Speaking Anti-Ukrainian in English: An Analysis of Russian Narratives about Ukraine Forwarded by TASS’s English-language Online News-reporting

KEYWORDS: disinformation, Russia, Ukraine, information warfare, TASS DOI: https://doi.org/10.4079/2578-9201.1(2022).03

KATERYNA STEPANENKO

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ESIA ‘21, kstepanenko@gwu.edu

ABSTRACT

With Russia’s growing ‘hybrid warfare’ and disinformation campaigns, there is limited research into Russian news agencies and their English-language online publications. The Russian news agency TASS is a critical player in Russia’s international narrative development regarding Ukraine. This paper analyzes the rhetoric TASS uses when covering events in Ukraine in English. By surveying 120 TASS articles, the research identified eight prominent anti-Ukrainian narratives: that Crimea was rightfully reunified with Russia, that Ukraine inhibits the resolution of the Donbas conflict, that Euromaidan was a coup aimed at establishing a Russophobic regime and discriminate against Russian-speakers, that the Ukrainian government officials are nationalist extremists destroying Soviet heritage, that Kyiv caused anti-Russian sanctions, and that the Ukrainian economy needs Russian support. Due to Russia’s dominance in the English-speaking media market covering Ukraine, these narratives represent most of the information available to Western audiences. The paper suggests that Ukrainian media cannot compete for narrative dominance. Additional research should explore the narratives promoted by other English-speaking Russian outlets or review strategies that Ukrainian media institutions can utilize to counter Russian disinformation in the West.

INTRODUCTION

Russian disinformation campaigns are of growing concern among Western powers such as the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, and other members of the European Union (E.U.). Disinformation is the circulation of misleading information spread through publications, social media networks, and websites, by impersonating journalistic styles and simulating objectivity (Bennett & Livingston, 2018). Russia is at the forefront of ‘hybrid warfare,’ a non-military effort to destabilize democracies, international dialogue, and public trust (Bennett & Livingston, 2018). Since the student protests at Kyiv’s Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) in 2014 named the Euromaidan, Russian news sources began spreading misleading information about Ukraine via the Internet. Russian news agencies such as TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) have a distinct pro-Russian bias showing prejudice for E.U. perspectives, criticizing international organizations such as the North Atlantic Peace Treaty (NATO), and vilifying neighboring countries. News agencies differ from regular publications because they are “wholesale news providers,” employing a large number of journalists to release “maximally accurate, maximally fast, and maximally factual information” relating to a wide range of topics in a 24/7 news cycle (Boumans et al., 2017). News agencies have a uniquely vast international reach, unattainable to an online newspaper publication due to the increased frequency of reported news. While TASS employs thousands of journalists worldwide, publishes an endless stream of daily news, and utilizes an internationally recognized journalistic style, it is not journalistically objective. Post-2014 Russian media is more centralized and homogeneous compared to Soviet propaganda, outliving any attempt at independent media in Russia (Campbell et al., 2014). Given the Western uniform condemnation of Russia’s aggression in eastern Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea, this paper hypothesizes that TASS amplifies an anti-Ukrainian narrative, common in Russian domestic news outlets, in its Englishlanguage coverage. By synthesizing academic research on Russian disinformation, Russian antiUkrainian sentiments, and the Russian media market, this paper (1) establishes a historical context for changes in TASS’s editorial objectives between 1992 and 2014 and describes the ideological shift among independent online publications and news agencies in Russia. By identifying keywords, this paper (2) determines the most frequently utilized anti-Ukrainian narratives in TASS publications between March 2016 and 2021. Finally, the research

(3) suggests why Ukrainian online news sources cannot compete in English-speaking media and why Russian anti-Ukrainian rhetoric overshadows Ukrainian efforts in the Eastern European news market. The future research of the Russian disinformation efforts must address the reasoning of the options aimed at coping with Russian state propaganda. METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS, AND SOURCES USED

Previous studies of Russian propaganda and disinformation analyze the formation of social media troll groups, Russian-language web publications, and the freedom of independent blogs. These studies omit an analysis of the increase in Russian English-speaking online publications and their growing influence in the news market covering Eastern Europe. The U.S. Department of State often analyzes Russian antiUkrainian disinformation via Kremlin-sponsored English TV and radio channels RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Both outlets are synonymous with explicit Kremlin information operations due to their presence in the U.S. and E.U. television spheres and social media, specifically targeting foreign audiences to change their perspective on Russia. Non-Russian media experts can easily detect Russian propaganda in English because RT and Sputnik openly disclose that they are not independent from the Russian government editorial insight (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Foreign journalists know to avoid information featured in RT and Sputnik, as Western governments repeatedly warn against these two outlets and their affiliates. RT and Sputnik do not provide an understanding into Russian domestic media, seen in TASS English-language articles or in the Kremlin domestic state media. Experts analyzing Russian domestic media such as Robert Hinck, Randolph Kluver, and Skye Cooley analyzed how Russian news broadcasting portrays the West and amplifies anti-Western sentiments to gain Russian approval for the Kremlin’s foreign policy (2018). The Kremlin’s disdain for the West is one of many targeted narratives aimed to shape the domestic audience’s perception of Russia’s place in the world. The study of domestic narratives does not analyze how strong Russian domestic narratives spill over to Western outlets to condition a greater international audience. TASS, in turn, captures both niche domestic narratives and makes them accessible to Western information market via strong use of English language.

Although TASS and other English-language outlets are not as outwardly propagandistic as Russian federal TV channels, the research argues that the English-language online publications are instrumental in promulgating Russian “soft power,” disseminating disinformation among the English-speaking international community and developing new self-serving rhetoric that discredits Ukraine. The purpose of this research is to identify Russian anti-Ukrainian rhetoric topics, investigate their potential Western outreach, and analyze the effectiveness of Ukrainian counter narratives in the media.

The study establishes a historical understanding of the news agency predominately through Elena Vartanova and Andrey Vyrkovsky (2020). The paper primarily uses Vartanova’s TASS research because her research into TASS’s historical background is present in almost all Russian media investigations. Kohei Watanabe’s analysis of TASS anti-Ukrainian narratives in 2014 established the framework of “statement bias” and “gatekeeping bias,” describing the method of TASS’s disinformation (2017). Watanabe’s survey of Russian conspiracy theories in the Western media (2018) assists in visualizing the spread of Russian hoaxes in the West. Alexander Fisher (2020), Antonio Missirolu, Jan Joel Andersson, Florence Gaub, Nicu Popescu, and John-Joseph Wilkins (2016) similarly show Russian media soft power in the West. Christina Cottiero, Katherine Kucharski, Evgenia Olimpieva, and Robert W. Orttung (2015) augments the investigation about the interconnection between Russian state media narratives on the internet and distinguishes the Kremlin’s focus on cultural destruction of World War II memorabilia. Ihor Hurak and Paul D’Anieri (2020) summarize Russian political tactics against Ukraine, needed to interpret Russian intervention in Ukrainian media. The analysis of the ineffectiveness of Ukrainian publications and news agencies has enjoyed a minimal amount of academic research. The most credible sources in this section include the Media Ownership Monitor by non-profit organization Reporters Without Borders and USAIDsponsored Ukrainian Institute of Mass Information.

Despite an array of Russian news publications in print, online, and on TV, I selected TASS for a closer investigation. TASS is a considerable news agency, having a greater reach than any other online Russian newspaper providing news for both domestic and international audiences. TASS underwent a notable shift in its ideological agenda and presentation in 2014, partially returning to its Soviet format and initiating global disinformation warfare. The Kremlin likely changed TASS objectives from providing sourcing to Russian outlets to targeting Western information markets monitoring Eastern Europe, which is a historically Soviet media practice.

Given the limited amount of academic research into Russian English-language publications, I began identifying keywords or terms that appear in the text with “abnormal frequency” (Fredheim, 2016, p. 39). Using keywords, a researcher can analyze frequencies in a narrative construction. In this study, keywords are oneword to four-word phrases that appear in the English version of TASS online publication. I surveyed 120 articles discussing Ukrainian affairs to gather these terms. I used a random number generator to select two dates per month to avoid selection bias. I used a random generator

to pick between the news stories if TASS published multiple articles on the same day. Due to TASS’s quote selection bias, the paper accounts for keywords in paraphrased sentences and quotes.

As identified by Rolf Fredheim’s research (2016) into online Russian-language publications of Lenta and Gazeta, the keyword system poses several inherent challenges. There is an endless number of potential word combinations, while the context surrounding a keyword may be irrelevant (Fredheim, 2016, p. 39). I referenced TASS “topics” categories found through the search bar on their sites to limit my search. TASS’s sanction labels “Anti-Russian Sanctions,” “Ukraine Crisis,” and “Crimea and Sevastopol’’ allowed for a refined set of topics and maintained the general context of an article. I implemented Fredheim’s model of including “adjacent” keywords to avoid losing context. For example, I grouped “annexation” with words such as “reunification,” “unity,” and “chose to secede” to reflect the linguistic and stylistic range. Additional computerized-content analysis used in Kohei Watanabe’s TASS study (2017a) could assist in processing identified keywords and narratives.

