Gender, Conflict, and Power Analysis: Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

SUDAN

SOUTH SUDAN

ETHIOPIA

SOMALIA

Gender, Conflict, and Power Analysis: Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

Cover artwork & Design: Diana Namanda Published: January 2023 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior approval in writing from The Research Team and the SIHA Network. This report is not a legally binding document. It is a collaborative informational and assessment document and does not necessarily reflect the views of any of the contributing partners in all of its contents. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.

Copyright © 2023 SIHA Network

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This report presents the findings of the Gender Conflict and Power Analysis study conducted by Ms. Olivia Bueno, an Independent Consultant and consultant researcher, on behalf of The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA).

The study was conducted in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan under the “Women Reclaiming their Agency in Peacemaking” (WRAP) project, which Global Affairs Canada generously supported.

The SIHA Network regional team, including Hala Al-Karib, Kimberly Armstrong, Faizat Badmus-Busari, Mercy Owuor, Sabine Ebner, and Christine Namubiru, provided invaluable guidance and support throughout the study, and the SIHA Country Coordinators Neimat Abbas, Zemdena Abebe, Yousef Abdi, and Gertrude facilitated, supported, and coordinated data collection.

The success of this analysis owes much to the dedicated Feminist Peace Lab Trainers of Trainers (ToTs) from Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, as well as the key informants, including government actors, community leaders, and representatives from women’s rights organizations.

Special appreciation goes to our Advocacy and Communication Team - Sandra Nassali and Faith James, for their significant contributions to this report’s editing, layout, and publishing.

We anticipate the report will offer valuable insights and meaningfully contribute to advancing Women’s Peace and Security in the Greater Horn of Africa region and beyond.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT ...............................................................................................................................I ACRONYMS .............................................................................................................................................. II EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................................. 1 ETHIOPIA ....................................................................................................................................... 5 Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.......................... 5 Historical Context.................................................................................................................................... 6 SOMALIA ....................................................................................................................................... 15 Historical context ................................................................................................................................... 16 SOUTH SUDAN ............................................................................................................................. 27 Historical context ................................................................................................................................... 28 SUDAN........................................................................................................................................... 36 Historical context ................................................................................................................................... 37 REGIONAL: THE HORN OF AFRICA ............................................................................................. 47 Regional conflict dynamics ................................................................................................................... 48 Annex A: Literature................................................................................................................................. 54

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

ACRONYMS AMISOM

African Union Mission to Somalia

ATMIS

African Union Transition Mission in Somalia

AU

African Union

CEDAW

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

CPA

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CSO

Civil Society Organisation

DDR

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DPDD

Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

DSRI

Development Studies and Research Institute

EPLF

Eritrean People’s Liberation Front

EPRDF

Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front

EU

European Union

FFC

Forces of Freedom and Change

FGD

Focus Group Discussion

FGM/C

Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting

GCA

Gender, Conflict and Power Analysis

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

ICC

International Criminal Court

IDP

Internally Displaced Person

IGAD

Inter-Governmental Agency for Development

IOM

International Organisation of Migration

IRC

International Refugee Committee

JEM

Justice and Equality Movement

JICA

Japan International Cooperation Agency

JPA

Juba Peace Agreement

KII

Key Informant Interview

MP

Member of Parliament

NAP-GE

National Plan of Action for Gender Equality

NCP

National Congress Party

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisation

NRC

Norwegian Refugee Council

NSCC

New Sudan Council of Churches

OCHA

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs III

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

IV

OLF

Oromo Liberation Front

PLW

Pregnant and Lactating Women

RSF

Rapid Support Forces

SACCO

Savings and credit scheme

SGBV

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

SIHA

Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa

SNM

Somali National Movement

SORD

Sudanese Organisation for Research and Development

SLM/A

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

SLM/A-AW

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Abdal Wahid

SLM/A-Hilu

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Hilu

SLM/A-N

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-North

SPLM/A

Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army

SPLM/IO

Sudan People Liberation Movement/In-Opposition

SSDM

South Sudan Democratic Movement

SSWEN

South Sudanese Women Empowerment Network

SWA

Somali Women Agenda

SWOT

Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats

TGoS

Transitional Government of Sudan

TMC

Transitional Military Council

TPLF

Tigray People’s Liberation Front

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

UNAMID

United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNISFA

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

UNITAMS

United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan

UNMEE

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNMISS

United Nations Mission in South Sudan

US

United States

WPS

Women, Peace and Security

WPHF

Women’s Peace & Humanitarian Fund

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The importance of women in peace and security is well documented. When women participate, women’s concerns and priorities are brought to the fore. And it makes the processes in which they participate more durable. For example, one study showed that when civil society organisations, including women’s rights organisations, participate in a peace process, it is 64% less likely to fail.1 Other research has shown that women’s participation specifically makes agreements more durable.2 This consensus was recognised by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 1325 in October 2000. The resolution recognises the importance of women’s participation in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and calls on all actors to increase the participation of women.3 Despite this growing consensus on the importance of including women, inclusion is not advancing in practice. In 2022, women constituted only 19 per cent of negotiators in UN-led processes.

In this context, SIHA launched the Women Reclaiming Agency in Peace-making project, which seeks to support the creation of stable and inclusive decision-making and democratic processes in the region by ensuring that women are able to influence peace processes and conflict prevention, turning pledges into action and enhancing public support for women’s engagement and participation. The project recognises that addressing women, peace, and security issues requires concurrent engagement with women’s rights generally.

This gender, conflict and power analysis describes the backdrop against which this work operates and seeks to identify opportunities and challenges for engagement. On a country-by-country basis, it seeks to identify key conflict dynamics and women’s concerns and priorities. It describes structures currently in place for conflict resolution and ensuring women’s participation to assess the extent to which these may be utilised in future action.

The analysis is based on a thorough literature review and qualitative key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) with key stakeholders in the targeted countries: Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.

Although the specifics vary significantly from country to country, the research found that women are excluded from decision-making throughout the region. Patriarchal systems dominating throughout the region, excluding women through their lack of exposure, limited support networks, and discrimination in law and practice. The exclusion of women is often justified based on cultural and religious traditions.

In some countries, there is more and less acknowledgement of the peace and security agenda. Until the recent conflict between the government and Tigrayan forces, for example, there has been little acknowledgement, despite widespread conflict, of the need for a peace and security agenda, much less women’s inclusion in it, in Ethiopia. In Somalia and South Sudan, by contrast, conflict is well acknowledged.

At the same time, women throughout most of the region are well organised and have strong advocacy organisations and structures that provide a strong basis for intervention. These movements, however, have their own weaknesses, including a focus on elite women and divisions based on class, ethnicity and age.

They are not immune to the conflicts in the countries in which they operate and can be divided along the same lines.

In all the countries studies, these networks, often supported by the international community, have extracted commitments to improve women’s engagement and participation. However, these commitments are not 1 2 3

Desiree Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace,” International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations, Volume 38, 2012, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2012.659139 Jana Krause, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace,” International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations, Volume 44, 2018, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2018.1492386 UN Security Council Resolution 1325, 2000, https://peacemaker.un.org/node/105

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

delivering the hoped-for results. In this context, the paper recommends several actions focused on ensuring deliberate follow through to monitor and push for implementation of commitments, expand and strengthen women’s movements and build public support for women’s engagement.

METHODOLOGY In 2022, The Research Team was contracted by SIHA network to conduct a Gender, Conflict and Power Analysis (GCA) in support of the Women Reclaiming Agency in Peace-making project by examining how existing gender relations and power dynamics have impacted and are impacted by conflict in the region.

Some specific areas of focus were the impact on women and girls, the issues women and girls prioritise, the current mechanisms and processes in place addressing conflict or post-conflict situations, the participation of women in these processes, how effective these processes are in addressing identified priorities of women, and understanding the current landscape for women, peace and security issues. Ultimately, the GCA will inform the identification of potential partners, entry points for initiating change and increasing women’s participation in peace-making, and the selection of targets for such changes. For this reason, the study investigates each country individually, but also focuses on the regional dynamics.

To conduct this evaluation, The Research Team conducted a desk review of project documents, reports and existing literature, and primary data collected through qualitative key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). Data collection took place in April 2022 remotely with respondents with the support of the SIHA country offices. A total of 4 focus group discussions (FGDs) and 11 key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted remotely with support from SIHA country offices with representatives of women’s organisations, WPS actors and activists in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. An additional consultant was retained to add detail and structure to the report. The consultant worked primarily on the basis of additional literature review, but also conducted some additional interviews.

This report presents the key findings of the GCA, and includes an executive summary, methodology, chapters on each of the focus countries, a regional chapter, and a conclusion. Literature consulted, interviews conducted, and data collection tools used for this study are attached in the Annexes to this report.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS The research was shaped around the following key questions: 1.

What are the past and prevailing gender norms that impact both men and women’s roles in conflict and conflict resolution?

2.

How are these roles changing or influenced by current and past national and regional contexts?

3.

How are women, girls and other marginalised groups differently impacted by conflict? What are some of the key intersections that create different perceptions, experiences, and levels of participation in conflict and conflict resolution?

4.

Who are the key actors in women, peace, and security (women and women’s organisations, government mechanisms)?

5.

Who are the key actors in the conflict and in conflict resolution? If relevant, who specifically are the key actors in peace building, transitional governance, or transitional justice and what is the current power distribution among these actors?

6.

What are some of the key processes, mechanisms, or platforms for conflict resolution and/or peace building, transitional governance, or transitional justice at the local, national and regional levels?

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

7.

How are women or other marginalised groups participating in these spaces at the community, national and regional level?

8.

What is the extent of women’s engagement in these spaces?

9.

What are some of the key platforms and mechanisms at the international level and what does current participation in these platforms look like?

10. To what extent is there enhanced public support for women’s engagement in peace and security? (are there articles/media pieces in key media that express support for women’s participation in peace and security initiatives in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia, which ones are there and how do they support women’s participation in peace and security)?

11. What are some of the key strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for WPS actors in the region?

What are key recommendations for their improved access and influence in WPS processes?

RESEARCH DESIGN To address the research questions above, The Research Team conducted a thorough literature review and qualitative KIIs and FGDs with key stakeholders in the four countries of interest: Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia. The subsequent consulted also conducted individual interviews. All interviews and discussions were conducted remotely, except for the FGD in Khartoum. The table below provides a detailed overview of the research methods applied.

Table 1: Research Methods Secondary data

Literature Review

Project documentation, relevant secondary literature including reports, policy papers, etc.

1

Primary Qualitative data

KIIS

Government officials, elders, Religious leaders, women’s group representative, youth groups Representative, wps activists and legal actors

15 Kiis

FGDS

Male and female activists and non-activists representing diverse backgrounds

4 Fgds

SAMPLING APPROACH The sample was selected using purposive and snowball sampling methods. Under purposive sampling, respondents were selected based on the researcher’s judgement of their expertise of key research questions.

Additionally, snowball sampling was used to recruit other primary data sources relevant to the study.

RESEARCH APPROACH Phase 1: Inception As a first step, the researcher conducted a desk review of project documents and reports shared by SIHA to familiarise itself with the work, the needs of the assessment and the specific target locations. This research informed the methodology, which was reflected in an inception report.

The research team then discussed the inception report and proposed methodology with SIHA representative, both at headquarters and in country. These calls formed the entry points for expanding the literature review, and proposed lists of respondents to invite for the qualitative interviews. The literature review drew together relevant information needed to answer the research questions and as well as identifying gaps in the literature that needed to be addressed through interviews, informing the design of interview tools. The tools were designed to allow participants to share detailed experiences, attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments. The 3

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

KII and FGD interviewing guides were semi-structured by design, inviting discussion between the researcher and the respondent(s) and flexible enough to allow interesting issues that emerged to be explored.

Phase 2: Data Collection Supported by the SIHA country offices, The Research Team’s team scheduled and conducted the KIIs and FGDs remotely. Where needed, translations were provided during the interviews. Otherwise, KIIs and FGDs were conducted in English. With the consent of respondents, interviews were also recorded to facilitate detailed notes and transcriptions of the interviews. Such recordings were stored on The Research Team’s secure servers and only used for the purposes of this study. Additional interviews were carried out by the second consultant.

Phase 3: Analysis and Reporting After completing data collection, transcripts of KIIs and FGDs were scripted and coded systematically based on a predetermined set of codes. The analysis focused on extracting patterns of thought, outliers, and key quotes. Based on the qualitative data collected and the literature review, The Research Team drafted a final report inclusive of an executive summary, background, methodology, key findings, summary and conclusion.

In addition, The Research Team will prepare key findings to be presented to key project stakeholders.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS During all stages of the market assessment, the principles of “do no harm,” and “do good” were respected.

All data collectors were briefed on adequate research procedures to ensure that communities or individual participants did not face any negative consequences or any threats to their physical security as a result of the research. Interviews were conducted in English, and when needed, translated to Arabic or Somali.

All respondents gave informed consent, through a verbal exchange with researchers which highlighted the voluntary nature of participation, the right to skip questions or exit the interview at any time and assuring them that their responses would be treated confidentially.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

ETHIOPIA

ETHIOPIA

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

Historical Context In Ethiopia, the formal legal system co-exists with customary laws used daily at the local level, based on historic and traditional customs. This complex interplay came into existence during the monarchical period.

Following the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974 by a military regime claiming to be socialist, the repression of ethno-regionalist movements and the complete closure of political space sparked conflict between the centre and its peripheries. Ethno-regional movements including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) took up arms against the government, leading to its fall in 1991.4 The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a set of regional organisations, at the time dominated by Tigrayan forces, took power in 1991 and introduced a system relying on ethnic federalism and a divide-and-rule strategy pitting ethnic groups against one another and demonstrating their ability to control power and wealth.5 The new dictatorship temporarily put a lid on internal conflicts in the country.

The new system led to the recognition of the cultural and linguistic rights of ethnic groups. Localized ethnic conflicts persisted sparked by disagreements about the use of land and water resources, about settlements, regional hegemony, access to State resources and language policies.6 Conflicts mainly followed ethnic fault lines and took place across the country, from the western lowland regions of Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella to Somali and Afar in the East. Between 1998 and 2000, Ethiopia also was engaged in a deadly war with Eritrea at its northern border.

Before the early 90’s, Ethiopia’s achievement regarding women’s rights rested solely in the ratification of international treaties, including the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1981. The new authorities who took power in the 90’s introduced a new program of action for women’s rights: In 1993, a “National Women’s Policy” and a “National Plan of Action for Gender Equality (NAP-GE)” identified strategies to achieve gender equality in the education, health, and economic sectors. Real changes, however, lagged behind, for example in achieving changes to labour and workload for women and reducing harmful practices. The 1995 federal constitution recognised gender equality as a basic requirement for the realisation of other rights and human freedoms.7 In the following years, a number legal protections were introduced in revisions of the Family Code and the penal code enabled the country to fight sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), still prevalent in and out of conflicts in Ethiopia. In addition a national roadmap to end child marriage and Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting (FGM/C) 2020-2024 was adopted.

Current contextual analysis Ethiopia has struggled to contain tensions in the country. The government has struggled to balance diverging demands for change among Ethiopia’s different regions and constituencies. There are now a number of regional conflicts ongoing in the country, and armed rebels and militias are present in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and Afar among others. The most prominent of these conflicts is the one in Tigray, which has recently been the subject of a peace agreement.

The conflict escalated in 2020 when the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) objected to joining the new Prosperity Party (PP) created by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, claiming that it was an effort to consolidate 4 5 6 7

6

Muhabie Mekonnen Mengistu, “Ethnic Federalism: A Means for Managing or a Triggering Factor for Ethnic Conflicts in Ethiopia” Social Sciences. Vol. 4:4, 2015, pp. 94-105. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20150404.15 Mehal Arada, TPLF’s Strategy of divide and rule has exhausted its steam and utility, 2016.

Bekalu Atnafu Taye. “Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia”, African Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2, 2017 SIHA Network, “Between Modernism and Heritage. The application of the parallel legal system to the Oromo Women of Ethiopia”, 2012.

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

federal power at the expense of regional and ethnic autonomy.8 When the government decided to postpone elections citing the COVID-19 pandemic, Tigrayan leaders decided to proceed with their citing the lack of an electoral mandate for the current government. The government labelled these elections as illegal, and the parliament voted to cut funds from the regional Tigrayan government. The TPLF were accused of attacking army bases and Ethiopian troops entered Tigray alongside Eritrean soldiers fighting for the Ethiopian government.9 After early gains and losses, the war turned into a stalemate, isolating Tigray from the rest of Ethiopia and subjecting it to looting, shelling, and airstrikes. The costly conflict that destroyed civil infrastructure and resulted in the displacement of about two million people.10 Although a peace agreement was signed in November 2022, the future of the conflict is unclear. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 5.4 million people in the Tigray region are currently in need of humanitarian assistance.11 Human rights violations, including killings and sexual violence, were widespread in Tigray, Amhara and Afar.12 Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Amhara and Tigrayan regional forces were all accused of sexual violence, with more than 2,200 cases reported formally between November 2020 and June 2021 across Tigray, only a small percentage of the atrocities likely committed.13 Although the conflict in Tigray is the most prominent, it is not the only conflict in Ethiopia. Oromia, which was the epicentre of the protests between 2014 and 2017 that paved the way for Prime Minister Abiy’s rise to power, has long hosted its own armed insurgency.

There are also a number of internal territorial disputes, for example between Oromia and Somali regions, which flared up in late 2016 and have killed hundreds and displaced more than 1.5 million people.14 Somali region special forces crossed the border and attacked residents.15 The conflict impacted humanitarian access, which led to an increase in global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates, especially among children, pregnant and lactating women.16 7 Tigray and Amhara also have an ongoing land dispute that has both been exacerbated by the Tigray conflict and contributed to localised violence.

Such conflict has the power to push the country decades backward. It has also threatened the already uneven progress towards women’s rights.17 However, the intensity of the conflict in Tigray has also forced the country to recognise the impact of conflict and has created opening for the women, peace and security agenda. Despite the diversity of conflicts in the country, Ethiopians saw themselves as relatively peaceful and therefore not in need of the women, peace, and security agenda. As one report on implementation of 1325 put it “Ethiopia does not see itself as falling under the field of the resolution’s implementation.”18 One key informant echoed this, saying that WPS was “a new concept” in Ethiopia, which has not seen itself as in conflict until the outbreak of fighting in Tigray.19 However the conflict has created new resolution mechanisms with new opportunities to engage women in the process, such as the national dialogue. However, women’s organisations have expressed concern about the failure to take advantage of the opportunity to engage 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

BBC, “Ethiopia’s Tigray war: The short, medium and long story”, 2021.

Vox, “Dying by blood or by hunger : The war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, explained,” 2021.

UNHCR, “Tigray Situation Update”, September 2021.

UN OCHA, “Ethiopia: Situation Report,” 18 January 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-situation-report-18-jan-2023 ACLED, “10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2022”, February 2022.

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Tigray conflict: UN experts call for urgent action to stop violence against women,” 3 December 2021, https://www.ohchr.org/en/2021/12/tigray-conflict-un-experts-call-urgent-action-stop-violence-against-women International Crisis Group, “Defusing Ethiopia’s Latest Perilous Crisis,” 3 July 2020.

Addis Standard, “New Analysis between accusations, denials, renewed violence along Oromo-Somali border area”, 2021 Addis Standard, “Violence in western Oromia displaces half a million, leaves hundreds of schools, health facilities non functional”, 2022.

SIHA Network, op.cit.

Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, “Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Africa: Needs Assessment Report,” https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/cdrom/documents/Needs_Assessment_Africa.pdf Interview with key informant, 24 November 2022.

