownership limit set by the OBBBA, which would disqualify Chinese companies from obtaining IRA tax credits if they exceed that threshold.”46

FH Capital: A Hong Kong Company FH Capital appears to have acquired the 75.1 percent stake in Jinko’s Jacksonville facility via FH JKV Holdings Limited, a Delaware-incorporated entity. That incorporation makes FH JKV an American entity. But its apparent parent, FH Capital, is a Hong Kong-headquartered entity. FH Capital appears to be the operating name of Hong Kong-based Fortune Harmony Investments Limited. Until at least May 2026, the terms of service page on FH Capital’s website – a page that 44

“FH Capital to Acquire 75.1% Majority Stake in JinkoSolar’s U.S. Manufacturing Operations, Establishing a Premier Domestic Solar and BESS Platform,” Business Wire, May 8, 2026. 45 "光伏巨头 13 亿“割肉”美国工厂，前中国首富妻子接手？[PV Giant Takes 1.3-Billion-Yuan Hit Offloading US Factory; Will the Wife of China’s Former Richest Man Take Over?]," OFWeek, May 14, 2026. 46 "光伏巨头 13 亿“割肉”美国工厂，前中国首富妻子接手？[PV Giant Takes 1.3-Billion-Yuan Hit Offloading US Factory; Will the Wife of China’s Former Richest Man Take Over?]," OFWeek, May 14, 2026.

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appears since to have been taken down – identified the company as “Fortune Harmony Investments Limited” (e.g., “This agreement is legally binding between you (“User,” “you” or “your”) and Fortune Harmony Investments Limited. That agreement cited a postal address of “Champion Tower 4420-22 3 Garden Road Central, Hong Kong.”47 Hong Kong corporate registry databases confirm that a “Fortune Harmony Investments Limited” is registered at Room 4420-22, Level 44, Champion Tower, No. 3 Garden Road, Central, Hong Kong and that the company was incorporated in June 2023. Its last annual return was filed in July 2026.48 Further bolstering these findings, FH Capital’s chief investment officer, Sanjeev Chaurasia, until at least August 2026 described his FH Capital work location as Hong Kong on LinkedIn. That appears since to have been updated to New York.49 A note: While at Credit Suisse, Chaurasia, per FH Capital press releases, facilitated JinkoSolar’s 2010 NYSE IPO.50 FH Capital does advertise a New York City address – alongside locations in Australia and Hong Kong – on its website. JinkoSolar’s regulatory filing cited that New York address.51 But it corresponds to a Regus facility, which offers physical space as well as options to function as a virtual office and mailbox provider.

PRC-Tied Key Stakeholders The ultimate owner of FH Capital is Zhang Wei (张唯), a naturalized Australian national married to Shi Zhengrong (施正荣), referred to in PRC media as the “wife of China’s former richest man and the ‘Godfather of photovoltaics.’”52

See: https://web.archive.org/web/20260508184002/https://www.fhcinv.com/legal/terms-of-service. “Fortune Harmony Investments Limited,” HK Company Directory, Accessed September 16, 2026. https://www.ltddir.com/companies/fortune-harmony-investments-limited/. 49 Jennifer Dluohy and Mark Chediak, “China Solar Firm's US Tax-Credit Bid Tested by Hong Kong Tie,” Bloomberg, August 6, 2026. 50 “FH Capital to Acquire 75.1% Majority Stake in JinkoSolar’s U.S. Manufacturing Operations, Establishing a Premier Domestic Solar and BESS Platform,” FH Capital, May 8, 2027 [sic]. https://www.fhcinv.com/insights/fhcapital-to-acquire-75-1-majority-stake-in-jinkosolars-u-s-manufacturing-operations-establishing-a-premierdomestic-solar-and-bess-platform. 51 Jennifer Dluohy and Mark Chediak, “China Solar Firm's US Tax-Credit Bid Tested by Hong Kong Tie,” Bloomberg, August 6, 2026. 52 "光伏巨头 13 亿“割肉”美国工厂，前中国首富妻子接手？[PV Giant Takes 1.3-Billion-Yuan Hit Offloading US Factory; Will the Wife of China’s Former Richest Man Take Over?]," OFWeek, May 14, 2026. 48

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As PRC media explains, on May 8, 2026, Jinko transferred 75.1 percent of its US factory to FH JKV Holdings Limited for 192 million USD. FH JKV Holdings was a newly established entity, set up – five months earlier with $1,500 in registered capital – specifically for the acquisition. FH JKV Holdings’s actual controller is Zhang Wei.53 Shi is considered a key figure in the PRC’s solar industry – and in its international expansion. In 2001, he established Wuxi Suntech in China, the country’s “first modern photovoltaic manufacturing enterprise.” That company listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 2005, “becoming the first Chinese photovoltaic company to be listed in the United States.” However, it ultimately went bankrupt after anti-dumping and countervailing duties imposed by the United States and Europe sought to address PRC non-market practices in the sector. Shi established a number of other Chinese photovoltaic companies thereafter, including in partnership with his wife.54 The two served as joint controllers of Asia Silicon, a supplier of high-purity polysilicon.55

