200422 RO.A&D #709

ZI DE ZI miercuri, 22 aprilie 2020

BULETIN INFORMATIV GRATUIT DEDICAT DECIDENȚILOR DIN INDUSTRIA DE AVIAȚIE ȘI CEA DE APĂRARE DIN ROMÂNIA

Ziua Planetei Pământ / The Earth Day

Partener al Proiectului RO.A&D

Contactați heraldcons@gmail.com pentru spațiu publicitar.

For advertising space in the newsletter, contact heraldcons@gmail.com Pour l'espace publicitaire dans le bulletin, contactez heraldcons@gmail.com

Contactați heraldcons@gmail.com pentru abonamentul RO.A&D INTEGRATED NEWS. Project RO.A&D Library: https://issuu.com/heraldcons Trimiteți observațiile, comentariile, propunerile și solicitările Dvs. la heraldcons@gmail.com Dacă doriți să primiți acest newsletter la altă adresă de e-mail, contactați heraldcons@gmail.com

Pagină 2 din 80

Pagină 3 din 80

distribuitor HERALD INSIGHTS

http://www.competitiveintelligence.ro

miercuri, 22 aprilie 2020

Gând de Numai Bine!

24 aprilie: Ziua Planetei Pământ / The Earth Day Se pare că Marea noastră Gazdă e cam supărată pe noi și nu ne-a invitat la petrecerea de câteva miliarde de ani.

A zis să stăm pe la casele noastre, ca să mai respire ceva aer, cât de cât mai nepoluat.

Poate că până la anu’ fiecare dintre noi va fi ceva mai CuMinte. Și vom fi invitați. Merită, pentru că locul Petrecerii este ceva magnific.

Hai să-i spunem deopotrivă Iartă-ne și La Mulți Ani! Numai Bine!

Emil Hedeșiu heraldcons@gmail.com

Pagină 4 din 80

Cap. AERONAUTICĂ ................................................................................................. 8 BVB - industria aeronautică .................................................................................... 8 AEROSTAR S.A. - 950531 ..................................................................................... 9 Ieri: AGA Ordinara si Extraordinara ..................................................................... 9 Disponibilitate raport anual 2019 ......................................................................... 9 Air Force One.......................................................................................................... 9 Air Force awards $84 million contract for new Air Force One manuals ............... 9 Cap. Arme de foc & muniție ...................................................................................... 11 UM Cugir SA, 1769224, ROMARM ...................................................................... 11 Angajat al UM Cugir, cercetat penal după ce şi-a infectat doi colegi cu COVID-19 .......................................................................................................................... 11 Cap. NAVAL ............................................................................................................. 11 Insights.................................................................................................................. 11 Cap. RACHETE ........................................................................................................ 11 Lockheed Martin Corporation ................................................................................ 11 LRASM se vinde ................................................................................................ 11 Cap. Soluții Tehnologice ........................................................................................... 13 Siemens ................................................................................................................ 13 CNC machine/accessory packages ................................................................... 13 Aircraft milled parts market size to reach $4.3B in 2025 ....................................... 14 Cap. EUROPA .......................................................................................................... 17 EU vs Virus Hackathon ......................................................................................... 18 How COVID-19 may impact the European Defence ............................................. 19 Cap. NATO ............................................................................................................... 21 Cap. DECIZIONAL ................................................................................................... 23 Agendă președinte Klaus Iohannis ....................................................................... 23 Ședință de evaluare a măsurilor cu privire la gestionarea epidemiei COVID-19 23 Agendă prim-ministru Ludovic Orban .................................................................... 23 Consultări cu reprezentanții publicațiilor online de știri ...................................... 23 Consultări cu reprezentanții radiourilor naționale .............................................. 24 Consultări cu reprezentanții televiziunilor naționale ........................................... 24 Măsuri de protecție socială ................................................................................... 24 Mario De Mezzo, vicepreședinte ANC .................................................................. 24 Cap. FINANȚE.......................................................................................................... 26 Cursul de schimb: euro, liră sterlină, USD, gr. aur ................................................ 26 Lockheed Martin Corporation ................................................................................ 27 First Quarter 2020 Results ................................................................................ 27 Cap. RESURSE, chiar și de idei ............................................................................... 41 OPEC .................................................................................................................... 41 Pagină 5 din 80

Monthly Oil Market Report ................................................................................. 41 Oil Market Highlights ......................................................................................... 42 Cap. EVENIMENTE .................................................................................................. 46 MINUSMA ............................................................................................................. 46 Cap. OPINII/ANALIZE .............................................................................................. 48 Descriere produs: IMM INVEST ROMANIA .......................................................... 48 The impacts of Brexit on the security and the defence industry in the European Union and the United Kingdom........................................................................................ 48 Cap. RO.A&D’s influencers ...................................................................................... 65 Prodways .............................................................................................................. 65 Cap. TOP SKILLs ..................................................................................................... 66 Răzvan BOGORODIȚĂ......................................................................................... 66 Mugurel Rădulescu ............................................................................................... 66 TIMPUL: Aliat sau Neprieten? .................................................................................. 67 Coronavirus - Covid-19 - Pandemie ...................................................................... 67 BDP - 21 aprilie 2020, ora 13.00 ........................................................................... 68 Index RO.A&D .......................................................................................................... 72 WE ARE ON THE SAME ROAD SUNTEM PE ACELAȘI DRUM ................................................................................................................................. 72 USE THE LINKS FOR NEWS & WEBSITES .................................................. 72

DISCLAIMER: All opinions reflect the views of the author(s), not of HERALD INSIGHTS Fiecare știre reprezintă doar punctul de vedere al autorului acesteia, iar linkul conduce la sursa originală și la forma integrală a articolului.

Conținutul acestui newsletter este destinat să ofere un ghid asupra subiectelor de interes pentru domeniul de activitate A&D. Pentru căutarea și identificarea circumstanțelor specifice se recomandă consultanța de specialitate asigurată de Herald Insights.

The contents of this newsletter is intended to provide a guidance on topics of interest to the A&D industry. For the searching and the identifying specific circumstances it is recommended the expert advice provided by Herald Insights.

În newsletter sunt folosite traducerile electronice oferite de Google Translate.

Pentru claritate deplină, consultați textul original.

Materialele publicitare sunt puse la dispoziție de partea contractantă și nu reprezintă punctul de vedere al editorului acestui newsletter.

Pagină 6 din 80

distribuitor HERALD INSIGHTS

http://www.competitiveintelligence.ro

Pagină 7 din 80

0,00

Pagină 8 din 80

160,00 140,00

120,00

100,00 80,00

60,00

40,00 20,00 02.12.2020

18.11.2020

04.11.2020

21.10.2020

07.10.2020

23.09.2020

09.09.2020

26.08.2020

12.08.2020

29.07.2020

15.07.2020

01.07.2020

17.06.2020

03.06.2020

20.05.2020

06.05.2020

22.04.2020

08.04.2020

25.03.2020

30.12.2020

180,00

30.12.2020

200,00 16.12.2020

TBM

16.12.2020

02.12.2020

RORX

18.11.2020

04.11.2020

21.10.2020

07.10.2020

23.09.2020

IARV

09.09.2020

26.08.2020

12.08.2020

29.07.2020

15.07.2020

AVIO

01.07.2020

17.06.2020

03.06.2020

20.05.2020

ARS

06.05.2020

22.04.2020

08.04.2020

11.03.2020

26.02.2020

12.02.2020

29.01.2020

15.01.2020

01.01.2020

MIL EUR0

25.03.2020

11.03.2020

mil. euro

26.02.2020

12.02.2020

29.01.2020

15.01.2020

150,00

01.01.2020

Cap. AERONAUTICĂ

BVB - industria aeronautică Herald Insights

AEROSTAR Bacău (ARS), AVIOANE Craiova (AVIO), IAR Ghimbav (IARV), Romaero (RORX), Turbomecanica (TBM):

Valoare totală de piaţă: 217,76 milioane euro Valoarea totală de piață BVB ind aviație

310,00

290,00

270,00

250,00

230,00

210,00

190,00

170,00

AEROSTAR S.A. - 950531 Ieri: AGA Ordinara si Extraordinara Disponibilitate raport anual 2019 http://www.bvb.ro/FinancialInstruments/SelectedData/NewsItem/ARS-Disponibilitateraport-anual-2019/CA5DF

Bursa de Valori Bucureşti “Raportul anual aferent exercitiului financiar 2019” elaborat in conformitate cu reglementarile contabile aplicabile, va fi transmis catre BVB si ASF si publicat pe website-ul societatii la adresa: www.aerostar.ro./Relatia cu investitorii /Raportari periodice/Anul 2020 pe data de 22 aprilie 2020,ora 800.

De asemenea, raportul se poate obtine si de la sediul social al societatii din Bacau, str.

Condorilor nr. 9, cabinet presedinte si director general. … citeste varianta originala si integrala urmarind link-ul …

Air Force One Air Force awards $84 million contract for new Air Force One manuals https://www.stripes.com/news/air-force/air-force-awards-84-million-contract-for-newair-force-one-manuals-1.626909

Stars&Stripes - USA

By ROSE L. THAYER | STARS AND STRIPES Published: April 21, 2020

An $84 million contract to create manuals for two new Air Force One aircraft was awarded to Boeing, according to the Air Force.

The contract is the second additional contract awarded to Boeing for the new planes since President Donald Trump announced in 2018 that he saved taxpayers $1.4 billion Pagină 9 din 80

by renegotiating the deal, which predated his administration. In July 2018, the White House announced the replacement aircraft would cost $3.9 billion through a “firm fixedprice contract” between the Air Force and the Seattle-based company.

Formal replacement efforts for Air Force One planes began in 2011. The current aircraft in service are more than 31 years old, according to the White House.

The two new planes began a multiyear modification process in March in San Antonio and have the military designation VC-25B, according to a March 11 news release from the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio.

The manuals contract announced April 15 pays for Boeing and subcontractors to “modify commercial manuals, update with VC-25B-specific information and deliver integrated manuals for the VC-25B system,” according to a news release about the contract. Work on the manuals will be performed in Seattle and is expected to be complete by Jan. 15, 2025 — after the new planes are set to be operational. article continues below These manuals are thousands of pages and include a library of information about flying, operating and maintaining the planes, said Jim Hodgson, executive director of the Fort Worth Aviation Museum. Hodgson served as a pilot in the Marine Corps and flew several Boeing aircraft during his more than 30 years with Continental Airlines.

Modifying commercial manuals for the Air Force’s use should make the process easier, but likely includes Boeing personnel using simulators to go through and verify all the procedures, Hodgson said. ... citeste varianta originala si integrala urmarind link-ul ...

Pagină 10 din 80

Cap. Arme de foc & muniție UM Cugir SA, 1769224, ROMARM Angajat al UM Cugir, cercetat penal după ce şi-a infectat doi colegi cu COVID-19 https://www.agerpres.ro/justitie/2020/04/21/alba-angajat-al-um-cugir-cercetat-penaldupa-ce-si-a-infectat-doi-colegi-cu-covid-19--490400

AGERPRES autor: Marinela Brumar, editor: Oana Popescu, editor online: Anda Badea

RO.A&D: Parcă am dori și știri cu un conținut economic ....

Un angajat al Uzinei Mecanice Cugir este cercetat penal după ce, cu toate că manifesta simptome specifice infectării cu SARS-CoV-2, s-a prezentat la serviciu, transmiţând virusul altor doi colegi, potrivit unui comunicat transmis, marţi, AGERPRES, de Parchetul de pe lângă Judecătoria Alba Iulia. ... citeste varianta originala si integrala urmarind link-ul ...

Cap. NAVAL Insights https://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/polonia-va-cumpara-doua-submarine-de-la-suedia https://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/india-ar-mai-putea-achizitiona-submarine-kilo

Cap. RACHETE Lockheed Martin Corporation LRASM se vinde https://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/lrasm-se-vinde

Romania Military George GMT 20 aprilie 2020 - 6:01

Probabil ca nu oricui, dar Australia tocmai ce a primit aprobarea pentru achizitia a 200 de rachete si ceva echipament auxiliar, totul in valoare de 990 milioane de dolari. .....

Mai multe despre noua racheta anti-nava americana gasiti in articolul lui Nicolae. … citeste varianta originala si integrala urmarind link-ul …

Pagină 11 din 80

Pagină 12 din 80

Cap. Soluții Tehnologice Siemens http://usa.siemens.com/828-fp

CNC machine/accessory packages https://www.aerospacemanufacturinganddesign.com/product/siemens-cnc-machineaccessory-packages/

Aerospace Manufacturing&Design April 21, 2020 Machining Motion Control

To offer a fast solution to U.S.-based machine tool builders, system integrators, and retrofitters, Siemens is stocking typical system packages that include the most frequently used Sinumerik 828D CNC, Sinamics drive, Simotics motor, and accessories such as cables in their Elk Grove Village, Illinois, facility to ensure fast and efficient delivery in less than 10 business days.

Additional benefits of ordering the pre-defined packages include a price discount, a simplified ordering process and a shortened lead-time.

The program is subject to availability and delivery time will depend upon the stock available in Elk Grove Village.

Only customers located in the United States with a physical mailing and delivery address are eligible for this program.

“Siemens is bringing the Sinumerik 828D to a highly competitive price point in the U.S. market. The 828D is a compact, panel-based CNC that offers machine tool builders very flexible machine design integration,” says John Meyer, Marketing Communications Manager, Siemens Industry Inc. He continues, “End-customers will benefit from our highly intuitive and easy-to-use ShopMill and ShopTurn graphical programming interfaces, which increase machine tool usability and shop-floor productivity.” There are seven pre-defined Sinumerik 828D packages covering the most typical standard milling and turning machines. They include: 3+1 Milling with 6.5Nm feed axes + 10kW spindle 3+1 Milling with 12Nm feed axes + 22kW flange mount spindle 3+1 Milling with 12Nm feed axes + 22kW foot mount spindle Milling with three 12Nm feed axes, No spindle with S120 Combi drive Milling with three 12Nm feed axes, No spindle with S120 Booksize drive Turning with 3 6.5Nm feed axes, No spindle with S120 Booksize drive Turning 2+1, 12Nm feed axes, 10kW spindle

Pagină 13 din 80

Aircraft milled parts market size to reach $4.3B in 2025 Stratview Research analysis reflects today's aircraft milled parts market for the forecast period 2020 to 2025. https://www.aerospacemanufacturinganddesign.com/article/aircraft-milled-partsmarket-size-reach-4-3-billion/

Aerospace Manufacturing&Design April 21, 2020 Eric Brothers Industry/Regulations

Stratview Research has issued a report on Aircraft Milled Parts Market by Aircraft Type (Commercial Aircraft, Regional Aircraft, Helicopter, Military Aircraft, and General Aviation), by Application Type (Airframe, Engine, Interiors, and Others), by Material Type (Aluminum, Stainless Steel, Titanium, and Other Metals & Alloys), by End-User Type (OEM and Aftermarket), and by Region (North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and Rest of the World), Trend, Forecast, Competitive Analysis, and Growth Opportunity: 2020-2025.

The report provides a comprehensive analysis that reflects today's aircraft milled parts market realities and future possibilities for the forecast period 2020 to 2025.

Per Stratview Research, the aircraft milled parts market is projected to grow at a healthy rate during the next five years to reach an estimated value of $ 4.3 billion in 2025.

The overall impact of the COVID-19 outbreak is still unpredictable, and yet the industry is optimist about its recovery. Huge order backlogs of Boeing and Airbus (13,237 aircraft at the end of Feb. 2020), accelerating demand for replacing iconic aircraft such as A380 and B747 with A321, A350XWB and B787, and the market entry of new aircraft programs such A321XLR, B777X, C919, and MC-21 are anticipated to assure a speedy recovery of the aircraft industry including milled parts.

Commercial aircraft is likely to remain the growth engine of the market during the forecast period, mainly driven by an expected increase in commercial aircraft deliveries in the coming years.

Based on the application type, the airframe segment is likely to maintain its unassailable dominance in the market during the forecast period. However, the engine segment is projected to witness the highest growth in the coming five years, mainly driven by a handful of engines, such as LEAP, GE9X, GEnx, PW F135, PW1000G, and Rolls-Royce Trent XWB and 7000.

Aluminum is projected to remain the most dominant material type in the aircraft milled parts market through the next five years, owing to its widespread usage and excellent track record in the aircraft industry. Titanium is estimated to be the fastest-growing material type in the market in years to come, mainly propelled by increased use of titanium in next-generation aircraft programs such as B787 and A350XWB. North America is projected to remain the largest market for aircraft milled parts during the forecast period. The U.S. is expected to remain the growth engine of the North American market, while Asia-Pacific is expected to witness the highest growth during the forecast period, driven by upcoming indigenous aircraft programs such as COMAC C919 and Mitsubishi SpaceJet, and opening of assembly plants for Boeing and Airbus in China.

The report offers insights on market dynamics for strategic decision making for existing market players and those willing to enter the market. The following are key features of the report: • Market structure: Overview, industry life cycle analysis, supply chain analysis • Market environment analysis: Growth drivers and constraints, Porter's five forces analysis, SWOT analysis Pagină 14 din 80

• • •

Market trend, forecast analysis Market segment trend, forecast Competitive landscape and dynamics: Market share, product portfolio, product launches • Attractive market segments, associated growth opportunities • Emerging trends • Strategic growth opportunities for existing, new players • Key success factors This report segments the global aircraft milled parts market five ways: Aircraft Milled Parts Market, by Aircraft Type • Commercial Aircraft • Regional Aircraft • Helicopter • Military Aircraft • General Aviation Aircraft Milled Parts Market, by Application Type • Airframe • Engine • Interiors • Others Aircraft Milled Parts Market, by Material Type • Aluminum • Stainless Steel • Titanium • Other Milled Parts Aircraft Milled Parts Market, by End-User Type • OEM • Aftermarket Aircraft Milled Parts Market, By Region • North America • Europe • Asia-Pacific • Rest of the World

Pagină 15 din 80

Pagină 16 din 80

Cap. EUROPA

European Commission

The Commissioners

Press corner

PRESIDENT(2019-2024)

High Representative/ Vice-President

Executive Vice-President Digital Age

Ursula von der Leyen NEWS

Josep Borrell Fontelles NEWS

Margrethe Vestager NEWS

COMMISSIONER Economy

COMMISSIONER Energy

COMMISSIONER Transport

Paolo Gentiloni NEWS

Kadri Simson NEWS

Adina Vălean NEWS

COMMISSIONER Internal Market Thierry Breton NEWS

COMMISSIONER Health and Food Safety Stella Kyriakides NEWS

COMMISSIONER Crisis Management Janez Lenarčič NEWS

European Parliament

SEDE

ITRE

Președinte European Parliament

Președinte

Președinte

SEDE Nathalie LOISEAU NEWS

ITRE Cristian-Silviu BUŞOI NEWS

David-Maria SASSOLI NEWS

Pagină 17 din 80

EU vs Virus Hackathon https://euvsvirus.org/

Comisia Europeană va organiza în perioada 24 - 26 aprilie 2020 un eveniment intitulat EU vs Virus Hackathon. Evenimentul se va desfășura sub patronajul Comisarului European Maryia Gabriel și care are ca scop dezvoltarea de soluții inovative pentru depășirea provocărilor legate de pandemia actuală.

Acțiunea se înscrie în seria unor evenimente similare care au avut loc la nivelul Statelor Membre UE (SM) sau la nivel global. Se vor conecta astfel reprezentanți ai societății civile, inovatori, parteneri și reprezentanți ai mediului de afaceri din tot spațiul european cu scopul de a contribui la obținerea de soluții inovative de combatere a coronavirusului și a efectelor acestuia. Printre domeniile de acțiune ce vor fi propuse se vor regăsi: producerea rapidă de echipamente, dezvoltarea capacităților de producţie în masă, transferul de cunoaștere și de soluții între țări, cu scopul final de a găsi răspunsuri rapide care pot fi dezvoltate și implementate pe toată piața unică europeană.

Domeniile de acţiune și modalități de participare sunt detaliate pe pagina evenimentului https://euvsvirus.org/ .