Contrary to research conducted by Olga Smirnova (2020) that surveyed individual narratives such as the Russian portrayal of migrants to the E.U., this research seeks to identify the most common reports covered by TASS. The research’s time frame was limited to 2016 because there are extensive amounts of available research conducted on anti-Ukrainian narratives during the Euromaidan protests in 2014. The survey of 120 random articles allows the research to identify frequently discussed topics and note their predominance among other themes.

Adopting the Boolean Search approach for the Google browser, I obtained a precise number of times that a rhetorical keyword or phrase surfaced in TASS articles. This research method allows for the processing of large quantities of online publications without the need for searching via the site’s search engine. I combined Boolean operator words such as “AND,” “OR,” “-,” “-site:,” and quotation marks to tailor my search to Ukraine and the online outlet. For example, to obtain the total number of the keyword “coup” usage when referencing the Ukrainian Euromaidan in TASS reports, I used the operators “site:tass.com Coup AND Ukraine.”

TASS website publishes an endless stream of articles daily, making it practically impossible to review in full without technical assistance. Based on the week of March 21 to 27, TASS published roughly two articles referencing Ukraine each day on average. Another limitation is the lack of engagement statistics on Tass.com, making it difficult to estimate the reach to the Western audiences or journalists. Further research must be conducted on an even more respected Russian source in the West, The Moscow Times. Given TASS’s Soviet legacy of being the Kremlin’s mouthpiece, it is crucial to see if credible sources have “subliminal biases” (Smirnova, 2020, 26). A statistical analysis should be conducted to analyze the frequency of Western publications referencing TASS reporting.

Russian English-language publications use Russian transliteration of Ukrainian names, cities, and regions. For example, TASS refers to Ukrainian ex-president Petro Poroshenko as Pyotr Poroshenko, labels Kyiv as Kiev, and spells Donbas as Donbass. To avoid confusion and maintain a consistent style, the paper adopts Ukrainian transliteration approved by the United Nations Romanization Systems for Geographical Names hearing on January 27, 2010 (Pall, 2011). TASSHistory

Vartanova and Vyrkovsky (2020) separate the history of Russian news agencies into three historical periods: Imperial Russia (1866-1917), Soviet Russia (1917-1991), and the Russian Federation (1991 to the present) (p. 1847). The first Russian news agency, the Russian Telegraph Agency (RTA), emerged under private control in 1866 due to mass social and economic reforms. However, the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency (SPTA) became the first governmentowned newswire service in 1904 that was able to send news abroad (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1847). During the Soviet time, the Bolsheviks nationalized SPTA and other mass media sources, creating the joint Rossiiskoe Telegraphnoe Agentstvo (Russian Telegraph Agency or ROSTA). ROSTA acquired a new name: The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), in 1925 (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1847). TASS became the source of Soviet domestic and international propaganda. It was the “only source of official information and the only news service ensuring the ideologically correct and wellcoordinated functioning of the Soviet media’’ (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1847). In the 1950s, TASS became one of the five most prominent news agencies in the world alongside the American Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI), as well as Britain’s Reuters, and France’s Agence France-Presse (AFP). Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev created another news agency called the Agentstvo Pechati Novosti (Agency Press News or APN) to promote the lives of Soviet citizens. By 1991, the reputation of TASS was profoundly undermined by repeated quoting for Soviet officials and publishing their statements across the globe (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1847).

Following 1991, the Russian media market became independent and privatized, while TASS rebranded into ITAR-TASS or Informational Telegraph Agency of Russia. In an interview, Jefim Fistein said the addition of “ITAR” to the name “was to bring a kind of credibility to the old name” (Recknagel, 2014). Freedom of the press and the advent of advertising led to creating other news agencies like Interfax, which began selling subscriptions and

established an online presence (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1849). The Soviet APN transformed into the Russian International Information Agency Novosti (RIA Novosti) and became the industry’s most successful due to its heavy investment in multimedia production. Most importantly, RIA Novosti was the first agency to engage Internet users with its websiteria.ru (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1849). Presently, RIA Novosti is defunct and became a part of the Kremlin’s second-largest agency, RIA Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today). Unlike RIA Novosti or Interfax, TASS maintained its heavy dependence on state subsidization, and until 2012 it was seen as a dying agency. During the period, TASS had offices in only 59 countries compared to 116 during the height of the Soviet era (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1849). However, under a new CEO, the news agency received a substantial $101.7 million investment from the Kremlin between 2012 and 2013 (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1849). In 2014, TASS dropped the ITAR abbreviation and replaced it with the Soviet name. By 2018, TASS began publishing online in Russian and English and opened new offices in 3 more countries (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, 1850). TASS returned to being the most cited Russian source internationally by 2015 (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, 1851). Thus, English programming and international focus is a relatively new development for modern TASS, suggesting further expansion of this media organization.

Several components of TASS’s history stand out. Most importantly, its competition with RIA Novosti. Vartanova and Vyrkovsky’s research hypothesized that RIA Novosti, known for its English-language propaganda channel RT, lost readership because of its “bias” that led to “loss of quality news content” in 2015 (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, 1850). This analysis suggests that TASS had none or minimal amounts of outright propagandistic biases during a politically charged period following the Crimean annexation and war in Donbas. TASS’s official name change announcement documented on March 18, 2014, is coincidental with the timeline of the Crimean occupation timeline (“ИТАР-ТАСС,” 2014).

Additionally, English-language TASS entered Twitter in September 2013. TASS’s social media platforms Twitter and Facebook have approximately 60,900 and 63,366 followers, respectively (Tassagency_en, 2021: TASS Facebook, 2021). Officially returning to their original name in September 2014, TASS proclaimed their dedication to “professionalism” (“TASS History,” 2014). In November 2014, Rossiya Segodnya, the second-largest news agency in Russia that absorbed RIA Novosti, launched an online publication SputnikNews (Sputnik for short). The online newspaper, like TASS, adopted a name reflecting the Soviet space legacy of the first satellite with the same name. Furthermore, it borrows its name from the Soviet color magazine Sputnik, which was often used for propaganda in Eastern Germany (Bradley, 2013, p. 519-20). The outlet broadcasts in 30 languages and has bases of operation in 130 cities worldwide. Unlike TASS, Sputnik received enormous amounts of Western attention and scrutiny for its “fake news.” For example, the 2016 review concluded that Sputnik’s E.U.-based broadcasting targeted rightwing groups decrying the deterioration of Christianity, expanding LGBTQ+ rights, and increased migration from the Middle East and the Islamic world (Missiroli et al., 2016, p. 10). Based on the timeline, (focus on foreign programming by both outlets, as well as nd the revival of Soviet legacy), one can hypothesize that Sputnik serves as an outlandish propaganda source to reestablish TASS’s credibility by proxy. RUSSIAN PRESS ONLINE

It is uncertain when ITAR-TASS emerged as an online portal and there are limited research studies on the early content of TASS’s reporting before Putin’s rise to power. According to extensive research it is unclear when the tass.com website launched. However, it is possible to investigate Russia’s experimental entrance into the online sphere through independent online publications Lenta. ru and Gazeta.ru. Furthermore, a study investigating the first two exclusively online publications illustrates the ideological shift within Russian online media in early and mid 2010s.

In the early 2000s, Russian outlets needed to adapt to the digitization of print media. Elena Vartanova (2019) argued that Russian media blindly experimented with the Internet to secure ad revenue (p. 26). Ivan Zassoursky found that the initial lack of government regulation has been “the greatest blessing for Russian Internet throughout its history” (2018, p. 33). The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media, or Roskomnadzor, saw a spike in registrations for media outlets due to the growing advertising demand (Vartanova, 2019, p. 26). Other factors, such as increasing access to the Internet and establishing the .ru Russian domain, sped up digitalization in the country (Vartanova, 2019, p. 26). Within a decade, state-controlled and commercial online media as well as television outnumbered the circulations of prominent print newspapers. By 2017, online versions of newspapers such as Kommersant.ru and Vedomosti. ru had exceeded print readership (Vartanova, 2019, p. 30). ITAR-TASS also addressed the growing need for advertisement and subscriptions, first creating PrimeTASS business newswire in 1996, which expanded into the English-language foreign exchange market by 2003 (Sterling, 2009, p. 1376).