A Jinko Guarantee According to Jinko’s financial disclosures, the company continues to guarantee the performance obligations of the Jacksonville facility (JAX), suggesting that the US operation maintains some type of enduring tie and potential dependence on its former PRC owner. The guarantor is JinkoSolar Holding Co., Ltd., the New York Stock Exchange-listed parent of JinkoSolar. The guarantee shows up on the 2026 semi-annual report of Shanghai Stock Exchange-listed JinkoSolar. According to that semi-annual report, JinkoSolar Holding Co., Ltd. guarantees the performance obligations that Jinko US and JAX, signed with NextEra Energy Constructors, LLC and Next Era Energy Resources, LLC.

"光伏巨头 13 亿“割肉”美国工厂，前中国首富妻子接手？[PV Giant Takes 1.3-Billion-Yuan Hit Offloading US Factory; Will the Wife of China’s Former Richest Man Take Over?]," OFWeek, May 14, 2026. 54 "13 亿元出售工厂：光伏大佬拿下控制权，晶科回应未放弃美国市场 [Factory Sold for 1.3 Billion Yuan: PV Tycoon Secures Control; Jinko Responds, Denying Exit from US Market]," 21st Century Business Herald, May 9, 2026. 55 "光伏巨头 13 亿“割肉”美国工厂，前中国首富妻子接手？[PV Giant Takes 1.3-Billion-Yuan Hit Offloading US Factory; Will the Wife of China’s Former Richest Man Take Over?]," OFWeek, May 14, 2026. 53

HORIZON ADVISORY

Conclusion The Prohibited Foreign Entity and Foreign Entity of Concern Restrictions in the OBBBA are intended to prevent US adversaries from accessing government funding – and, in so doing, continuing to decimate the domestic industrial base. The overarching ambition of these restrictions is to set the conditions for domestic manufacturing, jobs, and economic development that can fuel reinvestment into next generation technologies, which will in turn deliver energy dominance and positive externalities for American businesses, communities, and workers. But China is adept at circumventing US regulations. Chinese companies have developed a sophisticated playbook to bypass US restrictions. That playbook builds on general agility and a well-practiced capacity to retain access to US markets.56 Over the past year, China’s solar manufacturers have developed joint ventures, including with related entities, that allow them to sit below the 25 percent threshold that triggers PFE restrictions and built manufacturing facilities in third-party countries where equity, technological, and supply relationships are difficult to trace, among other mechanisms for compliance with FEOC and PFE restrictions. Every one of the surveyed arrangements appears meant to satisfy the requirement that is measured (i.e., equity ceilings). But every arrangement risks leaving intact other dependencies that are not measured. Equity ownership is disclosed, quantified, and easy to verify: That indicator was changed. Leasing, supply agreements, customer concentration, and customer guarantees are far less black and white. They appear to have changed less. A company can hold 24.9 percent of an American factory, own the machines inside it, license it the technology it runs on, supply its inputs, buy its output, and remain the guarantor of its debts – and still, on the face of the equity table, fall outside of the PFE definition as it currently exists, or at least is implemented. That is the problem the remaining rulemaking has to solve. New legislation is not necessary to do so. The OBBBA already contains the necessary prongs. The statute addresses influence and control stemming from debt, the ability to appoint officers, contractual arrangements, and material assistance. What observed restructuring suggests may be lacking is clear and enforceable guidance specifying how those factors are to be measured. Updates to Treasury and IRS guidance offer the opportunity to clarify as much. Responsive rulemaking should address two key elements. 1. The first is definitional: The final rules should make clear that long-term leases of production equipment, technology licenses from parties with sustained commercial relationships to a restricted entity, retained parent guarantees, and near-total customer or supplier concentration are

“When the Iron Is Hot: The Chinese Communist Party’s Subversion of US Recovery Investment,” Horizon Advisory, 2020.

HORIZON ADVISORY relevant to the effective control and material assistance determinations – not merely commercial background to an equity calculation. 2. The second is architectural: The disclosure regime should ask about those factors; leases, licenses, commercial relationships, parent guarantees, etc. If the filing framework only asks who owns the equity, equity will be the only indicator that changes. If the filing regime also asks who owns the equipment, who guarantees debt, and who buys outputs, PRC influence at those points will be more visible.

Neither element will be a silver bullet or fully future-proof. The restructurings documented in this report themselves responded to a law that was written to close the gaps left by the IRA three years earlier. Chinese companies will continue to find loopholes and manipulate US restrictions. Washington must be dynamic in responding. But dynamism is not the same as severity. The instruments that work here are precise ones – rules that follow dependency as a whole rather than single indicators of it, and disclosure that makes such dependency visible to regulators and to markets. Failing to adopt these instruments will guarantee that the US push for reindustrialization and rejuvenation of domestic manufacturing falls flat, and that the American taxpayer underwrites the companies cannibalizing domestic industry.

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