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women. The Network of Ethiopian Women’s Associations (NEWA) issued a statement, supported by 28 CSOs, calling for women’s meaningful engagement. Only 4 of 42 nominees shortlisted by the House of Peoples’ Representatives were women and only three were eventually named to the 11-member commission. There was concern that this offered too narrow a scope for women’s engagement. SIHA and its partners called for 50% representation in the commission and the adoption of a bottom-up approach that would allow for more comprehensive women’s engagement.20 In addition, many were doubtful of the effectiveness of this step and about the transparency on who was representing what in the process and the balance of power among actors.21 In recent negotiations that took place between the TPLF and the government, it was noted that there was insufficient effort made to include women in these processes, however there are informal processes at the local level that could be built upon to ensure greater engagement.

Gender norms and gender roles Structural gender and other inequalities in Ethiopia are persistent. This is evident in the Gender Inequality Index of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), where Ethiopia was ranked 173 out of 188 in 2018. highlighting the significant gender disparities within the country. However, it is important to note that progress has been made, albeit at a slow pace. According to the 2021 GII, Ethiopia’s ranking improved slightly to 129 out of 170 countries.

In a patriarchal society such as the one in Ethiopia, and particularly in rural areas where 85% of women live, customary laws and institutions are naturally weighted in favour of men.

According to the most recent Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS) 2016, the incidence of child marriage was 40.3% for young women aged 20–24 years and 14.1% were married before the age of 15.

The incidence of female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) was 47% of girls in the age group of 15-19 years.22 Overall, the national prevalence rate of intimate partner domestic violence was at 35%, and about 68% of women still believe wife beating can be justified.23 Such attitudes on SGBV illustrate that women empowerment remains a “work-inprogress”.

40.3%

Child Marriage Ages 20–24

14.1% Child Marriage Before the age of 15

These power relations give legitimacy to violence against women, and practices such as unwanted touching, assault, and physical violence directed towards family members are still considered normal in large parts of the country.24 These norms also justify disparities in the division of labour, share of power, resources, and benefits: women are often confined to household activities or invisible work in the informal sector. This has a direct impact on gender relations: When women are financially dependent on men, they are seen as the property of a “male protector.”25 This reinforces patterns of abusive and controlling behaviour.

8

20 21

SIHA, “Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission,” February 23, 2022, https://sihanet.org/the-ethiopian-national-dialogue-commission-2/ Amnesty International, “International Women’s Day: Dramatic deterioration in respect for women’s rights and gender equality must be decisively reversed”, 2022.

22 23 24

UNICEF, National Costed Roadmap to End Child Marriage and FGM/C 2020-220, 2019 Oxfam, op.cit.

Key Informant Interview, Timran, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022 & Key Informant Interview, AddisPowerhouse, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022.

25

Care International, “Gender in Brief Ethiopia”.

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

These dynamics also perpetuate an entrenched culture of silence, which undermines the possibility of public pressure to create institutional support for women, which contributes to the failure to prioritise these issues.26 Gender norms and roles act as limits to women’s empowerment in Ethiopia. In decision-making, women must usually seek approval of their husband to carry out activities or travel, and they participate in public life under the control of their male counterparts. Even though Ethiopian women’s political representation has considerably improved in recent years, women in politics face barriers, including a lack of exposure, limited support networks or exclusion from informal decision-making process. At the regional level, traditional systems of governance, such as the Gadaa system used by the Oromo give no formal role to women, unless under special circumstances.27 In addition, there is evidence that increased militarisation has made the situation for women in politics even more difficult.

Intersectionality, conflict and conflict resolution In conflict, the most marginalized and vulnerable are often made even more vulnerable, especially to SGBV, including intimate partner violence, socioeconomic, emotional, and sexual violence, and harmful traditional practices, mainly female genital mutilation, and early marriages.28 For example, since the conflict began in Tigray, a spike in domestic violence has been reported, and sexual harassment, assault and rape have also increased. According to the International Refugee Council (IRC), the lack of access to income and food has led some female internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to exchange sex for small amounts of cash. At the same time, the breakdown of traditional accountability mechanisms has facilitated impunity, while SGBV reporting mechanisms have almost disappeared.29 SGBV has been used as a weapon of war, something confirmed in the KIIs conducted as part of this GCA.30 The unique experiences of women during the war have been cited as a reason why more women’s engagement is needed in the peace process.

Similarly, women and other vulnerable groups have taken a heavy toll in other conflicts in Ethiopia. In Oromia and the Somali region, conflict has had an immediate impact on women, children, elderly people and people with disabilities: Women were exposed to a wide range of abuses, resulting in the loss of property, psychological trauma and displacement.31 The same pattern is found in other emergencies, such as with the El Niño drought in 2016-2017. According to Oxfam, one in five displaced women were exposed to SGBV, while the prevalence of some harmful practices, such as child marriage, also increased. Children, elderly people, and pregnant and lactating women (PLW) tend to be most vulnerable to food insecurity.32 Gender roles are often reinforced in the context of militaristic responses to conflict, which contributes to excluding women from conflict resolution processes. In Ethiopia, women are systematically excluded from decision-making positions prior to, during, and after violent conflicts.33 Each region and culture has their own conflict resolution system, but they have indirect and near-absent participation of women in common.

According to UNDP, this was both the case for both Somali and Oromo in resolving conflict between them. In the Somali xeer system (see extended discussion in the Somalia chapter), women are represented through

26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Wright Ain, “Closing the gender Gap: Women’s rights in Ethiopia and Mexico”, Global Majority E-Journal, Vol. 11:1, June 2020, pp. 47–60.

Care International, ”Gender in Brief Ethiopia”.

Key Informant Interview, Timran, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022.

SIHA Network, op.cit.

Social Impact, “Systematic literature review of gender-based violence in Ethiopia”, 2018.

UNDP, op.cit. & Key Informant Interview, Timran, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022 & Key Informant Interview, AddisPowerhouse, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022 Oxfam, “Ethiopia Gender Snapshot”, 2017.

Key Informant Interview, Timran, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

their husbands.34 Similarly, Oromo conflict resolution systems focus on elders, who are typically men and sideline women.35 Likewise in the Issa and Gurgura communities’ women are not allowed to participate in formal conflict resolution mechanisms.36 Despite their lack of a formal role, the informal roles of women in fostering peace and security are increasingly recognized in Ethiopia: women are more and more perceived as actors participating in resolving conflict.

It is agreed today that women can influence the decisions of their husbands, and women whose husbands die in conflict gain social recognition as “wives of heroes.” In Tigray, women called “Peace Mothers” came together to spread awareness in universities and persuade youth not to participating in war.37 Hence, more men at the state and local levels are informally engaging women in conflict resolution processes38 to a limited extent.

Key actors and power analysis Some of the key actors in Ethiopian political life are the government and political parties. The government has made efforts to increase women’s participation. Ethiopia had the highest increase in gender parity of any country in Africa between 2018 and 2021.39 Women made up 37% of Congress in Ethiopia, and Prime Minister Abiy appointed a cabinet in 2018 that was 50% women. These figures are higher than neighbouring countries and illustrate to the public that women are capable of holding and directing these positions.40 However, this progress is fragile, and the statistics do not reflect the full range of challenges to women in politics. Men continue to maintain primary control over political parties, which are a main player in national power structures, being over-represented in their executive committees and can effectively exclude even women with formal and a cabinet reshuffle in 2021 reduced women’s representation in the cabinet to 36.3%, with little attention or repercussion for the government.41 This instability has led some activists to argue for the need for quotas and legal provisions to protect women’s participation.42 Women who have made it into political life continue to face serious obstacles to operating effectively. They tend to face public attitudes that see them as less competent. Perhaps because of this, those women who are in politics are accused of being more conservative than their male counterparts and less able to diverge from party policy.43 For this reason, they are seen as less effective by women’s rights activists who expect them to advance a more feminist agenda. It was also suggested that more research is needed to help to give these female leaders the information that they need to take progressive action.44 One political force of particular relevance is the TPLF, which has particular weight both as the former ruling party and due to its affiliation with the Tigray Defense Forces who fought the Ethiopian government.

Although there is little information about the role of women in the current power structures, the TPLF in its opposition to the Derg regime embraced language of women’s liberation and women made up as much 34 35 36 37 38 39

Xeer, Sharia, and formal governmental legal systems are available for households. Studies suggest households have flexibility relating to which legal system they choose to use.

UNDP, op.cit.

Tadesse, Tesfaye and Beyene, “Women in conflict and indigenous conflict resolution among the Issa and Gurgura clans of Somali in Eastern Ethiopia”, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol 10:1, 2010.

Key Informant Interview, Timran, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022 UNDP, op.cit.

Olumide Abimola Ajayi, “Women and Gender Parity Trends in Africa,” Accord, September 21, 2022, https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/ women-and-gender-parity-trends-in-africa/

40 41

Key Informant Interview, AddisPowerhouse, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022 Hilina Berhanu Degefa and Emebet Getachew, “Why Ethiopia must close its political gender gap,” 3 August 2022, https://www.chathamhouse. org/publications/the-world-today/2022-08/why-ethiopia-must-close-its-political-gender-gap

42 43

Interview with female activist, 24 November 2022.

Wubante Ayalew Dessie, “Women and Ethiopian politics: Political leaders’ attitude and views on women’s effectiveness,” Cogent Social Sciences, Volume 7, 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2021.1948653 Interview with female activist, 24 November 2022.

44

10

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

of one third of its fighters. Although women complained of being inequitably treated in the demobilization process and the transition, this experience embeds a base of women’s right rhetoric at least in the party.45 At the local level, although conflict resolution mechanisms vary among communities and ethnic groups, they tend to be very male-dominated, both designed by and integrating a majority of male traditional leaders, both religious leaders and elders.”46 Increasingly, such leadership must coordinate with local government officials; in many regions, there is a high level of interdependence between the state and customary systems. To a certain extent, local efforts are co-opted by state processes, which may result in traditional authorities and elders losing legitimacy. Beyond that, in larger scale conflicts such as the current one in Tigray, such traditional conflict resolution mechanisms may be overlooked: this conflict remains dominated by the federal government and rebel groups.47 Increasingly, younger people in particular tend to disregard the traditional mechanisms, reflecting the loss of legitimacy noted above. As traditional mechanisms side-line women, the shift in power relation toward state and other actors might favour women’s inclusion in dispute resolution and governance. Yet, women’s inclusion in government processes can be exploited for government political purposes, undermining real inclusiveness. Still, the presence of various forms of women’s organisations also provides opportunity for state agents to step up their action to include women.48

Conflict resolution, human rights, and governance mechanisms at the local and national level There is a great diversity in conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level in Ethiopia. Indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms are important for reducing the delay and cost of conflict resolution. They act as more inclusive judiciary systems, accessible to groups who are marginalized, including the poor, those who live in rural areas and the illiterate. They can provide more sustainable conflict resolution as judges are part of the impacted communities, which can help them to better understand the conflict dynamics.49 In such processes, reconciliation and restitution are the main drivers of justice and are sought through mediation and arbitration. Restitution is used to enable reconciliation among parties, with the goal of restoring peace between individuals, families, and clans.

Local-level conflict resolution mechanisms often place the interests of the collective over the rights or interests of the individual. While this is enshrined in traditional roots, it also means that women’s individual and human rights, can be subjugated to the interests of the family or of the community, as defined by male family or community members. This can reinforce gender inequality and women’s position at the bottom of existing hierarchical structures of power. In general, elders are not aware of existing women’s rights law in Ethiopia, and do not act in accordance with it. This can constitute a serious shortcoming to such processes, which can be deemed as illegal under the constitution and violate women’s human rights.50 At the state level, interventions in peacebuilding and reconciliation often follow a piecemeal rather than strategic approach. As one example, there is no national action plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. The state usually acts as a facilitator for community-level negotiation through its local agents. For example, in all woredas of Oromia and the Somali region, reconciliation was facilitated by 45 46 47 48 49 50

See, for example, Francesca Baldwin. “Androgyny in Female Fighters the Case of Tigray, Ethiopia,” June 1, 2021, https://www.epoch-magazine. com/post/androgyny-in-female-fighters-the-case-of-tigray-ethiopia Federica de Sisto, “Inclusion-Exclusion of women in Local Peacemaking systems in the kaffa society of Ethiopia”, in Gender and Peacebuilding: All Hands Required, 2015.

Key Informant Interview, Timran, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022 & Key Informant Interview, AddisPowerhouse, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022.

UNDP, op.cit.

Alemie Ajanaw and Mandefro Hone, op.cit.

SIHA, op.cit

11

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

the Ministry of Defence, bringing customary leaders from both sides together.51 Despite lip service to the importance of women’s participation, it is rarely implemented in practice. While there are no comprehensive laws that deal with the institutionalisation and harmonisation of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms within the country’s legal system, the latter’s provisions regarding women’s rights are not implemented on the ground.52 At the national level, there are several mechanisms that could potentially be leveraged to engage on the women, peace, and security agenda. Ethiopia has created an Inter-Ministerial Taskforce which is composed of the ministers of defence, justice, women’s affairs, and others. The task force is intended to enable investigations of serious crimes committed in the context of the Tigray conflict and to provide redress and support to the victims, including GBV to which a special committee has been dedicated. The government claims that there have already been a number of investigations and prosecutions.53 The task force could be a target for advocacy.

In addition, Ethiopia has a strong tradition of contributing to peacekeeping efforts on the continent and has contributed female troops, which could be an entry point for engagement.54 In addition, UN Women is supporting review and efforts to reform the legal framework that supports the women, peace, and security agenda in Ethiopia.55

Women, Peace and Security Actors Following the establishment of the 1995 Constitution, women’s empowerment strategies were institutionalized, including federal, regional and district-level governance structures to focus on women’s issues. Yet, in the current context, the WPS agenda is stalling. The recent civil society law in Ethiopia has severely limited the work of rights-based organisations: Some women’s rights organisations have been silenced and even shut down because they reflect the situation and vulnerability of women during conflict.56 Even though patriarchal structures are prevalent in Ethiopia, women’s civil society organisations (CSOs) are at the forefront of the struggle for the implementation of the WPS agenda and the inclusion of Women.

Existing women’s organisations (formal and informal) at the local level are working to engage WPS, as well as to empower women in their communities and against SGBV. For example, Women’s iddirs are independent social and financial institutions that work on the creation of viable social networks and to provide solutions to socioeconomic challenges women are facing. Such organisations can play a key positive role in the general empowerment of women. Other women’s federations are central to achieving these goals.57 National professional women’s associations are functional in Ethiopia and participate in the overall WPS agenda. Ethiopia’s Association of Women in Business is a volunteer-driven membership that provides loans to people for business ventures. The Ethiopian Woman Lawyers Association aims to promote legal, economic, and social empowerment for women and children. It is doing so through workshops, political lobbying, and investment in businesses. Both organisations work to influence the local laws, ensure they are 51 52 53

54

UNDP, op.cit.

Gemma Lucy Burgess “When the personal becomes political: using legal reform to combat violence against women in Ethiopia”, Gender, Place & Culture, Vol. 19:2, pp.153-174, 2012 Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, “Reply ot the Joint Communication by the 7 UN Special Rapporteurs and 1 Working Group on Alleged Violations of International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Including Gender Based Violence in the Context of the Conflict in the Tigray, Amhara and Afar Regions,” 8 February 2022, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/ DownLoadFile?gId=36806.

Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, “Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Africa: Needs

Assessment Report,” https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/cdrom/documents/Needs_Assessment_Africa.pdf 55 56 57

12

UN Women, “The Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Enhanced Participation of Women in Peace and Conflict Resolution in Ethiopia,” 2022, https://africa.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/English%20policy%20brief%20on%20WPS%20UN%20Women%20ECO%202022.pdf SIHA Network, op.cit. & Key Informant Interview, AddisPowerhouse, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022 Teshome, E., Zenebe, M., Metaferia, H. et al, “Participation and significance of self-help groups for social development: exploring the community capacity in Ethiopia”. SpringerPlus 3:189, 2014.

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

well-implemented on the ground through monitoring, and help women support themselves economically.58 Other civil society organisations such as Timran, Setaweet or Addis Powerhouse are actively participating in WPS for example, working on empowering women in political participation and leadership for women as well as in decision-making processes.59 UN Women has also supported the enhanced participation of Women in Peace and Conflict Resolution in Ethiopia by creating a platform to discuss and gain knowledge on the WPS agenda with the key stakeholders, including the representatives of government entities, international and local CSOs and women’s groups and the media. As well as ensuring the equal participation of women in serving peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and recovery efforts and to identify their respective roles in implementing the WPS agenda.60 There has been increased training on WPS issues.61 Activists reported that although there has been positive international attention to, and support for, the women, peace and security agenda, there has been insufficient coordination among bi-lateral donors to ensure that they are working efficiently and not overlapping.

Public support for Women, Peace and Security In the last decades, institutional support has been important to advance the WPS agenda. In July 2000, the revision of the Family Code established equality between sexes on marriage related issues. Labour and Public Service proclamations and Land Use Administration Laws in 2003 respectively legislated to make gender-based discrimination illegal in regard to employment, and to uphold equal rights of women in respect to the use, administration, and control of land.62 In 2004, the penal code was revised to fight against SGBV: Numerous customary practices, including FGM/C, marriage by abduction, and early marriage were criminalised. Domestic violence, sexual abuse, and rape have also been given more severe punishments.63 According to a KII respondent, “the public is waking up [to the integration of women in peacebuilding], and it is hungry for peace.”64 Recent studies highlight that progressive change is being seen at the local and community level, though there are regional disparities. Improvements have been noted in some areas, including on perceptions of harmful traditional practices and forms of SGBV, especially among youth.

Women’s economic empowerment and engagement in income-generating activities is also increasing. This directly impacts the social norms which govern the division of responsibilities between men and women with a gradual acceptance of men sharing household responsibilities with women.65 Yet this social change remains slow and current cultural notions still prevail across the country, especially in rural areas. Media outlets remain very gender-biased.66 This culture acts as another deterrent for the use of the formal legal system by women to seek redress and justice.

Conclusion Promoting a women, peace and security agenda in Ethiopia is a challenging undertaking. As noted above, advancing the agenda comes up against patriarchal cultural attitudes and practices. Women are excluded both in local, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and also in formal government processes, in different ways and to varying extents. In addition, the political context is extremely tense, due to the ongoing conflict, 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Gemma Lucy Burgess, op.cit.

Key Informant Interview, Timran, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022.

UN Women, “ The Women, Peace and Security agenda: Enhanced participation of women in peace and conflict resolution in Ethiopia “, 2021.

Interview with female activist, November 24, 2022.

Moore Montana, “Gender equality in Ethiopia makes headway”, The Borgen Project, 2021.

Oxfam, op.cit.

Key Informant Interview, Timran, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022.

Care International, op.cit.

Key Informant Interview, AddisPowerhouse, Ethiopia, The Research Team, 2022

13

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

which is intensifying exclusive tendencies in the government and is contributing to a closing of the space for civil society in general, placing women’s civil society organizations at a disadvantage.

At the same time, there are positive aspects that could be built upon. First, the conflict is creating new recognition of the need for peace and reconciliation in the country. This has created a discussion about how to design those process, which in turn creates openings for women’s inclusion. In addition, there are strong civil society organizations operating at the national level and coordinating in various ways, although not explicitly as a women, peace, and security platform. In addition, a number of positive steps have been taken as the government has made steps to include women, create institutional structures to advance their interests and to improve legal frameworks. Although all of these are subject to fragilities and weaknesses, they also create opportunities for engagement and for building stronger women’s engagement and more durable peace.

Recommendations •

Focus on increasing the number and membership of nationally representative networks of CSOs working on women empowerment and WPS specifically.

•

Conduct awareness campaigns for men and women, traditional leaders, and security actors on the benefits of women empowerment, and WPS.

•

Provide institutional fundraising capacity-building activities for organisations working on WPS.

•

Work on actively involving women holding positions of power in WPS organisations and in promoting the WPS agenda.