Among the first pioneers of Russia’s online publications were the news-aggregator, Lenta.ru, and the first fully digital newspaper, Gazeta.ru. Founder Anton Nosski established both outlets in 1999, eventually losing Lenta. ru to Rambler Media group controlled by the Putin Administration’s chief Sergei Ivanov (Fredheim, 2016,

p. 35). Gazeta.ru also fell under political and oligarchic control, as oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky first owned it until his imprisonment in 2005 (Fredheim, 2016, p. 36). Khodorkovsky, alongside other media magnates such as Boris Berezovsky, the former owner of the independent NTV channel, was forced into exile after refusing to surrender their outlets to Putin’s regime (Dunn, 2018, p. 50). Until 2018, Gazeta and Lenta’s shares belonged to a Russian oligarch, Alexander Mamut, who has transformed the independent publications into Kremlin-controlled outlets (Fredheim, 2016, p. 34-36). For instance, in 2014, Mamut fired Lenta’s editor Galina Timchenko for interviewing a Ukrainian nationalist and replaced her with a pro-Kremlin journalist, Alexei Goreslavsky (“Russia’s Lenta.ru,” 2014). Journalistic staff at Gazeta and Lenta also reported worsening censorship during the turbulent 2012 presidential elections (Fredheim, 2016, p. 36). An examination by Rolf Fredheim (2016) concluded that both Gazeta and Lenta underwent a “dramatic reduction” of over 65% in articles focusing on failing democratic institutions and economic challenges in Russia during the 2014 and 2015 Ukraine crisis (p. 45). Owners sought to limit the newspapers’ editorial control over Russian internal challenges and emphasize Ukraine as a state in chaos. In sum, Lenta and Gazeta demonstrate how susceptible Russian print and online publications are to adopting pro-Kremlin narratives. Although neither outlets are in English, their dynamic shift from uncensored reporting exhibits Russia’s control of online publications and their informational directions.

RESULTS

My review of 120 TASS articles between March 2016 and March 2021 identified eight repeated and consistent topics: sanctions, Donbas, Crimean reunification with Russia, coup, in addition to change of power, destruction of cultural ties, nationalism, language-conflict, and economy. Sanctions often referred to three distinct narratives, including the Ukrainian responsibility for anti-Russian sanctions, the West’s inability to solve the conflict, and Russian capabilities to negotiate and drop sanctions. TASS reports on Donbas by blaming Ukrainian Armed Forces for ceasefire violations, advocating for Donetsk and Luhansk autonomies, criticizing Ukraine for its inability to uphold the Minsk Agreements and Normandy Four negotiations, and endorsing Ukrainian opposition leader Viktor Medvedchuk. TASS supports the legitimacy of the Crimean “reunification” by avoiding “annexation” terminology and condemning Ukrainian “occupation” of the peninsula. Coup d’etat and languageconflict coverage share a common ground, given that linguistic discrimination is often cited as the cause of the coup. TASS reports that the new nationalist government actively discriminates against all ethnic minorities in Ukraine, establishing a radical regime. At the same time, language-conflict rhetoric features a concern for Russophobia and nationalist groups in Ukraine. TASS’s coverage of Ukrainian nationalists discusses the history between Ukrainian nationalist groups, Nazis, and Polish populations living in Volyn during the 1940s. The nationalism topic is the most conspiratorial, suggesting that the extremist group called the Right Sector is plotting another coup and invasion of Crimea and Donbas. According to TASS, the destruction of cultural ties is a consequence of Ukrainian nationalism that led to the partitioning of the Pan-Orthodox community, disrespecting World War II achievements, and failure to recognize Ukrainian-Russian brotherly relations. PanOrthodox community refers to the cultural and religious unity among Eastern European Orthodox Christianity. Economic narratives imply that Ukraine cannot survive without Russian assistance (Stepanenko, Table 1: 2021).

Nationalism, Donbas, and sanctions are the most frequently mentioned topics throughout 120 articles, with 36, 29, and 17 mentions, respectively (Figure 1). It is important to note that some pieces had two to three themes, given the intersectionality between keywords. However, 10 articles discussing gas meetings, Covid-19 updates, and announcements of state visits contain no anti-Ukrainian narrative.

INTERPRETATION OF ANTI-UKRAINIAN NARRATIVES Avoidance of ‘Annexation’ Terminology and Disassociation

The Boolean Search of combined terms ‘annexation’ and ‘Crimea’ across TASS English service displayed approximately 539 results. Of the results, most headlines quote a political source explaining that “annexation” is not an appropriate word to describe the Russian occupation of the peninsula in March of 2014. Throughout the entire investigation, TASS coverage of Crimea mentioned the word “annexation” only once on February 15, 2018. TASS quoted Russian permanent representative to the United Nations Dmitry Polansky saying the Western label “annexation” disregards Crimean right for selfdetermination (“Moscow proud of Crimea’s reunification,” 2018). The statement concluded in a typical narrative that Ukrainian domestic politics such as Russophobia and the Euromaidan “riots” led to the Crimean decision to host a referendum.

TASS paraphrases quotes of Ukrainian and Western officials to embrace the Crimean “reunification” with Russia. For example, on May 16th, 2016, the English version of TASS reported on the victory of Ukrainian songwriter Jamala at the Eurovision Song Contest. The news agency decided to include an interview with Ukrainian deputy Anton Gerashchenko from Govorit Moskva radio station to discuss Ukraine, the next host country of Eurovision,

MAIN THEME IDENTIFIED NARRATIVE KEYWORDS EXTRACTED FROM ARTICLES

Sanctions - Ukrainian conflict is responsible for anti-Russian sanctions - Sanctions will not solve a conflict in Ukraine - Russia dialogues to drop sanctions

Donbas - Ukraine inhibits the implementation of Minsk Agreements and Normandy Four Negotiations - Ukrainian Armed Forces shell civilian populations - Viktor Medvedchuk initiates dialogue and conflict resolution - Self-proclaimed Donbas republics expressed their will and deserved autonomy and do not need to be reintegrated

Crimean Reunification

Coup & Change of Power

Destruction of Cultural Ties - Ukraine is destroying the Pan-

Orthodox community - New officials do not respect

Russian culture, World War II, or racial tolerance - Ukrainians must recognize brother-like cultural ties with

Russia - Criminal and amoral, blatant betrayal, conspiracy of totalitarian regimes, seizure of churches, so-called

Orthodox Church of Ukraine, religious war, so-called ‘unification’ council, believers arm-twisting its bishops, remain with Moscow Patriarchate, uncanonical and unlawful, - Anti-Semitism, racism, distort the truth about WWII, justify the aggressors, blatantly violate, hatred, vandals, St. George ribbons, upsets victims of Nazism, ban events on May 9th - Brotherly nations, Rossotrudnichestvo

- Crimea is willingly Russian, and the term “annexation” is not applicable - Referendum results are valid, final, and must be recognized in the international law - Crimeans escaped illegitimate

Ukrainian occupation and

Ukraine will pay for it - Euromaidan was a coup designed to establish an anti-

Russian regime - The coup aimed to hurt ethnic and linguistic minorities - Euromaidan was a violent riot promoting civil unrest and destabilization - Events in Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian crisis, pinning the blame on Russia - Anti-Russian sanctions, biased E.U. sanctions, blockade, negative impacts on settlements, countersanctions against Ukraine - Dialogue, national interests, ease tensions - Impossible to negotiate, new Ukrainian authorities, not motivated to solve conflict, get out of Minsk

Agreements, unwillingness, undermining proposals, disengagement, deliberately blocking peace initiatives, avoids complying to obligations - Destabilize, third world country, military buildup, war crimes, new phase of war, hostilities by Ukrainian Armed Forces, Ukraine violated ceasefire, open fire, shells, terrorism, civil war - Ukrainian problem, humanitarian resolution, humanity and mercy, neighbor - Donbas regulation, own volition, political will,

Reintegration Bill, autonomy to war-torn eastern regions, rights, internal conflict

- Crimean decision, join Russia, reunion, part of Russia, rejoined, chose to secede, reunify, reunification,

Crimean Tatars, Crimean languages respected - Absolutely convincing results, Russian territorial waters, Russia’s state borders, - “Return” Crimea to Ukraine, fables in the West, legitimacy of authorities, occupied by Ukraine, reimburse, rebuilding, Kyiv compensate for losses, extremist activity, anti-Russian - Coup d’état, de-Russification, plotted and staged, legitimacy of authorities, new Ukrainian government, burning flares and tires, corruption scheme, illegitimate, state coup, color revolutions - Ethnic minorities, oppression, regional succession, violations of rights, intolerance, Hungarians and Poles,

Ukrainization, political repression - Riots, Berkut riot police, provocations, crackdown of riots, armed clashes, civil unrest

TABLE 1.

Identified Keywords and Narratives in TASS English-Language Articles

MAIN THEME IDENTIFIED NARRATIVE KEYWORDS EXTRACTED FROM ARTICLES

Nationalism - Right Sector is planning another coup - Ukrainian nationalist organizations committed crimes against Western neighbors - Ukrainian radical nationalists seek to invade Crimea and Donbas with NATO - Mounting nationalisms, neo-Nazis - De-facto ties to territory, patriotic songs, torch marches, Stepan Bandera, Nazi collaborator, fascism, glorification of Nazi quisling, anti-Russian slogans, ultra-right organizations, Organization of Ukrainian

Nationalists, slaughtering Polish settlements, reign of terror - Ze-regime, Poroshenko regime, terrorist, radicals, right-wing, provocations, martial law

LanguageConflict - The coup initiated due to language discrimination - Russophobia is the driving forces of nationalist groups

Economy - Ukraine is a failing state incapable of surviving without Russian support - Lack of economic reform will lead to another power change - Russian-language speakers, language activist,

Russophobia, discrimination, language rights,

Russian-speaking population - Russophobia, remove Russian language, Crimean

Tatar language - State ceased to exist in Ukraine, economic reforms, deregulation of the economy, restoring ties with

Russia, Russian investment, political bankrupts - Moral depravity, merely waste of money, Ukraine wasted money, economic recovery impossible

TABLE 1.