Pagină 18 din 80

How COVID-19 may impact the European Defence https://finabel.org/how-covid-19-may-impact-the-european-defence/

FINABEL 18 March 2020 Written by Robin Vanholme European Defence Researcher at Finabel – European Army Interoperability Centre

With the current COVID-19 pandemic in the world, many – if not most – sectors and businesses are going to get negatively affected. The European defence sector is no exception. Let us see which consequences the coronavirus crisis has, and might have, on the European defence industries, the European armed forces, and the EU defence initiatives.

The threat to European defence industries The most direct economic impact is already taking place: it consists of the plummeting stock market. The health crisis worsening, the uncertainty of the future and the possible upcoming recessions are scaring the markets. In consequence, last week’s US Dow Jones Industrial Average drop was the worst decline in three decades. It was also the Dow’s biggest weekly drop ever, surpassing the 1929 and the 2008 economic crisis (CNBC, 2020a).

In Europe, the situation is similar: most companies, including the biggest EU defence firms, are witnessing an historic drop in stock market prices. As a result, industries such as Airbus, Safran, Dassault, Rheinmetall, SAAB, and even more the Italian companies Leonardo and Fincantieri, are losing all their recent gains and suffering huge losses in valuation. The fall in stock prices are consequently increasing their debt ratios, causing a structural threat on their survival (Meta-Défence, 2020). If this continues for a long time, perhaps for half a year, public authorities might need to inject money to save their defence industries.

The stock market falling down isn’t the only threat to the European Defence; COVID19 itself is. As public authorities are going to spend billions on fighting the coronavirus and as GDPs are expected to go down in consequence of the economic downturn, governments’ priority to defence projects is naturally going to lessen (CNBC, 2020b).

Less public priority and resources would mean less funds for military procurements and defence research and development (R&D). On the long-term, some projects like the European stealth fighter program might be delayed. Furthermore, because of the coronavirus, civil flights are decreasing and all major airlines are now battling for Pagină 19 din 80

survival (The Guardian, 2020a). This crisis is impacting the entire aviation industry. As some of the biggest European defence industries are also civil aerospace companies (Airbus, BAE Systems, Thales), this is only going to affect them more, as airlines might go bankrupt and order less airliners.

Less funds and plummeting stocks could also impact the in-house R&D of European firms. Indeed, arms companies don’t always develop a product only because they were awarded a contract by the government. Sometimes, they make their own R&D to improve their knowledge and capabilities. For instance, Airbus had worked on its own for years on a stealth aircraft technology demonstrator, the Airbus LOUT (see picture).

If the COVID-19 crisis persists, a lack of funds from different sides could, on the medium to long term, delay or reduce the EU’s R&D, and hence competitiveness, in Defence.

The consequences on the European armed forces The coronavirus outbreak is also starting to have an impact on European armies. Our soldiers are about to become very busy with matters not directly related to military exercises or defence operations, even though we are indeed “at war” against COVID19, according to French President Emmanuel Macron (CNBC, 2020b).

Consequently, armed forces in Europe will provide assistance to civil authorities to tackle the COVID-19 crisis. As a senior UK military official said: “”It feels like we’re getting ready for war, but this time at home” (Sky News, 2020). Some of the anticipated missions for the armed forces to help society are “backing up the police force, protecting major locations, staffing morgues and helping older people”, as well as using their military trucks to help deliver food, supplies and medicine (Sky News, ibid). The armed forces are also likely preparing to send thousands of military medics to assist the crowded hospitals (The Guardian, 2020b).

Concerning the military personnels themselves, the risk of coronavirus spreading in the army is high since soldiers work and basically live together. For instance, it is estimated that 20% of the British armed forces will contract the coronavirus (Sky News, ibid). However, a large proportion of the military staff is young is healthy, and hygiene protocols are said to be carefully followed, reducing the risk of a harsh impact on the military (Defensikrant, 2020). Currently, the armed forces all over Europe are still fully functionable and deployable.Finally, concerning the training missions, most are cancelled or reviewed. Indeed, the Dutch training mission in Iraq is halted, the Norway-NATO “Cold Response” exercise is cancelled (Euractiv, 2020), and so are the military sports championships (Defensikrant, ibid). Only small-scale training is expected to take place. As for the huge and long-awaited Defender Europe 2020 exercise, a.k.a. the biggest NATO training that should include 20,000 soldiers from the 29 NATO states across 10 European countries, is not cancelled, but the number of soldiers and the scope of the exercise are significantly reduced (Army Times, 2020).

The American wish to carry on this US-led military exercise and their military presence in Europe can be contrasted by the recent decision of the Trump administration to unilaterally and abruptly close its borders to EU citizens.

The possible impact on EU defence initiatives If, and only if, the COVID-19 worsens dramatically and remains for a long time, the recent EU initiatives in the field of defence, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) could be at risk.

PESCO consists of transnational collaboration, on cooperative projects between different Member States. As such, it directly goes against the current restriction on the free movement of persons across the EU. For technological PESCO projects, engineers and scientists sometimes have to move from one country to another, and for training PESCO projects, military personnels have to meet to work together. That is why some PESCO projects could be at threat of the lockdowns happening in more Pagină 20 din 80

and more European countries, especially if the coronavirus situation becomes even worse. If interoperable structures, like we can find in PESCO, cease to work efficiently in a period of crisis where states turn to sovereignty-prioritising structures, this would question the usefulness and existence itself of such collaborative programs.

As for the European Defence Fund, its budget still needs to be agreed on by the EU Head of States and Governments. But with the current situation, priority in the EU budget could go towards the healthcare sector, instead of the Defence sector. The budget of the EDF is then at risk of a reduction. Moreover, the COVID-19 maybe could slow down a deal between European leaders on the EU budget, postponing the entry into force of the EDF, currently planned for January 2021. Finally, on an even longer term, if the COVID-19 continues and worsens, plans such as an EU Army or a common EU Defence strategy will be halted.

In conclusion, in the short-term, armed forces are going to contribute directly in the fight against COVID-19 by supporting civil authorities, and less military training will take place. In the medium-term, European Defence companies are at risk of being less innovative, or even at risk of disappearing; we shall need to see how the stock markets go and if the national budgets in defence are reduced dramatically or not. On the longterm, some EU initiatives in the field of defence could be at risk. But we cannot foresee the future, and it all depends on the evolution of the coronavirus crisis. All we can do is prepare ourselves intelligently, and wish the best of luck to all the personal, civil or military, involved in combating what can be the biggest crisis of this decade.

Cap. NATO NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES LINKS ALBANIA (2009) DENMARK (1949) ICELAND (1949) NETHERLANDS (1949) SLOVENIA (2004)

BELGIUM (1949) ESTONIA (2004) ITALY (1949) NORWAY (1949) SPAIN (1982)

BULGARIA (2004) FRANCE (1949) LATVIA (2004) POLAND (1999) TURKEY (1952)

CANADA (1949) GERMANY (1955) LITHUANIA (2004) PORTUGAL (1949) UK (1949)

CROATIA (2009) GREECE (1952) LUXEMBOURG (1949) ROMANIA (2004) USA (1949)

CZECH Rep (1999) HUNGARY (1999) MONTENEGRO (2017) SLOVAKIA (2004)

NATO

NATO NOW

NEWSROOM

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg NEWS

Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană NEWS

NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu NEWS

Pagină 21 din 80

Pagină 22 din 80

Cap. DECIZIONAL România știri A&D

Klaus IOHANNIS

Robert CAZANCIUC

Marcel CIOLACU

Ludovic ORBAN

NEWS

NEWS

NEWS

NEWS

Președinție

Senat

Camera Deputaților

Guvern

Agendă președinte Klaus Iohannis Președinte România Ieri:

Ședință de evaluare a măsurilor cu privire la gestionarea epidemiei COVID-19

https://www.presidency.ro/ro/presedinte/agenda-presedintelui/declaratia-de-presasustinuta-de-presedintele-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis1587469769

Agendă prim-ministru Ludovic Orban Guvern România Astăzi:

Consultări cu reprezentanții publicațiilor online de știri pe tema măsurilor necesare pentru limitarea efectelor economice negative generate de epidemia de COVID-19

Pagină 23 din 80

Consultări cu reprezentanții radiourilor naționale RO.A&D: Consultări?!

Cu mass media?

Pentru limitarea efectelor economice?

pe tema măsurilor necesare pentru limitarea efectelor economice negative generate de epidemia de COVID-19

Consultări cu reprezentanții televiziunilor naționale

pe tema măsurilor necesare pentru limitarea efectelor economice negative generate de epidemia de COVID-19

Măsuri de protecție socială Guvernul României Ordonanță de urgență pentru modificarea și completarea unor acte normative privind măsuri de protecție socială determinate de răspândirea coronavirusului SARSCoV-2 Nr. 53 din 15-Aprilie-2020 M. Of. Partea I nr. 325 din 21 Aprilie 2020

Mario De Mezzo, vicepreședinte ANC

Primul-Ministru Decizie privind numirea domnului Mario De Mezzo în funcția de vicepreședinte, cu rang de subsecretar de stat, al Autorității Naționale pentru Cetățenie Nr. 220 din 21-Aprilie-2020 M. Of. Partea I nr. 325 din 21 Aprilie 2020

Pagină 24 din 80

Pagină 25 din 80

160

Pagină 26 din 80

30.12.2020

16.12.2020

02.12.2020

18.11.2020

30.12.2020

16.12.2020

02.12.2020

18.11.2020

04.11.2020

21.10.2020

07.10.2020

23.09.2020

09.09.2020

26.08.2020

15.04.20 4,8345 5,5327 4,4215 243,8895

04.11.2020

21.10.2020

07.10.2020

23.09.2020

09.09.2020

12.08.2020

29.07.2020

15.07.2020

01.07.2020

17.06.2020

03.06.2020

14.04.20 4,8327 5,5399 4,4150 244,2835

26.08.2020

12.08.2020

29.07.2020

15.07.2020

01.07.2020

17.06.2020

20.05.2020

06.05.2020

22.04.2020

08.04.2020

13.04.20 4,8297 5,5222 4,4155 239,9160

03.06.2020

20.05.2020

06.05.2020

22.04.2020

25.03.2020

Aur gr.

08.04.2020

US Dollar

25.03.2020

Lira sterlină

11.03.2020

26.02.2020

12.02.2020

Euro

11.03.2020

26.02.2020

240 29.01.2020

4,5

12.02.2020

5

15.01.2020

6

29.01.2020

250 01.01.2020

Lei

15.01.2020

4

01.01.2020

Cap. FINANȚE

Cursul de schimb: euro, liră sterlină, USD, gr. aur 16.04.20 4,8360 5,5532 4,4524 246,3635

5,25

4,8448

4,75

4,5316

4,25

21.04.20 4,8345 5,5100 4,4605 240,4832

http://www.bnro.ro/default.htm

5,7552

5,75

5,5

EURO Y19

EURO Y20

GBP Y19

GBP Y20

USD Y19

USD Y20

Lei/gr. 246,3635

230

220

210

200

AUR Y19

190

AUR Y20

180

170

grafice HERALD INSIGHTS în baza datelor istorice BNR

Lockheed Martin Corporation First Quarter 2020 Results https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2020-04-21-Lockheed-Martin-Reports-FirstQuarter-2020-Results

Lockheed Martin April 21, 2020

- Net sales of $15.7 billion - Net earnings of $1.7 billion, or $6.08 per share - Generated cash from operations of $2.3 billion - Maintained backlog of approximately $144 billion - Updates 2020 outlook for sales; maintains 2020 outlook for operating profit, earnings per share and cash from operations - Ultimate impact of COVID-19 on 2020 outlook uncertain Lockheed Martin Corporation (NYSE: LMT) today reported first quarter 2020 net sales of $15.7 billion, compared to $14.3 billion in the first quarter of 2019. Net earnings in the first quarter of 2020 were $1.7 billion, or $6.08 per share, compared to $1.7 billion, or $5.99 per share, in the first quarter of 2019. Cash from operations in the first quarter of 2020 was $2.3 billion, compared to cash from operations of $1.7 billion in the first quarter of 2019.

"As we confront the challenges introduced by the global pandemic, our corporation remains focused on providing vital national security solutions for our customers while maintaining a safe and healthy environment for our employees," said Lockheed Martin chairman, president and CEO Marillyn Hewson. "I'm so proud of the work the dedicated men and women of Lockheed Martin are doing as part of our strong portfolio to deliver critical products and services for our customers and long-term value for our shareholders."

Summary Financial Results The following table presents the corporation's summary financial results.

Pagină 27 din 80

1

2

3

4

The corporation closes its books and records on the last Sunday of the calendar quarter to align its financial closing with its business processes, which was on March 29 for the first quarter of 2020 and March 31 for the first quarter of 2019. The consolidated financial statements and tables of financial information included herein are labeled based on that convention. This practice only affects interim periods, as the corporation's fiscal year ends on Dec. 31.

Business segment operating profit is a non-GAAP measure. See the "Non-GAAP Financial Measures" section of this news release for more information.

In the first quarter of 2019, the corporation recognized a previously deferred non-cash gain of $51 million ($38 million, or $0.13 per share, after tax) related to properties sold in 2015 as a result of completing its remaining obligations.

Net earnings in the first quarter of 2019 include benefits of $75 million, or $0.26 per share, from additional tax deductions, based on proposed tax regulations released on March 4, 2019, which clarified that foreign military sales qualify as foreign derived intangible income. Approximately $65 million, or $0.23 per share, of the total benefit was recorded discretely because it relates to 2018.

2020 Financial Outlook The following table and other sections of this news release contain forward-looking statements, which are based on the corporation's current expectations. Actual results may differ materially from those projected. It is the corporation's typical practice not to incorporate adjustments into its financial outlook for proposed acquisitions, divestitures, ventures, changes in law, or new accounting standards until such items have been consummated, enacted or adopted. For additional factors that may impact the corporation's actual results, refer to the "Forward-Looking Statements" section in this news release.

1

The corporation's 2020 financial outlook includes updated guidance for net sales reflecting the currently expected impacts related to COVID-19. The ultimate impact of COVID-19 on the corporation's financial outlook for 2020 remains uncertain. Additionally, the corporation's financial outlook for 2020 does not include any non-cash impairment charge related to its equity method investment in AMMROC as discussed below or potential impacts to the corporation's programs, including the F-35 program, resulting

Pagină 28 din 80

2

3

from U.S. Government actions related to Turkey. Currently, the corporation does not expect U.S. Government actions related to Turkey will have a material impact on its 2020 financial results.

The net FAS/CAS pension adjustment above is presented as a single amount and includes total expected 2020 U.S. Government cost accounting standards (CAS) pension cost of approximately $1,975 million and total expected financial accounting standards (FAS) pension income of approximately $115 million. CAS pension cost and the service cost component of FAS pension expense are included in operating profit.

The non-service cost components of FAS pension expense are included in non-operating income (expense). For additional detail on the corporation's FAS/CAS pension adjustment, see the supplemental table included at the end of this news release.

Although the corporation typically does not update its outlook for proposed changes in law, the above includes the effect of proposed tax regulations confirming that foreign military sales (FMS) qualify for tax deductions for foreign derived intangible income. The corporation believes incorporating the effect of the proposed regulations yields more accurate disclosure of the company's expectations because the proposed regulations describe the tax treatment of FMS sales in accordance with the corporation's analysis of the Internal Revenue Code.

COVID-19 The global outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization and a national emergency by the U.S. Government in March 2020 and has negatively affected the U.S. and global economy, disrupted global supply chains, resulted in significant travel and transport restrictions, including mandated closures and orders to "shelter-in-place," and created significant disruption of the financial markets. Lockheed Martin has taken measures to protect the health and safety of its employees, work with its customers to minimize potential disruptions and support its community in addressing the challenges posed by this global pandemic. The extent of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the corporation's operational and financial performance, including its ability to execute its programs in the expected timeframe, will depend on future developments, including the duration and spread of the pandemic and related actions taken by the U.S. Government, state and local government officials, and international governments to prevent disease spread, all of which are uncertain and cannot be predicted. The outbreak did not have a material impact on the corporation's operating results or business in the first quarter of 2020. However, the corporation is beginning to experience some issues in each of its business areas related to COVID-19, primarily in access to some locations and delays of supplier deliveries. The corporation is updating its 2020 guidance for net sales to reflect these impacts, as production and supply chain activities have recently slowed in the Aeronautics business area.

However, the ultimate impact of COVID-19 on the corporation's 2020 outlook for sales, segment operating profit, earnings and cash flows from operations remains uncertain.

The corporation's 2020 outlook assumes, among other things, that its production facilities continue to operate and it does not experience significant work stoppages or closures, it is able to mitigate any supply chain disruptions and these do not worsen, and it is able to recover its costs under contracts and government funding priorities do not change. In addition, the corporation's financial performance assumes actual returns on its pension assets during 2020 will be 7.0%, and the discount rate used to Pagină 29 din 80

re-measure its pension liabilities at year-end 2020 will be 3.25%. Differences between these assumed values and actual values will affect the corporation's plan funded status and stockholders' equity as measured at year-end 2020. The corporation is also monitoring the impacts of COVID-19 on the fair value of its assets. While the corporation does not currently anticipate any material impairments on its assets as a result of COVID-19, future changes in expectations for sales, earnings and cash flows related to intangible assets and goodwill below its current projections could cause these assets to be impaired. While these are the corporation's current assumptions, this is an emerging situation and these could change, including if the duration of the pandemic is extended, which could affect outlook.

Investment in Advanced Military Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul Center LLC (AMMROC) As of March 29, 2020, the corporation had an investment in the AMMROC joint venture with a carrying value of $435 million. Substantially all of AMMROC's current business is dependent on a single customer contract to provide maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) services for fixed and rotary wing military aircraft that was up for recompetition. In April 2020, subsequent to the end of the corporation's first quarter, the customer announced its intent to award the contract to a competitor. The corporation is working with AMMROC's management and its joint venture partner to understand its options, including whether there is a basis to challenge the award and retain the MRO services, explore the possibility of AMMROC continuing to provide MRO services as a subcontractor to the competitor, an opportunity to replace the contract with other customer arrangements, or winding down the business. At this time, the corporation cannot determine the extent of the non-cash impairment charge, if any, related to its investment. However, if the customer moves forward with transitioning the MRO services to the competitor and AMMROC is not a subcontractor (or has only a limited role), the corporation expects there would be an adverse impact to AMMROC's business and the carrying value of its investment, which could be significant and an impairment could occur as early as the second quarter of 2020. Other than the impact to earnings for a potential non-cash impairment charge, currently the corporation does not expect any other significant impacts to its 2020 operating results, financial position or cash flows.

Cash Activities The corporation's cash activities in the first quarter of 2020 included the following: • paying cash dividends of $693 million, compared to $638 million in the first quarter of 2019; • repurchasing 1.7 million shares for $756 million, which includes $500 million paid pursuant to an accelerated share repurchase agreement (ASR), which will settle in the second quarter; compared to 1.0 million shares for $281 million in the first quarter of 2019. The actual number of shares delivered under the ASR is based on an average volume-weighted average price (VWAP) over the plan period and, based on the average VWAP as of April 20, 2020, the corporation expects to receive approximately 0.5 million additional shares upon final settlement; • making capital expenditures of $293 million, compared to $284 million in the first quarter of 2019; and • no net proceeds from or repayments of commercial paper, compared to making net repayments of $200 million in the first quarter of 2019.

Segment Results The corporation operates in four business segments organized based on the nature of products and services offered: Aeronautics, Missiles and Fire Control (MFC), Rotary and Mission Systems (RMS) and Space. The following table presents summary Pagină 30 din 80

operating results of the corporation's business segments and reconciles these amounts to the corporation's consolidated financial results.

Net sales and operating profit of the corporation's business segments exclude intersegment sales, cost of sales, and profit as these activities are eliminated in consolidation. Operating profit of the corporation's business segments includes the corporation's share of earnings or losses from equity method investees as the operating activities of the investees are closely aligned with the operations of its business segments.