•

Set up legal support networks to ensure existing laws protecting women are upheld and carry out rights awareness campaigns on women’s roles in peace process.

•

Finalize ongoing consultations on and adopt a national action plan on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

•

Revise national legislation to ensure that adequate provisions are in place to protect women from sexual and gender-based violence and ensure accountability for these crimes where they occur.

•

Improve access to services by women affected by conflict and the inclusion of women’s concerns in the planning of rehabilitation and recovery efforts.

•

Increase protections for women human rights defenders as a precondition for allowing them to engage fully and effectively on the women, peace, and security agenda.

14

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

SOMALIA

SOMALIA

15

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

Historical context In January 1991, the Somali Civil War broke out and brought Siad Barre’s regime to an end. Although the Barre regime was very problematic in many ways, its socialist leaning provided some opportunities for women, including promoting women’s education. It also promoted women’s engagement in politics and women held 10% of parliamentary seats.67 For more than 25 years, Somali civilians both inside and outside the Somali region have been affected by the continuous conflict. The level of material, institutional, and social destruction has been enormous, affecting every part of society. Individual repercussions have been gendered: women have been disproportionately affected.68 In May 1991, Somaliland declared independence from Somalia, but the declaration was soon weakened by a second round of conflict, as previous tensions within the Somali National Movement (SNM) reappeared in the power vacuum created by the fall of the Barre regime. A small group of traditional elders initiated a peaceful transition process in Sheikh in October 1992. After numerous further conferences involving Somali clans were conducted over several years, the clans were eventually able to reach an agreement in 1997 at the Hargeisa Peace and Reconciliation Conference. This agreement resulted in the peaceful development of a multiparty, parliamentary system which has mostly prevailed throughout the previous two decades, even though Somaliland remains unrecognized internationally as an independent state. Although women advocated for the process they were excluded from the actual conference. Instead, women gathered their communities for peace through grassroots campaigns which contributed to ending the clan-based conflicts.69 Ever since the Civil War broke out in Somalia, all attempts at establishing a functioning central government have faced outstanding obstacles in advancing fundamental state and peace-building processes. Furthermore, widespread insecurity spurred large influxes of foreign aid and several international interventions, including the US’ ill-fated humanitarian intervention in 1992-3, support for Ethiopian incursion in 2006 and later strikes against targets of counter-terrorism campaigns.70 Several AU and UN efforts also sought to sustain the weak territorial control of the central government and to fight against warlords and Al-Shabaab. This included a failed UN peacekeeping mission in the 1990s and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM),71 and the current African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

Women’s advances in social, economic, and political terms obtained during the socialist policies of the 1970s and 1980s were destroyed by the Civil War. Women who lost their husbands and boys found themselves without male protection, they were raped, had economic troubles, and frequently found themselves at odds with their husbands’ and fathers’ clans. Some Somali women steadfastly supported the Civil War by caring for the fighting men, raising funds, engaging in public demonstrations, and mass mobilisation through Buraanbur (female poetry), while others worked for peace and reconciliation.72 Since 1991, a number of peace processes have been organized to address the ongoing conflict. These have engaged women to differing extents. Despite their activism and strong advocacy, women have had limited 67 68 69 70

SIHA, “Reflection on Gender Equality Agenda in Somaliland,” November 2020.

Cindy Horst, “Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda? Somali Debates on Women’s Public Roles and Political Participation,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 11, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 389–407.

SIHA Network, “A Reflection on the Gender Equality Agenda in Somaliland,” 2020.

Oona Hathaway and Luke Hartig, “Forever War: The United States in Somalia,” Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/80921/still-at-warthe-united-states-in-somalia/

71

Ken Menkhaus, “Elections in the Hardest Places: The Case of Somalia,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 4 (2017): 132–46 and “Somalia Country Profile,” BBC News, January 4, 2018.; Ibrahim Farah, “Somalia: Thirty Years After,” Development 64, no. 1–2 (June 2021): 107–11, p. 108.; Jeffrey Gettleman, “Former Prime Minister Is Elected President of Struggling Somalia,” The New York Times, February 8, 2017; Farah, Somalia: Thirty Years After, pp. 108-109.

72

Matt Bryden and Martina I. Steiner, “Somalia Between Peace and War: Somali Women on the Eve of the 21st Century African Women for Peace Series”.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

space at the table in peace negotiations, only one woman has been a signatory to a formal peace agreement in Somalia.73 Women have attempted to counter this exclusion through advocacy and organizing. For example, at the 2000 Somali National Peace Conference in Djibouti, women organized as a “sixth clan.”

Their engagement facilitated strong human rights elements of the process outcomes, but these were unfortunately little implemented.74 Since the establishment of the government in Mogadishu in late 2011, debates about gender roles have resurfaced as the country has experienced greater stability, also influenced by the individuals who have fled the country to the diaspora since the 1980s.75

Current contextual analysis After Somali President H. S. Mohamud risked impeachment in 2015, Western donors pushed for indirect elections in 2016 by prioritising risk management and conflict prevention over universal direct elections while other regional powers directly backed candidates for their own agendas. In the 2016 election, members of parliament (PMs) were elected by electoral colleges rather than by clan elders directly. The permanence of the elders in the process signals the importance of clan politics and elders in Somali society.76 The 2016 elections, however, failed to meet the 30% quota for female seats in Parliament due to the political context that was fraught with violence, corruption, and divisions.77 The 2020 Electoral Law ensures women 30% of nominations, but not seats in parliament. In the 2016-2017 electoral cycle, women’s representation reached 24% at the national level. Representation is lower at the regional level, between 1.5% in Puntland and 15.8% in South-West.78 Unfortunately, the most recent electoral cycle elected fewer women, with women only achieving 14% representation.79 Recent elections in 2021-2022 used the same indirect electoral system to elect MPs and the president. The MPs were sworn in 2022 after the incumbent president had unsuccessfully tried to extend his own term by two years in 2021. The process was torn with threats and bloodshed, including the killing of a young female candidate, Amina Mohamed Abdi, who was a vocal critic of the government in a bomb attack claimed by al-Shabaab.80 According to the UN Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace, and Security, - women were more likely than men to face harassment and violence in the electoral process.81 Although women report significant continuing obstacles to participation, some progress has been made. For example, a woman, Sadia Samatar was elected as the country’s first female deputy speaker of parliament.82 Even as contestation within the government continues, an external threat from al-Shabaab militants continues.

The militant group remains the focus of government attacks but remains resilient. Al Shabab undertook an increasing number of attacks on Mogadishu in the second half of 2022. 83 The international community 73 74

Somalia National Action Plan for the Implementation the Somali Women’s Charter and UNSCR1325 on women, peace and security, 2021.

Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative, “Somalia (2000),” Case Studies Series: Women in Peace and Transition Processes, 2018, available at https://www.inclusivepeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/case-study-women-somalia-2000-en.pdf

75

Horst, 2017; Menkhaus, 2017.

76

Menkhaus, 2017; Jeffrey Gettleman, “Fueled by Bribes, Somalia’s Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption,” The New York Times, February 7, 2017’.

77 78 79 80 81

Gettleman, 2017.

Somalia National Action Plan for the Implementation the Somali Women’s Charter and UNSCR1325 on women, peace and security, 2021.

UN Security Council, “Informal Expert Group on Women Peace and Security of the Security Council: Summary of the meeting on the situation in Somalia held on 30 June 2021,” 19 July 2021, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2021_668.pdf Mohamed Odowa, “Somali women struggle to progress in politics.

UN Security Council, “Informal Expert Group on Women Peace and Security of the Security Council: Summary of the meeting on the situation in Somalia held on 30 June 2021,” 19 July 2021, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2021_668.pdf

82

Abdulkadir Khalif, “Saadia Samatar makes history as Somalia’s first female deputy speaker,” The East African, 29 April 2022, https://www. theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/somalia-first-female-deputy-speaker-3798242

83

Crisis Group, “CrisisWatch Digest: Somali,” November 2022.

17

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

continues to attempt to support the government’s struggle against Al Shabab through the deployment of ATMIS, which is focused on degrading the capacity of Al Shabab while at the same time developing the capacity of the Somali security forces to take over security responsibilities by December 2024.84 In addition, the humanitarian outlook remains dire, with 6.7 million Somalis facing food as a result of drought and ongoing conflict.85 Meanwhile, in Somaliland, political tensions are increasing as presidential and party elections that were supposed to be held in November and December 2022 have been delayed, and tensions over the calendar have already sparked mass protests which claimed five lives.86 In comparison to Somalia, Somaliland has made less progress in relation to women’s representation. There are currently no female MPs in Somaliland.

The upper house of parliament, known as the Guurti, is not elected but rather selected through clan processes. Women are not allowed to become members.87 However, some women have challenged this exclusion, with for example Dr Edna Adnan serving as Foreign Minister from 2003-2006.88

Gender norms and gender roles Somali society is dominated by a patriarchal system, with a culture based on a fusion of traditional practices and norms with Islamic beliefs. As an integral part of Somali culture, both in Somalia and Somaliland clans serve as a point of affinity and an expression of identity among both men and women. The patrilineal clan-based system is dominated by five major clan families. In the clan system, women’s roles are prescribed in terms of social and personal dependence on men.

The clan system incorporates customary norms called xeer, i.e., a code of conduct consisting of rules, rights and responsibilities developed between male clan members to mediate peaceful relations between competing clan and sub-clan groups, as well

Image from https://www.freepik.com

as to regulate inter-clan and intra-clan interactions.89 Xeer operates as a part of the national legal system interacting with sharia and statutory law. Xeer focuses on maintaining clan relationships and remains the main mechanism for the settlement of clan disputes, serving as a “collective security and social insurance”.

However, it prioritises group relations over maintaining individual rights. Main principles include: •

Segregation of the sexes and gender stratification: while there is no hierarchy of political power within the clan structure, there is a differentiation along gender and age lines, with women subjugated to men and young to old. Women are traditionally relegated to the private sphere and have no access to decision-making positions.90 By excluding women from decision-making, these systems help to maintain male privilege over women, cementing hegemonic masculinity in ‘traditions’ to be defended in addition to restricting women’s freedoms,

84

AU Peace and Security Council, Communique of the 1068th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 8 March 2022, https://atmis-au.org/ wp-content/uploads/2022/04/communique-for-the-1068th-meeting-on-atmis-mandate-8-march-2022.pdf

85 86

Crisis Group, “CrisisWatch Digest: Somali,” November 2022.

Crisis Group, “Overcoming Somaliland’s Worsening Political Crisis,” 10 November 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ somalia/overcoming-somalilands-worsening-political-crisis SIHA, “Reflection on Gender Equality Agenda in Somaliland,” November 2020.

SIHA, “Reflection on Gender Equality Agenda in Somaliland,” November 2020.

Ibrahim Bangura, “Trapped in Violence and Uncertainty: Patriarchy, Women, and the Conflict in Somalia,” African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review 11, no. 1 (2021): 80–103.); Fowsia Abdulkadir and Rahma Abdulkadir, “The Effects of Indigenous Patriarchal Systems on Women’s Participation in Public Decision-Making in Conflict Settings: The Case of Somalia,” in Rethinking Transitional Gender Justice (Springer, 2019), 257–72.

Judith Gardner and Amina Mohamoud Warsame, “CH. 7 - Women, Clan Identity and Peace-Building,” in Somalia-the Untold Story: The War through the Eyes of Somali Women, by Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra (CIIR, 2004).

87 88 89

90

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

•

Diya: contractual alliance amongst the male members of a ‘diya-paying group’ to collectively receive or pay blood compensation (diya) for homicide, injury or theft committed by or to members of the diya-paying group – women are not regarded as paying or receiving members, the amount to be paid or received is divided by the number of men in the group, however compensation to/from a group is foreseen for such crimes as homicide, physical injury, theft and sexual violence against women and girls,91 although sometimes with lower levels of compensation or punishments than when committed against men.

•

Guardianship: Because women are not part of the diya paying group, they are considered to be of lesser value than men. The xeer system does not treat women as independent but rather always as under the jurisdiction of male guardians and represented by them in legal proceedings.92

•

Insufficient attention to gender-based violence: the xeer system reportedly often does not take crimes against women, in particular domestic violence seriously. Unless it results in permanent damage, domestic violence is widely normalized. In addition, cases of sexual violence are sometimes resolved through marriage.93 In some areas these customs even support FGM/C practices, although the latter contradict Sharia rules.94

•

Code of conduct during wartime: the code stipulates rules of engagement on the treatment of prisoners and wounded combatants, as well as the immunity of certain vulnerable groups called birmagaydo which are the groups that shouldn’t be harmed such as guests, minorities, the elderly, women, children, in-laws and refugees.95 While protecting those within the clan, it puts great danger on those living outside one’s own clan.96

•

Although, xeer is problematic in many ways, it is not a monolith and there are important between clans and regionally. In addition, it is not static, and there have been efforts at reform. With support from the Danish Refugee Council, elders in Somaliland initiated a process of dialogue that culminated in a series of declarations, that have created positive change in customary justice.97

•

Islam also plays a strong role in Somali society, and therefore in defining the roles and status of women.

However, like xeer, Islam evolves and changes. In Somalia, it is important to note that in part increasing religious conservatism was a reaction to the Barre regime’s repression, some of which was directed at opponents of women’s right initiatives it undertook.98 Traditionally, the dominant form of Islam in Somalia was sufism, but Sufism has been weakened by the increasing influence of Salafist and Wahhabi movements. In part, the rise of these movements is associated with increased Saudi influence through financing Islamic schools and migration of Somalis to Saudi Arabia. Salafi and Wahhabi sects reject the teaching of later Islamic leaders considered to have veered too far from the original teachings of Mohammed. In Somalia, this has found expression in the destruction and desecration of important Sufi scholars.99 Such movements have also been increased by the instability of war. This increasing conservatism has hardened attitudes about women’s roles.

Women traditionally are the primary caretakers for children and elders, and while in nomadic households 91 92 93

Gardner and Mohamoud Warsame, 2004.

USAID, Expanding Access to Justice, Pact and the ABA Rule of Law Initiative, “Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Analysis,” 2019, https:// www.pactworld.org/EAJ%20GESI Ibid.

94 95 96

European Asylum Support Office (EASO), 2021.

Gaas Husien Mohamed, Order in chaos: Understanding Governance in Somalia, 2018.

Gardner and Mohamoud Warsame, 2004; Abdulkadir and Abdulkadir, 2019.

97

United Nations, UN Women, UNDP, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “A Practioner’s Toolkit on Women’s Access to

Justice Programming,” 2018, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/WA2J_Consolidated.pdf 98 99

Horst 2017.

Abdurahman Abdullahi, “The Conception of Islam in Somalia: Consensus and Controversy,”

19

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

they traditionally care for livestock by herding, feeding, milking, and collecting water and wood, in agricultural areas, women work both in the fields and take care of farm animals. The massive displacement of the civilian population since the Civil War has forced men and women into new roles and responsibilities, including taking on a wider range of work, businesses within the local economy and becoming breadwinners in their households.100 As a result of current environmental factors, drought has hit Somalia regions. Around three million are currently displaced because of both war and drought.101 The unemployment rate has increased, and women breadwinners have started to sell their belongings such as gold and livestock to meet their families’ needs. This situation has also increased GBV.102 Currently, Somalia ranks fourth lowest globally for gender equality.103

Intersectionality, conflict and conflict resolution The Somali conflict is caused by a variety of factors, including political, economic, colonial, and oppressive influences, as well as the availability of weapons, and contestation for power between clan-based militias,104 underpinned by – and as a reaction to – the Somali militarist state. An estimated 350,000 to 1,000,000 lives have already been lost. Despite a variety of conflict resolution and stabilisation measures in Somalia, hostilities have continued.105 Women have been and continue to be victims of discrimination and SGVB including rape, murder, poverty, and a variety of other abuses. In the anarchy of the conflict, the already weak support provided by clans to women has been further curtailed. Displaced women are particularly vulnerable to violence and attacks.106 Women have also been excluded from involvement in most formal negotiations and from substantial representation in political forums, according to women interviewed in the FGDs and KIIs conducted as part of this GCA.

Key actor and power analysis The situation in Somalia is changing rapidly, making it nearly impossible to profile all the powerbrokers. In the diffuse power structure of Somalia few actors have the power to guarantee outcome, although some exercise ‘veto power’. The high levels of clan distrust, the ease with which clan alliances dissolve, the easy availability of small weaponry and governments’ relatively limited power to hold actors accountable are all spoiler factors.107 Political instability at the centre, regional competition and conflict with Al-Shabaab all play a role in the country’s conflict dynamics.108 Key actors include: •

Clans: Somalis are divided into various clans on the basis of ancestry. There are four or five primary patrilineal clan families of nomadic pastoralist (Darood, Dir/Isaaq (some argue that the Isaaq are a separate clan family whereas others argue that they are a sub-group of the Dir), Hawiye) and agropastoral ancestry (Rahanweyn, also known as Digil-Mirifle). These clan families are then split into multiple

100 UNINSTRAW, “Women, Peace, and Security in Somalia: Implementations of UN Security Council Resolution 1325,” Background Paper, August 2008.

101 102 103 104 105 106

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Country Profile Somalia,” 2022, available at https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/ somalia#displacement-data Reliefweb, Child protection and GBV rapid assessment, 2022.

“Somalia: Funding for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls in Humanitarian Programming,” United Nations Population Fund.

Lucas Mahlasela Makhubela, “Conflict Resolution in Somalia: Learning from Failed Mediation Processes” (PhD Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2010).

Abas Ali Samia, “United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Somalia” (PhD Thesis, Kampala International University, 2019); Hussein Mohamed Adam, From Tyranny to Anarchy: The Somali Experience (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2008; Bangura, 2021.

Gardner and El Bushra, 2004; Bangura, 2021; UNINSTRAW, 2008.

107 Evie Browne and Jonathan Fisher, “Key Actors Mapping: Somalia,” Birmingham: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2013.

108 European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Somalia Actors: Country of Origin Information Report. (LU: Publications Office, 2021).

20

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

divisions and sub-clans, which can have their own conflicts and build alliances. All four are present in parts of Somalia, and the Darood are prevalent in Somali areas of Kenya and Ethiopia.109 In Somaliland, the Dir/Isaaq are the dominant group, divided into a number of sub-clans, and other minority groups like as the Gaboye.

•

Minority clans face severe discrimination in both Somalia and Somaliland, including hate speech, exclusion from employment and access to justice, with restrictions on inter-marriage.

•

In Somalia, the political system has attempted to contain clan competition through the 4.5 system which apportions parliamentary seats among the four major clans and minority clans with the minorities together getting half as many seats as the major clans. Some have presented this as an advance in ensuring representation of minority clans, but others have criticized it. One critique is that the system, by treating all minorities as a single group for political purposes, fails to recognize their diversity and seeks to freeze them in minority status.110 Others say the system inadequately representing the “minority” clans, who some argue may account for up to one-third of the Somali population.111 Others point out that by linking political power to clan identity, the system actually reinforced clan power and undermines the ability to build consensus across clan lines.112 Clan leadership structures are extremely influential in politics and tend to exert a limiting influence on women’s engagement as these structures are male-dominate and maintain male guardianship and control.

•

In Somaliland, clan representation includes the members of the dominant groups (Dir clan – Gadabursi, Issa or Ciise- and members the Isaaq clan) and members of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans of the Darood/Harti family, as well as other minority groups, such as the Gaboye.113

•

The Federal Government of Somalia is the internationally recognized government of Somalia. Based in Mogadishu, it has very limited reach and is heavily reliant on international support {from the UN, European Union (EU), United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), among others}.