Identified Keywords and Narratives in TASS English-Language Articles Continued

potentially excluding Russian performers next year. In an original interview, Gerashchenko stated that people responsible for the “seizure of Crimea and occupation of part of Donbas’’ are criminals, black-listed from Ukraine (Govorit Moskva, 2016). However, the TASS report paraphrased Gerashchenko’s statement to substitute the accusation of annexation with “Crimea’s reunification with Russia” (“Kremlin comments on Kiev,” 2016). Assuming TASS’s vast uniformity and high volume of daily publications, it is possible to hypothesize that the agency manipulates blame allocation away from the Kremlin by paraphrasing quotes.

The avoidance of legal status terminology only applies to Crimea and not any other conflict with alleged Russian involvement. Interestingly, TASS adheres to the classification of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) as “self-proclaimed” republics. However, the news agency does not label non-government-appointed republic officials as selfappointed leaders. Paradoxically, the Russian news agency establishes figures such as the “Head” of the DPR Denis Pushilin as credible sources capable of judging Ukrainian affairs (“LPR envoy accuses Kiev,” 2016). Placing a label on the “leader” eliminates the appearance of a reputable for which ostensibly no Ukrainian or Western source is available. The news agency dissociates Russia from the Malaysian Air Flight 17 tragedy when proRussian separatists shot down a passenger flight over non-government-controlled territory in Donetsk (“Maps of the crash,” 2014, fig. 4). However, TASS specified that the plane “crashed in the Donetsk Region of Ukraine” (“MH17 crash case,” 2020). Therefore, the news agency effectively shifts the blame by creating a misleading geopolitical distinction in its explanation. Other examples of disassociation in the study include calling Ukrainians “foreigners,” directly contradicting the narrative of the “brotherhood” between Russia and Ukraine (“Foreign involved in dissemination”, 2021).

Crimea Is Willingly Russian

TASS selectively interviews Russian and Western officials that have strongly upheld the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum. More importantly, the English version implies that the peninsula’s status is a resolved issue, especially when compared to the instability within the Ukrainian government and the conflict in Donbas. The persistent narrative that Russia resolved the Crimean question seeks to diminish the severity of the Crimean annexation and revert attention to Ukrainian disrespect towards Western self-determination and referendum principles.

Judging from the study, TASS increased its coverage of the peninsula between February and the end of March, reminiscent of the successful “reunification,” expressed will for self-determination, and the resistance to the new Ukrainian nationalist authorities leading the coup. Articles published closer to 2014 contain a more detailed

FIGURE 1.

“Themes of Identified Narratives Mentioned in TASS”

description of Crimean disapproval of Ukrainian change of government. For example, a 2016 report about the Venetian local council in Italy pushing to recognize Russian Crimea and alleviate anti-Russian sanctions included a distinct reasoning for the peninsula’s international illegitimacy (“Italian regional council,” 2016). TASS journalists wrote that most Crimean residents are ethnically Russian and therefore deserving of self-determination because they “refused to recognize the legitimacy of authorities brought to power amidst riots during a coup in Ukraine in February 2014” (“Italian regional council,” 2016). The article continued to announce the results and the voter turnout for the referendum, recall Russia’s reunification treaty, and compare celebratory attitudes of Crimeans to the disapproval of the West, United Nations, and Ukraine (“Italian regional council,” 2016). In this article, TASS calls out Nikita Khrushchev for transferring “Russian land” to Ukraine in 1954 and questions the legitimacy of the Ukrainian claim to Crimea (“Italian regional council,” 2016). Articles between 2017 and 2021 appear to be less historically charged and thorough, often summarizing the “reunification” in a paragraph. However, all articles discussing Crimea, regardless of the publishing year, included referendum voter turnout and results statistics. Repeated rhetorical use of numbers can enforce a sense of formality and legitimacy, aimed to soften the public’s outlook on the occupation.

Medvedchuk and Communication with Russia

Western researchers and journalists must be careful when using TASS’s government quotes. Watanabe (2017a) observed that TASS’s greatest strength as a propaganda source is its seemingly objective style of writing that presents an opinion in a factual format (p. 226). Russian media and TASS use “gatekeeping bias,” or stories quoting Russian officials who condemn any Ukrainian criticism of the pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk (Watanabe, 2017a, p. 238). However, Watanabe fails to account for TASS’s frequent use of pro-Kremlin Ukrainian sources such as Viktor Medvedchuk and his commentary concerning the discrimination of the Russian language and the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. This paper finds that Medvedchuk appeared seven times throughout the investigation.

Ihor Hurak and Paul D’Anieri (2020) argue that the promotion of pro-Kremlin oligarch and Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk is one of the six Russian political tactics aimed to destabilize Kyiv (p. 1). Medvedchuk and his party Opposition Party – For Life encourage Ukrainian voters to support politicians willing to compromise with Russia. In turn, cooperation with the Kremlin will solve Ukraine’s domestic issues, including corruption, low pension payments, and general welfare concerns (Hurak & D’Anieri, 2020, p. 5). The Kremlin has been promoting Medvedchuk as a Ukrainian political figure since Leonid Kuchma’s presidential administration as a window for communication between Kyiv and Moscow officials (Hurak & D’Anieri, 2020, p. 6). Subsequently, state-media outlet TASS seeks to represent Medvedchuk as an initiator of an international dialogue. In March 2020, TASS reported on Medvedchuk’s unofficial visit to

Russia discussing cooperation with the Kremlin in the Normandy Four talks and the Minsk Agreements, both tailored to ensure conflict resolution in Donbas (“Several Ukrainian MPs,” 2020). While the Verkhovna Rada did not approve Medvedchuk’s statements or his trip, TASS presented to its English-speaking audiences that several prominent Ukrainian politicians called for cooperation with Russia. Moreover, Medvedchuk’s public support of Putin’s statements on diplomatic relations between “two brotherly nations” shows TASS’s gatekeeping bias framing the Ukrainian government’s interest in resolving the Donbas conflict under Russian terms (“Ukraine’s opposition politician,” 2019). TASS’s coverage of Medvedchuk’s concern over humanitarian issues alongside his frequent communication with the Kremlin suggests that TASS plays a significant role in Russia’s ‘hybrid warfare.’ Watanabe defines the political and media tactic as a non-military technique to “achieve military goals” (Watanabe, 2017a, p. 226).

The Fascist Coup and Genocide Against Russians Narrative

The 2014 coup is TASS’s most versatile narrative applied to articles about Western sanctions, justifying Crimean occupation, describing emerging nationalist chaos, or suggesting oppression of ethnic and linguistic minorities. Most importantly, the keyword “coup” appears most commonly in discussion on anti-Russian sanctions and Crimean annexation, which shift Russian guilt on to Ukraine. Based on the investigation results, the “coup d’état” narrative was more detailed and more robust in 2016 than in 2021. Articles such as Putin alleging NATO involvement in the Ukrainian student ‘protests as Euromaidan were more frequent than in recent years. (“Putin thinks West,” 2016). TASS quoted Putin’s speech characterizing the Ukrainian internal political conflict as a “bloodshed,” “civil war,” and intimidation tactic towards the Russian-speaking population (“Putin thinks West,” 2016). Throughout the five years, TASS characterized the events of 2014 as a “de-Russification” campaign seeking to overthrow Viktor Yanukovych’s regime (“Street musicians beaten,” 2021). In short, TASS diminished Ukrainian protests to an act of language discrimination, Russophobia, and radicalized nationalism. Languageconflict and the rise of Nazism are almost always consistent in the coup rhetoric.

The “Nazism” and “fascism” keywords annually reemerge on TASS between January 1st and 3rd while covering the birthday of a 20th-century Ukrainian nationalist, Stepan Bandera. Although Russian politicians often use these terms to describe the Ukrainian government and antiRussian protesters, TASS only provides historical context for their terminology in early January. Every year, TASS portrays the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) as Nazi collaborators that betrayed Soviet authorities and established a Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) (“Ukrainian nationalists stage,” 2019). Unlike the federal channels, TASS does not criticize the movement for its anti-Soviet ideology but instead condemns it for war crimes against the Polish population in the Volyn region, often interviewing Polish “community leaders’’ about the horrors of Ukrainian nationalism. Similarly, TASS only points out that Poland considers Bandera a terrorist in Poland (“Ukrainian nationalists stage,” 2019). TASS overemphasizes UPA’s military strength and terror over the Red Army, Soviet authorities, and the Communist party members (“Ukrainian nationalists stage,” 2019). Jade McGlynn’s research (2020) into domestic sources Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Perviy Kanal, and others contradicts TASS’s English-language framing of Bandera as he is seen less as an “internal enemy” and more as an anti-Western terrorist (p. 13). Bandera narratives may cast doubt in Ukrainian relations with its neighbors and seek to undermine the heritage of Ukrainian independence movements.