Operating profit of the corporation's business segments also excludes the FAS/CAS operating adjustment described below, a portion of corporate costs not considered allowable or allocable to contracts with the U.S. Government under the applicable U.S. Government cost accounting standards (CAS) or federal acquisition regulations (FAR), and other items not considered part of management's evaluation of segment operating Pagină 31 din 80

performance such as a portion of management and administration costs, legal fees and settlements, environmental costs, stock-based compensation expense, retiree benefits, significant severance actions, significant asset impairments, gains or losses from significant divestitures, and other miscellaneous corporate activities.

The corporation recovers CAS pension cost through the pricing of its products and services on U.S. Government contracts and, therefore, recognizes CAS pension cost in each of its business segments' net sales and cost of sales. The corporation's consolidated financial statements must present pension and other postretirement benefit plan expense calculated in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (referred to as FAS expense). The operating portion of the net FAS/CAS pension adjustment represents the difference between the service cost component of FAS pension expense and CAS pension cost. The non-service FAS pension expense component is included in other non-operating expense on the corporation's consolidated statements of earnings. The net FAS/CAS pension adjustment increases or decreases CAS pension cost to equal total FAS pension expense (both service and non-service).

Changes in net sales and operating profit generally are expressed in terms of volume.

Changes in volume refer to increases or decreases in sales or operating profit resulting from varying production activity levels, deliveries or service levels on individual contracts. Volume changes in segment operating profit are typically based on the current profit booking rate for a particular contract. In addition, comparability of the corporation's segment sales, operating profit and operating margin may be impacted favorably or unfavorably by changes in profit booking rates on the corporation's contracts for which it recognizes revenue over time using the percentage-of-completion cost-to-cost method to measure progress towards completion. Increases in profit booking rates, typically referred to as risk retirements, usually relate to revisions in the estimated total costs to fulfill the performance obligations that reflect improved conditions on a particular contract. Conversely, conditions on a particular contract may deteriorate, resulting in an increase in the estimated total costs to fulfill the performance obligations and a reduction in the profit booking rate. Increases or decreases in profit booking rates are recognized in the current period and reflect the inception-to-date effect of such changes.

Segment operating profit and margin may also be impacted favorably or unfavorably by other items, which may or may not impact sales. Favorable items may include the positive resolution of contractual matters, insurance recoveries and gains on sales of assets. Unfavorable items may include the adverse resolution of contractual matters; restructuring charges, except for significant severance actions which are excluded from segment operating results; reserves for disputes; certain asset impairments; and losses on sales of certain assets.

The corporation's consolidated net adjustments not related to volume, including net profit booking rate adjustments, represented approximately 27 percent of total segment operating profit in the first quarter of 2020 as compared to 33 percent in the first quarter of 2019.

Pagină 32 din 80

Aeronautics

Aeronautics' net sales in the first quarter of 2020 increased $785 million, or 14 percent, compared to the same period in 2019. The increase was primarily attributable to higher net sales of approximately $695 million for the F-35 program due to increased volume on production, sustainment, and development contracts; and about $70 million for higher volume on classified development contracts.

Aeronautics' operating profit in the first quarter of 2020 increased $87 million, or 15 percent, compared to the same period in 2019. Operating profit increased approximately $80 million for the F-35 program due to higher volume on production, sustainment, and development contracts. Adjustments not related to volume, including net profit booking rate adjustments, in the first quarter of 2020 were comparable to the same period in 2019.

Missiles and Fire Control

MFC's net sales in the first quarter of 2020 increased $269 million, or 11 percent, compared to the same period in 2019. The increase was primarily attributable to higher net sales of approximately $175 million for tactical and strike missile programs due to increased volume (primarily High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) and hypersonic development programs); and about $125 million for integrated air and missile defense programs due to increased volume (primarily Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)). These increases were partially offset by a decrease of $40 million as a result of lower volume on energy programs and the divestiture of the Distributed Energy Solutions business in November 2019.

MFC's operating profit in the first quarter of 2020 decreased $21 million, or 5 percent, compared to the same period in 2019. Operating profit decreased approximately $55 million for integrated air and missile defense programs due to lower risk retirements on Pagină 33 din 80

international contracts (primarily PAC-3 and THAAD). This decrease was partially offset by an increase of $20 million for sensors and global sustainment programs due to higher risk retirements (primarily Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRNÂŽ) and Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod (SNIPERÂŽ)). Adjustments not related to volume, including net profit booking rate adjustments, were $30 million lower in the first quarter of 2020 compared to the same period in 2019.

Rotary and Mission Systems

RMS' net sales in the first quarter of 2020 were comparable to the same period in 2019.

Net sales decreased approximately $95 million for Sikorsky helicopter programs due to lower volume (primarily combat rescue helicopter and Black Hawk production programs). This decrease was mostly offset by an increase of about $85 million for C6ISR (command, control, communications, computers, cyber, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) programs due to higher volume (primarily undersea combat systems programs).

RMS' operating profit in the first quarter of 2020 was comparable to the same period in 2019. Operating profit increased approximately $20 million for Sikorsky helicopter programs due to better cost performance and higher risk retirements on international military aircraft programs. This increase was offset by a $20 million decrease for integrated warfare systems and sensors (IWSS) programs as lower risk retirements were partially offset by charges that were $30 million lower on a ground-based radar program. Adjustments not related to volume, including net profit booking rate adjustments, were $35 million lower in the first quarter of 2020 compared to the same period in 2019.

Space

Space's net sales in the first quarter of 2020 increased $277 million, or 10 percent, compared to the same period in 2019. The increase was primarily attributable to higher net sales of approximately $180 million for strategic and missile defense programs due Pagină 34 din 80

to higher volume (primarily hypersonic development programs and fleet ballistic missile programs); and about $100 million for government satellite programs due to higher volume (primarily Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen OPIR)).

Space's operating profit in the first quarter of 2020 decreased $53 million, or 16 percent, compared to the same period in 2019. Operating profit decreased approximately $40 million for government satellite programs due to lower risk retirements (primarily Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)); and about $35 million due to lower equity earnings from the corporation's investment in United Launch Alliance (ULA). These decreases were partially offset by an increase of $20 million for commercial satellite programs for charges recorded for performance matters in 2019 not repeated in 2020. Adjustments not related to volume, including net profit booking rate adjustments, were $40 million lower in the first quarter of 2020, compared to the same period in 2019.

Total equity earnings recognized by Space from equity method investments (primarily ULA) represented approximately $30 million, or 11 percent of Space's operating profit in the first quarter of 2020, compared to approximately $65 million, or 19 percent in the first quarter of 2019.

Income Taxes The corporation's effective income tax rate was 15.4 percent in the first quarter of 2020, compared to 12.4 percent in the first quarter of 2019. The rate for the first quarter of 2019 benefited from additional tax deductions of $65 million, or $0.23 per share, recorded discretely for 2018, based on proposed tax regulations released on March 4, 2019, which clarified that foreign military sales qualify for foreign derived intangible income treatment. The rates for both periods benefited from tax deductions for employee equity awards, the research and development tax credit, tax deductions for foreign derived intangible income, and dividends paid to the corporation's defined contribution plans with an employee stock ownership plan feature.

Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures This news release contains the following non-generally accepted accounting principles (non-GAAP) financial measures (as defined by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulation G). While management believes that these non-GAAP financial measures may be useful in evaluating the financial performance of the corporation, this information should be considered supplemental and is not a substitute for financial information prepared in accordance with GAAP. In addition, the corporation's definitions for non-GAAP financial measures may differ from similarly titled measures used by other companies or analysts.

Business segment operating profit represents operating profit from the corporation's business segments before unallocated income and expense. This measure is used by the corporation's senior management in evaluating the performance of its business segments and is a performance goal in the corporation's annual incentive plan.

Business segment operating margin is calculated by dividing business segment operating profit by sales. The table below reconciles the non-GAAP measure business segment operating profit with the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure, consolidated operating profit.

Pagină 35 din 80

1

2

The corporation's 2020 financial outlook includes updated guidance for net sales reflecting the currently expected impacts related to COVID-19. The ultimate impact of COVID-19 on the corporation's financial outlook for 2020 remains uncertain. Additionally, the corporation's financial outlook for 2020 does not include any non-cash impairment charge related to its equity method investment in AMMROC or potential impacts to the corporation's programs, including the F-35 program, resulting from U.S. Government actions related to Turkey. Currently, the corporation does not expect U.S. Government actions related to Turkey will have a material impact on its 2020 financial results.

Refer to the supplemental table "Other Financial and Operating Information" included in this news release for a detail of the FAS/CAS operating adjustment, which excludes $215 million of expected non-service FAS income that will be recorded in non-operating income (expense).

Conference Call Information Lockheed Martin Corporation will webcast live the earnings results conference call (listen-only mode) on Tuesday, April 21, 2020, at 11 a.m. ET. The live webcast and relevant financial charts will be available for download on the Lockheed Martin Investor Relations website at www.lockheedmartin.com/investor.

For additional information, visit the corporation's website: www.lockheedmartin.com.

About Lockheed Martin Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, Lockheed Martin Corporation is a global security and aerospace company that employs approximately 110,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services.

Forward-Looking Statements This news release contains statements that, to the extent they are not recitations of historical fact, constitute forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws, and are based on Lockheed Martin's current expectations and assumptions. The words "believe," "estimate," "anticipate," "project," "intend," "expect," "plan," "outlook," "scheduled," "forecast" and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and are subject to risks and uncertainties. Actual results may differ materially due to factors such as: • the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak or future epidemics on our business, including the potential for facility closures or work stoppages, supply chain disruptions, program delays, our ability to recover our costs under contracts, changing government funding and acquisition priorities and payment policies and regulations; and potential impacts to the fair value of our assets; • our reliance on contracts with the U.S. Government, which are conditioned upon the availability of funding and can be terminated by the U.S. Government for convenience, and our ability to negotiate favorable contract terms; • budget uncertainty, affordability initiatives or the risk of future budget cuts; • risks related to the development, production, sustainment, performance, schedule, cost and requirements of complex and technologically advanced programs including our largest, the F-35 program; • planned production rates for significant programs; compliance with stringent performance and reliability standards; materials availability; Pagină 36 din 80

• •

•

• • •

• •

• • • • •

• • • •

• • •

the performance and financial viability of key suppliers, teammates, joint ventures, joint venture partners, subcontractors and customers; economic, industry, business and political conditions including their effects on governmental policy and government actions that disrupt our supply chain or prevent the sale or delivery of our products (such as delays in obtaining Congressional approvals for exports requiring Congressional notification and export license delays due to COVID-19); trade policies or sanctions (including Turkey's removal from the F-35 program, the impact of U.S. Government sanctions on Turkey and potential sanctions on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia); our success expanding into and doing business in adjacent markets and internationally and the differing risks posed by international sales; changes in foreign national priorities and foreign government budgets; the competitive environment for our products and services, including increased pricing pressures, aggressive pricing in the absence of cost realism evaluation criteria, competition from outside the aerospace and defense industry, and bid protests; the timing and customer acceptance of product deliveries; our ability to continue to innovate and develop new products and to attract and retain key personnel and transfer knowledge to new personnel; the impact of work stoppages or other labor disruptions; the impact of cyber or other security threats or other disruptions to our businesses; our ability to implement and continue, and the timing and impact of, capitalization changes such as share repurchases and dividend payments; our ability to recover costs under U.S. Government contracts and changes in contract mix; the accuracy of our estimates and projections; timing and estimates regarding pension funding and movements in interest rates and other changes that may affect pension plan assumptions, stockholders' equity, the level of the FAS/CAS adjustment and actual returns on pension plan assets; the successful operation of joint ventures that we do not control and our ability to recover our investments; realizing the anticipated benefits of acquisitions or divestitures, joint ventures, teaming arrangements or internal reorganizations; our efforts to increase the efficiency of our operations and improve the affordability of our products and services; risk of an impairment of our assets, including a potential non-cash impairment charge as early as the second quarter for our equity investment in Advanced Military Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul Center LLC (AMMROC) and the potential impairment of goodwill, intangible assets and inventory recorded as a result of the acquisition of the Sikorsky business; the availability and adequacy of our insurance and indemnities; our ability to benefit fully from or adequately protect our intellectual property rights; the effect of changes in (or in the interpretation of) procurement and other regulations and policies affecting our industry, including export of our products, cost allowability or recovery and potential changes to the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD) acquisition regulations relating to progress payments and performance-based payments and a preference for fixed-price contracts; Pagină 37 din 80

including the potential for DoD to temporarily modify these in response to COVID-19; • the effect of changes in accounting, taxation, or export laws, regulations, and policies and their interpretation or application; and • the outcome of legal proceedings, bid protests, environmental remediation efforts, audits, government investigations or government allegations that we have failed to comply with law, other contingencies and U.S. Government identification of deficiencies in our business systems.

These are only some of the factors that may affect the forward-looking statements contained in this news release. For a discussion identifying additional important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated in the forwardlooking statements, see the corporation's filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission including, but not limited to, "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations" and "Risk Factors" in the corporation's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended Dec. 31, 2019 and subsequent quarterly reports on Form 10-Q. The corporation's filings may be accessed through the Investor Relations page of its website, www.lockheedmartin.com/investor, or through the website maintained by the SEC at www.sec.gov.

The corporation's actual financial results likely will be different from those projected due to the inherent nature of projections. Given these uncertainties, forward-looking statements should not be relied on in making investment decisions. The forwardlooking statements contained in this news release speak only as of the date of its filing.

Except where required by applicable law, the corporation expressly disclaims a duty to provide updates to forward-looking statements after the date of this news release to reflect subsequent events, changed circumstances, changes in expectations, or the estimates and assumptions associated with them. The forward-looking statements in this news release are intended to be subject to the safe harbor protection provided by the federal securities laws.

Lockheed Martin Corporation Consolidated Statements of Earnings1 (unaudited; in millions, except per share data)

Pagină 38 din 80

1

2

3

The corporation closes its books and records on the last Sunday of the calendar quarter to align its financial closing with its business processes, which was on March 29 for the first quarter of 2020 and March 31 for the first quarter of 2019. The consolidated financial statements and tables of financial information included herein are labeled based on that convention. This practice only affects interim periods, as the corporation's fiscal year ends on Dec. 31.

In the first quarter of 2019, the corporation recognized a previously deferred noncash gain of $51 million ($38 million, or $0.13 per share, after tax) related to properties sold in 2015 as a result of completing its remaining obligations.

Net earnings in the first quarter of 2019 include benefits of $75 million, or $0.26 per share, from additional tax deductions, based on proposed tax regulations released on March 4, 2019, which clarified that foreign military sales qualify as foreign derived intangible income. Approximately $65 million, or $0.23 per share, of the total benefit was recorded discretely because it relates to 2018.

Lockheed Martin Corporation Business Segment Summary Operating Results (unaudited; in millions)

Pagină 39 din 80

1 In the first quarter of 2019, the corporation recognized a previously deferred noncash gain of $51 million ($38 million, or $0.13 per share, after tax) related to properties sold in 2015 as a result of completing its remaining obligations. ... citeste varianta originala si integrala urmarind link-ul ...

Pagină 40 din 80

Cap. RESURSE, chiar și de idei OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/338.htm

OPEC The OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR) covers major issues affecting the world oil market and provides an outlook for crude oil market developments for the coming year. The report provides a detailed analysis of key developments impacting oil market trends in world oil demand, supply as well as the oil market balance.

In an effort to continuously enhance the service provided to our readers, we are pleased to announce that the analysis provided in the OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report is now more accessible than ever. As of March 2017, the electronic version of the report includes a bookmark feature, allowing readers to access individual sections directly from the table of contents, to make navigating the report as easy as one click.

Additionally, as of February 2019, key tables providing the latest information on the world oil demand and supply balance, including monthly revisions; OECD oil stocks and oil on water; non-OPEC supply and OPEC natural gas liquids; and world rig count – as contained in the MOMR appendix tables – will also be made available on the OPEC Website and can be downloaded in Excel, for ease of use.

Raportul lunar OPEC privind piața petrolului (MOMR) acoperă probleme majore care afectează piața mondială a petrolului și oferă perspective pentru evoluțiile pieței petrolului brut pentru anul viitor. Raportul oferă o analiză detaliată a evoluțiilor cheie care afectează tendințele pieței petrolului în cererea mondială de petrol, oferta, precum și echilibrul pieței de petrol. În efortul de a îmbunătăți continuu serviciul furnizat cititorilor noștri, suntem încântați să anunțăm că analiza oferită în Raportul lunar OPEC al pieței petrolului este acum mai accesibilă ca niciodată. Începând cu martie 2017, versiunea electronică a raportului include o caracteristică de marcaj, care permite cititorilor să acceseze secțiuni individuale direct din cuprins, pentru a face navigarea raportului la fel de ușor cu un singur clic. În plus, începând cu februarie 2019, tabelecheie care furnizează cele mai recente informații despre balanța mondială de cerere și ofertă de petrol, inclusiv revizuiri lunare; Stocurile de petrol OCDE și petrolul pe apă; aprovizionarea cu lichide de gaze naturale non-OPEC și OPEC; iar numărul de platforme mondiale - așa cum este cuprins în tabelele de apendice MOMR - vor fi, de asemenea, disponibile pe site-ul OPEC și pot fi descărcate în Excel, pentru o ușurință de utilizare.

Watch the MOMR Smart App video Urmăriți videoclipul aplicației inteligente MOMR

Pagină 41 din 80

Oil Market Highlights

Crude Oil Price Movements Crude oil prices collapsed in March 2020, recording their deepest monthly drop since the global financial crisis in 2008. The ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic were the main driving force, resulting in unprecedented worldwide oil demand shock and massive sell-offs in the global oil markets, amid a significant crude surplus.

The OPEC Reference Basket (ORB) value was down by $21.61, or 38.9%, m-o-m, to stand at $33.92/b, the lowest monthly value since September 2003. ICE Brent declined by $21.75, or 39.2%, m-o-m, to average $33.73/b, while NYMEX WTI fell $20.09, or 39.8%, to average $30.45/b. The term structure of all three crude benchmarks – ICE Brent, NYMEX WTI and DME Oman – moved to a super contango in March, and money managers cut speculative net long positions.

Prețurile petrolului s-au prăbușit în martie 2020, înregistrând cea mai profundă scădere lunară de la criza financiară globală din 2008. Ramificările pandemiei COVID-19 au fost principala forță motrice, rezultând în șocuri fără precedent ale cererii de petrol la nivel mondial și vânzări masive la nivel mondial piețele petroliere, pe fondul unui excedent brut important.

Valoarea coșului de referință (ORB) OPEC a fost în scădere cu 21,61 dolari, sau 38,9%, mamă, până la 33,92 USD / b, cea mai mică valoare lunară din septembrie 2003. ICE Brent a scăzut cu 21,75 dolari sau 39,2%, mamă, la o medie de 33,73 dolari / b, în timp ce NYMEX WTI a scăzut cu 20,09 USD, sau 39,8%, la o medie de 30,45 USD / b. Structura termenului pentru toate cele trei criterii de referință brute - ICE Brent, NYMEX WTI și DME Oman - s-a mutat într-un super contango în martie, iar managerii de bani au redus pozițiile speculative lungi net.

World Economy The world economy is forecast to face a severe recession in 2020, declining by 1.5%, following global economic growth of 2.9% in the previous year. Following tender signs of improvement at the beginning of the year, expectations for global economic growth were quickly burdened by the strong impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Within the OECD, the US is forecast to contract by 4.1% in 2020, following growth of 2.3% in 2019.

Pagină 42 din 80

An even larger decline is expected in the Euro-zone, where economic activity is forecast to fall by 6.0% in 2020, compared to growth of 1.2% in 2019. Japan is forecast to contract by 3.9% in 2020, comparing to growth of 0.7% in 2019. China’s 2020 GDP is forecast to grow by 1.5%, recovering from a sharp contraction in 1Q20 and following growth of 6.1% in 2019. India is forecast to grow by only 2.0%, a sharp slowdown from already weakening growth of 5.3% in 2019. Brazil’s economy is forecast to contract by 2.4% in 2020, following growth of 1.0% in 2019. Russia’s economy is forecast to contract by 0.5% in 2020, after growth of 1.4% in 2019, not only due to COVID-19, but also because of the considerable decline in oil prices. As risk remains to be skewed to the downside, further revisions may be warranted going forward.