•

Regional state governments: from South to North, Somalia’s Federal Member States are Jubbaland, South-West, Benadir (Mogadishu), Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and Puntland. Frequently, Federal Member States compete among themselves for political authority, legitimacy, resources, territory control, and monopoly on the use of force.114 The government of Puntland exercises a high degree of autonomy.

•

The government of Somaliland: exercises de facto control over its territory and plays a key role in determining many laws and policies that affect women in Somaliland.

•

Al-Shabaab: The Somali Federal Government is involved in a non-international armed conflict with AlShabaab, which is recognized as a terrorist organisation by the UK and the US. Al-Shabaab controls tracts of rural central, southern, and western Somalia and exerts influence nationwide, and seeks to overthrow the government and establish an Islamist state adhering to strict Salafi interpretations of Sharia. These conservative forces significantly limit the scope for women’s participation by insisting on strictly controlled gender relations and male guardianship over women.115 Women at various levels of activism have been persecuted by Al-Shabaab. On the other hand, some women engaged with the

109 110 111 112 113 114 115

Austrian Red Cross, ACCORD, “Clans in Somalia,” 15 May 2009, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b29f5e82.pdf Minority Rights, Somalia: Overview, 2018, available at https://minorityrights.org/country/somalia/ Menkhaus, 2017.

A. Jama, “The 4.5 Formula,” Medium, 7 March 2018, https://ajamarabi.medium.com/the-4-5-formula-6f0820646cc5 European Asylum Support Office (EASO), 2021.

Ibid.

SIHA, “Reflection on Gender Equality Agenda in Somaliland,” November 2020.

21

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

group have emphasised the relative freedoms that they experience to engage in business and travel.116 Politics are also influenced by the presence of warlords.117 •

Islamic State: Islamic State has also established a presence in Somalia, focusing particularly on northern Somalia and exploiting clan grievances to establish a foothold.118 This presence has helped to motivate US engagement in Somalia, as evidenced by the recent killing of an IS leader by US forces.119

•

International and regional organisations: a considerable number of international NGOs, including UN agencies, focus their resources primarily on conflict resolution and prevention. ATIMS aims to support the Federal Government of Somalia against Al-Shabaab. IGAD played a crucial role in the promotion of peace with the Mbagathi Accords of 2004.120 In addition the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia has sought to strengthen women’s participation, including through technical and logistical support and advocacy, among other things in favour of a quota for women’s participation.121 It is worth noting that although international organizations and donors also have influence in Somaliland, the fact that the country is not internationally recognised curbs some types of international engagement, such as reporting to international mechanisms like treaty review mechanisms.

Conflict resolution, human rights, and governance mechanisms at local and national level •

Although conflict remains rampant in Somalia, there are also a number of mechanisms in place to manage and address it. One mechanism is local clan elders, who may mediate disputes using the traditional xeer customs. However, their authority has reportedly been waning over time as youth increasingly find other influences. Other observers argue that the system is still relatively effective, although to varying degrees depending on the location and issue at hand.122 In Somaliland, elders play an official role in government through the upper house of parliament (called Guurti) is the House of Elders, whose members are selected through a clan-based nomination process and, in practice, hold their seats until they retire or die in which his son will inherit the position in the passing of his father.

Women, Peace and Security actors A great number of grassroots women’s and umbrella organisations have been created since 1991 to promote women’s rights through advocacy initiatives and mobilisation– examples in Somalia include the Women Pioneers for Peace and Life (also known as HINNA) and Somali Women Agenda (SWA) officially launched in 2007; in Somaliland, they include the NAGAAD Network, VOSOMWO and various associations organising “beyond the bounds of the conventional NGO format” – some of whom to avoid thinking of other women as “beneficiaries.” Professional associations, such as the Midwifery Leadership and Development in Somaliland Association, play an important role.123 It is also important to underline that throughout history, grassroots movements of women have played a role in promoting both peace and war by pressuring male clan representatives, petitioning politicians, giving logistical and financial support for peace talks, and through song and poetry (buraanbur), prayers for 116

“Khadija” and Stephen Harley, “Women in Al-Shabaab,” in Michael Keating and Matt Waldman, War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, 2018.

117 European Asylum Support Office (EASO), 2021.; Browne and Fisher, 2013; Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, “From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention and the ‘War on Terror’ Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia,” Third World Quarterly 39, no. 11 (November 2, 2018): 2033–52.

118 International Crisis Group, “The Islamic State Threat in Somalia’s Puntland State,” 17 November 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/ horn-africa/somalia/islamic-state-threat-somalias-puntland-state 119

AFP, “US military raid kills key Islamic State regiona leader in Somalia, officials say,” 26 January 2023.

Menkhaus, 2017 and Samia, 2019.

United Nations, “United Nations - WPS in Africa,” https://www.un.org/shestandsforpeace/sites/www.un.org.shestandsforpeace/files/final_ wps_in_africa_map_0.pdf 122 LandInfo, “Somalia: Protection and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms,” 2011, https://landinfo.no/asset/1796/1/1796_1.pdf 123 SIHA, “Reflection on Gender Equality Agenda in Somaliland,” November 2020.

120 121

22

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

peace (allabari); at times also through the threat of violence.124 Women in Somaliland have protested to call for peace and taken on increasing roles in community policing and are carrying out awareness raising and advocacy.125 An additional factor in the women’s movement is the continued engagement of the diaspora. Women in the diaspora are both organising transnationally and returning in increasing numbers to both Somalia and Somaliland, bringing new views and values regarding women’s roles. These women bring both unique organising potential and unique vulnerabilities in being criticised as foreign or Western.126 At the governmental level, there are several laws and policies that can be useful as anchors for pushing the women, peace, and security agenda. The Somali Provisional Federal Constitution 2012 provides for women’s rights and specifically for women’s right to participate at all levels of government. The ongoing constitutional review may also be a useful point of entry for the WPS agenda. The National Gender Policy 2016 and the National Action Plan on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict 2014 are also useful frameworks.

In 2019, an alliance led by the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development (MoWHRD) brought together 350 women, gender champions from across Somalia and the diaspora in Mogadishu, representing local and national government, parliament, civil society, the private sector, and the religious sphere. They compiled the Somali Women’s Charter, which articulates demands for women’s rights in peacebuilding and state-building process as well as empowering women in government, parliament, civil society, the private sector, and the media.127 The Charter makes demands around the key pillars of the WPS agenda, including: •

Participation – stating that full inclusion is the foundation of effective governance, and a 50/50 split of gender participation should be pursued.

•

Protection – calling for zero tolerance of GBV, justice for all, and commitment to gender equality.

•

Prevention – advocating for action in to prevent violence including GBV; and

•

Relief and Recovery – stating that women’s economic empowerment must be prioritised, and women should be placed at the centre of transitional justice.

Since its adoption, there have been efforts to create action plans for its implementation at the level of the Federal Member States.128 The MoWHRD also led Somalia’s efforts to develop a National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2021, supported by the government of Sweden and UN Women.129 Activists say that the process was a difficult one, there were minimal consultations in the early part of the process which was described as top-down. However, the final product was seen as positive and a good basis for future outreach, particularly with the security sector.130 Despite this progress, significant gaps in the legal framework remain. CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol have not been ratified. In addition, efforts to pass legislation on sexual violence have been fraught. In 2018, a Sexual Offences Bill which was endorsed by the UN was introduced in Somalia, which languished. In 2020 a new bill on Sexual Intercourse Related Crimes was introduced. The 2020 bill, which appears to have been formulated in consultation with religious leaders, allowed for marriage at puberty (as opposed to majority – 124 125 126 127 128 129 130

See Gardner and El Bushra, 2004; SIHA Network, 2020; Bangura, 2021.

Khadra Hassan, “Peace and security – restoring hope in Somalia/Somaliland,” https://www.saferworld.org.uk/en-stories-of-change/peace-andsecurity-restoring-hope-in-somalia-somaliland Cindy Horst, “Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda? Somali Debates on Women’s Public Roles and Political Participation,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 11, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 389–407.

The Somali Women’s Charter and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, 2020.

Somalia National Action Plan for the Implementation the Somali Women’s Charter and UNSCR1325 on women, peace and security, 2021.

Ibid.

Interview with female activist, November 24, 2022.

23

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

in line with international standards) and sanctions marriages without the consent of both parties.131 At the time of writing, neither bill had been adopted, highlighting the difficulty of achieving consensus on these issues. Similar dynamics have played out in Somaliland, where the Rape and Sexual Offences Act was signed into law in 2018, but then the president, facing criticism from religious leaders, allowed the law to be revised in a contested process leaving both old and new legislation in limbo. The new legislation allows for the settlement of sexual violence cases through payment of blood money and also allows guardians to consent on behalf of a minor or mentally ill woman.132 Somali Federal MOWHRD is an important institutional actor for the WPS agenda. The Ministry is mandated to support women’s empowerment, protection and advancement through research and supporting the development of law and policy. It is also mandated to lead the implementation of the 1325 Action Plan, in collaboration with the Ad Hoc Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee (IMCC). There is also a National Steering Technical Committee chaired be the MoWHRD, responsible, among other things, for resource allocation related to the NAP.133 In 2021, a new Women, Peace and Protection Joint Programme was launched with participation from the UN, civil society and the Somali government. The programme aims to facilitate women’s meaningful participation in peacebuilding processes in Somalia and to accelerate the implementation of the WPS agenda. It is funded through the peacebuilding facility, but its impact is yet to be assessed.134 In Somaliland, on the law and policy level, the Somaliland Constitution guarantees women’s rights, although women were excluded from the drafting process. Somaliland has a national Gender Policy and National Gender Action Plan, that may be leveraged to promote implementation of the WPS agenda.135 There is no National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325.

At the institutional level, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) includes a ten-person Gender Unit, which is an important point of engagement for women’s rights issues in the government.136 President Muse Bihi Abdi proposed that political parties ensure that women represented 30% of all their candidates. However, these proposals were ultimately not included in the 2020 Electoral Law. Women then promoted a commitment by parties to include at least six female candidates in their lists. Sadly, two of the three political parties did not meet even this voluntary commitment. Women who did contest were disadvantaged by lack of funding and ideological attacks, and as a result, Somaliland ended up with no female members of parliament following the 2021 elections.137 There remain overall severe obstacles to implementing WPS in both Somalia and Somaliland. The widespread social and physical destruction caused by the civil war has deeply impacted communities.

Clan divisions created disruptions to family networks of support and to the solidarity amongst women at the organisational and individual levels. In both countries, religious ideas are manipulated to limit debate and engagement. Human rights defenders have faced attack as complicit with Western ideologies that are accused of being colonialist in intention. Women’s rights are particularly accused, at times, of being 131 132 133 134 135 136 137

24

Nita Bhalla, Mohammed Omer, “Outrage as Somali parliament draft law permitting child, forced marriages,” Reuters, 11 August 2020, reuters. com/article/us-somalia-women-rights/outrage-as-somali-parliament-drafts-law-permitting-child-forced-marriages-idUSKCN257200 Yousif Timcade, “Religious backlash threatened Somaliland’s progressive rape law,” Open Democracy, 19 August 2022, https://www. opendemocracy.net/en/5050/somaliland-rape-law-backlash/ Somalia National Action Plan for the Implementation the Somali Women’s Charter and UNSCR1325 on women, peace and security, 2021.

United Nations, “UN in Somalia and Government Representatives Launch a New Joint Programme on Empowering Women,” 30 November 2021, https://somalia.un.org/en/161105-un-somalia-and-government-representatives-launch-new-joint-programme-empowering-women Michael Wells, Marie-Luise Schueller and Amina-Bahja Ekman, “Political Settlement in Somaliland: A gendered perspective,” March 2017, https://www.progressio.org.uk/sites/progressio.org.uk/files/gender_in_somaliland_single_page_2017_03_22_final.pdf Ibid.

Conrad Heine, “How did Somaliland end up with zzero female MPs?” African Arguments, 10 January 2022, https://africanarguments. org/2022/01/how-did-somaliland-end-up-with-zero-female-mps/

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

“Western” and “un-Islamic,” which undermines their capacity to advocate.138 The lack of financial resources for women’s organisations is another obstacle to action. There has also been some incorporation of a small, elite set of women in decision-making, which has undermined the development of a more truly inclusive women’s movement.

Public support for Women, Peace and Security Although there is grassroots activism by women and other activists for women’s inclusion in peace processes, these activists are working against a strongly patriarchal framework reinforced by both xeer and Islamic – and especially Wahhabi -- traditions. Participation of women in decision-making processes is limited, FGM/C and SGBV continue to be normalised despite the zero-tolerance policy embraced in the women’s charter, while politicians promoting women’s rights have not been taken seriously.139 Overall, a crucial source of pressure for change can come from the diaspora, since there is potential for harnessing resources, beliefs, values, and attitudes from diaspora communities for promoting women’s role in the public sphere in Somalia and Somaliland.140

Conclusion The women, peace, and security movement in Somalia, as elsewhere in the region, faces both challenges and opportunities. On the side of opportunities, there are strong women’s organisations in both Somalia and Somaliland who can be leveraged for advocacy. There is also a strong diaspora that can be leveraged to support peace, security and development objectives and who often have more progressive views on the roles and capacities of women than their national counterparts. In addition, there are elements of tradition that have allowed for women’s engagement in peace and security issues through song, poetry (buraanbur) and prayers for peace (allabari), that can be leveraged to increase support for women’s activism.

Challenges that need to be addressed are the overall difficult peace and security issues and the incapacity of the government and their international partners to ensure a base level of security within which women would be able to freely engage and advocate. In addition, although there are strong women’s organizations, few are specialised on peace and security issues. In addition, women face widespread social opposition to their activism for greater inclusion, facilitated and strengthened by conservative religious doctrines. In seeking inclusion in formal state processes, they confront not only this opposition but also the reality that these state structures are weak and have limited capacity to effect change.

Recommendations •

Involve male clan members and clan elders in any processes (and especially in awareness sessions) that promote women inclusion and WPS as they are currently the ones actively denying women roles in local-level peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

•

Build on the most powerful existing networks for the promotion of WPS. In the case of Somalia and Somaliland, these networks are likely professional networks and cooperatives. Train activists to ensure that they have appropriate expertise on women, peace, and security.

•

Actively involve diaspora movement in networks and promotion of WPS.

•

Promote the WPS agenda among all actors working on women’s empowerment, women’s equality and women’s participation in Somalia and Somaliland.

138 139 140

SIHA, “Reflection on Gender Equality Agenda in Somaliland,” November 2020.

Bangura, 2021; SIHA Network, 2020; Gardner and Mohamoud Warsame, 2004.

Abdulkadir and Abdulkadir, 2019.

25

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

•

Widen existing activist networks to build support to break the deadlock in the adoption of progressive law on SGBV in both Somalia and Somaliland, to more effectively protect women.

•

Promote revision of family law, which has a tremendous impact on women’s lives and capacity to engage on WPS issues.

•

Invest in women candidates and reduce financial barriers to running to help women overcome financial disadvantages.

•

Expand and strengthen the women’s rights movement in order to build their capacity to engage in the WPS agenda.

•

Encourage dialogue between the women’s and youth movements to engage youth in your developments.

•

Increase awareness raising on the women, peace and security agenda.

26

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

SOUTH SUDAN

SOUTH SUDAN

27

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

Historical context Before its independence from Sudan in 2011, South Sudan was entrenched in successive civil wars for more than 40 years. In the 1950s, separatist groups began the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972). In 1983, a second civil war broke out, instigated by what would become the main armed force of South Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

The North/South civil war opened clear fractures in the country, including between ethnically aligned factions of the SPLM/A and its consequences remain important. It has led to the displacement of more than 4.5 million people, and the death of 2.5 million. It also prevented the development of basic infrastructure, human capital and institutions while feeding political, ethnic and regional polarisation.141 South Sudan is home to more than 60 ethnic groups, the most numerous of which are the Dinka and the Nuer. Most tribes are further divided into sub-tribes and bloodlines. The latter share communal lands, essential for farming and animal husbandry, on which the majority of the population relies. They are sources of competition and inter-communal conflicts: access to these resources is often tied to ethnicity and political power, which can cause instability.142 South Sudanese women participated in the conflict, the Naivasha peace process, and negotiations leading up to the 2011 secession. The SPLM/A under John Garang made a conscientious effort to promote women in the organization. They were represented on the negotiation team, participated in drafting the peace agreement, and are still active in contributing to peace-building efforts at the grassroots level.143 For example, when the SPLM/A went through a bitter split, women from communities on opposite sides of the split in the then-Jonglei State continued to visit each other and maintain communication, providing a forum for discussion and building mutual understanding.144 Women also held central roles within their households, influencing their male counterparts, and organising protests against the war “crying out the need for peace” in public spaces or using theatre and radio programs to convey their message.145 The second civil war ended officially in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan. Although this agreement committed to a wide range of transitional reforms, it was ultimately reduced to the referendum on South Sudan’s independence.146 Although women were present at negotiations for the peace agreement, their capacity to influence the output. They were often tapped at short notice and had limited time to coordinate with one another. In the minority and with little space for planning they were unable to create a gender sensitive agreement.147 An interviewee explained to Search for Common Ground that: “as a woman I would ensure that my house is in order before I can leave home, and this affects us from attending local and national level peace efforts”.148 This contributed to the outcome that there were no provisions for accountability for war crimes, including sexual and gender-based violence, in that agreement, nor for women’s representation in the Joint National Transition Team (JNTT). Although the agreement committed the government to promote women’s equal access to political rights, women garnered few posts in the new government.

A study estimates that women made up 7% of the official forces of the SPLA. They were included in postwar Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. Women soldiers faced particular 141 142 143 144 145

SSOAR, “Comprehensive analysis of South Sudan conflict: determinants and repercussions”, 2020.

Institute for Peace and Security Studies, op.cit.

Key Informant Interview, South Sudan, Ministry of Gender, The Research Team, 2022 Ibid.

Focus Group Discussion with Women Activists in Wau, The Research Team, 2022 & Key Informant Interview, South Sudan Women Union, The Research Team, 2022.

146 Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, “South Sudan Conflict Insight”, 2018.

147

Anne Itto, “Guests at the table? The role of women in peace processes,” Conciliation Resources, Accord, Issue 18, 2006, https://rc-servicesassets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Peace_by_piece_Addressing_Sudans_conflicts_Accord_Issue_18.pdf

148

Search For Common Ground, op.cit.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

difficulties returning to their communities, because of gender-specific stigmas. However, this engagement in the war paved the way for the official recognition of Women as wartime heroes, women’s political engagement and the establishment of the Ministry of Gender.149 In December 2013, political tensions among South Sudanese leaders exploded into violence, creating a split in the governing SPLM/A party between forces loyal to the incumbent president Salva Kiir and the then Vice President Riek Machar, who went on to create the SPLM/IO – (SPLM In-Opposition). The conflict caused heavy casualties, mass displacement and a major humanitarian crisis. In 2015, a peace treaty negotiated under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD) was signed.150 But the cessation of hostilities did not last long, and episodic violence kept erupting as the country remained unstable. In 2018, a revitalised peace agreement was negotiated under the auspices of Uganda President Yoweri Museveni and Sudanese President Omar El Bashir. The process was not inclusive, and although the 2018 agreement did include some progressive provisions (including a 35% quota for women’s participation), this weakened the framework for its implementation.151 Implementation of the agreement has been delayed and a coalition government was only formed on 22 February 2020. Tensions, however, have continued and the situation remains tense. Women’s participation was limited by the structure of the peace talks, and women have not been well represented in the transitional arrangements.152

Current contextual analysis The conflict in South Sudan persists, and issues such as lack of accountability, human rights violations, and mismanagement of the economy have not been resolved. The parties failed to demilitarise the capital Juba and army officials retain important powers.153 The government did not recover full monopoly over the use of force across the country, is unable to provide basic services to the citizens and cannot guarantee their security. Illegal detentions, restriction of media freedom and suppression of critics continue. Targeted attacks on civilians, gender-based violence including rape, burning of homes and livestock, murder and kidnapping remain widespread. UNOCHA indicates that as of November 2022, 8.9 million people, more than three-quarters of the population, are in need of humanitarian assistance and 1 in 3 people is displaced, either internally or across an international border as a refugee.154 Local conflicts remain important and increase the risk of gender-based violence. At the centre of violence currently observed are the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, cattle raiding and land conflicts (such as in Abyei155). At times, cattle raiding is justified as a mechanism to pay for high dowries.156 Fighting is often aligned on ethnic and tribal lines. Sexual violence is used as a weapon of war both by rebel and government forces and informal militias. The current climate of insecurity and economic crisis reinforces and exacerbates practices and behaviours devaluing women and youth. The lack of livelihood opportunities and food shortages have led to an increase in the commodification of women’s bodies, particularly via the practices of bride wealth and survival sex.157 149 150 151 152 153 154

155 156 157

JICA, op.cit.