According to TASS, a vital framework of Ukrainian support of neo-Nazism and radical nationalism is Kyiv’s efforts to undermine Soviet achievements and offend the brotherly history. One such example is the separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate in 2018. Researchers at the King’s College London noted that TASS was a leading news source using “emotional and partisan language” when describing the schism (Ramsey and Robertshaw, 2019, p. 8). The topic of Ukraine disrupting its cultural legacy is one of the most persistent in the study, appearing five times between September 2018 and February 2020. One of the most passionate TASS reports denounced the Ukrainian church as a “so-called” Orthodox establishment. The article called the schism an unlawful seizure of property, mentioned the “2014 coup,” and discussed alleged attacks of Moscow church priests and bishops in the Rivne region (“Fourteen churches seized,” 2019).

Readers can find further emotionally charged journalism in TASS’s most recent article on the controversial topic featuring Putin. In an interview with TASS, the Russian president condemns Ukraine for misrepresenting the level of historical independence of the Ukrainian branch of the Moscow Patriarchate and for breaching cultural “cords that bind” Orthodox Christians together (“Putin says church rift,” 2020). As a result, domestic and Ukrainian publications RT, Vesti.ukr.com, Strana.ua, Podrobnosti.ua, Newsone.ua, 112 Ukraine, Korrespondent. net heavily replicated TASS’ “negative coverage” and “repackaged” Ukrainian news to fit a cultural rift narrative (Ramsey and Robertshaw, 2019, p. 8). Similar accusations of Ukrainian extremism appear in coverage of World War II celebrations on May 8th in Ukraine.

TASS Use of Right Sector Narrative

The most common use of the Right Sector narrative emerged during the 2014 presidential elections in Ukraine. TASS directly reported it five times throughout the study. Russian media strongly exaggerated the power and popularity of the newly formed Right Sector nationalist party in Ukraine. During this period, keywords such as “Russophobes, Nazis, and far-right nationalists” increased in Russian media (Uglvig, 2019, p. 45). Furthermore, TASS always mentions that the Right Sector is a “radicalized” and “extremist organization,” indirectly equating it to domestic terrorism (“Russian arrested in absentia,” 2017). Many domestic outlets portrayed the leader of the party, Dmytro Yarosh, as the next president of Ukraine. TASS featured a story of Yarosh for the first time on February 26, 2014, with the announcement of his party’s formation. Federal channels reported that Yarosh would win almost 37% of the popular vote, exposing a rift between western and eastern parts of the country (Uglvig, 2019, p. 45). However, only 0.7% of voters cast their ballot for Yarosh, and in upcoming parliamentary elections, his party did not meet the 5% threshold to have representation in the government (Umland, 2020, p. 251). TASS did not make exaggerated predictions of Yarosh’s victory. Instead, they suggested that Ukrainian society and government allowed a neo-Nazi and internationally wanted criminal to run for president.

TASS published the most detailed article on the Right Sector on September 30th, 2016. The agency reported on Russian officials investigating Yarosh, Andrey Tarasenko, Andrey Stempitsky, Valery Voronov, and Artyom Skoropadsky for extremist crimes against “Russian-speaking civilians’’ and Russian diplomatic staff (“Russia opens a criminal case,” 2016). TASS defined the Right Sector as a group of all organizations upholding the “ideology of radical Ukrainian nationalism, outspoken Russophobia and Nazism” (“Russia opens a criminal case,” 2016). The publication warned that the movement has over 5,000 militants gathered in the subgroups Tryzub, UNA-UNSO, Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya, UPA), Brotherhood, Social-National Assembly, White Hammer, Group S14, Carpathian Sich, and Ukrainian football fans (“Russia opens a criminal case,” 2016). Despite the large number of groups within the nationalist network, the study showed that TASS used only the Right Sector, Svoboda, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and National Court Groups after the first part of 2016 (“Russia opens a criminal case,” 2016). The article also emphasized that these nationalist groups were violent against ethnic minorities such as Jews and Tatars. However, there is an academic debate regarding the levels of Ukrainian nationalism. An expert on far-right activism in Eastern Europe inference that the Right Sector, Andreas Umland defined Ukrainian nationalism exclusively based on citizenship (Stern, 2015). Interestingly, the article did not characterize Russians as an ethnic minority in Ukraine, only mentioning an alleged abuse of “Russian-speakers” (“Russia opens a criminal case,” 2016).

Yarosh was an easy scapegoat for the Kremlin’s propaganda as he often called Russia an “eternal foe” and declared that war is “inevitable” between Ukraine and its neighbor (Najibullah, 2014). On one occasion, Yarosh promoted rebellion within Russia after asking Chechen warlord Doku Umarov to continue his fight against Moscow (Stern, 2015). A Moscow court arrested the nationalist in absentia, and Russian officials called on Interpol to apprehend him on account of incitement of terrorism. After his arrest notice, TASS mostly used Yarosh’s name in association with the Euromaidan protests, identified by TASS as “riots” (“Ukraine asks Russia for information,” 2014). TASS claimed that the Right Sector took an active part in the “deadly clashes” that resulted in over 100 deaths (“Ukraine asks Russia for information,” 2014). The Yarosh case study shows that TASS, like traditional RT and Perviy Kanal, concentrates on selecting antagonists to elevate Russian conduct in the public eye. In essence, Russia avoids addressing the situation by shifting its rhetoric to its Ukrainian counterparts. Olga Smirnova’s investigation (2020) shows similar patterns of “blame allocation” where she concluded that RT, in approximately 40% of reviewed broadcasts, and the channel directly blamed the E.U. for the migrant crisis and the rapid deterioration of European society (p. 224: fig. 5). Her analysis showed that Russian media promotes a sense of fear when discussing the E.U. through generalizations, avoidance, and stereotyping. In both instances of the presidential election and Euromaidan, the narrative of Yarosh in TASS evoked fear of the changing Ukrainian government. His last mention appeared on November 1, 2018, in a list of Russia-sanctioned individuals suggesting the shift of the “nationalist” narrative (“Russia introduces countermeasures,” 2018).

The “coup” and “riots” rhetoric seek to create instability and the illegitimacy of the current government. Combined with the notion of nationalism, the main Russian news agency often categorized Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelensky’s presidencies as “regimes’’ (“Ukraine’s opposition accuses,” 2019). Although one can interpret the Ukrainian government as a democratic or hybrid regime, the word “regime” in juxtaposition with Zelensky’s name implies authoritarianism that restricts the democratic liberties of its citizens (Tansey, 2013, p. 1170). Social media networks saw a similar wave of the accumulated toxic Ukrainian nationalism, which may shed light on Russia’s overall tactic involving the Right Sector and another staged coup. In 2016, researchers found several social media groups promoting the nationalist uprising, the so-called “Third Maidan,” from a Ukrainian perspective (Helmus et al., 2018). Thus, TASS seeks to identify Ukraine as an authoritarian regime vulnerable

to anarchic coups and power changes and incapable of international cooperation. WHY TASS CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED AS A SOURCE OF ANTI-UKRAINIAN RHETORIC TASS Paraphrases State-Media Narratives

TASS cited Russian state-media outlets 23 times throughout the research, with Kommersant, Rossiya 1, and Izvestia referenced 16 times together (Figure 2). The study showed that TASS articles appeared to have a stronger anti-Ukrainian narrative when citing Russian publications and federal TV channels. TASS has two formats of reciting other news outlets: Press Review and taking segments from Russian TV channels, predominantly interview fragments. Press Review is a daily overview of prominent Russian-language press publications such as Kommersant, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, and Izvestia. The influence of domestic propaganda narratives on Englishlanguage publications exposes Western audiences to Russian anti-Ukrainian perspectives in a more objective manner.

In the study of 11 Press Reviews, Izvestia, ranked as the most influential Russian pro-government newspaper in the country, appeared four times when discussing Donbas affairs and Ukraine-Russia relations (Moen-Larsen, 2019, p. 126). According to the Moen-Larsen 2019 study, Izvestia had the highest coverage of Russian international affairs, including content on Ukraine, compared to large newspapers Novaya Gazeta and Rossiyskaya Gazeta (p. 137). The researcher underlined the interconnectedness of narratives in Russian TV channels and newspapers, stating that Izvestia would be more likely to maintain pro-government coverage seen on TV. In two TASS articles, the newspaper promoted Rossotrudnichestvo, a Russian federal agency advancing international humanitarian cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo, 2021). In 2017, TASS paraphrased Izvestia’s article regarding Ukrainian nationalists’ provocations targeting the Russian diplomatic staff in Kyiv (“Press Review: Moscow’s response,” 2017). While summarizing, TASS journalists initiated a conspiracy theory stating that Ukrainian “radicals were planning something big” and violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations protocol (“Press Review: Moscow’s response,” 2017). Paraphrasing a Russian state-media source allows TASS to seemingly remain objective while delivering destabilizing conspiracy theories to the English-speaking audience. A literature review by Watanabe (2018) concluded that Russian publications often undermine Western democracies through conspiracies, especially via online outlets (p. 7). Therefore, TASS’s press review introduces greater Russian conspiracies about Ukraine by disassociating from the source.