Se estimează că economia mondială se va confrunta cu o recesiune severă în 2020, în scădere cu 1,5%, în urma creșterii economice globale de 2,9% în anul precedent. În urma semnelor licitate de îmbunătățire la începutul anului, așteptările la creșterea economică mondială au fost repede împovărate de impactul puternic al pandemiei COVID-19. În cadrul OCDE, se estimează că SUA se va contracta cu 4,1% în 2020, în urma creșterii de 2,3% în 2019.

O scădere și mai mare este așteptată în zona euro, unde se prevede că activitatea economică va scădea cu 6,0% în 2020, comparativ cu creșterea de 1,2% în 2019.

Japonia se va contracta cu 3,9% în 2020, comparativ cu o creștere de 0,7 % în 2019.

Se estimează că PIB-ul Chinei pentru 2020 va crește cu 1,5%, revenind la o contracție accentuată în primul trimestru și după o creștere de 6,1% în 2019. India este prevăzută să crească cu doar 2,0%, o încetinire accentuată a creșterii deja de 5,3 % în 2019. Se prevede că economia Braziliei se va contracta cu 2,4% în 2020, după o creștere de 1,0% în 2019. Economia Rusiei se va contracta cu 0,5% în 2020, după creșterea de 1,4% în 2019, nu numai datorită COVID-ului 19, dar și din cauza scăderii considerabile a prețurilor petrolului. Deoarece riscul este dezavantajat, este posibil ca revizuirile ulterioare să fie justificate.

World Oil Demand World oil demand growth forecast for 2019 is kept unchanged at 0.83 mb/d, compared with the previous month’s assessment. For 2020, the world oil demand growth forecast is revised lower by 6.9 mb/d, to a historical drop of around 6.8 mb/d. The contraction in the 2Q of this year is expected to be around 12 mb/d, with April witnessing the worst contraction at about 20 mb/d. The impact of the COVID-19 outbreak in China in 1Q20, and its negative impact on transportation and industrial fuels in the country, has since spread globally and is now affecting oil demand growth in most other countries and regions, with an unprecedented impact on global oil demand, transportation fuels in particular. As a result, OECD oil demand is revised lower by 3.7 mb/d to decline by 4.0 mb/d, while non-OECD oil demand growth is adjusted lower by 3.2 mb/d to contract by 2.9 mb/d for the year. Considering latest developments, and the large uncertainties going forward, downward risks remain significant, suggesting possibility of further adjustments, especially in the 2Q, should new data and further developments warrant revisions.

World Oil Supply Non-OPEC oil supply growth in 2019 is revised down by 0.01 mb/d from the previous month’s assessment and is now estimated at 1.98 mb/d. For 2020, non-OPEC oil supply is forecast to decline by 1.50 mb/d, a downward revision of 3.26 mb/d from the previous projection. The impact of COVID-19, ensuing global economic recession and oil demand shock, will also lead to supply disruptions. Benchmark oil prices plunge prompted companies to respond by cutting capital expenditure to the lowest in 13 years. The 2020 oil supply growth forecast for the US was revised down by 1.05 mb/d Pagină 43 din 80

to show a decline of 0.15 mb/d y-o-y. The supply growth for the 10 non-OPEC countries participating in the Declaration of Cooperation has also been adjusted lower.

Oil supply in 2020 is now forecast to show growth only in Norway, Brazil, Guyana and Australia. OPEC NGLs production in 2019 is estimated to have grown by 0.04 mb/d to average 4.79 mb/d and for 2020 will grow by 0.04 mb/d to average 4.83 mb/d. In March, OPEC crude oil production increased by 821 tb/d m-o-m to average 28.61 mb/d, according to secondary sources.

Product Markets and Refining Operations Global refinery margins globally showed mixed performance during March. In the US, margins weakened as strength in gasoil/diesel was offset by losses in gasoline cracks, as complex margins came close to negative territory. In Europe, product markets strengthened slightly at the middle of the barrel, supported by a fall in feedstock prices.

An already relatively tight global gasoil market saw support from output cuts and continued critical industrial activities for essential services and goods amid COVID-19.

However, in Asia, margins eased towards the end of the month, pressured by a weaker top of the barrel, despite healthy gasoil and fuel oil crack spreads.

Tanker Market The tanker market has been one of few segments of the oil industry that enjoyed positive momentum in March.

A sudden surge in crude exports boosted demand for VLCCs, which pulled up Suezmax rates as well. Dirty spot freight rates declined mid-month before climbing again as the market was supported by high demand for tankers as charterers rushed to place cargoes amid a collapse in demand due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Increased options for time-chartering, including for floating storage, underscored the build-up of excess supply of crude and products in the market. For the month, dirty spot rates averaged 69% higher m-o-m in March.

Clean tanker spot freight rates rose 12% m-o-m, as the need to find homes for excess product supplies supported the market.

Trade Crude and product trade flows have been notably affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and the uncertain outlook going forward, although there has been some lag in how the various regions have been affected.

US crude exports had a strong start to the year, averaging 3.5 mb/d in 1Q20, a gain of 0.8 mb/d over the same quarter last year, as the US remained a net liquids exporter Pagină 44 din 80

for the seventh-consecutive month. Meanwhile, China’s crude imports averaged 10.5 mb/d over the first two months of 2020, declining from December as disruptions caused

by COVID-19 led to some imports being diverted or delayed. Product trade was also affected, with imports and exports averaging 0.3 mb/d lower in the first two months of the year compared to December. Official data showed India’s crude imports increasing slightly in February, although some estimates show a higher jump as the country took in some discounted cargoes diverted from China. India’s crude and product trade is likely to be broadly impacted in March by a government-ordered lockdown.

Stock Movements OECD commercial oil stocks rose by 5.6 mb, m-o-m, in February to stand at 2,945 mb.

This was 64.3 mb higher than the same time one year ago and 24.7 mb above the latest five-year average. Within components, crude stocks fell by 6.1 mb, while product stocks rose by 11.7 mb, m-o-m. In terms of days of forward cover, OECD commercial stocks rose by 5.0 days, m-o-m, in February to stand at 72.7 days. This was 11.5 days above the same period in 2019, and 10.3 days above the latest five-year average.

Preliminary data for March showed that US total commercial oil stocks increased by 8.2 mb, m-o-m, to stand at 1,922 mb. This was 31.8 mb, or 1.7%, above the same period a year ago, and 16.2 mb, or 0.8%, lower than the latest five-year average.

Within components, crude stocks rose by 25.1 mb, while product stocks fell by 16.8 mb, m-o-m.

Balance of Supply and Demand Demand for OPEC crude in 2019 stood at 29.9 mb/d1, 1.2 mb/d lower than the 2018 level. Following the recent agreement reached at the extraordinary OPEC and nonOPEC Ministerial Meetings, the demand for OPEC crude in 2020 is expected at 24.5 mb/d, around 5.4 mb/d lower than the 2019 level, though this remains heavily subject to uncertainty surrounding current market conditions.

Cererea de petrol brut de la OPEC în 2019 s-a situat la 29,9 mb / d2, cu 1,2 mb / d mai mică decât nivelul din 2018. În urma recentului acord încheiat în cadrul reuniunilor ministeriale extraordinare OPEC și non-OPEC, cererea pentru OPEC brut în 2020 este de așteptat la 24,5 mb / d, în jur de 5,4 mb / d mai mică decât nivelul din 2019, deși aceasta rămâne puternic supusă incertitudinii în jurul condițiile actuale ale pieței.

1

Liquefied petroleum gas. mb/d, Thousand barrels per day. mboe/d, Thousand of oil equivalent per day.

2 Gaz lichefiat. mb / d, Mii de barili pe zi. mboe / d, Mii de barili de echivalent petrol pe zi.

Pagină 45 din 80

barrels

Cap. EVENIMENTE MINUSMA https://www.facebook.com/mapn.ro/posts/1669381173201126?__tn__=-R Ministerul Apararii Nationale, Romania - www.mapn.ro 20 aprilie la 08:00 · #Mali

De la 15 la 45 de grade Celsius, după un zbor la peste 4000 de kilometri distanță și trei ore în minus pe fusul orar, militarii detașamentului Carpathian Pumas, rotația a doua, au aterizat joi cu bine în Mali, pentru a prelua misiunea detașamentului românesc de elicoptere din cadrul MINUSMA, sub egida ONU.

Continentul african i-a întâmpinat cu căldură, la propriu și la figurat, iar acomodarea lor în teatru se va face treptat, în tabăra militară care le va fi casă timp de câteva luni: în contextul neprevăzut al pandemiei cauzate de noul coronavirus, preluarea atribuțiilor de la colegii din prima rotație se desfășoară cu respectarea măsurilor ONU de izolare și distanțare socială.

Pagină 46 din 80

Primele gânduri se îndreaptă către familiile rămase acasă: "Noi suntem bine, avem entuziasmul și hotărârea necesare pentru a ne îndeplini misiunea. De Paște, singura noastră dorința este ca voi, cei dragi, să fiți sănătoși și în siguranță!"

Pagină 47 din 80

Cap. OPINII/ANALIZE

RO.A&D: Dacă reușiți să accesați website-ul, anunțați-ne, vă rog

Descriere produs: IMM INVEST ROMANIA https://www.fngcimm.ro/imm-invest Programul IMM INVEST ROMANIA permite IMM-urilor afectate semnificativ de criza COVID-19 sa isi asigure lichiditatile pentru derularea activitatii curente sau pentru investitii, prin accesarea unuia sau a mai multor credite pentru realizarea de investitii si/sau unul sau mai multe credite/linii de credit pentru capital de lucru, garantate de catre FNGCIMM in numele si contul statului roman, prin Ministerul Finantelor Publice.

Plafonul maxim de garantare alocat este de 15 miliarde lei.

Inscrierea in program se face pe site-ul imminvest.ro Ghidul de completare a cererii online AVANTAJELE CREDITULUI GARANTAT IMM INVEST • Statul poate garanta pana la 90% din valoarea creditelor pe care le accesati la una din bancile partenere!

• Nu platiti dobanda, comision de garantare sau alte costuri de acordare! Costurile finantarii sunt subventionate in procent de 100% de la bugetul de stat, pana la data de 31.12.2020, cu posibilitati de prelungire.

• Nu platiti comision de rambursare anticipata!

• Valoarea maxima a creditelor poate fi de pana la 10.000.000 lei pentru investitii si pana la 5.000.000 lei pentru capital de lucru!

The impacts of Brexit on the security and the defence industry in the European Union and the United Kingdom https://warsawinstitute.org/impacts-brexit-security-defence-industry-european-unionunited-kingdom/

Warsaw Institute - Poland Date: 21 April 2020

On the 31st of January 2020 Brexit became a fact. Now with the help of a special transition period both the UK and the EU are actively preparing for the new reality apart from each other. Regardless of the final outcome of the London-Brussels negotiations that are said to conclude before December 31st of this year, the UK’s split from the EU will affect all aspects of this bilateral relationship, including security and defence Pagină 48 din 80

industry. All existing arrangements and defence cooperation agreements will need to be reassessed, completely changing the defence landscape of Europe. Despite all of this, the final extent of changes imposed by Brexit will only be known after the transition period negotiations conclude and an exact shape of the EU-UK relations post 2020 will be known.

• The Transition Period lasting from the 31st of January till the 31st of December 2020 will determine the final shape of the relationship between the EU and the UK. • The divorce will affect of aspects of our lives including defence. Nevertheless, when compared to other areas such as economy, travel and cross-border cooperation, its impacts will be minimal – this is because it is still NATO and not the EU that is the main security guarantor on the Old Continent. The UK already vowed to remain committed to NATO following Brexit.

• The absence of the United Kingdom in EU-organised peacekeeping and monitoring missions as well as the loss of Britain’s CSDP budget contributions will be the main impacts felt by the European Union’s defence sector.

• The EU’s defence industry will also experience the split since it will now be harder to trade parts and systems with the UK. At the same time, the sales of EU-made arms to UK were minimal. The multinational companies such as Airbus Defence may be the biggest losers since the ties with UK need to be upheld regardless of the future shape of the EU-UK relations.

• The United Kingdom will feel the negative effects of Brexit on its defence much more than the European Union will.

• By not participating in the CSDP, British Armed Forces may over time become less compatible with their European counterparts as no common goals will be set anymore. Furthermore, the UK will be excluded from training opportunities during EU-led peacekeeping missions and future projects of similar kind. At the same time the UK was always reluctant to further ‘militarisation’ of the EU citing the concerns for the key role of NATO needing to be upheld.

• The British arms industry will arguably be the biggest looser of Brexit as the new, post-2020 reality may impede many of its contracts with EU nations by increasing prices, delaying project completion – all as possible results of the returning EU-UK ‘hard border’. The loss of competitiveness in Europe would force the UK to look for new markets for their weapon systems.

After months of negotiations both with the EU Member States as well as within its own Parliament, the United Kingdom has finally left the European Union on Friday the 31st of January 2020. Nevertheless, the UK’s departure from the EU is not fully complete just yet, as both Brussels and London have agreed for a special Transition Period lasting for 11 months, during which the UK will still remain a part of the EU’s Single Market and the Customs Union. In the final act that is yet to come, the midnight of 31st of December 2020 will see Britain’s complete departure from the EU structures.

Before this happens both governments hope to reach a Free Trade Agreement that will allow to minimalize the chaos and financial loses that are to be expected in the first month of UK-EU trade and flow of people should a no-deal scenario with no such agreement play out.

At the same time, regardless of the direction in which the Brexit negotiations will ultimately go in, there will be consequences for both Europe and the UK in virtually all branches of their social, economic and political lives. One of the areas that is of particular concern is defence. The United Kingdom is only one of two European nations that possesses nuclear capability in the form of Trident nuclear ballistic missiles while at the same time sporting two very capable aircraft carriers that although are less relevant to the defensive war in Europe, are at the same time of immense advantage in military and peacekeeping operations in the far corners of the globe. The British Pagină 49 din 80

Army is at the same time one of the most modern and capable forces on the Old Continent, playing an important role in all modern conflicts during which other European nations have been involved. From the strictly economic perspective, the British arms industry is also one of the biggest in the whole of European Union, being surpassed only by France and Germany. What is more, the UK is involved in a number of international projects (Eurofighter Typhoon, F-35 etc) where it is only one of several participating states. Any perturbations resulting from Brexit are likely to affect both the strong position of the Royal Army and UK’s well-developed arms industry.

This report focuses on the possible consequences that Brexit may have on the armed forces and defence industries of both the United Kingdom and the European Union Member States. Since the final outcome of the post-transition agreement between the UK and the EU is not known at the time of writing this piece, several most possible scenarios will be explored, focusing on the most plausible ones.

The main thesis of the report that is examined in the forthcoming pages is that Brexit as such will have little effect on the military security and armies of both the European Union Member States and the United Kingdom. Although the EU is currently attempting to develop a more comprehensive cooperation between EU27 in the defence sector, it is still NATO and not the EU that undertakes the vast majority of defence-related activities and decisions in Europe. Nevertheless, at the same time it is becoming clear that Brexit will have a severe impact on the British arms industry regardless of which of the explored two scenarios (no-deal and Free Trade Agreement) happen. The difference will only be there in the extent of harm done. The European arms industry will also feel the effects of the British divorce with the European Union but because of its vast network of already established alternatives, the harmful effects will be felt to a lesser extent. This is the case for both the optimistic and the most pessimistic outcomes of the transition period that will have been explored.

KNOW YOUR BREXIT Britain’s relationship with the European Union has been, since its very beginning, far from perfect. The EU membership referendum of June 2016 was not just another symptom to it but rather a culmination of years of disagreements and British struggle to remain on its unique but separate pathway of development, while at the same time trying to adhere to the increasing amount of rules and regulations introduced by the European Union.

Initially, the United Kingdom wanted to join the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963 but was blocked from doing so by the French President Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle had several doubts about British commitments to the EEC, believing that London will always aim to side with Washington more than it will ever want to side with Brussels.[1] After the UK finally joined the Community in 1973 it quickly went into another period of uncertainty when the government had called a 1975 EEC Membership referendum to see what percentage of Brits supported their 1973 accession. The results were decidedly positive, with 67% of those who participated supporting the UK in the EEC. A relatively small margin of 33% of Britons voiced their disapproval to the partnership of two.[2] Less than 10 years later in 1984, British Prime Minister (PM) Margaret Thatcher went to war with the ECC over the payments that the UK was making towards the Community’s budget. Although the UK ranked as one of the poorest member states at the time, its financial contributions were higher than those of many wealthier states.[3] From the technical side, this had to do with a big focus on agriculture at the time and the financial subsidies to farms that the UK had enjoyed less of than other Member States. In the end, PM Thatcher managed to reduce the payment size – something that remained in place until Brexit. Other significant conflict points between the UK and the EEC/EU included a ban on British beef and Pagină 50 din 80

trouble with selling chocolate outside of the Kingdom, both of which were ultimately lifted following lengthy diplomatic and even judicial proceedings that took years to finalise.[4] [5] The first announcement regarding a possible referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU that ultimately lead to Brexit came in 2010 when PM David Cameron promised a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, citing worries that the British society had with regards to the increase of powers given to Brussels by the document. Three years later, in 2013 during his Bloomberg speech, PM Cameron said that should the Conservative Party win the 2015 General Elections, the government will try to renegotiate a more favourable membership conditions and will also hold a nationwide referendum, now known as the 2016 UK Membership Referendum.[6] In early 2014 the PM outlined the main aims of the upcoming re-negotiations with the EU, including more control over UK’s immigration, decentralisation of the EU and reduction of bureaucracy for business. The 2015 elections had been won by the Conservative Party with a large majority and hence the negotiations continued uninterrupted. Their outcome as well as a date for the now-confirmed referendum had been outlined in early 2016.[7] Following a brutal and extremely active campaign, the Membership Referendum took place on the 23rd June 2016 with results coming through just hours later.

On Friday 24th June 2016 the results had been announced, confirming the victory of the Leave EU campaign by a narrow margin. On the same day PM David Cameron announced his planned resignation set to happen in October, and following a Conservative leadership election, Theresa May was announced as the new Prime Minister who would lead the UK’s withdrawal negotiations.[8] The initial Brexit date has been set to 30th of March 2019 yet, following a quadruple defeat of the PM’s Withdrawal Agreement in the House of Commons and the subsequent delay in Brexit, she announced her resignation that was set to take place on 7th June 2019. Boris Johnson, a controversial Conservative politician, former Mayor of London and one of the heads of the victorious ‘Leave EU’ campaign, was then nominated to take Ms May’s spot, which he did on 24th July 2019.[9] In his first speech, Johnson sought to carry out Brexit on or before 31st October 2019, leaving both a deal and no-deal Brexit on the table – something that many Britons feared due to the possible catastrophic consequences related to obstructed movement of goods and people. After suspending the parliament and still being unable to gain acceptance for his Withdrawal Agreement or even a no-deal divorce, Johnson dissolved the House of Commons and called for General Election on 12th December 2019. These were to give Conservative Party enough seats to vote through a withdrawal agreement negotiated by Johnson with a help from UKIP and other Euro-sceptic parties. Quite surprisingly, the elections provided the Conservative Party with a landslide victory and the biggest parliamentary majority since 1987.[10] Having secured enough Members of Parliament to vote on his Withdrawal Agreement, the United Kingdom has left the European Union on 31st January 2020. Despite the departure, the UK has remained a part of the EU Single Market and the Customs Union until the end of the 11-month long transition period that is set to end on 31st December 2020 and that will take the UK out of all EU-related bodies and agreements.[11] The importance of this period cannot be stressed enough as it will be during these eleven months that London and Brussels will try to negotiate a UK-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as well as other equally important details of the future bilateral relations.[12] These will cover all aspects of people’s everyday life, from traveling and economy to judicial matters and defence.