Israel Nyaburi Nyadera, “South Sudan conflict from 2013 to 2018: Rethinking the causes, situation and solutions”, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol.18:2, 2018.

Eli Stamnes and Cedric de Coning, “The Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflice in the Republic of South Sudan,” PRIO, 4 May 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/revitalised-agreement-resolution-conflict-republic-south-sudan-r-arcss Sabala Kizito, “South Sudan’s 2015 Peace Agreement and Women’s Participation”, 2017.

SSOAR, op.cit.

UNOCHA, “South Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot,” November 2022, https://reliefweb.int/attachments/c2e25f18-7125-4dc88794-0584c4aedf0a/South%20Sudan%20-%20Humanitarian%20Snapshot%20%28November%202022%29.pdf?_gl=1*cxgqkn*_ ga*NTA3MDc2NTEuMTY3MjE2MjA3NA..*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTY3MjE2MjA3NC4xLjAuMTY3MjE2MjA3Ny41Ny4wLjA. Key Informant Interview, South Sudan Women Empowerment Network, The Research Team, 2022 Accord, CCR and DCA, “Conflict and Gender Study – South Sudan Addressing Root Causes Programme”, 2018. 99 Focus Group Discussion with Women Activists in Wau, The Research Team, 2022.

SIHA Network, “Caught in the Middle. Gender Inequality and Rampant SGBV in Wau, South Sudan”, 2019.

29

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

Gender norms and gender roles The

South

Sudanese

Constitution

guarantees equality between men and women before the law and forbids discrimination.

The

Constitution

also provides for affirmative action for women, calling for at least 25% representation executive

in

legislative

and

organs.

However,

the

158

Constitution also acknowledges the authority of customary law, which often reinforces

traditional

and

religious

imbalances in the power and status of women.159 Customary legal frameworks uphold unequal treatment of women in marriage arrangements. For example, early marriage is widespread, affecting 52% of girls in 2010 and possibly as many as 71% by 2019.160 These marriages are perpetuated by the far more powerful interests of male family members,

Image from https://www.freepik.com

poverty and armed conflict. Women who marry early often endure a power imbalance at home and adolescent pregnancy which risks their health.161 SGBV is normalised across the country: in 2009, 41% of the respondents to a poll by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) had personally experienced SGBV in the past year.162 Domestic violence is viewed as a normal mechanism of managing household disputes and ensuring compliance.163 Marital rape is not recognised as a crime in the country, and while the penal code criminalizes various forms of SGBV, incidents of violence are rarely reported because of the stigma facing survivors of sexual violence and impunity (a married woman complaining of rape can be prosecuted for adultery).164 Displaced women are also especially vulnerable to SGBV, often during their trips to find firewood, water or casual labour, having a detrimental effect on their mobility and independence.165 Traditional norms and values hinder women’s empowerment. Gendered power dynamics are persistent: both men and women tend to perceive women as belonging in the home, as naturally infantile, disobedient and in need of being disciplined.166 In agriculture, which provides 78% of the country’s employment, women play an important role, but their access to land is limited as customary law does not recognise women’s rights to land ownership and inheritance. There is large gender gap in literacy, 40% of men, as compared to

158

UN Women, “Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan 2011, as amended to 2020,” available at https://constitutions.unwomen. org/en/countries/africa/south-sudan 159 JICA, “Country Gender Profile, Republic of South Sudan”, 2017.

160 Girls not Brides, “South Sudan,” https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/learning-resources/child-marriage-atlas/atlas/south-sudan/#:~:text=Legal%20 age%20of%20marriage%20%2D%2018%20years%2C%20no%20exceptions,-What’s%20the%20prevalence&text=The%20most%20recent%20available%20data,prevalence%20of%20child%20marriage%20globally.

161 Edward, Jane Kani (The SUDD Institute), “A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan”, 2014.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

29% of women are literate.167 Poor and expensive education remains a core barrier to women’s development and emancipation in South Sudan, despite their increased presence in higher education.168 The burden of reproductive and unpaid care activities has increased for women as a result of the conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there is a noticeable shift in the gendered division of labour, with more women actively engaging in petty trade and construction.

Despite the disadvantages cited above, South Sudanese women have increased their role in governance.

Intersectionality, conflict and conflict resolution In conflict, women and vulnerable groups are disproportionately impacted. In South Sudan, the humanitarian crisis is ongoing. Pregnant women and children under five are particularly vulnerable to a lack of food.169 Displaced women are particularly vulnerable to SGBV, in part due to insufficient shelter, which can lack privacy and basic security such as locks.170 Overall, war has exacerbated the root causes of women’s and minority groups’ exclusion from politics and public life, as well as their disproportionate experience of SGBV. There has been a rapid escalation of rape, early pregnancy and school dropout impacting a whole generation.171 Women are not only victims, but they are also participants in the conflicts. During the civil wars, women fought with the SPLM/A. Most of them took on non-fighting roles, and provided soldiers with food, shelter, and water, or worked in cooperatives and women’s groups to act as messengers, cooks, carriers, and nurses.

At the local level, customs and traditions still determine the participation of both women and men in the conflict.172

Key actor and power analysis On conflict management and gender, local customary leaders hold a central role in South Sudan. Their role is complex to characterise as there are many ethnic groups in Sudan and each has its own customs and practices related to conflict mediation; this includes different ways of designating mediators who can be vested with different roles, including judges, representatives, chiefs, or elders. Although processes vary, most practices tend to side-line women. Women’s roles are often overlooked. Local dispute resolution mechanisms often disregard national and state-level legal provisions, as the central state lacks the means to enforce its authority over local leaders. Yet, at the local level, gang and small-scale armed groups, including cattle-rustlers, play an important and disruptive role in insecurity and inter-clan conflicts. Increasingly, they undermine traditional leaders’ authority.173 At the national level, political fragmentation tends to favour certain tribes, marginalising representatives of other tribes.174 During the civil war, the church played a central role in both conflict resolution and the women’s movement in South Sudan.175 It figured prominently in the liberation struggles in South Sudan, and included women in peace-building efforts, such as in the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC). Yet, the church’s structural basis and organisational features were deeply embedded in local communities and replicated patriarchal 167 168 169 170 171

World Bank, “Literacy rate, adult male,” and “Literacy rate, adult female,” 2018, available https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR. MA.ZS?locations=SS Focus Group Discussion with Women Activists in Wau, The Research Team, 2022.

Focus Group Discussion with Women Activists in Wau, The Research Team, 2022 Oxfam, “Joint Agency consolidated gender analysis. Gender analysis South Sudan”, 2017.

Focus Group Discussion with Women Activists in Wau, The Research Team, 2022; Key Informant Interview, South Sudan Women Union, The Research Team, 2022.

Key Informant Interview, South Sudan, Ministry of Gender, The Research Team, 2022.

Wassara, Dr. Samson S., “Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution”, Berghof Foundation, March 2007.

Focus Group Discussion with Women Activists in Wau, The Research Team, 2022 & Key Informant Interview, South Sudan Women Union, The Research Team, 2022 175 Key Informant Interview, South Sudan, Ministry of Gender, The Research Team, 2022.

172 173 174

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

structures, reinforced by the conservative nature of the church. Their influence nonetheless allowed South Sudanese women to form civil society groups. An ambivalent actor, it is still recognised as key by all parties and has undertaken interfaith cooperation.176 The state remains core to understanding power dynamics in South Sudan. Women are ministers of defence and education and the speaker of the national legislative assembly is also a woman.177 Today, women account for 32% of the National Assembly members, short of the 35% promised by the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS).178 Yet such seats and positions are monopolised by elite women, leaving women at the grassroots underrepresented. Another factor is that most women feel the need to organize towards these quota positions through political parties, which limits their ability to build and maintain connections to the broader women’s movement.179 Women also say that despite increased representation, they struggle to be equally involved in decision-making.180 The 2009 Local Government Act also calls on local authorities to enact affirmative action policies to support women’s engagement, ensuring a minimum of 25% representation.181 There are few women in local government, even fewer than at the national level.182 The government has developed a gender policy. Insufficient understanding and implementation of such policies remain an important challenge, and many other policies are still in draft form.

South Sudan ratified CEDAW in 2014183 and developed a National Action Plan in 2015. The process was led by the Ministry of Gender Child and Social Welfare (MGCSW) and supported by UN Women.184 There was some consultation about the NAP, but the women invited did not have sufficient information and too little time was spent to ensure that the issues were fully understood.185 The NAP calls for the revision of laws and policies that discriminate against women, the enactment of laws that protect women from SGBV to be implemented, and capacity building among other elements.186 The state has incorporated gender issues in the mandate of the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare and adopted a range of progressive policies. More women are now in decision-making roles. An SGBV Bill and Legal Aid Act are currently being pushed in parliament by women lawyers.187 However, these positive policies have been undermined by the impact of state-centric women’s movements, an overall shrinking of civil society space and the militarisation of the political space constraining the possibilities for women’s engagement.188 Unfortunately, women report many reforms have not been properly implemented due to lack of political will. There has been insufficient sensitisation about the contents of the NAP. Although a validation process was recently carried out to assess implementation, this was manipulated by the government which pushed women to reflect positively, regardless of what they thought.189 There was wariness as well about international engagement in the women, peace, and security agenda from 176

John Ashworth and Maura Ryan, “One Nation from Every Tribe, Tongue, and People”: The Church and Strategic Peacebuilding in South Sudan”, 2013.

177 Key Informant Interview, South Sudan Women Empowerment Network, The Research Team, 2022.

178 “South Sudan,” Gender Quotas Database, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/314/35 179 SIHA, The Current State of the Women’s Movement in South Sudan: Analysis,” August 2020.

180

SIHA TOT Training, October 2022.

181

Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions,” 2016.

182 183

Focus Group Discussion with Women Activists in Wau, The Research Team, 2022: SIHA TOT, October 2022.

Key Informant Interview, South Sudan Women Union, The Research Team, 2022

184

Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions,” 2016.

185 186

SIHA TOT Training, October 2022.

Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan National Action Plan 2015-2020 on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions,” http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/SS-NAP-1325.pdf 187 United States Institute of Peace, op.cit.

188 SIHA Network, “The Current State of the Women’s Movement in South Sudan”, 2020.

189 SIHA TOT Training, October 2022.

32

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

states that are not making sufficient effort to ensure that they are controlling arms exports to South Sudan, suggesting that they are not sufficiently committed to peace.190 At the same time, cooperation between the government, international organisations, and the UN on gender and peacebuilding is important and the UN is a primary funder for women’s projects.191 The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has an official mandate to protect civilians, including from sexual and gender-based violence. It includes an office of the gender adviser which is mandated to oversee the implementation of Resolution 1325 and to integrate gender issues mission wide. It offers capacity development and ensures that resources are allocated to the issue.192 However, the mission’s ability to make progress on SGBV is limited by its broad civilian protection mandate, which means that SGBV competes for attention with many other issues. Also, because the perpetrators of SGBV are often within the survivor’s community, UNMISS may need to engage them. Its reach and ability to intervene at the local level remains limited by lack of financial and human resources.193 Armed groups are also key actors in South Sudan, most prominently the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army/ Movement in Opposition (SPLA/M-IO) led by Riek Machar. This movement has been the main opponent of the government in the ongoing civil war. While plagued by some of the same problems as the government’s action, Riek Machar has expressed rhetorical commitment to women’s representation, promising 35% representation in the party194 and the SPLM-IO has created a women’s league, which might be an opening for engagement.195 The Nuer White Army, South Sudan Democratic Movement (SSDM) and smaller rebel groups also play a role.196 The White Army appears to take a more socially conservative view on the participation of women, excluding them from fighting, unlike the SPLM and SPLM-IO. There is less information available about the organization of the SSDM and their views on women’s participation.197 Although there is limited space for civil society in South Sudan, there is organising which plays an important role on peace and security issues. That role is discussed in further detail in the “women, peace and security actors” section below.

Women, Peace and Security Actors Women’s organisations in South Sudan have a long history of social and political activism, within church organisations, civil society or as components of rebel and armed groups. They were able over time to facilitate the emergence of influential women leaders, contributing to the enhancement of gender equality in politics, education, and the economy. Today, some women peace activists engage with the WPS agenda, highlighting the suffering of South Sudanese women, demanding a peace that will hold accountable those who have committed crimes against them. The End Rape campaign led by Crown the Woman, Born to Lead and others openly address the normalisation of violence against women.198 Political issues are at the core of the women’s movement. A quota for women’s participation in parliament is seen by many organisations as central and has prompted mobilisation.199 However, as in other countries, there is debate over whether quotas are the most effective way to advance women’s engagement.

190 191 192 193 194

SIHA TOT Training, October 2022.

Key Informant Interview, South Sudan Women Union, The Research Team, 2022 UNMISS, “Office of the Gender Adviser,” available at https://unmiss.unmissions.org/office-gender-adviser SIHA, 2020, op.cit.

“SPLM-IO promises to reflects women, youth representation in party structure,” Sudans Post, https://www.sudanspost.com/splm-io-promisesto-reflects-women-youth-representation-in-party-structure/ 195 “SPLM-IO Women League elects their chairperson,” Sudan Tribune, 23 Decemebr 2015, https://sudantribune.com/article55848/ RULAC, “Non-international armed conflicts in South Sudan”.

John Young, Popular Struggles and Elite Co-optation: The Nuer White Army in South Sudan’s Civil War,” July 2016, https://smallarmssurvey.org/ sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-WP41-White-Army.pdf 198 SIHA Network, “Women Reclaiming their Agency in Peacemaking”, Project Proposal for Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, April 2021.

199 Key Informant Interview, South Sudan, Ministry of Gender, The Research Team, 2022 196 197

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

There is also a widespread commitment among civil society organisations to document human rights violations, including SGBV, advocate with the state and other relevant institutions, and support transitional justice initiatives. Civil society organizations have also undertaken economic empowerment activities, such as savings and credit schemes (SACCOs), to bridge livelihood gaps for women. Sudanese Women’s Unions, notably in Wau and Juba, as well as the South Sudanese Women Empowerment Network (SSWEN), are other key actors in this struggle.200 WPS actors in South Sudan face difficult conditions. As members of civil society, they are subject to the general narrowing of civil society space in the country. WPS actors are also vulnerable to various types of fragmentation, including rural/urban, ethnic, and generational, especially in the highly divisive environment.

There is a strong exclusionary and elitist tendency within the movement;201 which contributes to insecurity and both this and conflict which reduce access to remote areas. The increasing tendency to advance women’s rights through NGOs has reportedly also narrowed the agenda for the women’s movement in South Sudan. Issues such as, sexual and reproductive health rights and economic empowerment have been side-lined compared to peace and security, due to the difficult funding environment and donor priorities.202 Women face particular challenges conducting advocacy. They are particularly vulnerable to social censure, either directly targeted at them, or indirectly through their families. One female activist reported that her husband was approached by a government official asking him to speak to her because she was too outspoken.203 While some platforms were made available to young people to amplify the voices and issues of women and girls, their reach remains limited. Finally, funding constraints are important, even more as the absence of an inclusive agenda among women divides the former across issues and actors. Many activists also lack information on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and are in need of capacity building to enable them to be successful. 204 The Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare is the key government ministry dealing with gender equality issues and leads on development of policies. However, a signal of the lack of political will around these issues is the reality that it has the lowest budget of any ministry at 1% of the gross domestic product (GDP).205

Conclusion As elsewhere in the region, the context in South Sudan is a complex one for engagement on women, peace, and security issues. On one hand, the government has made a number of efforts to promote women’s rights through legislative change, creation of institutions and adoption of quotas for women’s participation.

Although there are significant weaknesses at the level of implementation, these create frameworks for engagement and bring visibility to the issue. In addition, the prevalence of conflict has sensitised the population to the need for peace and security work and motivating women to seek engagement with peace processes. International actors are quite involved and seek to promote women’s rights and engagement, if imperfectly. Nationally, there are a number of strong civil society organisations who have proven effective in engaging with the government on a range of issue. These are all positive on which new engagement on women, peace and security can build.

On the negative side, civic space is shrinking, and non-state actors are subject to repression, including censorship and persecution.206 Conflict and political polarisation are rife and affect activists as well as 200 201 202 203 204 205 206

34

SIHA Network, 2020, op.cit.

Key Informant Interview, South Sudan Women Empowerment Network, The Research Team, 2022 Ibid.

SIHA TOT, October 2022.

SIHA TOT, October 2022.

Key Informant Interview, South Sudan Women Empowerment Network, The Research Team, 2022 Key Informant Interview, South Sudan Women Union, The Research Team, 2022.

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

society at large.207 Negative gender stereotypes remain prevalent,208 violence against women is normalised and perpetrators enjoy impunity. A strong women, peace and security movement will need to find ways of confronting these issues if it hopes to be successful.

Recommendations Action is needed to address the educational and economic inequality experienced by women.

There is a need to strengthen the women’s rights movement by encouraging dialogue and collaboration across divides in the movement, including inter-generational, class and ethnic.

In order to create a conducive environment for promoting the women, peace and security agenda, militarisation needs to be addressed and democratisation should be increased.

The advancement of the women, peace and security agenda relies on a strong civil society movement, which requires adequate space for civil society at the national level.

The legal framework should be reformed to better protect women’s rights. However, there is a gap between existing laws and their enforcement, which also needs to be addressed to make reforms effective.

Develop the coordination between existing women organisations, the pooling of funds, projects and databases, specifically in a logic aimed at greater inclusiveness of the actors participating in the WPS agenda, and use them as forums through which to debate current and/or divisive issues and make them more inclusive; Promote sustained dialogue between local governance institutions and local community leaders, to develop the inclusion of women in decision-making bodies at the local level.

207 208

SIHA, 2020, op.cit.

Key Informant Interview, South Sudan Women Union, The Research Team, 2022

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

SUDAN

SUDAN

36

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

Historical context Sudan has a prolonged history of conflict. Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has experienced nearconstant civil conflict, resulting in the death of millions of civilians. The first civil war between the northern and southern regions began a year before independence and lasted twelve years.209 From 1985 to 2005, the second Sudanese civil war was fought between forces loyal to the northern, Khartoum-based government and those based in the South, Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile.

In 1989, Omar al-Bashir took power in a military coup at the head of the National Congress Party (NCP), overthrowing the democratically elected government. The Bashir regime was grounded in Islamist ideology and aggressively prosecuted the war in the South. Even as the Islamists introduced a number of policies intended to control women, they also created women’s organisations within the Islamist movement, effectively splitting the women’s movement.210 Brokered by IGAD, the warring parties in the North-South civil war signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The agreement provided for a wide range of reforms intended to bring about a “New Sudan” which was to be democratic and rights-respecting. It gave South Sudan the right to a referendum for independence, intended as a safety valve in case the transition was unsuccessful. Although some women were present in the peace negotiations, their capacity to input effectively was limited (see more detailed discussion in the South Sudan section).