TASS’s anti-Ukrainian narrative intensifies when the news agency quotes federal television hosts such as propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov from Rossiya-1 channel. Kiselyov hosts a weekly hour-long show Vesti Nedeli (News of the Week). He presents his radical and unsubstantiated opinions, while serving as the general director of another Russian news agency, Rossiya Segodnya (C. Cottiero et al., 2015, p. 3). The West sanctioned Kiselyov for his public support of Russian aggression in Ukraine, making him the only sanctioned journalist (C. Cottiero et al., 2015, p. 3). Through his teacher-like authoritative demeanor and narration, Kiselyov covers current events by evoking a strong emotion among his viewers (C. Cottiero et al., 2015, p. 4). In 2014, researchers defined Kiselyov’s coverage of the Ukrainian crisis as a tactic used to divert the audience’s attention from domestic issues (C. Cottiero et al., 2015, p. 6). Furthermore, a study into Kremlin and Kiselyov’s framing of current events in 2014 showed a growing influence over Google searches and Russian Internet users (C. Cottiero et al., 2015, p. 19). In 2019, TASS reported

FIGURE 2.

"Citations for Russian State-Media Outlets in TASS"

on Kiselyov’s “We Need to Talk” initiative, inviting Kyiv to chat with Moscow officials on the pro-Kremlin Ukrainian channel NewsOne (“Ukraine’s NewsOne TV,” 2019). TASS not only positively portrayed Kiselyov and Medvedchuk as initiators of dialogue between Russia and Ukraine but also condemned the Ukrainian government and “radicals” for threatening physical violence and “terrorism” against anyone seeking to discuss and resolve the Ukrainian crisis (“High treason case opens,” 2019). TASS’s incorporation of Rossiya-24, a branch of Rossiya-1 channel targeted at American audiences, also contributed to the proliferation of anti-Ukrainian conspiracies. TASS dedicated an entire article quoting a broadcast of the Rossiya-24 show which speculated about Petro Poroshenko’s religious affiliation with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church or the Greek Catholic Church (“Russian Orthodox Church uncertain,” 2018). Not only were their opinions factually unfounded, but TASS also continued to suggest that a non-Orthodox cannot push for the separation of the Ukrainian Church from the Russian Orthodox Church. Concisely, TASS uses its English-language platform to spread conspiracy theories and pro-government narratives among foreign audiences, a technique highly employed by Sputnik-style propaganda.

TASS Influences Micro-Publications

TASS and other state media had a significant role in contributing to the narrative of the Ukrainian plan to invade occupied territories. According to DFRLab findings, TASS quoted the self-proclaimed leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Denis Pushilin confirming that the Ukrainian army has prepared a “massive attack” (Osadchuk, 2021). To further the rhetoric, Russian state media such as Rossiya 24 and RIA News reported that a Ukrainian explosive killed a five-year-old boy in Donetsk (Osadchuk, 2021). The Organization for Security and Cooperation was unable to link the explosion to any presence of the Ukrainian army in the region. However, DFRLab’s investigation concluded that TASS falsified an interview with UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR) spokesperson Liz Throssell, who allegedly confirmed the child’s death on site. Micropublications such as UrduPoint, a Russia-leaning Pakistani source, cited that the quote originally appeared on Sputnik. Throssell has never made an official statement about the alleged tragedy, and none of the Google searches provide her original message outside of Russian media (Osadchuk, 2021). One of the articles investigated in the research, especially during the arrest of Ukrainian sailors in the Kerch Strait in November of 2018. Russian online publications alleged that the Ukrainian martial law imposed by Poroshenko was a sign of the Kyiv attack on Russia. TASS featured a piece from Nezavisimaya Gazeta discussing how “Washington pushes Kyiv towards war with Russia” (“Press review: US hawks,” 2018). Thus, the narrative of the Ukrainian invasion is not exclusive to known propaganda networks during the 2021 border conflict escalations but was in development as early as 2014. The presence of smaller pro-Russian Englishlanguage publications such as BRICS, only distributes and verifies domestic anti-Ukrainian sentiment. In April 2021, BRICS upheld the narrative that Ukraine and NATO were planning an invasion and provoking Russia on the border (Aleksejeva, 2021). The publication justified the deployment of over 100,000 Russian troops to the Russian southwest border, promoting the narrative as early as February 2021. DFRLab, the Atlantic Council’s disinformation branch, identified that the website, also referred to as alt news, was registered under a U.S. sanctioned media group (Aleksejeva, 2021). The narrative of the invasion of Donbas and Crimea spread to academic research publications such as GlobalResearch.ca and Before It’s News (Aleksejeva, 2021).

Although most prominent Western publications rejected the Russian narrative of an aggressive neighbor, TASS as an official news agency carries immense power to influence various micro-sources. As a part of a hybrid war, Russia seeks to create a net of sources that verify each other and repeat the same views. The repetition of headlines is not a uniquely Russian tactic, as Western publications such as The New York Times, CNN, and NPR often have similar content and titles for their news stories. However, if a publication adopts an entirely different spin on the situation, its credibility may be overshadowed by the reach of the other breaking news stories. Instinctually, people are more likely to trust repetition according to the illusory truth effect. The effect notes that real or fake statements are processed and accepted easier if repeated to a person despite their political affiliations (Pennycook et al., 2018, p. 1866). Thus, Russian sources repeating state-media viewpoints affect their growing international network of supporting websites.

TASS and Sputnik also do not use the “.ru” domain for their websites, which may further mislead Western audiences. According to Watanabe (2017), TASS is an integral part of Russian disinformation warfare as the developed “systematic bias” appears to be a stable narrative throughout the years (p. 226).

The article research results show that TASS also misleads readers by citing unknown or nonexistent news outlets. For example, on September 20, 2016, the state-run news agency reported Ukrainian party leader Yuliya Tymoshenko expressed her disappointment with Lviv residents calling for the return of ousted Viktor Yanukovych (“Ukrainian politician notes,” 2016). According to the alleged quote from a fake Ukrainian news publication News Daily, Tymoshenko said western Ukrainians believe that the new Ukrainian government launched a “systemic genocide” against the nation (“Ukrainian politician notes,” 2016). Both the quote and the publication are intractable online, but they show how

Russian English-language fake news disguised as a quote may sway the perception of certain Western audiences regarding Ukrainian instability. The issue of false quotes especially concerns the context of a news agency as Western publications view it as the only source of political statements from the Russian government.

Western Sources’ Careless Use of Russian News Agencies

Russian disinformation, often discussed in Western academia and media, still seeps through into the Western media sphere. Researchers from Rand Corporation investigated the influence of Russian “fake news” on American and E.U. media. Through misleading and purposely confusing polls surveying the French support of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), Rossiya Segodnya news agency reported that 15% of surveyed Frenchmen backed the terrorist state (Helmus et al., 2018). French online publications adopted both the infographic and poll results, leading to the American publication Vox and micropublications spreading the misleading news and dominating the Google search results relating to France and ISIS (Helmus et al., 2018). In 2016, Russianaffiliated media sources such as Sputnik convinced at least a quarter of Czechs that NATO planned an attack on Russia from non-consenting Eastern European countries (Helmus et al., 2018). Disturbingly, Reuters reported RT’s coverage of Euromaidan and Crimean annexation, falsely claiming that Ukrainians were endangering Russianspeaking minorities (Watanabe, 2018).

The three scenarios show the vulnerability of American and European media to sloppy journalism. Additionally, given Rossiya Segodnya’s negative reputation and extensive Western research into RT, it is concerning that TASS’s disinformation is less analyzed by journalists, think tanks, and ‘hybrid war’ commissions. Like Rossiya Segodnya, Sputnik, or RT, TASS has been growing its social media presence since 2013, although at a much slower pace. Much of Sputnik’s effective disinformation stems from its largely international audience (approximately 323,100 on Twitter and 1,407,246 on Facebook). Still, the absence of prolific social media presence cannot discount that TASS, despite its relative invisibility, appears a more credible source for Kremlin quotes and interviews (Twitter, 2021: Facebook, 2021). Precisely its non-publicly controversial appearance diverts journalists’ guard from the Russian statement bias. Anti-Ukrainian narratives and the creation of doubt is an overarching agenda among Russian English-language online media, despite different delivery methods. Alexsandr Fisher (2020) concluded that the American public, primarily disengaged in Ukrainian affairs, often picks up topics about human rights violations, completely disregarding the source (p. 291). Therefore, TASS features on Donbas civilian shelling, allegedly by the Ukrainian forces, can influence careless American or Western perception of Ukraine.