Pagină 51 din 80

INFLUENCE OF BREXIT ON THE DEFENCE INDUSRY AND SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION The decision made by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to leave the European Union has had a significant impact on virtually every aspect of the Union. This is no different when it comes to defence and military security of the now EU27. Arguably, the impact on those same areas will be felt much less significantly by the EU when compared to the United Kingdom. Although the EU (compared to NATO) has relatively little to say when it comes to the coordination of armies or joint military exercises, the arms industry of the entire region is well interlinked, and new purchases and projects are greatly facilitated by the existence of the customs union and the European free market. The UK is set to exit both on 31st December 2020 and, should a free trade agreement not come to materialise, the Kingdom will be excluded from all of those joint projects, plus, any sales and purchases will then take longer and be more expensive than they were before 2020 due to border checks and customs tariffs in place.

SECURITY Despite the relatively limited consequences that the EU27 will have to face following the departure of the United Kingdom, it is obvious that this move will in some ways weaken the security of the European Union as well as its arms industry and peace-keeping capability. According to the 2019 Global Firepower Military Strength Index, the United Kingdom was ranked as the World’s 8th greatest military superpower surpassed by only one European power – France.[13] The UK also sports Europe’s largest defence budget and is one of only six states within NATO spending 2% of its annual GDP on defence. Furthermore, the UK alongside France are the only two states in Europe that possess nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in their arsenals while at the same time having a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.[14] The loss of member with such a powerful army and so much to say in global politics has certainly dealt a painful blow to the European Union. At the same time, since the EU does not possess its own offensive capability in the form of a European army, the absence of the UK at this stage is merely reputational and means that the EU will be less capable of indirectly affecting decisions undertaken by NATO and the United Nations.

Although the European Union is predominantly a political alliance, some of its members including France and Germany have openly spoken about creating an ‘European Army’. Despite different attempts having been made over the years, up until this stage these have withered out as mere political declarations. However, Brexit may actually accelerate the creation of a more defence-orientated Union. This is because ever since its accession in 1973 the United Kingdom has been a loud opponent of any attempts to increase the defensive capabilities of the Union citing the existence of NATO.[15] Now that the UK is gone, the Franco-German duo that has been pushing for a greater militarisation is left without its greatest and strongest opponent, hence allowing for less impeded steps to be taken for these plans to finally be put into action.[16] The first attempts to introduce defence issues into the EU happened with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty that established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993. In addition, the year 1999 saw the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to help EU with managing international crises through humanitarian, evacuation, peacekeeping and intervention missions. In 2003, this policy was put to practice with Operation Artemis, also known as the European Union Force (EUFOR), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As part of this operation, 2,300 European soldiers helped stop massacres in Ituri, to the north-eastern parts the Pagină 52 din 80

country.[17] The current state of defence affairs in the EU was established with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty that conceived the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), at the same time establishing the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who would at the same time hold the position of the VicePresident of the European Commission. The treaty also introduced the “mutual defence” clause – if one Member State experiences armed aggression, other EU Member States must come to its assistance. Interestingly, this clause was invoked for the first time following the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015.[18] Strengthening the European defence even further has been one of the European Union’s political priorities since the European Council meeting of December 2013. As a result, several actions have been undertaken as a part of CSDP, including the creation of a political framework called the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).[19] It includes 20 commitments to step up cooperation in several areas, including: defence investment, the interoperability of European armies, and development of the European industrial base. Furthermore, the European Defence Fund was created to better financially support the development of European defence capabilities. Its precursor, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) had been granted €500 million for the 2019-2020 period. In 2020 the European Commission announced its intention to set aside €28.5 billion for security and defence, including €13 billion for the EDF and €6.5 billion for military mobility.[20] As any other project or policy of the EU, the CSDP and the EDF are financed from the contributions from all 27 (28 before 2020) Member States.

Considering the size and capabilities of the British Army and its substantial budget, the financial contribution made by the United Kingdom towards the CSDP of approximately 2.3% of the total budget annually were quite low.[21] This was partially due to the already mentioned scepticism towards the EU militarisation and the possible noncompatibility with NATO in the eyes of London. The loss of such a relatively low financial contribution following Brexit is far from being a painful blow towards the idea of militarized EU and can result in either a lowering of CSDP budget or a slight alignment of EU27 contributions to fill for the missing UK’s part.[22] Another important part of the EU’s CSDP is the ability to conduct peacekeeping and monitoring missions across the globe. These are often done in cooperation and agreement with the United Nations and NATO but at this stage the EU is fully capable of organising missions independently and without any support from the aforementioned bodies.[23] The 2015 Operation Sophia is just one of many examples to this. Up to this moment, six operations made up of European soldiers from different Member States have been deployed abroad including: • Operation Atalanta (launched 2008) to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia • Operation Sophia (launched 2015) to combat migrant smuggling operations on the Mediterranean Sea • Operation Althea (launched 2004) peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina In addition, three military training missions have already taken place: EUTM Somalia in 2010, EUTM Mali in 2013 and EUTM RCA in 2016 as well as 10 civilian crisis management missions, to provide training and advice in the fields of internal security and border management, in the Sahel, North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, Ukraine, Georgia and Somalia.[24] Although the United Kingdom actively took part in many of these missions, the departure from the European Union will not allow the Kingdom to take part in such engagements anymore. This does not mean that the UK will be completely excluded from taking part in peacekeeping across the globe since most of such missions are organised and carried out by UN and NATO of which the UK will remain a member. For the European Union, the lack of British involvement in the future EU-led peacekeeping missions will not be a major game-changer. The UK Pagină 53 din 80

was reluctant to get heavily involved, sending only small components of troops and police officers to a selected number of these.[25] The absence of the United Kingdom therefore will not impede the EU’s capability to operate globally and maintain peace worldwide.

DEFENCE INDUSTRY Although the peacekeeping operations under the EU’s auspice are funded from the European Defence Fund, it is important to remember that not all of that money goes towards just foreign engagements. The European arms industry that has been developing rapidly across the whole Old Continent in the recent years and as such is now a second key beneficiary of the EDF funds. In 2015 alone, the total value of sales made by EU’s arms dealers exceeded 100 billion Euro, which would rank the Old Continent as the second biggest exporter of weapons by value, surpassed only by the United States of America.[26] In its entirety before Brexit, the EU’s arms industry employed over half a million workers directly with over one million more jobs being indirect. Despite these impressive numbers, the arms companies of the Old Continent have never been consolidated into one, joint venture but rather always operated as separate entities on completely separate markets.[27] The decision makers in Brussels have already seen the need for a closer arms market integration years ago. The European Defence Agency, created in 2004 is responsible for both the multilateral cooperation of the armies of each and every Member State but it also works closely towards building a closer relationships within the European defence sector so that its negotiating position is stronger and more international, multicompany projects can be undertaken for the good of the Union. Thanks to the steady financing of the EDA from the CSDP, the arms industry across the EU is now becoming increasingly Europeanised.[28] This can be exemplified by the Eurofighter Typhoon multirole fighter jet. From the very beginning this plane has been designed to be a joint, multicompany project that would result in a new fighter jet for a number of European armies. Due to this interoperability, the funding for development came in from different companies and even national governments which then pledged to purchase the ready airplane. At present, more than 75 companies from all over Europe are involved in its production and the plane itself is currently in use with four EU member states and one former one. These nations are: United Kingdom, Austria (also outside NATO), Germany, Italy and Spain and together they operate nearly 500 aircrafts.[29] This as well as other similar joint weapon projects were made possible thanks to different bodies of the European Union coming together to introduce regulations making it easier to transfer sensitive technology and information through borders. This process is likely to continue following Brexit, simply without the presence of British companies in the mix. The European Commission has made the integration of the European defence industry one of its core objectives.

Although already being partly liberalised, the European Defence Fund will allow the Commission to spend billions of euros in an attempt to further integrate the European arms industry and make it more competitive without the UK in the picture.[30] A successful cooperation of the EU’s defence markets is absolutely feasible without the UK as the majority of technologies and components can be sourced from the alternative Member States. This is even though the overall profits of the entire EU’s defence industry will be significantly reduced in the beginning of 2020; and all of this will be because of one UK based company – the BAE Systems. British Aerospace Engineering is Europe’s largest defence company with an average of 25 billion Euro of arms sales and 85 000 employed directly involved in its operations.[31] Although BAE Systems is not solely defence focused (it also manufactures products for civilian market) it still is considered as a predominantly arms-orientated company. The third Pagină 54 din 80

biggest company in the arms market of the Old Continent is French Thales, making ‘only’ 7 billion Euro – a significant difference to its British rival. Now that the UK is outside of the Union, these profits will flow outside of the EU and will not contribute towards a closer integration of the EU defence market.[32] At the same time, it is important to stress that the divorce does not necessarily need to make all international, multi-company defence projects go away completely, though they will not be as simple as they were before. A free trade agreement that both the UK and the EU wish to sign in the near future would allow for both easier cooperation as well as the lowering of costs associated with custom fees and taxes. This will only be possible should Brussels and London come to an agreement before 31st December 2020.[33] The exact status of negotiations is unknown at the time this piece is being written but multiple sources from within the European Union claim that negotiation are ‘slow and painful’ and that a consensus may not be reached before the end of the Transition Period at the end of the year. Should an FTA not be possible, bilateral industrial cooperation agreements would be then necessary in order to lower the impact of Brexit on the entire industry. These documents, signed between the UK and individual EU Member States would allow for the lowering or even a complete abolition of custom fees, taxes and border checks thus allowing for a more seamless cooperation and goods exchange. At the same time, one needs to remember that such documents usually take months if not years to draft and the necessity to negotiate and ratify as many as 27 of them could be a truly Pyrrhic undertaking for the current and forthcoming UK administrations.[34] Fearing the exclusion of British finances and technological know-how from the planned Europe-wide defence programmes like that of the tank and fighter jet of the future, the German officials have already expressed their will to grant the UK a special status that will allow London to join any new or to rejoin any old joint programmes. This would allow both Brussels and officials in Westminster to avoid the lengthy route of a bilateral free trade agreements.[35] The need for a special status in the UK-EU defence relation also becomes obvious when looking at the second biggest defence company of the Old Continent – Airbus.

Its defence section – Airbus Defence makes 13 billion Euro of sales annually and employees more than 140 000 workers in not one but more than six states across Europe.[36] Its unique international structure means that parts from factories and design bureaus scattered across Europe are then transported to one factory and put together there. The exclusion of the UK from this supply chain or even the presence of customs fees and taxation related to a no-free trade agreement scenario may mean a collapse of the entire Airbus production which would be devastating for both British and EU’s economy.

INFLUENCE OF BREXIT ON DEFENCE INDUSTRY AND SECURITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM The process of Britain leaving the European Union has been rocky and difficult all along. It has seen the fall of two governments, the shutdown of parliament, social campaign to give people a say in a second referendum and much more. But just like every soap opera, even the best ones, this too had to come to an end. Following a lengthy battle with Parliament that resulted in early elections being held in December of 2019, Prime Minister Johnson had finally succeeded with obtaining acceptance of his EU Withdrawal Agreement from the House of Commons in early 2020, hence avoiding the ever-feared ‘no deal’ scenario and taking the United Kingdom out of the European Union on 30th of January 2020. Since that day, an 11-month long Transition Period was put in place allowing the UK to remain in single market and customs union while politicians and civil servants work tirelessly to adjust new laws and regulations to the new reality. At the same time, negotiators in Brussels and London begun a difficult Pagină 55 din 80

talks of agreeing on a comprehensive EU-UK Free Trade Agreement that would allow both entities to avoid a chaos of having to introduce border checks, customs fees and taxation thus halting the flourishing trade between the UK and EU27. The importance of the FTA cannot be stressed enough as it will be largely thanks to this document that many dark scenarios presented below can be avoided in full. Nevertheless, as the negotiations are ongoing, there is always a possibility that these will fail, and no agreement will be in place for December of 2020. In that scenario the initial chaos will be averted by drafting bilateral trade agreements between the UK and individual EU Member States. This too can take months if not years but would be the only option available to lower the negative impact of no deal Brexit. In addition, some areas of EUUK economic and defence cooperation can be regulated on the basis of special agreements with the European Union and not its individual Member States, that although would cover only a narrow part of the relations, and thus can be seen as a last resort option.

SECURITY During the ‘bloody’ campaign that preceded the EU Membership Referendum of 2016 as well as during the December 2019 elections, the current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom – Boris Johnson used s slogan: ‘take back control’ to gain support for his push to finalise Brexit. This catchy phrase referred to European Union supposedly controlling the everyday lives of Britons as well as its economy, enforcing limits and regulations that did not allow it to flourish.[37] Although this might have been true with regards to some sectors of British economy (eg. the problems with too much milk content in Cadbury’s chocolate or a ban on British beef following the Mad Cow disease spread) this is certainly not so true with regards to British defence and its arms industry.

In the short term, the consequences of Brexit for the British Army will be minimal, with no planned disruptions or issues related to international exercises and cooperation.

This is predominantly because it is still NATO and not the EU that coordinates international military manoeuvres as well as the majority of peacekeeping or advisory operations both in the time of war and in the time of peace.

At the same time, it is important to remember that by the end of December 2020 the UK will no longer be a part of the Common Security and Defence Policy, which will reportedly be the biggest impact that the British Army will need to brace for. The limited access to CSDP will prevent the UK from joining any current or future peacekeeping/advisory operations run by the EU such as ALTHEA, ATLANTA and SOPHIA. The UK forces will, from 2021, be able to join only the missions run by NATO and the UN.[38] Although at first glance this seems not be a major disadvantage, one needs to remember that the EU plans to increasingly engage in such operations in the future. The exclusion of the United Kingdom from these, would mean that the soldiers of the Royal Army will have less opportunities to gain valuable combat experience and that the British Foreign Ministry will lose some of its strategic importance now that it will not be able to engage in geopolitical hotspots that the EU deems necessary to react in.

The exclusion from the CSDP will also have one more serious effect on Queen’s armed forces – one that in the long term can make military cooperation in Europe more difficult and less effective. The CSDP, on top of having a common budget also includes defence policies, that all Members States agree to pursue. Although not as comprehensive as the ones in NATO, the defence policies introduced by the EU are also of vital importance. The fact that UK will no longer have a say over the direction of development for the European armed forces and will no longer be bound to follow them, may in long term result in a development of a two-speed or even two-direction Europe. Should this happen, the EU27 armies will push in a direction and pace set by CSDP while the British army will either fall behind or set its own direction thus pulling Pagină 56 din 80

the Royal Army away from the EU27 armies. With that, the UK will become a third state to the EU with an army increasingly unable to cooperate with its European counterparts. At the same time, Brexit will not give back any control over defence to the UK as the CSDP have never covered that area. With that being said there are hardly if any benefits to the leaving of EU for British defence.[39] In order to compensate for the losses associated with the exclusion from the CSDP, the UK would need to consider something that the German officials have already mentioned as a plausible solution – a granting of EU’s defence partner status. This status would allow the UK to participate in the sittings of the defence committees, would allow the Royal Army to implement the agreed policies and would allow Brits to re-join any peacekeeping and advisory operations run by the European Union. Should this be agreed upon, the UK will still not have any say over what is being agreed upon but would at least push away the possibility of a two-speed, two-direction European defence. At this point it is also important to mention that should a special partner status be agreed for the United Kingdom, this would be an unprecedented move with no similia agreement in place before. Although some nations like Turkey and South Africa have partnership agreements signed with the EU, these would be nowhere near as comprehensive and generous as the planned deal with the UK.[40] In the end, the Royal Army and the administration within the British Ministry of Defence may not seek a close re-integration within the CSDP structures following Brexit as it would not give the UK any decision-making powers and hence its voice would still be largely unheard and non-binding. An alternative to the UK-EU defence agreement would therefore be a closer cooperation with a selected armed force of the EU27.

Some of such agreements are already in place with nations like Poland and France (in the form of Combined Joint Expeditionary Force) or even larger groups of nations at the same time like the JEF agreement (Joint Expeditionary Force – United Kingdomled expeditionary force consisting of Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway).[41] These would make sure that the UK armed forces are still capable of cooperating with its European counterparts while at the same time not returning to the disliked mechanisms of CSDP. The 2018 withdrawal of the USA from the so called ‘Iran Nuclear Deal’ was opposed

by Western European states which wanted to keep the deal despite its shortcoming, believing that this was the only way to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The inner European negotiations related to the deal have quite unexpectedly brought about yet another possible political format that if formalised, may actually somewhat compensate the UK and Western Europe for Brexit.[42] This format is known as the ‘E3’ and according to the German Chancellor Angela Merkel: ‘would provide an additional security forum on top of EU and NATO’ to resolve the most pressing issues related to global peace and the rapidly evolving challenges and threats.[43] The format was born during the Iran-USA-Europe negotiations and included France, Germany and the UK. Seeing the increased negotiation and decision-making effectiveness, there are now plans in place to formalise and make the ‘E3 format ’permanent. If realised, the E3 would in many ways compensate for the British exiting from the EU and the CSDP as it would allow Britain to still take part in the European discussion-making processes related to security issues and their possible resolutions.

Last but certainly not least, the emergence of the ‘Global Britain’ doctrine may be seen as the viable and politically worthy alternative to ties with the EU. The doctrine itself has been born not long after the 2016 EU Membership Referendum and in short focuses on the departure from the ‘oppressing’ and limiting ‘shackles’ of the EU and into a future, where Britain will establish new alliances and re-arrange the existing ones. The priorities of the British foreign and security policies are also set to be changed as they will no longer be dictated by Brussels. Largely favoured by the euroPagină 57 din 80

sceptic circles within the Conservative Party and right-wing think tanks, the doctrine itself has not yet been defined by paper.[44] Instead, as of today it is an idea that the current government wishes to pursue once its main ideas, goals and challenges are defined. Although not known at the time, it is nearly certain that it will aim at making UK more independent and global thus lowering the importance of the EU both internationally and ‘at home’.

DEFENCE INDUSTRY As much as Brexit is not predicted to be a major blow to the Royal Army and its operations both domestically and abroad, the British defence industry should brace for impact, especially if London and Brussels are not able to agree on a Free Trade Agreement before 31st December 2020. Even if such agreement is ratified sometime later, the effects of a no-deal Brexit with customs controls and fees being imposed on defence goods may impede production and sales of British arms for months to come.

This would be extremally painful to the entire British economy as UK defence sector accounts for as much as 3.5% of UK’s annual GDP.[45] As of 2019, the United Kingdom held the place of World’s second largest arms exporter with 9 billion pounds of export orders in 2017 and an industry turnover of 22.7 billion pounds in 2018. Here, it is also important to mention that approximately 10% of these sales have been made with EU Member States but the biggest chunk of UK’s 2019 defence sales – 60% have gone to the Middle East – UK’s defence industry biggest partner. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were amongst the top buyers of British weapons that although very good to the economy is also quite controversial as British weapons have been sold with a full knowledge of its immediate employment in the Yemen Civil War – a conflict that the UK government strongly condemns.[46] The exiting of the United Kingdom from the EU Common Market and the customs union without a free trade agreement will undoubtedly deal a devastating blow to the British arms industry and all other branches of the economy. The necessity to impose border checks and custom tariffs will mean that parts necessary for the building of many British weapon systems will be more expensive and will take longer to complete. This in turn will delay or even completely impeded some international contracts since deadlines will not be kept. The proposed introduction of a point-based immigration system proposed by Home Secretary Piri Patel in the beginning of 2020 may even further threaten the arms sector as it may result in an insufficient amount of skilled labour that often came to UK from Eastern Europe.[47] These people may not qualify for entry into UK in the future, leaving the county with a need of finding and training of UK-based staff.

The introduction of tariffs on the border will also result in an increased price of British products coming to Europe thus making it harder to sell these, especially amid growing competition from other defence firms Europe-wide. Further to that, the already mentioned international companies such as Airbus – that has factories scattered all across Europe will also have problems with acquiring parts from the UK, due to border checks and the associated ques of trucks waiting for hours if not days to be checked.

This in turn may result with international companies closing their UK factories in order to lower the production and shipping costs – thus hurting the UK economy to its core.

Last but certainly not least, the international arms projects like the Tempest 6th generation fighter and further upgrades to the Eurofighter Typhoon may be more difficult and thus may require bilateral cooperation agreements between respective governments.[48] This is also the case with parts and weapon systems intended for European customers or coming from the EU and into the UK (10% of UK arms sale went to EU in 2019). Should a comprehensive free trade agreement not be in place by December 2020, the UK should strive to sign bilateral industrial cooperation Pagină 58 din 80

agreements lowering the tariffs and abolishing border checks with its neighbours. At this time, the fate of the FTA is still unknown – just like us, the British defence industry must now anticipate in waiting for the outcome of the Brussel-London negotiations to plan its next move.