Ultimately the systemic change advanced by the CPA was reduced to the referendum. South Sudan became independent in 2011.211 Following the referendum, a series of confrontations broke out along the NorthSouth border, particularly in South Kordofan, the Blue Nile, and Abyei.212 Even before the signing of the CPA, conflict erupted in 2003 in Darfur.213 This conflict was characterised by widespread sexual and gender-based violence, deliberately deployed as a weapon of war. The government relied heavily on militias, such as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in these conflicts (both in Darfur and in South Kordofan and Blue Nile). These militia have been accused of committing systematic war crimes and crimes against humanity, in particular sexual violence.

A series of peace agreements were negotiated in an attempt to resolve these conflicts, including the Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006 and the Doha Peace Agreement in Darfur 2011. Both agreements address gender issues in some ways, but neither was sufficient in terms of including women or was ultimately successful in addressing the conflict. In 2020, the transitional government brought opposition armed movements in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, along with factions from eastern Sudan to negotiate the Juba Peace Agreement. The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) was signed in October 2020 with the Sudan Revolutionary Front.214 Women were represented in the JPA negotiations but reported that they were excluded from participation in the security arrangements – a critical piece of the agreement’s architecture. In addition, most of those who participated were members of armed movements and did not necessarily reflect the needs and priorities of civilian women in their home areas. Women from civil society did not receive support for recognition of their place at the negotiating table. While the JPA recognized the importance of women in peacebuilding and the importance of UNSC Resolution 1325,215 it is widely perceived as an elite and illegitimate deal and has been poorly implemented. This has minimized its potential to address conflict and 209 210 211 212 213 214 215

Black Past,” First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972)”, 2022.

SIHA, “At the Dawn of Post-Revolution Sudan: A Reflection on the Dynamics of the Women’s Movement,” 2021.

World Peace Foundation, “Sudan: 1985-2005”, 2015.

Carnegie, “Sudan from conflict to conflict”, 2012.

JSTOR, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate”, 2005.

Constitution.net, “Sudan Peace Agreement”.

Al Thawra, “Actors And Analysis,” draft on file with author.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

it has been accused of exacerbating conflict in Darfur.216 The secession of South Sudan in 2011 had a substantial impact on the Sudanese economy which lost almost 75% of its oil production revenue. The Sudanese economy further deteriorated because of mismanagement, US-imposed sanctions, corruption, and underdevelopment of basic services.217 A wave of demonstrations against the regime in September 2013 led by university students protesting economic deterioration and political repression, led to the deaths of 12 protesters and the arrest and torture of hundreds of opposition politicians, civil society leaders and journalists.218 In late 2018, a new round of protests began in Sudan. The immediate cause of the protests was the price increase of bread and fuel, but soon much deeper grievances with the Bashir regime came to the surface, and protestors demanded the replacement of the regime by a civil administration.219 Bashir was ousted in April 2019 and his regime was initially replaced with a Transitional Military Council (TMC). Protests continued and a sit-in at army headquarters which had started a few days before Bashir’s ouster continued for 58 days until it was violently broken up by police, security agents and members of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. An estimated 130 protesters were killed, and many women were raped.220 Ultimately, the TMC and the opposition coalition, the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), signed a Constitutional Declaration in August 2019, outlining a schedule for the transition to civilian administration and elections.221 Through this agreement, the TMC was replaced by the split civilian/military Sovereignty Council, and a civilian head of state with Abdalla Hamdok as prime minister.

Women played a significant role both in the protests that brought about the negotiations of the Constitutional Declaration and the negotiations themselves. Women represented 40% of all negotiators in the process.222 The Constitutional Declaration included provisions forbidding discrimination (Article 7(7)), protecting women’s rights as included in international treaties and encouraging affirmative action for women (Article 48). Article 67(c) calls specifically for the application of UNSCR 1325.223 The document also promises reform of laws that discriminate against women.

Despite promises of accountability for a variety of violations, not least of which was the June 3 attack on the sit-in, little progress was made. Three and a half years later, there has been no accountability. An independent investigation committee researching the incident reported that it was forced to suspend its investigations following the 25 October 2021 coup.224 The lack of accountability is a continuing concern for pro-democracy and human rights activists.

Current contextual analysis The Transitional Government of Sudan (TGoS) was tasked with reforming Sudan (or essentially rebuilding a state that was systematically broken down by the previous regime) to create the required institutional bodies and legislation to facilitate the democratic transition and international cooperation while dismantling remnants of power of the previous regime. The TGoS prioritised establishing peace, ending the economic 216

221

FIDH and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, “Delays and Dilemmas: New Violence in Darfur and Uncertain Justice Efforts within Sudan’s Fragile Transition,” November 2021, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_report_sudan2021.pdf_.pdf Khalifa, Abdelrahiem, “Sudan’s Transition: Challenges and Opportunities”, 2020.

Human Rights Watch, World Report: Sudan, 2013.

Hassan Mai et Kadouda Ahmed,” Sudan’s Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator”, 2019.

Hamza Hendawi, “Special Report: Inside the June 3 massacre now etched into Sudan’s collective memory,” The National, June 6, 2020, https:// www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/special-report-inside-the-june-3-massacre-now-etched-into-sudan-s-collective-memory-1.1028906 ICTJ, “Sudan”

222

TOT workshop, October 2022.

223 224

Sudan Constitutional Declaration.

Radio Dabanga, “June 3 Massacre investigation committee forced to suspend its activities,” https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/ article/june-3-massacre-investigation-committee-forced-to-suspend-its-activities

217 218 219 220

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

crisis and the engagement of women and youth in the transition process.225 Meanwhile, the economic crisis in Sudan deepened, characterised by hyperinflation, currency devaluation and shortages in essential products including fuel and cash. In addition, tensions were rising within the TGoS. On 25 October 2021, General Al-Burhan arrested Prime Minister Hamdok and dismantled the Sovereignty Council.226 The military coup led to widespread protests and international condemnation. Despite this pressure, the Sovereignty Council was reinstalled with General Burhan as the chairman and General Dagalo (Hemeti) as vice-chairman.

In the aftermath of the coup, the national security services and RSF became more active in Khartoum, conducting widespread arrests of activists and political representatives of democratic movements. There have been reports of torture and the security situation has deteriorated. The signing of a new framework agreement on 5 December 2022 has changed the context, but many activists reject the agreement, like any agreement which gives a significant role to the military and is continuing to call for protest and fully civilian government.227 The full impact of the agreement remains to be seen.

Sudanese women played a significant role in the revolution and the response to the coup, for example protesting in the street, making posters, bringing food and water to protesters as well as participating in the political awareness platforms during the sit-in. However, women experienced severe repression and sexual violence during the protests.228 Women hoped that their steadfast support for the revolution would allow them to advance feminist agendas in the transitional period, but the reality fell short. Few women were named to government office. Only two of eleven members of the sovereign council were women and four out of 26 ministers during the transitional period.229 Some important legal progress was made, including the repeal of the public order law and the banning of FGM. However, important legal reforms, including reform of the Criminal Act and the Personal Status Law and action to combat sexual and gender-based violence, have stalled.230 A recent report characterized the reforms as “selective, at best; focusing on low-hanging fruit and quick wins.”231

Gender norms and gender roles As in the other countries under discussion, traditional society in Sudan is strongly patriarchal and structurally excludes women, some of these patterns were reinforced and intensified by the increasing sway of more militant and political Islam, including that of the National Islamic Front that brought Bashir to power. However, the corruption and repression of the Islamist regime has contributed to a decline of public support for Islamist politics generally, especially among youth.232 Cultural norms, exclude women from decision-making processes, political participation, and cast women as the primary caretakers of the household. These norms make women unwelcome in public spaces, which causes women to adopt strategies to make themselves more less conspicuous to stay safe. Although women, particularly those participating in the revolution, are challenging these norms, they continue to exert pressure on them through friends, family and other members of society. Women protesters have faced violence not only from security forces, but also from fellow protesters ostensibly seeking to protect them. In addition, many women, particularly those who are not very politically active, perceive politics as something for men and elites, discouraging them from participation.233 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232

UNICEF, “Gender Annual Report”, 2020.

Aljazeera, “Sudan army chief names new governing Sovereign Council”, 2021.

See, for example, Hala Al-karib, “Sudan should not settle for anything other than true democracy,” https://sudantribune.com/article269336/ Archambault Mai, A Women’s Revolution in Sudan, The Mcgill Al Thawra, “Actors And Analysis,” draft on file with author.

CMI, “An opportunity to be seized,” 2022.

Al Thawra, “Actors And Analysis,” draft on file with author.

Munzoul AM Assal, “Sudan’s popular uprising and the demise of Islamism,” Bergen: Chr Michelsen Institute (CMI Brief no 2019: 3), https:// www.cmi.no/publications/7062-sudans-popular-uprising-and-the-demise-of-islamism 233 Al Thawra, “Actors And Analysis,” draft on file with author.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

Sudan’s female protesters leading the pro-democracy movement in 2019. Picture by Duha Mohammed

In addition, a number of harmful cultural practices remain prevalent. This includes FGM/C, which is has a prevalence of 86.6% in Sudan. There are signs, though, that support for the practice is waning, as only 40.9 percent of women surveyed say that the practice should continue, compared to 79% in 1990.234 Early marriage is also prevalent: 34% of girls are married before they turn 18. This is driven in part by cultural understanding that maturity is achieved young (at 10 years old) and that younger women make better mothers.235 Cultural attitudes minimize the impact of domestic and sexual violence. Domestic violence is not considered a serious rights violation and sexual harassment and violence are common and victims are often blamed.236 Sexual and gender-based violence has been deployed as a mechanism to control not only women but entire communities. The threat of sexual violence is used to warn both women and communities away from activism. Meanwhile smear campaigns have exerted psychological pressure against female activists.

Women are also restricted economically in a wide variety of ways. Women have unequal access to land rights, bank services, and autonomy to manage their own assets without intervention from male guardians.237 Women are also restricted from certain types of employment by the Labour Act.238 However, conflict has pushed high numbers of women into the role of head of household, taking on new and more active economic roles.239 Although awareness of the need for women’s political participation is growing, political parties have sought to exploit this without fully involving women or supporting the women’s movement. Although some mass media support women’s issues and advocacy by writing about their rights and activating hashtags to show 234 235 236

UNICEF, “Female Genital Mutilation in Sudan: Factsheet,” 2022, https://www.unicef.org/sudan/media/9386/file/FGM%20Factsheet-FINAL.pdf Girls not Brides, “Sudan,” https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/learning-resources/child-marriage-atlas/regions-and-countries/sudan/ UNFPA, “Voices From Sudan 2020: A Qualitative Assessment of Gender-Based Violence,” 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/voicessudan-2020-qualitative-assessment-gender-based-violence-sudan-enar.

237 Mwcoalition.org, “Implementing Gender Quotas: Spotlight on Sudan- Sharia Law and Women” 238 Sudan Labour Act (ilo.org).

239 JSTOR, “War and Women in Sudan: Role Change and Adjustment to New Responsibilities”.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

support for women’s issues, 240 there are also obstacles. Women are less likely to become journalists or to be consulted as experts. Women journalists have been subject to attacks and intimidation on the basis of their personal lives.241 The Public Order Law of 1996 gave police broad rights to arrest individuals for vaguely and broadly defined moral violations. These powers were used disproportionately against women, and in particular economically marginalized women. Women were widely arrested for their attire.242 Women street vendors (commonly ethnic minorities), and beggars became targets of SGBV, public flogging, imprisonment, harassment, and confiscation of their property by public order police. Although the law has now been repealed, its legacy remains engrained in the minds of many Sudanese and security forces see it as their responsibility to enforce moral codes.

Despite the obstacles to gender equality in Sudan, women have consistently fought for equal rights, dating back to the colonial period. Women gained the right to vote in 1964 and the first woman was elected to parliament in 1968.243 Women formed women’s unions to advance their aims though these were disbanded after the military coup in the early 1970s. Women continued to mobilise until a 10% quota for women’s representation was legally recognized in 1973.244 Women’s movements have tended to face several trends of opposition. One is that women’s rights, while valid, are not the priority at any given moment and that women’s aspirations must take second seat to other political or ideological objectives. Another is the articulation that women’s roles are religiously ordained, and thus that deviation is unacceptable. This articulation is conflated with cultural morays as women’s rights are posed as western impositions seeking to undermine or upend Islamic values.

Social perceptions have changed, however, as a result of the revolution. One activist described the change in attitudes towards sexual and gender-based violence, “Women and youth are clear about the rights of women. People are reporting [sexual and gender-based violence] more and the stigma and shame are significantly reduced. They are seeing it as a crime.”245

Intersectionality, conflict, and conflict resolution Sudanese people have been affected by conflicts, losing their homes, livelihoods, and communities. Around 3.2 million have been displaced.246 Women have suffered in particular ways, in part because warring parties used SGBV, including rape, as a weapon of war. Long-term conflicts have led to more female-headed households, widows, and migration.247 In addition, conflicts have disproportionately impacted Sudan’s peripheries, Darfur in the west, the east and Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile in the south. Women from these regions are disproportionately affected and have also found themselves disproportionately affected by violence. In addition, women who are rural or uneducated find themselves too often excluded.

Women facing intersectional discrimination find it even more difficult to engage, often without access to the education and resources to do so, as well as being both geographically and culturally removed from the centres of power.

240 241 242 243

FGD with Women activists in Sudan.

Reporters without Borders, “Sudan,” https://rsf.org/en/country/sudan Mwcoalition.org, “Implementing Gender Quotas: Spotlight on Sudan- Sharia Law and Women” Liv Tonnesen and Hilde Granas Kjostvedt, “the Politics of Women’s Representation in Sudan: Debating Women’s Rights in Islam from the Elites to the Grassroots,” 2010, CMI, available at https://www.cmi.no/publications/3643-the-politics-of-womens-representation-in-sudan 244 Democratic Arab Center, “Women political participation in Sudan 1989-2010”, 2016.

245 Interview with woman’s rights activist Sudan, March 2022.

246 247

OCHA, Sudan Situation Report, 2022.

Abirafeh Lina,” From Afghanistan to Sudan: how peace risks marginalizing women”.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

Political negotiations have tended to be perceived as elite deals, bringing together elites and both excluding grassroots populations and undermining their legitimacy. In this context, there is an urgent need to rethink the structures for addressing peace and security issues in the country.

Key actor and power analysis Main actors in the political and conflict sphere in Sudan include the Sudanese military and related paramilitary groups, armed rebel movements, democratic opposition movements, and the international community.

The military has a very high level of influence over Sudanese society and tends to take a negative view of women’s rights, adopting the attitude of the former regime that control of women is a means to broader political control. Related paramilitaries like the RSF, and other security agencies like the General Intelligence Services and police adopt similar views. All have been perpetrators of serious violence against women.

Corruption is a significant issue and elites associated with the military and the former regime are motivated by the desire to maintain economic benefits accrued during the former regime. Some of these benefits accrue to the military through running businesses, which both provide a significant incentive for the military to maintain this control and also resources to the military which it can invest in political machinations.248 Other armed groups include the Beja Congress – formed by the non-Arab Muslim Beja tribes, the Janjaweed, the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the JEM. Some of these movements “present a veneer of inclusivity by mandating quotas, adopting structures such as women’s secretariats”249 and other measures. In others, in particular, the JEM, such efforts face the counterweight of their Islamist ideology. The SPLM-N, by contrast, espouses a more consistent and extensive commitment to gender equality.250 At the governmental level, some efforts have been made to increase women’s participation. Debates are ongoing about a female parliamentary quota. The 2019 Constitutional Document guaranteed a 40% quota for women in the Transitional Legislative Council.251 Some are campaigning to increase this to 50%. As elsewhere, there are important debates around the relevance and appropriateness of quotas, which cannot be the sole, or even necessarily the main, indicator of gender equity.252 In the Sudanese context, this debate is complicated by the fragility of the transitional structures in which women are seeking inclusion.253 Furthermore, three Islamic groups can be identified on the Sudanese political scene: modern groups affiliated with political Islam, Sufi orders and radical literalist groups (Salafists). Traditional tribal leaders are also important actors.254 Another important set of political actors in Sudan is the political opposition including the Umma party, Communist party, and others. These parties are influential in representing and articulating opposition views and promoting change. Some are active in courting women, but they have also been criticized for side-lining women not affiliated with political parties and attempting to harness women’s activism in service of party objectives.255 Women are in a delicate negotiation with political parties, which are seeking to harness the women’s movement and utilise it for their own political aims.256 248

Said Ibrahim et Enslin Christine, Lived experiences of females with entrepreneurship in Sudan: Networking, Social Expectations, and Family Support”, 2020.

249 Al Thawra, “Actors And Analysis,” draft on file with author.

250 Al Thawra, “Actors And Analysis,” draft on file with author.

251 UNDP, “We will then be unstoppable,” 15 Jun2 2020, available at https://undp.medium.com/we-will-then-be-unstoppable-32e49388b639 252 253 254 255 256

42

CDN, “Women at the forefront of Sudan’s political transformation”, 2019.

SIHA, “At the Dawn Of Post-Revolution Sudan: A Reflection on the dynamics of the women’s movement in Sudan,” 2021 Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, “Sudan: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation”, 2006.

SIHA, “At the Dawn Of Post-Revolution Sudan: A Reflection on the dynamics of the women’s movement in Sudan,” 2021 SIHA, “At the Dawn Of Post-Revolution Sudan: A Reflection on the dynamics of the women’s movement in Sudan,” 2021

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

The FFC is a wide political coalition of pro-democratic civilian organisations. They include the Sudanese Professionals Association, the No to Oppression against Women Initiative, the Sudan Revolutionary Front, the National Consensus Forces, Sudan Call, the Unionist Association and the Sudanese Resistance committees.

Throughout the transitional period, the FFC gained significant support and took a greater role in decisionmaking, even in rural communities. The FFC’s commitment to women’s participation is questionable, as evidenced by the lack of representation of women in its own ranks (women only represented 3 of 26 central council members).257 Even to the extent that that the FFC supports women’s participation its impact is limited by their weak position in the transitional government, infighting within the movement and the limitations of the political parties that represent its membership (discussed above). In addition, the FFC has been weakened by internal splits with, for example, the Communist Party leaving the coalition in August 2019.

The Sudanese Professionals Association and the resistance committees left in November 2020. Following the military coup, many prominent FFC figures were arrested, further weakening the movement.

Another key player in Sudan are the resistance committees, organised to facilitate popular resistance to the regime. These institutions have a mixed record on women’s rights. On the one hand, some have a very large membership of women and have taken progressive positions, in others “a patriarchal mentality is rife.”258 Nonetheless, the fact that these institutions are rhetorically supportive and open to new membership creates important opportunities for engagement.

In addition to political parties, there is significant engagement for civil society organisations. The repression of opposition political parties during the Bashir era motivated some to focus their activism on civil society.

Many civil society organizations are, at least rhetorically, supportive of women’s rights.

International partners and donors are also important actors in the women, peace, and security agenda.

These actors were engaged in supporting domestic civil society, such as supporting the development of an IDP protection network mentioned above. International donors were also engaged in supporting the transitional government until the military coup in 2021. Since then, support have been more heavily directed once again to civil society.

Conflict resolution, human rights, and governance mechanisms at the local and national level Many actors engage in conflict resolution in Sudan in one way or another. These actors include local government, including the Native Administration and traditional reconciliation mechanisms. These mechanisms have all coexisted since colonial times. Local mechanisms, however, have been undermined by central government meddling, a process intensified under the al-Bashir regime.259 The Native Administration and the local committees play a significant role in mediating conflict, especially at the local level, but need support, capacity building, and funding to fulfil their mandate.260 They tend, however, to be male-dominated and act in ways that undermine women’s rights and participation.261 In addition to actors, there are traditional mechanisms. For example, in eastern Sudan, conflicts are resolved

by Galad, a truce between the two parties that gives them an opportunity to negotiate a solution. Elsewhere, government-sponsored conferences have been convened to address conflict at the local level.