Why Ukraine Can’t Counteract These Russian Narratives

Another source of Ukrainian news for Englishspeaking audiences is Euronews, which launched in 1993 to present a united E.U. perspective on European affairs (Missiroli et al., 2016, p.11). Euronews offers TV, radio, and online newspaper programming. The All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) owns a significant portion of Euronews shares, despite the European Commission being the largest financial supporter of the publication. Between 2002 and 2015, VGTRK purchased 16.94% of shares, which led to several accusations of biased reporting within the Russianlanguage programming (Missiroli et al., 2016, p.11). During that period, the Euronews Russian service repeatedly misrepresented the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and the situation in Donbas. The Russian Euronews office described self-proclaimed Luhansk rebels as a “people’s militia” and a “people’s uprising” (Bunyak, Google Search, 2021). These articles are no longer available online. Like TASS’s coverage, the narrative avoids labels such as “separatists” when describing anti-Ukraine forces in Donbas.

In February 2013, a pro-Kremlin media magnate Dmytro Firtash acquired the Ukrainian Euronews service from Viktor Yanukovych’s ex-First Deputy Prime Minister, Valeriy Khroshkovskiy. The National Telecompany of Ukraine, the state television regulator, revoked the TV licensing of the Ukrainian branch (Gotev, 2015). Shortly after, Firtash abandoned the service due to lack of funding, leaving 17 Euronews journalists unemployed. The laid-off staff accused the online newspaper of ethnic discrimination and Russian favoritism, as Russian service refused to accept Ukrainian reporters citing “cultural differences” (Gotev, 2016). One of the journalists said that the European perspective in Euronews was “brutally disappearing” at the hands of the Russian state propaganda (Gotev, 2016). Ukrainian government officials such as parliamentarian Volodymyr Ariev supported former Euronews employees by reposting their petition and imploring the E.U. to charge the Russian editors with discrimination charges. Most importantly, Ariev and the journalists warned that the E.U.’s failure to employ Ukrainian writers would lead to an imbalanced coverage when covering the Russo-Ukrainian conflict (Homon, 2016).

Even though the Russian service is primarily in the Russian language, the E.U. does not sponsor the channel (European Court of Auditors, 2019, fig. 1). Euronews regional journalists are required to publish their content instead of simply translating the English version across 12 languages. As a result, stories systematically vary linguistically, rhetorically, and contextually. In 1998

research, Professor Marcel Machill’s analysis of the same stories in five different languages noted reporting style difference and variance in quantities of informational content (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 113). National biases within the pan-national publication can explain these differences as audiences require different amounts of background information (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 113). The research concluded that the Euronews network is plagued with “national viewpoints” only augmented with Russia’s financial stake in the company and lack of E.U. sponsorship to the service. Essentially, Russian channels and articles can curate any pro-Russian rhetoric curated under Euronews credibility. By missing the Ukrainian service, which would report from Kyiv, Euronews allows for the rise of Russian unregulated “national viewpoints.”

Ineffective Ukrainian Online Sources

The presence of English-language Ukrainian newspapers is invisible compared to Russian counterparts due to lack of government regulation, financing, oligarchic control, and Russian intervention. Online news agencies and other web newspapers emerged in response to Leonid Kuchma’s limitations on freedom of speech in the late 1990s. Like Russian Lenta and Gazeta, most web Ukrainian outlets started as one-person projects responding to the growing advertisement market and Kuchma administration’s bias. A Reporters Without Borders media monitor report showed that Ukrainian online outlets expanded faster than any other Eastern European post-Soviet nation (Reporters Without Borders [RSF], 2018a). However, the trend of online journalism slowed due to oligarchic control and investment in television networks and their websites, and social media (RSF, 2018a). According to the Media Ownership Monitor Ukraine project, Ukraine does not have registration requirements for online publications, which would allow for the increase of numerous unregistered outlets (RSF, 2018a). When a new online source emerges, the Ukrainian government cannot verify the site’s founders or obtain information about the origin of the project’s funding. Since most Ukrainian online websites are in Russian, it is easy to mistake a Russian web newspaper. Most importantly, a limited number of Ukrainian sites offer English programming, forcing Western audiences to rely on Russian coverage of Ukrainian events (RSF, 2018a). The most trusted Ukrainian online newspaper is Ukrainska Pravda, which was founded in April 2000 (RSF, 2018b). Unlike oligarch-owned media, Ukrainska Pravda belongs to Olena Prytula, a journalist with over 30 years of experience. Prytula witnessed the deaths of her cofounder Georgy Gongadze in September 2000 and her civil husband Pavlo Sheremet, a prominent Ukrainian journalist, in 2016 (RSF, 2018c). The website is available to Russian and English-speaking readers, but only selected articles are translated from Ukrainian. The project best describes Ukrainian inefficiency in the market as an “informational ghetto created by its own oligarchs” (RSF, 2018a).

Ukrainian English-language news agencies expressing national interests are underdeveloped and often overlooked. Kyiv has six news agencies: Ukrinform, Interfax-Ukraine, Ukrainski Novyny (also known as Ukrainian News Agency or Ukranews), UNIAN, RBCUkraina, and LigaBusinessInform. Most agencies have limited available information or academic research regarding their biases, ownership, and outreach. Of the six, Ukrinform is the only state-controlled outlet offering programming in Ukrainian, Russian, English, Spanish, and German. Ukraine’s Institute of Mass Information (IMI) ranked the agency the most reliable outlet, citing over 95% of factual reporting in 2020 (“IMI Склав Список,” 2021). As of March 2021, Ukrinform published the second greatest number of updates on the situation in Crimea concerning international support, human rights, and speeches made by Kyiv and Moscow (Institute of Mass Information [IMI], 2021). However, the news agency has less of a professional appearance demonstrated in disorganized website design and frequent grammatical errors in English. Ukrinform has no prominence in Western publications such as The New York Times, which have only used information from the agency six times in the entire archive. Meanwhile, the American newspaper quoted TASS about 875 times relating to Ukrainian news. Thus, despite the seeming credibility of the news agency, Ukrinform cannot compete with TASS’s reach in the English language Eastern European news market.

Ukrainian Independent Information Agency of News or UNIAN is a prime example of both oligarchic control and the shadow of investment into Ukrainian TV channels. The news agency is a part of the 1+1 Media Group owned by media magnate Ihor Kolomoyskyi (RSF, 2018d). Kolomoyskyi, a member of the Dnepropetrovsk oligarch clan, purchased the 1+1 Media Group in 2010 and gained ownership of UNIAN (RSF, 2018d). As a regional politician, Kolomoyskyi committed several acts of corruption from 2014 to 2015, and U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken banned him from ever entering the U.S. in March 2021 (Blinken, 2021). Furthermore, the Ukrainian government launched an investigation into oligarchs’ media holdings. They discovered that pro-Russian opposition leader Viktor Medvedchuk indirectly owns 57.95% shares of Studio 1+1, a company within 1+1 Media Group (IMI, 2020). It is not clear in research how involved Russia is in the company. Like Ukrinform, American publication The Washington Post mentioned the news agency 13 times more than TASS’s 126 results.

Media conglomerates Ukrainski Novyny, InterfaxUkraine, and RBC-Ukraina, are affiliated with Russian sponsorship. Dmytro Firtash, former owner of Ukrainian

service of Euronews, and Serhiy Livichkin, ex-head of the Yanukovych administration, own Ukrainski Novyny under the controversial Inter Media Group (Ianitsky, n.d.). Since 2015, approximately 29% of Inter Media Group belongs to Russian Perviy Kanal (RSF, 2018a).