CONCLUSION Although the British exit from the European Union has now become a reality rather than a distant vision, there are still many unknowns to this equation that do not allow both the UK and the EU to fully move forward with the new reality. The current 11month Transition Period that is set to end on 31st December 2020 is in place to allow the Britain to prepare and enact new legislation that will take the place of the EU laws that were in place before Brexit. Despite ratifying his Withdrawal Agreement with both chambers of British Parliament, Prime Minister Boris Johnson still has plenty of work to do before he can forget about the EU-UK divorce. The agreement that he fought for so vigorously and even organised early election to get it passed in the House of Commons was largely dedicated to the situation within the UK during and not after the Transition Period. With that being said, it is now that the governments in Brussels and London have to negotiate agreements that would regulate the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union starting from 1st January 2021 – when the UK will completely leave the Union and all associated agreement such as the customs union and the common market.

The premise of the above report was to explore the effects that Brexit may have on the security and defence sectors of both the European Union and the United Kingdom. As mentioned in the opening section, issues explored here were hypothetical with a high degree of likeliness due to how difficult the negotiations between the European Union and the British government are, and how little time there is remaining to finalise them.

At the same time, considering the current situation in Europe and the quickly growing pandemic of the SARS Covid-19 disease worldwide, the chances of diverting priorities away from a comprehensive agreement are very likely. In this case, and with the transition period not extended beyond the end of 2020, the no-deal scenarios presented in this work are expected to materialise. There is of course a chance that the TP will be extended beyond the end of December 2020 but as of today this is not very likely as its non-extending has been one of the most important pledges of Prime Minister Boris Johnson during his electoral campaign of December 2019.

The first section of the report explored the possible consequences that Brexit may have on the armies of the EU Member States, the defence policies pursued by Brussels and the ever-growing arms sector of the EU’s economy. The in-depth analysis of the Brexit consequences allowed the author to establish that the negative consequences felt by the EU as such and the EU27 armies will be minimal to none. The biggest downside of the divorce will be the fact that less resources will be available to make up the future peacekeeping/advisory operations run by the EU worldwide. There will also be less finances available for these operations coming from the CSDP as there will be less contribution paid towards it. At the same time, despite having an army with the highest financing in the entire EU, the UK only contributed about 3,5% of the overall CSDP budget. In the future this financial gap may be filled by minor adjustments to the contributions of the remaining EU27 states. In some regards, the British departure may also have a healing result, as now both France and Germany will be able to pursue a more comprehensive defence policies of the EU – a move that was often blocked by the UK, which believed that NATO would be sufficient as European peacekeeper.

Despite this, Brexit is set to have a significantly more harmful consequences on the European defence sector. If a comprehensive free trade agreement is not in place by the time the Transition Period ends, the EU-UK borders would need to be re-erected, Pagină 59 din 80

controlling all goods intended to and from the UK. The associated custom tariffs would also be in place further impeding the mutual trade. Although the defence markets of EU27 still remain largely independent and have not yet been closely integrated, many companies from across Europe buy or sell parts to various British companies. In such case, a no-deal Brexit would mean price hikes and possible delays in European projects relying on British parts or know-how. These companies include industry giants like Airbus and products as complex and important for European security as the Eurofighter Typhoon. The expected crisis can be averted either by the free trade agreement in place or should this option not be possible, a bilateral trade agreement between UK and several if not all EU27 states abolishing tariffs and border checks.

Should these measures not be in place, many projects run by European companies may be hit with delays or even cancellations.

The predicted consequences of Brexit for the British Royal Army and UK’s defence sector are more harmful and long-lasting than those expected to be felt by the European Union. After December 2020, the Royal Army will not be able to participate in the peacekeeping missions organised by the EU anymore. This will strip the UK from a valuable training opportunities and will take away some of its international powerprojection abilities. The UK will no longer be able to affect the policies are agreed upon as the part of the CSDP. The UK is free to stir its defence policies away from the EU, setting its own independent course, possibly resulting in a creation of two speeds and two directions Europe – something dangerous for the integrity of the Old Continent. To avoid this both sides agreed that the UK should be granted a special status with regards to its relations with EU over security policies in order to remain independent but still close to the Union. At the same time, the UK is also free to pursue its defence cooperation without the EU, signing bilateral defence cooperation agreements or investing political power into alternatives such as the E3 format or the conceived but still unborn concept of the ‘Global Britain’.

Arguably it will be the British defence sector that will suffer the most in both short and long term. Should a free trade agreement not be in place by 1st January 2021, the UK will face a landslide of costly order delays, cancelations, price skies and even being side-lined as a worthy industry partner for European companies. The erecting of border checks, custom tariffs and the introduction of point-based immigration system will all cause products on either side of the bilateral exchange to be more expensive, slower in arriving to their destination and ultimately even harder to build for the British companies due to workforce shortage. Although the bulk of British arms are exported to the USA and the Middle East, the industry still relies on the European made parts and workers. Furthermore, when the Middle Eastern defence markets eventually become sufficiently modernised, more attention would need to be shifted back to Europe, at which point the UK-made hardware may have difficult times competing with its EU counterparts due to higher costs associated with their importing and manufacturing. This ‘dark’ scenario can, yet again be largely averted by the introduction of a free trade agreement that would regulate the flow of goods between the UK and the EU or should this not be possible – a series of bilateral industry cooperation agreements with EU27 states.

As this piece is being written in the first quarter of the 2020, the exact state of the EUUK negotiations remains unknown. These are expected to be equally difficult as the negotiations over every aspect of the Withdrawal Agreement therefore a happy ending in the shape of comprehensive FTA in place by December 2020 should not be taken for granted. Furthermore, as the global healthcare crisis is still in the development phase, any bilateral talks will certainly be put on hold until the pandemic is in a more controllable state. This will put even more pressure on the already short Transition Period and making any deal unlikely to be made anytime soon. With such situation on Pagină 60 din 80

hand, the governments in Brussels and London will be faced with two options. One of them would be to agree on a extension to the Transition Period beyond December 2020 – this option although most sensible may be blocked by the Prime Minister Boris Johnson himself who have made it his main promise not to extend the deadline even if Britain would have to leave the UE without an agreement in place. The second option would be to return to the negotiation table and work on a free trade agreement until a consensus is reached, regardless of the deadline set by the transition period. As similar trade agreements between the EU and outside states like Canada took years to finalise, a move to work on a deal without extending the TP would mean a return of border checks and custom tariffs for the time between December 2020 and the FTA ratification – making all ‘dark’ scenarios of this work come true, at least for some time.

If agreed on, such move could be potentially devastating for both UK’s and EU’s economies which will already be fragile following the Covid-19 pandemics. Considering how difficult the current times are, one should hope that the pandemics finishes soon and that the transition period is extended should the free trade agreement negotiations are not finalised by the end of 2020.

[1] Jen Kirby, ‘A short history of the long road to Brexit’. VOX; 31 January 2020; https://www.vox.com/2020/1/31/21083573/brexit-news-boris-johnson-timeline-eu-uk [2] Robert Hutton, ‘The Roots of Brexit’. Bloomberg; 1 February 2020; https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/will-uk-leave-eu [3] Nauro Campos, Fabrizio Coricelli, ‘How EEC membership drove Margaret Thatcher’s reforms’. Vox.eu; 10 March 2017; https://voxeu.org/article/how-eecmembership-drove-margaret-thatcher-s-reforms [4] Andrew Osborn, ‘Chocolate war over after 30 years’. The Guardian; 14 January 2003; https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/jan/17/foodanddrink [5] John Darnton, ‘For the British Beef War: A Truce but No Victory’. New York Times; 24 June 1996; https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/24/world/for-the-british-beef-war-atruce-but-no-victory.html [6] BBC Newsround, ‘Brexit: A brief history of Britain and the EU’. BBC; 31 January 2020; https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/50166269 [7] Roch Dunin-Wasowicz, ‘The referendums of 1975 and 2016 illustrate the continuity and change in British Euroscepticism’. London School of Economics; 31 June 2017; https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/07/31/the-referendums-of-1975-and-2016illustrate-the-continuity-and-change-in-british-euroscepticism/ [8] Pauline Schnapper, ‘Brexit, or Theresa May’s Headache’. Journals Open Edition; 20 August 2018; https://journals.openedition.org/osb/2048 [9] Rowena Mason, ‘Boris Johnson becomes PM with promise of Brexit by 31 October’.

The Guardian; 24 July 2019; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/24/borisjohnson-becomes-pm-with-promise-of-brexit-by-31-october [10] John Roberts, ‘The domestic fallout from the UK general election’. Atlantic Council; 16 December 2019; https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-domesticfallout-from-the-uk-general-election/ [11] Adam Payne; Adam Bienkov; Thomas Colson, ‘Brexit finally happens: The United Kingdom has left the European Union’. Business Insider; 31 January 2020; https://www.businessinsider.com/brexit-finally-happens-united-kingdom-leaveseuropean-union-boris-johnson-2020-1?IR=T [12] Haydon Etherington, ‘What is the Brexit transition period?’. Institute for Government; 19 February 2020; https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/brexit-transition-period [13] Global Firepower, ‘2019 Military Strength Ranking’. Global Firepower; February 2020; https://www.globalfirepower.com/ Pagină 61 din 80

[14] Sandrine Amiel, ‘How will Brexit impact Europe’s defence? Euronews answers’.

Euronews; 10 December 2019; https://www.euronews.com/2019/12/04/how-willbrexit-impact-europe-s-defence-euronews-answers [15] Cornelia-Adriana Baciu, ‘Brexit opens up a Pandora’s box of security, defence, and foreign policy issues’. London School of Economics; 17 March 2020; https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/03/17/long-read-brexit-opens-up-a-pandoras-boxof-security-defence-and-foreign-policy-issues/ [16] Anna Nadibaidze, ‘Brexit raises questions for EU defence integration’. EU Observer; 19 September 2019; https://euobserver.com/opinion/145992 [17] Claudia Major, ‘U-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006’. European Union Institute for Security Studies; 1 September 2008; https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/37588002X.pdf [18] Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, ‘European Defence’. France Dyplomatie; 1 July 2019; https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/europe/european-defence/ [19] Simon Sweeney, ‘Security, defence and Brexit: shared collateral damage for the UK and the EU’. The UK in the Changing Europe; 2 December 2019; https://ukandeu.ac.uk/security-defence-and-brexit-shared-collateral-damage-for-theuk-and-the-eu/ [20] Alexandra Brzozowski, ‘Faced with defence budget threats, EU eyes new money sources’. Euractiv; 11 December 2019; https://www.euractiv.com/section/globaleurope/news/faced-with-defence-budget-threats-eu-eyes-new-moneysources/1409550/ [21] James Black; Alex Hall; Kate Cox; Marta Kepe; Erik Silfversten, ‘Understanding the possible implications of the UK’s decision to leave the EU — Compendium report’.

RAND Corporation; 1 July 2017; https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1786/RA ND_RR1786.pdf [22] Øyvind Svendsen, ‘Brexit and the future of EU defence: a practice approach to differentiated defence integration’. Journal of European Integration; 27 May 2019; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07036337.2019.1622540?journalCode =geui20 [23] Thierry Tardy, ‘The European Union and UN Peace Operations: What Global– Regional Peace and Security Partnership?’. United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order; 12 October 2018; https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-99106-1_12 [24] European Union, ‘Military and civilian missions and operations’. European Union External Action; 5 March 2019; https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en [25] Policy Department for External Relations – Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, ‘CSDP after Brexit: the way forward’. European Parliament; 1 May 2018; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603852/EXPO_STU(20 18)603852_EN.pdf [26] Apostolis Fotiadis, ‘Why are we letting the defence industry hijack the EU?’. The Guardian; 11 December 2019; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/11/defence-industry-hijack-eu [27] Paola Sartori; Alessandro Marrone; Michele Nones, ‘Looking Through the Fog of Brexit: Scenarios and Implications for the European Defence Industry’. Instiuto Affari Internazionali; 1 July 2018; https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1816.pdf

Pagină 62 din 80

[28] Alexandra Brzozowski, ‘Brexit uncertainty delays EU’s defence industry plans’.

Euractiv; 9 May 2019; https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-andsecurity/news/brexit-uncertainty-delays-eus-defence-industry-plans/ [29] Robert Farley, ‘Could the Eurofighter Typhoon Be A Viable Alternative to America’s F-35?’. National Interest; 6 February 2020; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/could-eurofighter-typhoon-be-viable-alternativeamericas-f-35-120786 [30] Frédéric Mauro, ‘European defence: Mourning England’. Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques; 22 January 2020; https://www.iris-france.org/143794european-defence-mourning-england/ [31] Marc Selinger, ‘BAE Systems reports ‘good’ financial results in 2019’. Jane’s 360; 21 February 2020; https://www.janes.com/article/94448/bae-systems-reports-goodfinancial-results-in-2019 [32] Torben Schütz; Christian Mölling, ‘Fostering a defence industrial base for Europe: the impact of Brexit’. International Institute for Strategic Studies; 1 June 2018; pp 1-6 [33] Sarah Lain; Veerle Nouwens, ‘The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security’. Royal United Services Institute; June 2017; pp 1-39 [34] Georgina Wright, ‘UK–EU future relationship: defence and security co-operation’.

Institute for Government; 25 February 2020; https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/future-relationship-defencesecurity-cooperation [35] Patrick Wintour, ‘UK must get post-Brexit ‘defence privileges’, says German minister’. The Guardian; 16 January 2020; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/16/uk-must-get-post-brexit-defenceprivileges-says-german-minister [36] Tim Hepher; Cyril Altmeyer, ‘What are Brexit contingency plans for aerospace and defence?’. The Guardian; 18 February 2018; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/feb/18/what-are-brexit-contingency-plansfor-aerospace-and-defence [37] Martin Wolf, ‘The Brexit delusion of taking back control’. Financial Times; 26 March 2019; https://www.ft.com/content/473bd2ae-4ee5-11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294 [38] Piotr Szymański, ‘The consequences of Brexit for the UK’s security policy and NATO’s eastern flank’. Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich; 3 April 2019; https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2019-04-03/consequencesbrexit-uks-security-policy-and-natos-eastern [39] Helen Warrell, ‘UK’s military seeks new place in world after Brexit’. Financial Times; 23 December 2019; https://www.ft.com/content/ee18fbdc-2343-11ea-92daf0c92e957a96 [40] LSE Ideas, ‘GLOBAL STRATEGIES – The UK’s Foreign, Defence, and Security Policy After Brexit’. London School of Economics; 9 November 2017; http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-UK-ForeignDefence-Security-Policy-After-Brexit.pdf [41] Helen Warrell; Michael Peel; Tobias Buck in Berlin; Victor Mallet, ‘UK battles to define defence and security role post-Brexit’. Financial Times; 30 January 2020; https://www.ft.com/content/762c45e2-427f-11ea-abea-0c7a29cd66fe [42] Thomas Escritt, ‘After Brexit, let’s formalise the ‘E3’ European security trio – German minister’. Reuters; 7 November 2019; https://www.reuters.com/article/ukbritain-eu-defence/after-brexit-lets-formalise-the-e3-european-security-trio-germanminister-idUSKBN1XH15X [43] Andreas Rinke; Paul Carrel, ‘Let’s stick together on security, Germany’s KrampKarrenbauer tells UK’. Reuters; 14 February 2020; https://www.reuters.com/article/usPagină 63 din 80

germany-security-interview/lets-stick-together-on-security-germanys-krampkarrenbauer-tells-uk-idUSKBN2080SY [44] Dalibor Rohac, ‘Global Britain Is a Pipe Dream’. Foreign Policy; 1 May 2019; https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/01/global-britain-is-a-pipe-dream-brexit-free-tradedeals/ [45] Phillip Inman, ‘UK growth will dip to 1% even if no-deal Brexit avoided, warns OECD’. The Guardian; 21 November 2019; https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/nov/21/tories-no-deal-brexit-plansdamage-uk-economy-oecd-eu [46] Adam Forrest, ‘UK arms sales to Saudi-led coalition up by almost 50 per cent, despite arms trade treaty’. The Independent; 24 December 2019; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-saudi-arabia-arms-salesyemen-war-weapons-treaty-oxfam-a9258166.html [47] David Child, ‘UK presses ahead with points-based immigration plan amid pandemic’ Al Jazeera; 10 April 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/ukpresses-points-based-immigration-plan-pandemic-200409153724281.html [48] Tania Lațici, ‘What role in European defence for a post-Brexit United Kingdom?’.

European Parliament; 1 April 2019; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637941/EPRS_BRI(201 9)637941_EN.pdf

Pagină 64 din 80

Cap. RO.A&D’s influencers

Didier PHILIPPE Senior Vice President MBDA for NATO countries Twitter Prodways

Pagină 65 din 80

Cap. TOP SKILLs Vezi toate datele în publicația on-line RO.A&D TOP SKILLs În acest capitol vă supunem atenției firme, specialiști, care vă pot fi parteneri, consultanți sau angajați. Herald Insights îi recomandă. Sunt oportunități de TOP. Așteptăm propunerile Dvs.

Răzvan BOGORODIȚĂ Răzvan BOGORODIȚĂ Open for new opportunities LinkedIn Cod ROADTOPSKILLS001BR

Răzvan Bogorodiță este absolvent al Facultății de Mecanică din cadrul Universității Dunărea de Jos Galați și are o diplomă de Master în Managementul Afacerilor Internaționale în cadrul Academiei de Studii Economice București.

Cu aproape 24 de ani de experiență domeniul relațiilor comerciale internaționale în diferie industrii, siderurgică, carbon, aluminiu, ciment, Răzvan Bogorodiță și-a început activitatea ca inginer în cadrul Combinatului Siderurgic Galați în 1995. Între 2004 – 2017 a ocupat diferite funcții în grupul Elsid & Electrocabon, de la Director Comercial al Elsid SA până la cea de Președinte al Consiliului de Aministrație Electrocarbon SA. Între 2018 – 2019 a activat ca Manager de dezvoltare pentru Europa de Est al companei Rain Carbon.

Mugurel Rădulescu Mugurel Rădulescu Head of Regional Network at Point Public Affairs LinkedIn Cod ROADTOPSKILLS002RM

Mugurel Rădulescu are o experiență considerabilă în management, afaceri publice și în relații publice susținute de educație formală în științe politice, PR și jurnalism internațional.

S-a dezvoltat și a obținut rezultate marcante într-o varietate de organizații, lideri pe piețele lor: „Adevărul” - ca jurnalist de politică externă; Delegația Comisiei Europene la București - analist politic; Coca-Cola Hellenic, în funcția de Director Afaceri Publice și Comunicare; Organizația de transfer de responsabilitate în domeniul deșeurilor de ambalaje Eco-Rom Ambalaje, în calitate de președinte al consiliului de administrație; Sanofi România și Moldova, în calitate de Director Afaceri Publice; Point Public Affairs, în calitate de șef al rețelei regionale de colaboratori ai organizației.

A condus proiecte majore, cum ar fi Eco-Rom Ambalaje, prima schemă de colectare a deșeurilor din România. Pentru impactul programelor comunitare implementate a beneficiat de recunoaștere internațională.

Pagină 66 din 80

TIMPUL: Aliat sau Neprieten?

Click pe dreptunghiuri

Coronavirus - Covid-19 - Pandemie https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html

Johns Hopkins University - USA hartă interactivă, click pe link să aveși datele cele mai recente:

news coronavirus ieri:

Pagină 67 din 80

BDP - 21 aprilie 2020, ora 13.00 https://gov.ro/ro/media/comunicate/buletin-de-presa-21-aprilie-2020-ora-1300&page=1 De la intrarea în vigoare a Ordonanței Militare nr. 2 și până în prezent, au fost plasate în carantină instituționalizată 2.134 de persoane care nu au respectat perioada de autoizolare. De asemenea, 131 de persoane aflate în carantină au părăsit locația în care au fost plasate, pentru acestea fiind dispusă măsura carantinării pentru o nouă perioadă de 14 zile.