In addition, international actors, from the UN to Qatar and South Sudan, have been engaged in mediation.

IGAD supported peace talks between the government and the SPLM/A in 1994. Other efforts by the 257

258 259 260 261

Al Thawra, “Actors And Analysis,” draft on file with author.

Al Thawra, “Actors And Analysis,” draft on file with author.

Redress, “Transitional Justice Processes in Sudan”, 2020.

OCHA, “Strengthening The Rule of Law and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms”, October 2021.

Al Thawra, “Actors And Analysis,” draft on file with author.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

international community include extensive peace-building programming in Darfur, including the United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).262

Women, Peace and Security Actors Historically, Sudanese women have largely been excluded from decision-making related to conflict and resolution. Though, they do have some traditional roles, for example, the Hakamat (local singers), would call on the men in their community to take up arms.

However, in recent community-based conflict resolution programming, such traditions have been used to successfully argue for the inclusion of women in local peacebuilding processes.263 Women are also engaged in resistance committees and political alliances like the No to Oppression against Women Initiative formed in 2009.184 Another important coalition is the Women of Sudan Civic and Political Group (MANSAM). MANSAM is a union of women’s political groups, civil society organisations, youth groups, and individual affiliates that played an active role in the creation of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) that negotiated with the Transitional Military Council (TMC) after the overthrow of Omar Al Bashir.264 A representative of MANSAM was included in the negotiation of the 1325 national action plan (NAP, described in more detail below). MANSAM, however, has been criticised for attempting to homogenise women’s voices instead of allowing a diversity to flourish. It has also been accused of being overly subject to the FFC, which has been accused of trying to leverage women’s engagement over to its own agenda.

There are a wide variety of NGOs working on women’s issues generally and several coalitions working on the women, peace, and security agenda, specifically. These include the Darfur Women Inclusive Stand and the Darfur Women’s Alliance for Peace.265 The Darfur Women’s Alliance for Peace is a coalition of 16 women’s organizations from various areas of Darfur that are working for peace and seeking to bring women’s voices to the fore.266 There is also an IDP women’s protection network.267 There are divisions within the women’s movement oriented around a number of different axes, including class and generation. Younger women’s rights activists who engage on issues such as abortion and LGBTIQ rights are often seen as “radical” by their older peers.

Sudan also subscribed to UN Resolution 1325. In March 2020, Sudan’s transitional cabinet approved the national action plan (NAP) to implement Resolution 1325, the plan was developed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Development, with the participation of civil society organisations, some of them from conflict areas.268 The process was criticised by some, however, for being too driven by the government and not consultative enough. The NAP called for extensive action to increase women’s participation, particularly at the local level, to prevent and respond to gender-based violence and to reform discriminatory laws and policies. Unfortunately, many of the targets have not been achieved by the end of the period. It is unclear how a new process may be taken up or advanced considering efforts to create a new government ongoing in Sudan.

International actors also play a role in the WPS agenda. United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) is mandated to support political stability, constitution-making and inclusive peace. Gender is integrated into this mandate. “UNITAMS will consider gender considerations as a cross262 263 264 265 266 267 268

44

KII with Darfur Women Equality Group in Sudan.

KII with Darfur Women Equality Network Organization in Sudan.

CMI, An opportunity to be seized, 2022.

Training of trainers, SIHA, October 2022.

Vond Foundation, “Publications,” available at http://www.stvond.nl/publications/.

UNAMID, “UNAMID supports establishment of Women’s Protection Networks for IDPs in South Darfur,” 22 May 2018, available at https:// reliefweb.int/report/sudan/unamid-supports-establishment-women-s-protection-networks-idps-south-darfur

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

cutting issue throughout its mandate.”269 It has taken an active role in facilitating dialogue in the country generally and has engaged on the women’s agenda in particular. In July and August 2022, they convened more than 170 women from Khartoum, the East, the North, Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur to foster collaboration and cooperation. In September, women were convened to discuss a gender-responsive constitutional vision.270 In December 2022, working with the National Democratic Institute (NDI), UNITAMS launched a nationwide initiative to consult women on their priorities for the transitional period. This is to be a nationwide process, with consultations held in every state and include women who have traditionally been marginalized, including women in the informal sector.271 The Women’s Peace & Humanitarian Fund (WPHF) has also supported Sudan to enhance the role of civil society organisations in advocating for and ensuring the local implementation of WPS commitments. WPHF has promoted the acceleration of women’s leadership in peacebuilding, as well as strengthening the capacity of local organisations working on gender-specific cases in conflict.272 Since 2014, Norway has supported the WPS agenda through the Development Studies and Research Institute at the University of Khartoum. This includes supporting the development of the 1325 NAP. Norway has also supported Sudan work on legislation criminalising violence against women, training the police, medical personnel, media, and civil society.273 The U.S. Department of State has supported the WPS agenda and evaluated the impact around the implementation of the U.S. National Action Plan on WPS in Sudan. In August 2016, they evaluated the impact of small grants awarded between 2011 and 2015 in countries across Sub-Saharan Africa, including Sudan. The report concluded that Sudan was among the most effective arenas for implementation, showing that organisations with experience in political participation and legislation have increased the capacity and confidence of local women politicians.

They also empowered more women leaders in areas that have traditionally been led by men, whenever there were local exchanges between women politicians and local communities.274 At the local level, the SIHA Network conducted a mapping of organisations active in working on women, peace, and security, and identified the dominance of minority urban and elite-based representation as the key weakness of the movement. Some actors that contributed to WPS (even if not solely focussed on WPS) included: 1. Solidarity Women Group operates in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and other parts of rural Sudan.

2. Self Help Women Group operates in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and other parts of rural Sudan.

3. Self Help Group is a grassroots women IDPs’ network in Khartoum 4. Umm Doreen Women Group operates mostly in the Nuba Mountains 5. Bait Al Mahaba Association in the greater Khartoum.

6. Alaag Center 269 270 271

272 273 274

UNITAMS, “Mandate,” available at https://unitams.unmissions.org/en/mandate UNITAMS, “Towards a Common Women Agenda,” 13 November 2022, available at https://unitams.unmissions.org/en/towards-commonwomen-agenda UNITAMS, “UNITAMS Launches Nation-Wide Initiative https://unitams.unmissions.org/en/unitams-launches-nation-wide-initiative-consultwomen-their-priorities-transition-and-beyond to Consult Women on their priorities for the Transition and Beyond,” 1 December 2022, available at WPHF, “Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund Call for Proposals in Sudan, 2022.

Norway in Sudan, “WPS”, 2019 US Department of State, “Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Small Grants Evaluation,” August 2016, https://2017-2021.state.gov/sub-saharanafrica-women-peace-and-security-wps-small-grants-summary/index.html

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis,Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

7. Development Studies and Research Institute (DSRI) 8. Sudanese Organisation for Research and Development (SORD) 9. Darfur Women’s Committee

Conclusion The situation in Sudan presents a complex terrain for advancing women, peace and security framework. The country is experiencing significant political upheaval as the military maintains control of the government, and the significant opposition to this is divided between those who are willing to negotiate with the military and those who are refuse accommodation with them. The space for civil society to operate has been narrowing since the coup. The fate of the transition to democracy is likely to have a substantial impact on the outcome of both the country’s conflicts and its capacity for inclusive politics.

Some of the strengths on which women, peace and security agenda can build in Sudan are the strength of women’s organizations in Sudan, the prodemocracy movement as a whole and high level of sensitivity towards conflict issues. Women’s rights organizations have been advocating on these issues for many years.

In addition, the history of conflict in the country has led to a relatively high level of sensitisation on the need for peace and security work. There has been a consistently high level of international engagement in the country, which has lent support to women’s rights organization and engagement. The resistance to the Bashir regime and now the military authorities has built a strong opposition movement that is increasingly articulating an alternative vision for the country, one which it was able to take tentative steps towards actualizing during transitional period from 2019 and 2021.

Some of the weaknesses which engagement will need to confront are divisions within the opposition. An additional difficulty is the focus of peace and security mechanisms on achieving a negotiated settlement, though in the context of Sudan, the string of ineffective and unimplemented agreements has undermined confidence in the prospect of a negotiated settlement. The peace and security architecture focuses on are the bias of advocacy generally, and women, peace, and security actors in particular towards Khartoum and the weakness of regional inclusion. Women’s rights groups can also be elitist on a class and educational basis.

Recommendations The women’s agenda is linked to the democratization project. Military actors have been hostile to the women’s rights agenda and are likely to remain so. Positive engagement with the sector is likely to only be possible following security sector reform.

•

Although efforts are underway to encourage the development of an inclusive women’s agenda and movement, more needs to be done to ensure that these efforts are inclusive and not limited to elites.

•

WPS actors should receive capacity building on institutional fundraising.

•

WPS actors should be supported to promote legal reform protecting women’s rights and encouraging women’s participation.

•

Although positive commitments to gender issues have been made, their implementation has been inadequate, and the prospects remain uncertain in light of the current political instability in Sudan.

Greater efforts need to be made to ensure the implementation of key reforms.

•

Peace agreements in Sudan have, for the most part, been seen as elite deals, which limits their credibility with the public and their ability to deliver peace. Including women would be one step towards making these agreements more inclusive and effective.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

REGIONAL: THE HORN OF AFRICA

SUDAN

ERITREA DJIBOUTI

SOUTH SUDAN

ETHIOPIA

SOMALILAND

SOMALIA

UGANDA

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

Regional conflict dynamics Conflicts in the Horn of Africa are interrelated. Many of them are driven by similar factors, and regional actors intervene to advance their own interests, at times by supporting allies, and at others by undermining rivals. Interventions range from political rhetoric to policy frameworks, to direct military interventions. All these factors have an impact on conflict, peace, and security and need to be considered in creating effective interventions. In addition, countries in the region have come together to create regional mechanisms to manage conflict which need to be understood and engaged.

Cross-cutting issues Conflicts in the region are often driven by similar factors and the way in which the conflicts are prosecuted is similarly influenced by regional political, economic, and social factors shared across the region. Challenges that drive conflict across the region include managing diverse ethnic, religious, or clan groupings in society, religious and ideological differences, environmental stressors, colonial histories, and the availability of small arms. Wide-spread environmental degradation has led to scarcity of resources and famine, which can both drive conflict over those resources and be exacerbated by conflict, which disrupts production processes and blocks the flow of scarce resources into conflict regions and further conflict and displacement. The vast majority of communities living in the Horn of Africa rely on natural resource-dependent livelihoods; agriculture and livestock kept by agropastoral, pastoral, and nomadic groups. Thus recurrent droughts, floods, and pests infestations hit them more acutely. Without robust institutional responses, this can lead to food crises, conflict and displacement. These causes have contributed to both intra- and interstate conflict.

Another common driver is the failure to manage ethnic, religious, and clan diversity. Some religious, ethnic, and tribal groups compete with one another or pursue restitution for historical or more recent grievances.

Many conflicts in the region have an ethnic or clan identity alignment, such as Arab and African alignments in the Darfur conflict, Tigrayan and Amhara identities in the Ethiopian conflict, or Dinka and Nuer in South Sudan. Although these alignments have very real impacts on the way in which conflicts take place, it is important to remember that they are not inevitable, and there are important ways in which they are impacted by elite manipulation and political aims. In addition, it is important to remember that marginalised groups are often particularly vulnerable within conflict. So, for example, Somali suffered particularly intense violations both under the Siad Barre regime and Al Shabaab.275 Religious and ideological splits are also having a regional impact. During the cold war, communist and capitalist ideologies played a significant role in determining regional and international alignments. More recently, political and radical Islam are more influential. Al-Shabaab in Somalia is seeking to establish its own society in line with their interpretations of Sharia Law.276 Al-Shabaab’s alignment with al-Qaeda, Islamic State and other transnational Islamic radical groups have also played a role in both their decisions to undertake attacks across borders such as the 2010 World Cup attacks in Uganda, the 2013 attack on Westgate mall in Nairobi and the 2019 attack on the Dusit complex in Nairobi. These attacks were both a response to, and helped to shaped international intervention in Somalia. In Sudan, the three-decade-long Bashir regime had a strong Islamist bent, which played a role in creating conflict with the majority non-Muslim South. It also played a role in fostering Sudan’s friendly relationships with terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda, the US decision to place the country on the States Sponsoring Terrorism List.277 The Islamist nature of the regime and its conflict with Christians in the South also played a role in mobilising US and broader Western interest 275

Catherine Bestman, “Conflict over Resources and the Victimization of the Minorities in the South of Somalia,” 31 October 2013, https://sites. tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/10/31/conflict-over-resources-and-the-victimization-of-the-minorities-in-the-south-of-somalia/ 276 Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Al Shabaab”.

277 Abdelaziz, Khalild, Michael Georgy and Maha El Dahan, “Abandoned by the UAE, Sudan’s Bashir was destined to fall”, in Reuters on 3 July 2019.

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

in the causes of Southern Sudanese and “African” Darfuris.

Across the region, women are marginalised, though there are variations in the contours of that discrimination that vary. As a result of this marginalisation, women are more vulnerable at times of conflict and stress, including to sexual and gender-based violence. Although there are variations, this plays out in similar ways across conflict and similar cultural norms block women from fully engaging in conflict resolution processes.

Throughout the region, conflict has led to widespread human rights violations, including unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests, disappearances, tortures, recruitment of child soldiers, restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, corruption, and violence targeting members of racial or ethnic minority groups. In many cases, governments did not take substantial steps to prosecute human rights abusers in official positions.278

Engagement of regional actors in conflict In intra-state conflict has, at times, had significant cross border implications, especially in a region with such porous borders. Conflict forces huge numbers of refugees across borders. For example, the conflict in South Sudan has forced an estimated 2.2 million people from the country, with an estimated 850,000 feeing to Uganda, nearly 800,000 to Sudan and an estimated 400,000 to Ethiopia. These population movements have considerable impact on receiving countries, at times stretching resources and at time influencing local political dynamics as refugees may find ethnic kin on the other side of the border. In addition, conflict has at times spilled across borders. For example, Al-Shabaab fighters launched cross-border attacks into Ethiopia in mid-2022.279 In part motivated by these consequences, neighbouring countries have often aligned to either undermine one another by sponsoring rebel groups, or provide support, keeping regimes in place.280 For example, for years the government of Uganda supported the Southern Sudanese Sudan People’s Liberation Army, while Sudan supported Lord’s Resistance Army rebels in northern Uganda. More recently, Ugandan troops intervened in 2013 to prop up the embattled Southern Sudanese government against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLM-IO). At times, these cross-border alliances have been motivated by ideological concerns, such as Ugandan support for Southern Sudanese rebels being seen as a counterbalance for the Sudanese regime’s Islamist goals.281 At other times, interventions are efforts to bolster governmental interventions against regional competitors. For example, it has been speculated that Sudan is supporting Tigrayan rebels in Ethiopia as a counterweight to the potential of Eritrean-Ethiopian cooperation.282 In some cases, regional engagement in national conflicts has included direct military intervention. This was the case, for example, when Ethiopia invaded Somalia to fight Eritrean-backed Islamists in the 1990s. Ethiopia also sent troops into Somalia in 2006 in support of the internationally recognised but weak Transitional Federal Government against the Islamic Court Union.283 In 2011, Kenya launched Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) into Somalia to fight Al Shabab.284 In 2013, Uganda sent troops to Juba in defence of

278

United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. South Sudan”, 2022; “Sudan”, “Somalia”, “Ethiopia”.

279 Omar Faruk, “In a first, Somalia-based al Shabab is attacking in Ethiopia,” August 5, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/africa-ethiopia-somaliaal-shabab-26a2426642f9eebc0b4280a4d749acd7 280 Abbink, 2003.

281

International Crisis Group, “From Conflict to Cooperation? Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda,” 20 June 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/

africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/conflict-cooperation-sudan-south-sudan-and-uganda 282

Dr. Frederico Donelli, “Eritrea and Sudan in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict and implications for the Horn of Africa,” 30 October 2022, https:// trendsresearch.org/insight/eritrea-and-sudan-in-ethiopias-tigray-conflict-and-implications-for-the-horn-of-africa/ 283 International Crisis Group, “Reforming the AU Mission in Somalia,” 15 November 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ somalia/b176-reforming-au-mission-somalia 284 International Crisis Group, “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia,” 15 February 2012, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ kenya/kenyan-military-intervention-somalia

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Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

the government against the SPLM-IO.285 Similarly, Eritrea intervened on the side of the government in the conflict in Tigray beginning in 2020.286

Inter-state conflict At times, regional tensions have developed into significant conflict, whether military or not. Some of these conflicts revolve around borders. Ethiopia and Somali have conflicted over the Ogaden region in 19771978.287 Following the secession of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Eritrea engaged in a bloody border war. About 100,000 people died and many Eritreans were expelled from Ethiopia.288 Some other border disputes continue to play a destabilising role in the region, even if they have not caused direct inter-state conflict.

Following the 2011 secession of South Sudan, the border has not been demarcated and the status of Abyei, which was supposed to get its own separate referendum on whether to join the north or the south remains contested. Sudan and Ethiopia remain in contestation over the Al Fashaga region, especially heightened since the outbreak of the war in 2020.

Another source of inter-state conflict in the region has been over the waters of the Nile. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has created tension between Ethiopia, which views the project as a centrepiece of its development plans, and Sudan and Egypt downstream who fear that the dam will negatively impact on the flows of the Nile, on which they are dependent.289

Key actors and power analysis National actors, national governments, national armies, other armed military groups, traditional leaders, and civil society described in the chapters above play an important role in peace and security at the regional level.

The international community plays a huge role in the Horn of Africa because of its strategic importance.

In each of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, regional and international powers actively choose sides and provide financial and material support. In part, this is due to the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa along the main shipping route from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the United States. On top of that, the region is rich in natural resources, including gold, salt, natural gas and petroleum.290 The US, Russia, China and the UAE all have strong interests in the Horn of Africa.

Western powers also have significant influence. The United States has designated Ethiopia as a strategic partner in the global war on terrorism, although that relationship has been strained by the recent war and imposition of US sanctions against Ethiopia.291 The US also established a military base in Djibouti in 2002.

France operates a naval base in Djibouti.292 The US has security interests in Somalia and has been pursuing these in various ways over the past few years, primarily through support for military action.293 While western position rhetorically recognises human, including women’s rights, objectives, military interests appear to 285

Julius Barigaba, “Uganda steps in, sends troops to South Sudan,” East African, 22 December 2013, https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudanrepublic/uganda-now-steps-sends-troops-south-sudan 286 Reuters, “Eritrea troops still on Ethiopia soil, U.S. says,” 28 January 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/eritrea-troops-still-ethiopiansoil-us-2023-01-28/ 287 288 289 290 291 292 293

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Wilson Center, “Horn Of Africa Crisis,” https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/topics/horn-africa-crisis International Crisis Group, “Eritrea’s Long Bitter Feud with Ethiopia’s Tigray,” 09 November 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/hornafrica/eritrea-ethiopia/eritreas-long-bitter-feud-ethiopias-tigray ACLED, ‘’Red lines. Upheaval and containment in the Horn of Africa”, 2021.

National Centre of Competence in Research, “Horn of Africa profile” Gabriel Negatu, “The US risks losing its influence in the Horn of Africa. Here’s how to get it back,” New Atlanticist, 11 January 2022, https:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-us-risks-losing-its-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa-heres-how-to-get-it-back/ Samuel Ramani, “’Engaged Opportunism’ Russian’s Role in the Horn of Africa,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 2020, https://www.fpri. org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/engaged-opportunism-russias-role-in-the-horn-of-africa.pdf Paul D. Williams, “Understanding US Policy in Somalia: Current Challenges and Future Options,” Chatham House, July 2020, https://www. chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2020-07-14-us-policy-somalia-williams.pdf

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

continue to take priority.