Established in 1992, the Interfax-Ukraine has been a Ukrainian extension of the Interfax Russian news agency. While the Institute for Mass Information concluded that generally, Ukrainian journalists operate both Interfax-Ukraine and RBC-Ukraina, media scholars must conduct additional research into Russian sponsorship and news coverage (Hovolenko & Holub, 2018). In 2014, Interfax-Ukraine adopted the Russian narrative by labeling Crimean annexation as “Crimea’s reunification with Russia’’ (“Tiraspol calls Crimea’s,” 2014). Articles “Tiraspol calls Crimea’s reunification with Russia just” and “Economic Policy: Medvedev’s Russia’s Reunification with Crimea Not a Subject to Revision’’ both describe the Crimean occupation as “reunification” (2014). Both articles disregarded the widely accepted “annexation” term, undermining the Ukrainian position in the conflict. Although most current Interfax-Ukraine articles embrace the use of “annexation,” on several occasions, such as January 1st, 2020, the Ukrainian news agency used Russian media rhetoric to describe Crimean status (Interfax-Ukraine, 2020). PRO-RUSSIAN UKRAINIAN ONLINE OUTLETS

The Russian takeover of Ukrainian channels and online portals 112 Ukraine (112.international or 112.ua), NewsOne, and the ZIK network is the most striking finding. TASS mentioned Ukrainian sources eight times but only quoted Ukrainian state-owned platforms once throughout the investigation (Figure 3). From 2018 to 2019, deputies from Viktor Medvedchuk’s opposition party purchased three TV channels and related websites. Ukrainian officials launched an investigation into the outlets, concluding that most of the financing stemmed from Russia-backed Medvedchuk. Pro-Russian sponsors such as the one mentioned earlier, discussed Dmytro Firtash concealed Russian sources such as Strana.ua, NewsOne, Vesti.ua, Inter, and NTN as fully Ukrainian (Hurak & D’Anieri, 2020, p. 6). The pseudo-Ukrainian channels often augment Russian narratives suggesting that Ukrainian elections are illegitimate and purposely mislead international election observers’ opinion. Hurak and D’Anieri surveyed the Kerch Strait incident in November 2018, analyzing the portrayal of the incident by both Russian and “Ukrainian” media outlets. These sources reported that the 30-day military emergency status was a hoax orchestrated by former President Petro Poroshenko to delay upcoming elections (p. 6). Their research concluded that the incident brought a “blurry” confusion regarding Kerch Strait escalations, both domestically and internationally (Hurak & D’Anieri, 2020, p. 6).

While Zelensky banned 112 Ukraine in February 2021, the channel’s English-language website became a consistent source of Ukrainian news for Western audiences. Before the ban, 112 Ukraine most frequently appeared in simple “Ukrainian news” Google searches. The website features no ads and follows a professional journalistic style, equivalent to one of TASS. The data survey shows that TASS often references interviews conducted by the pro-Russian news network alongside NewsOne. In 2017, TASS used both selective and gatekeeping biases to suggest that former Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Groisman criticized Western representation in the Ukrainian government. Groisman’s quote, obtained from an equally misleading article by 112 Ukraine, emphasized that reforms in Ukrainian society must be determined by Ukrainian citizens, referencing several Russian and proRussian deputies in the Verkhovna Rada. Instead, both TASS and 112 Ukraine paraphrased the interview clip to

FIGURE 3.

"Ukrainian Media Use by TASS"

insinuate that Ukrainian citizens were growing tired of only appointing Western foreigners to power following the “coup” in 2014 (“Ukrainian PM Says,” 2017).

A report conducted by Ramsay and Robertshaw also noted 112 Ukraine’s coverage of the Independence Day of Ukraine Parade in 2018. According to the study, proRussian Ukrainian websites cited radical Ukrainian politicians reposted by TASS (Ramsay and Robertshaw, 2019, p. 96). Pro-Russian outlets in Ukraine misinform the Ukrainian public and dominate the English-language Ukraine information market, eliminating actual Ukrainian voices from Western discussions. Furthermore, they provide a convenient “Ukrainian source” necessary to create an objective image for Russian news agencies such as TASS.

CONCLUSION Expanding Study of Disinformation in International Affairs

Russian disinformation campaigns covering Ukraine have severe implications for expanding ‘hybrid warfare’ tactics across the globe. While the international security field allocates vast resources to counteract Russian physical hegemony, equivalent policy focus must emerge addressing Russian disinformation. Recent discussions by the Group of Seven (G7) format in May 2021 only further confirm the growing worldwide concern over the divisive influence of Russian propaganda and fake news. As a large and growing news agency, TASS holds tremendous power in the Eastern European news market, stopping the flow of factual information from the region. By casting doubt over states such as Hungary, Austria, Poland, and the U.S., Russia seeks to discredit the Western legislative and economic support of Ukraine. Moreover, future studies must juxtapose TASS to its Western competitors.

The historical evaluation of TASS revealed that the news agency recently mobilized its worldwide outreach, consistent with the timelines of other disinformation online outlets such as Sputnik. TASS’s ideological shift between the fall of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 is consistent with the government adjustment of independent news websites through pro-Kremlin private ownership. Given TASS’s partial credibility for Kremlin government statements, the news agency remains a necessary evil for Western publications. Careless Western reporting may advance anti-Ukrainian narratives to cast doubt on the unilateral condemnation of Crimean annexation and Russian aggression in Donbas. Researchers must conduct an additional historicalcomparative study between TASS’s reporting style and rhetoric in the early 2000s up to 2015 to evaluate the state’s propagandistic agenda. This research identified eight repeated themes regularly reported on in TASS: (1) disruptive Ukrainian nationalism, (2) unstable Ukrainian government susceptible to the coup, (3) Kyiv’s responsibility for anti-Russian sanctions, (4) Crimea is Russia, (5) proRussian politicians seek to solve the Donetsk conflict, (6) Ukrainian economy needs close cooperation with Russia, (7) Ukrainians disrespect Soviet legacy, and (8) the language-conflict promotes Russophobia in Ukraine. Approximately ten articles of 120 surveyed reports had no anti-Ukrainian narrative, often describing upcoming events, negotiations, or meetings. The topic of nationalism is the most prevalent of TASS’s descriptions of Ukrainian society uniformly, including keywords such as Right Sector, radicals, terrorists, extremists, regime, neoNazis, and fascists. For most of the “nationalism” stories, TASS expressed “gatekeeping bias” by quoting strongly anti-Ukrainian politicians, Russian TV personalities, and misleading polls. However, TASS also portrayed “statement bias” by providing a historical background written by the news agency’s journalists featuring a onesided historical overview of 20th-century Ukrainian nationalism. Given TASS’s historical background as a Soviet news distributor, a narrative study within a more credible Russian outlet such as The Moscow Times would allow for a full assessment of the Russian international media market.

Another significant observation is TASS’s incorporation of Russian federal TV channels and newspapers in its news coverage. The research found that the most referenced TV channel was Rossiya 1, a network associated with the director of another news agency Rossiya Segodnya. The news agency owns other propaganda networks such as Sputnik and RT targeted at Western audiences. Western journalists and disinformation studies scholars must expand their Sputnik and RT warnings onto TASS. The study found that TASS displays a stronger anti-Ukrainian narrative when paraphrasing Russian state newspapers such as Kommersant, Izvestia, and Rossiyskaya Gazeta. TASS reports, compiled in a Press Review, were more emotionally charged, and displayed an increased amount of anti-Ukrainian keywords.

The research proposes a hypothesis that TASS is growing a network of micro-publications reposting Russian coverage of world news. By establishing a network, the Kremlin can misinform smaller communities or establish a sense of credibility globally. Further research into small publications such as UrduPoint and BRICS could illustrate TASS’s reach to local American or European audiences. Meanwhile, TASS’s short-lived presence on social media requires monitoring, like Sputnik and RT, to prevent the spread of politically charged “fakes.” Further disinformation studies should investigate the Russian reporting on the Covid-19 pandemic and assess its space in post-Soviet countries. Another study into Russian domestic and international coverage during an active conflict such as the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the 2015 Donbas escalations, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh, or April

2021 military escalations on the Ukrainian border could show that the Kremlin uses narratives to prepare its population for Russian military campaigns abroad.

The troubling segment of the research is the analysis of Ukrainian media institutions and their invisibility in the Eastern European news market. European media such as Euronews closed its Ukrainian office entrusting Russian journalists with coverage of the broader region. Additionally, the Russian financial backing of Euronews and several Ukrainian news agencies is another gateway for the Russian anti-Ukrainian narrative. Another observation showed that Ukrainian news agencies are several underfunded and do not match TASS journalistic appeal. Critically acclaimed sources are unable to support a consistent stream of English programming. Oligarchic ownership reserves sponsorship for the development of domestic TV channels for marginal profits. Russia also camouflages its publications in Ukraine by using the Russian language, Ukrainian domains, and no foreign website registration law in Ukraine. The three recently banned sources, 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and Zik TV, are only a minor reflection of Russian control within Ukrainian media. The lack of substantial academic research into Ukrainian media suggests the large gap in modern counteraction of disinformation warfare. Kyiv policymakers must address the weak Ukrainian media front and consider the effects of Russian disinformation on their international appearance.

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About the Author

Kateryna Stepanenko is an alumna of the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University Class of 2021. Natively from Kyiv, Ukraine, Kateryna focused her academic and professional career investigating the implications of Russian hybrid and information warfare in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. She presently researches Russian war in Ukraine, Russian military advances, and the Kremlin’s domestic information space conditioning aimed at justifying war efforts. Kateryna was a GW Hatchet staff writer and a member of the Sigma Iota Rho International Affairs Honor Society during her time at GW.

Mentor Details

Dr. Richard Robin is the Director of the Russian Language Program and a Professor of Russian and International Affairs at the George Washington University. Dr. Robin received his Ph.D. in Slavic linguistics from the University of Michigan. Dr. Robin focuses on Russian language teaching, publishing several widely used Russian language and proficiency-based textbooks. Dr. Robin served as the senior researcher at the National Capital Language Resource Center, and taught at University of New Mexico, State University College at Oswego, and Middlebury College.