Până astăzi, 21 aprilie, pe teritoriul României, au fost confirmate 9.242 de cazuri de persoane infectate cu virusul COVID – 19 (coronavirus). Dintre persoanele confirmate pozitiv, 2.153 au fost declarate vindecate și externate.

Numărul de cazuri confirmate, pe județe, potrivit raportării Institutului Național de Sănătate Publică: Județ

Nr. crt.

Număr de cazuri confirmate

35.

Suceava

2.238

42.

Mun. București

1.033

2.

Arad

423

22.

Hunedoara

392

37.

Timiș

389

29.

Neamț

368

8.

Brașov

345

7.

Botoșani

314

28.

Mureș

303

18.

Galați

297

5.

Bihor

294

13.

Cluj

263

41.

Vrancea

214

14.

Constanța

198

25.

Ilfov

193

34.

Sibiu

182

24.

Iași

161

1.

Alba

155

15.

Covasna

154 Pagină 68 din 80

Județ

Nr. crt.

Număr de cazuri confirmate

23.

Ialomița

128

4.

Bacău

117

6.

Bistrița-Năsăud

116

19.

Giurgiu

104

3.

Argeș

98

16.

Dâmbovița

85

36.

Teleorman

80

11.

Caraș-Severin

64

17.

Dolj

63

39.

Vaslui

60

26.

Maramureș

57

31.

Prahova

54

12.

Călărași

47

32.

Satu Mare

46

27.

Mehedinți

43

38.

Tulcea

35

20.

Gorj

23

33.

Sălaj

23

40.

Vâlcea

20

9.

Brăila

18

21.

Harghita

17

10.

Buzău

15

30.

Olt

13 TOTAL

9.242

Totodată, până acum, 482 persoane diagnosticate cu infecție cu COVID-19, internate în spitale din Dolj, București, Iași, Suceava, Arad, Bacău, Timiș, Cluj, Neamț, Hunedoara, Constanța, Satu Mare, Sibiu, Ialomița, Bistrița-Năsăud, Covasna, Pagină 69 din 80

Dâmbovița, Vrancea, Galați, Caraș-Severin, Mureș, Giurgiu, Bihor, Argeș, Vaslui, Botoșani, Alba, Sălaj, Brașov, Mehedinți, Teleorman, Gorj și Prahova, au decedat.

De la ultima informare transmisă de Grupul de Comunicare Strategică, au fost înregistrate alte 306 de noi cazuri de îmbolnăvire.

La ATI, în acest moment, sunt internați 245 de pacienți.

Pe teritoriul României, în carantină instituționalizată sunt 13.372 de persoane. Alte 41.136 persoane sunt în izolare la domiciliu și se află sub monitorizare medicală.

Până la această dată, la nivel național, au fost prelucrate 101.552 de teste. În ultimele 24 de ore, au fost înregistrate 341 de apeluri la numărul unic de urgență 112 și 1.465 la linia TELVERDE (0800 800 358), deschisă special pentru informarea cetățenilor.

Prin structurile abilitate ale M.A.I. au fost întocmite, până în prezent, 452 de dosare penale, sub aspectul săvârșirii infracțiunii de zădărnicirea combaterii bolilor, faptă prevăzută şi pedepsită de art. 352 alin. 1 Cod Penal.

Polițiștii și jandarmii au depistat, în ultimele de 24 de ore, 5.271 persoane care nu au respectat măsura privind restricţionarea circulaţiei. Acestor persoane le-au fost aplicate sancţiuni contravenţionale, în valoare de 12.748.883 de lei. În ceea ce privește situația cetățenilor români aflați în alte state, potrivit informațiilor obținute de misiunile diplomatice și oficiile consulare ale României în străinătate, 947 de cetățeni români au fost confirmați ca fiind infectați cu COVID-19 (coronavirus): 633 în Italia, 196 în Spania, 26 în Franța, 14 în Germania, 59 în Marea Britanie, 2 în Namibia, 2 în SUA, 3 în Austria, 3 în Belgia, 2 în Indonezia, 2 în Elveția și câte unul în Argentina, Tunisia, Irlanda, Luxemburg și Suedia. De la începutul epidemiei de COVID-19 (coronavirus) și până la acest moment, 62 de cetățeni români aflați în străinătate, 14 în Italia, 15 în Franța, 19 în Marea Britanie, 7 în Spania, 3 în Germania, 2 în Belgia, unul în Suedia și unul în Elveția, au decedat.

Dintre cetățenii români confirmați cu noul coronavirus, 11 au fost declarați vindecați: 7 în Franța, 2 în Indonezia, unul în Luxemburg și unul în Tunisia.

Le reamintim cetățenilor să ia în considerare doar informațiile verificate prin sursele oficiale și să apeleze pentru recomandări și alte informații la linia TELVERDE - 0800.800.358. Numărul TELVERDE nu este un număr de urgență, este o linie telefonică alocată strict pentru informarea cetățenilor. De asemenea, românii aflați în străinătate pot solicita informații despre prevenirea și combaterea virusului la linia special dedicată lor, +4021.320.20.20.

Alte decizii, precum și alte date de interes, vor fi aduse la cunoștința publicului în cel mai scurt timp. În continuare vă prezentăm situația privind infectarea cu virusul COVID – 19 (Coronavirus) la nivel european și global: Până la data de 20 aprilie 2020, au fost raportate 947.693 de cazuri în UE / SEE, Regatul Unit, Monaco, San Marino, Elveția, Andora. Cele mai multe cazuri au fost înregistrate în Italia, Franţa, Germania, Spania și Regatul Unit. ŢARA

CAZURI CONFIRMATE

Italia

178.972 (+3.047)

23.660(+433)

48.877 (+1.822)

Spania

195.944 (+4.218)

20.453(+410)

80.587 (+3.230)

Franţa

112.606

(+785)

19.718(+395)

38.037

Germania

141.672 (+1.775)

4.404(+110)

DECEDAȚI

Pagină 70 din 80

VINDECAŢI*

(+849)

95.200 (+7.200)

Regatul Unit

120.067 (+5.850)

16.060(+596)

446

(+9)

Sursă: Centrul European pentru Prevenirea și Controlul Bolilor (https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en)

SITUAȚIE GLOBALĂ LA 20 APRILIE 2020 CAZURI CONFIRMATE

DECEDAȚI

VINDECAȚI*

2.355.853 (+74.130)

164.656 (+5.145)

651.503 (+26.502)

* conform datelor publicate de către Johns Hopkins CSSE - https://systems.jhu.edu/ * datele din paranteze reprezintă numărul de cazuri noi, în intervalul 19-20 aprilie 2020* conform datelor publicate de către Johns Hopkins CSSE - https://systems.jhu.edu/ Grupul de Comunicare Strategică

distribuitor HERALD INSIGHTS http://www.competitiveintelligence.ro

Promote Your Interests!

Consultanță S.E.T. prin Competitive Intelligence.



Te rog gândește-te la mediul în care vor trăi copiii și nepoții noștri.

Tipărește acest document sau oricare altul doar dacă este chiar necesar!

Mulțumesc!

Pagină 71 din 80

FII MAI VIZIBIL ÎN INDEX: scrie la heraldcons@gmail.com

Index RO.A&D ediția 191211

SUNTEM PE ACELAȘI DRUM

WE ARE ON THE SAME ROAD

USE THE LINKS FOR NEWS & WEBSITES A NEWS NEWS

NEWS NEWS NEWS

NEWS

ABB LTD ABU DHABI SHIPBUILDING ACADEMIA TEHNICA MILITARA ACADEMIA TEHNICA MILITARA CENTRUL DE EXCELENTA-LABORATOR DE EXPLOZIVI SI MUNITII ACITURRI ACUMULATORUL SA ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING & ENGINEERING ADSB ADINA SRL ADISAM TELECOM SA ADISAN SA ADVANCED AEROSTACE TOOLING, INC. ADVANCED TECHNICAL FINISHING LLC ADVANCED TEHNOLOGY SYSTEMS SRL ADVANCED TURBINE ENGINE COMPANY - ATEC A-E ELECTRONICS SA AERNNOVA AEROBOTIX, INC. AEROJET ROCKETDYNE AEROMOBIL AERO CARE ROMANIA SRL AEROFINA SA AERO PART EXPERT SRL AEROSPACE SERVICES SRL AEROSTAR SA AEROTEH SA AEROVIRONMENT AER TECH SRL AGENTIA DE CERCETARE PENTRU TEHNICA SI TEHNOLOGII MILITARE (ACTTM) AGENȚIA SPAȚIALĂ ROMÂNĂ - ROSA AGEXIMCO SRL AGILROM SCIENTIFIC SRL AIDC AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GMBH AIRBUS CYBERSECURITY AIRBUS DEFENCE AND SPACE AS AIRBUS DEFENCE AND SPACE ROMANIA SRL AIRBUS HELICOPTERS AIRBUS HELICOPTERS INDUSTRIES SRL AIRBUS HELICOPTERS ROMANIA SA AIRBUS INDUSTRIES AIRBUS TEAM SRL AIR FRANCE AIRSPAN AKER SA ALARM SYSTEMS SRL ALCATEL ROMANIA SA ALDIMPEX '98 SRL ALERIS ALESTIS AEROSPACE ALLIAN ALMAZ ANTEY ALOFT AEROARCHITECTS ALSTING SA ALTON GROUP SRL AMAZON.com INC AMERICAN OUTDOOR BRANDS CORPORATION AMERILEX SRL

NEWS

NEWS

AMPHENOL AMMUNITION CORPORATION AMTEC LESS LETHAL SYSTEMS INC. AM-TEL COMPOSITE SRL AMT INTEGRATED SOLUTIONS (ACCURATE MACHINE & TOOLS CORP.) ANCEX Departamentul pentru Controlul Exporturilor, autoritatea naţională în domeniul controlului exporturilor, importurilor şi altor operaţiuni cu produse militare, produse cu dublă utilizare ANDAIR LTD ANDREI CONSULTANTA SRL ANTEU SA APS TRADING SERV SRL ARAS DENIZ INSAAT AANONIM SIRKETI ARCONIC ARECA SA ARIES COMERȚ&INDUSTRIE SRL ARGOS SA ARSENAL 2000 JSCO ARSENAL REȘIȚA SA ARTECA JILAVA SA ARTEC CONSORTIUM ASCO INDUSTRIES ASELSAN AS ASELSAN ELEKTRONIK SANAYI VE TICARET A.S. ASIGURARE REASIGURARE ARDAF SA ASIGURARE REASIGURARE ASTRA SA AS METAL COM SRL ASTRONICS CORPORATION ASTRONICS PECO INC ATI (ALLEGHENY TECHNOLOGIES) AVEILLANT

AVIOANE CRAIOVA SA office@acv.ro Fabricarea de aeronave si nave spatiale AUDI AG AUSTAL AUTOCONF TEXTILE SA AUTOMECANICA SA AUTOMECANICA MORENI SA AVIATION INDUSTRY CORPORATION OF CHINA, AVIC AVIGILON CORPORATION AXEL SOFT SRL AXIS COMMUNICATIONS AB

Ayehu Technologies AZ TECHNOLOGY, INC. AZUR SA

B NEWS NEWS

NEWS

Pagină 72 din 80

BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL GROUP PLC BAE SYSTEMS BAICELLS TECHNOLOGIES BALL AEROSPACE BALLUFF BANATIM SA

BANCA NAȚIONALĂ A ROMÂNIEI BARNES AEROSPACE

Click pe news și afli cele mai recente știri despre firmă

NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS

NEWS

BATTELLE BEAM SHOT BEIA CONSULT INTERNATIONAL SRL BELGIUM NAVAL&ROBOTICS BELL BERETTA ARMS COMPANY BERETTA HOLDING BHARAT DYNAMICS LIMITED BHARAT ELECTRONICS LIMITED BHARAT GEARS LTD BIDEPA SECURITY SRL BILLITZ HUNGARIA & PARTNER KFT BLIGHTER SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS LTD BLUE AIR BLUESPACE TECHNOLOGY SRL BLUE TEAM ECOLOGIC SRL BOEING COMPANY BOMBARDIER BONFIGLIOLI RIDUTTORI S.P.A. BOLLORE LOGISTICS ROMANIA SRL BOSCH SECURITY SYSTEMS BRAHMS INTERNATIONAL SRL BRIARI'S IND SA BRK SYSTEMS SRL BROWNING INTERNATIONAL SA BROWN PRECISION, INC. BUSINESS INFORMATION SYSTEMS SRL BUSINESS PLUS SRL

NEWS

fb

C&M JELER CALMAR INTERNATIONAL SRL CAMELEON SECURITY SYSTEMS SA CANON INC. CARANDA BATERII SRL CARFIL SA CARTIVATOR CAS INC. CAVAR L&I IMPEX SRL CCSANBCE CENTRAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE BUREVESTNIK CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES CENTRUL DE CERCETARI SI INCERCARI IN ZBOR CENTRUL DE CERCETARE SI PROIECTARE SISTEME TEHNOLOGICE SI DE PRODUCTIE - INFO SIT SA CENTRUL DE CERCETARE STIINTIFICA PENTRU FORTELE NAVALE CENTRUL MEDICAL DE DIAGNOSTIC SI TRATAMENT "LIL MED" SRL CENTRUL PENTRU SERVICII DE RADIOCOMUNICAȚII CENTURY ARMS CENTURY INDUSTRIES SRL CERTIND CERTSIGN SA CHANTIERS DE L'ATLANTIQUE CHC HELICOPTER CHEMRING GROUP CHEMTRADERS SRL CHESS DYNAMICS LTD CHIMTITAN SRL CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY CORPORATION CHINA SOUTHERN CHINA STATE SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION (CSSC) CHROMALLOY CIMARRON COMPOSITES CISCO CISCO DEFENSE ORCHESTRATOR (CDO) CISCO SYSTEMS INC. CIVITAS PSG SA

COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE IN ROMANIA CONCEPT ELECTRONICS SRL CONDOR SA CONDOR NON-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES CONFIND SRL CONSTELLIUM CONSUMER FUELS, INC. CONTELA CONTINUOUS COMPOSITES CORNING COVALENA 51 IMPEX SRL CRANE AEROSPACE AND ELECTRONICS CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY CREFORM CRESCENDO INTERNATIONAL SRL CRIABO DEFENCE&SECURITY SRL CROSBY COMPOSITES CUBE CONSULTING COMPANY SRL CUMMINS CURTISS-WRIGHT CUSTOM MOLD & DESIGN CYBERBIT CYTEC

C NEWS NEWS

CLASICOR SA CMC ELECTRONICS AURORA LLC COBHAM COLT DEFENSE LLC COLT’S MANUFACTURING COMPANY LLC COLUMBIA HELICOPTERS COM NICO SERV SRL COMBA TELECOM COMBINED SYSTEMS, INC. COMMSCOPE

D NEWS NEWS NEWS

Pagină 73 din 80

D3 SECURITY DACIA MILITARY INDUSTRY DAEWOO SHIPBUILDING & MARINE DAHER DAHER SOCATA DAHUA TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD. DAMEN SHIPYARD GROUP DAMEN SCHELDE NAVAL SHIPBUILDING BV DANEX AUTO IMPEX SRL DANFOSS GROUP DANUBIANA SA D”ARMY PIETRO BERETTA SPA DASSAULT AVIATION DATEK TELECOM SRL DAVI COMFIRE SRL DCN INTERNATIONAL SA DCNS ENERGIES SAS DEDALUS TECH SRL DEEP SERV 2000 SRL DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY - DARPA DEFENSE ENGINEERING SA DELOREAN AEROSPACE LLC DELTA PLUS TRADING SRL DEMISTO DENEL DYNAMICS DETECT INC DETROIT FLYING CARS DF LABS DIEHL AVIATION DIEHL DEFENCE GMBH & CO.KG DIEHL & EAGLE PICHER GMBH DIELH GROUP DIEHL RETROFIT MISSILE SYSTEME GMBH

Click pe numele firmei și vizitezi website-ul acesteia

DIGITAL BIT SRL DINAMIC INTERNATIONAL SRL DRAEGER SAFETY ROMANIA SRL DRONESHIELD DUAL MAN SRL DUCOMMUN DUNARIT CORP DYNITEC GMBH

NEWS

DSEI LONDON - DEFENCE & SECURITY EQUIPMENT INTERNATIONAL

NEWS

DUBAI AIRSHOW EBACE - EUROPEAN BUSINESS AVIATION CONVENTION & EXHIBITION ENFORCE TAC EUROSATORY

E

NEWS

EXPO 2020, DUBAI, UAE FAMEX - FERIA AEROESPACIAL MÉXICO

NEWS NEWS NEWS

NEWS

EATON CORPORATION PLC ECA GROUP EHANG ELBIT SYSTEMS LTD ELCOS PROIECT SRL ELECTRIC IMPEX 2000 SRL ELECTROAPARATAJ SA ELECTRO GEMENII SRL ELECTROIND SRL ELECTROMAGNETICA SA ELECTROMECANICA PLOIEȘTI ELECTRO OPTIC COMPUTERS SRL ELECTRO OPTIC SYSTEMS HOLDINGS LTD ELETTRA COMMUNICATIONS SA ELMAT SA ELPROF SA ENERGOTECH SRL EMBRAER EMCO LTD EMCO CAS SA EMCO INTERNATIONAL IMPORT-EXPORT SRL EMIRATES EMP TRADE SRL EMUGE CORP. ENGINEERING CO. LTD ENTERPRISE CONTROL SYSTEMS LTD ENTERPRISE VENTURES CORPORATION ERICSSON ESCRIBANO MECHANICAL AND ENGINEERING ESTERLINE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION EURO CONSTRUCT OAS SRL EUROCOPTER ROMANIA SA EUROFIGHTER EUROPEAN AERONAUTICS SCIENCE NETWORK - EASN EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY

NEWS

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY

NEWS

EUROPEAN UNION

FARNBOROUGH AIRSHOW HAI HELI - EXPO NEWS

IDEF - INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE INDUSTRY FAIR IDEX IMDEX ASIA - INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DEFENCE EXHIBITION NEWS

IMTS INTERNATIONAL MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY SHOW, CHICAGO, USA

NEWS

IWA OUTDOOR CLASSICS LAAD - LATIN AMERICA AERO & DEFENCE LANGKAWI INTERNATIONAL MARITIME AND AEROSPACE EXHIBITION - LIMA

NEWS

NEWS

MSPO - MIĘDZYNARODOWY SALON PRZEMYSŁU OBRONNEGO, KIELCE, POLAND PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL MARITIME EXPOSITION PARIS AIR SHOW SEA-AIR-SPACE

NEWS

Seoul ADEX - International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition

NEWS

SHOT SHOW, LAS VEGAS, USA

F NEWS NEWS

EUROSAM GIE EUROSPIKE GMBH EUROSTAT EUROTEHNIC INDUSTRIES SRL PITESTI EUROTRANSPORT LOGISTICS SRL EUROUNIFORM SRL EUROYARDS

Expo/Târguri

FABRICA DE ARME CUGIR SA FABRICA DE PULBERI FĂGĂRAȘ SA FACC FEDERAL AMMUNITION FELIX IT SA FELIX TELECOM SRL FENIX GROUP FIATEST SRL FIBAT PRESTEX SRL FIGEAC AERO FINCANTIERI MARINE GROUP FINCANTIERI SPA FHF SPECIAL CONTAINERS SRL FLAMEOFF COATINGS, INC FLIR SYSTEMS INC. FN HERSTAL FORTAN SRL FRANKE INDUSTRIES FUJITSU

G

AERODAYS 2019 – TandemAEROdays19.20

NEWS NEWS

AERO INDIA ARMS AND SECURITY - INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIR, KIEV, UKRAINE AVALON NEWS

IAC - INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL CONGRESS & EXHIBITION, Washington

BSDA - BLACK SEA DEFENCE AND AEROSPACE, BUCHAREST, ROMANIA

Pagină 74 din 80

GAMMA ALLOYS GARMIN GARRETT METAL DETECTORS GAZ SERVICES SRL GEDVEC SA GEMALTO GENERAL ATOMICS GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS INC (GA-ASI)