Increasingly, Russia has been engaging more broadly in the Horn of Africa. They have sought to establish themselves as providers of arms. Ethiopia imported $71 million of Russian arms in 2019, facilitated by strategic Russian debt forgiveness. Eritrea is another major purchaser. It has been seeking to establish a base on the Red Sea, with possible locations in Berbera and Port Sudan being discussed. 294 Russia has also sought to collaborate with Somali authorities on counter-terrorism priorities. In Sudan, the Wagner Group has been accused of providing support to the regime in exchange for access to gold mining.295 Russian and western competition in the region has been intensified by the war in Ukraine, which has left both sides scrambling for approval of their positions.296 Russia not only lacks the western rhetorical commitment to human rights in its foreign policy it has actively taken a disruptive stance on women, peace, and security, introducing a resolution on the issue in 2022 that was characterised as “ the weakest on this issue that the Council has even been asked to consider.”297 The Gulf countries have also played an important role in the Horn. The UAE is expanding its influence in the region. The UAE and their Saudi allies helped to broker the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement. The UAE has also made big investments in Sudan, with a consortium of private Emirati companies signing a six billion dollar deal to develop and operate the Abu Amama port.298 Although the UAE does not have the same history of commitment to the inclusion of human rights in its foreign policy priorities as western governments do, they have sought to prioritise women, peace and security issues in their tenure as a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, facilitating discussions on how women’s economic inclusion can promote participation299 and hosting a women, peace, and security conference in Abu Dhabi in September 2022.300

Conflict resolution, human rights, and governance mechanisms As discussed in the preceding chapters, across the region local, national, regional and international efforts overlap in addressing conflict resolution. Local conflict resolution, justice and governance mechanisms have been concentrated on traditional elders. Conflict resolution at the national level is often highly centralised within governments. Most of the region’s most high-profile agreements have been internationally mediated, including Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the North-South Civil War, the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in South Sudan, the joint cooperation agreement between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia in Asmara in 2018, and 2020 Juba Peace Agreement in Sudan.

The IGAD was established in 1996 and includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. IGAD supports increased cooperation between its member states on food security, environmental protection, peace and security, and economic cooperation. IGAD has a peace and security division, which is mandated to engage in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Its work is supported by the Conflict Early Warning and Early Response mechanism which is mandated to provide early warning 294

Samuel Ramani, “’Engaged Opportunism’ Russian’s Role in the Horn of Africa,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 2020, https://www.fpri. org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/engaged-opportunism-russias-role-in-the-horn-of-africa.pdf 295 Michael Fitzpatrick, “How Russian mercenaries colluded with the Khartoum regime to exploit Sudan’s gold,” RFI, 6 November 2022, https:// www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20221106-how-russian-mercenaries-colluded-with-khartoum-regime-to-exploit-sudan-s-gold 296 The Associated Press, “Russia and the West are vying for influence in Africa and Ukraine is a big reason why,” NPR, 28 July 2022, https://www. npr.org/2022/07/28/1114187972/russia-and-the-west-are-vying-for-influence-in-africa-and-ukraine-is-a-big-reaso 297 CARE, “CARE Statement on the failure of Russia’s draft resolution on Women, Peace and Security,” 31 October 2020, https://reliefweb.int/ report/world/care-statement-failure-russia-s-draft-resolution-women-peace-and-security 298

“Sudan, UAE’s consortium sign $6bln deal to build new port on Red Sea,” Sudan Tribune, 13 December 2022, https:// sudantribune.com/article268175/

299

Security Council Report, “Women, Peace and Security,” March 2022, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-03/ women-peace-and-security-7.php 300 UN Women, In the United Arab Emirates, UN Women Executive Director Calls for Increasing Women’s Leadership in Global Peace and Security and Climate Action,” 30 September 2022, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/news/2022/09/in-the-united-arab-emirates-un-womenexecutive-director-calls-for-increasing-womens-leadership-in-global-peace-and-security-and-climate-action

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information and engage in conflict prevention. CEWARN has recently made efforts to engender the peace and conflict indicators monitored through the system.301 IGAD has set up an IGAD Women, Peace and Security Forum (IWPSF) which includes three members of each IGAD state (representing the executive, legislature, and civil society) to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment.302 The institution has also made a number of efforts to ensure that its staff is trained on women, peace, and security issues. Similarly, the African Union, which includes 55 member states across Africa, has played a considerable role in responding to conflict. The organisation is mandated to promote unity and solidarity between states and promotes international cooperation. The AU has deployed a peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

The African Union named Bineta Diop as Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security in 2014, and also coordinates the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation - also known as FemWise.

The AU has also adopted a Gender, Peace and Security Programme (2015-2020). Although these efforts have been successful in raising the profile of the women, peace, and security agenda, they have been less successful in effecting change on the ground. For example, in 2017 only 23% of the permanent representatives in the AU’s premier security organ – the AU Peace and Security Council were women.303 In addition, the AU has deployed peacekeepers in Somalia, originally as AMISOM, replaced in April 2022 by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

The EU and the UN also have representatives in each of the states of the Horn of Africa. The UN has named a Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, currently Hannah Serwaa Tetteh.304 This position is not specifically mandated to focus on the women, peace, and security agenda, but it is focused on peace and security and could potentially have a significant impact. Like the AU, the UN has deployed peacekeepers UNMISS was extended by the Security Council in March 2022 to prevent South Sudan from sliding back into civil war305 and in Sudan, =the civilian UNITAMS306 and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) are still active.

Conclusion A number of regional organisations, including IGAD and the AU, as well as the UN and donor governments, have been rhetorically supportive of greater inclusion of women in political, and more specifically peace and security, discussions. These efforts have been effective in raising the profile of women, peace and security issues, but have been far less successful in advancing change on the ground.

As noted in the chapters above, many countries in the region have strong networks of women, peace, and security actors. However, more needs to be done to link these networks with regional and international mechanisms, to ensure that international and regional discussions are infused with local knowledge and also that regional and international frameworks are followed up and implemented at the national level.

In addition, in light of the cross-border impact of regional governmental decisions, it is clear that more needs to be done to link activists at the national level across the region to enhance the capacity of national activists in one country to better understand and advocate on the cross-border implications of their countries’ actions.

301

Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, “Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Africa: Needs Assessment Report,” https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/cdrom/documents/Needs_Assessment_Africa.pdf 302 IGAD, “IGAD Women, Peace and Security Forum Discusses Priorities to Promote Sustainable Peace in the Region,” 25 January 2021, https:// igad.int/igad-women-peace-and-security-forum-discusses-priotities-to-promote-sustainable-peace-in-the-region/ 303 Amani Africa, “10 Years Review of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda of the AU Peace and Security Council,” 2020, https://amaniafrica-et. org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/08_10_Years_Review_of_the_Women_Peace_and_Security_Agenda_of_the.pdf 304 United Nations, “Secretary-General Appoints Hanna Serwaa Tetteh of Ghana Special Envoy for Horn of Africa,” 22 February 2022, https://press. un.org/en/2022/sga2100.doc.htm 305 306

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Africa News, “UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan extended”, 16 March 2022 .

UNITAMS mandate, UNITAMS website.

Gender Conflict and Power Analysis, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan

Recommendations Prioritise conducting thorough risk and assessments, including the development of security protocols for all project activities prior to implementation to ensure the safety and support of project participants in each country.

1. Actively monitor changes in legislation and political climate for civil society.

2. Actively monitor regional and international policy frameworks to identify opportunities to leverage these for positive change at the national level, 3. Facilitate engagement by national civil society with regional and international mechanisms to both influence discussions and enhance the implementation of agreed frameworks at the national level.

4. Actively monitor the impact of external interventions on the realities of peace and security in the region.

5. Integrate newly established WPS organisations and feminist labs to existing national and regional WPS networks.

6. Integrate newly established WPS organisations and feminist labs to 7. existing national and regional conflict resolution and peacebuilding networks

Conclusion The Horn of Africa is a difficult and complex environment in which to advocate on women, peace and security issues. Despite the diversity of cultures and religions across the region, most exclude women from decision-making. However, there is evidence that attitudes are changing. Development, war and contact with other cultures are changing the demands placed upon, and responses of women.

Throughout the region, women have developed strong organisational and advocacy skills and these activists, and their organisations form a strong basis on which to build future actions. However, their movements are also subject to weaknesses. They can be internally divided based on geographical, ethnic, age or class divisions. They can lack funding, specialised training and a capacity to work collaboratively across the region.

In part because of the work of these groups, and also influenced by global human rights standards and advocacy, governments, international and regional bodies have adopted a number of strategies and mechanisms intended to advance women’s inclusion, both in political participation generally and also specifically on peace and security issues. These efforts have been effective in raising the profile of women, peace and security issues, but have been far less successful in advancing change on the ground.

In this context, these efforts need to be reinforced. In part, this should include addressing weaknesses within the women’s movement itself by encouraging it to be more inclusive and through training and adequate resourcing. There also needs to be more careful monitoring of the implementation of commitments and follow through to ensure that the region can move from commitments to action. There is a need to better understand and engage effectively with the range of instruments and mechanisms available.

At the same time, there is a need to strategize proactively to ensure that women themselves are setting the agenda and that the issues that are important to them, rather than those that may be viewed as critical by governmental or international actors.

Finally, there is a need to engage more proactively with public opinion to build a broad base of support for women’s inclusion.

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Annex A: Literature Abdelaziz, Khalild, Michael Georgy and Maha El Dahan, “Abandoned by the UAE, Sudan’s Bashir was destined to fall”, in Reuters on 3 July 2019.

Abdulkadir, Fowsia, and Rahma Abdulkadir. “The Effects of Indigenous Patriarchal Systems on Women’s Participation in Public Decision-Making in Conflict Settings: The Case of Somalia.” In Rethinking Transitional Gender Justice, 257–72. Springer, 2019.

Abdulle, Habon. “Somali Diaspora Women and Sense of Identity and Belonging.” In The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship: Somali Communities in Finland and the United States, edited by Päivi Armila, Marko Kananen, and Yasemin Kontkanen, 129–49.

International Perspectives on Migration. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019.

Abirafeh, Lina,” From Afghanistan to Sudan: how peace risks marginalizing women”.

Abusharaf, Rogaia, “The women of Sudan will not accept setbacks”, Brookings,2022.

Accord, CCR and DCA, “Conflict and Gender Study – South Sudan Addressing Root Causes Programme”, 2018.

ACLED, ‘’Red lines. Upheaval and containment in the Horn of Africa”, 2021.

———, “10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2022”, February 2022 Africa News, “UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan extended”, 16 March 2022.

African Business, “Sudan’s gold: Hemedti’s untold power”, 2019.

AfricaNews. “Somalia’s Parliament Hit by Al-Shabab Mortar Attack.” Africa news, April 18, 2022.

Agency for Peacebuilding, “Assessment Summary. Women, Peace, and Security in the Horn of Africa”, 2016.

Ajanaw, Alemie and Mandefro Hone, “Roles of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms for maintaining social solidarity and strengthening communities in Alefa district, northwest of Ethiopia”, Journal of Indigenous Social Development, Vol. 7:2, 2018.

Aljazeera, “Sudan army chief names new governing Sovereign Council”, 2021.

Aljazeera, “Unacceptable: Sudanese PM criticizes army’s business interests”, 2020.

ALTAIR. “SOMALIA 2016-2017 LIMITED ELECTION PROCESS - EU Election Expert Mission Final Report,” 2017.

Amnesty, “Decision to repeal public order laws a step forward for women’s rights”, 2019.

Ashworth, John and Maura Ryan, “One Nation from Every Tribe, Tongue, and People”: The Church and Strategic Peacebuilding in South Sudan”, 2013 Assal Munzoul M.A, “Sudan’s popular uprising and the demise of Islamism”, CMI, 2019.

Audu, Isaac Ishaya, “Patterns of Conflict Resolution and Intergroup Relations. A Case study of the Republic of South Sudan”, September 2015.

Bangura, Ibrahim. “Trapped in Violence and Uncertainty: Patriarchy, Women, and the Conflict in Somalia.”

African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review 11, no. 1 (2021): 80–103.

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BBC News, “Somalia Country Profile.” January 4, 2018, sec. Africa.

Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, “Sudan: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation”, 2006.

Browne, Evie, and Jonathan Fisher. “Key Actors Mapping: Somalia.” Birmingham: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2013.

Bryden, Matt, and Martina I. Steiner. “Somalia Between Peace and War: Somali Women on the Eve of the 21st Century African Women for Peace Series.” Nairobi, Kenya: UNIFEM. Bryld, Erik, Julian Brett, Nadia Masri-Pedersen, and Cécile Collin. “Evaluation of Sida’s Support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts.” Synthesis Report, 2019.

Burgess, Gemma Lucy, “When the personal becomes political: using legal reform to combat violence against women in Ethiopia”, Gender, Place & Culture, Vol. 19:2, pp.153-174, 2012.

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De Sisto, Federica, “Inclusion-Exclusion of women in Local Peace-making systems in the kaffa society of Ethiopia”, in Gender and Peacebuilding: All Hands Required, 2015 Democratic Arab Center, “Women political participation in Sudan 1989-2010”, 2016.

Dias, Alexandra Magnólia, “Introduction: Understanding conflict and processes of state formation, reconfiguration and disintegration in the Horn of Africa”, 2013.

Duany, “War and Women in Sudan: Role Change and Adjustment to New Responsibilities”, 2001.

Edward, Jane Kani (The SUDD Institute), “A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan”, 2014.

Elnagar, S.E., “The impact of war on women and children: Case study of Sudan”.

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Farouq, M., “Implementing Gender Quotas: Spotlight on Sudan- Sharia Law and Women” Gardner, Judith, and Amina Mohamoud Warsame. “CH. 7 - Women, Clan Identity and Peacebuilding.” In Somalia-the Untold Story: The War through the Eyes of Somali Women, by Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra. CIIR, 2004.

Gardner, Judith, and Judy El Bushra. Somalia-the Untold Story: The War through the Eyes of Somali Women. CIIR, 2004.

George, R., “Women at the forefront of Sudan’s political transformation”, 2019.

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GW-UMT. “Equity vs. Equality: What’s the Difference?” November 5, 2020.

Harper, Mary. Getting Somalia Wrong: Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012.

Hassan, Mai et Kadouda Ahmed,” Sudan’s Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator”, 2019.

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———, “Sudan: Halt Attacks on Protesters”, 2019.

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Ibrahim, Mohamed Hassan. Somaliland’s Investment in Peace: Analysing the Diaspora’s Economic Engagement in Peace Building. 4. [University of Jyväskylä], Diaspeace Project, 2010.

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Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, “South Sudan Conflict Insight”, 2018.

International Crisis Group, “Defusing Ethiopia’s Latest Perilous Crisis”. July 3rd, 2020 IRC, “Gender analysis key findings: women’s exploitation & gender-based violence across Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis”, 2021.

JICA, “Country Gender Profile, Republic of South Sudan”, 2017. ———, “Country Gender Profile, Sudan”, 2012.

———, “Ethiopia - Country Gender Profile”, 2006.

Khalifa, Abdelrahiem,” Sudan’s Transition: Challenges and Opportunities”, Fikra Forum, 2020.

Krause, Jana, Werner Krause and Piia Branfors, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace”, International Interactions, 2018.

Makhubela, Lucas Mahlasela. “Conflict Resolution in Somalia: Learning from Failed Mediation Processes.”

PhD Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2010.

Massoud, Mark Fathi. “Muslim Women Are Using Sharia to Push for Gender Equality.” The Conversation.

Accessed April 22, 2022. http://theconversation.com/muslim-women-are-using-sharia-to-p ush-for-genderequality-158371.

Menkhaus, Ken. “Elections in the Hardest Places: The Case of Somalia.” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 4 (2017): 132–46. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0073.

Mercy Corps, “South Sudan” webpage, 2022 Mohamed, Ahmed. “Al-Shabab Increases Attacks as Elections Drag in Somalia.” VOA. Accessed April 23, 56

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2022. ———. “Somalia’s Promised 30% Quota for Women Lawmakers Unlikely.” VOA. Accessed April 23, 2022.

Mohammed Hassan, Zeynab. “CH. 6 - Women and Peace-Making in Somaliland.” In Somalia-the Untold Story: The War through the Eyes of Somali Women, by Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra. CIIR, 2004.

Momodu, S., “First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972)”, 2022.

Moore Montana, “Gender equality in Ethiopia makes headway”, The Borgen Project, 2021.

Muhabie Mekonnen Mengistu, “Ethnic Federalism: A Means for Managing or a Triggering Factor for Ethnic Conflicts in Ethiopia” Social Sciences. Vol. 4:4, 2015, pp. 94-105 Nadine, “The Sudanese Woman: An Analysis of Gender Roles and Equality in the Sudan”, 2017.

National Centre of Competence in Research, “Horn of Africa profile”. Norway in Sudan, “WPS”, 2019 Nyaburi Nyadera, Israel, “South Sudan conflict from 2013 to 2018: Rethinking the causes, situation and solutions”, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol.18:2, 2018 OCHA, “Strengthening the Rule of Law and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms”, October 2021.

OHCR, “Press Statement of the UN Independent Expert on the Situation of Human rights in the Sudan”, 2018.

Open Democracy, “Sudanese women show that peace requires participation not just representation”, 2020.

Osman, A., “Sudanese women in civil society and their roles in post-conflict reconstruction”, 2009.

OSRSGSVC. “Secretary-General Annual Reports.” United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. Accessed April 24, 2022. https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/digital-library/reports /sg-reports/.

Ottaway, M.and Mai El-Sadany, “Sudan from conflict to conflict”, 2012. Oxfam, “Ethiopia Gender Snapshot”, 2017.

Oxfam, “Joint Agency consolidated gender analysis. Gender analysis South Sudan”, 2017 Petit, Franck, “SUDAN: IF AL-BASHIR CAN’T GO TO THE ICC, WILL THE ICC GO TO AL-BASHIR?”, Justiceinfo. net, 2020 Redress, “Transitional Justice Processes in Sudan”, 2020.

Reuters. “Death Toll from Twin Somalia Bombings Rises to 48: Regional Leader.” Reuters, March 24, 2022, sec. Africa.

RULAC, “Non-international armed conflicts in South Sudan”. ———, “Non-international armed conflicts in Sudan”.

S/RES/1325. Security Council Resolution on Women and Peace and Security | UN Peacemaker.” Accessed April 23, 2022. https://peacemaker.un.org/node/105.

Said, Ibrahim et Enslin Christine, “Lived experiences of females with entrepreneurship in Sudan: Networking, Social Expectations, and Family Support”, 2020.

Samia, Abas Ali. “United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Somalia.” PhD Thesis, Kampala International

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University, 2019.

Scott, J., Averbach, S., Modest, A.M. et al. “An assessment of gender inequitable norms and gender-based violence in South Sudan: a community-based participatory research approach. Confl Health” 7, 4 (2013).

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———, “A Reflection on the Gender Equality Agenda in Somaliland”, 2020.

———, “Between Modernism and Heritage. The application of the parallel legal system to the Oromo Women of Ethiopia”, 2012.

———, “Caught in the Middle. Gender Inequality and Rampant SGBV in Wau, South Sudan”, 2019.

———, “Mapping and Analysis: Women and Youth Engaged in the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Somalia and Somaliland”.

———, “The Current State of the Women’s Movement in South Sudan”, 2020.

———, “Tracing the Roots of Discrimination within Sudanese Law”.

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———, “A Reflection on the Gender Equality Agenda in Somaliland,” 2020.

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