Click pe fb și vizitezi pagina de facebook a firmei

NEWS

GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION GENERAL DYNAMICS EUROPEAN LAND SYSTEMS GENERAL DYNAMICS NASSCO GENERAL DYNAMICS ORDNANCE AND TACTICAL SYSTEMS, INC / GD-OTS GENERAL ELECTRIC AVIATION GENERAL PROTECTION GROUP SRL GENESYS SOFTWARE ROMANIA SRL GEOSYSTEMS ROMANIA SRL GERMANOS TELECOM ROMANIA SA GKN AEROSPACE GKN FOKKER SERVICES GLOBAL CERT SA GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES ROMANIA SA GLOCK INC. GM&T INTERNATIONAL 2000 SRL GRIFFON HOVERWORK GRSE GRUP PASMATEX SA GRUP ROMET SA GRUPUL DE COMERT SI INVESTITII SRL GOOGLE NEWS GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING SERVICES - GCS GULF HELICOPTERS

IMI SYSTEMS INDES AVIATION LTD INDES FORUM SRL INFINOVA GROUP INFO WORLD SRL INMARSAT INNOVATIVE PLASTICS, INC INSPECTORATUL GENERAL PENTRU SITUAȚII DE URGENȚĂ - IGSU INSTAL SOMET SA INSTITUTE OF METAL SCIENCE, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGIES / ACAD. A. BALEVSKI INSTITUTUL DE CERCETARE PROIECTARE SISTEME DE PRODUCTIE SA INSTITUTUL NATIONAL DE CERCETARE DEZVOLTARE PENTRU TEXTILE SI PIELARIE INSTITUTUL NAȚIONAL DE CERCETAREDEZVOLTARE TURBOMOTOARE COMOTI INSTITUTUL NAȚIONAL DE CERCETĂRI AEROSPAȚIALE ,,ELIE CARAFOLI” INCAS INSTITUTUL NATIONAL DE MEDICINA AERONAUTICA SI SPATIALA "G-RAL. AV. DR. VICTOR ANASTASIU" INSTITUTUL NATIONAL DE PROIECTARI PENTRU TELECOMUNICATII SA INSTITUTUL NAȚIONAL DE STATISTICĂ INSTITUTUL PENTRU ANALIZA SISTEMELOR INAS SA INSTITUTUL PENTRU TEHNOLOGII AVANSATE INTEGRATE INVESTMENT SRL INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE SRL INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS & BUSINESS CONSULTING INTERACTIVE TECHNICAL SERVICES SA INTERARMS IMPEX SRL INTERGUARD GRUP SRL INTEROPERABILITY SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL HELLAS SA INTRAROM SA INTREPRINDEREA DE CONFECTII TARGSOR INTREPRINDEREA OPTICĂ ROMÂNĂ - IOR SA INTREPRINDEREA TEHNICA MEDICALA AMIRO SA IP ACCESS IPA SA IPACRI ROMANIA SRL IRIDEX GROUP CONSTRUCTII SRL IRIDIUM COMMUNICATIONS ISRAEL AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES (IAI) ISRAELI WEAPON INDUSTRIES (IWI) ITT CORPORATION

GUVERNUL ROMÂNIEI

H NEWS

NEWS

HANGZHOU HIKVISION DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY CO. HANWHA CORPORATION HANWHA TECHWIN CO. LTD. HARRIS CORPORATION HARTZELL ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES HECKLER & KOCH AG HEICO HELLIMED SRL HELINICK SRL HELTECH SRL

HERALD INSIGHTS SRL

fb

heraldcons@gmail.com Consultanță prin Competitive Intelligence HEROUX-DEVTEK HEXCEL HIDROMECANICA SA HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS LIMITED, HAL HISTRIA INTERNATIONAL SA HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC HONEYWELL SECURITY HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD. HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIES HUTCHINSON HYOSUNG CORPORATION HYUNDAI HEAVY INDUSTRIES

I

INTERVIURILE RO.A&D NEWS

MANOLE, Viorel #462;

NEWS

PAULIUC, Nicoleta #462;

J NEWS

NEWS

IAR SA IBM RESILIENT ICEPRONAV ENGINEERING SRL ICH CONSTRUCTII GRUP SA ICPE IHI ILCORA SA IMA-METAV SA

Pagină 75 din 80

JAGUAR MANAGEMENT CONSULTING SRL JAMCO JANE's by IHS MARKIT JAPAN AIRLINES JENOPTIK OPTICAL SYSTEMS, INC. JET AVIATION JOBY AVIATION JUNGHANS DEFENCE

K NEWS NEWS NEWS

NEWS

KAISER ALUMINUM KALASHNIKOV CONCERN KALASHNIKOV GROUP, JSC KALLMAN WORLWIDE KAMAN CORPORATION KAMAN AEROSPACE KAREM AIRCRAFT KAUTEX KAWASAKI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD KINTEX KITTY HAWK KOGAION COM SRL KONGSBERG DEFENSE SYSTEMS KONGSBERG GRUPPEN ASA KONSTRUKTORSKOYE BYURO MASHYNOSTROYENIYA KOREA AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES, LTD KOREAN AIR AEROSPACE DIVISION KRATOS DEFENSE & SECURITY SOLUTIONS KRAUSS-MAFFEI WEGMANN (KMW) KT CONSULTING INC K TECH ELECTRONICS SRL KVH INDUSTRIES, INC

NEWS

NEWS

L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, INC L-3 TECHNOLOGIES L&T MBDA MISSILE SYSTEMS LTD LABORMED PHARMA SA LAMPERD LESS LETHAL, INC. LARGE BUSINESS SERVICE SRL LARSEN & TOUBRO LATECOERE LAZZARINI DESIGN STUDIO LEONARDO Spa LEONARDO DRS LESS LETHAL AFRICA LIEBHERR LILIUM LINDE (PRAXAIR) LINE-X LLC LINKS ASSOCIATES SRL LINKS SHARE SRL LISI LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION LOCKHEED MARTIN MISSILES AND FIRE CONTROL LOGIC COMPUTER SRL LOGIMAETICS ELECTRIC SRL LOGRHYTHM LORD CORPORATION LOTUS DISTRIBUTION & SERVICE SRL LUFTHANSA LUFTTRANSPORT LUKASIEWICZ-PIAP INSTITUTE LURSSEN WERFT GMBH

MBL COMPUTERS SRL MCALLISTER TOOL & MACHINE MCM ITP - MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS FOR MISSILES, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP

NEWS

MACE SECURITY INTERNATIONAL, INC. MACRO INDUSTRIES, INC MAGELLAN AEROSPACE MAGICA INTERNATIONAL TRADE SRL MAGIC ENGINEERING MAGIC SYSTEMS SA MAGUAY IMPEX SRL MAHEPA MAKEYEV DESIGN BUREAU MAIN TURBO SYSTEMS MAN ENERGY SOLUTIONS MANTECH MARCTEL S.I.T. SRL MARINE ALUTECH

MD HELICOPTERS, INC MDV CHIMICAL GRUP SA MECRO SYSTEM SRL MECTRON MEDIMPACT SA MEGATECH TRADING CONSULTING SRL MEGGITT METALICA GRUP SA METALPET SA METAVR METROM SA MEYER TURKU MEYER WERFT MFA SA Mizil MICROPLASMA SRL MILSOFT YAZILIM TEKNOLOJLERI AS

&

MINISTERUL APĂRĂRII

MINISTERUL ECONOMIEI MINISTERUL FINANȚELOR PUBLICE MIRA TELECOM SRL MIRSAND SRL MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES MITSUBISHI RAYON MM DATA SRL MOBILICOM LIMITED MOLLER INTERNATIONAL MONITORUL APĂRĂRII ȘI SECURITĂȚII MOOG MOWAG MSA AUER ROMANIA SRL MT AEROSPACE AG MTU AERO ENGINES MUSS SRL

M NEWS

MBDA MISSILE SYSTEMS EXCELLENCE AT YOUR SIDE

L NEWS NEWS

MARINE GEARS, INC MARKET CREATIVE SOLUTIONS SRL MARS ARMOR MARSHALL AEROSPACE MARTIN-BAKER MARTPLAST SRL MASTER SA MATSUURA MAXAM OUTDOORS SA MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES SPACE SYSTEMS

N NEWS

NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS

Pagină 76 din 80

NAMMO AS NATIONAL COPPER & SMELTING NATIONAL SCALE TECHNOLOGY, INC. NATLOG SRL NAVAL GROUP NAVAL GROUP AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED NAVANTIA NAVARIS

NEWS NEWS

NEC NEOTEL SRL NERA CAROSERII SRL NET CONSULTING SRL NEVA AEROSPACE LTD NEXCELLE NEXTER SYSTEMS NIRVANA SYSTEMS LTD NIRVANA AUTOGYRO NOKIA NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGIES NORDAM GROUP NORRIS CYLINDER COMPANY NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

POLY-DELTA CHEMICALS SA POLYSTART IMPEX SRL PRATT&MILLER ENGINEERING FABRICATION Inc PRATT&WHITNEY PRECISION CASTPARTS PRELMEC SA PREȘEDINTELE ROMÂNIEI

NEWS

PRINTEC GROUP ROMANIA SRL PROCETEL SRL PROD STEFANO SRL PRO OPTICA SA PRO OPTICA SERVICE & COMPONENTS SRL PROSOFT++ SRL PRO SYS SRL PROTECT SECURITY SRL

NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION NOVA GRUP SRL NOVA MODUL SRL

Q

O NEWS

OFICIUL DE METROLOGIE AL ARMATEI OF MOSSBERG & SONS INC OLIMPIC SRL OMNILOGIC BGS SRL OMNIS GROUP SRL ONROBOT OPENER OPENHYDRO GROUP LIMITED OPGAL OPTICOELECTRON GROUP OPTIMEC PROD SRL OPTIX ORBITAL ATK INC ORGANISMUL MILITAR DE CERCETARE, ACREDITARE SI SUPRAVEGHERE (OMCAS) ORGANIZAȚIA PATRONALĂ DIN INDUSTRIA AERONAUTICĂ ROMÂNĂ OPIAR OZATA TERSANECILIK SANAYI TICARET LTD

NEWS NEWS NEWS

NEWS

PAL-V INTERNATIONAL BV PANASONIC AVIONICS PANASONIC CORPORATION PANEURO COMPANY SRL PANSIPROD MEDICAL SRL PARADIGME ENGINEERING PARAGON SA PARAPRODFARM INDUSTRIES SRL PARKER-HANNIFIN CORP PARSYS GMBH

NEWS

NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS

NEWS NEWS NEWS

NOW

PATROMIL Asociația Patronală Română a Producătorilor de Tehnică Militară PATROMIL SUPORT SRL PBS VELKA BITES PECEF TEHNICA SRL PELCO PE SPPE SPARING-VIST CENTER / ECOTEST PETROLEUM HELICOPTERS INTERNATIONAL, INC PFERD PHANTOM SPLUNK PILATUS AIRCRAFT LIMITED PIROCHIM VICTORIA SA PLASMA PROCESSES, LLC PLASTIC FUSION FABRICATORS, INC PNG AVIATION INTERNATIONAL SRL POLICOLOR SA POLO INVEST SRL

QINETIQ QANTAS QUARTON USA, INC

R

P NEWS

AND

NEWS

NEWS

Pagină 77 din 80

R2C SUPPORT SERVICES RADIAN RAFAEL ADVANCED DEFENSE SYSTEMS LTD RAMILA WORLD TRADE SRL RAM-SYSTEM GMBH RAPID7 RARTEL SA RASIROM RA RATIU & RATIU S.Av. RAYTHEON COMPANY RAYTHEON INTEGRATED DEFENSE SYSTEMS RAYTHEON MISSILE SYSTEMS RC TEAM SA RECARO AIRCRAFT SEATING REDSTONE AVIATION GROUP REMINGTON REMINGTON OUTDOOR COMPANY RHEINMETALL AG RHEINMETALL AIR DEFENCE AG RHEINMETALL BAE SYSTEMS LAND

RO.A&D Project ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY ROCHEUX INTERNATIONAL, INC RODMIR EXPERT SRL ROKETSAN ROCKWELL COLLINS INC ROHDE & SCHWARZ ROHDE & SCHWARZ ROMANIA SRL ROKURA SRL ROLLS-ROYCE ROLTA INDIA ROMCARBON SA ROM ELECTRIC GROUP IMPEX SRL ROMAERO SA ROMAN SA ROMANIA ENERGY CENTER - ROEC ROMANIAN MILITARY VEHICLE SYSTEMS SA ROMANIAN SOFT COMPANY SRL ROMANIAN SPACE ENGINEERING SRL ROMARM CN Principalul producător şi exportator direct de produse militare din România

NEWS NEWS NEWS

ROMBAT SA ROMEXPO SA ROMGUARD GRUP SA ROMKATEL SRL ROMPRIM SA ROMRADIATOARE SA ROMSERVICE TELECOMUNICATII SRL ROMSTAL IMEX SRL ROM TECH SRL ROMSYS SRL ROMTEHNICA SA de 40 ani pe piaţa internaţională, sub coordonarea MApN ROMTELECOM SA ROMTELECOM SA - DIVIZIA SERVICII DE DATE SI INTERNET ROMTELESERVICE SRL ROMTRANS SA ROMTURINGIA SRL RONEXPRIM SRL ROSTEC STATE CORPORATION ROVSOL SRL RUAG RUGER & CO.

NEWS

NEWS NEWS

NEWS

Consultanță GDPR 0732 895 042 STARC4SYS SRL ST ENGINEERING STIL XXI SRL STIMPEX SA STINGAL SA STING PREST PROD SRL STRATEGIC and COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS - SCIP STURM SUBANSAMBLE AUTO SA SUBARU SUDARC SRL SWIMLANE SYNCURITY SYSCOM 18 SRL SYSGO SYSTEMATIC SYSWARE ROMANIA SRL

Ș NEWS

S NEWS

STABRIS SRL

SAAB AEROSTRUCTURES SAAB GROUP SAFARILAND GROUP SAFETY SRL SAFRAN SAGE CONTROL ORDNANCE, INC. SAGEM SAMEL - 90 PLC SAMSUNG SAMTEC SRL SANTINELLE ROUMANIE VEILLE ECONOMIQUE

ȘANTIERUL NAVAL CONSTANȚA SA SANTIERUL NAVAL "DAMEN" GALAȚI SA ȘANTIERUL NAVAL MANGALIA SA ȘANTIERUL NAVAL TULCEA SA

T NEWS NEWS

NEWS

SEARCH SYSTEMS SECONDO MONA SPA SECURITY DEVICES INTERNATIONAL, INC. SEINKO SRL SELLIER & BELLOT SENIOR AEROSPACE SERCO GROUP SA SERVICE FAUR SRL SGL GROUP SHEBA EXIM SRL SHINMAYWA SIARM SA SIEMENS AG SIEMENS SRL SIEMPLIFY SIERRA NEVADA CORPORATION SIG SAUER SILVANIA SA SIMULTEC SA SINGAPORE AIRLINES SINGAPORE TECHNOLOGIES ENGINEERING LTD SIVECO ROMANIA SRL SKF SKYDRIVE INC SOCIETE POUR L'INFORMATIQUE INDUSTRIELLE - SII SODICK PLUSTECH SOFTNET SERVICES SRL SOLVAY GROUP SONACA SONY CORPORATION SORENA SA SPECTRALUX AVIONICS SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS SPUMOFLAM SRL

NEWS

NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS

Pagină 78 din 80

TACTICAL MISSILES CORPORATION TAURUS HOLDINGS INC. TCHERNO MORE CO TEACHING FACTORY, INC. TEAMNET ENGINEERING SRL TEAMNET INTERNATIONAL SA TEAMVANTAGE TECHNOSYS SRL TEHMIL GROUP SRL TEHNOBIT SRL TEHNOTON SA TEIJIN TELECONSTRUCTIA SA TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES TELE ELECTRON SRL TEMPEST PROJECT TENCATE TERRAFUGIA TERMAR PROD COM SRL TERRASIGNA SRL TEXTRON CORPORATE TEXTRON AVIATION TEXTRON SPECIALIZED VEHICLES TEXTRON SYSTEMS THALES AIR DEFENCE THALES ALENIA SPACE THALES AUSTRALIA THALES COMMUNICATIONS THALES ELEKTRONIC SYSTEMS GMBH THALES GROUP THALES INTERNATIONAL SAS THALES NEDERLAND THALES OPTRONICS THALES RAIL SIGNALLING SOLUTIONS THALES SERVICES THALES SYSTEMS ROMANIA SRL THALES TRAINING & SIMULATION THALES UNDERWATER SYSTEMS THEONICS, INC. TINMAR, INC. TOHAN SA TOPEX PUBLIC SWITCHING SA TOP SECURITY SERVICE SRL TORAY TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION

TRACE COMPENDIUM business bribery risk in 200 countries TRANSCARPAT SPORTOURS INTERNATIONAL SRL TRANSDIGM TRENCADIS TRIUMPH GROUP INC TRU SIMULATION + TRAINING TUNGALOY AMERICA INC TURBOMECANICA SA TURKISH AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES TURNATORIA CENTRALA ORION SA

U

NEWS

VICAS SA VICONIC DEFENSE VICTORIA SA VIETNAM HELICOPTER CORPORATION VINTAN FOR REPUTATION SRL VIRGINIA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP VOLOCOPTER VORMETRIC

W NEWS

WARN INDUSTRIES

NEWS

WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT WELDALOY PRODUCTS CO

NEWS

NEWS

UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC UEFISCDI UKROBORONPROM UKRAINEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY / ДК УкрОборонПром ULTRATEC SPECIAL EFFECTS, INC UNI-AXIS SRL UNISON ENGINE COMPONENTS BUCHAREST SA UNITECH ELECTRONICS SRL UNITED AIRCRAFT UNITED PLATING, INC. UNITED SHIPBUILDING UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP UNIVERSAL HELICOPTERS UNIVERSITATEA NATIONALA DE APARARE "CAROL I" UNIVERSITATEA NATIONALA DE APARARE "CAROL I" - CENTRUL DE STUDII STRATEGICE DE APARARE SI SECURITATE UNIVERSITATEA POLITEHNICĂ BUCUREȘTI USAM SA UTI DEFENSE & SECURITY ENGINEERING SA UTI GRUP SA UTILNAVOREP SA UZINA AUTOMECANICĂ MORENI UZINA DE PRODUSE SPECIALE DRAGOMIRESTI SA UZINA MECANICĂ BĂBENI SA UZINA MECANICĂ BUCURESTI SA UZINA MECANICĂ CUGIR SA UZINA MECANICĂ DRĂGĂȘANI SA UZINA MECANICĂ FILIAȘI SA UZINA MECANICA MÂRȘA UZINA MECANICĂ MIJA UZINA MECANICĂ ORĂȘTIE SA UZINA MECANICĂ PLOPENI SA UZINA MECANICĂ SADU SA

WINCHESTER AMMUNITION WOODWARD INC WORKHORSE GROUP

X XEROX ROMANIA SA - ECHIPAMENTE SI SERVCII XINXING JIHUA INTERNATIONAL TRADING CO.,LTD

Y YAHOO NEWS NEWS

YMENS TEAMNET SRL YOUTUBE

NEWS

YUGOIMPORT - SDPR

Z NEWS

ZEITFRACHT GRUPPE ZF FRIEDRICHSHAFEN AG ZIPACON SRL ZIROM ZODIAC AEROSPACE ZONE ADVANCED PROTECTION SYSTEMS ZHUKOVSKY INSTITUTE ZTE CORPORATION

0 ...

V NEWS

WILL/BURT COMPANY, THE

VAYLON SAS VECTOR INTERNATIONAL SA VECTRUS SYSTEMS CORP. VERINT SYSTEMS INC. VERTEX GLOBAL AEROSPACE VIASAT

NEWS

14 BIS SUPPLY TRACKING

NEWS

2x1 HOLDING CAPE MIDIA SHIPYARD SA

Pagină 79 din 80

Page 80 of 80